TIJAM V.

SIBONGHANOY
G.R. No. L-21450
April 15, 1968
Dizon, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Subject Matter JurisdictionOriginal (Exclusive/Concurrent)
SUMMARY: Tijams filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibonghanoys, who then filed
a counter bond with Manila Surety. Judgment was in favour of Tijams and a writ of execution
was issued against the Sibonghanoys. Tijams moved for writ of execution against Surety which
was granted. Surety moved to quash this but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the
issue on lack of jurisdiction. CA affirmed CFI decision. Surety filed to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction because the Judiciary Act of 1948 became effective a month before filing the
petition for recovery. The Act placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all
civil actions for demands not exceeding P2000 exclusive of interest. CA referred the case to SC,
as it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in
issue. SC affirmed CFI and ruled that Surety was estopped by laches as 15 years had elapsed
before it raised the issue of jurisdiction.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: The CA set aside its affirmation of the orders for the
writs of execution issued by the Cebu CFI, and certified this case to the SC.
FACTS: Jul.19, 1948: Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced an action in the Cebu
CFI against Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover P1,908 with legal interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. A writ of
attachment was issued against the Sibonghanoys properties, but this was dissolved upon filing
of a counter-bond by the Sibonghanoys and Manila Surety.
CFI: in favor of the Tijamsthis became final and executor. Upon motion of the Tijams, CFI
issued a writ of execution against the Sibonghanoys. This was unsatisfied, so the Tijams moved
for issuance of a writ of execution against the counter-bond. The Surety filed a written
opposition for failure to prosecute and absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of
the amount due under the judgment. The Surety prayed for denial of the motion for execution on
the counter-bond and the granting of affirmative relief of the Suretys liability under the bond.
CFI denied this, as no previous demand had been made on the Surety for satisfaction of the
judgment. The demand was made, but it failed, so the Tijams filed another motion for execution
against the counter-bond. On the day of the hearing, CFI, upon motion of the Surety's counsel,
granted the Surety 5 days to answer the motion. It failed, so the Court granted the motion for
execution and issued another writ.
The Surety moved to quash, claiming the writ was issued without the required summary hearing
as provided in Sec.17, Rule 59 of the RoCthis was denied, so the Surety appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the orders being appealed. 5 days after receiving notice of the decision, the
Surety asked for a time extension to file an MR. CA granted this. Jan.12the Surety filed a
motion to dismiss, as a month before the action was filed in the CFI, the Judiciary Act of 1948
took effect, placing within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions
where the value of the subject-matter or demand does not exceed P2000, exclusive of interest
and costs, so the CFI had no jurisdictionraising this ground for the first time. The CA required
the Tijams to answer this, but they did not, so the CA set aside its decision and certified the
case to the SC.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The Judiciary Act of 1948 had already become effective. Sec. 88
of this placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the

Bries

CASE #1

value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive
of interest and costs, so the Cebu CFI had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: The Surety should be barred from raising lack of jurisdiction
after 15 years had passed, especially after it had already submitted to the CFIs jurisdiction.
ISSUES: Should the case be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction?
HELD: No. The Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea. 15 years had elapsed
before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party
may be estopped from raising a questionin this case, by laches. Laches is failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. After voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late to question the jurisdiction of the
court, as this would lead to the practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Bries

CASE #1

HENRY SY V. COSLAP & FENINA MINA

G.R. NO. 140903
12 SEPTEMBER 2001
DE LEON, JR., J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION; ORIGINAL; SUPREME COURT; ORIGINAL
SUMMARY: Mina filed a case with COSLAP against allegedly unlawful occupants. Henry Sy, the manager of SM
Fairview was subpoenaed even though he found no reason for him to be involved. COSLAP ordered the denial
Sys motion for Special Appearance for dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Sy filed a case in the SC
assailing COSLAPs order. The SC ruled that the case be referred to the CA. Sy should have stated in his
petition the special and important reasons for the SC to bypass the hierarchy of the courts.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, praying for the annulment of an Order dated November 3, 1999 issued by the public
respondent Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
FACTS
Mina purchased from the late Camilo Osias and Avelina Lorenzana properties consisting of five (5) parcels
of land situated in Quezon City. A deed of absolute sale was perfected and the title of the previous owners
were delivered to her.
Subsequently, she sojourned in another country. Upon her return, she finds out that said properties where
occupied by certain persons, who held titles over the lands.
On July 15, 1999, Mina filed a letter-complaint before public respondent COSLAP, a quasijudicial agency,
requesting it to settle her land dispute by annulling the titles of the occupants.
Petitioner Henry Sy, the manager was subpoenaed, so as to make him appear in the mediation proceedings
for the settlement of the abovementioned dispute.
A Motion for Special Appearance was filed by Sys counsel for dismissal of the letter-complaint on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. COSAP filed an order denying the motion. Sy assails this order in the case at bar.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: COSLAPs jurisdiction under EO 561 and EO 292 is limited to land problems or disputes
involving small settlers or landholders and members of cultural communities and other land problems on disputes which are
critical or explosive in nature involving lands of the public domain. (May iba pang arguments pero di naman ito yung issue
so di ko na linagay)
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: Motion for Special Appearance is inconsistent with the purpose of which this Commission
was created, i.e., as a means of providing effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general,
which are frequently the sources of conflict among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.

ISSUE/HELD: WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to try this case. -NO
RATIO
The Court has original and appellate jurisdiction. It has original jurisdiction to issue writs, such as certiorari
and mandamus, but this jurisdiction is concurrent with other courts, such as the RTC and the CA.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs
an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. The
hierarchy of courts should still apply.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should only be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy, which Sy did not comply with.
The Court reaffirms this policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it
perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of the litigants, causing over-crowding in the Courts docket.
Furthermore, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which supplanted Revised
Administrative Circular 195, provides that. This rule [Decisions and orders of voluntary arbitrators are
appealable to the CA] shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
No convincing reason exists why appeals from the COSLAP should be treated differently from other quasijudicial agencies whose orders, resolutions or decisions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals
RULING: The instant petition is hereby referred to the Court of Appeals for resolution under Rule 43.
CABALLA

CABALLA

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME vs. NLRC and BIENVENIDO G.R. NO. 130866
ARICAYOS
16 SEPTEMBER 1998
REGALADO, J.
T OPIC IN SYLLABUS: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION; ORIGINAL; SUPREME COURT; ORIGINAL
SUMMARY: After the labor arbiter decided in favor of St. Martin Funeral Home, the respondent appealed the case to the
NLRC set aside the questioned decision and remanded the case to the LA. Petitioner brought the case to the SC on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in favoring the respondents. SC held that NLRC cases
should not be brought directly to the SC but instead be appealed to the Court of Appeals first, citing the legislative
history of RA 7902 which removed the prohibition on appeals of NLRC decisions to the Court of Appeals. Such was
done in order to decrease the number of labor cases which clog the dockets of the Supreme Court by allowing them to
achieve finality or at least finality of the factual findings before the labor cases reach the SC.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein
private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
FACTS
Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home.
There was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi monthly payroll. He was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita
Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home. They claim that the private respondent asked for financial
assistance form the mother of Amelita and since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
When Amelita took over the management of the business, she discovered that there were arrears in the payment of
taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita
then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. Private respondents filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment.
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. Private respondent appealed to the
NLRC.
NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC
for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The remedy is to appeal by certiorari directly to the Supreme Court, hence the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over the present case.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
ISSUE/HELD: WON the Supreme Court should acquire jurisdiction to try this case given that it is an appeal of a decision
of the NLRC. -NO
RATIO
To allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the
evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are
correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal
appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions.
There is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times
been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the
Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component
divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of
constitutional protection to labor.
All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court
are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all
such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
DE MESA, E.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an
oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine,
Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme
Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have
reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.

RULING: under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent
records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent
with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

DE MESA, E.

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT V. CA
G.R. NO. 75919
MAY 7, 1987
GANCAYCO., J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION; ORIGINAL; SUPREME COURT; ORIGINAL
SUMMARY: Petitioners Manchester Development filed an action for damages and specific performance
against the Private Respondents Cityland Development Corporation et al. Upon filing, the petitioners paid a
docket fee of only P410, although the damages alleged amounted to P78,000,000. Subsequently it was found
that the fee was under-assessed. CA said docket fee should be based on the amount of damages alleged in
the original complaint. Petitioners contended that the fee must be based on the amended complaint. Court
held that The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint and not in the amended complaint. Also, a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Finally, The Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. Wag kuripot sa docket
fees.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: MR of the resolution of the Second Division of Jan 28, 1987
(presumably) upholding the decision of the CA which held that the docket fees should be based on the original
complaint. (Unsure of lower court decisions; not mentioned in case)
FACTS
Petitioners Manchester Development filed an action for torts and damages and specific performance against
the Private Respondents Cityland Development Corporation et al. Upon filing, the petitioners paid a docket fee
of only P410, based on the consideration that the action was only for specific performance. Subsequently it
was found that the fee was under-assessed: The original complaint did not dictate the amount of damages in
the prayer, but such amount was found in the body amounting to roughly P78,000,000. Thereafter, an
amended complaint was filed but it removed all mention of damages. The court conducted an investigation,
and deemed that the proper docket fee should be much higher, based on the damages alleged in the original
complaint. Petitioners contended that the filing fee must be based on the amended complaint.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The docket fee must be based on the (amount of damages alleged in the)

amended complaint. The petitioners heavily relied on Magaspi v. Ramolete.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: The docket fee must be based on the original complaint.

ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WoN the docket fees should be based on the amount alleged in the amended complaint (NO)
(2) WoN the amended complaint should be admitted. (NO)
RATIO
The petitioners hinged on Magaspi v. Ramolete to support the contention. That case however, had different
facts as compared to the present case.
(1) The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
damages. --- The present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance, and prayer for
TRO.
(2) In the Magaspi case, there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action. The action for
damages in that case were treated mainly (incidental? Word is missing from the case) from the main action. --In the present case, there is no such difference of opinion: it is clearly an action for damages and specific
performance. The P410 payment on the basis that the action was merely for specific performance is clearly
erroneous.
In the Magaspi case, the amount was based on the amended complaint on the basis that the wrongful payment
was the result of an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee, and that, in
any case, the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter were proper and
regular. The court reversed this holding in the Magaspi case: failure to pay the proper docket fee means that
the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case, since for all legal purposes there was no such original
GASTANES

complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the court are null and void.
The court declared that, in lieu of the practice of counsel in the case in attempting to evade the payment of
docket fees, that all complaints petitions, answers, and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading which fails to comply with this shall
not be accepted nor admitted.
Leche si Gancayco ang gulo mag sulat.

RULING: MR denied.

GASTANES

SUN INSURANCE v. ASUNCION

G.R. NOS. 79937-38
1989 FEBRUARY 13
GANCAYCO, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Subject Matter Jurisdiction Original (Exclusive/Concurrent) Supreme
Court
SUMMARY: Private respondent Tiong filed a complaint for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Sun Insurance. The prayer in the complaint
did not quantify the amount of damages sought, but the amount could be inferred from the body
of the complaint to be about P50M. Only P210.00 was paid by Tiong as docket fee. Tiong then
filed amended and supplemental complaints, and was reassessed additional docket fees. Tiong
paid a total of P182,824.90 as docket fee. Sun Insurance insists that the amount should be
P257,810.49, and that because the proper fees had not been paid, Tiongs complaint should be
dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.
Petition dismissed. Clerk of Court of court a quo instructed to reassess and determine the
additional filing fee, and to require Tiong to pay the deficiency, if any. A more liberal
interpretation of the rules is called for considering that unlike Manchester, Tiong demonstrated
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. It is not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: SIOLs petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning
respondent J. Asuncions Order admitting Tiongs amended complaint, was denied elevated
to SC by SIOL
FACTS:
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a complaint for the consignation of a premium refund
on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for judicial declaration of its nullity against Manuel
Uy Po Tiong. Tiong was declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the
reglementary period.
Tiong later likewise filed a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against SIOL and two additional defendants later included. The
prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought, but the
amount could be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about P50M (actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, expenses of
litigation, costs of suit). Only P210.00 was paid by Tiong as docket fee.
Tiong filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer, he asked to be awarded no less
than P10M as actual and exemplary damages. However, in the body of the complaint,
the amount of his pecuniary claim was approx. P44,601,623.70. This amended
complaint was admitted and Tiong was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00
based on his prayer of not less than P10M in damages, which he paid.
o SIOL filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning J. Asuncions Order
admitting the amended complaint.
Tiong then also filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20M in
damages so that his total claim was approx. P64,601,620.70. Seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, he paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00.
o CA rendered decision denying SIOLs petition.

[LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.]

[CASE #05]

After the promulgation of the decision of the CA, and during the pendency of the present
petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester (infra), Tiong paid an additional docket
fee of P62,132.92.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: While Tiong indeed paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the
docket fee, considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental
complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70 SIOL insists that Tiong must pay a docket fee
of P257,810.49. The complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom annulled.
Cited Manchester Devt Corp. v. CA: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of
the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: Manchester cannot be retroactively applied to this case. At the
time of filing, there was no Manchester ruling yet.
Magaspi v. Ramolete instead applies: Court held that TC acquired jurisdiction even if the
docket fee was insufficient.
ISSUE: WON a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper
docket fee has not been paid
HELD: Petition DISMISSED. Clerk of Court of court a quo instructed to reassess and determine
the additional filing fee that should be paid by Tiong considering the total amount of the claim
sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint, and to require Tiong to pay the
deficiency, if any.

The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
[The SC goes through the history/relevant jurisprudence. The rulings in the cases
mentioned were similar, holding that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act
on a petition or complaint. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. A case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.]
SC says the principle in Manchester could be applied in the present case. The pattern
and intent to defraud the government of the docket fee is obvious not only in the filing of
the original complaint, but also in the filing of the amended complaint.
o However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the
case was decided. Due to the fraud committed on the government, the SC held
that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and the amended
complaint could not have been admitted as the original was null and void.
o In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that unlike Manchester, Tiong demonstrated willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The
promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had a sobering influence
on Tiong who thus paid the additional docket fees as ordered.
SIOLs contention that the docket fee paid was insufficient is a matter which the
clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerkin-charge should determine. Thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must
require Tiong to pay the same.

[LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.]

[CASE #05]

SC summarizes its ruling as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee.

[LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.]

[CASE #05]

EULALIA RUSSEL et al. V. RTC JUDGE VESTIL, ADRIANO TAGALOG et. al.
MARCH 17, 1999

G.R. No. 119347

KAPUNAN, J.

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Subject Matter Jurisdiction -> RTC

SUMMARY: Some legal heirs of a parcel of land discovered a document for partition over said
land executed only by the other heirs. An action for declaration of nullity and partition was filed
before the RTC. RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction since the land was valued at
Php5,000.00 which was cognizable by the MTC. The SC however ruled that the action was
primarily for declaration of nullity of a document thus it was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The RTC properly had jurisdiction over the case.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Certiorari to set aside the Order dated January
12, 1995 issued by respondent Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on ground of lack of jurisdiction
FACTS: Spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho owned a parcel of land in Liloan,
Compostela, Cebu. Upon the death of the spouses, the property was inherited by their seven
children which eventually passed on to some of the grandchildren upon the death of six. The
property remained undivided. However, herein petitioners (all grandchildren) later discovered a
public document ("DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS
ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION") where they took no part in and where they were not
declared as legal heirs. They then filed an action against private respondents (one child, all the
rest grandchildren) for "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION" before the RTC of
Mandaue City asserting that the document was false and perjurious. The RTC however
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The RTC had jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which
is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Sec. 19(l) of B.P. 1291, as
amended.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: The RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the
total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under Sec. 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 76912 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela.

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed valuedoes not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

[DINO-POBLETE, MA. KATRINA LORIS]

[CASE NO. 06]

ISSUE/HELD: WON the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation so that the RTC has the
proper jurisdiction YES
RATIO:
Singsong v. Isabella Sawmill: Criterion in determining whether an action is one where
the subject matter is not capable of pecuniary estimation: nature of the principal action
or remedy sought.
o Capable of pecuniary estimation: primarily for the recovery of a sum of money
(whether MTC or RTC would depend on the amount of the claim.)
o Not capable of pecuniary estimation: the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought (cognizable exclusively by RTC).
Examples: specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or
annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,
annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for
rescession, which is a counterpart of specific performance.
In this case: The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and
void the document. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this
is just incidental to the main action. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein

[DINO-POBLETE, MA. KATRINA LORIS]

[CASE NO. 06]

MALANA v. TAPPA
G.R. NOS. 79937-38
September 17, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Subject Matter Jurisdiction Original (Exclusive/Concurrent) Regional
Trial Court
SUMMARY: Dispute over property where petitioners claimed ownership over subject property,
which respondents refused to vacate. Petitioners inherited subject property from Anastacio
Danao, who allowed Consuelo Pauig, relative of respondents, to build on and occupy the
southern portion, under the condition that they vacate the land when Anastacio and his heirs
might need it. Dubious documents presented by respondents to support their claim of ownership
over the property created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property, prompting the filing of a
complaint before the RTC, the principal cause of which was for quieting of title. RTC dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Issue revolves around the jurisdiction of the RTC under
Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, and under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by
Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of
jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners in Civil Case No. 6868
FACTS:
Petitoners Carmen Danao Malana, et al. alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners
of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937situated
in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
Petitioners claim that they own the subject property in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, through
inheritance from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio). Anastacio died intestate, and, during his
lifetime, had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo) to build on and occupy the southern
portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate
the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.
Petitioners aver that respondents Benigno Tappa, et. al, who were family members of
Consuelo, continued to occupy the subject property even after her death, built their
residences thereupon using permanent materials, and claimed ownership over the subject
property.
Petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the property, but respondents refused.
According to petitioners, documents presented by respondents to support their claim of
ownership were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of
ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners
title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to
remove such cloud from their title.
Petitioners additionally sought in their Complaint an award against respondents for actual
damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latters baseless claim over the
subject property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil
Code on Human Relations. Petitioners likewise prayed for an award against respondents for
exemplary damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith
and resorted to unlawful means to establish their claim over the subject property. Finally,
petitioners asked to recover from respondents P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, because the
latters refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to engage the services of a
lawyer.
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May
2007 dismissing petitioners Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC
referred to Republic Act No. 7691, amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real

[VICENCIO, SOLOMON G.]

[CASE #07]

actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found
that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to
recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC dismissed. Petitioners
thereafter filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed for the
setting aside of the RTC Orders dismissing their complaint. RTC denied the motion.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: In the MR, petitioners argued that their principal cause of action
was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek
complete relief from respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed,
since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
RTC ARGUMENT: In denying the MR, RTC reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real
action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises
exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property does not
exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 0248386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the complaint motu proprio
HELD: Petition DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October
2007 of the Regional Trial Court ofTuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered
to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the court of proper
jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a
will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.
The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the
validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties
thereunder.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63, Section 1, which provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article
1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.
As the provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
The second paragraph, meanwhile, specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation
of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action

[VICENCIO, SOLOMON G.]

[CASE #07]

to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to
consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to
repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because
they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the
need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.
Above provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, which states:
o Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: x x x
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to
quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may, which denotes that
the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an
option.
Judiciary Reorganization Act, meanwhile, uses the word shall and explicitly requires
the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00.
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in the Tax
Declaration is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and
possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC,
not the RTC.jurisdiction.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. The purpose of an
action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights
and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed or contract for their guidance
in the enforcement thereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof.
A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that
have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies
the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a
repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action
for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action.
In the present case, the case for quieting of title was filed after Danao heirs already
demanded, and Tappa refused to vacate the subject property. Since the heirs had
already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is
the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory
relief.

[VICENCIO, SOLOMON G.]

[CASE #07]

An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property
involved. Given that the property is only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has
jurisdiction over an action to recover the same.

[VICENCIO, SOLOMON G.]

[CASE #07]

Sabitsana v. Muertegui

G.R. No. 181359

August 5, 2013

DEL CASTILLO

Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Court

Summary:
Garcia sold a parcel of land to Muertegi via an unnotarized deed of sale. 10 years later, Garcia sold
the same parcel to Atty. Sabitsana, the family lawyer of the Muerteguis. Atty. Sabitsana succeeded
in registering the same and was able to obtain title. The Muertegis attempted to register the land
but was opposed by Atty. Sabitsana, hence they filed an action to quiet title in the RTC. The SC
ruled that 1) the RTC has jurisdiction over actions to quiet title under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
and 2) Muertegui has better right over the property.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the January 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals which denied the appeal and its January 2008 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.

FACTS:
On September 1981, Alberto Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent
Juanito Muertegui over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land in Biliran, Leyte. Juanitos
father and brother took possession and planted coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real
property taxes on the lot for the years 1980 up to 1998.

On October 1991, Garcia sold the same lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty. Clemencio C.
Sabitsana, Jr., through a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered. Atty. Sabitsana
also paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999. In 1996, he introduced concrete improvements
which were destroyed by a typhoon.

After the death of his father, Muertegui applied for registration under the Public Land Act. Atty.
Sabitsana opposed. On April 2000, Juanito filed an action for quieting of title claiming that they
bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same, which
acts thus constitute a cloud over his title.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
Petitioners asserted that the sale to Juanito is null and void absent the marital consent of Garcias
wife, Soledad Corto (Soledad); that they acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that
the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches.

They likewise insisted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran did not have jurisdiction
over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is
merely P1,230.00. Since the assessed value of the lot was a mere P1,230.00, jurisdiction over the
case lies with the first level courts, pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
Respondents argue that petitioner Atty. Sabitsana was the Muertegui familys lawyer at the time
Garcia sold the lot to Juanito, and that as such, he was consulted by the family before the sale was
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CASE 08

executed; that after the sale to Juanito, Domingo Sr. entered into actual, public, adverse and
continuous possession of the lot, and planted the same to coconut and ipil-ipil; and that after
Domingo Sr.s death, his wife Caseldita, succeeded him in the possession and exercise of rights over
the lot.

Respondent also counters that a suit for quieting of title is one whose subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2. Who has better right over the parcel of land

HELD:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

1. RTC has jurisdiction over the case

An action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of
the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.

The suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners opposition to respondents application
for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title,
respondent filed the Civil Case to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is
one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule
63 of the Rules.

2. Muertegui has better right over the land

Act No. 3344 applies to sale of unregistered lands.
What applies in this case is Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of recording
of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any
registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.

The sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991, or ten
years after the sale to respondents. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to
the lot, while the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the
seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.

Nor can petitioners registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanitos rights. The mere
registration of a sale in ones favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no
longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale
was unrecorded. Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and
void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration
laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.

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[Type text]

CASE 08

OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ and NENITA P. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs.

G.R. No. 131283
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, now UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; and
PREMIERE INSURANCE & SURETY CORP., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
October 7, 1999
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: I.A.4. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
SUMMARY: Petitioners purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing scheme of the private respondent, and
the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the financing institution. The total amount to be paid for 48 monthly
installments would amount to P553,944. Considering that the principal amount involved was P553,944, petitioners filed
an Answer to the banks complaint for a sum of money, mentioning in its defenses a Motion to Dismiss, for lack of
jurisdiction,
SC: The fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners, as shown in respondent bank's Complaint, is the
collection of the sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Although the value of
the vehicle seized pursuant to the Writ of Replevin may have exceeded P200,000, that fact does not deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case. After all, the vehicle was merely the subject of a chattel mortgage that had been
used to secure petitioners' loan.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Spouses Fernandez challenge, via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the Decision and Resolution of the CA. The assailed Decision dismissed petitioners' suit
for certiorari and prohibition praying for the redelivery of the vehicle seized from them and for the declaration of nullity of
the Writ of Replevin, which had been issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City.
FACTS:
Petitioners purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing scheme of the private respondent, and the chattel
mortgage was executed in favor of the financing institution. The total amount to be paid for 48 monthly installments would
amount to P553,944.
Due to the respondent bank's "greedy desire" to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of the petitioners, the former filed an
unfounded complaint for a sum of money with replevin before the MTC of Pasay City.
Considering that the principal amount involved was P553,944, petitioners filed an Answer mentioning in the special and
affirmative defenses a Motion to Dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, but this was denied on February 10, 1997 and was
received on February 20, 1997. A Motion for Reconsideration was then submitted on April 2, 1997.
Aside from that, petitioners contested the venue considering that the principal office of the respondent bank was in Makati,
while their residence was in QC.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 9, 1997 and received by them on May 29, 1997.
When the respondent bank filed its complaint with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Replevin on November 28, 1997,
the monthly installments were almost fully paid; they would have been fully paid on November 26, 1997. Furthermore, the
car's mileage at the time of illegal seizure was only 28,464 kilometers. They could not have been considered in default at
the time the complaint was filed, considering that: (a) they attempted many times to pay the bank their installments for the
months of August, September, October, 1996, and up to the time of the filing of the case, they had not received any
statement of delinquency as mandated by RA 3165 (Truth in Lending Act).
If at all, petitioners added, the baseless filing of the case was deliberately done to enrich the bank at the expense of the
petitioners which [was] tantamount to simple robbery. They even tried consigning the P69,168 through a Manager's Check
dated January 7, 1997 for the months of August to February, 1997, or beyond the four months installment in advance but
were similarly refused by the court for no valid reason.
Their petition for the outright dismissal of the complaint, as well as the lifting of the Writ of Replevin was denied even if the
amount of P553,344 representing the value of the chattel was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

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Case #9

To be precise, MTC Order states:

As to the question of jurisdiction the complaint shows that the amount plaintiff seeks to recover is P190,635, which
is well within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Likewise the attached Promissory Note in the Complaint also
contains stipulation as to the venue agreed upon by the parties in case an action is filed in court, in which case this
court has jurisdiction. The Motion to Dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction is likewise denied for being
unmeritorious.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
1. The jurisdiction of the MTC of Pasay City is strictly limited within the confines of the boundary limits of Pasay City,
B.P. 129, Sec. 28.
2. The MTC's jurisdiction is limited to not more than two hundred thousand pesos.
3. Assuming that the MTC of Pasay City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to issue the ancillary writ of
replevin, the CA erred in sanctioning the order of the MTC in denying Petitioners' Motion for Redelivery of the vehicle
which was filed within five days after such seizure, which in essence was an outright departure from the express
provision of the law and the settled jurisprudence on the matter.
4. The bank's Memorandum dated July 5, 1999 should be stricken off and ordered expunged from the records for
being fatally defective in form and substance. No Annexes to said Memorandum were attached to petitioners' copy,
thereby making said memorandum fatally defective because the annexes were integral parts of the memorandum
itself. Up to this late date, respondent Premiere Insurance and Surety Corporation has not submitted its memorandum
and may therefore be deemed to have admitted the entire text of the Petition to be true, valid and binding against it.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
CA ruled that the MTC of Pasay City had jurisdiction over civil cases in which the amount of the demand did not exceed
P200,000 exclusive of interest, damages and attorney's fees. The basic claim in the present case was P190,635.90;
hence, the MTC had jurisdiction.
CA further held that the objection to the impropriety of the venue should have been raised in a motion to dismiss before
the filing of a responsive pleading. The said issue, however, was raised for the first time only in petitioners' Answer.
Lastly, the CA agreed with the MTC that the Writ of Replevin could be validly executed anywhere in Metro Manila because
Section 27, Chapter III of B.P. 129, authorized the establishment of the MTC of Metro Manila with 82 branches. Therefore,
any branch in this case, Branch 44 which was stationed in Pasay could issue writs and processes that could validly
be served and executed anywhere within Metro Manila.
ISSUES:
(1) May the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City be enforced outside the city? YES
(2) Did the MTC have jurisdiction over the Complaint? YES
(3) Were petitioners entitled to the redelivery of the subject vehicle? NO
HELD:
A writ of replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City may be served and enforced anywhere in the
Philippines. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount of the claim alleged in the complaint, not by
the value of the chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Territorial Enforcement of the Writ of Replevin
Petitioners argue that the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay could be enforced only within the confines of
Pasay City. In support, they cite Section 28 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129, which states:

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Case #9

Sec. 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. The Supreme Court shall constitute Metropolitan Trial Courts in such
other metropolitan areas as may be established by law whose territorial jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the
cities and municipalities comprising the metropolitan area.
Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area which shall be his permanent station and
his appointment shall state the branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be originally assigned. A
Metropolitan Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch within said metropolitan area as the
interest of justice may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station within
the meaning of this section.9
We are not convinced. Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated January 11, 1983, providing for the
interim rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like the one issued in the present
case may be served anywhere in the Philippines. Specifically, the said Resolution states:
3. Writs and processes.
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo, warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial
court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or
municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a
certification by the judge of the regional trial court. 10
Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously does not fall under item "a" of the above-cited Rule,
may be validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners confused the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a
case on the one hand with, on the other, its power to issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said
jurisdiction. Applying the said Rule, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals reiterated the foregoing distinction between the
jurisdiction of the trial court and the administrative area in which it could enforce its orders and processes pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred on it:
The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only
within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which
court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. No legal provision, statutory or
reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit to its area of enforceability. On the
contrary, the provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is
not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the
processes contemplated in paragraph (b).
Objection to Venue Too Late
Petitioners object to the filing of the Complaint in Pasay City, pointing out that their residence is in QC, while private
respondent's principal place of business is in Makati. Again, we are not persuaded. Under the Rules of Court before the
1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it
will be deemed waived. In Diaz v. Adiong, the Court explained such requirement in this wise:
Indeed, the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over
the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
Finally, Sec. 1 of Rule 16 provides that objections to improper venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before
any responsive pleading is filed. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and set up defenses.
Consequently, having already submitted his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer
object to the venue which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As such, improper
venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may be deemed waived.
In the present case, petitioners' objection to the venue of the case was raised for the first time in the Answer itself. Not
having been raised on time, their objection is therefore deemed waived. In any event, petitioners had agreed to a
stipulation in the Promissory Note that a suit arising from their transaction may be filed in the proper court anywhere in
Metro Manila, at the sole option of respondent bank. Necessarily, Pasay City is deemed included in the said stipulation.

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Case #9

Second Issue: MTC's Jurisdiction Over the Complaint

Petitioners argue that the value of the property seized is in excess of P200,000 and thus outside the jurisdiction of the
MTC. This argument has no legal and factual basis. The fundamental claim in the main action against petitioners, as
shown in respondent bank's Complaint, is the collection of the sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. Although the value of the vehicle seized pursuant to the Writ of Replevin may have exceeded
P200,000, that fact does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case. After all, the vehicle was merely the
subject of a chattel mortgage that had been used to secure petitioners' loan. In any case, private respondents are entitled
only to the amount owed them. Under Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged
property shall be used primarily to pay the costs of the sale, the obligation that has been secured and other subsequent
obligations; and the balance will be turned over to the mortgagors, herein petitioners.
Third Issue: Redelivery of Subject Vehicle
Petitioners assail the MTC's refusal to release the seized vehicle despite a Manager's Check in the amount of P69,168
they issued for the redelivery of the vehicle within five days from its seizure.
This argument is devoid of merit. As observed by the trial court, petitioners failed to comply with the requisites for the
redelivery of the vehicle seized:
Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days from January 7, 1997 to post a re-delivery bond, in
order to secure the return of the subject vehicle and to post a counter bond double the amount of the chattel. In this
respect, defendants failed to exercise his right.
In their Petition for Review, petitioners plainly admit that they issued a check for only P69,168 for the purpose of
covering the advance payments plus the redelivery bond. Clearly, that amount was insufficient to cover even just the
required redelivery bond alone, which should be in an amount double that of the chattel. Hence, the MTC's refusal to
grant petitioners' Motion for redelivery was correct, and the CA did not err in upholding it.

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Case #9

Fabian v. Desierto
G.R. No. 129742

September 16, 1998

Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT)
which was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering
District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of
the Ombudsman.
Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those under the FMED, and Nestor V. Agustin,
reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled Teresita G. Fabian into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted
for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in
problems concerning the same in his office.
Later on, Teresita tried to end the relationship with Nestor but the latter did not take it well. He employed acts of harassment,
threats, and intimidation. She eventually filed an administrative case against him in a letter-complaint. The complaint sought the
dismissal of Nestor for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges
referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. Ombudsman Desierto approved the aforesaid resolution
with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension without pay for
one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's new counsel
had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of
respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the administrative charges.
Teresita points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07
(Rules of Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative
proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has
no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act
No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims
that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on
the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid?
Held: No. The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 Rule 45, on "Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court," explicitly states:
SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgement or final order
or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only question of law which
must be distinctly set forth.
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be
adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies, whenever the
purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just
discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Section1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in
line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

This is terrible. I will upload a better one.

Sorry.

FAR EAST MARBLE v. CA

August 10, 1993
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Subject Matter Jurisdiction Appellate

GR No. 94093
Melo, J.

SUMMARY:
BPI filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage against Far East Marble, which was
granted several loans by the petitioner bank. The RTC dismissed it, but the CA set aside the
lower courts decision. Far East Marble now disputes the decision of the CA, alleging it had
erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case because pure questions of law may only be
entertained by the SC. The SC, looking into the exchange of pleadings between the parties,
deemed that the current controversy inevitably raised a question of fact - such being the case,
the appeal taken by BPI to the CA was proper.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
Petition for review by certiorari, seeking reversal of decision of CA which set aside the order of
RTC and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings on grounds that the
complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin had not prescribed.
FACTS:
v RTC NCR, 1987 - BPI filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin
against petitioner Far East Marble, alleging:
o 1st Cause of Action - Far East received from Commercial Bank and Trust Co.
(now merged with BPI) several loans evidenced by promissory notes executed
by Far East; that said promissory notes have matured, but Far East refused to
pay despite repeated demands.
o 2nd Cause of Action Far East was extended credit facilities by BPI in the form of
Trust Receipts; that said Trust Receipts have long matured but Far East refused
to pay despite repeated demands.
o Cause of Action against Individual Defendants that a continuing guaranty was
executed in favor of BPI to answer for the obligations of Far East, but they
refused to pay long after Far East had defaulted.
v Far East raised the affirmative defenses of prescription and lack of cause of action
(denying that BPI had made previous repeated requests). It claimed that more than 10
years has elapsed from the dates of maturity of said obligations to the time the action for
foreclosure was filed; it claimed it did not receive from BPI any demand for payment.
v RTC dismissed the complaint against Far East Marble on the aforementioned grounds.
v CA upon appeal by BPI, assailed findings of RTC and rendered a decision setting
aside the order of the RTC, remanding the case for further proceedings.
v Hence, the petition for review.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
That the CA stepped beyond the limits of its authority when it assumed jurisdiction over the
appeal filed by BPI inasmuch as said appeal raised only the pure questions of law, thus, should
have been decided by the Supreme Court.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
N/A
ISSUE 1:
WON the CA had jurisdiction over the current case YES.

Butalid, Angela

[CASE # 11]

HELD:
v When an appeal raises only pure questions of law, it is only the SC which has the
jurisdiction to entertain the same (Article VIII, Sec. 5 (2) (e), 1987 Constitution; Rule 45,
Rules of Court). On the other hand, appeals involving both questions of law and fact fall
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA.
o Question of Law when there is a doubt or difference of opinion as to what the
law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
o Question of Fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts.
v The controversy in the case at bar is centered on the very existence of previous
demands for payment allegedly made by BPI on Far East. This dispute inevitably raised
a question of fact. Such being the case, the appeal taken by BPI to the CA was proper.
ISSUE 2:
WON BPI had a cause of action YES.
HELD:
A cause of action consists of 3 elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative
obligation for the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right. These elements were manifest in BPIs complaint. Its allegation that despite
repeated requests and demands for payment, Far East has failed to pay is sufficient to
establish BPIs cause of action.
BPIs failure to allege that the period of prescription was interrupted was not fatal to BPIs cause
of action. The interruption of the prescriptive period was not an ultimate fact which had to be
expressly and indispensably pleaded by BPI in its complaint. Ultimate facts are the essential
and substantial facts which either for the basis of the primary right and duty or which directly
make us the wrongful acts or omission of the defendant.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
hereby AFFIRMED.

Butalid, Angela

[CASE # 11]

DACOYCOY v. IAC
April 02, 1991

G.R. No. 74854

Fernan, C.J.

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Venue

SUMMARY: Dacoycoy filed a case in Antipolo RTC for the annulment of deeds of sale and surrender of
produce & payment of damages for a parcel of rice land in Lingayen, Pangasinan. The RTC dismissed
the case motu propio for being filed on the wrong venue. The SC held that the court may not dismiss a
case motu propio for being filed on the wrong venue because venue is a matter of convenience of the
parties. Only the parties may object to the venue.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review (Rule 45)
FACTS: Dacoycoy, a resident of Cainta, Rizal, filed before in RTC Antipolo branch a complaint against De
Guzman praying for the annulment of 2 deeds of sale involving a parcel of rice land situated in Barrio Estanza,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce thereof and damages for private respondent's refusal to have
said deeds of sale set aside upon petitioner's demand. Before summons could be served to De Guzman, RTC
Executive Judge issued an order requiring counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the
matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. It
found that the action is a real action over a parcel of land outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC.
IAC: affirmed RTCs dismissal of the complaint
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The right to question the venue of an action belongs solely to the defendant and
that the court or its magistrate does not possess the authority to confront the plaintiff and tell him that the venue
was improperly laid, as venue is waivable.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: The dismissal of the complaint is proper because the same can "readily be
assessed as a real action." He asserts that "every court of justice before whom a civil case is lodged is not even
obliged to wait for the defendant to raise that venue was improperly laid. The court can take judicial notice and
motu proprio dismiss a suit clearly denominated as real action and improperly filed before it.
ISSUE: WON the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue?NO.
HELD: Nullified IAC ruling. Complaint filed in RTC is revived and reinstated.
Jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits. Venue deals on the locality, the
place where the suit may be had.
The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the
plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to
jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.
RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter according to Section 19(2) of BP 129: exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein x x x"
The RTC could have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, either by his voluntary appearance in court and
his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal process exercised over his person. The RTC
should have exhausted the alternative modes of service of summons.
Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly
said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically
wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The
trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue
by motu proprio dismissing the case.

DE MESA, ATHENA CHRISTA D.G.

[CASE # 12]

DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RODOLFO M. BELLAFLOR, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 11, RTC-CEBU AND FRANCISCO TESORERO,
RESPONDENTS.
De Leon, Jr. , J.
Facts: Davao Light filed complaint for damages of 11M against private respondent Francisco
Tesorero before RTC Cebu City. Private Respondent argued that the venue is improperly laid; he
presented several contracts of said company with National Power Corp. NAPOCOR where
Davao lights principal office is in Davao City and showed that said place was used as principal
office in cases filed in the RTC.
Trial Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue. CA affirmed.
Petitioner asserts its right to file damages in Cebu City which cannot be negated by a supposed
estoppel absent the essential elements of the false statement having made to private respondent
and his reliance in good faith on the truth thereof.
Issue: WON the venue is improper.
Held:No. It is stated in the amended articles of incorporation and by-laws of Davao Light, as
required by the Corporation Code, that its principal office is in Cebu City. The purpose of the
requirement is to establish the residence of the corporation (Young Auto Supply Co. v. Court of
Appeals)
Also, in Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillon, it was explained that corporation cannot maintain
its action in a branch office and can only file in its principal place of business unless a coplaintiff or defendant resides in that place.
Furthermore as to the evidences presented by private respondent, he is not a party to any of the
contracts presented before us despite his protestations that he is privy thereto, on the rather
flimsy ground that he is a member of the public for whose benefit the electric generating
equipment subject of the contracts were leased or acquired. We are likewise not persuaded by his
argument that the allegation or representation made by petitioner in either the complaints or
answers it filed in several civil cases that its residence is in Davao City should estopped it from
filing the damage suit before the Cebu courts. Besides there is no showing that private
respondent is a party in those civil cases or that he relied on such representation by petitioner.
VENUE
may be changed by the consent of the parties
and an objection that the plaintiff brought his
suit in the wrong county may be waived by the
failure of the defendant to make a timely
objection

JURISDICTION
may not be conferred by consent or waiver
upon a court which otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action

HERNANDEZ v. DBP
June 18, 1976
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Venue

G.R. No. L-31095

Martin, J.

SUMMARY: Hernandez was an employee of DBP for 21 years until his retirement in 1966 due to illness. In
1964, in due recognition of his unqualified service to DBP, the latter awarded to him a lot with a Type E
house in Quezon City. He issued checks to cover payment for the same. DBPs Chief Accountant and
Comptroller returned the check to him, informing him the DBP had cancelled the award. Hernandez
protested against the cancellation of the award and demanded from DBP the restoration of all his rights to
said award; DBP refused. Hernandez filed a complaint in CFI Batangas seeking the annulment of the
cancellation of the award. DBP filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
CFI Batangas sustained the motion to dismiss filed by DBP on the ground of improper venue. The Court
agrees that Hernandez action is not a real but a personal action. His action is one to declare null and
void the cancellation of the award of the lot and house in his favor which does not involve title and
ownership over said properties but seeks to compel DBP to recognize that the award is a valid and
subsisting one which it cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered
payment in full which it had rejected and returned to Hernandez. Such an action is a personal action
which may be properly brought by Hernandez in his residence.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review of the order of CFI Batangas sustaining DBPs
motion to dismiss.
FACTS: Jose Hernandez was an employee of DBP in its Legal Department for 21 years until his
retirement in 1966 due to illness. In 1964, in due recognition of his unqualified service to DBP, the latter
awarded to him a lot with a Type E house in Quezon City. He issued checks to cover payment for the
same. More than a week thereafter, DBPs Chief Accountant and Comptroller returned the check to him,
informing him the DBP, through its Committee on Organization, Personnel and Facilities, had cancelled
the award. Hernandez protested against the cancellation of the award and demanded from DBP the
restoration of all his rights to said award; DBP refused. Hernandez filed a complaint in CFI Batangas
seeking the annulment of the cancellation of the award. DBP filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of improper venue. CFI Batangas sustained the motion to dismiss filed by DBP on the ground
of improper venue.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS: Not expressly stated.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS: Not expressly stated.
ISSUE: Whether the action of Hernandez was properly filed in CFI Batangas.
HELD: Yes. It is a well settled rule that venue of actions, or the country where the action is triable,
depends to a great extent on the nature of the action to be filed, whether it is real or personal. A real
action is one brought for the specific recovery of land, tenements, or hereditaments. A personal action
is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of
damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property.
The Court agrees that Hernandez action is not a real but a personal action. His action is one to declare
null and void the cancellation of the award of the lot and house in his favor which does not involve title
and ownership over said properties but seeks to compel DBP to recognize that the award is a valid and
subsisting one which it cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered
payment in full which it had rejected and returned to Hernandez. Such an action is a personal action
which may be properly brought by Hernandez in his residence.

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 14]


Unimaster Conglomeration Inc v. CA and Kubota Agri-Machinery
Philippines
February 7, 1997

G.R. No. 119657

Narvasa, C.J

VENUE
SUMMARY: Kubota and Unimasters agreed to have all suits arising out of tthere agreement be filed with
appropriate courts of QUEZON CITY. Unimasters filed action for recovery of money before RTC-TACLOBAN,
his principal place of business. Kubota moved to dismiss case on the ground of improper venue. Court held
that Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and
intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City -- or
other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention -- the stipulation should be
construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits
either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff Unimasters.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Appellate proceeding
FACTS:
Kubota and Unimasters entered into a Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services of Kubotas products
in Samar and Leyte.
Contract contained that: All suits arising out of this agreement shall be filed with/in the proper
courts of QUEZON CITY, and that Unimasters is bound to obtain a credit line with Metrobank-Tacloban
in the amount of 2M to answer for its obligations to Kubota
Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in RTC-Tacloban against Kubota, Go and Metrobank-Tacloban
for damages for breach of contract, injunction with prayer for TRO
RTC issued a TRO enjoining Metrobank from authorizing payment of any alleged obligation of Unimasters
to Kubota against the credit line, or charging Unibank for any amount paid and released to Kubota. Set
injunction hearing to Jan 10.
Kubota filed 2 motionsone for dismissal of case on the ground of improper venue and another for
transfer of injunction hearing to Jan. 11, 1994 because of unavailability of counsel due to prior commitment
RTC dismissed Kubotas motion to dismiss.
o RTC explained: Kubotas principal place of business is in Quezon City, while Unimasters principal
place of business is in Tacloban. Thus, the proper venue is either Tacloban or Quezon City. QC
and Manila, as agreed upon in the Dealership Agreement, are additional places other than the
place stated in the Rules of Court. The filing in Tacloban then, is proper.
Kubota challenged the Orders via special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, contending that it has
been issued with grave abuse of discretion
CA agreed with Kubota:
o The stipulation respecting venue in the agreement limited the venue of all suits arising thereunder
only and exclusively to the proper courts of Quezon City
CA denied MR.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Unibank claims that in the absence of qualifying or restrive words, venue
stipulations in a contract should be considered merely as agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue
to the specified place.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: That stipulation limited all actions to be filed only and exclusively in the
stipulated venuesproper courts of Quezon City; that RTC-Tacloban has no
ISSUES: What construction should be placed on the stipulation in the Dealership Agreement that all suits
arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City?
JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

CASE # 70

HELD: Not restrictive. Merely additional.

Agreements on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action
may be changed or transferred from one province to another." Parties may by stipulation waive the legal
venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary to
public policy or prejudicial to third persons.
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place
agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon
but also in the places fixed by law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the proposition that
normally, venue stipulations should be deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation should be
adopted which most serves the parties' convenience.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this general policy, the language of
the parties must be so clear and categorical as to leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or
places, or to fix places other than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions.
An analysis of these precedents reaffirms and emphasizes the soundness of the Polytrade principle. Of the
essence is the ascertainment of the parties' intention in their agreement governing the venue of actions
between them. That ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that convenience is the foundation of
venue regulations, and that that construction should be adopted which most conduces thereto.
Hence, the invariable construction placed on venue stipulations is that they do not negate but merely
complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. In other words, unless the
parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish the
venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard
the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or
restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said rule.
o CASE AT BAR: Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the
parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place
selected by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire
and intention -- the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only
to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the
option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).
One last word, WRT KUBOTA's theory that the Regional Trial Court had "no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of UNIMASTERS' action considering that venue was improperly laid." This is not an accurate
statement of legal principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction,
except in criminal actions. This is fundamental.
o The action at bar, for the recovery of more than 20,000, is assuredly within the jurisdiction of RTC.
Assuming that the venue were improperly laid in the Court where the action was instititred, the
Tacloban RTC, that would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional impedimentprecluding ventilation
of this case before that Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that the subject matter is within its
jurisdiction. However, If the objection to venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to
dismiss, the RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion it it then tried and decided the action.
o This is true also of real actions. Thus, even if a case "affecting title to, or for recovery of possession,
or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property"[37] were
commenced in a province or city other than that "where the property or any part thereof lies,"[38] if
no objection is seasonably made in a motion to dismiss, the objection is deemed waived, and the
Regional Trial Court would be acting entirely within its competence and authority in proceeding to
try and decide the suit.
HELD: CA REVERSED. RTC REINSTATED. RTC IS DIRECTED TO PROCEED

JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

CASE # 70

Adamas v. J.M. Tuason!

October 14, 1968! !

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G.R. No. L-21957

MAKALINTAL, J.

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Venue

SUMMARY:
Petition to compel J.M. Tuason to make new purchase contracts in favor of plaintiffs over parcels of
land. J.M. Tuason alleges that the case was filed in the improper venue. The Court held that action
to compel defendant to execute purchase contracts and pay damages, such action is a personal
action.
HOW THE CASE REACHED SC: Regular appeal from CFI.
FACTS:
- 33 plaintiffs instituted action for Specific Performance and Damages:
- Plaintiffs possessed residential lots in Matalahib and Tatalon, Quezon City, which was
included in a bigger parcel of land covered by Torrens title under the name of J.M. Tuason
Co. Inc. Lots became subject-matter of several civil cases. Parties entered into a
compromise agreement;
- Courts decision attached list of people who are to continue and/or who are entitled to elect
and have elected to buy their respective lots from the legal owners who are now J.M. Tuason
& Co. Inc. shall be credited sums already paid by them under their former purchase contracts
from their respective predecessors-in-interest.
- J.M. Tuason, without any legal justification, refused to make new purchase contracts in favor
of plaintiffs despite demands.
- Plaintiffs ask from CFI of Manila that J.M Tuason be ordered to make new purchase contracts in
favor of the plaintiffs on their respective lots.
- CFI: Granted J.M. Tuasons motion to dismiss complaint due to failure to state cause of action.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT
N/A
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
- Improper venue and failure to state cause of action
ISSUE: WON venue was improperly laid - NO
HELD:
- Allegations as well as the prayer in the complaint show that this is not a real but a personal
action - to compel the defendants to execute the corresponding purchase contracts in favor of
the plaintiffs and to pay damages. The plaintiffs do not claim ownership of the lots in question:
they recognize the title of the J.M. Tuason. They do not ask that possession be delivered to
them, for they allege to be in possession.
- CFI decision set aside and case remanded for further proceedings.

Javellana, Maria Yolanda A. !

Case No. 16

REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN V LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 146594 | June 10, 2002 | PANGANIBAN, J.
SUM M ARY: LANDCENTER hired the services of CABUTIHAN as a facilitator for the recovery of property in
PARANAQUE of which it was the absolute owner. The agreement provided for compensation of 20% of the
area of the recovered property. When LANDCENTER failed to give her what was due, she filed an action
for specific performance in PASIG. LANDCENTER filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue. SC: Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. A
suit for such breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the real estate,
subject of the said action, should not be considered in computing the filing fees. Neither a misjoinder nor
a non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action, because parties may be dropped or added at
any stage of the proceedings.
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
FACTS:

LANDCENTER is the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated at Kay-biga, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
LANDCENTER decided to engage the assistance of CABUTIHAN as FACILITATOR for the purpose of
facilitating and arranging the recovery of the property in question, as well as the financing of such
undertakings necessary in connection thereto.
As compensation for the undertaking of the FACILITATOR, [she] shall be entitled to Twenty [Percent]
(20%) of the total area of the property thus recovered for and in behalf of LANDCENTER.
Armed with Board Resolution No. 01, Series of 1997, which had authorized her to represent the
corporation, Luz Baylon Ponce entered into a February 11, 1997 Deed of Undertaking with a group
composed of petitioner, Wenifredo P. Forro, Nicanor Radan Sr. and Atty. Prospero A. Anave.
The Deed states the following: LANDCENTER solicited, engaged and hereby voluntarily acknowledges
the assistance of certain persons, in recovering, arranging and financing the undertaking up to
completion/consummation of the same;
o To pay or compensate the following persons, based on the gross area of the afore-described
parcel of land or gross proceeds of the sale thereof, as the case may be, to wit:
Rebecca T. Cabutihan
------------------------------------ 20%
Wenifredo P. Forro
----------------------------------- 10%
Nicanor Radan, Sr.
------------------------------------ 4%
Atty. Prospero A. Anave ----------------------------------- 2.5%
TOTAL
----------------------------------- 36.5%
o Execute a Deed of Assignment unto and in favor of each of the persons above-mentioned
corresponding to their respective shares in the subject parcel of land or in the proceeds thereof;
o This Undertaking as well as the Deed of Assignment above-stated shall be effective and binding
upon the heirs, successors-in-interest, assigns or designates of the parties herein.

PETITIONERS ARGUM ENTS:

An action for specific performance with damages was filed by petitioner on October 14, 1999 before
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 263.
She alleged that accomplished her undertakings under the subject Agreement and the Undertaking.
So in a letter dated 18 April 1997, LANDCENTER was informed accordingly thereof. Simultaneously,

CABUTIHAN demanded upon LANDCENTER to execute the corresponding Deed of Assignment of the
lots in the subject property, as compensation for the services rendered in favor of LANDCENTER.
LANDCENTER failed and refused to act.
Petitioner prayed, inter alia, that respondent corporation be ordered to execute the appropriate
document assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering the particular lots in her favor. The lots
represented compensation for the undertakings she performed and accomplished, as embodied in the
Agreement.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
Because of the troubled situation obtaining at the management level of LANDCENTER, the sale
between LANDCENTER and PCIB regarding the Fourth Estate Subdivision was not registered with the
Register of Deeds office, although LANDCENTER continued holding the deed of sale over the Fourth
Estate Subdivision.
A group of persons led by one Wilfredo Maghuyop, including herein [petitioner], Wenifredo Forro,
Nicanor Radan, and others, taking advantage of the management mess at LANDCENTER, tried to grab
ownership and with use of fraud, cheat, misrepresentation and theft of vital documents from the office,
succeeded in filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission false papers and documents
purporting to show that the Articles of Incorporation of [respondent corporation] had been amended,
installing Maghuyop as president of [respondent corporation].
Respondent sought the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (3) nonpayment of the proper docket fees. Specifically, it
contended:
8. That venue is improperly laid. The present case should have been filed by [petitioner]
with the proper court in Paranque City which has jurisdiction over the x x x Fourth Estate
Subdivision because said subdivision is situated in Paranaque City. Since [petitioner] filed
the present case with this x x x [c]ourt in Pasig City, she chose a wrong venue
9.

That the [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim

*RTC further ruled that, since the suit would affect the title to the property, it should have been instituted in
the trial court where the property was situated. Since this case was an action in rem, it was imperative for
petitioner to pay the appropriate docket or filing fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim, a duty
she failed to discharge. Consequently, following Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE #1: Proper Venue? YES

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an answer to the issue of venue. Actions affecting
title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried
in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated.
On the other hand, all other actions, (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper
courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides.
Where the action affects title to the property, it should be instituted in the trial court where the
property is situated.

A case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court where
any of the parties reside.
In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the undertaking the
parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for
rescission. If petitioner had filed an action in rem for the conveyance of real property, the dismissal of
the case would have been proper on the ground of lack of cause of action.

ISSUE #2: Non-Joinder of Proper Parties ground for dismissal? NO

Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may
be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the courts own initiative at
any stage of the action.
The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the said order would
have been ground for dismissal of the action.
Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without impleading
the companions of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately proceeded with the case
as far as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned, independent of the other 16.5 percent. This
fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties without whom no final determination can
be had. At best, they are mere necessary parties who ought to be impleaded for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. The non-inclusion of a necessary party
does not prevent the court from proceeding with the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall
be without prejudice to the rights of such party.

ISSUE #3: Correct Docket Fees based on land value? RULE DOES NOT APPLY. NOT AN
ACTION IN REM .

The RTC ruled that although the amount of damages sought had not been specified in the body of the
Complaint, one can infer from the assessed value of the disputed land that it would amount to P50
million. Hence, when compared to this figure, the P210 paid as docket fees would appear paltry.
True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the assessed value of the real estate,
subject of an action, should be considered in computing the filing fees. But the Court has already
clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific performance, which is classified as an
action not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Besides, if during the course of the trial, petitioners 20 percent claim on the Fourth Estate Subdivision
can no longer be satisfied and the payment of its monetary equivalent is the only solution left, Sunlife
Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncionholds as follows: Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

HELD: GRANTED.
JOSE, G.

INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC.

AUGUST 24, 2007
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Venue

[G.R. No. 156596]

[AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ]

SUMMARY:
The case at bar is an action for revival of judgment in an action for specific performance and damages, which
includes an order for the execution of a deed of sale over a parcel of land. The controversy revolves around
the proper venue of the action, which would depend on whether or not the action for revival is in personam or
in rem. The Court held that since the case involves real property, it is an action in rem and thus the venue lies in
Muntinlupa City where the property is located.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
An action for revival was filed before the Muntinlupa RTC over a judgment rendered by the Makati RTC in
action for specific performance and damages. A motion to dismiss the action for revival was filed by
petitioner, which was denied by the Muntinlupa RTC. Petitioner appealed to the CA, which upheld the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
FACTS:
On June 6, 2001, Respondent Aran Builders filed an action for revival of a judgment of the Makati
RTC against petitioner Adelaida Infante in an action for specific performance and damages.
The judgment sought to be revived became final and executory on November 16, 1994. It decreed
that petitioner execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of
herein private respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in connection with said sale; register the deed of
sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to Ayala Corporation the certificate of title issued in the
name of private respondent.
The same judgment ordered private respondent to pay petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon
petitioner's compliance with the aforementioned order.
It is further alleged that petitioner refused to comply with her judgment obligations despite private
respondent's repeated requests and demands, and that the latter was compelled to file the action for
revival of judgment.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the action (for revival of judgment) on the grounds that the
Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and that venue was improperly
laid.
On September 4, 2001, the Muntinlupa RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
judgment which is sought to be enforced necessarily involves the interest, possession, title, and
ownership of the parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City. Hence, the action for revival was
properly filed with said RTC.
Petitioner came to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari, assailing the RTCs denial of the
motion to dismiss.
On August 12, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision ruling in favor of respondent. The CA held
that since the judgment sought to be revived was rendered in an action involving title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, the action for revival of judgment is then an action in
rem which should be filed with the RTC of the place where the real property is located.
Petitioner relies on the cases of Aldeguer v Gemelo and Donnelly v CFI of Manila in support of her
contention that the action for revival of judgment is a personal action and should be filed in the
court of the place where either the plaintiff or defendant resides.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific performance and damages before the Makati RTC is
a personal action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is also personal in nature; and
Lopez, Catherine Nicole

CASE #18

that, consequently, the venue of the action for revival of judgment is either Makati City or Paraaque
City where private respondent and petitioner respectively reside, at the election of private
respondent.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that the subject action for revival judgment is
"quasi in rem because it involves and affects vested or adjudged right on a real property"; and that,
consequently, venue lies in Muntinlupa City where the property is situated.
ISSUES:
Where is the proper venue of the action for revival of judgment?
HELD:
The proper venue of the action for revival of judgment is the RTC of Muntinlupa.
The proper venue depends on the determination of whether the present action for revival of
judgment is a real action or a personal action.
Under the present Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide for the venue for real and
personal actions.
The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent's right to have the title over the
disputed property conveyed to it.
The sole reason for the present action to revive is the enforcement of private respondent's adjudged
rights over a piece of realty.
Hence, the action falls under the category of a real action, for it affects private respondent's interest
over real property.
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should indeed be filed
with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is located.
Petitioners reliance on Aldeguer and Donnelly is misplaced. In Aldeguer, the judgment sought to be
enforced was one for damages, which is a personal action. Meanwhile in Donnelly, the issue on
whether an action for revival of judgment is quasi in rem was not yet proper and justiciable. Therefore,
the case cannot be used as precedent.
A branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over a particular territory
defined by the Supreme Court.
Originally, Muntinlupa City was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. However,
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7154, entitled An Act to Amend Section Fourteen of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, Otherwise Known As The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981, took effect on
September 4, 1991. Said law provided for the creation of a branch of the Regional Trial Court in
Muntinlupa.
Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or
authority to validly issue orders and processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.

Lopez, Catherine Nicole

CASE #18

Baritua v. CA
3 February 1997

G.R. No. 100748

Puno, J.

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Ven You

SUMMARY: A bus owned by Jose rammed Roy's car. Roy, through Crispin (attorney-in-fact),
filed before the RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint for damages (a personal action).
Court dismissed the complaint for improper venue. Rule 4 Sec. 2(b) gives the plaintiff (Roy)
the option to file the case in a place where the defendant (Jose) or any of the principal
defendants resides, or where any of the principal plaintiffs resides. When the complaint was
filed in Rosales, Pangasinan, not one of the parties was a resident of the town. Roy is a
resident of Los Angeles, California while his attorney-in-fact is a resident of Cubao, Quezon
City. Jose's business address is in Pasay City, and he resides in Gubat, Sorsogon. The
venue in Rosales, Pangasinan was indeed improperly laid.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Jose
Baritua, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of CA in not dismissing the case for
improper venue

FACTS:

On 19 January 1988, a bus owned by Jose Baritua rammed Roy Domingos car along the
Maharlika Highway, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
Roy is a Filipino and a resident of Rosales, Pangasinan before he went to the U.S. (February
1988 - present).
In 1989, Roy, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Crispin Domingo, filed with the RTC of
Rosales, Pangasinan a complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict.
Jose's business address is at Tramo St., Pasay City. Crispin resides in Cubao, Quezon City.
Jose moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss after finding that Roy was merely temporarily out of
the country and did not lose his legal residence in Rosales, Pangasinan. CA affirmed.

JOSE'S ARGUMENT: Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed

the motion to dismiss despite overwhelming evidence that the venue of action was improperly
laid. Since Roy was not a resident of the Philippines, the complaint should be filed in the place
where Jose (the defendant), resides, which is in Gubat, Sorsogon.

RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT: See TC's ruling above.

ISSUE: Whether the civil case should be dismissed for improper venue
HELD: Yes.

A complaint for damages is a personal action. A complaint in personal actions may be filed in
the place where the defendant resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff resides, at the
option of the plaintiff. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his
complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them [plaintiffs] resides; or
(2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the
defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time
the action is commenced.

Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance. - - x x x

(b) Personal actions. - - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE # 19

 Section 2 (b) of Rule 4 speaks of the place where the defendant or the plaintiff resides. The

residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual
residence or abode. It does not mean fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning.
The word resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile.
For purposes of venue, actual residence is the place of abode and not necessarily legal
residence or domicile. Actual residence signifies personal residence, i.e., physical presence
and actual stay thereat. This physical presence, nonetheless, must be more than temporary
and must be with continuity and consistency.
It is fundamental that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the
rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to parties litigants and their witnesses by
affording them maximum accessibility to the courts of justice. The choice of venue is
given to the plaintiff but is not left to his caprice. It cannot unduly deprive a resident
defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.

Does Roy have his actual residence in Rosales, Pangasinan or in Los Angeles, California?

Los Angeles, California.

In the complaint itself, it was stated that he "is a resident of Pangasinan before he went to the
US where he now lives."
The SPA in favor of his attorney-in-fact was drawn and executed before the Philippine Consul
jn Los Angeles, California. It was also stated in the SPA that Roy was a resident of Los
Angeles.
Roy was not a mere transient or occasional resident of the United States. He fixed his place of
abode in Los Angeles, California and has been staying there continuously and consistently for
over a year at the time the complaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan.
His working non-immigrant visa did not make him a non-resident of the United States.
After the filing of the complaint, there is no showing that Roy actually returned to the
Philippines and resumed residence in Pangasinan.
That Roy has been in the United States continuously and consistently since 1988 until the
present has not been refuted.

RULING: Petition is granted. The complaint is dismissed for improper venue.

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE # 19

Philippine Banking v. Tensuan

December 10, 1993
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Venue

G.R. No. 106920

FELICIANO, J.

SUMMARY: In this case, the promissory notes of Respondent all contained the stipulation that the latter expressly
submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action and thus when the petitioner instituted a
case against him for collection of his loans at the RTC of Makati, the respondent assailed that this was not the
proper venue. Court held that although there was a stipulation that respondent submits to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Valenzuela, the stipulation does not require the laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily.
The stipulation merely authorizes or permits the bringing of a suit in Valenzuela, with no indication of intent to bar
another suit in competent courts.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petitioner Bank instituted a complaint for a collection of a sum of money, with a
prayer for preliminary attachment at the RTC of Makati. Trial judge granted the motion, but no properties of the
respondent or the other obligors could be found to attach on, so the respondents were served summons. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that venue was improperly laid as the agreement had fixed the venue
in Valenzuela onlythis was found meritorious by the Judge so petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
when denied, was followed by the present action of Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
In 1983 and 1984, Respondent Circle Financial Co., through its representatives, obtained loans amounting
to Php1,000,000 from petitioner
Correspondingly, respondent delivered to petitioner 4 promissory notes, each containing the stipulation
that: I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which
may arise out of this promissory note.
As security for the payment of the loans, eight individuals (impleaded as defendants in the complaint)
executed a Continuing Surety Agreement, and undertook to pay jointly and severally the obligations of
respondent Circle
However, Circle failed to pay its loans as did the 8 sureties when the Bank demanded payment from them
Bank moved for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, alleging that Circle had become insolvent and
had been placed under receivership by the Central Bank. This was granted by the trial judge, but the
sheriffs return indicated that no properties belonging to the respondents could be found, so they tried to
serve summons on all the respondents (some successful, some not)
A motion to dismiss was filed by the respondents (Circle and sureties) on the ground that the venue of the
action was improperly laid since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions arising from the promissory
notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila onlythis was granted and the Order of the Judge is the subject of the
present action
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
Stipulation found in the promissory notes is merely an agreement to add the courts of Valenzuela to
tribunals to which the parties may resort, it did not restrict or limit the permissible venue of actions arising
out of the notes to the courts of Valenzuela to the exclusion of all other courts, recourse to any one of
which is authorized or permitted under the RoC
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
Words used in the stipulation are clear and unambiguous, a promise to submit to the jurisdiction of a
specific court, without an express reservation of the right to resort to one of more of the tribunals
accessible under the Rules of Court is an agreement definitely fixing the permissible venue in only one
place (in this case, Valenzuela) to the exclusion of other competent courts
ISSUE: WON venue was improperly laid as the promissory notes from respondent contained the express stipulation
that he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela for any legal action arising out of those notes
NO, can resort to other competent courts

MORTELL, KHRISKA VIKTORIA M.

CASE # 20

HELD:
-

Permissive stipulations have been received with judicial approval and court has declared in the past the
either of the parties is authorized to lay venue of an action in the court named in the stipulation. However,
the stipulation may not deprive either party of its right to elect, or option to have to resort to, another
competent court
The stipulation merely confers/confirms a right upon the party to elect recourse to that particular venue
stipulated but not to the exclusion of others
The stipulation must be distinguished from others which require or compel parties to lay venue of an action
in a specified place and in that particular place only. In that case, it must clearly indicate, through qualifying
or restrictive words, that the parties deliberately intended to exclude actions from the operation of
ordinary permissive rules on venue and they intend to designate a specific venueintent to establish an
inflexible restriction to one single place is not to be presumed or inferred from stipulations that (like the
one in this case) include no qualifying or exclusionary terms
Reading the stipulation, it does not require the laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily.
The ordinary import of the stipulation is the mere authorizing of, or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela,
with no indication of any intent of the parties to bar suit in other competent courts
Court also noted that not one of the respondents had claimed to have been put to undue hardship or
inconvenience as a result of the institution of the action in Makati. Venue relates to the trial and touches
more upon convenience of parties rather upon the substance or merits of the case

MORTELL, KHRISKA VIKTORIA M.

CASE # 20

HEIRS OF PURISIMA NALA v. CABANSAG

June 13, 2008
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Cause of Action; General

G.R. No. 161188

Austria-Martinez

SUMMARY: Cabansag filed a case for damages against Nala. He alleges that he suffered
damages when Nala, through Atty Del Prado, demanded rental payments from a land he
occupies (which Cabansag claims he bought).
The Court held that the basis for Cabansags claim for damages is Art 19 but the Court found
Nala not liable. The Court held that there was no abuse of right on Nalas part when she
demanded rent.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
FACTS:
According to Cabansag, he bought a 50-square meter property from Sps Gomez
October 1991: He received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del
Prado), in
behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until
he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which criminal and
civil actions will be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991.
Because of such demands, he suffered damages and was constrained to file the case
against Nala and Atty. Del Prado
Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was
merely acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership.
Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her
late husband, Eulogio Duyan. The 400-square meter property was conveyed to spouses
Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it will be merely held by them
in trust for the Duyan's children.
RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent, finding Nala liable for damages. This was
affirmed by CA.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
CA erred in: not considering the right of Purisima Nala to assert her rights and interest over the
property,
and in not considering the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in the case for
reconveyance which upheld the rights and interest of Purisima Nala and her children over a
certain parcel of land and lastly, awarding damages and attorneys fees without basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages.
HELD:
The Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision
of law under which it held petitioners liable for damages.
But, based on the allegations in respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that the
basis for his claim for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which provides: Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal
Pua, Irene Mae

[CASE # 01]

because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the

source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good
faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right
when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.
In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in
bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her
counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to
respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala's actions since she believed that
the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was
illegally occupying the same.
Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with
the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless nights when he received the demand
letters; however, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from
the injury. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the
demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her
legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of
his own legal right does no injury. Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent
should be borne solely by him.
Petition granted. Civil case filed by Cabansag is dismissed.

(Regarding the property, it has already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs. In its Decision dated
March 8, 2000 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and ordered the reconveyance of the property to
petitioners, and TCT No. 281115 was declared canceled. Said CA Decision was affirmed by this Court in its
Decision dated March 18, 2005 in G.R. No. 144148, which became final and executory on July 27, 2005.)

Pua, Irene Mae

[CASE # 01]

FLORES v. MALLARE-PHILLIPS
24 Sept 1986
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Cause of Action; Joinder

G.R. No. 66620

Feria, J.

SUMMARY: Flores filed a case before the RTC against Binongcal for P11,643.00 and Calion for P10,212.00. RTC
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, saying below jurisdictional amount of P20K. Flores appealed, claiming joinder of
defendants. SC denies, saying misjoinder as the claims against Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct from
each other and neither falls within jurisdictional amount of RTC. SC also compares old and new rules of joinder of
parties. Under the old rules (wrt to joinder of defendants), jurisdiction is acquired if based on the amount of each claim
sought to be joined (regardless of w/n same transactions). Under the new rules, the totality test is applied, and joinder is
only allowed if the causes of action arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions, and there is a common
question of law or fact.
FACTS:
Flores filed a case before the RTC of Baguio City and Benguet Province:
1. against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay P11,643.00 representing the cost of truck tires the latter purchased
on credit from Flores from August to October 1981
2. against Fernando Calion for refusing to pay P10,212.00 representing the cost of truck tires the latter purchased on
credit from Flores from March 1981 to October 1981.
Binongcals counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
o Amount of the demand against Binongcal was only P11,643.00
o Under BP 29, RTC only has exclusive original jurisdiction if demand is more than P20,000.00.
o Although Calion was also impleaded, his obligation for P10,212.00 is separate and distinct.
o Callions counsel joined in the Motion.
RTC judge (Mallare-Phillipps) granted the Motion and dismissed petitioners complaint. SC affirms
ISSUE: W/N RTC had jurisdiction? NO.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Apply the totality rule under Sec. 33(1) of BP 129:
where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions
Sec 11, of Interim Rules, also provide:
In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be
the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not
the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the
amount thereof must be specifically alleged.
1
Comparing these to Sec. 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 , the deletion of the last phrase made the totality of claims in all,
not in each, of the causes of action, as the jurisdictional test.
HELD:
No difference between the old and new rules with respect to the fact that when a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or
more separate causes of action, the amount of demand shall be the totality of all claims in all the causes of action
(w/n same transactions).
However there is a difference wrt two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant.
o OLD RULE: "where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to
different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test";
o NEW RULE: same as with one plaintiff against two or more defendants.
But, Rule 3, Sec. 6 states that these causes of action should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact.
In this case, there is a misjoinder of parties because Binongcals and Calions claims are separate and distinct from
each other; and neither of their claims falls within the RTC jurisdiction for being less than P20K
*SC also illustrated the difference of the old and new rules of permissive joinders via these cases. If the new rules were applied in here, the
RTC would have jurisdiction only if claims arose from same transactions / series of transactions; and there is a common question of law or fact.

Soriano y Cia v. Jose: 29 employees joined in a complaint against defendant to collect their respective claims. Each of the 29 claims fall
under the municipal court, but its aggregate sum would fall under RTC. In this case, even if demands were separate, distinct and
independent, joint suit was taken cognizance by the municipal courts.

International Colleges v. Argonza: 25 dismissed teachers jointly sued defendant for unpaid salaries, SC affirmed the jurisdiction of the
municipal court because the amount of each claim was within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts.

1 Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of
the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes
of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test

CASE 03

REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 117209
Feb. 9, 1996
J. Regalado
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Joinder
SUMMARY:
Sps. Munson filed a petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. In the petition, they prayed for a change of
name from Kevin Earl to Aaron Joseph to complement the surname Munson y Andrade. RP objected. The SC rejected
their claim because a petition for change of name is different from a petition for adoption. Thus, there can be no
joinder of actions since both are conceptually different ideas.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari from decision of RTC Pasig. (RULE 65)
FACTS:
March 10, 1994, Sps. Munson filed a petition to adopt Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran (less than 1 year old).
They also prayed for the change of the first name to Aaron Joseph, his baptized name and his name at the
Munson house since May 6, 1993, when he arrived at the Munsons residence.
April 18, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines (RP) opposed the relief for change of name during trial.
o A petition for change of name should be done in a separate proceeding.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Sps. Munson.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
1. A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name should be done in 2 different proceedings. A change of
name would involve a substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should
accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefore being conformably satisfied.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS:
1. Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line
with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. There is no prohibition in the Rules against the
joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.
2. The conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of
parties, have been met. They rely on Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of
the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption YES!
(2) Whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name NONE!
HELD:
Rules on Joinder of Actions
1. Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following
requisites:
(a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and
(b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for
demands for money or are of the same nature and character.
Definitions
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.
A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in
one declaration, complaint or petition.
SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #23

The party litigant has the option to join causes of action.

The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of
a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting and
might under applicable joinder rules be joined.
General Rule: A party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action.
Intention: to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be
done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants.
Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies
between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable,
with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.
The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity
between them.
While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be
some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the
restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.
Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
In The Case at Bar
There is no relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they
present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder.
The petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of name of the
adoptee.
Underlying test: conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under the Rules.
A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and
purpose, are different from each other.
Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws, rules, and issues.
In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to evaluate the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications
to bring up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs. Republic).
In a petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the
propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic).
Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz are non sequitur (it does not follow). The commonality of relationship which stands
out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and change of name.
In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to
transfer the management of conjugal assets to the wife.
In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the
land subject of partition and distribution proceeding.
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal
construction thereof.[ Brief discussion of the importance of procedure]
Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and
connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules.
Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #23

OTHER RULINGS:
1. The given or proper name of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register.
The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered first
name.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefore furtively inserted in a
petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefore is indispensable in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication.
It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. Thus, it cannot be
granted by means of any other proceeding.
2. While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of
an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and
moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably considered.
The change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does not lawfully
extend to or include the proper or given name.
By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court. For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively
implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. A petition
for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites
thereforein order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity.
A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider
carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be
authorized to change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil
register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.
Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage;
(e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudice to anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #23

PANTRANCO v. STANDARD INSURANCE

16 March 2005
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Cause of Action; Joinder

G.R. No. 140746

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

SUMMARY: Pantrancos bus, driven by Buncan and insured with Standard, hit a jeep owned by Martina Gicale. Following
the hit and run incident, the total cost of the repair of the jeep amounted to P21,415.00, which was shouldered by
Standard (P8K) and Martina (P13,415). Pantranco is questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC in taking cognizance of the
case since the cause of action each respondent did not arise from the same transaction. SC says that there was a
permissive joinder of parties, since a) there was a common transaction (the bus hitting the jeep); b) there is common
question of fact (w/n petitioners was negligent); and c) the joinder is not proscribed by provisions on jurisdiction
(following the totality rule, the amount of demand is the whole P21,415.00 thus under the RTCs jurisdiction indeed).
FACTS:
Crispin Gicale was driving a passenger jeepney owned by his mother, Martina Gicale along the National Highway in
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Behind the jeep was a bus owned by Pantranco, driven by Alexander Buncan. When the two
vehicles were negotiating a curve, the bus overtook the jeepney and hit the left rear side of the jeep and sped away.
Crispin reported the incident to a police station and Standard Insurance, who paid only P8K out of the P21,415.00 total
repair cost (Martina shouldered the balance). Standard and Martina then demanded reimbursement from Pantranco and
Buncan. When they refused, a complaint was filed before the RTC, which rendered a decision ordering Pantrance and
Buncan to pay P8K to Standard and P13,415 to Martina. CA affirmed. SC also affirmed.
ISSUES: W/N RTC had jurisdiction even if the cause of action each respondent did not arise from the same transaction?
HELD: YES. There was a valid joinder of parties in this case.
Rule 3, Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or
arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.
Permissive joinder of parties requires that:
a. the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions;
b. there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and
c. such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.
In this case, Pantrancos bus hitting the jeep is a single transaction common to all. The common question of fact, is
whether or not petitioners are negligent. Thus, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain
the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here even if Martina and
Standard filed separate complaints, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action.
Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids
multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Rule 2, Sec 5, also provides that a party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of
action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: (d) Where the claims in all the
causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
This paragraph embodies the totality rule as in BP 129, Sec 33 which states, among others, that where there are
several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions.
Thus, for the purposes of determining jurisdiction, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims P8K of
Standard and P13,415.00 of Martina. BP 129, Sec 19 provides that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to
more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case. Also, RA7691, expanding the
jurisdiction of the MTCs had not yet taken effect when the complaint was filed.

SULIT LEOR JYLE C.

CASE #s

TRAVEL WIDE ASSOCIATED SALES (PHILS.), INC. v. CA

25 July 1991 G.R. No. 77356 Cruz, J.
TOPIC: Parties; Real Party in Interest
SUMMARY: Petitioners allege that they are not the real parties-in-interest, being mere agents of a disclosed principals.
The Court held that it would be useful to make a more careful appraisal of the evidence. If the petitioners were
indeed acting as agents, they could still be held liable under Art. 1909. Case remanded for further proceedings.
NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the CA, which remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.

March 1975 - Decisions Systems Corp. and its President Alcuaz filed a complaint in RTC Manila alleging that Travel
Wide Associated Sales (TWAS) and Trans World Airlines (TWA) failed to comply with their obligations under Travel
Pass '73 USA, a package deal consisting of tickets to LA, NY, and Boston plus accommodations.
TWA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action. RTC ordered the
plaintiffs to amend their complaint and particularize their averments.
TWA and TWAS (petitioners) filed separate motions to dismiss on the ground that the amended complaint still did
not contain a cause of action. RTC held that the complaints were now "sufficiently particular".
Petitioners filed a joint answer alleging special defense that they were not the real parties-in-interest; they acted
only as agents of a disclosed principal. They pointed to Travel Pass 73 Plan brochure stipulation that said "Tour
Services, Inc. and/or their agents" are acting "as agents for the passengers." They stressed that the Miscellaneous
Charge Order issued to Alcuaz indicated that the amount of $218.00 was payable to Tour Services, Inc.
Petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special Defense, which was opposed by the plaintiffs on
the ground that the special defense was barred, not having been raised in the two motions to dismiss the amended
complaint. RTC granted the joint motion and held a preliminary hearing.
After the prelim hearing, RTC dismissed the complaint, finding that neither of the defendants was a real party-ininterest; TWAS was the general agent of TWA, and TWA was only an agent of a disclosed principal, Tour Services Inc.
CA reversed the RTC, holding that the defendants should have pleaded the special defense that they were not real
parties-in-interest in their motion to dismiss and not in their joint answer, conformably to the omnibus motion rule.
Not having done so, they are deemed to have waived that ground. CA remanded the case for further proceedings.

PETITIONERS (TWA & TWAS) ARGUE: Under Rule 16, Sec. 1, "the defense of not being a real party-in-interest" is not one of
the grounds for a motion to dismiss. They could not have pleaded it in their motion to dismiss.
W/N petitioners are the real parties-in-interest YES.
The CA was correct in setting aside the dismissal, but the Court disagrees with the reason.
o A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The term applies to both the plaintiff and the defendant, and the
suit may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action if neither of them is a real party-in-interest.
o Even if the special defense was not invoked in the motion to dismiss, it would still not be deemed waived
because it is one of the two exceptions mentioned in Rules 9, Section 2, to the omnibus motion rule. The
first is lack of jurisdiction, which can be invoked any time, even on appeal. The second is lack of a cause of
action, which can be raised even during the trial on the merits.
RTC judge erred in conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in support of the petitioners' affirmative
defense. As stated in Heirs of Clavano v. Genato, "It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is
the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. "
RTC may have also erred in holding that the petitioners were mere agents of a disclosed principal. The Court
believes it would be useful to make a more careful appraisal of the evidence, particularly the terms and conditions
of the brochure. The plaintiffs are entitled to prove that the petitioners did not provide for the accommodations. It
is also worth noting that if the petitioners were indeed acting as agents of the passengers, as the brochure
stipulates, they could still be held liable under Article 19091.
Because the petitioners are the real parties-in-interest, as defendants in the suit, the motion to dismiss should
not have been granted. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

1
Art. 1909. The agent is responsible not only for fraud, but also for negligence, which shall be judged with more or less rigor by the courts, according to whether
the agency was or was not for a compensation.

VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S.

PAGE 1 OF 1

CASE # 06

TUZON V. JUDGE CORIBEL-PURRUGANAN

26 NOVEMBER 2001
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: PARTIES; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662

PARDO, J.

SUMMARY: This case is an administrative complaint filed against Judge Coribel-Purruganan after she personally
prepared and signed the comment in behalf of Raymundo Catral. The latter was directed by the CA to file his
comment on a pending petition for certiorari assailing Judge Coribel-Purugganans Order. The Court ruled that
he was merely a nominal party and has no personal interest or personality in the case and that a judge
whose order is challenged in an appellate court need not file any answer, or take an active part in the
proceedings unless expressly directed by order of the Court.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Upon a complaint filed by complainant, Tuzon, the Deputy Court
Administrator submitted to the SC a recommendation that Judge be fined for filing an answer in behalf of
respondent, Catral who was required by the Court of Appeals to submit his comment on a petition for certiorari
challenging Judge C-Ps order.
FACTS
On June 25, 1988, Victor Tuzon filed before the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the Order of Judge
Purugganan denying his motion to cross-examine a witness. The CA, thru a resolution, directed respondent
Catral to file his comment.
Judge Purugganan filed the comment on behalf of Catral and herself and affixed her name and signature on
the Comment. The CA then dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Tuzon then filed before the SC an administrative complaint against Judge alleging that she engaged in the
private practice of law when she filed the comment. The Judge then responded and said that she authored
the comment as the lawyer of Catral was sick.
The Deputy Court Administrator recommended that she be fined for filing the comment on behalf of Catral
and defending her own questioned order.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The Judges actions constituted for illegal practice of law, gross ignorance of the law,

serious misconduct, evident bias and partiality, knowingly rendering unjust judgment, and willful violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: She filed a comment on behalf of one of the parties to the case because the

counsel was suffering from an illness at the time.

ISSUE/HELD: WON it was proper for Judge Purugganan to file the Comment on behalf of herself and the
respondent being the author of the assailed order. NO
RATIO
The Court has reminded judges of the lower courts that a judge whose order is challenged in an appellate

court need not file any answer, or take an active part in the proceedings unless expressly directed by
order of the Court.

The Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any
pleading therein. If either party elevates the case to a higher court, the public respondents
shall be included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically
directed, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein.

Furthermore, by filing the comment, she has failed to maintain a detached attitude from the case and
engaged in private practice of law in clear violation of both Sec. 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule
5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING: Guilty of illegal practice of law, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Revised Rules of
Court.
Rivera

Premium Marble Resources Inc. v. CA

G.R. No. 96551
Nov. 4, 1996
Torres Jr., J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: PartiesReal Party In Interest
SUMMARY: Premium Marble (PM), assisted by Atty. Dumadag filed an action for damages
against International Corporate Bank (ICB). Then PM, this time represented by Siguion Reyna,
Montecillio and Ongsiako, filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the filing of the case was
without authority from the board of directors as shown by the excerpt of the minutes of the
boards meeting. PM through Atty. Dumadag contended that those who signed the board
resolution were not directors of the corporation and were allegedly former officers and
stockholders dismissed for fraudulent acts. PM, through Siguion Reyna, asserted that it is the
general information sheet filed with the SEC that is the best evidence to show who the
stockholders of a corporation are. SC upheld the TC ruling, as the filing of the case v. ICB was
not authorized by a duly constituted board of directors. The power of the corporation to sue
and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its
corporate powers.
FACTS: Premium Marble (PM), assisted by Atty. Dumadag, filed an action for damages against
International Corporate Bank (ICB). The complaint stated that Ayala Investment issued 3 checks
worth P31,663.88 payable to PM, and that former PM officers headed by Saturnino G. Belen,
Jr., without any authority from PM, deposited the checks to the current account of his conduit
corporation, Intervest. Although the checks were clearly payable to the PM and crossed on their
face and for payees account only, ICB accepted the checks to be deposited to Intervests
account, and then presented the same for collection from the drawee bank which subsequently
cleared them, allowing Intervest to make use of PMs funds. PM demanded that ICB restitute
the amount of the checks; ICB refused. PM thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering ICB
to pay the amount of P31,663.88 representing the value of the checks plus interest, and
P100,000 as exemplary damages. In its Answer, ICB alleged PM has no personality/authority to
sue and the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
PM, this time represented by Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Office as counsel,
filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the filing of the case was without authority from its duly
constituted board of directors, as shown by an excerpt from the minutes of PMs board of
directors meeting. In its opposition to the motion to dismiss, PM, through Atty. Dumadag
claimed that those who signed the board resolution (Belen, Jr., Nograles & Reyes), were not
directors of PM, but former officers and stockholders dismissed for various irregularities and
fraudulent acts; that Siguion Reyna Law office is the lawyer of Belen and Nograles, not of PM;
and that PMs Articles of Incorporation show that Belen, Nograles and Reyes are not majority
stockholders. Siguion Reyna Law firm, as PM counsel, claimed that it is the general information
sheet filed with the SEC that is the best evidence that would show who are the stockholders of a
corporationnot the Articles of Incorporation since these do not keep track of the changes that
take place after new stockholders subscribe to corporate shares of stocks. ICB filed a
manifestation that it was adopting Premiums motion to dismiss and joining it in praying for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that PM lacks authority from its duly constituted board of
directors.
TC: the PM officers represented by Atty. Dumadag do not yet have the legal capacity to sue for
and in behalf of PM, and/or the filing of this present action by them before Case No. 2688 of the
SEC could be decided is a premature exercise of authority or assumption of legal capacity for
and in behalf of plaintiff corporation. Before SEC Case No. 2688 can be decided, neither the set
of officers represented by Atty. Dumadag nor the set represented by Siguion Reyna may

Bries

CASE #8

prosecute cases in the name of PM. The existence of a cause of action against ICB is
dependent upon the resolution of the SEC case involving intra-corporate controversy.
CA: affirmed the TCs dismissal of the case. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was the filing of the case for damages against ICB authorized by a duly constituted
Board of Directors?
HELD: No. Petition denied. CA AFFIRMED. PM through the first set of officers (Mario Zavalla,
Oscar Gan, Lionel Pengson, Jose Ma. Silva, Aderito Yujuico and Rodolfo Millare) presented the
Minutes of the meeting of its Board of Directors as proof that the filing of the case was
authorized by the Board. On the other hand, the second set of officers (Saturnino Belen, Jr.,
Alberto Nograles and Jose L.R. Reyes), presented a Resolution to show that PM did not
authorize the filing in its behalf of any suit against ICB.
PM submitted its Articles of Incorporation dated Nov. 6, 1979 with the following as Directors:
Mario Zavalla, Pedro Celso, Oscar Gan, Lionel Pengson, and Jose Ma. Silvabut based on the
general information sheet and the Certification issued by the SEC on Aug. 19, 1986, as of
March 4, 1981, the officers and members of the board of directors of PM were: Alberto
Nograles, Fernando Hilario, Augusto Galace, Jose L.R. Reyes, Pido Aguilar, and Saturnino G.
Belen, Jr as chairman. The Minutes of the Meeting of the Board on April 1, 1982 stated that the
newly elected officers for the year 1982 were Oscar Gan, Mario Zavalla, Aderito Yujuico and
Rodolfo Millare, PM failed to show proof that this election was reported to the SEC.
The Court held, In the absence of any board resolution from its board of directors the
authority to act for and in behalf of the corporation, the present action must necessarily
fail. The power of the corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the
board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. Thus, the issue of authority and the
invalidity of plaintiff-appellants subscription which is still pending, is a matter that is also
addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Securities & Exchange
Commission.
According to Sec. 26 of the Corporation Code, all corporations duly organized pursuant thereto
are required to submit within 30 days to the SEC the names, nationalities and residences of the
directors, trustees and officers elected. This is to give the public information, under sanction of
oath of responsible officers, of the nature of business, financial condition and operational status
of the company together with information on its key officers so that those dealing with or
intending to do business with it have the means of knowing facts concerning the corporations
financial resources and business responsibility. The claim of PM as represented by Atty.
Dumadag, that Zaballa, et al., are the incumbent officers, has not been fully substantiated. In
the absence of an authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the officers
of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation.

Bries

CASE #8

MARCELINO ARCELONA, TOMASA ARCELONA-CHIANG & RUTH

ARCELONA vs. CA, RTC, and MOISES FARNACIO
2 OCTOBER 1997
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: PARTIES; NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

G.R. No. 102900

PANGINIBAN, J.

SUMMARY: Some co-owners of a pond were not impleaded in a case over its ownership. The judgment made by the
lower court is void for lack of jurisdiction over indispensable parties. As co-owners of the undivided pond, the
petitioners must be considered as indispensable parties, their interest being prejudiced by the assailed decision
without being granted due process.

HOW DID THE CASE REACH THE SC: Petition for review of the CA denying petitioners plea for annulment
of a final and executory judgment rendered by the RTC of Dagupan City.
FACTS
The six Arcelona siblings are the co-owners of the pond they inherited from their parents.
They leased the pond to Tandoc and Olanday, et al., who assigned Farnacio as the caretaker-tenant.
After three years, their contract was extinguished and Tandoc surrendered possession.
However, Fernacio wanted to retain his tenancy, so he instituted a case for against the lessors
Olanday, et al. RTC ruled in favor of Fernacio, eventually claiming ownership of the entire property.
Only the three Arcelanos, residing in the Philippines were impleaded in the case.
The petitioners three Arcelanos that became American residents filed with Court of Appeals a petition
for annulment of the aforesaid judgment against private respondent and the implementing sheriff. The
CA issued a resolution directing petitioners to implead as party defendant the RTC.
The CA still eventually affirmed the judgment of the RTC. The petition for review was filed with the SC.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The RTC judgment should be annulled because they were not impleaded. Being
the legal owners of the property they should be considered as indispensable parties to the original case.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO
WON the judgment should be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of indispensable
parties and denial of due process? YES, Petition GRANTED.

There are three remedies available: first, a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of RoC; second, a
direct action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud; and third, a direct action for certiorari or
collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals.
The declaration of nullity of a patently void final judgment is based on grounds other than extrinsic fraud, which
includes lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process.
Basic considerations of due process impel a similar holding (as in a case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter) in cases involving jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable parties which a court must acquire before
it can validly pronounce judgments personal to said defendants.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the manner
required by law or otherwise by his voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been
summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered
against such defendant is null and void.
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest.
It is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status as such, must implead all the co-owners of
the land; in failing to do so, there can be no final determination of the action. In other words, a tenant
who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire coowned land. Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed
within the definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded.
In this case the petitioning Arcelanos are co-owners of an undivided part of the property1 being claimed
by Ferancio, making them indispensable parties to the case that should have been summoned as
prescribed by Rule 3. They were knowingly omitted as defendants by the plaintiff as seen in the
pleadings and testimonies, and the Court could have impleaded them by virtue of Rule 3 Sec. 11.

Other issues not relevant.

If the land was divided, and if the decision did not divest the petitioners of their portion, the decision may have been valid.
CABALLA

CASE # 9

DE GUIA. v. CA
08 Oct 2003
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Parties; Necessary and Indispensable Parties1

G.R. No. 120864

Carpio, J.

SUMMARY: Ownership of a fishpond is being claimed by two parties Abejo and De Guia. De Guia possesses
the entire fishpond, so Abejo filed an action for recovery of possession for his share, naming 39,611 out of
the 79,220 sqm. De Guia claims that partition should first be done before a co-owner may exercise his right to
claim a segregated portion of the land. SC agrees that partition should be made firstl but holds that a since a
co-ownership exists between Abejo and De Guia, a co-owner may file a recovery of possession against
another co-owner. Its effect is then limited to the recognition of the co-ownership, and not the awarding of a
specific potion of the property being claimed.
FACTS:
A fishpond is registered under the names of Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego (married to Juan
Abejo) conveying share to each of them, as evidenced by the TCT. The fishpond contains a total
land of 79,220sqm.
De Guia (with a certain Victa) acquired possession of the entire fishpond by virtue of a Salin ng
Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan (lease contract) between him and the heirs of Lejano. Lease was
effective from July 30 1974 to Nov 30 1979 for P100,000.00 consideration.
This lease contract was executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo as the sole heir of
Lorenza Araniego (who died intestate).
Teofilo Abejo sold his undivided share in the fishpond to his son Jose Abejo.
Manuel De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond and derive income from the property despite
expiration of the lease contract. Several demand letters sent by Teofilo and Jose to no avail.
In anticipation of De Guias vacating of the fishpond, Jose Abejo entered into a two year Kasunduan ng
Buwisan ng Palaisdaan with Ruperto Villarico for P50,000.00, but this contract had to be cancelled
because De Guia did not vacate the fishpond.
Jose Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages, alleging:
He is claiming ownership of a undivided portion (39,611sqm out of 79,220sqm)
De Guia continues to possess and use the fishpond without any contract and without paying rent,
causing damage and prejudice to Abejo.
De Guia refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the fishpond despite repeated demands to
do so after De Guias sublease contract over the fishpond had expired.
Abejo prays for the court to order De Gua to vacate the 39,611sqm it owns.
De Guia, in his Answer, alleges that the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed:
Fishpond was originally owned by Maxima Termulo, who died intestate, leaving Primitave Lejano as the
only heir. The heirs of Lejano, not Abejo, are the owners of the fishpond.
He was authorized by the heirs of Lejano to possess the entire fishpond.
Abejos ownership of the portion is void, and he claims ownership over a portion as well.
De Guia seeks for damages and reimbursement for improvements introduced as builder in good faith.
RTC ruled in favor of Abejo, ordering De Guia to turn over possession of of the fishpond to Abejo. It held that
De Guias lease contract expired in 1979 and Abejo acquired his fathers share in 1983. However, Abejo failed
to present evidence of the partition of the fishpond, which makes impossible the identification of the specific
area pertaining to Abejo.
CA affirmed RTC, debunking De Guias theory that partition was the proper remedy (as against recovery of
possession), since the trial court decision effectively enforces Abejos right over the property which De GUia
violated by his possession and use without proper compensation.
SC also affirms, subject to a few modifications.

Not sure how case is related to topic. Im guessing that other co-owners not indispensable/necessary party to a suit involving the coproperty owned in common. This is evidenced by this case wherein a co-owner sues a co-owner. NOT. SURE.
PAGE 1 OF 2

CASE 10

ISSUES:
1. W/N an action possession and turn-over of the 12 undivided portion of a common property is proper
before partition? NO.
2.

W/N there is sufficient bases for compensatory damages and attorneys fees? YES

HELD:
1. De Guia claims that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the property until there is a partition.
Therefore Abejo should have filed an action for partition, instead of an action for recovery of possession,
since the latter makes enforcement difficult (if not impossible) before partition of the property. SC agrees.

Art 484: there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing belongs to different persons
Art 487 provides that, any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This applies not only
against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts
exclusive ownership of the entire property.
However, if filed against a co-owner, the purpose is only to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. A
plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because the latter still has a right of
possession as a co-owner. The courts cannot proceed with the partitioning of the co-owned property.
Prior to partition, a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property.

In the case at bar

De Guia has been in exclusive possession of the entire fishpond since July 1974.
De Guia implicitly recognized Abejos share when he offered to settle the case and vacate the property.
Neither De Guia nor Abejo asserted a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire fishpond.
So, while Abejo and De Guia are co-owners. They are owners of the whole and over the whole, and they
can jointly exercise the right of dominion.
Since a co-ownership subsists, judicial or extra judicial partition is the proper recourse; both in Abejos
claim for the 39,611sqm and claim for the accounting of the profits De Guia received from the fishpond.
At the same time, they are individual owners of a portion, which is still abstract before partition.
However, De Guia is still liable to pay the rent.
A co-owner cannot devote a common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.
If there is an agreement to lease the property in common, the co-owners may demand rent from the coowner who uses the property.
In the case at bar
Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the fishpond to De Guia until 1979. Beyond that period, he
had no right to use the entire fishpond without paying rent.
To allow him to do that would prejudice Abejos right to receive rent, pursuant to his share in the pond
Abejo acquired his share on Nov 22 1983, so De Guia shall pay P25K yearly rent from that date.
2.

SC finds no cogent reason to overturn the RTC (as affirmed by the CA. P25K yearly compensation is upheld. Likewise,
attorneys fees is proper as under Art 2208 (2), attorneys fees may be awarded where the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. De Guia being a lawyer, he
should have known that a co-owner could not have taken possession of a common property

DISPOSITIVE:
Co-ownership between De Guia and Abejo over the entire FISHPOND is recognized
They shall equally enjoy possession and use of the entire FISHPOND prior to partition;
The compensatory damages of P25,000 per annum representing rent from 27 Nov 1983 until May 1992 shall earn
interest at 6% p.a. from 27 Nov 1983 until finality of this decision, and thereafter at 12% p.a. until full payment;
De Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent of P25,000 from June 1992 until finality of this decision, with interest
at 6% per annum during the same period, and thereafter at 12% interest per annum until full payment.
From finality of this decision and until de Guia exclusively possesses the entire FISHPOND, he shall pay Abejo a
yearly rental of P25,000, unless Abejo secures from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate.

PAGE 2 OF 2

CASE 10

BALOLOY v. HULAR
G.R. NO. 157767
SEPTEMBER 9, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: PARTIES; NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
SUMMARY: Respondent Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title against the heirs of (the deceased)
Iluminado Baloloy, alleging that Hulars father was the owner of a parcel of land and that it was part of Lot No.
3347 of the Juban Cadastre. Hular also alleged that Baloloy had acquired a free patent over the property
through fraud (the parcel Hular was claiming was, under the patent, considered to be part of Lot No. 3353,
which Baloloy owned.) (See how the case reached SC) SC held that respondent was unable to implead
all the indispensable parties in his original complaint in the RTC, thus all proceedings subsequent to
the filing of the complaint were ineffective, including the judgement.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: RTC held in favor of Respondent. CA affirmed; MR with CA denied.
Case rose to SC through certiorari (Rule 45).
FACTS
(See summary)
Context/Background
Irene Griarte owned a parcel of land with an area 6,666 sqm. She sold it to Martiniano Baldebina. The property
was bounded on the south by the property of Lino Estopin. A road was constructed, which separated the
property of Baldebina and Estopin, and was subsequently used as the boundary for the properties. Baldebinas
land was north of the road, while Estopins was south of it. A cadastral survey was conducted, and Baldebinas
land was designated as a portion of Lot No. 3353 (the other portion was owned by someone else named
Gruta); Estopins land was designated Lot No. 3347.
Balbedina sold his land (a portion of Lot No. 3353) to Iluminado Baloloy. The latter thereafter acquired a free
patent over the land. Gruta sold his land (the other portion of Lot No. 3353) to the husband of one of
Iluminados children. Estopin died; his wife Lagata subsequently sold their land (Lot No. 3347) to Hular.
The controversy arose when Hulars son (respondent) built a house on Lot No. 3347, but it also occupied a big
portion of lot No. 3353
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The land is part of Lot No. 3352.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: The land is part of Lot. 3347, and in any case the respondent has acquired

ownership through acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WoN all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the respondent in the trial court (NO)
(2) WoN said respondent had a cause of action against the petitioners (NO)
(3) WoN the respondent had acquired ownership over the property through acquisitive prescription (NO)
RATIO (of Issue 1, to keep it short.)
When respondents his parents died intestate, they were survived by their children, the respondent and his
siblings. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the
deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner
exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use
and enjoyment of the same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article
covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory
action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of
GASTANES

Case #11

the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner
and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who
are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and
praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived
their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware
of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of
the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the decision
of the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings, being coowners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be
stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the
respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019.
Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has
been held that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondents
siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the
court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
RULING: Petition granted. RTC and CA reversed.

GASTANES

Case #11

ARNELITO ADLAW AN v. EMETERIO & NARCISA ADLAW AN

G.R. No. 161916
2006 JANUARY 20
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
T OPIC IN S YLLABUS : Parties Necessary and Indispensible Parties
S UMMARY : Arnelito Adlawan, claiming to be Dominador Adlawans acknowledged illegitimate child and sole
heir, brought suit for unlawful detainer against Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan, Dominadors siblings. The lot in
dispute is Lot 7226, which is registered in Dominadors name. Dominador was survived by his legal wife,
Graciana, whose heirs also attempted to intervene to protect their rights as co-owners of the property.

SC: A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed,
however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be
dismissed.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review of the CA Decision which set aside the RTC
Decision and reinstated the MTC Decision; MTC Decision dismissed petitioner Arnelito Adlawans unlawful
detainer suit against respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan; also challenging the CA Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS/PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:

The instant ejectment suit stemmed from a dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, registered in
the name of Dominador Adlawan (+), located at Barrio Lipata, Minglanilla, Cebu.
Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan claims he is Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate child and sole heir. He
executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself said Lot 7226 and the house built thereon. Out of respect and
generosity to respondents Emeterio and Narcisa, who are Dominadors siblings, he granted their plea to
occupy the property, provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise.
In 1999, he verbally requested that Emeterio and Narcisa vacate the property, but they refused and instead
filed an action for quieting of title. Upon respondents refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate (dated
2000 Aug. 2), Arnelito filed the instant case.

FACTS/RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
Narcisa and Emeterio (70 and 59 y.o., respectively), denied begging Arnelito to allow them to stay on the
property. They stress that they have been occupying the property since birth.
They allege that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan,
and the ancestral house was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia. During the lifetime of their parents
and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana, also
occupied the same. Arnelito, however, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226.
o

Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of the house. Since they were not qualified to
obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of the lot in the name of their son, Dominador, who was the only one
in the family with a college education.

Other points raised by Narcisa and Emeterio:

o Through a simulated deed of sale, a title was issued to Dominador, enabling him to secure a loan
with Lot 7226 as collateral. The execution of the deed notwithstanding, a then-single Dominador
LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #12

o
o

never disputed his parents ownership of the lot. Even after marriage, Dominador and his wife did not
disturb the possession of the property.
Dominadors signature at the back of Arnelitos birth cerfticate was forged. Thus, Arnelito is not an
heir and has no right to claim ownership of the lot.
Even if Arnelito is indeed Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son, Arnelitos right to succeed is
doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife.

MTC: Dismissed complaint. The establishment of Arnelitos filiation and the settlement of Dominadors
estate are conditions precedent to the accrual of Dominadors action for ejectment. Gracianas legal heirs
are also entitled to their share in Lot 7226 since Dominador was survived by Graciana.
RTC: Reversed MTC. Dominadors title over the lot cannot be collaterally attacked.
CA: Set aside RTC and reinstated MTC. Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. Thus,
Arnelito cannot eject Emeterio and Narcisa from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own
name and as the sole owner of the property.
Note: Gracianas nephew and nieces (heirs of Graciana) also filed a motion for leave to intervene,
contending that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in the lot and their intervention is necessary to
protect their right over the property. They also declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing
Emeterio and Narcisa to stay on the lot until a formal partition of the property is made.

ISSUE: W ON Arnelito can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment NO
HELD:
Arnelitos theory of succession ends up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is because
Dominador was survived not only by Arnelito, but also by the legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after
Dominador. By intestate succession, Graciana and Arnelito became co-owners of Lot 7226.
o Gracianas death did not make Arnelito the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because Gracianas share
passed to her relatives by consanguinity, and not to Arnelito with whom she had no blood relations.
o Arnelito has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.

Arnelito contends that even granting that he has co-owners over the lot, he can on his own file the instant
case pursuant to CC 487 (Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.). This contention
was rejected by the SC.
o A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as coplaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be
stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claim s
to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the
action should be dismissed.
Citing Tolentino: If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims
possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
o In this case, Arnelito brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own
benefit, to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. He even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication
over the disputed property. Clearly, he cannot m aintain the instant action, considering
that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory
of succession to the property of Dominador.

Arnelito also attempts to claim that he has the legal personality to file the suit because the ejectment of
Narcisa and Emeterio would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. This was also rejected by
the SC.
o Arnelito filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If
granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of
damages.
o SC also points out in default of Gracianas heirs, whom Arnelito labeled as fictitious heirs, the State
inherits her share and will be Arnelitos co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the
property.

Note: The SC also cites Baloloy v. Hular [previous case in the syllabus].

LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #12

NEWSWEEK v. IAC, NATL FEDERATION OF

SUGARCANE PLANTERS, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 63559

MAY 30, 1986

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: PARTIES CLASS SUITS

FERIA, J.

SUMMARY: Associations of sugarcane planters (landowners) from Negros Occidental filed a civil case
for libel seeking damages against Newsweek for publishing an allegedly defamatory article. The case
was intended as a class suit. However, the Supreme Court ordered the case to be dismissed since it was
not a proper class suit.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction
to annul the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order
of the then Court of First Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for libel filed by private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated March
10, 1983 which denied its Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS: On March 5, 1981, private respondents (associations of sugarcane planters in Negros
Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters) initially filed a civil
case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of
Negros Occidental, against now petitioner Newsweek (and its reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came).
The complaint alleged that Newsweek committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An
Island of Fear" in its February 23, 1981 issue. The article allegedly portrayed them to have exploited the
impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers and even brutalized and killed some of these workers
with impunity. The complaint alleged that the article showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood,
slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them in such a bad light.
Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss but the trial court and the IAC denied it. Thus the present petition.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a
cause of action because the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article
complained of regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents;
that libel can be committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to
have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond
the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS: (they assert that the case they filed is a class suit)

RELEVANT ISSUE/HELD: WON the complaint filed for libel may prosper as a class suit? -NO
RATIO:
As stated by the Court in Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen: Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group
of persons in general language only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group
unless the statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that even then no action would lie where the
body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the
publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and
law abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions
of a part." Thus, where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all- embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or
class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if, need be.
As applied in this case The case at bar is NOT a class suit. We have here a case where each of the
plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

DISPOSITIVE: (IAC reversed) Case dismissed.

[MA. KATRINA LORIS DINO-POBLETE]

[CASE #13]

MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Dawah Council of The Philippines

Date: January 28, 2003
Ponente: Bellosillo, J.
Doctrine: In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must
consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class;
(b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor
bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
FACTS
Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations, and
Muslims Linzag, Arcilla, De Guzman, Da Silva and Junio filed in RTC Manila a complaint for damages in their own
behalf and as a class suit in behalf of Muslim members nationwide, against MVRS Publications, Laconsay, Aguja,
and Binegas for publishing an offensive article1 in Bulgar on Aug1, 1992.
Complaint stated that libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims, that these words alluding to
the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings,
cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good
morals and human relations, and because of such Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the
entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. But MVRS defended itself by saying
that the article didnt mention them specifically as object of the article and that such was only an expression of
belief/opinion without malice or intention to injure Muslims.
RTC: dismissed complaint for failure to establish cause of action because persons defamed werent specifically
identified
CA: reversed because it was clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of
the Islamic faith. This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the
same religious beliefs. Also the complaint was a class suit and the Islamic DaWah is a Muslim umbrella organization
with personality to sue in interest of Muslims.
ISSUES/HELD
1. W/N elements of libel existed - NO
2. W/N Islamic Dawah et. al. had right to institute a class suit - NO
3. W/N MVRS is liable for damages - NO
RATIO
1. Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation
through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect,
good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication
of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into
disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community
may have, or tend to have, of the person. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to
advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular
member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right
of free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights. There was no fairly identifiable person
who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, Islam
DaWah and the individual Muslims have no individual causes of action. Hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly
disparaged. They must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case
to prosper. The rule on libel has been restrictive. There could be no libel against an extensive community. With regard
to the largest sectors in society, including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the
behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of the individual, will lie. If the group is a very large one, then the libelous
statement is considered to have no application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind.
Not only does the group as such have no action, the person does not establish any personal reference to himself. At
present, modern societal groups are both numerous and complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as

"ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga
ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain.
Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang
Ramadan.

the size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel
become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2) important public policies: first, where the group referred to
is large, the courts presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying to each
individual member and second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and
expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests
involved in libel cases. In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the
Muslims were particularly defamed. The statements published by MVRS didnt specifically identify nor refer to any
particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Islamic DaWah et. al. can
scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. 2
2. In any case, Islamic DaWah Councils lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class
suit. An element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation.3 In determining the question of fair
and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of
the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion
of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing
on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. The rules require that courts must
make sure that the persons intervening should be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of
all concerned. Islamic Dawah Council seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the Muslims in
the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. They obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to
represent such a global group, neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity of their interests
with those they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that there can be a safe guaranty that those
absent will be adequately represented by those present, a class suit, given its magnitude in this instance,
would be unavailing.
3. Moral damages although incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate
for injury sustained and actual damages suffered. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if
claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither
of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately established
by Islamic DaWah et al.

I didnt include the discussions on protected speech and tortious actions. Basically, libel is not protected speech and emotional distress is a

tort action in personal nature.

3

Jose Vitug

AYALA LAND, INC., petitioner, vs. MARIETTA

VALISNO, respondent.

G.R. No. 135899

February 2, 2000

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

TOPIC:

Summary
Ayala Land filed 8 cases of quieting of title, 5 of which involve Valisno as a defendant. Valisno accused Ayala
Land of forum shopping. The SC held that Ayala Land is not guilty of forum shopping as each suit was based
on a different certificate of title, hence, res judicata will not apply.

How the case reached SC

This is a petition for review of the Decision dated May 29, 1998 and Resolution dated October 13, 1998 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 47122.

Facts
Ayala Land, Inc. is the owner of several parcels of land in Las Pias City. When it began to develop its
properties, petitioner became aware of adverse claims of ownership over the properties from several
persons. Among these claimants is Marietta Valisno.

Petitioner instituted actions to quiet its titles. Since petitioner's entire property is covered by twenty-one
separate torrens titles, petitioner contends that it could have brought twenty-one distinct actions. Upon
advice of counsel, petitioner resolved to file only eight cases on a "per lot/per TCT (or sets thereof)" basis.
Other considerations dividing or grouping together petitioner's causes of action were the number of
claimants, the sizes of the claims, the contiguity of the lots involved, the manageability of litigating its
claims and the speed in the adjudication thereof. Among those eight cases, respondent was named
respondent in five of them, to wit:
(a) Civil Case No. 93-3685 of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 56, filed on October 14, 1993;
(b) Civil Case No. 94-467 of the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 275, filed on February 7, 1994;
(c) Civil Case No. 94-468 of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 64, filed on February 7, 1994;
(d) Civil Case No. 94-1432 of the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 275, filed on April 8, 1994; and
(e) Civil Case No. LP-97-0058 of the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253, filed on February 21, 1997.

Respondent filed with the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253, on March 1997 an action against petitioner
wherein she claimed ownership of the land covered by her TCT.

Both parties accused each other of forum-shopping. Petitioner alleges that respondent's claims were in
reality compulsory counterclaims which she could have and should have pleaded in the cases initiated by
petitioner against her. Respondent filed motions to hold petitioner guilty of forum-shopping for filing five
distinct cases all on the ground that her lands overlapped those of petitioner.

The RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 found petitioner guilty of forum-shopping and ordered the dismissal of
the complaint and maintained the Civil Case filed by respondent.
The RTC of Las Pias, Branch 275 found respondent guilty of forum-shopping.
The RTC of Makati City, Branch 56, dismissed the charges of both parties against each other.
In the precursor to the instant petition, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 64, found that neither party is guilty
of forum shopping.

RUIZ

case # 01

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On May 1998, the Court of Appeals
found petitioner guilty of forum-shopping and ordered the dismissal of the five cases filed by petitioner
notwithstanding that the subject of the petition forcertiorari was a mere incident in Civil Case No. 94-468.

Petitioners arguments
Petitioner insisted that inasmuch as both the Court of Appeals and respondent Marietta Valisno
acknowledged that every overlap on its titles presented a distinct cause of action which may or may not be
joined in one suit, there could have been no forum-shopping.

Respondents arguments
Respondent argued that petitioner's act of filing five separate actions against her before different courts
praying for exactly the same relief to declare her TCT null and void constitute forum-shopping, bad faith
and abuse of right

Issues
WON Ayala Land guilty of forum shopping

Held / Ratio
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No, Ayala Land not guilty of forum shopping.

Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following
requisites:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both
actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res adjudicata in the other case.

Where a litigant sues the same party against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the
same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in one
case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus would cause
the dismissal of the rest.

In this case, while there may be identity of parties and of some reliefs prayed for, any judgment rendered in
one of the actions filed by petitioner will not amount to res judicata in the other actions. The following are
the elements of res judicata:
1. The former judgment must be final;
2. The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction the parties and the subject matter;
3. It must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause
of action.22

The five actions filed by petitioner were for quieting of title based on separate certificates of title. Hence,
the subject matters involved are different in each case. As such, the cases alleged different causes of
action. Corollarily, a judgment in any one case win not affect the issue in the other cases inasmuch as those
pertain to different lands covered by different certificates of title. Consequently, petitioner could not have
been guilty of forum-shopping.
RUIZ

case # 01

BA SAVINGS BANK, petitioner, vs. ROGER T. SIA, TACIANA U. SIA and JOHN DOE,
G.R. No. 131214
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
July 27, 2000
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: V.A.2. Format, certification, verification
SUMMARY: CA issued a Resolution denying due course to a Petition for Certiorari filed by BA Savings Bank, on the
ground that the Certification on anti-forum shopping incorporated in the petition was signed not by the duly authorized
representative of the petitioner, as required under SC Circular No. 28-91, but by its counsel, in contravention of said
circular. MR was denied by the CA on the ground that SC Revised Circular No. 28-91 requires that it is the petitioner,
not the counsel, who must certify under oath to all of the facts and undertakings required therein.
SC: In the case of natural persons, Circular 28-91 requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping. However, such requirement cannot be imposed on artificial persons, like corporations, for the simple reason
that they cannot personally do the task themselves. As already stated, corporations act only through their officers and
duly authorized agents. Circular 28-91 was prescribed by the Supreme Court to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum
shopping. We see no circumvention of this rationale if the certificate was signed by the corporations specifically
authorized counsel, who had personal knowledge of the matters required in the Circular.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
August 6, 1997 Resolution of CA in CA-GR SP No. 43209. Also challenged by petitioner is the October 24, 1997 CA
Resolution denying its MR.
FACTS:
CA issued a Resolution denying due course to a Petition for Certiorari filed by BA Savings Bank, on the ground that "the
Certification on anti-forum shopping incorporated in the petition was signed not by the duly authorized representative of
the petitioner, as required under SC Circular No. 28-91, but by its counsel, in contravention of said circular."
An MR was subsequently filed, attached to which was a BA Savings Bank Corporate Secretarys Certificate showing that
the petitioners Board of Directors approved a Resolution authorizing the petitioners lawyers to represent it in any action
or proceeding before any court, tribunal or agency; and to sign, execute and deliver the Certificate of Non-forum
Shopping, among others.
MR was denied by the CA on the ground that SC Revised Circular No. 28-91 "requires that it is the petitioner, not the
counsel, who must certify under oath to all of the facts and undertakings required therein."
ISSUE: W/N SC Revised Circular No. 28-91 allows a corporation to authorize its counsel to execute a certificate of nonforum shopping for and on its behalf.
HELD: YES
A corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and
those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of
directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed
only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or by a specific act of the board of directors.
In the present case, the corporations board of directors issued a Resolution specifically authorizing its lawyers "to act as
their agents in any action or proceeding before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency;
and to sign, execute and deliver in connection therewith the necessary pleadings, motions, verification, affidavit of merit,
certificate of non-forum shopping and other instruments necessary for such action and proceeding." The Resolution was
sufficient to vest such persons with the authority to bind the corporation and was specific enough as to the acts they were
empowered to do.
In the case of natural persons, Circular 28-91 requires the parties themselves to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping. However, such requirement cannot be imposed on artificial persons, like corporations, for the simple reason
that they cannot personally do the task themselves. As already stated, corporations act only through their officers and duly
authorized agents.

RZ Zamora

Case #2

It is noteworthy that the Circular does not require corporate officers to sign the certificate. More important, there is no
prohibition against authorizing agents to do so.
In fact, not only was BA Savings Bank authorized to name an agent to sign the certificate; it also exercised its appointing
authority reasonably well. For who else knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate but its own retained
counsel. Its regular officers, like its board chairman and president, may not even know the details required therein.
Consistent with this rationale, the Court in Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus Quitain has allowed even an
acting regional counsel of the NPC to sign, among others, the certificate of non-forum shopping required by Circular 2891. The Court held that the counsel was "in the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness of the
allegations in the Complaint" and "to know and to certify if an action had already been filed and pending with the courts."
Circular 28-91 was prescribed by the Supreme Court to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. We see no
circumvention of this rationale if the certificate was signed by the corporations specifically authorized counsel, who had
personal knowledge of the matters required in the Circular. In Bernardo v. NLRC, we explained that a literal interpretation
of the Circular should be avoided if doing so would subvert its very rationale. Said the Court:
"Indeed, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must
not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping."
Finally, we stress that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed Resolution is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to continue the proceedings in CA-GR SP No. 43209 with all
deliberate speed.

RZ Zamora

Case #2

CAGAYAN VALLEY DRUG CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE
G.R. No. 151413
February 13, 2008
Summary: Cagayan Valley Drug Corp, operator of drugstores, is claiming for the tax refund of
the 20% senior citizen discount for year 2005. CTA held that the discount should be treated as
tax credit and not as deductions from the gross sales. Upon appeal to CA, the latter dismissed
petition on procedural grounds. Held that the person who signed the verification and
certification of absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J. Concepcion, President of
petitioner, failed to adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the board of directors to do so.
SC held that there is substantial compliance with Rule 7, Secs. 4 and 5 of the RoC.
Facts: Cagayan Valley Drug Corp is a duly licensed retailer of medicine and other
pharmaceutical products. It operates two drugstores the name and style of Mercury Drug.
Petitioner alleged that in 1995, it granted 20% sales discounts to qualified senior citizen
purchases of medicine pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7432 and its implementing rules and
regulations. In compliance with Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 2-94, petitioner treated the 20%
sales discounts granted to qualified senior citizens in 1995 as deductions from the gross sales in
order to arrive at the net sales, instead of treating them as tax credit as provided by Section 4 of
RA 7432.
On December 27, 1996, however, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) a
claim for tax refund/tax credit of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it granted to senior
citizens for the year 1995, allegedly totaling to PhP 123,083 in accordance with Sec. 4 of RA 7432.
The BIRs inaction on petitioners claim for refund/tax credit compelled petitioner to file on
March 18, 1998 a petition for review before the CTA in order to forestall the two-year
prescriptive period provided under Sec. 230 of the 1977 Tax Code. Thereafter, on March 31,
2000, petitioner amended its petition for review.
CTA dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit. The 20% sales discounts petitioner
extended to qualified senior citizens in 1995 should be treated as tax credit and not as
deductions from the gross sales as erroneously interpreted in RR 2-94. The CTA reiterated its
consistent holdings that RR 2-94 is an invalid administrative interpretation of the law it
purports to implement as it contravenes and does not conform to the standards RA 7432
prescribes. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
CA dismissed the petition on procedural grounds. Held that the person who signed the
verification and certification of absence of forum shopping, a certain Jacinto J. Concepcion,
President of petitioner, failed to adduce proof that he was duly authorized by the board of
directors to do so. The main issue was whether or not the verification and certification of nonforum shopping signed by the President of petitioner is sufficient compliance with Secs. 4 and 5,
Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In Premium Marble Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
(Premium), in the absence of an authority from the Board of Directors, no person, not even the
officers of the corporation, can validly bind the corporation.
Issues: 1) Whether petitioners president can sign the subject verification and certification sans
the approval of its Board of Directors. 2) Whether the CTA committed reversible error in
denying and dismissing petitioners action for refund or tax credit in C.T.A. Case No. 5581.
Held:
1) The factual antecedents and issues in Premium are not on all fours with the instant case and is,
therefore, not applicable.

With respect to an individual litigant, there is no question that litigants must sign the sworn
verification and certification unless they execute a power of attorney authorizing another
person to sign it. With respect to a juridical person, Sec. 4, Rule 7 on verification and Sec. 5, Rule
7 on certification against forum shopping are silent as to who the authorized signatory should
be. Said rules do not indicate if the submission of a board resolution authorizing the officer or
representative is necessary.
Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate
powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of
directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its directors and officers
and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that
an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the
corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding
in cases instituted by a corporation. In a slew of cases, however, the SC has recognized the
authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the
Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the
authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to
justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the
verification or certificate against forum shopping, being in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition.
In Philippine Airlines v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines, we ruled that
only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of
non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. The action can be dismissed if the certification
was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys authority. Appendingthe board
resolution to the complaint or petition is the better procedure to obviate any question on the
authority of the signatory to the verification and certification. The required submission of the
board resolution is grounded on the basic precept that corporate powers are exercised by the
board of directors, and not solely by an officer of the corporation.
In this case, there is substantial compliance with Rule 7, Secs. 4 and 5. First, the requisite board
resolution has been submitted albeit belatedly by petitioner. Second, we apply our ruling in
Lepanto with the rationale that the President of petitioner is in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Third, the President of petitioner
has signed the complaint before the CTA at the inception of this judicial claim for refund or tax
credit.
2) CTA Decision shows that the appellate tax court correctly ruled that the 20% sales discounts
petitioner granted to qualified senior citizens should be deducted from petitioners income tax
due and not from petitioners gross sales as erroneously provided in RR 2-94. Net loss in a
taxable year does not preclude grant of tax credit.

Santos v. CA
July 05, 2001
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Complaint Certification, Verification

GR No. 141947
Bellosillo, J.

SUMMARY:
Petitioners were PEPSI employees who were terminated due to PEPSIs redundancy program.
They initially consented and accepted their separation pay, until they learned that new positions
were created soon after. The LA and the NLRC dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal.
The CA dismissed the petition outright, noting the verification and certification against forum
shopping were executed merely by petitioners counsel and not by petitioners. SC affirmed the
CA. It is clear that the certification must be made by the petitioner himself and not by counsel,
since it is petitioner who is in best position to know whether he had previously commenced any
similar action involving the same issues in any tribunal or agency.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SUPREME COURT:
Petition for review seeks to annul the Resolution of the CA, which summarily dismissed
petitioners special civil action for certiorari for failing to execute properly the required verification
and certification against forum shopping and to specify the material dates from which the
timeliness of the petition may be determined.
FACTS:
v Petitioners Ismael Santos and Alfredo Arce were employed by PEPSI as Complimentary
Distribution Specialists (CDS), while Hilario Pastrana was employed as a Route
Manager.
v In a letter dated December 26, 1994 PEPSI informed its employees that, due to poor
performance of its Metro Manila Sales Operations, it would restructure and streamline
certain physical sales distributions systems to improve warehouse efficiency. Certain
positions, including that of petitioners, were declared redundant and abolished.
Consequently, employees with affected positions were terminated.
v January 15, 1995 Petitioners left their positions, accepted separation pay, and
executed corresponding releases and quitclaims.
v Petitioners learned later on that PEPSI created new positions called Account
Development Managers (ADM), which substantially had the same duties as the CDS
daw.
v Petitioners filed a complaint with the LA for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement, back wages, moral and exemplary damages, and attys fees. They
alleged the creation of new positions belied PEPSIs claim of redundancy, and the
qualifications of the CDS and ADM were the same. They likewise noted procedural
errors, like the non-compliance of the 1-month notice before the intended date of
termination.
v PEPSI maintained that termination due to redundancy was a management prerogative,
plus the CDS and ADM positions had very different functions.
v LA dismissed complaint for lack of merit.
v NLRC Affirmed the LA, and cited International Hardware v. NLRC which waived the
required previous notice to the DOLE if the employee acknowledged existence of valid
cause for termination of his employment.
v CA Upon petitioners special civil action for certiorari, the CA dismissed the petition
outright for failure to comply with requirements under Sec. 3, Rule 46, in rel. to
Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
o The verification and certification against forum shopping were executed merely
by petitioners counsel and not by petitioners.
Angela Butalid

[CASE #4]

o
o

Petition also failed to specify the dates of receipt of the NLRC decision, as well
as the filing of the motion for reconsideration.
Under the aforecited Rules, failure to comply with any of the requirements was
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

ISSUE:
WON petitioners failed to comply with the requirements in filing their petition for certiorari
YES.
HELD:
v It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, the SC had held that there is
substantial compliance if the same is executed by an attorney, it being presumed that
facts alleged by him are true to his knowledge and belief.
v However, the same doesnt apply with the requirement of a certification against
forum shopping.
v Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly requires that, the petitioner
shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency
v It is clear that the certification must be made by the petitioner himself and not by
counsel, since it is petitioner who is in best position to know whether he had
previously commenced any similar action involving the same issues in any
tribunal or agency.
v The only exception to this rule is if the petitioner were a corporation, a juridical person,
hence requiring natural persons to act in its behalf (BA Savings Bank v. Sia).
v In the instant case, petitioners were all natural persons and there is no showing of any
reasonable cause to justify their failure to personally sign the certification.
v Petitioners argument that a Special Power of Attorney is effectively meet any
contingency related to the case is untenable, because at the outset, no justifiable reason
existed for counsel to substitute petitioners in signing the certification.
o Convenience cannot be made the basis for a circumvention of the Rules.
OTHER ISSUES:
v Moreover, petition failed to indicate the material dates that would show the timeliness of
the filing thereof with the CA. There are 3 essential dates that must be stated in a
petition for certiorari brought under Rule 56:
o First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or Resolution was
received
o Second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed
o Third, when notice of the denial thereof was received.
v Even without the procedural lapse, the case will fail on its merits. Termination was
justified; the redundancy program by PEPSI was undertaken in good faith, without any
malice nor ill motive against petitioners, and in an honest effort to make the company
more efficient.
o Indeed, the 1 month notice to DOLE prior termination is unnecessary by the
consent of the worker himself.

WHEREFORE, in the absence of any reversible error on the part of the Court of
Appeals, the petition is DENIED.

Angela Butalid

[CASE #4]

CAVILE v. CAVILE
April 1, 2003
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pleadingsformat, certification, verification

G.R. No. 148635

Puno, J.

SUMMARY: Bernardos descendants from the 1st and 2nd marriage filed a complaint for partition
against the descendants from the third marriage. They alleged that they (all kids of the three
marriages) are the co-owners of the six parcels of land they inherited from Bernardo but Castors kin
(from the 3rd marriage) took possession of the parcels of land as well as their fruits. The TC initially
ordered the partition of the properties. However, the descendants from the 3rd marriage presented a
deed of partition. The TC then dismissed the petition for partition. The CA reversed the dismissal,
because it gave credence to the testimonies of the respondents. The SC reversed the CA and ruled
that the Deed of Partition is a public document and its presumption of regularity was not controverted
by clear and convincing evidence submitted by the respondents. The execution of one of the
petitioners in behalf of all of the petitioners of the certificate against forum shopping
constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules.
HOW IT REACHED THE SC: Petition for review of the CA Decision
FACTS: Bernardo Cavili contracted three marriages during his lifetime. Also, throughout his
lifetime, he acquired six parcels of land which is the subject of this case.
Wife # 1: Ines Dumat-ol, with child: Simplicia (Respondents)
Wife # 2: Orfia Colalho, with two kids: Fortunato & Venencia (Respondents)
Wife # 3: Tranquilina Galon, with three kids: Castor, Susana, Benedicta (Petitioners)
The descendants from the 1st and 2nd marriage teamed up and filed a complaint for
partition against the descendants from the 3rd marriage. The complaint alleged, that
respondents and petitioners were co- owners of the properties in question, having inherited
the same from their dad. Upon the death of Bernardo, his son by his third marriage, Castor,
took possession of the properties as administrator for and in behalf of his co-owners.
However, when Castor died, his children took possession of the parcels of land but no longer
as administrators. They claimed the properties as well as their fruits as their own and
repeatedly refused respondents demand for partition.
The petitioners failed to file an answer within reglemantary period so the respondents were
allowed to present evidence ex parte. The trial court ordered the partition of the six
parcels of land.
Primitivo and Quirino (I suppose descendants of Bernardos kids in the 3rd marriage) were not
served with summons, the trial court allowed them to present evidence. One of the evidence
presented was the Deed of Partition. The TC gave weight to the document and dismissed
the petition for partition. The respondents appealed to the CA.
The CA reversed. It gave weight to the testimonies of Ramona Tacang and Filomena Pareja
that Simplicia Cavili, was in Mindanao at the time of execution of the deed and hence, could
not have signed it. Also, Simplicias thumbmark seemed like an ink blot.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
1. Deed of Partition is a public document. Genuineness and due execution need not be
proved.
2. Ramona Tacang and Filomena Parejas testimonies were mere denials.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
1. Only one of the 22 petitioners signed the certification against non-forum
shopping.
DE MESA, ATHENA CHRISTA D.G.

[CASE # 5]

2. The CA did not commit any error

ISSUE(S):
1. Procedural: WON the certification against forum shopping signed by only Thomas George
Cavili, Sr. (one of the 22 petitioners) is valid YES.
2. Substantive: WON the Deed of Partition dated April 5, 1937 is valid and binding as to the
parties YES.
HELD: Reversed the CA decision. Ruled in favor of petitioners. Dismissing the petition for
partition of property.
PROCEDURAL: The execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the other
petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with the
Rules.
The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only one of them is insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed
to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of
the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances.
All the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a
common interest thereon. They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition
filed by the respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective,
raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.
The merits of the substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as special
circumstance for the Court to take cognizance of a petition for review although the
certification against forum shopping was executed and signed by only one of the petitioners.
SUBSTANTIVE:
Presumption of regularity: Documents acknowledged before notaries public are public
documents which are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their
authenticity and due execution. It is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
To overcome presumption of regularity, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld.
The respondents failed to overcome presumption of regularity.
Ramona Tacang and Filomena Pareja testified saying that Simplicia Cavile was in Mindanao from
1934-1947 and hence could not have executed the Deed. Granting such fact to be true, it does
not preclude the possibility that Simplicia Cavile could have traveled from her residence in
Mindanao to Tolong, Negros Oriental to participate in the execution of the Deed of Partition.
There were sufficient transportation at that time and Simplicia was was in perfect health and
completely mobile ergo fit to travel at that time.
The visible grooves or lines on the imprint indicate that they are not mere drops of ink but an
actual thumbprint. The respondents claims are unfounded.
*A copy of the whole Deed of Partition is part of the Decision in the original case.

DE MESA, ATHENA CHRISTA D.G.

[CASE # 5]

MC ENGINEERING, INC., and HANIL DEVELOPMENT CORP., LTD., petitioners, vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ARISTOTLE BALDAMECA,
respondents.
SUMMARY: Local employment agency MC Engineering failed to file a affidavit of non-forum
shopping in behalf of Hanil. CA dismissed the case. SC sustained the dismissal. The local private
employment agency may sue on behalf of its foreign principal on the basis of its contractual
undertakings submitted to the POEA, there is no reason why the said agency cannot likewise
sign or execute a certification of non-forum shopping for its own purposes and/or on behalf of its
foreign principal.

HOW REACHED THE SC: petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of CA Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
thereto fo for failure to comply with the requirements regarding the certification of non-forum
shopping and explanation of service by registered mail.
Facts: Private respondent Aristotle Baldameca entered into an Employment Agreement with
MCEI for deployment as a plumber in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia for a period of twelve months.
Baldameca was not able to finish so upon his return he filed a case for illegal dismissal against
MC Engineering and Hanil.
LA: MCEI solidarily liable with hanil. NLRC affirmed. CA denied petition for certiorari because
(1) there is no certification against forum shopping by co-petitioner Hamil Development Co.,
Ltd.; (only by MCEI) and (2) there is no written explanation why the service of the pleading was
not done personally (Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Petitioners argument: substantial compliance with the requirements of the rule as the petition
contains the required affidavit of service that shows that the petition has indeed been served on
the parties concerned. Moreover their failure to indicate an explanation was a purely technical
error which does not call for an outright dismissal of the petition.
ISSUE: 1. WON MCEI could sign affidavit of non-forum shopping for Hanil.
2. WON no personal explanation of non-personal service requires dismissal.
Held:
1. Yes. Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that in all cases filed in
the Court of Appeals, as with all initiatory pleadings before any tribunal, a certification of nonforum shopping signed by the petitioner must be filed together with the petition or else it be
dismissed. It will also be dismissed if it be not signed by the petitioner or belatedly filed.
However, with respect to the contents of the certification, the rule of substantial compliance may
be availed of.
Considering that the local private employment agency may sue on behalf of its foreign principal
on the basis of its contractual undertakings submitted to the POEA, there is no reason why the

said agency cannot likewise sign or execute a certification of non-forum shopping for its own
purposes and/or on behalf of its foreign principal.
The rationale behind the requirement that the petitioners or parties to the action themselves must
execute the certification of non-forum shopping is that the said petitioners or parties are in the
best position to know of the matters required by the Rules of Court in the said certification.
2. Yes. In the case at bar, there was no substantial compliance made by petitioners of the
requirement in Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure An affidavit of service,
under Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is required merely as proof that
service has been made to the other parties in a case. Thus, it is a requirement totally different
from the requirement that an explanation be made if personal service of pleadings was not
resorted to. In Alonso v. Villamor, it was allowed to be filed, even with the same cause in this
case but in that case the counsel therein may not have been fully aware of the requirements and
ramifications of the said provision as the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had only been in effect
for a few months. Not like in this case where it was in effect for years.

HAMILTON v. LEVY
G.R. No. 139283
November 15, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pleadings Complaint Format, Certification, Verification
SUMMARY: Hamilton filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against respondents. TC issued a
WPI; sheriff levied on an aircraft. The point of contention is the petition for certiorari filed by the
respondents with the CA wherein the certification of non-forum shopping attached was prepared not by
respondents but by one Teresita Torres, who was not a party to the suit either before the TC or the
certiorari proceedings in the CA. SC held that respondents explained that they were both abroad when
the petition was filed. This is reasonable cause to exempt them from compliance with the requirement that
they personally execute the certification (Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review to set aside the CA Decision which ordered the
RTC to dismiss the case.
FACTS:
Jun 30, 1997 Petitioner Allen Leroy Hamilton filed a complaint for sum of money and damages, with
prayer for preliminary attachment, against respondents David Levy and Fe Quitangon and one Pablo
de Borja with the RTC of Angeles, Pampanga.
Jul 14, 1997 TC ordered the issuance of a WPI; issued the next day.
Court sheriff levied on a Cherokee 180 Piper aircraft, allegedly owned by Levy; sheriffs return filed.
Nov 17, 1997 Hamilton filed a motion to declare defendants in default for failure to file any
responsive pleading within the reglementary period; granted by RTC in its order dated Feb 20, 1998.
Dec 3, 1997 Ramon Araneta filed an affidavit of third party claim asserting ownership of the levied
aircraft by virtue of a sale from WEL Phils. Inc., represented by Levy, on Jun 19, 1997.
Mar 26, 1998 Prior to the presentation of evidence, respondents counsel filed a special appearance
to question the jurisdiction of the TC.
Jul 16, 1988 When no action was made on the special appearance, they filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA.
While the petition for certiorari was pending before the CA, proceedings before the TC continued with
the filing by Hamilton of formal offer of exhibits and motion for leave to sell attached property pending
entry of judgment.
Apr 16, 1999 CA issued the assailed decision, granting the petition and ordering the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, on its finding that summons was not validly served upon respondents,
hence, TC never assumed jurisdiction over their persons; MR denied.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS: (Only the issue relevant to the topic)
The certification of non-forum shopping attached to respondents petition was prepared not by
respondents but by one Teresita Torres, who was not a party to the suit either before the TC or the
certiorari proceedings in the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents petition should be denied because of the alleged defect in the
certification on non-forum shopping.
HELD: No. Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that the certification
must be executed by the principal party, which in this case are respondents David Levy and Fe
Quitangon. This is so because the attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party executing. To merit the Court's consideration, respondents
must show good reasons for failure of the proper party to personally sign the certification. They must
convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
In the case at bar, respondents explained that they were both abroad when the petition for certiorari was
filed with the CA. This is reasonable cause to exempt them from compliance with the requirement that
they personally execute the certification. Moreover, to dismiss their petition for certiorari on this sole
ground would deny them the opportunity to question the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over their
persons.
Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 07]

Sevilleja v. Laggui
August 14, 2001

A.M No. RTJ-01-1612

Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pleadings

SUMMARY: Sevilleja filed an administrative case against Judge Laggui on the ground of gross misconduct for
not inhibiting himself from the proceedings for the execution of judgment in an election case filed by Sevillejas
rival, Garcia. He also filed a similar complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman. Court held that
this could not constitute forum-shopping because the power of Ombudsman is investigative in character and
its resolution cannot constitute a valid and final judgment because its duty is to file the appropriate case with
the Sandiganbayan.
FACTS:
- In the May 1998 elections, Marco Sevilleja was proclaimed the winner in the election of Mayor in Sta.
teresita, Cagayan against his rival Romeo Garcia.
- Garcia filed with RTC-Cagayan an election protest, where Judge Laggui was the presiding Judge.
- Garcia filed a motion to inhibit Judge on the ground that the wife of Garcia, Lolita is the legal researcher of
Judge Laggui.
- For delicadeza and in order that Garcia may have peace of mind, Judge granted motion to inhibit.
- Case was re-raffled to Branch 8, a vacant sala because of the retirement of Judge Catral, but paired with
Branch 9, where Judge Agcaoili sits. Judge Agcaoili declared Garcia as duly elected mayor.
- Sevilleja filed a notice of appeal. While Garcia filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
- Judge Agcaoili ordered records to be elevated to COMELEC.
- Due to absence of Judge Agcaoili, Judge Laggui, in his capacity as Executive Judge of RTC-Aparri, issued
an order holding in abeyance the transmittal pending resolution of motion for execution
- When Judge Laggui was designated acting presiding judge of Branch 8 in view of Administrative Order No.
43-99, he granted motion of execution pending appeal. He issued writ of execution. MR by Sevilleja
denied. Hence, this present administrative complaint on the ground of gross misconduct.
- Sevilleja also filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman involving the same issues.
SEVILLEJAS ARGUMENT: Claims that Judge is guilty of gross misconduct for not inhibiting from deciding
motion for execution, just as he had done the same in the election protest.
JUDGES ARGUMENT: He failed to question his act in granting the motion, hence he has waived his right to
question the jurisdiction. Also claimed that he does not have to lift his order of inhibition because as acting
judge of Branch 8, Lolita Garcia is not his legal researcher, and hence the legal impediment no longer exists.
Also claimed that Sevilleja is guilty of forum shopping for filing a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
Ombudsman involving same issues.
ISSUES: WoN Judge is guilty of gross misconduct? YES.
HELD:
- Sec. 1, Rule 137 lays down the rule on judges inhibition and disqualification. The mere fact that he was
designated acting presiding judge per SC Admin Order doesnt mean that his previous inhibition has been
lifted. The admin order presupposes that judge designated has not inhibited in the cases raffled to said
branch.The fact remains that Mrs. Lolita Garcia is still his legal researcher in RTC-Branch 10 and the
election case is still the same case where judge inhibited himself from.
- Theres serious or gross misconduct when judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. A judge is not only
required to be impartial, he must appear to be impartial. He should have refrained from acting on the case
to avoid being misunderstood and as such, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved.
- WRT forum shopping: A case pending before the Ombudsman cannot be considered for purposes of
forum-shopping because the power of Ombudsman is only investigative in character, and its resolution
cannot constitute a valid and final judgment because its duty is to file the appropriate case before
Sandiganbayan. JUDGE LAGGUI FINED in the amount of 5000 with WARNING that the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely by the Court.
Jenaira Mae A, Jalasco

CASE # 8

TANTUICO v. REPUBLIC! !
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December 2, 1991! !
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Topic in Syllabus: Pleadings; Complaint; Alleging causes of action

G.R. No. 89114

Padilla, J.

SUMMARY: The Sandiganbayan denied Francisco Tantuicos motion for a bill of particulars on the
ground that the particulars were evidentiary in nature. The SC ruled that the allegations in the
complaint pertaining are deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and
presumptions unsupported by factual premises. A complaint must inform the defendant clearly and
definitely of the claims made against him, thus the motion for a bill of particulars was granted.
FACTS
- Francisco Tantuico, Jr., Chairman of the Commission on Audit, was included as defendant in the
case filed with the Sandiganbayan against Kokoy Romualdez and Ferdinand Imelda Marcos for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages.
- Tantuico filed for a Motion for Bill of Particulars claiming that it is necessary that he be furnished
the particulars sought so that he can intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and prepare
for trial
- Sandiganbayan denied the motion for a bill of particulars on the ground that the particulars
sought are evidentiary in nature. MR was also denied.
ISSUE
WON the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions
denying the motion for a bill of particulars - YES
RATIO
- Complaint - a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause or causes
of action
- The complaint shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts
- Office, purpose, or function is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims
made against him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial
- Rules on pleading speak of two kinds of facts
- Ultimate facts - the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is
essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
insufficient.
- Evidentiary facts - those facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts;
they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are based. Facts which
furnish evidence of existence of some other fact.
- Where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form of
conclusions, the proper recourse would be a motion for a bill of particulars.
- The complaint alleges that "Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other Defendants,
acting singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of
public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous abuse
of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines,
embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth
- The allegations that defendant Marcos, together with the other defendants "embarked upon a
systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth" and that they acted "in flagrant breach of
public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous
abuse of right and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines", are
conclusions of law unsupported by factual premises.
- Nothing is said in the complaint about the acts in execution of the alleged "systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth", or which are supposed to constitute "flagrant breach of public
trust", "gross and scandalous abuse of right and power", and "violations of the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines". The complaint does not even allege what duties the petitioner
failed to perform, or the particular rights he abused.

- The complaint also alleged that Tantuico, taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman
of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such
Chairman, acting in concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos
facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of
government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs to the grave and irreparable damage
and injury of Plaintiff and the entire Filipino people."
- The allegation that petitioner "took undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit," that he "failed to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman,"
and acting in concert with Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, "facilitated and made
possible the withdrawals, disbursements, and questionable use of government funds as
stated in the fore going paragraphs, to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of
plaintiff and the entire Filipino people", are mere conclusions of law.
- There was also an allegation that Tantuico acted as dummy, nominee, or agent by allowing
himself "to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff" or "to be (an) incorporator, director, or
member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled" by the Marcoses and Romualdezes
- Complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is
perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent and is thus a conclusion of law without
factual basis.
- The allegations in the complaint pertaining to Tantuico are deficient in that they merely articulate
conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the
particulars prayed for in the motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the Tantuico can not
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
- The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions.

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. AND TAGUM PLASTICS, INC. VS. SWEET
LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES, INC. AND
HON. COURT OF APPEALS.
G.R. No. 87434 | August 05, 1992 | REGALADO, J.:
TOPIC: Pleadings>Answer>Alleging Defenses
SUMMARY: A suit for recovery between Philamgen/TPI and SLI/DVAPSI was dismissed on the ground of
prescription. The bills of lading contained a paragraph providing for shortened periods to file claims, BUT they
were never presented in evidence. Prescription was raised as an affirmative defense by SLI, but Philamgen/TPI
failed to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the written
instruments in question. This amounts to an admission. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS, verbal or written, made by the
parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case, are conclusive.
Instrument need not be presented formally because it is considered an admitted fact. While Petitioners objected
to the validity of the agreement in the bills of lading, the existence of such were impliedly admitted.

FACTS:
Petitioners Philamgen and TPI filed a maritime suit against SLI and DVAPSI for the recovery of the cost of lost
or damaged shipment only 5820 bags from 2 consignments consisting of around 7000 bags of Low Density
Polyethylene arrived in good condition.
Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered and the trial court granted a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the said amicable settlement.
On appeal, CA reversed on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari, faulting CA for the following: 1) upholding the existence of
a prescriptive period; 2) granting that it exists, in not finding it null and voidl 3) assuming arguendo it is valid
and legal, in failing to conclude that petitioners substantially complied.
WON it was error for the CA to reverse the appealed decision on the ground of prescription when SLI
failed to offer the bills of lading in evidence NO
*The bills of lading were said to contain shortened periods for filing a claim and instituting a court action against
the carrier. The claims must have been made at the time of delivery to consignee or agent, if container shows
exterior signs of damage or shortage.
-CA: although the bills of lading were not offered in evidence, the litigation obviously revolves on such bills of
lading which are practically the documents or contracts sued upon, hence, they are inevitably involved and their
provisions cannot be disregarded in the determination of the relative rights of the parties thereto.
-SC:
Prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably raised EXCEPT the bills of lading were not formally
offered in evidence. The issue now is whether or not prescription can be maintained as such a defense and
constantly upheld on the strength of mere references thereto.
Because petitioners are suing upon SLIs contractual obligation under the contract of carriage, the bills of
lading can be categorized as ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS. Under the rules, they must be properly pleaded
either as causes of action or defenses, and the genuineness and due execution of which are deemed
admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party.
Petitioner failed to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the
written instruments in question. This amounts to an admission. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS, verbal or written,
made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case, are
conclusive. Instrument need not be presented formally because it is considered an admitted fact.

Petitioners failed to touch on the matter of the non-presentation of the bills of lading in their brief and earlier
on in the appellate proceedings in this case, hence it is too late in the day to now allow the litigation to be
overturned on that score, for to do so would mean an over indulgence in technicalities.
The non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the formal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts of
this particular case, be considered a fatal procedural lapse as would bar respondent carrier from raising the
defense of prescription.
The carriage of the cargo involved was effected pursuant to an "Application for Delivery of Cargoes without
Original Bill of Lading" issued on May 20, 1977 in Davao City with the notation therein that said application
corresponds to and is subject to the terms of bills of lading. It would be a safe assessment to interpret this to
mean that, sight unseen, petitioners acknowledged the existence of said bills of lading. By having the cargo
shipped on respondent carriers vessel and later making a claim for loss on the basis of the bills of lading,
petitioners for all intents and purposes accepted said bills. Having done so they are bound by all stipulations
contained therein. As petitioners are suing for recovery on the contract, and in fact even went as far as
assailing its validity by categorizing it as a contract of adhesion, then they necessarily admit that there is such
a contract, their knowledge of the existence of which with its attendant stipulations they cannot now be
allowed to deny.
While Petitioners objected to the validity of the agreement in the bills of lading, the existence of such were
impliedly admitted.

WON the shortened periods in par 5 of the Bill of Lading (30 days for filing a claim with the carrier in case
of loss of or damage to the cargo and 60 days from accrual of the right of action for instituting an action
in court) is valid -YES

The fundamental reason or purpose of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but
reasonably to inform it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged with liability therefor, and
to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the injury. This protects the carrier by affording
it an opportunity to make an investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to
safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims.
In the absence of any statutory limitation and subject only to the requirement on the reasonableness of the
stipulated limitation period, the parties to a contract of carriage may fix by agreement a shorter time for the
bringing of suit on a claim for the loss of or damage to the shipment than that provided by the statute of
limitations. Such limitation is not contrary to public policy for it does not in any way defeat the complete
vestiture of the right to recover, but merely requires the assertion of that right by action at an earlier period
than would be necessary to defeat it through the operation of the ordinary statute of limitations.
While petitioners may possibly have a cause of action, for failure to comply with the above condition
precedent they lost whatever right of action they may have in their favor or, taken in another sense, that
remedial right or right to relief had prescribed.
The shipment in question was discharged into the custody of the consignee on May 15, 1977, and it was
from this date that petitioners cause of action accrued, with thirty (30) days therefrom within which to file a
claim with the carrier for any loss or damage which may have been suffered by the cargo and thereby perfect
their right of action. The claim was filed with SLI only on April 28, 1978, way beyond the period provided in
the bills of lading.
TPI filed a provisional claim with DVAPSI as early as June 14, 1977 and, as found by the trial court, a survey
fixing the extent of loss of and/or damage to the cargo was conducted on July 8, 1977 at the instance of
petitioners. If petitioners had the opportunity and awareness to file such provisional claim and to cause a
survey to be conducted soon after the discharge of the cargo, then they could very easily have filed the
necessary formal, or even a provisional, claim with SLI itself within the stipulated period therefor, instead of
doing so only on April 28, 1978 despite the vessel's arrival at the port of destination on May 15, 1977.
Petitioners slept on their rights and they must now face the consequences of such inaction.

There is no constitutional or statutory prohibition infirming paragraph 5 of subject Bill of Lading. The
stipulated period of 60 days is reasonable enough for appellees to ascertain the facts and thereafter to sue,
if need be, and the 60-day period agreed upon by the parties which shortened the statutory period within
which to bring action for breach of contract is valid and binding.
The report on losses and damages is not the claim referred to and required by the bills of lading for it does
not fix responsibility for the loss or damage, but merely states the condition of the goods shipped. The claim
contemplated herein, in whatever form, must be something more than a notice that the goods have been
lost or damaged; it must contain a claim for compensation or indicate an intent to claim.

Liability of DVAPSI
Unlike a common carrier, an arrastre operator does not labor under a presumption of negligence in case of
loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods discharged into its custody. In other words, to hold an arrastre
operator liable for loss of and/or damage to goods entrusted to it there must be preponderant evidence that
it did not exercise due diligence in the handling and care of the goods.
What can only be inferred from the factual findings of the trial court is that by the time the cargo was
discharged to DVAPSI, loss or damage had already occurred and that the same could not have possibly
occurred while the same was in the custody of DVAPSI, as demonstrated by the observations of the trial
court quoted at the start of this opinion.
HELD: DENIED.
JOSE, GISELLE

Garcia v. CA
June 11, 1992
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Default

G.R. No. 83929

Padilla, J.

SUMMARY: Antonio Garcia filed an action for damages against Sps. Uy for padlocking stalls in Virra Mall.
Sps. Uy failed to file a reply within the reglementary period. TC declared them in default. Garcia filed for
motion for execution. TC granted and issued writ of execution. Sps. Uy challenged validity of writ of
execution because it was granted without notice to them or hearing. CA granted Uys petition for certiorari.
SC held that a party in default is still entitled to motion for execution pending appeal as default is not a waiver
of all rights; only a waiver of right to present defense and examine (and corss examine witnesses). CA
affirmed.
FACTS:
Antonio Garcia filed an action for damages against Sps. Uy for padlocking stalls in Virra Mall.
Sps. Uy failed to file a reply within the reglementary period.
TC declared them in default. Garcia filed for motion for execution pending appeal.
TC granted and issued writ of execution.
Sps. Uy challenged validity of writ of execution because it was granted without notice to them or
hearing.
CA granted Uys petition for certiorari and set aside TCs order to grant writ of execution.
Garcia argues that notice to the adverse party becomes mandatory only in case the defendant has
NOT been declared in default.
ISSUES:
W/N a party declared in default is entitled to notice of a motion for execution pending appeal of a judgment
of default? YES
HELD:
Cited case: SC Johnson & Son v. CA
o A party declared in default is entitled to notice of the motion for execution pending appeal.
o Without notice, the various recourses available to defaulted party after judgment will be
rendered illusory.
o Consistent with this right to notice of final order or judgment is the right to notice of the
motion for execution pending appeal of the default judgment.
Remedies available:
o No judgment rendered yet: Motion to set aside order of default
o After judgment: Motion for New Trial, Petition for Relief from Judgment, Appeal the
Judgment, or special civil action for certiorari
As being in default does not imply a waiver of rights, as aforesaid, the defaulted party has the right to
expect compliance with the requisites for executing a judgment pending appeal under Section 2 of
Rule 39
Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party the
court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the special order
shall be included therein.
A party in default only loses the right to present his defense and examine or cross-examine witnesses.
It does not mean that being declared in default, and thereby losing one's standing, constitutes a
waiver of all rights
A party in default is still entitled to notice of final judgments and orders and proceedings
Petition denied. CA affirmed.
Lopez, Catherine Nicole

CASE # 11


Filinvest v. CA
26 February 1990

G.R. No. 78885

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pleadings; Answer; Default

SUMMARY: Filinvest filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Philfinance.
Philfinance, thru 4 different lawyers, filed a total of six motions for extension to file an Answer,
on the basis of the counsel's inability to read the records because of too much work, heavy
pressure of work, the unexpected wedding of one of the counsel, and illness of counsel. The
lower court granted the first 5 motions but denied the sixth. It declared Philfinance in default
and rendered a judgment in favor of Filinvest. Philfinance petitioned that the order of default
be set aside and that his super late Answer be admitted. Court held that Philfinance was
properly held in default. The inability of 4 lawyers to file an Answer within the 88-day extension
granted by the lower court was inexcusable. Besides, Philfinance, in its Answer, did not have a
meritorious defense; thus, nothing would have been gained had the order of default been set
aside.
How it reached the SC: Petition for review of CA decision lifting the order which declared
Philfinance in default, admitting Philfinance's Answer, and remanding the case to the lower court

FACTS:

Filinvest filed a complaint against Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation

(Philfinance) for Recovery of Possession of a parcel of land including a 7-storey building
thereon. Filinvest alleged that it is the owner thereof, by virtue of a TCT in its favor, but is
occupied by Philfinance despite repeated demands to vacate the same.
13 October 1983: Summons and complaint were served upon PUFC.
Philfinance, thru Atty. Salva, filed a motion for extension (20 days) to file an Answer. Ground:
Its counsel (Salva) had to confer with the officers of the corporation conversant with the facts
of the case and to go over voluminous documents and other related cases. Court granted the
motion.
Philfinance, thru Atty. Reyes, filed a second motion for extension (15 days) to file an Answer.
Ground: The transactions involved voluminous records and in order to prepare an intelligent
answer, its counsel (Reyes) had to read all the records in his possession in addition to the
heavy pressure of work in other equally important cases. Court granted the motion.
Philfinance, thru Atty. Bautista, filed a third motion for extension (10 days) to file an Answer.
Ground: The lawyer assigned to handle this case was quite busy preparing for his wedding.
Court granted the motion.
Philfinance, thru Atty. Magno Salva, filed an urgent request for another extension (20 days).
Ground: The issues to be brought up in the answer and in the third party complaint of
Philfinance are very controversial, complicated and difficult, requiring careful analysis, study
and research. Court granted the motion.
Philfinance filed a fifth urgent motion for extension (20 days). Ground: Heavy pressure of work
in pending cases with the SEC. Court granted the same, but only for 5 days (Expiration: 9
January 1984).
Finally, Philfinance, filed a verified urgent motion for extension (10 days) to file Answer.
Ground: Salva had loba pneumonia, collapsed in his house, and was bedridden for 10 days.
Court denied the motion.
On 10 January 1984, Filinvest filed a motion to declare Philfinance in default. Lower
court issued an order (received by Philfinance on 17 January 1984), holding Philfinance in
default. A hearing ex parte was conducted and terminated the same day.
11 January 1984: A decision was rendered against Philfinance, ordering it to vacate the
building and lot, and turn over its possession to Filinvest.

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE #12

 12 January 1984, 8:00 a.m.: Philfinance filed a 15-page Answer with Counterclaim, denying
Filinvest's claims and averring that Filinvest's title is null and void.
25 January 1984: Philfinance filed a petition for: (1) the admission of its Answer, (2) setting
aside of the default order and the default judgment, and (3) leave to file its third-party
complaint against third-party defendants.
Lower court denied Philfinance's petition.
Court of Appeals set aside the order of default.

LOWER COURT's ARGUMENT: Philfinance's counsel's negligence to file the Answer for a
period of 90 days is inexcusable. Furthermore, Philfinance had no meritorious defense to
warrant a change of decision. Finally, the matter alleged in the third-party complaint is foreign to
the issues of the subject case.

CA's ARGUMENT: Philfinance was placed under receivership making it difficult for its lawyers to
have access to the records of the corporation.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant, Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation, was properly
declared in default
HELD: Yes. Order of default is sustained.

The lower court granted the five (5) motions and denied the sixth motion before it declared
Philfinance in default. All in all, the lower court gave the Philfinance eighty-eight (88) days to
answer the complaint, so it can not be stated that the trial court has in any way unduly favored
the Filinvest, neither can it be considered that Philfinance has been denied due process.

Philfinance's counsel's having difficulty with the records of the corporation is not only

insufficient to explain six motions for postponement but was also belatedly raised. It was a
mere afterthought on the part of counsel when he raised such reason after they were already
adjudged in default. (See: grounds for motions for extension above).
The pattern of inexcusable neglect, if not deliberate delay is all too clear.
Philfinance was given extraordinary opportunity to have its day in court when the lower court
had given it a total of eighty-eight (88) days from service of summons to file its answer to the
complaint. The inability of four (4) lawyers to prepare the answer for this long period of time is
not justified.
Cited Pahilanga v. Luna: ... "but it is not error, or an abuse of discretion, on the part of the court to
refuse to set aside its order of default and to refuse to accept the answer where it finds no justifiable
reason for the delay in the filing of the answer."
On the merits of the case, Court agreed with lower court's ruling. Philfinance's mere denials
did not prevail over convincing evidence on record. Philfinance had no valid defense. Citing
Pahilanga again, "nothing would be gained by having the order of default set aside where the party
held in default has no valid defense in his favor for in such case, he will just the same fail on the merits
even if the default order is lifted."

Reminders from the Court: This Court reiterates that it is concerned with the heavy caseloads

of courts at all levels. Most of the delays for which the justice system is assailed come from
failure of counsel to cooperate with candor and will in the speedy resolution of cases. We have
instituted continuous trial. We are revising the Rules of Court to make them responsive to
current problems. We call judges to task when their cases are not adjudicated with accuracy and
dispatch. The least we can do is sustain them when they come across litigants like the private
respondent in this case.

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE #12

Talsan Enterprises, Inc. v. Baliwag Transit, Inc.

July 8, 1999
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pleadings: Answer - Default

G.R. No. 126258

BUENA, J.

SUMMARY: Respondents were attesting that they should not have been held in default since the TC did not acquire jurisdiction over
them due to improper service of summons. Court held that there was proper service of summons as to respondent corporation,
Baliwag. It was also held that the appeal taken by respondents was the proper remedy as a default judgment is an adjudication on
the merits and is appealable. (See held for other remedies)
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petitioners instituted a civil complaint for damages against respondents before RTC Makati (decided
in favor of petitioners). Without waiting for the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents appealed the decision to
the CA and as a result thereof, case was remanded to the RTC. Petitioners MR was denied, thus present petition for review on
certiorari of the CA decision.
FACTS:
Passenger bus owned by Baliwag Transit, Inc. and driven by private respondent, Angeles Ramos, hit and bumped a van owned
by petitioner Francisco San Diego and driven by Alfredo Santiago
Petitioners instituted a civil complaint for damages against respondents before the RTC of Makati
Summons and a copy of the complaint was served upon private respondents cashier, Baby Cansino at respondents bus
station in Caloocan City, who received the court process but refused to sign the original summons
TC, upon motion of petitioners, declared respondents in default. Pursuant to this order, petitioners presented evidence exparte
Respondents received a copy of the default order and it moved for reconsideration, alleging: TC did not acquire jurisdiction
over its person by reason of improper service of summons; Person who received the summons is only a cash receiving clerk
who, unschooled with the law, and whose position is not so integrated with the management circle of defendant
corporation, did not fully appreciate the legal significance and consequences of said document
Without ruling on respondents motion, TC rendered a decision ordering respondents to pay repair cost of the van, medical
and hospitalization expenses, unearned income of the passengers and the corporation (for non-use of the van), moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees
Without waiting for resolution of the MR, respondents appealed to CA, arguing that they could not be held in default due to
improper service of summons
CA: Annulled and set aside TC order of default and remanded case to TC for appropriate proceedings, since TC did not
acquire jurisdiction over person of respondent
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
TC did not acquire jurisdiction over it due to improper service of summons: Baby Cansino was a mere cash receiving clerk
and cannot be considered as an agent or representative of the corporation; Also, summons was served at a place other than
respondents principal place of business (served at one of the respondents bus stations in Caloocan)
Basically, respondents main argument was that it was not properly notified of the action against it and so, it could not be
held in default
ISSUES:
1) WON there was valid service of summons upon respondents As to bus driver, NO; As to the corporation, YES
2) WON appeal taken by respondents instead of motion for new trial is the proper remedy YES
HELD:
VALIDITY OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON RESPONDENTS
1) Service of summons upon Angeles Ramos (bus driver) was improper
In actions in personam, summons must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him
If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt service impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendants dwelling house/residence with person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by
leaving copies at his office or regular place of business with competent person
In this case, sheriff hastily effected service of summons by substituted service without first attempting to personally serve the
same upon the defendant
Lower court thus did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Ramos; Judgment against him without effect
2)

Service of summons upon Baliwag Transit, through its cashier, Baby Cansino, is proper
MORTELL, KHRISKA VIKTORIA M.

CASE # 13

Under Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, if the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines, service of summons may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors

Affidavit of Ms. Cansino stating that she is not the cashier of respondent Baliwag, but merely a cash receiving clerk deserves scant consideration
for being self-serving

The Sheriff's Return certifying that summons were served upon defendant Baliwag is prima facie evidence of the fact that the person on whom
the summons was served was in fact the cashier of the company

Affidavit cannot overcome the presumption that official duty had been regularly performed, which presumption may be overcome only by clear
and convincing evidence

Even if Ms. Cansino is not the cashier, still service would be proper as she is considered an agent of the company authorized
to receive court processes
Since respondents dont deny that they actually received summons, there is substantial compliance with the rules on service
of summons
Service on respondents bus terminal (even if it is not the corporations main office) does not render the service of summons
invalid

Artemio Baltazar v. CA: Section 13, does not, however, impose such requirement, and so personal service upon the
corporation may be effected through service upon, for instance, the president of the corporation at his office, or
residential address
TC validly acquired jurisdiction over Baliwag

APPEAL TAKEN BY RESPONDENTS WAS PROPER (PERTINENT UNDER THIS TOPIC)

It is well-settled that, a defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies, to wit:
(a) He may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of
default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a
meritorious defense;
b) If judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If he discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under
Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to
set aside the order of default has been presented by him
Private respondents can appeal the judgment pursuant to Section 2(3), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
A default judgment is an adjudication on the merits and is thus appealable
SIDE NOTE (Am I Gab???)
Since driver has yet to come under courts adjudicatory powers, there is no proof adduced as to his negligence upon which
Baliwags primary but vicarious liability (under Art. 2180) could be based
No presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees can operate against or be overcome by Baliwag
since the factual basis for such presumption does not exist

MORTELL, KHRISKA VIKTORIA M.

CASE # 13

MELITON v. CA and ZIGA

Dec 11, 1992
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pleadings; Answer; Counter-claim

G.R. No. 101883

Regalado

SUMMARY: Ziga filed a complaint against Meliton. Meliton filed three counterclaims. Zigas
complaint was dismissed for being moot and academic. Melitons counterclaims were dismissed
for non-payment of docket fees. Months after, Meliton filed a complaint involving the same
grounds in her earlier counterclaims. Ziga filed a motion to dismiss Melitons new case on the
basis that such case was barred by the dismissal of both her earlier case and Melitons
counterclaims.
The Court held that the counterclaims are compulsory in nature BUT Meliton is not barred from
asserting the same in another action.
FACTS:
June 22, 1988: Respondent Nelia Ziga, in her own behalf and as attorney-infact of Alex
A. Ziga and Emma A. Ziga-Siy, filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480
against petitioner Lydia Meliton for rescission of a contract of lease over a parcel of land.
Alleged grounds: failure to deposit the one month rental and to pay the monthly rentals due; her
construction of a concrete wall and roof on the site of a demolished house on the leased
premises without the lessor's written consent; and her unauthorized sublease of the leased
property to a third party.
July 29, 1988: Meliton filed an answer to the complaint denying the material averments
thereof and setting up three counterclaims for recovery of the value of her kitchenette
constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was demolished by private respondent; the
value of the improvements introduced in the kitchenette to beautify it, plus the value of the
furniture and fixtures purchased for use in the kitchenette; and moral damages, attorney's fees
May 29, 1989: Trial Court, on motion of private respondent contending that her cause of
action had already become moot and academic by the expiration of the lease contract,
dismissed the complaint.
The counterclaims of Meliton were also dismissed for non-payment of the docket fees.
On December 6, 1989, petitioners Lydia Meliton and Virgilio Meliton filed a complaint
against private respondent for recovery of the same amounts involved and alleged in their
counterclaims in Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
RTC 89-1942
On February 15, 1991, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the cause of action therein was barred by prior judgment in Civil Case No.RTC 881480
On February 22, 1991, the court denied Ziga's motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil
Case No. RTC 89-1942 on the ground that the dismissal of the petitioner's counterclaims in Civil
Case No. RTC 88-1480 is not an adjudication on the merits as the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the counterclaims for failure of Meliton to pay the docket fees, hence the said
dismissal does not constitute a bar to the filing of the later complaint.
Ziga's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order was denied by the lower court for
lack of merit in its order of March 18, 1991. Ziga went to the SC but was referred to CA. CA
granted CAs petition, thus this appeal by Meliton.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature. Compulsory
2. Whether or not petitioners, having failed to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from
the order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are already barred from asserting the same in
another action. - NO

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #14

HELD: Issue #1
Counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
The determination of whether the counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, the "one
compelling test of compulsoriness" is the logical relationship between the claim alleged
in the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of
the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and
time, as where they involve many of the same factual and/or legal issues.
In the Civil Case No. 88-1480, all the requisites of a compulsory counterclaim
are present. The counterclaims are logically related to the complaint. Zigas complaint was
for rescission of the contract of lease due to Meliton's breach of her obligations under the said
contract. On the other hand, Meliton's counter claims were for damages for unlawful demolition
of the improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold occupancy of the premises, as
well as for the filing of that civil suit which is contended to he clearly unfounded. Both the
claims therein of petitioners and private respondent arose from the same contract of
lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as well as their potential liability for
damages, emanated from the same contractual relation.
Petitioners' right to claim damages for the unlawful demolition of the improvements they
introduced on the land was based on their right of possession under the contract of lease which
is precisely the very same contract sought to be rescinded by private respondent in her
complaint.
CA correctly held that the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature.
Issue #2
According to Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a counterclaim not set up shall be
barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. However, said rule is
not applicable to the case at bar.
Contrary to the claim of private respondent, it cannot be said that herein petitioners
failed to duly interpose their causes of action as counterclaims in the previous action.
Petitioners' claims were duly set up as counterclaims in the prior case but the same were
dismissed by reason of non-payment of docket fees. The ruling of respondent Court of Appeals
to the effect that the failure of petitioners to appeal or to move for reconsideration of the said
order of dismissal bars them from asserting their claims in another action cannot be upheld.
Where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be
abated upon a plea of auter action pendant or litis pendentia and/or dismissed on the ground of
res judicata, depending on the stage or status of the other suit.
The present action cannot be dismissed either on the ground of litis pendentia since
there is no other pending action between the same parties and for the same cause, nor on the
ground of res judicata.
In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment
must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, was dismissed upon motion of private respondent, plaintiff
therein, under Section 2 of Rule 17. Dismissal thereunder is without prejudice, except when
otherwise stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in the order of the

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #14

court. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the
merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the
dismissal action had not been commenced. The discontinuance of a case not on the merits
does not bar another action on the same subject matter. Evidently, therefore, the prior
dismissal of herein petitioners counterclaims is not res judicata and will not bar the
filing of another action based on the same causes of action.
Also, the trial court, in dismissing the complaint of private respondent, did not intend to
prejudice the claims of petitioners by barring the subsequent judicial enforcement thereof. As
stated therein, (t)he court in dismissing the counterclaim(s) has taken into account the fact that
a counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the
plaintiffs." This is a clear indication, deducible by necessary implication, that the lower
court was aware of the fact that petitioners could avail of the causes of action in said
counterclaims in a subsequent independent suit based thereon and that there was no
legal obstacle thereto.
In dismissing private respondent's complaint, the trial court could not but have reserved
to petitioners, as a condition for such dismissal, the right to maintain a separate action for
damages. Petitioners' claims for damages in the three counterclaims interposed in said
case, although in the nature of compulsory counterclaims but in light of the aforesaid
reservation in the dismissal order, are consequently independent causes of action which
can be the subject of a separate action against private respondent.
Assuming arguendo that the bar under the rule on compulsory counterclaims may be
invoked, the peculiar circumstances of this case irresistibly and justifiedly warrant the relaxation
of such rule. The court a quo dismissed petitioners' counterclaims for nonpayment of docket
fees pursuant to our then ruling in Manchester Development Corporation, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al. before its modification. The failure of petitioners to seek reconsideration of or to
take an appeal from the order of dismissal of the counterclaim should not prejudice their right to
file their claims in a separate action because they were thereby made to understand and believe
that their counterclaims were merely permissive and could be the subject of a separate and
independent action. Under the Rules, there is no need to pay docket fee for a compulsory
counterclaim. The ruling in Manchester applies specifically to permissive counterclaims only,
thereby excluding compulsory counterclaims from its purview, and that was the ruling of the
court below to which the litigants therein submitted. Had the trial court correctly specified that
petitioners' counterclaims were compulsory, petitioners could have objected to the dismissal
sought by private respondent on the ground that said counterclaims could not remain pending
for independent adjudication.

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #14

Visayan Packing v. Reparations Commission & CA

G.R. No. L-29673
Nov. 12, 1987
J. Narvasa
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pleadings: Answer: Counter-claims
SUMMARY:
REPACOM sold to VISPAC several properties on installment basis. VISPAC filed a case alleging ambiguity on the terms
of payment. REPACOM filed a separate case for collection on the 1st installment. The SC said REPACOM should have
filed an answer to the 1st case but still found VISPAC liable to pay the 1st installment.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari on a decision of CA. (RULE 65) (INFERRED only by having CA as
respondent because the case did not say anything).
FACTS:
Through a Contract of Conditional Purchase and Sale of Reparation Goods, Reparations Commission
(REPACOM) sold a cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant, and 3 fishing boats to Visayan Packing Corp.
(VISPAC) for P1,135,712.47 in 10 equal yearly installments with interest.
Prior to the due date of the 1st installment, RECPACOM sent VISPAC a written reminder.
In response, VISPAC filed a special civil action for declaratory relief in CFI Manila (1st case) alleging an ambiguity
on the precise time the obligation to pay the first installment.
For VISPACs failure to pay despite several demands for the 1st installment (P135,712.47), REPACOM filed an
ordinary civil action for collection (2nd case).
VISPAC moved to dismiss the 2nd case on the ground of pendency of the declaratory relief actions.
Oct. 9, 1962: In the 1st case, CFI dismissed the complaint, holding that the issues raised would be necessarily
threshed out in the collection suit.The SC affirmed the CFI, holding the clarity of terms of the contract.
March 27, 1963: In the 2nd case, CFI denied the motion to dismiss and ordered VISPAC to pay the 1st installment.
VISPAC appealed to the CA stating that the TC erred in not holding the collection suit (2nd case) was barred by
the pendency of the declaratory relief cases (1st case). CA affirmed CFI.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in not dismissing the 2nd case because of the pendency of the 1st case YES!
HELD:
A compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in the same suit
involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it.

Section 4, Rule 9 (1985 ROC) states that a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

However, Sec. 3, Rule 9 (1985 ROC) provide that when a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim through oversight,
inadvertence, or excusable negligence, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or
crossclaim by amendment before judgment.
Where the counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be abated upon a plea of another action pendant or
litis pendentia, and/or dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata.

There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim
based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint.
A special civil action is not essentially different from all ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of
the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special
regulation. The Identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may
and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar
rules governing special civil actions.

The separate action for collection should have been dismissed and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the
declaratory relief suits, by way of an amended answer.

st

BUT it appears VISPAC initiated the 1 case merely to obstruct and delay the payment of the installments. Under the
circumstances, and taking account of the not inconsiderable length of time that the case at bar has been pending, it would
be to do violence to substantial justice to pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on compulsory
counterclaims. Form cannot prevail over substance.
SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #23

REPUBLIC v. CENTRAL SURETY

26 October 1968
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pleadings; Third-party complaint

G.R. No. L-27802

Castro, J.

SUMMARY: Central Surety posted a P5000 bond to answer for the appearance of Po Kee Kam in a deportation
proceeding against him. When he failed to show up, Republic sought the recovery of the said amount. Central then filed
a third party complaint against Po and Go (pursuant to an indemnification agreement between them and Central). CFI
dismissed the third party complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but sustained its jurisdiction in the main case, ordering Central
to pay P5000 to Republic. SC sets aside the dismissal, saying that a third party complaint is ancillary to the main case,
and its jurisdiction depends on the jurisdiction of the main case. Thus, even if the third party complaint, if filed
independently) is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, the fact that the CFI had acquired jurisdiction over the main case
vests the CFI with jurisdiction over the third-party complaint.
FACTS: Republic filed a case for collection of money against Central Surety and its bond manager Casmiro Mangoba for
the P5000 bond it executed for the temporary release of Po Kee Kam, a Chinese citizen in a deportation proceeding.
Since Po did not appear at a scheduled hearing, Central Suretys bond was declared confiscated with an order of the
Commissioner of Immigration demanding the remittance of the said amount with interest, plus P1000 as attorneys fees.
Surety and Mangoba filed separate answers, saying that they cannot be held liable for more than P5000, and that the
court has no jurisdiction since the amount is only P5000, and that the Republic has no cause of action.
Central Surety then filed a third-party complaint against Po Kee Kam and Tony Go, alleging that Po and Go executed an
indemnity agreement in favor of Central Surety to indemnify it for damage, loss, costs, payments, advances and
expenses of whatever kind and nature which Central Surety may at any time incur as a consequence of having executed
the bond. Po and Go filed their answered, saying that the case is premature as the main deportation case has not yet
been terminated. Upon verbal motion of Po/Go, TC dismissed this third-party complaint (without prejudice to its re-filing
with proper courts), saying that the complaint claims only P6,000.00, and all civil cases involving not more than
P10,000.00 are cognizable by the Municipal Courts.
TC then ordered Central Surety to pay Republic the sum of PK with interests, and absolved Mangoba. Central Surety
appealed both decisions. CA then certified the case to SC as the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. SC sets aside the
dismissal of the third-party complaint, and orders Po and Go to pay Central Surety the amount that the latter will pay.
ISSUES:
1. Is the Surety liable on its bond? YES
2. Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the subject- matter of the main action? YES

3. Did the trial court have jurisdiction over the third-party complaint? YES
HELD:
1.

Central Surety is only liable if there must be notice to it by the Republic to produce Po Kee Kam and that the latter fails to it and said
person fails to appear. While Central Surety claims these conditions did not happen, evidence provides that notice was given
because Central Surety even asked for the postponement of the production of Po Kee Kam. No reason for it to move for
postponement if it was not notified.

2.

Central Surety says it had no jurisdiction since the total amount is only P6K, and CFI only vested with jurisdiction over claims
exceeding P10K, as provided by RA 3828 which became effective on June 22, 1963. The case was filed on June 20, 1963, and
Central Surety claims that the trial courts jurisdiction was lost on June 22 when RA3828 took effect. SC says that jurisdiction once
acquired continues until the case is terminated

3. A third party complaint is an ancillary suit, which depends on the jurisdiction of the court over the main action. Even if
the complaint was filed after the effectivity of RA 3828 and its demand does not exceed P10K (within the jurisdiction of
the CFI); the fact that the CFI acquired jurisdiction over the man case follows that it had acquired jurisdiction over the
main action. Jurisdiction over the main case embraces all incidental matters arising therefrom and connected
therewith, to avoid split jurisdiction" and in multiplicity of suits.
The third-party complaint is but a continuation of the main action, its purpose being merely to seek contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.' The aim is to avoid actions which
should be tried together to save time and cost, and obtain consistent results from identical or similar evidence.
A third-party complaint cannot be likened to a counterclaim which must be within the jurisdiction of the court
trying the main case, because unlike a third- party complaint, a counterclaim 'need not diminish or defeat the
recovery sought by the opposing party, but may claim itself exceeding in amount or different in kind from that
sought in the opposing party's claim. (Rule 6, Sec. 6). A third-party complaint may likewise be likened to a
cross claim under Rule 9, section 5. [Talisay-Silay Mining v. CIR, cited at length in this case]:
SULIT LEOR JYLE C.

CASE #17

P A S C U A L

v .

B A U T I S T A

29 May 1970 G.R. No. L-21644 Dizon, J.

TOPIC: Pleadings; Answer; Third-Party Complaint
SUMMARY: Bautista sought to revive a final judgment against her judgment debtor. The Court held that the
action for revival was filed out of time because 10-year period began to run from the promulgation of the
CFI judgment by default against third-party defendant Flores, not of the SC decision on the main case.

NATURE: Appeal by third-party defendant Flores from the decision of CFI Manila which revived the decision of the
SC in G. R. No. L-6569 and G.R. No. L-6576.

In CFI Manila case entitled, "Wenceslao Pascual vs. Pilar Bautista, Primitivo Lovina, Nelly Montilla de Lovina
and Leon Yambao", Bautista, with leave of court, filed a third-party complaint against Mariano R.
Flores . Having failed to answer the third-party complaint, Flores was declared in default.
March 7, 1951 - CFI held the defendants solidarily liable to Pascual. With respect to the third-party
complaint, CFI held in favor of Bautista and against Flores, ordering the latter to pay Bautista
liquidated damages and atty's fees.
All the parties except Flores appealed to the CA, which modified the CFI decision by holding Bautista
solely liable. Bautista and Pascual appealed to the SC, which affirmed the CA on April 18, 1956. The SC
decision was entered by the Clerk CFI Manila in the entry book of his office on June 6, 1957.
Bautista secured a writ to execute the decision against Flores, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. She
obtained several alias writs, all returned unsatisfied. She filed a petition for the examination under oath of
her judgment debtor (Flores), alleging that he had fraudulently disposed of his properties.
The court ordered Flores to appear before it for examination. Upon petition of Flores, however, the court
set aside its order for his examination as well as the writ of execution then outstanding, on the ground that
"more than ten years had already elapsed since the judgment against third-party defendant Mariano R.
Flores and in favor of third-party plaintiff was entered, so that no writ of execution of said judgment can
now be issued (See. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court)".
Bautista filed a petition for relief from said order but it was denied by the court, and although she filed a
notice of appeal, no appeal appears to have been actually perfected.
Nov. 21, 1961 - Bautista filed an action for the revival of the final judgment against Flores. In his Answer,
Flores alleged that said judgment had already prescribed pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court, and
Art. 1144(3) of the Civil Code. After trial, the lower court rendered the appealed judgment.

APPELLANT FLORES ARGUES: The judgment sought to be revived had already prescribed.
APPELLEE BAUTISTA ARGUES: The judgment may not be considered final and enforceable until the final
determination of the main case, which took place only when the SC promulgated its decision on April 18, 1956.
Which judgment could be revived against Flores, the CFI Decision of March 7, 1951, or the SC decision of
April 18, 1956? The former. The action to revive it came too late on Nov. 21, 1961.
Flores did not appeal from the CFI decision. He was not affected by the CA decision, nor by the SC decision.
Moreover, the CFI decision, as far as Flores was concerned, was a judgment by default which under the law
then in force was not appealable and was deemed to be immediate and executory. Therefore, even if he
appealed, his appeal would have been out of order.
Bautista's argument might apply if her cause of action was dependent on the success/failure of the main
action, but such is not the case. Her cause of action was based on par. 5 of their agreement, which makes it
clear that Bautista would be entitled to recover the liquidated damages etc. from Flores "in the event that
for any reason whatsoever" a deed of sale was not executed by Nelly Montilla de Lovina. Because Mrs.
Lovina failed to execute the deed of sale, the CFI rendered the judgment by default against Flores.
It is clear from the provisions of the Rules of Court that for a claim to be properly raised in a pending action
by way of third party complaint, it is not necessary that it be one arising from or entirely dependent upon
the main action; it is enough that it be "in respect" of the claim of third party plaintiff's opponent (Rule 6,
Section 12), or that it be "connected with plaintiff's claim" (Capayas vs. CFI Albay).
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the appealed decision, without costs.
VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S.

PAGE 1 OF 2

CASE # 18

BARREDO, J., concurring in the result:

The proposition in that the judgment in Bautista's favor could be enforceable even before the SC's decision
on the main case is unnecessary and therefore, obiter dictum.
First of all, if Flores' liability were really entirely independent of Bautista's liability to Pasual in the main case,
Bautista would not have been able file a third-party complaint. I maintain, therefore, that the pleading filed
by Bautista against Flores was not a third-party complaint but an ordinary complaint, mistakenly pleaded
within the pending action between Pascual and Bautista. Nevertheless, since judgment by default was
rendered by the CFI, it must be treated as an ordinary one, as contradistinguished from a judgment upon a
third-party complaint.
If, on the other hand, the pleading in question were to be considered as a genuine third-party complaint,
the dispositive portion of this decision would not be, in my opinion, correct. I regret I have to disagree with
the excessively broad concept of a third-party complaint defined by the main opinion. I do not believe that
the phrase "in respect of his opponent's claim" used in Section 12 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court concerning
third-party complaints, can be equated with or has the same connotation as that of being merely
"connected with the plaintiff's claim", as the main opinion holds. I realize that this quotation is from
Capayas v. CFI Albay, but it can be taken out of context, because precisely in that decision, the Court held,
"The test to determine whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party complaint, 'in respect to
plaintiff's claim' is, whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff's claim is based, or
the third-party's claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected
with the plaintiff's claim.
***
Another test, provided for by section 4, Rule 12, of our Rules of Court, is whether the third-party
defendant may assert any defenses which the third- party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiff's
claim. If he may properly assert such defenses, then he is a proper third-party defendant; otherwise he is
not and the claim against him can not be considered as a third-party complaint."
The way I understand the above-quoted dissertation, it does not lay down one single test that can be
utilized or applied separately from the others. To determine whether a third- party complaint is proper or
not, all the tests mentioned must have to be satisfied.
In defining a compulsory counter-claim, Section 4 of Rule 9 uses the phrase "necessarily connected with". IF
it were the intention of Section 12, Rule 6 to refer to merely "connected" claims, it would have used that
word instead of the phrase "in respect of" as in Section 4, Rule 9, and thereby avoid confusion. The use of a
different word, with a known somewhat different connotation, indicates that the meaning intended to be
conveyed is also different. It appears quite clear to me that in ordinary parlance, to say that one thing is
"connected with" another does not convey the same import as saying that it is "in respect of" it. "Connected
with" comprehends a much broader idea than "in respect of". I am sure that, at least, these two phrases are
not always interchangeable.
According to Senator Vicente Francisco, a distinguished authority in procedural law, "The rule on thirdparty complaint requires that the claim of the defendant be 'in respect of the plaintiff's claim.' Unlike
permissive counter-claim, the third-party complaint must be founded on the claims in the original action."
Applying these views to this case, I reiterate that if the claim of Bautista were a real third-party
complaint, the effect would be that the judgment, even by the default, against Flores did not
become executory until after the claim against Bautista had been finally determined, for in my
concept, as explained above, of a real third-party complaint, the third-party defendant is never liable to the
defendant unless the latter is liable to the plaintiff.

VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S.

PAGE 2 OF 2

CASE # 18

LEOBRERA v. CA and BPI

GR No. 80001
February 27, 1989
Cortes, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Amendments and Supplements (Rule 10)
SUMMARY: Lebrero secured two separate loans secured by separate real estate mortgages. After
defaulting on the first, BPI threatened to foreclose. Lebrero filed for and was granted a restraining
order against BPI. He defaulted on the second, BPI threatened to foreclose and Lebrero filed for a
Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint and was granted another restraining order. The court held
that the Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint should not have been given due course as Lebrero
did not comply with the notice requirement and the supplemental complaint itself was defective for
stating a cause of action different/unrelated from that in the original complaint.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari filed by Lebrero after the
CA annulled the orders issued by the trial court restraining BPI from foreclosing real
estate mortgages which were security for two separate loans.
FACTS:
Lebrera was granted two loand by BPI:
LOAN 1 a P800,000 credit facility as part of an amicable agreement which was
converted into 90-day promissory notes. These were secured with two real estate
mortgages.
LOAN 2 a separate P500,000 loan payable within three years and secured with a
third real-estate mortgage.
Lebrera failed to settle his first loan upon maturity. BPI prepared to foreclose the two real
estate mortgages but before it could do so, Lebrera filed a claim for damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin BPI from foreclosing the
mortgages. The trial court issued an order restraining BPI from foreclosing the real estate
mortgages.
Lebrera again failed to pay the amortization on the second loan. BPI wrote him to say that
they are accelerating the maturity of the loan. He failed to pay and BPI threatened to foreclose
the mortgages. Before BPI could do so, he filed a Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint
which prayed for the issuance of an injunction to restrain BPI from foreclosing the third
mortgage. The next day, the trial court issued a restraining order.
BPI filed a motion to set aside the order which was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the CA. The CA gave due course to
the petition and enjoined the trial court from enforcing the restraining order. It also
subsequently granted the petition, declared the second restraining order null and void, and
remanded the case.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the supplemental complaint. NO
1. Did not comply with notice requirement - Sec. 6 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court1
expressly provides that the Court may allow a party upon motion to serve a
supplemental pleading after a reasonable notice has been given the other party. The
petitioners Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint was filed on March 11. A copy of
the Motion was sent to BPI by registered mail but the same was only received on March
13 or a day after the trial court had already issued an order granting the motion to
1

Section 6. Matters subject of supplemental pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party should
plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor.

Page 1 of 2

admit the supplemental complaint. By then, it was too late to contest the Motion. This
can hardly be described as reasonable notice. The notice of hearing is a minimum
requirement of due process.
2. Different causes of action As to the supplemental complaint itself, what militates
against its admission is the fact that the matters involved therein are entirely different
causes of action. A supplemental complaint, as implied by the name, should only
supply deficiencies in aid of an original complaint. It must be based on matters arising
subsequent to the original complaint. The cause of action for the original complaint
was the supposed violation of the terms of amicable settlement in loan 1. The cause
of action for the supplemental complaint was the alleged act harassment of BPI in
declaring Lebrero in default and demanding in full loan 2. Although there is an identity
as to the relief sought (injunction against foreclosure), the causes of action are
different.
Petition Denied.

Page 2 of 2

SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. V. HON. HELEN RICAFORT, TEAM

IMAGE ENTERTAINMENT, INC., CO, CAL & CUISIA
5 AUGUST 1998
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: FILLING; MODES OF SERVICE

G.R. No. 132007

DAVIDE, J.

SUMMARY: Solar received a copy of the respondents answer through mail even if respondent could have personally served the
pleading, given that their offices were very near from each other. Solar filed a motion to expunge the pleading because it did not
have an explanation why personal service was not made as required in Rule 13, Sec. 11. The Court ruled that Solar should have
complied with the requirement of an explanation given that it is an innovation made to obviate delay in the administration of justice.
However, the Court exercised valid discretion in accepting the pleading because at the time of the service of the pleading the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure was only enacted a month ago.

HOW DID THE CASE REACH THE SC: Petitioner filed the instant special civil action of certiorari, contending that public
respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
she admitted private respondents' "Answer (with Counterclaims)."
FACTS
The offices of the two counsels of the opposing parties in a civil case for recovery of possession and damages with
prayer for a writ of replevin were merely around 200 meters away from each other.
The respondent, Team Image decided to serve its pleading, Answer (with Counterclaims)" to the petitioner via
registered mail and it did so without inserting and did not contain any written explanation as to why service was not
made personally upon petitioner-plaintiff, as required by Section 11 of Rule 13.
Petitioners filed a motion to expunge pleading, and such was denied by respondent Judge Ricafort.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: There is absolutely no valid reason why defendants should not have personally served the
copy of their answer as the office of defendants counsel is just a stone throw away from the office of petitioners counsel.
Moreover, the post office was about ten (10) times farther from the counsels office.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: They aver that public respondent Judge Bautista-Ricafort correctly admitted private
respondents pleading in light of Section 6, Rule 1 and Alonso v. Villamor; that Section 11 of Rule 13 begins with the phrase
whenever practicable, suggesting that service by mail may still be effected depending on the relative priority of the pleading
sought to be filed; and when service is not done personally, it is more prudent and judicious for the courts to require a written
explanation rather than to expunge the pleading or consider it not being filed. The court has discretion in this matter.
ISSUE/HELD: WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioners motion to expunge private respondents answer with counterclaims on the ground that said pleading
was not served personally. NO, even if the explanation is mandatory, the pleading should still be accepted in this case.
RATIO
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be
done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
SEC. 6. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

GENERAL RULE: Whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place
and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. EXCEPTION: Only when personal service or filing is not
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court
shall likewise consider 1) the importance of the subject matter of the case, 2) the issues involved, and 3) the prima
facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Sec.11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we
allow circumvention of the innovation introduced in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.
To the merits of this case, in view of the proximity between the offices and the absence of any attendant explanation
(there could still have been a valid explanation, i.e. if there was no one to receive the pleading) as to why personal
service of the answer was not effected violated Sec. 11 of Rule 13. However, the grant or denial of said motion
nevertheless remained within the sound exercise of the trial courts discretion. Thus, as guided by Section 6, Rule
1, as well as Alonso v. Villamor, the trial court opted to exercise its discretion in favor of admittance.
To our mind, if motions to expunge or strike out pleadings for violation of Sec. 11 of Rule 13 were to be
indiscriminately resolved under Section 6 of Rule 1 or Alonzo v. Villamor (talagang magkaiba spelling) and other
analogous cases, then Section 11 would become meaningless and its sound purpose negated.
Nevertheless, we sustain the challenged ruling of the trial court. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only
on 1 July 1997, while the questioned pleading was filed only on 8 August 1997, or on the 39 th day following the
effectivity. Hence, private respondents counsel may not have been fully aware of the requirements and
ramifications of Sec. 11, Rule 13. In fact, as pointed out by petitioners counsel, in another case where private
respondents counsel was likewise opposing counsel, the latter similarly failed to comply with Sec. 11. (LOL)
However, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 is mandated one
month from promulgation of this Decision.
CABALLA

CASE #21

SPS. MIRANDA v. CA
G.R. NO. 114243
FEBRUARY 23, 2000
QUISUMBING., J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: SERVICES OF SUMMONS; MODES OF SERVICE; SUBSTITUTED
SUMMARY: Respondent Java lost a case against Luneta Motor Company, and pursuant to a writ of execution
their assets were sold at a public auction (a jeep and a parcel of land, the latter being sold to LMC who then
sold it petitioners). The Javas then filed a (second) case for nullifying the judgment of the first case, with the
Sps. Miranda and others as defendants. Trial court dismissed, but CA reversed (annulling the judgment of the
1st case) for want of proper service since the summons was served by substituted service without effort at
personal service. SC affirmed CA: service of summons was not properly made: The modes of service
should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person. In this
case, no reason was given as to why no personal service was made; also the substituted service was
invalid. A final judgment may be annulled upon (1) extrinsic fraud or (2) lack of jurisdiction.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: RTC dismissed the case filed by respondent. CA reversed RTC. Case
rose to SC through review on certiorari.
FACTS
In 1965, Luneta Motor Company (LMC) filed suit against spouses Lucila and Pablo Java with the CFI for
recovery of a Thames jeep, P9403 + interest, and attorneys fees. The Java spouses were later declared in
default for failure to file their answer within the reglementary period despite notice. Pursuant to a write of
execution, the vehicle was sold at a public auction, as well as a piece of land described as Lot 8015. The lot
was sold to LMC, who then sold it to petitioners.
In 1977, Lucila Java and her daughter filed a case and sought to nullify the judgment of the 1965 case.
The petitioners, as well as Ernesto Elizondo and Angeles java Elizondo (son-in-law and daughter of Lucina)
were named as defendants. During the pendency of the case, Lucila died and was substituted by her heirs.
In 1988, the trial court dismissed the 1977 case. The Javas appealed to the CA; the latter reversed the
trial court for want of proper service since the summons was served by substituted service without effort of
personal service.
ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WoN the summons was properly served in the 1965 case. (NO)
RATIO
(Pertinent rules: Rule 14, RC, Sec. 7 and 8) Service of summons upon the defendant is essential for the
court to acquire jurisdiction over his person. The modes of service should be strictly followed in order
that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made.
In this case, the Sheriffs Return of Service shows no reason why personal service could not be made.
Impossibility of prompt, personal service should be shown by stating in the proof of service that efforts were
made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed, hence the resort to substituted service. Here,
no such explanation was made. Such failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of
substituted service renders said service ineffective.
Petitioners point to the deposition of Ernesto Elizondo to support their argument that there was valid
service of summons. But he testified that he was not living in the same house as his parents-in-law.Rule 14,
Sec. 8 requires that substituted service must be effected by (a) leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.
The requirement that the summons be left with a person in the same dwelling house or residence has not been
complied with, thus the substituted service is ineffective.
For want of proper service of summons upon defendants, the trial court in the 1977 case never
acquired jurisdiction over the former, hence the execution of sales of the defendants assets are void. A final
judgment may be annulled upon either the ground of (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
RULING: Petition dismissed. CA affirmed.

GASTANES

Case #11

MANOTOC v. CA
2006 AUGUST 16
T OPIC IN S YLLABUS : Service of Summons Modes of Service Substituted

G.R. No. 130974

VELASCO, JR., J.

S UMMARY : Manotoc (aka Imee Marcos) challenges the TCs jurisdiction over her person due to invalid substituted service
of summons. The summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon a certain Macky de la Cruz, allegedly the
caretaker of Manotoc at Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, alleged to be Manotocs residence. Manotoc wins.
Requirements for substituted service: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service; (2) specific details in the return; (3) a
person of suitable age and discretion; (4) a competent person in charge. In this case, the Sheriffs return cited no clear,
valid reason as to why the efforts to serve the summons on Manotoc in person proved inadequate. There were only
generally couched phrases, and neither was it shown that Trajano or the Sheriff exerted extraordinary efforts to locate
Manotoc. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts
made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the
alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts
undertaken. Due to the lack of information in the Sheriffs return, Macky de la Cruz could also not have been deemed to
be a person of suitable age and discretion.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
FACTS:
Manotoc [aka IMEE MARCOS] is the defendant in the Civil Case entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se, and on behalf of
the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda "Imee" R. Marcos-Manotoc for Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of
Foreign Judgment.
Trajano seeks the enforcement of the foreign judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by the US District Court of Honolulu,
Hawaii, in the case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, for the wrongful death of
Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command,
direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of Manotoc. [We discussed this case in PIL. Wala lang. If
you want to know how a United States court was able to decide on this case involving Filipinos, find me and ikukuwento ko. LOL.]

July 6, 1993 TC issued a Summons addressed to Manotoc at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra
Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City
July 15, 1993 The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon Macky de la Cruz, an
alleged caretaker of Manotoc at the condo unit.
When Manotoc failed to file her Answer, the TC declared her in default in an Order dated October 13, 1993.
October 19, 1993 Manotoc, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction of the TC over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS/EVIDENCE:
(1) The address indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business;
(2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3)
the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) Manotoc was a
resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.

Manotoc presented Carlos Gonzales, who testified that he saw Manotoc visit Alexandra Homes only twice. He also identified the Certification of
Renato A. de Leon (Assistant Property Administrator of Alexandra Homes), which stated that Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc., and
that the unit was not being leased by anyone at the time.
Manotoc also presented her Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card issued by the Immigration Service of Singapore to show
that she was a resident of Singapore.
Manotoc further claimed that the person referred to in Trajanos Exhibits "A" to "EEEE" as "Mrs. Manotoc" may not even be her, but the mother of
Tommy Manotoc. Even granting that she was the one referred to in said exhibits, only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs. Manotoc. Hence, the
infrequent number of times she allegedly entered Alexandra Homes did not establish that she was a resident.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS/EVIDENCE:

Trajano presented Robert Swift, lead counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who testified that he
participated in the deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. (Bongbong Marcos); and he confirmed that Bongbong testified that Manotocs
residence was at the Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills.
The entries in the logbook of Alexandra Homes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing the name of Manotoc, as well as the Sheriff's Return,
were also adduced in evidence.

TC: Rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss; ruled that for purposes of the Complaint her residence was at Alexandra
Homes based on the documentary evidence of Trajano; relied on the presumption that the sheriff's substituted
service was made in the regular performance of official duty
CA: Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition; adopted TCs findings that Manotocs residence was at Alexandra
Homes, which was also the residence of her husband as shown by the testimony of Atty. Robert Swift and the Returns of
the registered mail sent to Manotoc

The Disembarkation/Embarkation Card and the Certification issued by Renato A. De Leon were hearsay. The Certification did not refer to July 1993,
the month when the substituted service was effected.
Also rejected Manotocs Philippine passport as proof of her residency in Singapore as it merely showed the dates of her departure from and arrival
in the Philippines. The last two inside pages, where Manotocs residence was indicated, were not presented. CA considered the withholding of those
pages as suppression of evidence.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid substituted service of summons for the TC to acquire jurisdiction over
Manotoc NO
HELD:

Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court.
"Any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void." In an action strictly in
LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #03

personam, personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be
served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to.
While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service."
Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules.

REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTITUTED SERVICE:

1.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT PERSONAL SERVICE

Sec. 8, Rule 14 (now Sec. 7, Rule 14) provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve
the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned.
What is a reasonable time? ONE MONTH from the issuance of summons can be considered
"reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant
o

[Possibly because at the end of each month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
summons assigned to the sheriff for service]
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed
so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. The sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the
process on the defendant.

There must be SEVERAL ATTEMPTS by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period
[of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts "
means AT LEAST THREE TRIES, preferably on at least two different dates.

The sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. Only then can impossibility of service be confirmed or accepted.

2.

SPECIFIC DETAILS IN THE RETURN

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail in the Return.
The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the
name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done , though
futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service.

3.

A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION

Person of suitable age and discretion = has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons
To be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to
comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to
the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action.
The person must have the "RELATION OF CONFIDENCE" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would
receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons.
The sheriff must therefore determine: (1) legal age + (2) relationship with defendant (WON
relation of confidence) + (3) W ON person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it/at least notify the defendant

4.

These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

A COMPETENT PERSON IN CHARGE

Substituted service at defendant's office/regular place of business should be served on a competent person in
charge of the place, i.e., the one managing the office/business of defendant, e.g., the president or manager
Such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. These details must also be contained
in the Return.

IN THE CASE AT BAR:

Sheriff Caelas Return reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on
Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to
reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable.
o There were only generally couched phrases such as "on many occasions several attempts were made to
serve the summons x x x personally," "at reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for the reason that
the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises."
It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were made.
As the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative
that the pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in
the Return or Certificate of Service.
Moreover, it has not been shown that Trajano or Sheriff Caelas exerted extraordinary efforts to
locate Manotoc. The second paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were "informed, and so [they]
allege" about the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct means.
o In this case, where Manotocs residence or house is doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have
been better for personal service to have been pursued persistently.
In view of the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number
of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and
wasteful legal expenses, the Court rules that the narration of the efforts made to find the defendant and the
fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will not suffice.
The facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of
attempts made at personal service, dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant,
names of occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be included in the
LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #03

Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such efforts were made to personally serve
summons on defendant, and those resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service.

RE: MACKY DE LA CRUZ AS A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION

Even granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious nonconformity with
the requirement that the summons must be left with a "person of suitable age and discretion" residing
in defendant's house or residence.
There are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2)
recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant.
o In this case, both requirements were not met. The Sheriff's Return lacks information as to
residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriff's general assertion that
de la Cruz is the "resident caretaker" of Manotoc, as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged
receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes.
o

SC: It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her
stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. [Hmm okay ;?]

SC: De la Cruz's refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary
"relation of confidence" with Manotoc.
To protect Manotocs right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted
service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.

RE: PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY BY THE SHERIFF

The court a quo reasoned out that "[t]he certificate of service by the proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts
set out herein, and to overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be clear and
convincing."
SC acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the presumption to apply, the Sheriff's
Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons
and that said efforts failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. Otherwise, the
Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of.
As explained above, the Return of Sheriff Caelas did not comply with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court.
(Venturanza v. CA) x x x the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the
sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective
RE: WON MANOTOC IS A RESIDENT OF ALEXANDRA HOMES
SCs findings that substituted service is void has rendered the matter moot and academic. Even assuming that
Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact would not make an irregular and void substituted service
valid and effective.

LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #03

PENNOYER v. NEFF
Case decided in 1878

95 U.S. 714
Opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice FIELD

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: SERVICE OF SUMMONS

SUMMARY: Mitchell filed a collection suit against Neff before the Oregon circuit court. The former
caused the publication of the summons as Neff was then a non-resident of Oregon. Upon favorable
judgment, Neffs property in Oregon was levied upon and sold to Pennoyer. Neff sought to recover the
property from him. SC granted his petition since the first case was invalid for lack of proper service of
summons.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE US SC: petition questioning the validity of the judgment of the Court of
Appeals reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Oregon which denied the action to recover
property filed by Neff against Pennoyer
FACTS: Mitchell, a lawyer, filed a suit before the Oregon State Court against Neff for unpaid legal fees.
Since Neff was at that time, a non-resident of Oregon, Mitchell caused the publication of the summons
1
upon approval of the court based on the Code of Oregon . Neff did not participate in the trial. He was
declared in default and judgment was later rendered against him. Neffs property in Oregon, though not
previously attached, was levied upon to satisfy the judgment. Pennoyer was the one who bought the
property in this execution sale. Neff later filed suit against Pennoyer to recover his property.
NEFFS ARGUMENT: The judgment rendered against him in the collection suit filed by Mitchell is null
and void for failure to acquire jurisdiction over his person due to lack of proper service of summons.
Therefore, the sale of his property to satisfy the judgment therein is also void.
RELEVANT ISSUE/HELD: WON the judgment rendered against Neff and the subsequent sale of his
property are void YES (lack of proper service of summons)
RATIO:
1. Judgment rendered against Neff was void.
a) Substituted service by publication, or in any other authorized form, may be sufficient to inform parties of the
object of proceedings in rem. But where the entire object of the action is to determine the personal rights and
obligations of the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in personam, constructive service in this form upon
a nonresident is ineffectual for any purpose. Process sent to him out of the State, and process published within it,
are equally unavailing in proceedings to establish his personal liability.
b) "Due process of law would require appearance or personal service before the defendant could be personally
bound by any judgment rendered." (Cooley)
2. The sale of the property is likewise void for it was never brought under the control of the court.
a) In the case against the plaintiff, the property here in controversy sold under the judgment rendered was not
attached, nor in any way brought under the jurisdiction of the court. Its first connection with the case was caused
by a levy of the execution. It was not, therefore, disposed of pursuant to any adjudication, but only in
enforcement of a personal judgment, having no relation to the property, rendered against a nonresident without
service of process upon him in the action or his appearance therein. Note that in this case, the adjudication from
which it proceeded was invalid.
DISPOSITIVE: Court of Appeals affirmed. Neff is entitled to recover his property.
1

Sec. 55. xxx court or judge or justice may grant an order that the service be made by publication of summons in either of the following cases:
(3) When the defendant is not a resident of the State, but has property therein, and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action.
Sec. 56. The order shall direct the publication to be made in a newspaper published in the county where the action is commenced, and, if no
newspaper be published in the county, then in a newspaper to be designated as most likely to give notice to the person to be served, and for
such length of time as may be deemed reasonable, not less than once a week for six weeks. Xxx.
Sec. 57. The defendant against whom publication is ordered, or his personal representatives, on application and sufficient cause shown, at any
time before judgment, shall be allowed to defend the action xxx.
Sec. 60. Proof of the service of summons shall be, in case of publication, the affidavit of the printer, or his foreman, or his principal clerk,
showing the same.

[MA. KATRINA LORIS DINO-POBLETE]

[CASE #04]

EL BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO V. PALANCA

January 26, 1918
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Service of Summons Any Other Manner

G.R. No. 135306

Bellosillo, J.

SUMMARY:
Engracion Palanca Tanguinyen y Limquingco executed a mortgage upon real property as a
security for a debt to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. He returned to China and died. Foreclosure
proceedings were instituted, and notice was successfully given through publication but not
through mail. SC held that due process was observed, as notice was given by publication in a
newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
CFI rendered judgment against Palanca. Appeal to SC.
FACTS:
Engracion Palanca Tanguinyen y Limquingco executed a mortgage upon various real
property situated in Manila as security for a debt to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. He then
returned to China and died there, never returning to the Philippines
Foreclosure proceedings were instituted, but, as Palanca was a non-resident at the time,
it was necessary that notice be given pursuant to Sec. 399 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which states:
o

In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is known, the
judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited by the clerk in
the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his place of residence

Publication was made through a newspaper in the City of Manila.

As to whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. An
affidavit, however, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia, an employee
of the attorneys of the bank, showed that upon that date he had deposited in the Manila
post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila,
containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, the summons, and the order of
the court directing publication as aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's receipt that
Bernardo probably used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt
purports to show that the letter emanated from the office.
Judgement by default was rendered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff. Said judgment
stated publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about
notice having been given by mail.
Foreclosure of the subject property then proceeded and sale was confirmed by the court.
Seven years after the confirmation sale, Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the
Defendants estate, moved that the Order of Default and the above Judgment rendered
thereon be declared void. Said Motion to Vacate Judgment was denied; hence,
this Appeal.

ISSUE:
WON there was a denial of due process of law because of failure to mail the notice NO.

HELD:

Requirement of due process is satisfied if the ff conditions are met: (1) There must be a
court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
As to the requirement that the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard, in a
foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner
prescribing the time within which appearance must be made is essential.
Statutes generally provide for the requirement of publication, and usually in addition
thereto, the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense, it is
merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his
property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take
such steps as he sees fit to protect it.
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance
that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice.
Furthermore, the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely
require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case
where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that
actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be
considered absolutely necessary.
Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent;
and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
o It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures
that in some way he shall be represented when his property is called into
requisition, and if he fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary
publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune,
and he must abide the consequences.
With respect to the sending of notice by mail, the requirement is that the judge shall
direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the court, and it is not in
terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We consider this to be of
some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the principles upon
which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged property
must, so far as the due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible
failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk
or the mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy the parcel or envelope containing the
notice before it should reach its destination and be delivered to him.
Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which
the law unconditionally requires. Judgment affirmed.

MALCOLM, J., dissenting

The fundamental idea of due process of law is that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without
notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense. Protection of the parties demands a strict and an exact
compliance with this constitutional provision. In the instant case the defendant received no notice and had no
opportunity to be heard, certainly we cannot say that there is due process of law.

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)

Decided June 24, 1977
JUSTICE MARSHALL

TOPIC
Service of Summons

SUMMARY
Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, filed an action against the officers of Greyhound Corp. (which was
incorporated in Delaware) who are also nonresidents. He obtained a sequestration order over the latters
shares over the Company. The defendants question the sequestration arguing that violates their right to due
process. The SC rules in favor of the defendants.

HOW THE CASE REACHED SC

Appeal from the supreme court of Delaware

FACTS
Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, is the owner a share of stock in the Greyhound Corp., a business
incorporated in Delaware. On May 1974, he filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of
Delaware naming as defendants Greyhound and 28 of its present or former officers or directors (who
are nonresidents of Delaware as well)
Heitner alleged that the defendants violated their duties to Greyhound by causing it to engage in
actions that resulted in the corporation's being held liable for substantial damages in a private
antitrust suit and a large fine in a criminal contempt action.
Heitner also filed a motion for sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants.
The affidavit identified the property to be as stock, options, warrants, and various corporate rights
of the defendants.
The sequestration order was signed the day the motion was filed. The seizures were accomplished by
placing "stop transfer" orders on the books of the Greyhound Corp. None of the certificates
representing the seized property was physically present in Delaware. The stock was considered to be
in Delaware by virtue of Del.Code Ann., Tit. 8, 169 (1975), which makes Delaware the situs of
ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations.
All defendants were notified of the initiation of the suit by certified mail directed to their last known
addresses and by publication in a Delaware newspaper. The defendants responded by entering a
special appearance for the purpose of moving to quash service of process and to vacate the
sequestration order.
The Court of Chancery denied the motion to quash.

DEFENDANTS ARGUMENTS
They contended that the ex parte sequestration procedure did not accord them due process of law, and that
the property seized was not capable of attachment in Delaware. Appellants asserted that, under the rule of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,326 U. S. 310 (1945), they did not have sufficient contacts with
Delaware to sustain the jurisdiction of that State's courts.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS (Reasoning of the Court of Chancery)

The primary purpose of 'sequestration' is not to secure possession of property pending a trial between
resident debtors and creditors on the issue of who has the right to retain it. Sequestration is a process used
to compel the personal appearance of a nonresident defendant to answer and defend a suit brought against
him in a court of equity. If the defendant enters a general appearance, the sequestered property is routinely
RUIZ

released, unless the plaintiff makes special application to continue its seizure, in which event the plaintiff
has the burden of proof and persuasion."
This limitation on the purpose and length of time for which sequestered property is held renders
inapplicable the due process requirements. Finally, the court held that the statutory Delaware situs of the
stock provided a sufficient basis for the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction by a Delaware court.

ISSUE
WON Court has jurisdiction over defendants

HELD / RATIO
The judgment of the Delaware Supreme Court must, therefore, be reversed.

No, Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction over defendants.

The Delaware courts rejected appellants' jurisdictional challenge by noting that this suit was brought as a
quasi in rem proceeding. Since quasi in rem jurisdiction is traditionally based on attachment or seizure of
property present in the jurisdiction, not on contacts between the defendant and the State, the courts
considered appellants' claimed lack of contacts with Delaware to be unimportant. This categorical analysis
assumes the continued soundness of the conceptual structure founded on the century-old case of Pennoyer
v. Neff.

Under Pennoyer, state authority to adjudicate was based on the jurisdiction's power over either persons or
property. If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant's person, the action and
judgment are denominated "in personam," and can impose a personal obligation on the defendant. If
jurisdiction is based on the court's power over property within its territory, the action is called "in rem" or
"quasi in rem." The effect of a judgment in such a case is limited to the property that supports jurisdiction,
and does not impose a personal liability on the property owner, since he is not before the court. In
Pennoyer's terms, the owner is affected only "indirectly" by an in rem judgment adverse to his interest in the
property subject to the court's disposition.

The Pennoyer rules generally favored nonresident defendants by making them harder to sue. This advantage
was reduced, however, by the ability of a resident plaintiff to satisfy a claim against a nonresident
defendant by bringing into court any property of the defendant located in the plaintiff's State.

Pennoyer itself recognized that its rigid categories could not accommodate some necessary litigation.
Accordingly, Mr. Justice Field's opinion noted that cases involving the personal status of the plaintiff, such as
divorce actions, could be adjudicated in the plaintiff's home State even though the defendant could not be
served within that State.

The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the
owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued
acceptance would serve only to allow state court jurisdiction that is unfair to the defendant.

It is clear that the law of state court jurisdiction no longer stands securely on the foundation established in
Pennoyer. The time is ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in
International Shoe should be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam.

It is premised on recognition that "[t]he phrase, judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary way of
referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." This leads to the conclusion that, in order
to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising
RUIZ

"jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing." The standard for determining whether an exercise of
jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum contacts
standard elucidated in International Shoe.

The Delaware courts based their assertion of jurisdiction in this case solely on the statutory presence of
appellants' property in Delaware. Yet that property is not the subject matter of this litigation, nor is the
underlying cause of action related to the property. Appellants' holdings in Greyhound do not provide
contacts with Delaware sufficient to support the jurisdiction of that State's courts over appellants. If it
exists, that jurisdiction must have some other foundation.

Appellants have simply had nothing to do with the State of Delaware. Moreover, appellants had no reason to
expect to be haled before a Delaware court. Delaware, unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that
treats acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State.

And "[i]t strains reason to suggest that anyone buying securities in a corporation formed in Delaware
'impliedly consents' to subject himself to Delaware's jurisdiction on any cause of action."

Appellants, who were not required to acquire interests in Greyhound in order to hold their positions, did
not, by acquiring those interests, surrender their right to be brought to judgment only in States with which
they had had "minimum contacts."

The Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations."

DISCLAIMER: This is poorly written. Ang hirap magbasa ng US cases T_T

RUIZ

PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD v. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 172242

August 14, 2007

Summary: Dakila Trading is the sole distributor of Perking Elmer, a Singaporean corporation. The latter unilaterally
terminated this agreement, prompting respondent to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong City, a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP
(another local company affliated with PEIA). The RTC issued summons to the petitioner. Acting on the said Order,
Dakila Tradings General Manager went to Singapore and served summons on the petitioner. PEIP questioned this,
claiming that the civil case is one for collection of money, an action in personam, therefore, extraterritorial service of
summon is inappropriate. The Court granted PEIPs petition and discussed everything you need to know regarding
service of summons. Extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but
not if an action is in personam.
Facts: Dakila Trading Corporation into a Distribution Agreement with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd.
(PEIA), a Singaporean corporation. By this agreement, PEIA appointed the respondent as the sole distributor of its
products in the Philippines. The respondent was likewise granted the right to purchase and sell the products of PEIA
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Distribution Agreement. PEIA, on the other hand, shall give
respondent a commission for the sale of its products in the Philippines. Dakila Trading shall order the products of
PEIA, which it shall sell in the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or from Perkin-Elmer Instruments (Philippines)
Corporation (PEIP), an affiliate of PEIA, a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, and
involved in the business of wholesale trading of all kinds of scientific, biotechnological, and analytical instruments and
appliances.
PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement, prompting respondent to file before the RTC of
Mandaluyong City, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Attachment against PEIA and PEIP.
The RTC issued an Order denying respondents prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment. The respondent
moved for the reconsideration of the said Order but it was denied. Respondent then filed Ex-Parte Motions for
Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize Respondents General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve
Summons Outside of the Philippines, which the RTC granted. Thus, an Alias Summons, dated 4 September 2000,
was issued by the RTC to PEIA. But the said Alias Summons was served on 28 September 2000 and received by
Perkinelmer Asia, a Singaporean based sole proprietorship, owned by the petitioner and, allegedly, a separate and
distinct entity from PEIA.
PEIP moved to dismiss the Complaint filed by respondent on the ground that it states no cause of action.
Perkinelmer Asia, on the other hand, through its counsel, sent letters, dated 12 October 2000 and 15 November
2000, to the respondent and to the RTC, respectively, to inform them of the wrongful service of summons upon
Perkinelmer Asia.
Dakila Trading filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, together with the Amended Complaint
claiming that PEIA had become a sole proprietorship owned by the petitioner, and subsequently changed its name to
Perkinelmer Asia. Being a sole proprietorship of the petitioner, a change in PEIAs name and juridical status did not
detract from the fact that all its due and outstanding obligations to third parties were assumed by the petitioner. RTC
deputized respondents General Manager to serve summons on petitioner in Singapore. The RTC thus issued
summons to the petitioner. Acting on the said Order, respondents General Manager went to Singapore and served
summons on the petitioner.
Petitioner subsequently filed with the RTC a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss respondents Amended
Complaint based on the following grounds: (1) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner;
(2) the respondent failed to state a cause of action against the petitioner because it is not the real party-in-interest; (3)
even assuming arguendo that the respondent correctly filed the case against the petitioner, the Distribution Agreement

#08

1/3

which was the basis of its claim grants PEIA the right to terminate the contract at any time; and (4) the venue was
improperly laid. This was denied by the RTC.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure with application
for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the Amended
Complaint
Issues: (1) proper service of summons and acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over the person of the petitioner;
(2) existence of a cause of action against petitioner in respondents Amended Complaint; and (3) proper venue for
respondents civil case against petitioner.
Petitioners argument: This case involves an action for collection of sum of money and damages arising from the alleged
breach of the Distribution Agreement. The action is one in personam, or an action against a person based on his
personal liability; and for the court a quo to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, personal service of
summons, and not extraterritorial service of summons, must be made within the state even if the petitioner is a nonresident. Petitioner avers that extraterritorial service of summons stated under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, is only proper in in rem and quasi in rem cases; thus, resort to an extraterritorial
service of summons in the case at bar was erroneous. Petitioner asseverates that the allegations in the respondents
Amended Complaint that the petitioner has personal properties within the Philippines does not make the present case
one that relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines warranting the extraterritorial service
of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner states that for an
action to be considered as one that relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, the main
subject matter of the action must be the property within the Philippines itself, and such was not the situation in this
case. Resultantly, the extraterritorial service of summons on the petitioner was not validly effected, and did not give
the RTC jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Held: Petition granted.

#08

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner
required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. If the
defendants have not been summoned, unless they voluntarily appear in court, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over their persons and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. To be bound by a
decision, a party should first be subjected to the courts jurisdiction. Thus, one of the modes of acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent in a civil case is through service of summons. It
is intended to give notice to the defendant or respondent that a civil action has been commenced against
him. The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner.
The proper service of summons differs depending on the nature of the civil case instituted by the plaintiff or
petitioner: whether it is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. Actions in personam, are those actions brought
against a person on the basis of his personal liability; actions in rem are actions against the thing itself instead
of against the person; and actions are quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the purpose
of the proceeding is to subject his or her interest in a property to the obligation or loan burdening the
property.
Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there are only four instances
wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons by
extraterritorial service, to wit:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the
defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; and

2/3

#08

(4) when the defendant non-residents property has been attached within the Philippines. In these instances,
service of summons may be effected by
(a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
(b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
The said extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but
for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of
the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him
or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby
take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts
cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.
Thus, being an action in personam, personal service of summons within the Philippines is necessary in order
for the RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, and this is not possible in the
present case because the petitioner is a non-resident and is not found within the Philippines. Respondents
allegation in its Amended Complaint that petitioner had personal property within the Philippines in the form
of shares of stock in PEIP did not make this civil case fall under any of the four instances mentioned in
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, as to convert the action in personam to an action in rem or quasi in
rem and, subsequently, make the extraterritorial service of summons upon the petitioner valid.
That petitioner had personal property within the Philippines in the form of shares of stock in PEIP does not
convert Civil Case No. MC99-605 from an action in personam to one quasi in rem, so as to qualify said case
under the fourth instance mentioned in Section 15, Rule 14 of RoC. It is worthy to note that what is
required under the aforesaid provision of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not a mere allegation of the
existence of personal property belonging to the non-resident defendant within the Philippines but, more
precisely, that the non-resident defendants personal property located within the Philippines must have been
actually attached.
If there was no valid summons served upon petitioner, could RTC have acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner by the latters voluntary appearance? As a rule, even if the service of summons upon the
defendant or respondent in a civil case is defective, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over his person
when he voluntary appears in court or submits himself to its authority. Nonetheless, voluntary appearance,
as a mode of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is likewise inapplicable in this case. It is
settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court for the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of
said court, based on the invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In sum, this Court finds that the petitioner did not submit
itself voluntarily to the authority of the court a quo; and in the absence of valid service of summons, the RTC
utterly failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

3/3

BELEN v. HON. CHAVEZ

March 26, 2008
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Service of Summons

GR No. 175334
TINGA, J.

SUMMARY:
Warning: Highly Procedural Case! But its an easy read; give it a chance.

The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of the complaint, is for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment in a complaint for breach of contract whereby petitioners were ordered to pay private
respondents the monetary award. The issue here was whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over them,
since they were permanent US residents and it was only their counsel appearing for them in court. Court
held in the affirmative. Jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the
service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to
its authority. The rules in service of summons depend on the nature of the case, whether it is an action in
personam or in rem. This case was an action in personam because private respondents are suing to
enforce their personal rights under said judgment. Generally, personal service of summons is
required to acquire jurisdiction over their person. However, in this case, the numerous pleadings filed
by counsel of Sps. Belen indicated their consent to the appearance of their counsel on their behalf; thus,
the court had jurisdiction over them.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:

Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari which sought to nullify the orders of the RTC, which
denied herein petitioners motion to quash writ of execution and their MR.
FACTS:
v Private Respondents secured a judgment by default in a case rendered by a certain
Judge John Green of the SC of California. The judgment ordered Petitioners Domingo
and Dominga Belen to pay the respondents the amount of $56, 204.69, representing
loan repayment and share in profits, plus interest and costs of suit.
o The summons was served on petitioners former address in San Gregorio,
Alaminos, Laguna.
v Petitioners counsel, Atty. Alcantara, filed an answer, alleging that Petitioners were
actually residents of California, USA. He also claimed that petitioners liability had been
extinguished via a release of abstract judgment in the same collection case. He also filed
a motion to dismiss, citing the judgment of dismissal issued by the SC of California.
v RTC denied the motion to dismiss for failure to present a copy of the alleged judgment of
dismissal.
v Atty. Alcantara sought the reinstatement of the motion to dismiss by attaching a copy of
the foreign judgment.
v Respondents filed an amended complaint prayed for judgment ordering petitioners to
satisfy their obligation in the amount of P2,810,234.50.
v Atty. Alcantara answer raised the defenses of lack of cause of action, res judicata and
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of the defendants.
v RTC Decision- Because petitioners failed to appear at re-scheduled pre-trial
conference, the RTC declared petitioners in default. RTC directed the petitioners to
pay respondents around P3.5M in total, including interest.
o Aug 14 2003- A copy of the RTC decision was sent to the former address of
the petitioners in Alaminos, Laguna, and received by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla.
v Immediately after promulgation, respondents filed an ex-parte motion for preliminary
attachment, which RTC granted.
v Upon respondents motion, RTC directed the issuance of a writ of execution. The real
properties belonging to petitioners were levied upon and a public auction was scheduled.

M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 09

v Jan 6 2004 - Petitioners new counsel Atty. Culvera (Atty. Alcantara had already passed
away) filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, and a Notice of Appeal from RTC.
v Petitioners filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA, imputing on the RTC grave abuse of
discretion for rendering its decision although it had not yet acquired jurisdiction over their
persons in view of improper service of summons, among other things.
v CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Thus, this petition.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
The CA committed serious errors of law in ruling that the TC acted within its jurisdiction, and
that the decision of the TC was duly served upon the petitioners through their alleged relatives,
even if the records clearly show that said petitioners are residents of the USA.
ISSUES:
1. WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners through either proper service of
summons or the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on behalf of the petitioners YES.
2. WON the service of a copy of the RTC decision on a certain Teodoro Abecilla was valid and
binding on petitioners (its important to know the reckoning point so we can determine whether
the Notice of Appeal was filed within the 15-day reglementary period) NO.
HELD:
1. As a rule, if defendants have not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their
person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. To be bound by a decision, a
party should first be subject to the court's jurisdiction.
The SC has underscored the necessity of determining first whether the action is in
personam in rem or quasi in rem, because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14
apply according to the nature of the action1.
v In an action in personam - Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who
does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons
as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally
served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in
accordance with Section 8 of said Rule.
o If the defendant is a non- resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. If he is not found therein, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and
decide the case against him.
Exception: In a case, a non-resident was served with summons through
his wife who was a resident of the Philippines and acted as his
representative and atty-in-fact.2
v In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem Summons must be served not for the
purpose of vesting the court with JD but merely satisfying the due process requirements.
Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Phils. and (1) the
action affects his personal status; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter is
Philippine property in which the defendant has a claim or lien; (3) the action seeks the

Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals

Gemperle v. Schenker

M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 09

exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property, or (4) the property of the
defendant has been attached in the Philippines --- service of summons may be effected
by:
(a) Personal Service out of the country, with leave of court;
(b) Publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) Any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
APPLYING IT TO THIS CASE:
The action filed against petitioners, prior to the amendment of the complaint, is for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment in a complaint for breach of contract whereby
petitioners were ordered to pay private respondents the monetary award. It is in the nature
of an action in personam because private respondents are suing to enforce their personal
rights under said judgment.
Indeed, petitioners have been permanent residents of California. It has been consistently
maintained that their physical absence rendered the service of summons on their former
address in Alaminos, Laguna defective, and did not serve to vest in court jurisdiction over their
persons.
Nevertheless, the CA correctly concluded that the appearance of Atty. Alcantara and his
filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of
petitioners. Through certain acts, Atty. Alcantara was impliedly authorized by petitioners
to appear on their behalf.
v For instance in support of the motion to dismiss the complaint, Atty. Alcantara attached
a duly authenticated copy of the judgment of dismissal in the foreign court, and a
photocopy of the Belens passport. This indicates their consent to the appearance of
Atty. Alcantara on their behalf.
2. Undoubtedly, upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between him
and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on him is ineffective and did
not bind petitioners.
The subsequent service on petitioners' purported "last known address" by registered mail is also
defective because it does not comply with the requisites under the aforequoted Section 7 of
Rule 13 on service by registered mail. It contemplates service at the present address of the
party and not at any other address of the party. The service of the RTC decision at their former
address in Alaminos, Laguna is defective and does not bind petitioners.
The RTC decision is deemed served on petitioners only upon its receipt by Atty. Culvera on 29
December 2003. Therefore, the filing of the Notice of Appeal on 06 January 2004 is within the
reglementary period and should be given due course.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Rosario. Batangas, Branch 87 are SET ASIDE. The RTC is also ordered to GIVE DUE COURSE
to the Notice of Appeal filed by Atty. Culvera on 06 January 2004.

M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 09

LA NAVAL v. CA AND YAO

G.R. No. 103200

Vitug, J.

August 31, 1994

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Voluntary Appearance (equivalent to service of summons to defendant)

SUMMARY: Yao (lessor) and La Naval (lessee) cant agree on the rental rate so they submitted the matter
for arbitration. Yao alleged that La Naval is committing dilatory tactics to delay the arbitration
proceedings. La Naval controverted this claim and said that it was actually Yao who was in default for
failing to do what is incumbent upon him. Yao filed an amended complaint to enforce arbitration
agreement with damages. La Naval argues that the court has no jurisdiction to also decide on the claim of
damages as the special court has a limited jurisdiction. The SC ruled that Angeles City Br. 56 has no
jurisdiction over the issue and to desist from hearing the claim and counterclaim.
The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that
jurisdiction. (I DONT SEE HOW THIS DOCTRINE IS IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE. ALSO, THIS CASE IS
TERRIBLY WRITTEN)

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Original action for Certiorari and Prohibition for Annulment of
the Orders, dated April 26, 1990 and June 22, 1990, of Branch LXI, Angeles City, Pampanga RTC for
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement with Damages.

FACTS:
Wilson Yao is the present owner of a commercial building a portion of which is leased by La
Naval Drug under a contract of lease executed on Dec. 23, 1983 with the buildings former
owner, La Proveedora, Inc. The contract expired on Apr. 30 1989 but La Naval exercised its
option to lease the building for another five years. Yao and La Naval were not able to agree
on a rental rate. In order to resolve the controversy, Yao wrote La Naval expressing his
intention to submit their issue to arbitration in accordance with RA 876 (Arbitration Law).
Yao appointed Alamarez as his arbitrator on May 6, 1989. Meanwhile, La Naval appointed
Atty. Sabile as his arbitrator on June 5, 1989. The confirmation of the third arbitrator, Tupang,
was held in abeyance because La Naval ordered Sabile to defer the same until La Navals
BOD could convene and approve Tupangs appointment.
Yao alleged that La Naval intentionally delays the arbitration proceedings so it prayed that
after the summary hearing, Atty. Sabile and Alamarez be directed to proceed with the
arbitration by appointing and confirming the appointment of the third arbitrator Tupang and
that the three (Atty. Sabile, Alamarez, and Tupang) be ordered to convene and resolve the
controversy.
La Naval denied the claims of Yao and theorized that the petition of Yao is premature since
the latter has not yet formally required Alamarez and Sabile to agree on the third arbitrator,
within ten (10) days from notice, and that the delay in the arbitration was due to Yao's failure
to perform what is incumbent upon him, of notifying and thereafter, requiring both arbitrators
to appoint the third member of the Board of Arbitrators. According to La Naval, it actually
gave arbitrators Sabile and Alamarez a free hand in choosing the third arbitrator; and,
therefore, respondent Yao has no cause of action against La Naval. By way of Counterclaim,
petitioner alleged that it suffered actual damages of P100,000.00; and incurred attorney's
fees of P50,000.00, plus P500.00 for every court appearance of its counsel.
On October 20, 1989, Yao filed an amended petition for 'Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreement with Damages;' praying that La Naval be ordered to pay interest on the unpaid
rents, at the prevailing rate of interest in commercial banks, and exemplary damages of at
least P250,000.00.
DE MESA, ATHENA CHRISTA D.G.

[CASE # 10]

 La Naval averred that amended petition should be dismissed on the ground of non-payment
of the requisite filing fees, it is in the nature of an ordinary civil action (a full blown and regular
trial is necessary). Hence, Yao's proposition for a summary hearing of the arbitration issue
and separate trial for his claim for damages is procedurally untenable and implausible.
The court admitted the amended petition of Yao despite La Navals protest. The court also
announced that Mr. Narciso was chosen as third arbitrator by Atty. Sabile and Mr. Alamarez.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The CA sits as a special court exercising limited jurisdiction and
is not competent to act on respondent Yao's claim for damages, which poses an issue litigable
in an ordinary civil action.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: (not explicitly mentioned)
ISSUES:

WON the Court has jurisdiction to decide on the damages claimed via summary
proceedingNO.

HELD:
Jurisdiction over the person (relevant to the topic assigned)
The lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so
seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he
shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This
defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is
understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let
alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action
Lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action is the situation that arises when a court, which
ordinarily would have the authority and competence to take a case, is rendered without it either
because a special law has limited the exercise of its normal jurisdiction on a particular matter or
because the type of action has been reposed by law in certain other courts or quasi-judicial
agencies for determination. Nevertheless, it can hardly be questioned that the rules relating to
the effects of want of jurisdiction over the subject matter should apply with equal vigor to cases
where the court is similarly bereft of jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
Guidelines:
(1) Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss or
by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a waiver of this
defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be construed as an estoppel or as a
waiver of such defense.
(2) Where the court itself clearly has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action, the
invocation of this defense may be done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard that rule, let alone to confer that jurisdiction, this matter being legislative in character. Barring
highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, such as hereinbefore exemplified, neither estoppel nor
waiver shall apply.

Conclusion:
The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in, equity which, broadly defined,
is justice according to natural law and right. It is a principle intended to avoid a clear case of
DE MESA, ATHENA CHRISTA D.G.

[CASE # 10]

injustice. The term is hardly distinguishable from a waiver of right. Estoppel, like its said
counterpart, must be unequivocal and intentional for, when misapplied, it can easily become a
most convenient and effective means of injustice. Estoppel is not understood to be a principle
that, as a rule, should prevalently apply but, such as it concededly is, as a mere exception from
the standard legal norms of general application that can be invoked only in highly exceptional
and justifiable cases.
La Naval is in estoppel from questioning the competence of the court to additionally hear and
decide in the summary proceedings Yaos claim for damages, it (petitioner) having itself filed
similarly its own counterclaim with the court a quo.
The arbitration law explicitly confines the court's authority only to pass upon the issue of
whether there is or there is no agreement in writing providing for arbitration. In the affirmative,
the statute ordains that the court shall issue an order "summarily directing the parties to proceed
with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof." If the court, upon the other hand, finds
that no such agreement exists, "the proceeding shall be dismissed."
The proceedings in the instant case are summary in nature. However, the court a quo
must refrain from taking up the claims of the contending parties for damages because it
must be decided on a separate regular proceedings.
The court a quo, in the instant proceedings, is ordered to DESIST from further hearing
private respondent's claim, as well as petitioner's counterclaim, for damages.

DE MESA, ATHENA CHRISTA D.G.

[CASE # 10]

BIENVENIDO EJERCITO and JOSE MARTINEZ, Petitioners, - versus -and

M.R. VARGAS CONSTRUCTION, MARCIAL R. VARGAS, Sole Owner,
RENATO AGARAO, Project Foreman,
Summary: City Government of Quezon City entered into a construction agreement with M.R.
Vargas Construction for the concreting of the Panay Avenue. Ejercito and Martinez filed a
petition for injunction, TRO and preliminary injunction against M.R. Vargas, thereafter included
Vargas and Agarao. The summons were not received by M.R. Vargas but by petitioner Martinez
and one Adol for JCB. Agarao attended one of the hearings. Lawyers filed motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of company. SC states that when defendant does not
voluntarily submits or there is no valid service of summons, court has no jurisdiction. Agaraos
presence in TRO hearing is not voluntary appearance, absent any showing that he is an owner or
acts as an agent, since M.R. Vargas is a sole proprietorship thus Vargas should have been
impleaded and notified under Rule 14, Sec. 6 and 7. When counsel appeared in court to object
the jurisdiction, it is not appearance in court.
How it reached the SC: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure from CA decision denying petition for certiorari for RTC Decision.
Facts:
City Government of Quezon City entered into a construction agreement with M.R.
Vargas Construction for the concreting of the Panay Avenue.
Claiming lack of necessary permits and prior consultation, Ejercito and Martinezbrought
it to the attention of brgy. Authorities mayor etc.; due to inaction, they filed a petition for
injunction, TRO and preliminary injunction against M.R. Vargas, thereafter included
Vargas and Agarao.
Summons returned unserved.
TRO granted
Counsel (Mangoba Tan Agus) filed special appearance on behald of M.R. Vargas and
motion for dismissal of the case and quashal of TRO on ground of lack of jurisdiction,
failure to impute City govt as real party, TRO issued without posting a bond, and gross
defect of petition for injunctive writ.
Court interpreter showed receipt of summons with signature, thus counsel remove the
said ground on lack of jurisdiction.
Counsel realized the mistake that it was petitioner Martinez who signed it; file to nullify
the proceedings and cite latter in contempt.
RTC granted
CA dismissed petition for certiorari.

Petitioners argument: 1. TC acquired jurisdiction when foreman Agarao appeared in hearing

for TRO application. Voluntary appearance of Agarao is equivalent to service of summons.
2. receipt of Adol of summon is binding to the company.
3. waived the defense of lack of jurisdiction when counsel filed a motion.
Issue: WON there is voluntary appearance.

Held: No. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendants voluntary appearance in court, in the absence of either, any judgment of the court
is null and void. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person.
Agarao is not authorized to represent M.R. Vargas
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from
the personality of the owner of the enterprise; thus the real party-in-interest is Marcial
Vargas, the owner.
Accordingly summons should have been served on Vargas himself, following Rule 14,
Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules of Court on personal service and on his refusal, substituted
service i.e. tendering it to him.
This must be strictly, faithfully and fully followed.
While it is true that an appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person, the appearance must constitute a positive act on the part of the litigant
manifesting an intention to submit to the courts jurisdiction.
Neither is the service of the notice of hearing on the application for a TRO on a certain
Rona Adol binding on respondent enterprise since latter signed it for entity named JCB.
Also court requires service of summons not any other court processes.
No waiver of defense of lack of jurisdiction
It should be noted that when the defendants appearance is made precisely to object to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, it cannot be considered as appearance in court.
The counsel first appearance in court was special in character and was only for the
purpose of questioning the courts jurisdiction over Vargas, considering that the latter
never received the summons. However, the counsel was shown a copy of the summons
where a signature appears at the bottom which led him to believe that the summons was
actually received by Vargas when in fact it was petitioner Martinez himself who affixed
his signature as recipient thereof. When the counsel discovered his mistake, he lost no
time pleading that the proceedings be nullified and that petitioners and the process server
be cited for contempt of court. Both the

E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO. LTD. v. JUDGE BENITO

G.R. No. 136426
August 6, 1999
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Service of Summons Service on a Representative
SUMMARY: IDC filed a complaint against EBV. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon
EBV, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan,
CDO. EBV opposed this saying that there was no proper service of summons. The designation of
persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is
now limited and more clearly specified in Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set aside the
Orders of respondent Judge Benito (RTC Makati) and praying that he be ordered to desist from further
proceeding with the case.
FACTS:
Petitioner EB Villarosa (EBV, a limited partnership) and respondent Imperial Devt. Corp. (IDC)
executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain
parcels of land located at Bo. Carmen, CDO belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the
construction of low cost housing units. They also agreed that in case of litigation regarding any
dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.
IDC filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against EBV before the RTC Makati
allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few
unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein.
Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon EBV, through its Branch Manager
Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, CDO.
o BUT the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.
B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May
5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the
signature on the face of the original copy of the summons."
EBV filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss alleging that on May 6, 1998, "summons
intended for defendant" was served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee EBV at its branch
office at CDO. EBV prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of
summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of EBV.
IDC filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default alleging that EBV has failed to file an answer
despite its receipt allegedly on May 5, 1998 of the summons and the complaint,
IDC filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss alleging that the records show that EBV,
through its branch manager, Engr. Wendell Sabulbero actually received the summons and the
complaint on May 8, 1998 as evidenced by the signature appearing on the copy of the summons and
not on May 5, 1998 as stated in the Sheriff's Return nor on May 6, 1998 as stated in the motion to
dismiss; that EBV has transferred its office; and that the purpose of the rule is to bring home to the
corporation notice of the filing of the action.
TC denied EBVs MTD and IDCs MTDDD. EBV was given 10 days to file a responsive pleading.
o Since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its
branch manager Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of
summons and consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS: Invokes Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. EBV
contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and
exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues
that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it
could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS: Cites Kanlaon Construction v. NLRC wherein it was held that service
upon a construction project manager is valid, and Gesulgon v. NLRC which held that a corporation is
bound by the service of summons upon its assistant manager.
Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 11]

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of EBV upon service of
summons on its Branch Manager.
HELD: No. Earlier cases have upheld service of summons upon those who are considered as agent
within the contemplation of the old rule. Under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the
corporation is no longer allowed.
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation
or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary"
instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
The revision under this section was explained by retired SC Justice Regalado:
"x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to `be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.' The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad
and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word `agent' of the corporation. The Filoil case, involving the
litigation lawyer of the corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose very
appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, is an illustration of the need for this
revised section with limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the
amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the corporation who is in effect an employee of the
corporation, as distinguished from an independent practitioner."

Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court Revision Committee:
The rule must be strictly observed. Service must be made to one named in the statute x x x"

Even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been
enjoined. In Delta Motor Sales Corporation v. Mangosing, the Court held:
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer
upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. x x x.
The purpose is x x x to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.' x x x.

We rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of EBV at its branch office at CDO,
instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of EBV.
The fact that EBV filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person.
The filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or
attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no
means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
There being no proper service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will
consequently be null and void.
Petition is granted. TC decision annulled and set aside.

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 11]

Talsan Enterprises, San Diego, Ramoga and Talplacido v. Baliwag

Transit and Ramos

GR No. 126258

July 8, 1999

Buena, J.

TOPIC: Service on a Representative Domestic Juridical Persons (Sec 11, Rule 14)
SUMMARY: Respondents bus bumped van owned by petitioner. Case for damages was filed by Talsan against
Baliwag and Ramos, but the latter were declared in default. RTC rendered judgment against them. On MR,
petitioners claim that RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over their persons because of improper service of
summons upon cash receiving clerk Ms. Baby. Court held that summons upon Ramos was improper because
sheriff resorted to substitute summons without first attempting to serve personally. But summons upon Baliwag
was proper because Baby is considered as an agent authorized to receive orders on behalf of company.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
FACTS:
- March 4, 1992, 11:30 pm, Maharlika Highway, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija bus owned by Baliwag Transit,
driven by Ramos bumped a Kia Ceres Van owned by San Diego, driven by Santiago.
- June 10, 1992 Talsan Enterprises et al. filed case for damages against Baliwag Transit and Ramos.
- June 29, 1992 Summons and copy of complaint were served upon Baliwags cashier, Baby Casino at
their bus station in Caloocan City, who received the court process but refused to sign the original
summons.
- Sept 11, 1992 RTC declared Baliwag in default, upon motion of Talsan. Talsan then presented evidence
ex parte. Sept 23, 1992 Baliwag received a copy of default order. Oct 8, 1992 Baliwag filed Motion
for Reconsideration.
o BALIWAG CLAIMS that RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its person by reason of improper
service of summons. They claimed that the person who received the summons is only a cash
receiving clerk, who unschooled with the law, and whose position is not so integrated w/
management circle, did not fully appreciate the legal significance and consequences of said
document that she failed to turn over the same to her superior.
- Without ruling on Baliwags motion, RTC rendered decision ordering Baliwag to pay.
- Copy of decision received by Baliwag on Oct 13, 1992. Without waiting for resolution for MR, they
appealed before CA.
- CA annulled RTCs order of default and remanded case to RTC. It explained that RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over person of respondent..
ISSUE 1: WoN service upon RAMOS (driver) was proper? NO.
HELD: Sheriff hastily effected the service of summons upon Ramos by SUBSTITUTED SERVICE without first
attempting to personally serve the same upon him. This is in violation of the rule, which provides that service
upon defendant shall be by personal service first and only when defendant cannot be promptly served in
person will substituted service be availed of. Consequently, RTC did not acquire jurisdiction on him,
hence no power to render judgment against him. Thus, judgement against him is nugatoru and without
effect.
ISSUE 2: WoN service of summons upon Baliwag Transit through cashier Baby Cansino was proper?
YES.
HELD: Under Sec 13, Rule 14, if the defendant is a corporation organized under laws of Philippines, such as
Baliwag, service of summons may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its
directors.
- Affidavit of Baby that shes not a cashier but merely a cash receiving clerk is self-serving and deserves
scant consideration.
JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

CASE # 13

Sheriffs Return certifying that summons were served upon Baliwag and Ramos, thru Baby Casino,
cashier of Baliwag, who received but refused to sign original summons at no. 199 Rizal Ave. Ext,
Caloocan is prima facie evidence of fact that the person on whom summons was served was in fact the
cashier of company. Affidavit of Baby cant overcome presumption of regularity in performance of official
duty. (clear and convincing evidence necessary)
Even assuming that Baby is not the cashier, service upon her still proper. Shes considered as an AGENT
of company authorized to receive court processes. Generally, service on persons other than those
mentioned in Sec 13 has been held as improper but this has been liberalized to give life to the rationale
behind the rule service must be made on a representative so integrated w/ the corporation sued as to
make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do w/ any legal
papers served on him.
So the ff. are considered agents w/in contemplation of the rule: ordinary clerks, private secretaries of
corporate executives, retained counsel, officials who had charge or control of the operations of the
corporation, like Assistant General Manager, and the corporation's Chief of Finance and Administrative
Officer.
Case at bar: Baby is conferred w/ vital and sensitive functions and responsibilities. She may be relied upon
to appreciate the importance of the paper served on her.
In addition, service on bus terminal at the address stated in the summons and not its main office in Baliwag
do not render it invalid.
o Baltazar v. CA: The regular mode, in other words, of serving summons upon a private Philippine
Corporation is by personal service upon one of the officers of such corporation identified in Section
13. Ordinarily, such personal service may be expected to be made at the principal office of the
corporation. Section 13, does not, however, impose such requirement, and so personal
service upon the corporation may be effected through service upon, for instance, the
president of the corporation at his office or residential address."
THUS proper service of summons. RTC acquired jurisdiction over Baliwag.

But Court cant rule on Baliwags liability as of the moment because driver isnt under its jurisdiction yet. Then
obviously theres no proof adduced in a full-dress trial as to his purported negligence upon which Baliwags
primary but vicarious liability is perched. Thus, as things stand, no presumption of negligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees can operate against Baliwag because factual basis for such adverse
presumption simply does not exist.

JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

CASE # 13

FRENCH OIL v. CA
G.R. No. 126477
September 11, 1998
MARTINEZ
Topic in Syllabus: Service of Summons; Service on a Representative; Foreign Juridical Persons
SUMMARY: Summons was served on Trans-World, alleged agent of French Oil. French Oil alleges that
it is not doing business in the Philippines and Trans-World is not its agent thus the summons has no
effect. The Court ruled that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines, summons may be served on (a) its resident agent designated in accordance with law;
xxxx or (c) any of its officer or agent within the Philippines. In this case, French Oil treated TransWorld as its Philippine agent in the assailed transaction thus summons was properly served.
FACTS
- Ludo and Luym Oleochemical Co. filed a complaint with breach of contract and damages against
French Oil Mill Machinery, a foreign corporation, and its alleged Philippine agent, Trans-World
Trading Company.
- A summons was served on Trans-World which moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that it is
not French Oils agent.
- French Oil argued that the court had no jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of
summons. It was not doing business in the Philippines and Trans-World is not its agent therefore
the procedure in Secs. 14 and 17, Rule 14 should be observed.
- RTC: Dismissed complaint
- RTC-MR: Reversed the order of dismissal and ruled that summons was properly served on French
Oil whom it found doing business in the Philippines with Trans-World as its agent
- CA: Affirmed
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT (French Oil)
- It is not doing business in the Philippines and Trans-World is not its agent, and thus, the summons
served on the latter has no effect on the former.
ISSUES
- WON French Oil was doing business in the Philippines - YES
- WON French Oil was validly served with summons - YES
RATIO
French Oil was doing business in the Philippines.
- The fact of doing business must first be "established by appropriate allegations in the complaint"
and the court in determining such fact need not go beyond the allegations
- In this case, the allegations that French Oil entered into a contract with Ludo and Luym to supply
and install various machineries and equipments for the use of the latter's oil mill factory and that
the first shipment of machineries from petitioner was received by Ludo and Luym are sufficient
allegations that French Oil is doing business for purposes of Section 14, Rule 14.
French Oil was validly served with summons.
- If the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, summons may be
served on (a) its resident agent designated in accordance with law; (b) if there is no resident agent,
the government official designated by law to that effect, or (c) any of its officer or agent within the
Philippines.
- Although there is no requirement to first substantiate the allegation of agency yet it is necessary
that there must be specific allegations in the complaint that establishes the connection between
the principal foreign corporation and its alleged agent with respect to the transaction in question.
- For purposes of the rules on summons, the determination of principal-agent relationship from the
allegations in the complaint is only preliminary and is not even conclusive as to liability. Nothing
bars the court from later making a different finding after the parties had substantiated their
respective allegations with respect to agency should the same be disputed.
- As found by the lower courts, French Oil treated Trans-World as its Philippine agent in the assailed
transaction. Such factual assessment is binding on this Court.
Javellana, Maria Yolanda A.

Case #14

BA FINANCE CORPORATION VS. RUFINO CO, HIGHLINE MERCANTILE, INC., LUCITA VELOSO
YAP, CLOVERLEAF SUPERMARKET, INC., SAN ANDRES COMMERCIAL AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105751 | June 30, 1993 | BELLOSILLO, J.

SUMMARY: BA Finance wanted to recover a sum of money from the respondents, but it failed to attend the PreTrial Conference. The respondents moved for the dismissal of the case BUT 33 days later moved to set the reception
of evidence in support of their counterclaim. BA Finance asserts that the dismissal of THEIR claim also carries with it
the dismissal of RESPONDENTSclaim. SC agrees with BA Finance because the counterclaim was COMPULSORY.
If the trial court no longer possesses jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case, as when it dismisses the
same, then the compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to the principal controversy, the counterclaim must likewise
be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the grant of any relief. Anyway, the motion for reception of
evidence is time-barred. REMEDY: the respondents should not have moved for dismissal but should have just
moved for BA Finance to be NONSUITED then reserved the right to present evidence on its counterclaim.

FACTS:

Petitioner BA Finance Corporation brought this action as plaintiff in the court below to recover a sum of money
arising from
o a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting line which it granted to defendant Rufino Co
o and certain suretyship agreements executed in its favor by his co-defendants Highline Mercantile, Inc.,
Lucita Veloso Yap, Cloverleaf Supermarket, Inc., and San Andres Commercial.
After defendants' Amended Answer to Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaim was admitted, the case was set for
Pre-Trial Conference.
For various reasons, however, the conference was repeatedly reset.
19 December 1989 - counsel for plaintiff, petitioner failed to attend the Pre-Trial Conference.
Consequently, defendants moved for dismissal of the case without prejudice.
The motion was granted.
22 January 1990 - respondents moved to set the reception of their evidence in support of their counterclaim.
Petitioner opposed the motion.
2 April 1990 - TC denied the motion. Respondents elevated the order of denial to the Court of Appeals.
18 December 1991 - CA reversed the questioned order and directed the trial court to set the reception of their
evidence on their counterclaim.
2 June 1992 Petitioners MR was denied, so petitioner instituted the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON dismissal of the complaint for nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial, upon motion of defendants,
carries with it the dismissal of their compulsory counterclaim? YES
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: the compulsory counterclaim should not have been included in the dismissal.
RATIO:

The counterclaim of private respondents is not merely permissive but compulsory in nature.
o It arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of

JOSE

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the opposing party's claim;

o It does not require the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction;
o Trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
The counterclaim of private respondents is denominated compulsory" and consists of claims for alleged
overpayments and damages.
o They assert that they are no longer indebted to petitioner and are in fact entitled to reimbursement for
overpayments.
o They ask for damages for expenses incurred and inconveniences suffered by them as a result of the filing of
the present action.
Clearly, the same evidence needed to sustain the counterclaim of private respondents would also refute the cause of
action in petitioner's complaint. For, if private respondents could successfully show that they actually made
overpayments on the credit accomodations extended by petitioner, then the complaint must fail.
The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain pending for independent adjudication by the court." This
is because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and merely derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom.
Thus, it necessarily follows that if the trial court no longer possesses jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the
case, as when it dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to the principal controversy,
must likewise be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the grant of any relief under the counterclaim.
REMEDY: Under Sec. 2, Rule 17, defendant may raise objection to the dismissal of the complaint; in such case, the
trial court may not dismiss the main action.
HOWEVER, respondents themselves moved for the dismissal of the complaint.
o They could have simply asked the trial court to declare petitioners to be "non- suited" on their complaint,
and "as in default" on their compulsory counterclaim, for their failure to appear at the pre-trial despite due
notice.
o Neither did they reserve their right to maintain their counterclaim. Consequently, the dismissal of the
complaint carried with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.
It may also be stressed that respondents moved to set for hearing the reception of evidence to support their
counterclaim after the lapse of thirty-three (33) days. By then, the order of dismissal had already become final.
HOWEVER equity and justice dictate that he be accorded adequate relief under the circumstances.
o If any of the grounds to dismiss under Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court arises, the proper recourse for
a defendant who desires to pursue his compulsory counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move for
the dismissal of the complaint;
o He should only move to have plaintiff declared non- suited on the complaint so that the latter can no longer
present his evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he be declared as in default on the compulsory
counterclaim, and reserve the right to present evidence ex parte on his counterclaim.
o This will enable defendant who was unjustly haled to court to prove his compulsory counterclaim, which is
intertwined with the complaint, because the trial court retains jurisdiction over the complaint and of the
whole case. The non-dismissal of the complaint, the non-suit notwithstanding, provides the basis for the
compulsory counterclaim to remain active and subsisting.

"x x x x The petitioner does not object to the dismissal of the civil case but nonetheless wants her
counterclaim therein to subsist. Impossible. A person cannot eat his cake and have it at the same time. If the
civil case is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein."
-JUSTICE VICENTE ABAD SANTOS

JOSE

2 of 3

SEPARATE OPINION
REGALADO, J .:

Concurs in the result. Concurrence is founded only upon the fact that the assailed order of the trial court was already final and
executory, hence petitioner's present recourse is indisputably time-barred.
Section 3 of Rule 17, whereby a plaintiff may be nonsuited and the dismissal of the complaint has the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits unless otherwise provided by the trial court, shall have the same equivalent effect on a plainfiff who fails to
appear at a pre-trial conference.
RESOLVE whether Section 2 of Rule 17 is likewise applicable to that plaintiff who is nonsuited for non-appearance at such pretrial conference.
NONSUIT - judgment given against plaintiff when he is unable to prove a case, or when he refuses or neglects to proceed to
trial and leaves the issue undetermined. In our jurisdiction, a declaration of nonsuit necessarily involves the rendition of a final
order or judgment which terminates plaintiff's cause of action or right of recovery under his complaint which is thereby
dismissed.

SEC 2 vs SEC 3 (RULE 17)

The dismissal of the complaint under Section 2 is at the instance of plaintiff, for whatever reason he is minded to move for such
dismissal, and, as a matter of procedure, is without prejudice unless otherwise stated in the order of the court or, for that
matter, in plaintiff's motion to dismiss his own complaint.
o By reason thereof, to curb any dubious or frivolous strategy of plaintiff for his benefit or to obviate possible prejudice
to defendant, the former may not dismiss his complaint over the defendant's objection if the latter has a compulsory
counterclaim since said counterclaim would necessarily be divested of juridical basis and defendant would be
deprived of possible recovery thereon in that same judicial proceeding.
Section 3, on the other hand, contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him
and which, in the present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also covered by Section 3, as
extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court.
o Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative
significance.
o The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action
outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits.
o This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such absence of evidence to prove defendant's counterclaim
although the same arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which was merely terminated for lack of proof.
o To hold otherwise would not only work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into Section 3
and wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists even by mere implication.
o Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of
course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part,
unless from his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his
counterclaim.

SUBMISSION: In determining whether or not the dismissal of a complaint ipso jure results in the dismissal likewise of a
compulsory counterclaim thereto, the distinctions between the situations contemplated in and provided for by Sections 2 and 3 of
Rule 17 should be observed, with the difference in effects as explained in the foregoing disquisition.
Otherwise, we may be indulging in judicial legislation although, ironically, it is within the power of the Court itself to change or
revise the aforesaid provisions should the same be considered inadequate to meet its normative perceptions of what the rules
should be.

JOSE

3 of 3

Roxas v. CA
Aug 15, 2001
T OPIC IN S YLLABUS : Early Dismissal Dismissal by the Plaintiff

G.R. No. 139337

De Leon Jr., J.

S UMMARY : Ma. Carminia Roxas filed Civil Case No 97-0523 (CC1) with RTC of Panraaque (Branch 257) for
declaration of nullity of marriage on ground of psych incapacity with application for support pendente lite. She
filed a Notice of Dismissal, without prejudice, considering that summons has not been served and no responsive
pleading has been filed. Same complaint as Civil Case 97-0608 (CC2) was re-filed with Branch 260 presided by
Judge Bautista-Ricafort, who granted the application for support pendente lite. Jose Roxas, husband and
private respondent, sought to nullify the order on the ground that there was no mention of the prior filing of
case (CC1) on the certificate of non-forum shopping.
SC held proceedings and orders issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort in the re-filed case (CC2) were not rendered
null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping re: the prior filing and
dismissal without prejudice of CC1. The dismissal did not amount to litis pendentia or res judicata (elements below)
thus does not merit the nullification of entire proceedings. There is no litis pendentia since the CC1 was
dismissed/withdrawn by the Carminia Roxas, without prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal (Sec 1,
Rule 17 RoC). Neither is there res judicata because order of dismissal was not a decision on the merits.
How the case reached SC: Petition for review on Certiorari of CA decision and resolution nullifying the
Judges orders of RTC Branch 260.
FACTS:
Nov 4, 1997 Ma. Carminia Roxas filed Civil Case 97-0523 (CC1) an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psych incapacity on the part of her husband Jose, with an application for
support pendente lite for their 4 minor children. Case was raffled to Brnach 257 in Paraaque.
Nov 20, 1997 She filed Notice of Dismissal to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, pursuant to Sec 1,
Rule 17 of RoC, considering that no summons has been served and no responsive pleading has been filed.
Nov 25, 1997 Same complaint was refiled as Civil Case 97-0608 (CC2). Raffled to Branch 260 presided by
Judge Bautista-Ricafort. (Judge B-R)
May 19, 1998 Judge B-R granted the application for support pendente lite
o Under Art. 49 of the Family Code, there being no written agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendant for the adequate support of their minor children, this Court finds the prayer for support pendente
lite to be in order. Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to contribute to the support of the abovenamed minorsP42,292.50 per month

July 22, 1998 Carminia filed motion praying that the TC cite Jose in contempt of court after failing to pay
support. Jose answered, through conter-manifestation, that he wants to make sure that whatever funds he
provides for the purpose will go to the expenses for which they are intended. He prays for a modification
in the manner and mode of paying by directly paying the persons or entities.
Sept 23, 1998 Judge B-R directed Jose to comply with the May 19 order under pain of legal sanctions.
Sept 28, 1998 Jose filed an Omnibus Motion to re-open the hearing on the motion for support pendente
lite and to temporarily stay the execution of May 19 and Sept 23 orders. Presiding Judge refused.
Oct 8, 1998 Judge B-R gave Jose 10 days to comply with order, or else be cited for contempt of court.
Oct 23, 1998 Jose filed petition for certiorari with CA questioning May 19, Sept 23, and Oct 8 orders.
Nov 27, 1998 Judge B-R pronounced Jose guilty of Contempt of Court.
The next day, Jose was arrested by NBI but was released on Dec 14, 1998 after CA enjoined Judge B-Rs
Nov 27, 1998 order as well as her May 19, Sept 23, and Oct 8 orders.
March 11, 1999 TRO lapsed; Jose was re-arrested then released after depositing with clerk of court the
amount of support in arrears.
Lopez, Catherine Nicole

Case #2

CA:

Rendered decision in favor of Jose, nullifying all orders and proceeding of Judge B-R because the
certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior filing of CC1.
o

While a complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service
of the answer (Sec. 1, Rule 17), there is however a need to state the fact of prior filing and dismissal thereof in
the certification on non-forum shopping, in the event the complaint is refiled, as in this case. This must be so
in order to prevent the plaintiff or principal party from invoking Section 1 of Rule 17 in the hope that, if and
when refiled, the complaint will be raffled to a more sympathetic judge.

Carminia availed of Sec 1, Rule 17 not for any other reason or purpose than to take the case out of the sala
of Judge How (Branch 257 judge) and to have it assigned to another. This belief finds support from the
fact that Carminias lawyer and Judge B-R were classmates at the UP College of Law.
While Carminia actually resides in Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa City, it was made to appear in the complaint
that she is a resident of Paraaque City, where Judge B-R is one of the RTC Judges. While the question of
venue was not properly raised on time, this circumstance is being cited to support Joses charge of forumshopping.
For the peace of mind of Jose who entertains some doubts on the impartiality of Judge B-R, the
annulment case should be returned to Branch 257 of the RTC of Paraaque.

ISSUES:
W/N a case dismissed without prejudice upon the filing by the plaintiff of a notice of dismissal (Sec 1, Rule 17)
before the service of the answer or responsive pleading, would require the certificate of non-forum shopping for
the subsequent re-filing of the case by the same party to state that a case involving the same issues and parties
was filed and dismissed without prejudice beforehand?1 NO. (complicated, I know.)
Would the omission of such a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping render null and void the
proceedings and orders issued by the trial court in the re-filed case? NO.
HELD:
Proceedings and orders issued by Judge B-R in the application for support pendente lite (and the main
complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case (CC2) were not rendered null and void by the
omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the prior filing and dismissal
without prejudice of CC1 which involves the same parties and issues.
o

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Xxx

Considering that the complaint in CC1 was dismissed without prejudice by virtue of Carminias Notice of
Dismissal, there is no need to state in the certificate non-forum shopping in CC2 about the prior filing and
dismissal of CC1.
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in the other.

Basically: W/N a party who previously moved to dismiss, without prejudice, can re-file same complaint without stating that they previously
moved to dismiss in their certificate for non-forum shopping?
2
Rule 17, Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order
confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an
1

Lopez, Catherine Nicole

Case #2

Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum
of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forumgrounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition
It is primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a
claim for relief. The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation
caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related
causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs.
o

For the principle of res judicata to apply, the ff must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter
and causes of action.

In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in CC1. The dismissal without
prejudice of the complaint in CC2 at the instance of the petitioner was pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 17 of RoC2
considering that it was done before service of answer or any responsive pleading. The dismissal does not
amount to litis pendentia nor res judicata. There is no litis pendentia since CC1 before Judge How was
dismissed or withdrawn by the Carminia without prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal. Judge
Hows order is one merely confirming the dismissal of the complaint by Carminia. Neither is there res
judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without
prejudice.
Thus, Joses apprehension that the case was dismissed in order to be transferred to the sala of a judge
who is allegedly more sympathetic to the petitioners cause is baseless and not a valid reason to declare
the petitioner guilty of forum shopping.
o
o
o

1) Carminia is not assured that the case would be raffled to a more sympathetic judge
2) Judge B-R of Branch 260, is presumed to be fair and impartial despite the claim that she is an alleged law
school classmate of the Carminias counsel.
Jose could have filed before the same judge a motion for her inhibition on that ground. But private
respondent did not.

Jose is estopped in questioning the proceedings and orders of Judge B-R. He tacitly acknowledged the
validity of the proceedings and the orders by participating actively in the hearing on the application for
support pendente lite and by praying that he be allowed to directly pay the persons or entities to which
payments are intended.
An omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res
judicata and litis pendentia is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings
Cited case: Gabionza v. Court of Appeals: Circular No. 28-91 (now Section 5, Rule 7) was designed to serve as an
instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules or procedure. The
fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it
cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded.
For a party to be adjudged guilty of forum shopping in the trial courts, a motion to dismiss on the ground of either
litis pendentia or res judicata must be filed before the proper TC and a hearing conducted thereon in accordance
with Section 5, Rule 7.

Decision and Resolution of the CA REVERSED. Orders of the RTC Paranaque, Branch 260, are REINSTATED.

Rule 17, Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order
confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the
same claim.

Lopez, Catherine Nicole

Case #2

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA

11 February 1999
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Early Dismissal; Dismissal by the Plaintiff

G.R. No. 117385

Bellosillo, J.

SUMMARY: CMI filed a case against BPI. Records of the case were burned. CMI filed a petition
for reconstitution of records. TC directed the parties to attend a conference to discover ways to
expedite the disposition. CMIs counsel failed to attend the conference because she was
physically indisposed due to her monthly period. TC dismissed the complaint, holding that CMIs
counsels failure to attend evidenced lack of interest to pursue the case. Court held that TC
committed error in dismissing the complaint solely on that basis. This case does not fall under
the instances which warrant a dismissal based on plaintiffs fault. The conference which CMIs
counsel failed to attend was not a regular trial or a trial where she would present evidence, nor a
pre-trial. There was also no failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. This was
also her first absence. Lastly, it cannot evince lack of interest to pursue the case the filing of a
petition for reconstitution shows that CMI is interested in pursuing its complaint.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: BPI appeals CAs reversal of the dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS:
1983: Citiwide Motors, Inc. (CMI) filed a Complaint for Nullification of Foreclosure and Auction Sale
with Injunction against Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Pretrial was set for 21 June 1988.
11 June 1988: Entire records of the case were burned in a fire in City Hall.
1989: CMI filed a petition for reconstitution of the burned records, attaching documents which its
counsel was able to gather.
1990: Trial court directed CMI and BPI to examine the annexes to the petition and to initial them
before they could form part of the reconstituted records.
BPIs counsel manifested that he could not comply with the order because the
attending counsel resigned and the substituting counsel still had to locate the records
for comparison.
1992: BPI moved to dismiss the complaint for failure of CMI to reconstitute the records.
TC denied the motion and directed the parties and their counsel to attend a
conference to discover ways and means of expediting disposition, including
submission of the case for mediation. The scheduled conference was reset twice.
TC dismissed the complaint upon failure of CMIs counsel to appear in Court,
evidencing lack of interest to pursue the case.
o CMIs counsel (Atty. Cruz) filed a motion for reconsideration. Reason: She was
physically indisposed due to her monthly period. Denied.
CA reversed.
BPIS ARGUMENT: Dismissal was in accordance with the Rules. CA should not have disturbed
the discretion of the TC in determining what constituted an unreasonable length of time in the
absence of patent abuse.
CAS ARGUMENT: Unless a party's conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or
dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should
consider lesser sanctions which would still achieve the desired end. In the absence of clear lack
of merit or intent to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and
final disposition of the cases before the court
ISSUE: Whether a civil case should be dismissed for supposed lack of interest to pursue it after
the complainant failed to attend a conference

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE # 03

HELD: No.
The rules contemplate certain instances where the complaint may be dismissed due to the
plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time; (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court; or, (4) where the
plaintiff fails to appear when so required at the pre-trial. None of these is applicable to the
instant case.
The conference which CMIs counsel failed to attend was not a regular trial or trial where
she would be presenting her evidence. Neither was it a pre-trial conference. It was
simply a conference set the TC to discover ways and means of expediting disposition,
including submission of the case for mediation.
In the absence of any pattern to delay, TC committed reversible error in dismissing the
complaint solely on such failure to attend the conference.
CMIs counsel cannot be accused of failing to prosecute the action for an
unreasonable length of time. Her failure to attend the conference alone does not justify the
dismissal. BPI itself contributed largely to the delay of the proceedings It could not
immediately comply with the TC order to examine the annexes of the reconstituted records. It
also filed a motion to dismiss, delaying further the disposition of the complaint.
Also, the absence of Atty. Cruz CMIs new counsel during the conference was her first
absence. TC should have been more indulgent by giving her another opportunity.
CMI cannot be said to have lost interest in pursuing the case.
It filed a petition for reconstitution of the burned records, which is enough
manifestation that it was still very interested in pursuing its complaint to a successful
conclusion.
o

While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test of such
power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due
diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or
a scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar,
courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss (Marahay v.
Melicor).

Although the dismissal of a case for failure to appear during trial or prosecute an action for
an unreasonable length of time rests on the sound discretion of TC, such discretion must not
be abused. Proceedings may be deferred so that cases may be adjudged only after full and
free presentation of evidence. The propriety of dismissing a case must be determined by the
circumstances surrounding each case. There must be sufficient reason to justify dismissal.
There was none in this case.
SC admonished BPIs counsel to be more prudent and circumspect in filing motions and
appeals and reminded trial courts to exert efforts to resolve matters before them on the merits
and adjudge them accordingly so that appeals may be discouraged.
RULING: Case is remanded to the court of origin which is directed to resolve the case with
dispatch.

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE # 03

RADIOWEALTH v. SPOUSES DEL ROSARIO

July 6, 2000

G.R. No. 138739

PANGANIBAN, J.

SUMMARY: When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court cannot
remand the case for further proceedingsit should render judgment on the basis of the evidence proffered by plaintiff. In
this case, since the defendants already admitted the due execution of the promissory note, CA should have rendered
judgment on the basis of that note and other pieces of evidence presented during the trial.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money before the RTC of
Manila. After the petitioner rested its case, respondents filed a Demurrer to evidence for alleged lack of cause of
action. TC dismissed but CA reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. The present case is a petition
for review on certiorari before the SC.
FACTS:
- Spouses Vicente and Maria del Rosario (respondents), jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in
favor of petitioner Radiowealth Finance Company, a promissory note for Php138,948
"FOR VALUE RECEIVED, on or before the date listed below, I/We promise to pay jointly and severally
Radiowealth Finance Co. or order the sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT Pesos (P138,948.00) without need of notice or demand, in installments as
follows: P11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months starting on ________ 19__ until the amount of
P11,579.00 is fully paid. Each installment shall be due every ____ day of each month. A late payment
penalty charge of two and a half (2.5%) percent per month shall be added to each unpaid installment
from due date thereof until fully paid.
- Respondents defaulted on the monthly installments, despite repeated demands, they failed to pay their
obligations under their promissory note
- Petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money before the RTC of Manila
- During trial, Jasmer Famatico, credit and collection officer of petitioner presented in evidence: respondents
check payments, demand letters, customers ledger card for the respondents, and Metrobank dishonor
slips
Famatico admitted that he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of
the presented documentary evidence, merely endorsed to him
- TC issued an order terminating the presentation of evidence and petitioner rested its case
- Respondents then filed a demurrer to evidence for alleged lack of cause of action
- TC dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claims as the evidence it had presented
were merely hearsay
- CA reversed TC and remanded the case for further proceedings
Judicial admissions of respondents established their indebtedness to petitioner: they admitted the due
execution of the promissory note and their only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the
installment payments were to begin
Art. 19 and 22 require that every person must, in the exercise of rights and in the performance of their
duties, act with justice, give all else their due and observe honesty and good faith
Rules on evidence are to be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and to assist parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of an action
ISSUE: WON CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the trial court instead of rendering judgment on the basis of
petitioners evidenceYES
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
- If a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence, and the appellate court should render judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the
plaintiff
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
- Petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim, simply on the ground that they lost their right to present
evidence in support of their defense when the demurrer was reversed on appeal
- CA just found them indebted to petitioner, silent on when their obligation became due and demandable
HELD:
- VILLANUEVA TRANSIT v. JAVELLANA:

If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for an award of
judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then
proceed to hear and receive the defendant's evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending
parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of
appeal.
The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial
court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his
behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff's case and
evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render
judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff's evidence."
- RULE: Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence retain the right to present their own
evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate
court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their
own evidence. Appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits
- In this case, CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by petitioner. CA
already had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection suit
Respondents do not contest the amount of the principal obligation. Their liability as expressly stated in
the Promissory Note and found by the CA is "P138,948 which is payable in 12 installments at
P11,579.00 a month for twelve consecutive months."
The obligation of the respondents had matured and they clearly defaulted when their checks bounced.
Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month (April 2, 1991) after the date of the
Note because the check representing their first installment bounced

RE: Due and demandable obligation

- Respondents theorize that action for immediate enforcement of obligation is premature because its fulfillment is
dependent on the sole will of the debtor (evidenced by blank space left for date on which installments should
have commenced)
- THIS IS UNTENABLE: The act of leaving blank the due date of the first installment did not necessarily mean that
the debtors were allowed to pay as and when they could, if this was the intention, they should have indicated in
the promissory note
- Note also clearly provided that each installment should be payable each month and even provided for an
acceleration clause and late payment penalty which showed intention of parties that installments should be paid
at a definite date
- Conclusion that installments had already become due and demandable is also bolstered by the fact that
respondents started paying installments on the note, even if their checks were dishonored

BERNARDO v. CA, HON. LEVISTE, RONQUILLOCONCEPCION

Sept 5, 1997
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Demurrer to Evidence

G.R. No. 119010

BELLOSILLO

SUMMARY: After the prosecution rested its case, Bernardo (defendant in that case) asked for
leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence which was denied by the trial court. Even without
leave of court, she still insisted on filing a demurrer thus waiving her right to present evidence.
She assailed trial courts order considering her motion dilatory with the CA. CA ordered that trial
be set for the reception of her evidence. SC held that Bernardos motion for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence having been denied the only right she has is to adduce evidence in her
defense. However, after her motion for leave was denied, she insisted on filing a demurrer, thus
the only recourse left is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution because she already waived her right to present her evidence
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision
FACTS:
Paz T. Bernardo was charged with 4 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
Private complainant Florlita Ronquillo-Concepcion eventually executed an Affidavit of
Desistance which led to the dismissal of two cases.
20 May 1994: Prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits.
After the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, the following transpired in open
court:
- Judge: Defense, present evidence.
- Defense asked for a resetting and for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence on the
ground that the prosecution failed to elicit the fact where the checks were issued and
where they were actually dishonored which is material for jurisdiction.
- Judge asked prosecution whether they would admit that there is no proof where the
checks were issued and where they were dishonored
- Prosecution denied it and presented the exhibit where such facts are evidenced.
- After further questioning and inquiries, the demurrer was denied and defense was asked
to present its evidence.
- Defense asked for reconsideration
- Judge said: If you will waive your right to present your evidence, the Court will give you
a period to file a demurrer to evidence. And, if you dont present your evidence now, you
will be considered to have waived your right to present evidence.
- Defense said that even without leave of court, they will file a demurrer to evidence
- Judge replied that such is tantamount to postpone and considered the motion dilatory
Bernardo assailed the Order. CA modified the order and directed the trial court to set the
cases for trial for reception of Bernardos evidence.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: Bernardo argues that: 1) when her counsel moved for leave to
file a demurrer to evidence this meant that she intended to make a written demurrer after
extensive research and with proper authorities to support the same; 2) trial courts denial was a
denial only of the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and not the demurrer to evidence
itself; 3) the order of CA to present her evidence was premature; 4) she should first be given the
opportunity to file her demurrer to evidence and wait for its denial with finality before she could
be directed to present her evidence before the trial court.

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #5

ISSUE: WON CA erred in ordering that Bernardo present her evidence - YES

HELD:
Bernardos motion was merely "dilatory." But the CA order directing the trial court to
receive the evidence of the defense after its motion for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence was denied is contrary Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court.
Under this new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer
to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior
leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his
demurrer is denied. HOWEVER, if he demurs WITHOUT leave of court, or after his
motion for leave is denied, he WAIVES his right to present evidence and submits
the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power
to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in
filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.
The trial court denied Bernardos motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. Thus,
the only right she has under Sec. 15, Rule 119 is to adduce evidence in her defense.
However, after her motion for leave was denied, she insisted on filing a demurrer
Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the
trial court but once prior leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to
evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to
present evidence. The only recourse left is to decide the case on the basis of the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
Unless there is grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not
present in this case, the trial courts denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or
motion to dismiss may not be disturbed.

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #5

CRISTINA DIMAN, et al vs. HON, FLORENTINO M.

ALUMBRES, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, LAS PIAS,
BRANCH 255; HEIRS OF VERONICA V. MORENO
LACALLE, REPRESENTED BY JOSE MORENO LACALLE
November 27, 1998
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Summary Judgment

G.R. No. 131466

NARVASA, C.J.:

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:

RTC Las Pinas dismisse ->Petition for review on certiorari dismissed ->MR granted
FACTS:

The case began in the RTC Las Pinas where a complaint for "Quieting of Title and
Damages" was filed by the Heirs of Veronica V. Moreno Lacalle (represented by Jose
Moreno Lacalle) against Cristina Diman, Clarissa Diman, George Diman, Felipe Diman and
Florina Diman.

The petition for review on certiorari in this case was initially dismissed via Resolution on
January 1998 but after deliberating on petitioners' MR on February 1998, the private
respondents' comment thereon, the reply to the comment, as well as the record of the case
itself, the Court was convinced that the order of dismissal should be reconsidered and the
petition reinstated.

The court accordingly promulgated a resolution to that effect on October 12, 1998, and
required respondents to file their Comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.
Notice of the Resolution was duly served on private respondents' attorney on October 21,
1998. The latter filed a motion for extension of time of 30 days to file comment, counted from
October 31. The Court granted the extension sought, but only for 15 days. The comment
was filed late, on November 20, 1998, Counsel's explanation is that he had sought an
extension of 30 days "due to the other volume of legal works similarly situated and
school work of the undersigned as professor of law and dean of the University of
Manila," and had entertained "the honest belief" that it would be granted. However, he
learned belatedly that only a 15-day extension had been conceded. He completed the
comment and filed it, but it was five days late.

This case deals with modes of discovery a request for admission under Rule 26; legal
consequences of the failure to respond thereto in the manner indicated by law. It also treats
of other adjective devices to expedite litigation: a summary judgment under Rule 34, and a
judgment on demurrer to evidence under Rule 35. (NOTE: This case used the 1964
ROC!).

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
Counsel's explanation for seeking an extension of 30 days "due to the other volume of legal
works similarly situated and school work of the undersigned as professor of law and dean of
the University of Manila," and had entertained "the honest belief" that it would be granted.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
Alumbres granted only 15-day extension based on judges discretion.
ISSUES: WON the comment should be admitted by the court

SOLIS, RAFAEL ALEJANDRO L.

CASE # 06

HELD: YES.

Application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court.
Parallel to this, determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply
with the modes of discovery rests on the same sound judicial discretion. It is the duty of the
courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the
applicability of modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an
expeditious administration of justice.

Although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact, if it is shown by
admissions, depositions or affidavits, that those issues are sham, fictitious or not genuine,
or, in the language of the Rules, that except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law, the Court shall render a summary judgment for the plaintiff as the case may
be.

A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary

judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions
or admissions. Another distinction is that while the remedy of a judgment on the pleadings
may be sought only by a claimant (one seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, supra), a summary judgment may be applied for
by either a claimant or a defending party.

The Court admits the late comment, but takes this occasion to reiterate the familiar
doctrine that no party has a right to an extension of time to comply with an obligation
within the period set therefor by law; motions for extension are not granted as a
matter of course; their concession lies in the sound discretion of the Court exercised
in accordance with the attendant circumstances; the movant is not justified in
assuming that the extension sought will be granted, or that it will be granted for the
length of time suggested by him. Thus, any movant may move for extension to exercise
due diligence to inform himself as soon as possible of the Court's action on his motion, by
time inquiry of the Clerk of Court. Should he neglect to do so, he runs the risk of time
running out on him, for which he will have nobody but himself to blame.

The Lacalle Heirs had proven nothing whatever to justify a judgment in their favor. They had
not presented any copy whatever of the title they wished to be quieted. They had not
adduced any proof worthy of the name to establish their precedessors' ownership of the
land. On the contrary, their own evidence, from whatever aspect viewed, more than
persuasively indicated their lack of title over the land, or the spuriousness of their claim of
ownership thereof. The circumstances, including the outlandish grounds of opposition
advanced by the Heirs against the Dimans' motions for summary judgment and for demurrer
to evidence, no less than the obviously mistaken grounds cited by the Trial Court for
denying said motions, this Court has no hesitation in declaring that it was indeed grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the TC to have refused to render a summary judgment or
one on demurrer to evidence.

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE: the Orders are annulled and the Civil Case dismissed. Cost against private
respondents.

SOLIS, RAFAEL ALEJANDRO L.

CASE # 06

VELASQUEZ v. CA and PHIL. COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK

G.R. No. 124049
June 30, 1999
J. Bellosillo
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Early Dismissal: Summary Judgment
SUMMARY:
Velasquez is an officer of PUFFI. PUFFI got a loan from PCIB, and subsequently defaulted. The CM was
foreclosed. Since the proceeds from the foreclosure sale was insufficient, PCIB went after Velasquez who
issued a Surety Agreement. Velasquez was declared in default so a summary judgment was issued against
him. The SC upheld the summary judgment.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review on certiorari for reversal of the Decision of the CA
promulgated which affirmed the summary judgment of the RTC of Makati City, a default judgment against
petitioner.
FACTS:
Velasquez is an officer and stockholder of Pick-up Fresh Farms, Inc. (PUFFI).
Dec. 1984: PUFFI filed an application for a loan for P7.5M with PCIB under the govts Guarantee
Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (Fund).
April 1985: They executed the loan, and as security 2 Promissory Notes (P4M and P3.5M) were signed
by Nebrida and Canilao, Jr., officers of both PUFFI and Aircon and Refrigeration Industrices, Inc. (ARII).
A Chattel Mortgage (CM) was also executed by ARII over its equipment and machineries in favor of
PCIB. (1st security)
Velsquez, Nebrida and Canilao also executed deeds of suretyship in fabor of PCIB. (2nd security)
PUFFI defaulted so PCIB foreclosed the CM. The proceeds of the sale were P678,000.
PCIB filed an action to recover the remaining balance of the entire obligation, including interest,
penalties and other charges, exemplary damages and atty.s fees.
Oct. 1989: RTC Makati granted a writ of preliminary injunction.
Velasquez and Canilao filed their joint answer with counterclaim, denying personal liability and
interposing the defense of novation.
April 11, 1989: Velasquez and counsel failed to appear despite due notice, and on the same day,
upon motion of PCIB, Velasquez was declared in default and the RTC granted the motion for
summary judgment as against Canilao.
Velasquez did not lift the default order and an ex parte hearing was conducted against him.
June, 1990: RTC rendered a summary judgment in favor of PCIB, holding Velsaquez and Canilao
solidarily liable to pay P7,227,624.48 plus 17% interest and P700,000 attys fees.
MR was denied. CA: affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
1. Viajar v. Estenzo: that a party who moves for a summary proceeding has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as
to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.
2.
3.

There are triable issues of fact raised in his answer. Any ambiguity in the contract should be decided against PCIB under the
contract of adhesion doctrine.
PCIB's acceptance of royalty fees which were the fruits of the Franchising Agreement between PUFFI and Arturo Rosales[19]
constituted a novation of the loan agreement and deeds of suretyship.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in not relying on the SC ruling in Viajar v. Estenzo NO!
SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #07

HELD:
1. While this rule (Viajar v. Estenzo ruling) is true in the summary proceedings under Rule 34 of the Revised
Rules of Court, it does not apply to summary proceedings under Rule 35.

A different rationale operates in Rule 35 for it arises out of facts already established or admitted during the
pre-trial held beforehand, unlike in Rule 34 where the judge merely relies on the merits of the movant's
allegations. Rule 34 pertains to a judgment on the pleadings while Rule 35 relates to a summary judgment
which was the holding in this case.

Note: RTC decision was not a summary judgment but a judgment by default as hearing was held ex parte
against him.
WRT petitioners claim that a special power of attorney in favor of his lawyer was drawn up because he could
not attend the pre-trial due to previous commitments abroad.
The records show that the Order declaring Velasquez in default was sent to his counsel and was received by the latter as
early as May 10, 1989. No steps were taken to have the said Order lifted or reconsidered. This is binding on Velasquez
who is himself guilty of negligence when, after executing the special power of attorney in favor of his lawyer, he left for
abroad and apparently paid no further attention to his case until he received the decision.
Other Rulings:
2. A mere perusal of the deed of suretyship readily shows Velasquez's personal liability under the loan contract, hence,
proper for summary judgment. Moreover, the more appropriate doctrine in this case is that of the "complementary
contracts construed together" doctrine in National Power Corporation v. CA.
The "complementary contracts construed together" doctrine finds support in the principle that the surety contract is
merely an accessory contract and must be interpreted with its principal contract, which in this case was the loan
agreement. (See 1374 of Civil Code)
3. Extinctive novation has these requisites:
(a) the existence of a previous valid obligation;
(b) the agreement of all the parties to the new contract;
(c) the extinguishment of the old obligation or contract; and,
(d) the validity of the new one.
Thus, novation is effected only when a new contract has extinguished an earlier contract between the same parties.
Necessarily, there is no novation when the new contract is not between the same parties as in the old contract.
The franchise agreement was only between PUFFI and Rosales (dont know who the f*** is this).
Magdalena Estases, Inc. v. Rodriguez: An obligation to pay a sum of money is not novated, in a new instrument
wherein the old is ratified, by changing only the terms of payment and adding other obligations not incompatible
with the old one, or wherein the old contract is merely supplemented by the new one. The mere fact that the
creditor receives a guaranty or accepts payments from a third person who has agreed to assume the obligation,
when there is no agreement that the first debtor shall be released from responsibility, does not constitute a
novation, and the creditor can still enforce the obligation against the original debtor.

PETITION DENIED. CA and RTC affirmed.

SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #07

VILLAGONZALO v. IAC
22 November 1988
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Early Dismissal; Motion to Dismiss; Prescription

G.R. No. 71110

Regalado, J.

SUMMARY: Juan Villagonzalo bought a lot in Ormoc. In 1961, the TCT was issued in favor of the name of her
daughter Cecilia to the exclusion of the other heirs. In 1975, the other heirs of Juan filed for reconveyance
of the said property. SC ruled that they are barred from prescription, since the 10-year prescriptive period in
enforcing an implied trust accrues from the date of registration of the title. Said registration effectively
repudiates the implied trust and is adverse because it was solely in Cecilias name. Also, the action is also
barred by laches for the heirs failure to take preventive or retaliatory action despite knowledge of Cecilias
adverse possession. In prescription by laches, repudiation of an implied trust is not even required.
FACTS:
Feb 22 1961: Juan Villagonzalo purchased a lot from the heirs of Roman Matuguina in Ormoc.
o It was made to appear that the sale was in the name of his daughter, Cecilia, who was single, since he
borrowed from her the P500.00 needed to complete the full payment of the purchase price.
o The TCT was issued in the name of Cecilia as registered owner.
Apr 2, 1975: the other heirs of Villagonzalo (petitioners herein) filed the complaint for reconveyance.
CFI-Leyte ruled in favor of the heirs, declaring the property as the conjugal property of Juan Villagonzalo
and his wife Felicisima. TCT of Cecilia was cancelled.
IAC reversed the CFI, ruling that the right of action ahs prescribed.
o When Cecilia obtained TCT in her name, she excluded the other heirs from the estate of Juan. She set
up a title to the land adverse to the other heirs.
o The registration of the land was constructive notice to the whole world of her adverse claim to the lot,
thereby repudiating any fiduciary or trust relationship involved (as far as co-ownership of heirs).
o An action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years from the date when adverse
title is asserted by the possessor of the property.
SC affirms IAC decision.
ISSUE: W/N action has prescribed? YES
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
1. Action was seasonably filed because Cecilias registration of the land in her name was not a repudiation of
the implied trust created between her and their father.
2. Good faith and Just title are essential requisites in this case.
RATIO:
An action for reconveyance of real property to enforce an implied trust prescribes in 10 years.
o It is an action based on an obligation created by law so Art 1144 of the Civil Code applies.
The 10 years is counted from the date adverse title to the property is asserted by the possessor.
o In this case, it was when TCT was issued on July 18 1962.
o This also operates as a repudiation of the implied trust for the purpose of the statute of limitations.
o SC cited the case of Vda de Pama v. Pama, where it ruled that when the registration and the issuance
of the TCT in favor of the respondent was on 1956; it constituted as constructive notice to the
petitioners of the adverse claim of the respondent, so that their filing of the reconveyance complaint in
1969 was valid ground to dismiss the said complaint.

o
o
o

There is also evidence to the effect that:

As early as 1961, Cecilia refused to give any share in the produce of the land to the other heirs
In 1963, she mortgaged the property in her own name
In 1969: she leased the lot to Ramon Valera
Despite these, the other heirs did not take preventive or retaliatory action.
As such the action to enforce the implied trust is barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.
In laches, repudiation is not even required.
Whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by laches.

SULIT, LEOR JYLE C.

PAGE 1 OF 1

CASE 08

VDA. DE. CABRERA v. COURT OF APPEALS

03 Feb 1997 G.R. No. 108547 Torres, Jr., J.
TOPIC: Early Dismissal; Motion to Dismiss; Prescription
SUMMARY: In 1950, Plaintiff Virgilia obtained a parcel of land from 2 out of 3 co-owners. In 1972, the 3rd coowner later sold her share to Sps. Cabrera who immediately took possession of the property. Virgilia
filed an action for reconveyance/quieting of title in 1988. SC held that her claim was barred by laches.
NATURE: Petition for review certiorari of the CA decision ordering petitioner to vacate the lot in question.

Jan. 1950 - Daniel and Albertana Teokemian executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Andres Orais over a
7.37-hectare parcel of unregistered land in Abejod, Cateel, Davao Oriental. Their sister Felicidad
Teokemian ("Felicidad T") was listed as a vendor although she did not sign the Deed.
o The land was surveyed in the name of Andres' daughter Virgilia. It had an area of 11.1 hectares.
o June 1957 - Virgilia was issued a Free Patent and an OCT was issued in her name over Lot 2239.
July 1972 - Albertana executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the eastern half of Lot 2239 to
Elcano Cabrera (petitioner's husband). This 55,510-sqm portion was supposedly Felicidad T's 1/3 share.
o Petitioner Felicidad Cabrera ("Felicidad C") explained that Albertana signed the Deed because the
whole of Lot 2239 was adjudicated to Albertana in a prior cadastral case. The Cabreras
immediately took possession of the western (!) portion.
1974, 1978 - Virgilia's brothers confronted the Cabreras of their alleged encroachment and illegal
occupation of Virgilia's land.
Feb. 1988 - Virgilia filed a complant for Quieting of Title to Real Property, Damages with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Felicidad C and her daughter. In June, the complaint was amended to
include Felicidad T as party defendant.
o RTC - Ruled in favor of Cabreras. Virgilia can no longer recover the western portion due to laches.
o CA - Reversed and ordered Cabreras to vacate. Though Virgilia's registration was fraudulent
(included Felicidad T's share), its effects must be upheld because the defendant's action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust had already been barred by prescription.
! Virgilia's action not barred by laches. While the complaint is designated one for quieting of
title, the allegations show that is actually for recovery of ownership/possession.
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Elcano Cabrera did not convey any title. Assuming
Felicidad T still owned her 1/3 share, she did not give Albertana any authority to convey.
2. Felicidad T could only dispose her undivided interest, not a definite portion. Worse, the
Cabreras occupied the western portion, not the eastern portion as indicated in the Deed.
Such occupation without any color of title could not have ripened into ownership.
3. As testified by Virgilia's brother, it was only in 1974 that she came to know her property
was occupied. They went to Elcano thrice to complain of the occupancy. This case was has
no congruency with cases where the registered owner is barred by laches.
! Cabreras are possessors in good faith; entitled to benefits accorded by the Civil Code as such.

PETITIONERS ARGUE: The long period of time which lapsed from the time Virgilia's title was registered (1957)
until the action for quieting of title was instituted (1988) constituted a waiver of any interest that she had.
W/N Virgilia's action is barred by laches YES.
At the outset, it must be observed that Virgilia's title does not cover Felicidad T's share, considering
that the Deed of Sale did not bear the latter's signature.
o CA held that Virgilia's attempt to recover the property is justified because Felicidad T's own action
for reconveyance has already been barred by prescription, which is the same as stating that the
very tardiness of the plaintiffs in pursuing the present action for reconveyance of the subject
property has rendered the defendants defense nugatory. This conclusion is incorrect. Virgilia
could not have registered the part reserved to Felicidad T as this was not among those ceded in
the Deed of Sale. Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title.
o The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud in the issuance of title.
VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S.

PAGE 1 OF 2

CASE # 09

The defendants' right of conveyance arising from an implied trust (NCC Art. 1456) has not yet lapsed.
o Olviga v. CA: An action for reconveyance based on an implied/constructive trust prescribes in 10
years from the date of registration of the deed/ issuance of the title BUT this rule applies only
when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If the person is in
possession of the property, the right to seek conveyance (which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property) does not prescribe.
! Reason for the rule: His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of
a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must be shown that:
a) Trustee performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust;
b) Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and,
c) The evidence thereon is clear and positive.
Felicidad T and thereafter the Cabreras were in actual possession of the property since 1941, which
possession has been uninterrupted despite the sale of the 2/3 portion to Virgilia in 1950.
Until the institution of the present action in 1988, plaintiffs have not displayed any unequivocal act of
repudiation, which could be considered as an assertion of adverse interest from the defendants, which
satisfies the abovequoted requisites. Thus, it cannot be argued that the right of reconveyance on the
part of the defendants, and its use as defense in the present suit, has been lost by prescription.
On the other hand, the action for reconveyance (quieting of title) was instituted 30 years from the time
the title was acquired. In the meantime, the Cabreras had actively possessed the land, tilling it and
constructing an irrigation system thereon. This constitutes the basis for laches.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
o The defense of laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the
defendants title, but only with whether or not by reason of plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable
neglect, he should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so would
be inequitable and unjust to defendant.
o Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals with
the fact of delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.
In our jurisdiction, even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of
property by virtue of laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property Registration Decree),
no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. The same is not true with regard to laches.
o Mejia Lucas v. Gamponia: While the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by
virtue of his long continued possession, the original owners right to recover possession of the
property and the title thereto has, by the defendant's long period of possession and by owner's
inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite
portion of the community property, and, therefore, void, is likewise untenable. See NCC Art. 493.
o Go Ong v. CA: The heirs, as co-owners, shall each have the full ownership of his part and its fruits.
He may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the conveyance, with respect to the
other co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon partition.
o Since the sale of the 2/3 portion, Virgilia has allowed Felicidad T to occupy the 1/3 allotted to her.
There has been, therefore, a partial partition where a transferee allowed a co-owner to occupy a
definite portion and has not disturbed the same for too long a period to be ignored.
o The possessor is in a better condition or right. (Potior est conditio possidentis.)
Petition GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. RTC decision REINSTATED.

VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S.

PAGE 2 OF 2

CASE # 09

LEDESMA v CA
June 30, 1993
EARLY DISMISSAL; MOTION TO DISMISS; PRESCRIPTION

G.R. No. 106646

J. Regalado

SUMMARY: RCBC filed 2 actions against Ledesma; the first was dismissed w/o prejudice for lack of summons. He filed the
second one 7 years after the dismissal of the first but after 14 years since they signed subject trust agreement. RCBC won.
Ledesma filed a motion for reconsideration for the dismissal of a petition for certiorari. He contends that his Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of prescription should have been given due course as the first action merely tolled the prescriptive
period, rendering the second action already prescribed against him. The Court ruled that the filing of an action renews the
period.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: MTR on a failed petition for certiorari.
FACTS: On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. filed a civil case in the CFI of Rizal
against Jaime Ledesma to enforce the terms of a Trust Receipt executed by them on April 1, 1974 but which the latter failed
to comply with. Summons could not be served on Ledesma so the case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981.
On December 2, 1988, RCBC again instituted a civil case for the same cause of action ad subject matter in the
Makati RTC.
Ledesma filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription but this was denied and judgment was rendered
in favor of RCBC. This was affirmed by the CA in a decision promulgated on January 7, 1992 and denied Ledesmas motion
for reconsideration in August 1992.
Ledesma filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Courtwhich was denied, hence the present motion for
reconsideration.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The second action of the respondent bank had already prescribed, following the rulings of
Vda. de Nator, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al. and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al and that
in case of the filing of
an action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled and continues to run again, with only the balance of the
remaining period available for the filing of another action
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: (None mentioned)
ISSUES: W/N the prescription period is merely tolled by the filing of the first action.
HELD: NO.
1. The cases cited by petitioner are not controlling T he cases cited by the petitioner cannot be
relied upon as in Vda. De Nator, there were conflicting statements as to the interpretation of the
provision and the ruling in Fulton Insurance Company is not clear on the matter it concluded that
the issue of whether the action merely tolled or it actually interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period was moot and academic because, in either case, the second action was still filed within the
prescriptive period.
2. More recent jurisprudence on the matter support the view that the period is renewed and
not merely tolled - Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of an action,
involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written contract
under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written
extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
The effects of the last two instances have already been decided:
a. Interruption by extrajudicial demand - in Overseas Bank of Manila v. Geraldez, et al, it was held
that the interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the
said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct meaning
of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period. That
same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs. Organo.
b. Interruption of prescriptive period by reason of written acknowledgement In Philippine National
Railways vs. National Labor, it was ruled that the period of prescription, when interrupted by a
written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of limitation might have already
elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is thereby negated and rendered inefficacious.
MATS Rivera

CASE # 10

Based on the aforecited cases, Article 1155 has twice been interpreted to mean that upon the
cessation of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period of prescription commences to
run anew. Thus, the interpretations in the rulings in Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National
Railways Company are the correct interpretations as not only are they more recent, both also
squarely resolved in a decisive and logical manner the issue at hand.
3. Petitioners interpretation would result in absurdity - If the petitioners interpretation of Art.
1155 is upheld, it would result in an irrational conclusion that a judicial action cannot produce the
same effect as a mere extrajudicial demand or an acknowledgement of the debt.
Petitions motion is denied with finality.

MATS Rivera

CASE # 10

Camara v. CA
July 20, 1999
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Motion To DismissRes Judicata, Litis Pendentia

G.R. No. 100789

Purisima, J.

SUMMARY: Zulueta sold a lot to the Camaras. After the execution of the deed of sale, the
Camaras found out that the title was burdened with two mortgages. Camara filed an action for
specific performance against Zulueta to remove the encumbrances. TC ordered Zulueta to
cancel the mortgages or return the purchase price. When Zulueta died, Camara availedof the
alternative remedy by presenting a money claim as creditor in the intestate estate of the former.
He was granted partial execution. Hernaez, the mortgagee of the lot in question, filed an action
for judicial foreclosure of the contract of mortgage against Zuluetas heirs. TC: in favor of
Hernaez. The lot was publicly auctioned to Hernaez as the highest bidder and a judicial
confirmation of ownership was issued. Camara instituted a case for quieting of title against
Hernaez before the Makati RTC which dismissed the case. SC: dismissed Camaras case, as
Camaras cause of action arose from the contract of sale executed by Zulueta in his favor, and
conclusiveness of judgment in the action for specific performanceres judicata.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of a CA decision affirming the decision of the Makati RTC which dismissed
plaintiffs complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages
FACTS: Nov. 18, 1963: Ramon Lacson executed a Deed of Assignment of his mortgage over a
parcel of land (owned by Jose Zulueta and his wife Soledad Ramos), in favor of Celina
Hernaez. Jul. 21, 1964: Zulueta and wife sold the land to the spouses Camara (petitioners).
After the execution of the Deed of Sale, petitioners noticed two separate mortgages annotated
on the TCT; inscribed was a mortgage in favor of Chinabank, as well as a second mortgage,
annotated on Nov. 2, 1959, in favor of Lacson. The petitioners demanded from Zulueta the
removal of the annotations by bringing an action for specific performance and damages. During
the pendency of the case, the Chinabank loan was settled, leaving only the Lacson mortgage.
1967: the case for specific performance was settled in favor of petitioners, ordering Zulueta to
cancel or release the mortgages, or in the alternative, to return the purchase price of P15k and
to pay attorneys fees. Zulueta later executed a Supplemental and Amendment to the
Mortgage over his other properties in favor of Hernaezthis reproduced, confirmed and
supplemented the assigned Lacson mortgage. Zulueta then died, and two years later, Hernaez
brought an action for judicial foreclosure of the Supplemental and Amendment to Contract of
Mortgage against his heirs before the Pasig CFI. Meanwhile, the petitioners presented a money
claim as creditors to Zuluetas heirs, because Zuluetaand later, his heirsfailed to release the
Lacson mortgage on the land. They were able to collect attorneys fees in partial execution.
The judicial foreclosure case was then decided in favor of Hernaez. The properties involved,
including the land in this case, were publicly auctioned and the Certificate of Sale for the land
was issued to Hernaez, who was the highest bidder. Judicial confirmation of the sale was
ordered by the Pasig CFI; the petitioners then presented a Motion for Clarificatory Order and a
Motion for Leave to Intervene before the same court. Both motions were denied, but the
petitioners did not appeal. Petitioners then instituted a case for quieting of title against Hernaez
with the Makati RTC.
RTC: dismissed complaint for lack of cause of action, and ordered the Register of Deeds of
Rizal at Makati to cancel the Notice of Lis Pendens at the back of the lands TCT. CA:
dismissed appeal and subsequent MR. Hence this petition.

Bries

CASE #11

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for quieting of title should be dismissed on the ground
of lack of cause of action and res judicata (our main issue here)
HELD: YES. PETITION DENIED. Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior
judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under
Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Petitioners claim that the decision in the case for quieting of title was
not res judicata because they were not impleaded in the action for judicial foreclosure brought
by Hernaez.
There is conclusiveness of judgment, when, between the first case where judgment was
rendered and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, not
of causes of action. The judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved there.
This principle is applicable here, as there is identity of parties and subject matter, but not
of causes of action. The action for judicial foreclosure has a different cause of action (namely,
the Supplemental and Amendment to Contract of Mortgage), while the action for quieting of
title arose from the violation by Zulueta of his express warranty that the land was free from any
lien or encumbrance, at the time it was sold to petitioners.
Re: identity of parties, the parties involved are not exactly the same, but there is an identity of
parties for purposes of res judicata. Even if the first action for judicial foreclosure was brought
against the heirs of Zulueta and the present action is against Hernaez, the former and the latter
can be considered as substantially the same parties since Hernaez is a successor in interest of
Zulueta. There is identity of parties not only where the parties are the same, but also
those in privity with them, as between their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity, or where there is substantial identity of parties. Although it does
not have the same effect as res judicata which bars subsequent actions, still, conclusiveness of
judgment operates as estoppel with respect to matters in issue or points controverted, on the
determination of which the finding or judgment was anchored.
The parties are now precluded from challenging the validity of the Supplemental or Amendment
to Contract of Mortgage because of the decision in the action for judicial foreclosure in favor of
Hernaez. The action for quieting of title also cannot be allowed because this would be an appeal
from the final and executory decision in the action for judicial foreclosure, which had in fact been
executed and satisfied. A decision which has long become final and executory can no
longer be set aside when there is no showing that it was procured by fraud or
respondents were deprived of due process.

Bries

CASE #11

LEONCIO ZARATE V. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS

MARCH 18, 1919
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: EARLY DISMISSAL; RES JUDICATA, LITIS PENDENTIA

G.R. No. L-13334

MALCOLM, J.

SUMMARY: Zarate appeals from an SC decision. A doctrine in the earlier decision had been subsequently
been reversed. The court applied the principle of the Law of the Case and dismissed his petition. The Law
of the Case is the rule declared by an appellate court, which would continue to govern or to be observed in
the same case in future proceedings. However, such rule may be reversed in other cases.
FACTS
In a decision of this Court in the case of Zarate vs. Director of Lands, the judgment of the Court of Land
Registration was modified; the applicant has the right to register title to all of the lands described in the
application, except the portion claimed as a homestead by Apolonio Gamido, which shall be excluded
from registration, provided the Court of Land Registration shall find that a patent was obtained for said
land; otherwise, then the court shall register title in favor of the Zarate to all the lands.
o It was ruled by the Court here that "Under Act No. 926, a patent issued under the homestead Law has
all the force and effect of a Torrens title acquired under Act No. 496; and that being the case . . . we must
respect the title so secured, provided it be a fact that the patent has been secured in any of said homestead
proceedings."

o This doctrine has been modified (or reversed) by the later decisions of this Court.
It was subsequently declared by the CFI Nueva Ecija, through an order, that a homestead patent had
been issued to Gamido and consequently directing the exclusion of this portion of the land.
Applicant Zarate appeals from this order in the case at bar. (contention not well grounded)

ISSUE/HELD: WON the applicants appeal is meritorious. NO, judgment affirmed

RATIO

Gamido having compiled with the express mandate of the appellate court, his homestead should remain his
property. "The patent of the US is the conveyance by which the nation passes the title to portions of the public
domain."

The Law of the Case" principle applies with regard to the doctrine applied by the Court in the earlier decision.

A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, such
declaration continues to be the law of that case even on the subsequent appeal. The rule made by an
appellate court, while it may be reversed in other cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent
proceedings in the same case. The "Law of the Case," as applied to a former decision of an appellate
court, merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided.
Such a rule is "necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently,
which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in
the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal."
The rule is necessary as a matter of policy in order to end litigation. "There would be no end to a suit
if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticism on their opinions,
or speculate of chances from changes in its members."

US Jurisprudence (Courts Legal Basis)

The general rule, nakedly and badly but, is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether on the
general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribed the duty and limit the power of the trial
court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all after steps
below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason.
o Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation. In Short,
there would be endless litigant were allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the
chance of our rewriting proposition once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law
of a given case.
o An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal, would result in the foolishness of the
inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so
choose, to act like ordinary sensible persons. The Administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is
a practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use.
CABALLA

CASE # 12

Tan v. CA
G.R. NO. 142401
AUGUST 20, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: EARLY DISMISSAL; MOTION TO DISMISS; RES JUDICATA, LITIS PENDENTIA
SUMMARY: Respondent invested $80,000 in Petitioners hatchery business. The latter was only able to repay
$10,000. Thus, respondent filed a complaint with the NBI. Before the NBI, the petitioner signed an Affidavit of
Undertaking promising to pay his debt. Subsequently, he filed a case for annulment of document claiming that
he signed the affidavit under duress. RTC held in his favor, but CA reversed. The decision became final.
ANOTHER case was filed by respondent this time, an action to collect the remainder of petitioners debt. In
this 2nd case, the petitioner still insisted on using the defense of signing the affidavit under duress. RTC held
in petitioners favor, but was reversed by CA which held that no, under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, you cannot use the same defense. Petitioner filed a petition for review of the 2nd CA decision. SC
affirmed the CA. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as
preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel, issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.

FACTS
Respondent Wu Sen Woei, a Taiwanese national, met Petitioner Andrew Tan, a Filipino, in Taiwan. Petitioner
convinced respondent to invest in the formers business (a hatchery business, where they probably make
hatchets*) Respondent gave $80,000, to which the petitioner only repaid $10,000. Respondent then lodged a
complaint with the NBI to recover the balance, and before the NBI the petitioner signed an Affidavit of
Undertaking where he and his sister bound themselves to pay the balance in installments ($10,000 monthly).
(1st case) Petitioner field an action for annulment of document with the RTC, claiming that he was
coerced into signing the undertaking. RTC held in favor of petitioner. CA reversed and dismissed petitioners
complaint.
(2nd case) In the meantime, respondent was able to collect $25,000, leaving a balance of $45,000. He
filed an action for the collection of a sum of money to collect the said balance, alleging that the petitioner had
defrauded him. The respondent filed the case (presumably) in the RTC, a case which he (presumably) lost,
which he (definitely) appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC. This 2nd case is what is now being lifted to
the SC through a petition for review. (Note: in the 2nd case, petitioner is still claiming that the affidavit had been
executed under duress)
CA held that based on the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the petitioners claim that the
Affidavit had been executed under duress was rendered ineffective by the CA decision in the 1st case, where
the CA ruled that the affidavit was an admission against interest, a clear acknowledgment by Tan of his
obligation to Wu Sen Woei.
*That is a joke.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: RTC held in favor of petitioner. CA reversed and denied MR. Case
lifted to SC through petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WoN the affidavit of undertaking is valid. (Or rather, has the earlier decision by the CA, regarding the same
issue, become conclusive upon the parties) (YES)
RATIO
(1) Yes, the affidavit of undertaking is valid on the basis of the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment.
The CAs earlier decision concerning the validity of Tans affidavit of undertaking has become conclusive on
the parties, pursuant to Sec. 47(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The parties are bound by the matters
adjudged and those that are actually and necessarily included therein.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as preclusion of
issues or collateral estoppel, issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
GASTANES

Case #13

The concept clearly applies to the present case, because petitioner again seeks refuge in the alleged
nullity of the same affidavit, the question on the validity of which has already been settled. The same question
cannot therefore be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.
Even though the two actions are technically different, the concept of conclusiveness of judgment
applies because under the principle, the identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of
issues. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
Significantly, petitioner no longer questioned the CA decision in the 1st case.
Note: Petitioners assertion that the affidavit was executed under duress is contradicted by the events that took
place following its execution. Petitioner did not immediately question its validity, he paid at least $25,000, and
even asked for a reduction of the installments due.
RULING: Petition denied.

GASTANES

Case #13

FELICIANO v. CA
G.R. No. 123293
1998 MARCH 05
BELLOSILLO, J.
T OPIC IN S YLLABUS : Early Dismissal Motion to Dismiss Res judicata; litis pendentia
S UMMARY : Feliciano instituted an action for annulment and reconveyance with damages against the Insular
Bank of Asia and America. During the pendency of that case, Baron bought the disputed property from the
bank and demanded that Feliciano pay rents and vacate the premises. Feliciano refused, causing Baron to file
a complaint for ejectment. SC held that there was no litis pendentia, as there was no identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for in the two actions (see: table in the Held section.)
The pendency of an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance may not be successfully pleaded in
abatement of an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only. Such judgment shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts in a
case between the same parties upon the different cause of action involving possession. If the rule were
otherwise, ejectment cases could be easily frustrated by the defendant through the simple expedient of filing
an action in the RTC contesting the plaintiffs ownership over the property.
REQUISITES FOR LITIS PENDENTIA: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review assailing the CA Decision as well as CA Resolution
which reversed and set aside the RTC Decision
FACTS:
In 1978, Eleuterio Cosme obtained a loan of P50,000 from the Insular Bank of Asia and America. To secure
the loan, he mortgaged a parcel of land registered in his name married to Asuncion Obando. However, the
loan was not paid upon maturity, and the mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially and sold at public auction
with the bank as the highest bidder. After the lapse of the redemption period, ownership over the land was
consolidated in the bank and a TCT was issued in its name.
The sps. Cosme and Obando later died. Their daughters, ELISA FELICIANO (Petitioner) and Arsenia C.
Buendia took possession of the property and exercised their rights of ownership thereof as compulsory
heirs of their parents.
[ACTION #1] In 1985, Feliciano instituted before the RTC of Quezon City an action against the bank for
Annulm ent of Mortgage, Certificate of Sale, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 283860;
Reconveyance with Petition for Issuance of a W rit of Preliminary Injuction; and Damages.
o During the pendency of the case (or on 15 February 1991), ERNESTO BARON (Private
Respondent) bought the property from the bank and the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed in his favor. On the basis of the sale, Baron demanded from Feliciano and Buendia to pay
rents and vacate the premises. Feliciano refused, insisting that she was owner of the property and
that it was currently the subject of a pending litigation in the RTC of QC.
[ACTION #2] Baron thus filed before the MeTC of QC a com plaint for ejectment.
o MeTC: Dismissed the ejectment case on the ground of litis pendentia.
o RTC: Affirmed MeTC; held that (1) litis pendentia existed and (2) the MeTC did not validly acquire
jurisdiction since there was no sufficient averment in the complaint to bring the case within the
purview of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
o CA: Reversed RTC and remanded the case for further proceedings; held that (1) litis pendentia was
not present as there was no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in the RTC and in the
MeTC; and (2) the allegations in the complaint for ejectment adequately and sufficiently established a
cause for unlawful detainer, thus MeTC had jurisdiction.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS: Feliciano asserts that the CA misinterpreted and misapplied the laws and
jurisprudence on (1) litis pendentia and (2) on the acquisition or absence of jurisdiction.
(1) [On litis pendentia] There is identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both the pending RTC case
for annulment and reconveyance with damages, and the MeTC case for ejectment, i.e., ownership and
possession of the property. A judgment in the RTC case, regardless of which party is successful, will amount
to res judicata in the ejectment case.
(2) [On jurisdiction] The allegations in the complaint for ejectment do not show nor imply that there is unlawful
withholding of material possession by Feliciano. Hence, the complaint is insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the
MeTC to entertain the ejectment suit.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS: [Not specified, but essentially just the opposite of Felicianos arguments.]
ISSUES: (1) W ON Felicianos invocation of litis pendentia was proper NO
(2) WON the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the ejectment suit YES
LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #14

HELD:
(1) Litis pendentia is a Latin term which means a pending suit. It is variously referred to in some decisions as
lis pendens and auter action pendant.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is
pending between the same parties for the same cause of actions and that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious.
R EQUISITES FOR LITIS PENDENTIA : (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.
Applying the foregoing criteria, litis pendentia does not obtain in this case because of the
absence of the second and third requisites. While there may be identity of parties and subject
matter in the two actions, the issues involved and the reliefs prayed for are not the same:
Issue
Relief Sought
ACTION #1: Annulment and
Validity of the mortgage and the
Recovery of ownership of the
reconveyance [Feliciano]
subsequent foreclosure sale
subject property
(Assuming
the
mortgage
and
foreclosure
ACTION #2: Ejectment
Restoration of possession to
to be valid) WON Baron has the right to
[Baron]
Baron
take possession of the property
Thus, the MeTC can validly try the ejectm ent case even while the annulm ent suit is being
litigated in the RTC. There being different causes of action, a decision in one case will not
constitute res judicata as to the other.
o Concededly, a decision in one may, to a certain extent, affect the other case since they involve the
same parcel of land. But the test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the
same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first.
o

While some items or pieces of evidence may be admissible in both actions (e.g., the Deed of Absolute Sale
between the bank and Baron), it cannot be said that exactly the same set of evidence presented to sustain the
first action can defeat the second.

Moreover, well-settled is the rule that the pendency of an action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for unlawful
detainer or forcible entry.
o The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to
the possession only and shall in no case bind title or affect ownership. Such judgment shall not bar
an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held
conclusive of the facts in a case between the same parties upon the different cause of action
involving possession.
o R ATIONALE : If the rule were otherwise, ejectment cases could be easily frustrated by the defendant
through the simple expedient of filing an action in the RTC contesting the plaintiffs ownership over
the property from which the defendant is sought to be evicted. This would render nugatory the
underlying philosophy of the summary remedy of ejectment -- to prevent criminal disorder and
breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to possession of
the property, resort to force rather than to appropriate action in court to assert their claims.

(2) In determining the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, the test is whether admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.
In this case, the complaint for ejectment stated, among others, that (a) Baron bought the premises, as shown by the
deed of absolute sale; and (b) Feliciano was requested to vacate the premises for lack of lawful possession and nonpayment of rentals but her lawyer informed the plaintiff that she was the owner of the premises.
o Clearly, these allegations adequately established a cause of action for unlawful detainer on the basis of which
the MeTC could render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff.
o In an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. (Sumulong v. CA)
SC Notes:
We are not unmindful of the afflictive consequences that will be suffered by petitioner if her ejectment is ordered by
the MeTC, only to be reinstated later if she eventually wins the nullification of the mortgage case in the RTC. However,
respondent will also suffer an injustice if denied of the remedy of ejectment, resort to which is not only allowed but in
fact encouraged by law.
Petitioner is not being ejected yet. The Court of Appeals, and now this Court, is simply ordering the MeTC to reinstate
the ejectment case and proceed with it.

LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #14

FELIZARDO S. OBANDO, and ESTATES OF JOSE FIGUERAS

v. EDUARDO FIGUERAS, AMIGO REALTY CORP.

G.R. No. 134854

January 18, 2000

PANGANIBAN, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: EARLY DISMISSAL -> MOTION TO DISMISS -> RES JUDICATA, LITIS PENDENTIA
SUMMARY: Eduardo became the administrator of his parents joint estate. His cousin Obando
presented a Will, allegedly that of Eduardos mother, which bequeathed two Quezon City lots to the
Obando clan. Eduardo and Obando were appointed co-administrators by the probate court. Eduardo,
believing that the Will was forged, filed separate cases against Obando for estafa through falsification of
public doc and for removal as co-admin before the probate court. Obando was first convicted in the
criminal case; he appealed the conviction. Eduardo then sold the two aforementioned lots to Amigo
Realty. Thus, Obando filed a case for nullification of the sale against Eduardo and Amigo. The latter
sought to have the case dismissed for Obandos lack of legal capacity to sue but the trial court denied it.
The probate court subsequently removed Obando as co-administrator; Obando also appealed this
decision. Eduardo and Amigo consequently filed a second Motion to Dismiss on the same ground. It was
then granted by the Court. Obando questioned the dismissal. SC upheld it.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul the Decision of the CA which affirmed RTCs dismissal of Obandos action for annulment of contract and
reconveyance
FACTS:
1964 Petition for settlement of deceased Don Jose Figueras estate filed by his wife Alegria and stepsons
Francisco and Eduardo (herein respondent);
Doa Alegria died pending the settlement thus Eduardo became administrator of the joint
estates of Jose and Alegria
Before the proceedings could even begin, Felizardo Obando filed a Petition for Probate allegedly by
virtue of the Last Will and Testament of Doa Alegria;
Obando was a nephew of Doa Alegria
The alleged Will bequeathed several properties to the Obando clan, including two lots in
New Manila, QC
The court consolidated the intestate proceedings (filed by Eduardos family) with the probate case
(filed by Obando);
Eduardo and Obando were appointed co-administrators of the joint estates
Eduardo, however, questioned the validity of the Will
Will was examined by NBI, found that it was forged
Criminal case for estafa through falsification of public doc was filed, Obando was convicted;
he entered his appeal
Petition to remove him as co-admin before the Probate Court was also filed
1990 Eduardo filed Motion for Authority to sell the two QC lots mentioned above
Motion denied by Probate Court
But Eduardo nonetheless sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corp (the other respondent)
1992 Obando, as co-administrator and universal heir of Doa Alegria, filed complaint against
Eduardo and Amigo Realty for nullification of sale/ annulment of contract and reconveyance
Eduardo and Amigo filed a Motion to Dismiss but was denied since Obando was still a coadmin, the petition for removal was still pending
1997 The Probate Court removed Obando as co-administrator
Obando appealed the decisions of removal as co-admin
Consequently, Eduardo and Amigo Realty filed another Joint Motion to Dismiss in the case for
nullification of sale on the ground of no legal capacity to sue under Rule 16, Sec. 1 (d)
The Motion was granted (without prejudice) despite being filed after Obando had
already rested his case
Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
He filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the CA, but was denied.
Thus he filed the instant Petition for Review (Rule 45) before the SC
OBANDOs ARGUMENTS:
1) It was already too late for Eduardo to file a Motion to Dismiss after he had finished presenting his evidence

[MA. KATRINA LORIS DINO-POBLETE]

[CASE #15]

2) It was premature for the trial court to dismiss the case because his conviction and removal as co-admin by
the probate court is still on appeal
3) The trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its previous rulings when it granted Eduardos
later Motion to Dismiss
RELEVANT ISSUES/ HELD (#2 specifically pertains to res judicata):
(1) WON a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive pleadings were already made can still be granted?
YES, the ground became available only after the responsive pleading was filed
(2) WON it was premature for the trial court to grant the dismissal as Obandos conviction and removal as coadmin are still on appeal?
NO, the trial court can act on the basis of the rulings; if his status is later restored, the case may continue
without being barred by res judicata
(3) WON there was conflict between the order dismissing the civil case and the previous action of the trial
court?
NO, the trial court could not dismiss the case earlier because the ground only became available at a later
time
RATIO:
(1) A trial court may act upon a motion to dismiss at any time a ground therefor becomes available,
even after a responsive pleading to the complaint has already been filed
a) The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case.
b) Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be
filed within the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. However, even after an answer
has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss (grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction,
(2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for
dismissal)

c) The grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16 may be waived, except for lack of cause of action or lack of
jurisdiction. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all
within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9.
In this case, Eduardo and Amigo Realty did not waive their right to move for the dismissal of the
civil case based on Petitioner Obandos lack of legal capacity. It must be pointed out that it was only after he
had been convicted of estafa through falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation of
the Figueras estates; only then did this ground become available to the respondents. Verily, if the plaintiff
loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to
dismiss, even after the lapse of the period for filing a responsive pleading.
(2) A civil case initiated by an estate administrator may be dismissed upon a showing that the said
administrators appointment as such has been revoked by the probate court
Obando derived his power to represent the estate of the deceased couple from his appointment as
co-administrator. When the probate court removed him from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked the
legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras estates, he could not continue prosecuting the civil case. Thus,
the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss.
The fact that the conviction of Obando and his removal from administration are on appeal only means
that his legal standing could be restored; thus, the civil case was correctly dismissed without prejudice. If his
conviction is reversed and his appointment restored by the probate court, the case may continue without being
barred by res judicata.
(3) The dismissal of an action may be made after the ground therefor becomes known, even if the trial
court has refused to do so earlier when that ground was not yet available.
There is no conflict between these trial court rulings. They were based on different grounds. The
first Motion to Dismiss was denied because, at that time, Obando still had legal capacity to sue as coadministrator. On the other hand, the second Motion was granted because the probate court had already
removed him from his office as co-administrator. The change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference
in the adjudication of the trial court.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. RTC Order of Dismissal, AFFIRMED.
[MA. KATRINA LORIS DINO-POBLETE]

[CASE #15]

AGRAVANTE v. PATRIARCA
March 14, 1990
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Early Dismissal - Motion to Dismiss

G.R. No. L48324

Narvasa, J.

SUMMARY:
Defendants counsel sought cancellation of pre-trial pleading illness. The motion for cancellation
contained no notice of hearing, and had a photocopy of a medical certificate attached to it
attesting that the counsel was suffering from headache. Motion was denied for lack of notice of
hearng. Defendants and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial and were declared in
default. Defendants filed a petition for certiorari arguing that the defect in their motion was
merely formal. SC ruled that notice of hearing is essential.
FACTS:
Juana Patriarca Pena filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur an action to quiet title with
damages against Jose and Juan Agravente.
Case was set for pre-trial but record of the case was lost due to a fire in the capitol building. Record of
the case was reconstituted and the pre-trial was set again for Jan. 25, 1978. Defendants counsel
moved for cancellation of this setting.
Court re-set the pre-trial for Feb. 25, 1978, but defendants counsel once again sought
cancellation, pleading illness. The motion for cancellation, though dated Feb. 14, 1978,
was filed only on Feb. 22. It contained no notice of hearing , but had a photocopy of a
medical certificate attached to it attesting that the counsel was suffering from headache,
and was advised rest.
o Motion was denied in an Order dated Feb. 22, 1978, on the grounds that it was
not in accordance with the rules for lack of notice to the adverse party, there was
a lack of setting of the date of hearing, and the medical certificate attached
thereto was only a xerox copy of an alleged medical certificate dated since
January 20, 1978 and Atty. Pacamarra had sufficient period to rest between the
date of the certification and the next hearing of the case.
Neither the defendants nor their counsel were present at the scheduled pre-trial on Feb.
27, and, thus, they were declared in default.
Defendants moved for reconsideration of the orders of the court twice, and were denied
both times, hence, this petition for certiorari.
DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT:
They were denied their day in court. Though their counsels motion was defective, it was merely
a formal defect.
ISSUE:
WON the omission of the notice of hearing in their motion for cancellation was a formal defect
NO.

HELD:
The motion for cancellation or postponement was not one that could be granted by the
Court as a matter of course, and thus be acted on ex parte. No party has a right to a
postponement of a trial or hearing, or pre-trial; and his adversary has the right to oppose
any move towards this end.

Vicencio, Solomon

[CASE # 16]

A party or counsel desiring a postponement of a pretrial or trial must comply with the
requisites of motions in general set out in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, i.e.:
o the motion shall be made in writing, shall state the grounds upon which it is
based and if necessary be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other
papers, and notice thereof -- specifying the date of hearing which is
supposed to be specified by the movant himself -- shall be served by the
applicant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days before said
hearing, together with a copy of the motion and of any affidavits and other
relevant papers.
Such notice of hearing, it must be added, is essential. Its importance is underscored by
the prohibition of action by the court on any motion which is not accompanied by proof of
service thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or
parties are not affected. And if the motion be grounded on illness of a party or
counsel, the Rules further require an "affidavit that the presence of such party or
counsel at the trial (or pre-trial) is indispensable and that the character of his
illness is such as to render his non-attendance excusable.
Defendants counsel failed to show that the character of his illness was such as to
render his non-attendance excusable, i.e., that the headache was so severe and
expected to last for such a period of time as to make it impossible or extremely difficult
for him to attend the pre-trial, still a month away. Trial Courts hesitancy to give full
credence to an unverified photocopy was also not unreasonable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is
immediately executory.

Vicencio, Solomon

[CASE # 16]

COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION,

TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY
STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 110318 August 28, 1996
REGALADO, J.:p

TOPIC
Motion to dismiss; Plaintiff no legal capacity to sue

SUMMARY
Petitioners obtained a search warrant against respondents for several copyright violations. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the RTC quashed said search warrant. The CA affirmed the quashal. SC reversed.

HOW THE CASE REACHED SC

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA sustaining the order of the RTC for the quashal of
Search Warrant it earlier issued for violation of Sec. 56 of PD49 ("Decree on the Protection of Intellectual
Property.")

FACTS
Complainants lodged a complaint with the NBI for violation of PD No. 49 and sought its assistance in their
anti-film piracy drive. The NBI made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila
including Sunshine Home Video Inc., owned by Danilo Pelindario in Makati.

On November 1987, the NBI applied for a search warrant against Sunshine seeking the seizure of pirated
video tapes of copyrighted films. The NBI Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted
motion pictures.

A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed but was denied. The Motion for reconsideration of
the Order of denial was filed and granted. The RTC ruled that the master tapes of the copyrighted films
from which the pirated films were allegedly copies, were never presented in the proceedings for the
issuance of the search warrants in question hence issuance of warrants were in error.

The CA affirmed the RTC on appeal.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to be able to
maintain an action in Philippine courts. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a
suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do business.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Petitioners deny that they are doing business in the Philippines and that private respondents have not
adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business as would require them to be licensed by
the SEC. Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive right does
not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the presumption of doing business.

ISSUE
(other issues not related to syllabus are not included)
RUIZ

(NOTE: Personality to sue and Capacity to sue will be discussed in the latter part of the digest)
WON petitioners have capacity to sue respondent

HELD/RATIO
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily
inclusive of the order of the lower court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Corporation Code provides:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene
in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on
any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a condition precedent
to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by a foreign corporation. However, under the
aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines
unless it shall have the license required by law, and until it complies with the law in transacting business
here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts.

Thus, any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action in our courts
upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of
the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but "doing business" in the Philippines without such
license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign
corporation is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no
capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines.

No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or
"transacting" business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental
circumstances. The true test is whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the
business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it
over to another.

A foreign corporation is "doing," "transacting," "engaging in," or "carrying on" business in the State when it
has entered the State by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting through them some
substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be
distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts.

The term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent,
the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to or in
progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization.

There is no showing that petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the
Philippines as would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our courts. No
evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other
specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.

Accordingly, the certification issued by the SEC stating that its records do not show the registration of
petitioner film companies as corporations is of no consequence to petitioners' right to bring action in the
RUIZ

Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration by petitioners can be expected to be found for said foreign
corporations do not transact or do business in the Philippines.

The fact that petitioners are copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of
motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing business which would
require them to obtain a license before they can sue.

Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico Domingo as attorney-in-fact of petitioners tantamount to doing
business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising one's legal and property rights can be deemed by
and of themselves to be doing business.

For allegedly being foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license, private
respondents repeatedly maintain that petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action before
Philippine Courts.
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and
that the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in
the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does
not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of
personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded on failure to
state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a
party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Correspondingly, the
first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas
the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the
face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.

Applying the above discussion, the ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an unlicensed
foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should properly be "lack of capacity to
sue," not "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated is
undeniably such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply
with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.

RUIZ

PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., AND FABRIQUES OF
G.R. No. 91332
TABAC REUNIES, S.A.,petitioners vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.
July 16, 1993
MELO, J.:
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: IX.E.6. MTD-Plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue
SUMMARY: Philip Morris, et al, corporations organized under the laws of USA, asserted that defendant Fortune
Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly
similar trademark.
SC: Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the Philippines
on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question of whether they have an exclusive right over the
symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in
line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous on petitioners to claim that when a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be
actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines.
Facts:
Petitioners Philip Morris, Inc., Benson and Hedges (Canada), Inc., and Fabriques of Tabac Reunies, S.A., are ascribing
whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when
respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, herein private respondent, from manufacturing and selling "MARK" cigarettes in the local market. Banking on
the thesis that petitioners' respective symbols "MARK VII", 'MARK TEN", and "MARK", also for cigarettes, must be
protected against unauthorized appropriation,
Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Virginia, United States of America,
and does business at 100 Park Avenue, New York, New York, United States of America. The two other plaintiff foreign
corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are similarly not doing business in the Philippines
but are suing on an isolated transaction.
Plaintiffs-petitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes
bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark. Plaintiffs admit in the complaint that "xxx they are not
doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an isolated transaction xxx'. This simply means that they are not
engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, exportation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the
Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs' right of property to such trademark or trade name. NO
Whether or not petitioners have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the
Philippines. YES
Held:
There is no proof whatsoever that any of plaintiffs products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the
trademark applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines.
To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners, as foreign corporations not engaged in local
commerce, rely on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law reading as follows:
SECTION 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade-name has been registered or assigned
under this act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin and
false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen
hundred and fifty-nine, as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided,
That the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it is domiciled, by treaty,
convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As inserted by Sec. 7 of
Republic Act No. 638.) to drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the
Philippines on account of the principal perception that another entity is pirating their symbol without any lawful authority to
do so.

RZ Zamora

Case #2

A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to
the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a tradename. Adoption alone of a trademark would not give exclusive
right thereto. Such right grows out of their actual use. Adoption is not use. One may make advertisements, issue circulars,
give out price lists on certain goods; but these alone would not give exclusive right of use. For trademark is a creation of
use.
The records show that the petitioner has never conducted business in the Philippines. It has never promoted its
tradename of trademark in the Philippines. It is unknown to Filipinos except the very few who may have noticed it while
travelling abroad. It has not paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine government. Under the law, it has no right to the
remedy it seeks.
In other words, petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the
Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law but the question of whether they have an exclusive right
over the symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks in the
Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is thus incongruous on petitioners to claim that when a
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity need not be
actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines.
In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost
consideration heretofore discussed on the absence of their "right" to be protected.
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in
the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a
municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means
imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as
applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative
enactments.

RZ Zamora

Case #2

Heirs of Paez v. Torres

G.R. No. 104314

February 02, 2000

Failure to state cause of action

Sum mary: This case involves two parcels of land in Punta Princesa, Cebu, which were allegedly owned by
petitioners predecessor, Nepomucena Paez, but were allegedly included fraudulently in the Petition for
Reconstitution of the Transfer Certificates of Title of the late Don Sergio Osmea . Heirs of Nepomucena
Paez, lodged a Complaint for Declaration of Nullities of Certificates of Title, Recovery of Ownership and
Possession, Reconveyance and Damages, against the heirs of Don Sergio Osmea and the persons whose
certificates of title were derived from the reconstituted certificates of title of Don Sergio Osmea over subject
parcels of land. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that: (1) the complaint states no cause
of action as against them; and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations and by
laches. SC held that since the Petitioners complaint states a sufficient cause of action against the deceased
Edilberto Osmea, a legitimate son of the late Don Sergio Osmea, it follows that there is likewise a sufficient
cause of action against the herein private respondents, who are the children and forced heirs of the late
Edilberto Osmea. The motion to dismiss herein raised an affirmative defense that there is no cause of action
as against them. The motion thus posed a question of fact that should be resolved after due hearing.
Facts: Nepomucena Paez was the owner of two (2) parcels of land in Punta Princesa, Cebu. Nepomucena
Paez-Cabansay died. Unknown to her other children, her son, Victor Cabansay, who took care of her in Cebu
while she was still alive, brought with him the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 8309 when he migrated to
Mindanao. Elders of the Cabansay clan (petitioners predecessors) were prevented by persons under the
employ of Don Sergio Osmea from harvesting fruits from lots. They began their long search for any record or
document to prove the ownership of subject lots of their ancestor, Nepomucena Paez- Cabansay, but they
failed. Most if not all the pertinent records in the Registry of Deeds were lost or destroyed during the last
world war. The owners duplicate copy of OCT. No. 8309 could not also be found.

They found in Manila the owners duplicate copy of title in the possession of Cirilo Cabansay, who, because of
his limited education, kept said document left by his deceased uncle, Victor Cabansay, inside a "caban" without
knowing its significance. On May 18, 1990, on the basis of such owners duplicate copy thereof, OCT No.
8309 covering subject lots was duly reconstituted in the name of Nepomucena Paez. Petitioners filed a
complaint, against the heirs of Don Sergio Osmea and the latters successors-in-interest, since they
discovered for the first time in 1989 that titles covering Lots 5829 and 5830, were reconstituted in the name
of Don Sergio Osmea.
The Complaint prayed, among others, for the declaration of nullity of reconstituted titles in the name of Don
Sergio Osmea and of the other TCTs derived therefrom, and prayed for the restoration of their possession of
subject lots, and for an award of damages and attorneys fees in petitioners and against the private
respondents.
Instead of sending in an Answer, the herein private respondents (children-heirs of Edilberto Osmea)
presented a Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that: (1) the complaint states no cause of action as against
them; and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations and by laches. Contended that
they cannot be faulted for the acts or omissions of their predecessors with respect to the lots in question
because they were either minors or still unborn at the time of the commission or omission complained of; and
that petitioners cannot claim any title or rights over subject parcels of land by right of subrogation, after
having failed to assert such rights of title for almost fifty years.

TC: Issued the Order of dismissal under attack on the ground that the Complaint does not allege a sufficient
cause of action, as against the private respondents. Held that there are no allegations of any act or omission
on the part of any of the defendants- movants violative of the rights of the plaintiffs or constituting a breach
of any obligation of any of the defendants-movants to the plaintiffs since the allegations of transfers of
ownership of Lot 5830 referred only to Edilberto Osmea and not to any of the defendants-movants.

#19

Petitioners Argum ent: Petitioners contend that since their complaint states a sufficient cause of action
against the deceased Edilberto Osmea, a legitimate son of the late Don Sergio Osmea, it follows that there
is likewise a sufficient cause of action against the herein private respondents, who are the children and forced
heirs of the late Edilberto Osmea.
Private Respondents Argument 1: Countered that there are no averments in the complaint showing that
they were privies to the subdividing and sale of subject lots to transferees nor are there allegations therein
that they received properties from their late father, Edilberto Osmea. Private respondents further argued that
petitioners
cause
of
action,
if
any,
is
barred
by
prescription
and
laches.

Issue: Does the complaint state a sufficient cause of action against the herein private respondents?
Held: Yes. Petition granted.

Petitioners cause of action sued upon is mainly for the declaration of nullity of the reconstituted
certificates of title in the name of the late Don Sergio Osmea, allegedly procured through fraud, and
the subsequent certificates of title deriving their existence from the said titles. Petitioners should have
been heard before the dismissal of their complaint, as against the private respondents, who are the
children and forced heirs of the late Edilberto Osmea, and who stand to succeed or inherit the
properties or proceeds from the sale of the properties sought to be recovered by the petitioners.
Questions of fact raised by private respondents, which petitioners dispute, viz.: that they (private
respondents) did not inherit a single centavo from their deceased father, Edilberto Osmea, that the
petitioners remained silent or did nothing to assert their rights over subject lots for the past fifty (50)
years, barring therefore their claim by reason of laches; and that petitioners title, which was
reconstituted only in 1990, is based merely on a dubious machine copy of the owners duplicate copy,
can be ascertained at the hearing on the motion to dismiss the complaint.Section 2 of Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, the rule in point, provides:

Sec. 2. Hearing of Motion. - At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the
questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact involved except those not available at that time.
Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall automatically be part of the
evidence of the party presenting the same."

The complaint precisely impleaded the defendants-movants as the successors-in-interest of Don
Sergio Osmea. Accordingly, the affirmative defense raised by defendants-movants should have been
heard before the dismissal of the complaint. Otherwise petitioners would be barred from pursuing
their action without being accorded a hearing. Unlike a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action, which may be resolved solely on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint, the motion to dismiss herein raised an affirmative defense that there is no cause of action
as against them. The motion thus posed a question of fact that should be resolved after due hearing.
Without hearing the plaintiff would be barred from pursuing her action. The plaintiff should at least
have been accorded a hearing. This is the least she is entitled to. And this is true regardless of any
strong opinion the court may have as to the truthfulness of the document. No such hearing was held.
Without hearing, the plaintiff would be barred from pursuing her action and is to be deprived of what
she claims to be her property (Excel Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Gochangco).

1. Article 774 of the Civil Code, by virtue of which private respondents succeeded to subject parcels of land by operation of law, their lack of
knowledge of the existence of such properties, notwithstanding;
2. Article 1311 of the Civil Code, which provides that hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of debts of the estate;
3. Petitioners further claim that subject parcels of land are registered under the Torrens system. A Torrens title is not subject to prescription.

#19

HEIRS OF CLAVANO v. HON. JUDGE GENATO

October 28, 1977
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Motion to Dismiss Failure to State Cause of Action

GR No. L-45837
Concepcion Jr., J.

SUMMARY:
Petitioners filed 2 cases against private respondent. In the 2nd case, private respondent initially filed a motion
to dismiss on ground of a pending action between the same parties for the same cause. This motion to
dismiss was denied. Then, as an answer to that 2nd complaint, private respondent raised lack of cause of
action as an affirmative defense. SC ruled that the Judge properly dismissed the case based on that ground.
Sec 5, Rule 16 allows the grounds for a motion to dismiss to be set up as affirmative defenses in the
answer if no motion to dismiss has been filed. Even if the general rule is that grounds available but not
alleged are deemed waived, lack of cause of action falls under the exceptions in Sec. 2, Rule 91, therefore it
cannot be considered waived.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul and set aside decision of respondent Judge
FACTS:
v Sept 1970, CFI (First Case) Petitioners Heirs of Juliana Clavano filed an action for reformation
and rescission of a lease contract against private respondent Lee Gee & Co., and David Ang Militante
o TC - dismissed the complaint, declaring the lease contracts terms and conditions very clear,
leaving no room for further interpretation; sentenced the Petitioners to pay P1,000 atty fees for
harassing the defendant
o CA Petitioners filed an appeal, which was still pending when--v Sept 1974 Petitioners filed another complaint against Lee Gee & Co., for recovery of ownership and
possession of the land subject of the lease contract
o Private respondent (PR) moved to dismiss on the ff. grounds:
(1) Cause of action is barred by prior judgment
(2) There is another pending action between same parties for the same cause
o Judge Genato denied the motion to dismiss, saying the land subject matter of the instant
complaint is not identical with the land subject matter of the First Case)
o PR filed an answer - admitting some allegations, and by way of special affirmative defenses,
alleged that petitioners have no cause of action + there is a pending action
o During trial PR manifested it would file a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
alleged in the affirmative defenses, and moved for a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses
o Petitioners made a MR against Judge Genatos granting of a preliminary hearing, alleging that:
Since PR didnt include the ground lack of cause of action in their motion to dismiss,
they had waived that ground already.
The 2nd ground, pendency of another action between same parties with same cause
was already resolved when Judge denied motion to dismiss
o Judge denied the MR and required PR to present evidence.
o Judge DISMISSED the case, and ruled petitioners didnt have cause of action.
v Without filing a MR, petitioners filed the present petition, claiming Judge Genato committed grave
mistake of law and acted with grave abuse of discretion when he granted the PR a preliminary hearing
on affirmative defenses.
ISSUES:
1. WON it was proper for Judge Genato to dismiss the complaint based on lack of cause of action, which
was not alleged in a motion to dismiss but raised as an affirmative defense in the answer YES
2. WON it was proper for Judge to conduct a preliminary hearing NO

1970 Rules of Court. The equivalent in the current Rules on Civil Procedure is Rule 9, Sec. 1: when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court
shall dismiss the claim. Note that the ground failure to state the cause of action may now be cured under Sec 5, Rule 10 (Feria).

M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 21

HELD:
Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - Any of the grounds for dismissal provided
for in this Rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a
preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dis miss had been filed."
v This provision allows the grounds for a motion to dismiss to be set up as affirmative
defenses in the answer if no motion to dismiss has been filed.
v If such motion was filed an unconditionally denied, the grounds alleged therein are deemed
finally adjudicated and cant be alleged again.
v GEN: The other grounds available at the time of filing but not alleged are deemed waived.
v EXC: The grounds specified in Rule 9, Sec. 2*, ie. failure to state a cause of action, lack of
jusrisdiction over the subject matter
v IN THIS CASE (DOCTRINE): Although the private respondent failed to include in its motion to
dismiss the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the same cannot be considered to
have been waived, and it may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in its answer.
OTHER ISSUES
Nevertheless, SC believes the Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the
PRs affirmative defenses.
v GEN: Under the same rule, Sec 5, Rule 16, a preliminary hearing may be had on affirmative
defenses, as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
v EXC: If the ground was that complaint failed to state a cause of action.
o It is a well settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on complaints failure to state
a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself.
o The sufficiency of a cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint to
sustain a dismissal on this ground.
o To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others should be considered.
v Judge Genato departed from this Rule.
v STILL, though, certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, will not lie where an appeal can be
taken
v The order of a dismissal of a case was a mere error of judgment, not a matter of lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 21

BLARDONY v. HON. COSCULLUELA & BLARDONY

G.R. No. 70261
February 28, 1990
GRIO-AQUINO, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Failure to comply with a condition precedent
SUMMARY:
Rosario Blardony filed a Petition for Partition of CPG. Mauro Blardony opposed this because the case should
have gone first to the Lupon Tagapamayapa. Judge Sosa dismissed the petition of the wife for failure to comply
with PD 1508. The court was reorganized and the case was transferred to Judge Cosculluela. The latter judge
set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal and required the husband to submit an accounting of his salaries,
allowances, bonuses, and commissions. Mauro went to the SC via Rule 65. The SC held that that while the
referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a
jurisdictional requirement. Its non-compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired
over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Furthermore, this case (support pendent lite) falls in
the exemptions as provided in PD 1508 Section 6.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Rule 65 with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction of the orders of
respondent Judge Coscolluela, Jr., of the RTC Makati.
FACTS:
Mauro (petitioner) and Rosario (respondent) were married on April 30, 1975 and they had a child named
Patricia who was born on November 10, 1975. The spouses separated in March 1981 due to irreconcilable
differences.
May 3, 1982wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership. The husband said that they
previously tried to file a joint Petition for Dissolution of their Conjugal Partnership but they failed to agree upon
an equitable partition. He then prayed the court to order a fair and equitable dissolution of their CPG.
October 8, 1982Husband filed a motion to dismiss (no reason was stated for the sudden change of mind)
claiming that the case should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapamayapa as provided in P.D. 1508,
because both are residents of Makati.
Wife opposed the motion to dismiss. Judge Soza dismissed wifes petition or failure to comply with PD 1508.
Wife then filed an MR. Meanwhile, the court was reorganized and the case was transferred to Judge
Cosculluelas sala.
August 9, 1983 Judge Coscolluela set aside Judge Soza's order of dismissal and required the husband to
submit an accounting of his salaries, allowances, bonuses, and commissions. Husbands MR was denied.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The case should have been filed first in the Lupon Tagapayapa
RESPONDENT JUDGES ARGUMENT: The issues of support pendente lite and delivery of personal property
belonging to the conjugal partnership of the parties are essentially involved in the petition, hence, the parties
could go directly to court without passing through the Lupon Tagapamayapa, as provided in Section 6 of P.D.
1508.
ISSUES: WON referral to the Lupn Tagapayapa is a jurisdictional requirement for filing a complaint in courtNO.
HELD: RTC AFFIRMED
Our jurisprudence is replete with decisions of this Court to the effect that while the referral of a case to the
Lupon Tagapayapa is a condition precedent for filing a complaint in court, it is not a jurisdictional
requirement, "its non-compliance cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant." (Fernandez v. Militante; Gonzales v. CA; Royales v.
IAC) Petitioner waived the pre-litigation conciliation procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1508 when he did not file a
motion to dismiss the complaint on that score, but filed his answer thereto wherein he prayed the court to make an
equitable partition of the conjugal properties. Furthermore, under Section 6 of P.D. 1508, the complaint may be
filed directly in a competent court without passing the Lupon Tagapayapa in the following cases:
SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof, shall be filed
or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or
unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following
cases: xxx
(3) Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
properly and support pendente lite; and xxx
DE MESA, ATHENA CHRISTA D.G.

[CASE # 22]

CHUNG FU INDUSTRIES (PHILIPPINES) INC., ITS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS NAMELY: HUANG KUOCHANG, HUANG AN-CHUNG, JAMES J.R. CHEN, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, VICENTE B. AMADOR, ROCK A.C.
HUANG, JEM S.C. HUANG, MARIA TERESA SOLIVEN AND VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONERS, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ (PRESIDING JUDGE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI [BRANCH 57]) AND ROBLECOR PHILIPPINES, INC.,RESPONDENTS. Romero J.
Summary: Chung Fu and Roblecor entered into construction agreements with a stipulation that any
dispute arising from performance of said contract shall be resolved through arbitration. The latter failed
to complete the project but set into arbitration his collectibles from Chung Fu. RTC approved their
arbitration agreement that states that the arbitrators award shall be final and unappealable and
assigned an arbitrator which awarded 16.1M to Roblecor. SC: If parties declared intention to arbitrate
before going to the courts, this constitutes a condition precedent, such that if a case is instituted
prematurely, the court may suspend the proceedings and direct the parties to proceed to arbitration.
Also, Art 2044 CC that any stipulation that the arbitrators award shall be final is valid but is not absolute
and without exceptions.
How the case reached the SC: Special civil action for certiorari to annul CAs decision to uphold RTC
Makatis decision that the arbitration award shall be final and unappealable.
Facts:
Chung Fu and Roblecor entere into a construction agreement of the formers industrial/factory
complex for 42M; thereafter they also made 2 ancillary contracts for the dormitory worth 3.8M
and installation of electrical, water and hydrant system in the plant for 12.1M. It was stipulated
that in the event of disputes arising from the cperformance of the contract, it shall be submitted
before a single arbitrator chosen by both parties.
Roblecor failed to complete the work thus Chung Fu had to take over the construction.
Roblecor claims 10.5M unsatisfied account and unpaid progress billings of 2.3M; thus filed a
petition for compulsory arbitration and TRO in RTC.
Chung Fu moved to dismiss and restrain the TRO
Both parties consented to an arbitration agreement whereby it provides in 2 (e): there shall be
no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the
arbitrator's award.
Engr. Asuncion was appointed as sole arbitrator and ordered payment of 16.1M to Roblecor and
it be final and unappealable pursuant to arbritation agreement.
Roblecor moved for confirmation and issuance of writ of execution which RTC granted
Chung Fu filed a motion to remand which was denied by RTC. Thus he filed a petition for
certiorari to CA which was denied.
Issue: WON the arbitration award is final and unappealable. No
Held:

Resort to the arbitration process may be spelled out by parties in a contract in anticipation of
disputes that may arise between them. Or this may be stipulated in a submission agreement
when they are actually confronted by a dispute. Whatever be the case, such recourse to an
extrajudicial means of settlement is not intended to completely deprive the courts of
jurisdiction.
In the event that they declare their intention to refer their differences to arbitration first before
taking court action, this constitutes a condition precedent, such that where a suit has been

instituted prematurely, the court shall suspend the same and the parties shall be directed
forthwith to proceed to arbitration.
Art 2044 CC provides that "Any stipulation that the arbitrators' award or decision shall be final is
valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040." (also in Construction Industry
Arbitration Law) Under LC, voluntary arbitration shall be final and unappealable except those
excedding 100k or 40% of paid-up capital of employer, whichever is lower may be appealed to
NLRC on ground of abuse of discretion or gross incompetence. But with deletion of said LC
provision, it became final.
However, 2044 of CC provides that the finality of the arbitrators' award is not absolute and
without exceptions. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable
to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators' award may be annulled or
rescinded. Additionally, under Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law, there are grounds for
vacating, modifying or rescinding an arbitrator's award.
When courts refure or neglects to inquire if award is in accordance with law, the proper remedy
is certiorari under Rule 65 of RRC where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown.
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) et al. v. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, et al states that Inspite of statutory
provisions making 'final' the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have taken
cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of
the law were brought to our attention
Voluntary arbitrators acting in their quasi-judicial capacity, should not go beyond the spcope of
power of judicial review.
we find that petitioners have amply made out a case where the voluntary arbitrator failed to
apply the terms and provisions of the Construction Agreement which forms part of the law
applicable as between the parties, thus committing a grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, in
granting unjustified extra compensation to respondent for several items, he exceeded his
powers -- all of which would have constituted ground for vacating the award under Section 24
(d) of the Arbitration Law.
Also the court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to look into the merits
of the case despite the prima facie evidence.

History of Arbitration
Physical combat was ruled out as a means to resolve disputes; thus the recourse to disinterested
third parties. Legal history states that early judges are the arbiters.
It was recognized in Philippines thru the Spanish Civil Code under Art 1820 and 1821 on
arbitrations, repealed by implication with repeal of Spanish Law of Civil Procedure but
reinstated in present Civil Code.
CA 103 provided for compulsory arbitration in Court of Industrial Relation. In 1953, Industrial
Peace Act or RA 875 favored the free collective bargaining, enunciated in PD 442 or Labor Code
amended by RA 6715 (1989)
RA 876 or the Arbritation Law was passed.
In the construction industry the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission was created by
EO 1008 on Feb 4, 1985.

GUERRERO v. RTC
G.R. No. 109068
January 10, 1994
Bellosillo, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Early Dismissal Failure to Comply with a Condition Precedent
SUMMARY: The enumeration of brothers and sister as members of the same family does not
comprehend sisters-in-law. Since the FC repeats essentially the same enumeration of members of the
family, we find not reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. The attempt to compromise as
well as their inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the
same family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the
proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review of the dismissal by the court a quo.
FACTS:
Gaudencio Guerrero filed an accion publiciana against Pedro Hernando.
It was dismissed by Judge Luis Bello Jr. (RTC Ilocos Norte) on the ground that the parties, being
brothers-in-law, it should have been alleged in the complaint that earnest efforts were first exerted
towards a compromise.
Hernando overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the
complaint on this ground in his answer.
Dec 7, 1992 It was only on this date, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of Guerrero
and Hernando was noted by Judge Bello, they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law.
o Judge Bello (who considered this as a jurisdictional defect) gave Guerrero 5 days to file his
motion and amend complaint to allege that they were very close relatives and that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were exerted but failed.
Dec 11, 1992 Guerrero moved to reconsider the order claiming that:
o Since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts
towards a compromise, and
o Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss not
assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
Dec 22, 1992 Judge Bello denied the MR; he warned that unless the complaint was amended within
5 days, the case would be dismissed.
Jan 29, 1993 Judge Bello dismissed the case (no amended complaint).
ISSUES (basically, these were Guerreros arguments):
1. Whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217,
par. (4), and Art. 222 of the CC, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, ROC requiring earnest
efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained. No.
2. Whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise
were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Yes.
HELD:
1. Art. II, Sec. 12 of the Constitution provides the policy that the State shall protect the sanctity of the
family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous social institution. This is also
embodied in Art. 149 and given flesh in Art. 151 of the FC.
Art. 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
family shall be recognized or given effect.
Art. 151 No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

Considering that Art. 151 starts with the negative word No, the requirement is mandatory. Art. 151
is complemented by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, ROC which provides as a ground for a motion to

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 07]

dismiss that the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made.
Code Commission explains the reason behind the requirement: This rule is introduced because it is difficult to
imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known
that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers A litigation in a family is to be
lamented far more than a lawsuit between strangers.

But the above provisions do not apply in this case. As held in Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of
brothers and sister as members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. Since the
FC repeats essentially the same enumeration of members of the family, we find not reason to alter
existing jurisprudence on the matter.
2. As held in OLaco v. Co Cho Chit, citing Mendoza v. CA, the attempt to compromise as well as their
inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same
family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the
proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
It is not correct, as Guerrero contends, that Hernando may be deemed to have waived the defects in
failing to move to dismiss pr raise the same in his answer. We cannot sustain the proposition of
Hernando that the case was dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, ROC for failure of Guerrero to
comply with the courts order to amend his complaint.
The Dec 7, 1992 order merely gave Guerrero 5 days to file his motion and amended complaint with a
reminder that the complaint failed to allege that earnest efforts were exerted towards a compromise.
The Dec 22, 1992 order simply stated that Guerrero (plaintiff), if he so desire, must amend the
complaint otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case.
The Jan 29 1993 order only made reference to an earlier order admonishing counsel for Guerrero to
amend the complaint, and an admonition is not synonymous with order.
Since the assailed orders do not find support in our jurisprudence but are based on an erroneous
interpretation and application of the law, Guerrero could not be bound to comply with them.

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 07]

HONTIVEROS v. RTC

GR No. 125465

June 29, 1999

Mendoza, J.

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Failure to comply with condition precedent (Article 151, Family Code)
SUMMARY: Sps Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and
Teodoro Ayson. Respondents claim that case states no cause of action for failure to allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise had been made, considering that plaintiff Augusto and respondent Gregorio are
brothers. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint with the said allegation, which was denied by respondents.
RTC ruled that failure to verify as to the earnest efforts made and the failure of the same, as required under
Art 151 of the Family Code, is ground for dismissal of case. Court held that failure to comply with Art. 151 is
not a jurisdictional defect. What the Court should have done is to order plaintiffs to verify it, and not to dismiss.
Also, Art. 151 does not apply because of the inclusion of strangers namely, Maria Hontiveros and Teodora
Ayson, which takes it out of the ambit of Art. 151.
FACTS:
Sps Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and
Teodora Ayson. Augusto and Gregorio, both surnamed Hontiveros, were brothers.
Plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners of land in Capiz, pursuant to a decision by the IAC in a land
registration case filed by Gregorio. They claim have been deprived of income from the land as a result of
the filing of the case, consisting of rentals from tenants, and that they were in bad faith.
Gregorio and Ayson prayed for dismissal of the case. As counterclaim, they claimed damages and
reconveyance of the land.
o They denied that they were married. Gregorio claimed to be a widower, while Ayson single. Denied
that they deprived petitioners of possession and that property had already been returned by virtue
of writ of possession. They also claimed that complaint failed to state a cause of action since it
did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that
Augusto and Gregorio were brothers. Ayson claimed that she had nothing to do with the case as
she was not even married to Gregorio and did not have any proprietary interest in the property.
Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful.
o Private respondents filed Answer to Amended Complaint w/ Counterclaim in which they denied that
earnest efforts have been made to reach a compromise but were unsuccessful.
Petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents answer did not
tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint.
o Private respondents opposed motion alleging that they had denied the claims and thus tendered
issues of fact to be resolved after trial.
RTC denied Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, but dismissed main case because it was not verified as
required under Art. 151 of the Family Code, and thus, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made
to arrive at a compromise.
Claiming that case involved pure questions of law, they elevated case to SC.
ISSUE: WoN judgment on the pleadings may be had? NO.
HELD: Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed, the trial court has
the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a Party. Where there are actual issues
raised in the answer, such as one involving damages, which require the presentation of evidence and
assessment thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to render judgment based on the pleadings
alone. In this case, aside from the amount of damages, the following factual issues have to be resolved,
namely, (1) Teodora Ayson's participation and/or liability, if any, to petitioners and (2) the nature, extent, and
duration of private respondents' possession of the subject property.

JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

CASE # 25
Page 1

ISSUE: WoN case must be dismissed for failure to comply with verification requirement under Art. 151,
FC? NO.
HELD: The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the
allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply have
ordered petitioners to verify them.
Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest
efforts had been made toward a compromise but the parties' efforts proved unsuccessful is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would the
court be justified in dismissing the action.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the
suit is not exclusively among family members. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant
and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent
Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros,
are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
ISSUE: WoN Art 151 is unconstitutional? Not proper case to decide this issue because its not lis mota.

Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect
amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in
favor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the
conclusion we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon
this question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis mota of the
case.

PETITION GRANTED. RTC DECISION SET ASIDE. CASE REMANDED TO RTC FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.

Art. 151, Family Code.

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must
be dismissed.

JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

CASE # 25
Page 2

SOLDEDAD DY v. CA







G.R. No. 121587
March 9. 1999








MENDOZA, Jr.
Topic in Syllabus: Early Dismissal; Motion to Dismiss; Failure to comply with a condition
precedent
SUMMARY: Soledad Dys lumber was forfeited by the DENR. The RTC granted her petition for
writ of replevin. Odel Bernardo Lausa filed a motion to dismiss and/or quash on the ground that
resort should first be made to the DENR. The SC ruled that a Dy must exhaust all administrative
remedies before she can resort to courts. The lumber properly came under the custody of the
DENR and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency.
FACTS
- Task Force Kalikasan (charged with combatting illegal logging, log smuggling or possession of
and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber, flitches and other forest products)
chased two trucks loaded with lumber who accelerated upon reaching their checkpoint. They
caught up with the two vehicles at the compound of Young Metalcraft and Peterwood AgroForest Industries. The caretaker could not produce any document as proof of the legality of the
origin/possession of the forest products.
- The DENR issued a temporary seizure order and a seizure receipt for the two vehicles and their
cargo consisting of several pieces of lumber. The seized lumber and vehicles were then taken
to the City motorpool and placed in the custody of respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who was
the acting chief of civilian security in the mayor's oce.
- For lack of claimants, DENR Regional Technical Director Raoul Geollegue recommended to the
Secretary the forfeiture of the lumber and the two vehicles. DENR Regional Director De la Rosa
ordered the CENRO of Butuan City to issue the requisite forfeiture orders which the CENRO
issued.
- More than two months after the lumber had been forfeited, Soledad Dy, claiming to be the
owner of the lumber, filed a suit for replevin in the RTC for its recovery.
- The trial court issued a preliminary writ of replevin.
- Lausa filed a motion for the approval of a counterbond. Before the court could act on his
motion, he moved to dismiss and/or quash the writ of replevin on the ground that the lumber
having been seized and forfeited by the DENR was under its custody and, therefore, resort
should first be made to the DENR.
- RTC: Denied respondent Lausa's application for the approval of the counterbond as well as his
motion to dismiss and/or quash the suit for replevin
- CA: Granted the approval of his counterbond and the nullification of the two orders granting
Dys prayer for a preliminary writ of replevin and denying Lausas Motion to Dismiss Case and/
or Quash Writ of Replevin.
ISSUE
WON the RTC could take cognizance of the replevin suit, considering that the object was
the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law enforcement agents of the DENR - NO
RATIO
- A party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. Before a
party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed himself of all the means aorded by the administrative processes. The premature
invocation of a court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.
- As Dy clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the CA correctly set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC granting Dys application for a replevin writ and denying Lausas
motion to dismiss.
- The lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR and all actions seeking to recover
possession thereof should be directed to that agency.
- What the RTC should have done was to dismiss the case without prejudice to Dy filing her
claim before the DENR.
- Decision of the CA and its Resolution are AFFIRMED with the modification that the complaint
for recovery of personal property is DISMISSED.

Javellana, Maria Yolanda A. !

Case No. 26

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COM MISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT) VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. AND DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 90478 | November 21, 1991 | NARVASA, J.
FACTS:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago -- together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda -- are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the
Sandiganbayan.
The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages," and was filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT
SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS"
By Order dated January 29, 1988, the Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG
forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations.
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court"
o Basically, they sought an answer to the question: "Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG (aside from its Chairman, Hon.
Ramon Diaz, who verified the complaint) who approved or authorized the inclusion of Messrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and
Dominador R. Santiago as defendants in the ** case?"
The PCCG responded by filing a motion dated February 9, 1988 to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, "queer,"
"weird," or "procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise."
PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint.
Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through a Manifestation
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal
and factual basis. Also denied was the PCGG's motion to strike out impertinent pleadings dated February 9, 1988.
o The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the complaint to be "sufficiently definite and clear enough," there are adequate
allegations.; "the other matters sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or
trial proper.
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim under date of July 18, 1988.
In response, the PCGG presented a "Reply to Answer with Motion to Dismiss Compulsory Counterclaim."
The case was set for pre-trial on July 31, 1989.
On July 25, 1989, the PCGG submitted its PRE-TRIAL BRIEF. The pre-trial was however reset to September 11, 1989, and all other parties
were required to submit pre-trial briefs on or before that date.
On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2,
1989, an Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff" as well as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents.
o The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of PCGG's amended complaint
! what specific property or properties does the plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from defendants Tantoco, Jr. and
Santiago for being 'ill-gotten'?"
! what specific act or acts ** were committed by defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago in 'concert with' defendant
Ferdinand Marcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alleged systematic plan of said defendant Marcos to accumulate
ill-gotten wealth?"
! what specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago ** were committed by said defendants as part, or
in furtherance, of the alleged plan to conceal assets of defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos?"
! is it plaintiffs position or theory of the case that Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc., including all the assets of said
corporation, are beneficially owned by either or both defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and that the defendants
Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, as well as, the other stockholders of record of the same corporation are mere 'dummies' of
said defendants Ferdinand and/or Imelda R. Marcos?
o The motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for examination and copying of
! "official records and other evidence"
! the documents listed in PCGG's Pre-Trial Brief as those "intended to be presented and ** marked as exhibits for the
plaintiff;" and
! "the minutes of the meeting of the PCGG which chronicles the discussion (if any) and the decision (of the Chairman
and members) to file the complaint" in the case at bar.

By Resolutions dated August 21, 1989 and August 25, 1989, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the
motion for production and inspection of documents.
PCGG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989. It also filed on September 4, 1989 an opposition to the
Amended Interrogatories.
Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September 18, 1989.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989
o Denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of documents)
o Reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff (PCGG).
PCGG FILED THIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
This Court issued a temporary restraining order on October 27, 1989, directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its questioned
resolutions
The Solicitor General withdrew "as counsel for plaintiff * * with the reservation, to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters
pending with this ** Court if called for by circumstances in the interest of the Government or if he is so required by the Court."[23] This, the
Court allowed by Resolution dated January 21,1991.
Subsequently, PCGG Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren advised the Court that the cases from which the Solicitor General had withdrawn
would henceforth be under his (Maceren's) charge "and/or any of the following private attorneys: Eliseo B. Alampay, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko,
Mario Jalandoni and such other attorneys as it may later authorize."

PCGGS ARGUMENTS: Said orders, both dated September 29, 1989, should be nullified because rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
As regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff PCGG:
o Said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed
only to the PCGG;
o The interrogatories deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan (in denying the movants motion for bill of particulars) had
already declared to be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial; and
o The interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and
related issuances
As regards the order granting the motion for production of documents:
o Movants had not shown any good cause therefor;
o Some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's
exhibits, and the movants had viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon; and
The other documents sought to be produced are either
o privileged in character or confidential in nature and their use is proscribed by the immunity provisions of Executive Order No. 1,
or
o non-existent, or mere products of the movants' suspicion and fear.
RATIO: (THE PETITION IS DENIED!)
DOCTRINES, ETC.
FUNCTION OF COURTS
It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue -- fully and fairly; i.e., to present to the court all the material
and relevant facts known to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the
technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his knowledge.
Only ''ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings; hence, only the barest outline of the factual basis of a party's claims or defenses is
limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which die party pleading relies for hits claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts.
DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY PROCEDURE IN RULES 24-29
Evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the
parties -- before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial -- should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action,
not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials
should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth
in Rules 24 to 29.

The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of
notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings.

PURPOSE OF MODES OF DISCOVERY

The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve
o (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and
o (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.
The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.
FIELD OF INQUIRY MAY BE BROAD FISHING EXPEDITIONS ARE OK!
The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are
privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain
evidence for use upon said trial.
The principle is reflected in Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) which generally allows the examination of a deponent
o 1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or
defense of any other party;"
o 2) as well as:
! a) "the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things" and
! b) "the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
LEAVE OF COURT???
Such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to
parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court
intervention.
The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint
has been served.
It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action)
that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and
the disputed facts are not clear.
On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in accordance
with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule 28, which may be granted upon due application and a showing
of due cause.
SANCTIONS & LIMITATIONS
SANCTIONS on the party who refuses to make discovery such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering
judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance
with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses;
striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings.
LIMITATIONS: when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the person subject to the inquiry. Further limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege."
AS APPLIED TO THE CASE:

It was correct for RESPONDENTS to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been
served.
o In such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the action" but before
answer, Section 1 of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to parties)
explicitly requires "leave of court."

But there was no need for the private respondents to seek such leave to serve their "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff (dated
August 2, 1989) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's complaint, just as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act
thereon.

PCGG SAYS: the interrogatories in question are defective because they (a) do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded,
being addressed only to the PCGG, and (b) are "fundamentally the same matters ** (private respondents) sought to be clarified through their
aborted Motion ** for Bill of Particulars".
SC SAYS: Section 1, Rule 25 which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private corporation
or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered ** by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf." That the interrogatories
are addressed only to the PCGG, without naming any specific commissioner or officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be
invoked as a reason to refuse to answer.
PCGG SAYS: The matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters subject of a prior motion for bill of particulars addressed to the
PCGG's amended complaint.
SC SAYS: A bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so-called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper subject of
discovery.
PCGG SAYS: The amended interrogatories lack specificity.
SC SAYS: The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the PCGG's expanded complaint and inquire about details of the
ultimate facts therein alleged. What the PCGG may properly do is to object to specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of lack of
relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it.[45] But until such an objection is
presented and sustained, the obligation to answer subsists.
PCGG SAYS: The interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGG's proof upon trial.
SC SAYS: It is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial,
this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.
PCGG SAYS: The interrogatories would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of Executive Order No. 14 and
related issuances.
SC SAYS: In the first place, there is nothing at all wrong in a party's making his adversary his witness. This is expressly allowed by Section 6,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
PCGG SAYS: The private respondents are engaged on a "fishing expedition
SC SAYS: "fishing expeditions" are precisely permitted through the modes of discovery. Moreover, a defendant who files a counterclaim against
the plaintiff is allowed by the Rules to implead persons (theretofore strangers to the action) as additional defendants on said counterclaim.
PCGG SAYS: PCGG or its members are not amenable to any civil action "for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated
by ** (Executive) Order (No. 1)
SC SAYS: The disclosure of facts relevant to the action and which are not self-incriminatory or otherwise privileged is one thing; the matter of
whether or not liability may arise from the facts disclosed in light of Executive Order No. 1, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may
properly be set up by way of defense in the action.
PCGG SAYS: The answers to the interrogatories may be utilized as foundation for a counterclaim against the PCGG or its members and officers.
SC SAYS: They will be. The private respondents have made no secret that this is in fact their intention.
PCGG SAYS: None of its members may be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial * * proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance.
SC SAYS: The act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the
operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery. The State is, of course,
immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of
its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or
preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State.
PCGG WANTS: nullity of the Sandiganbayan's Order for the production and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its
possession.

SC SAYS: Some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's
exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is
nothing secret or confidential about these documents. There is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject of the
motion dated August 3, 1989. Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the
material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff.
SC WANTS YOU TO KNOW THAT MODES OF DISCOVERY ARENT (THAT) COMPLICATED!

All that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, is
simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of questions with the request that they be answered individually. The
service of such a communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering the questions "separately and
fully in writing under oath," and serving "a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen (15) days after
service of the interrogatories **.
Discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the service on a party of a letter or other written communication
containing a request that specific facts therein set forth and/or particular documents copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in
writing. Again, the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving the party
requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters," failing in which "(e)ach of the matters of which admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted."
The taking of depositions in accordance with Rule 24 (either on oral examination or by written interrogatories) while somewhat less simple,
is nonetheless by no means as complicated as seems to be the lamentably extensive notion.
SHET IM SO SORRY.
-GISELLE

Dela Torre v. Pepsi

Oct 30 1998
T OPIC IN S YLLABUS : Interrogatories to Parties

G.R. No 130243
M endoza, J.

S UMMARY : Petitioners are winners of a Pepsi promo. They filed a case because of Pepsis refusal to deliver prizes.
Pet. did not answer the written interrogatories because they thought that the TC order suspended all matters
connected with the case except those relating to the submission of the papers showing their qualifications to
litigate as paupers. TC and CA ruled that dismissal of case is proper for non-submission of interrogatories.
SC held dismissal was unjustified. The interrogatories were not directly related to the main matter of the suit, only
ancillary matters. Also, petitioners were in GF only misapprehended of the TC order suspending proceedings.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision, which affirmed TC.
FACTS:
Petitioners are holders of softdrink bottle caps bearing the number 349, allegedly a winning digit in a
contest sponsored by respondents Pepsi Cola Products Phils Inc. (PCPPI) and Pepsico Inc (PI) to promote
their beverage products. (PCPPI domestic, PI foreign major stockholder of PCPPI)
Aug 24, 1994 Because PCPPI and PI refused to deliver the prizes, petitioners 8 separate complaints for
spec performance and dam in RTC Makati. Petitioners likewise filed separate motions for authority to
litigate in forma pauperis.1
Nov 22 & 23, 1994 PI sent written interrogatories to pet (59 questions) to determe their eligibility to
litigate as paupers. Petitioners received the written interrogatories between November 23 and December
12, 1994.2
o Examples of questions in the interrogatories: Are you employed, Are you engaged in any
business, Do you own real property, What type of dwelling do you live in,!If you are without viable
means of income, how are you and your family being financially supported
Nov 25 1994 RTC Makati issued an order suspending the proceedings until petitioners could complete
the documents required for establishing their right to litigate as paupers.
Petitioners did not answer the written interrogatories because they thought that the order of the court
suspended all matters connected with the case except those relating to the submission of the papers
showing their qualifications to litigate as paupers.
PI filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of refusal of petitioners to make discovery.
TC:

Granted PIs motion to dismiss.

There is nothing in the order authorizing plaintiffs to ignore the interrogatories. The answers required
would reflect as to whether they are entitled to litigate as paupers.
There is no reason why plaintiffs should be excused from sanctions provided in RoC and case law.

CA:

Petitioners failure to serve their answers within the reglementary period is a valid ground for dismissal.
While there are other sanctions, other than dismissal, for failure of a party to serve answers to
interrogatories but since PI is seeking the dismissal of the complaints, such failure justifies TC dismissal.
By not answering the interrogatories, petitioners made it difficult for Pepsico to substantiate its
opposition to their request to litigate as paupers.

ISSUES:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
2

To be exempted from paying docket fees.

It says 1998 in the case but Im pretty sure thats wrong.
Lopez, Catherine Nicole

CASE # 02

W/N petitioners failure to answer written interrogatories is sufficient reason for dismissal of their complaints? NO.
HELD:
Rule 25, Sec 1 (1964 RoC)
A litigant may serve, with leave of court and after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or, even
without such leave, after an answer has been served, written interrogatories on the adverse party.

Like the other modes of discovery authorized by RoC, the purpose of written interrogatories is to assist the
parties in clarifying the issues and in ascertaining the facts involved in a case
To ensure the efficacy of the various modes of discovery, the Rules provide sanctions against a party who
refuses to make discovery
Rule 29, Sec 5 (1964 RoC)
If any party xxx fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such
interrogatories, the court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or
dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and
in its discretion, order him to pay the reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorneys fees.

TC was rather precipitate in dismissing the complaints of petitioners against PCPPI and PI. The written
interrogatories served by PI on petitioners dealt with ancillary matters which may be inquired into, but are
not directly related to the main issues in the suit.
PI was able to get the information it needed so dismissal of petitioners complaints appears to be rather
drastic for failure to answer questions dealing with ancillary matters
Petitioners failure to answer the written interrogatories was due, not to intransigence, but to a
misapprehension of the scope of the trial courts order
N showing in the case at bar that petitioners were guilty of defying or disregarding any court order to
answer the written interrogatories of PI in order to delay the proceedings.
It would be unjust to dismiss petitioners complaints for a mistake committed in good faith.
TC should have required petitioners to answer the subject interrogatories, with a warning of the possible
consequences if they did not comply.

CA REVERSED. Case REMANDED to RTC Makati.

Lopez, Catherine Nicole

CASE # 02

Producers Bank v. CA
29 January 1998
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Discovery; Interrogatories to Parties

G.R. No. 110495

Romero, J.

SUMMARY: SIHI filed a complaint against PBP (collection for unpaid interest and for principal amount of
P2m covered by 2 CTDs). Trial on the merits ensued. One of the defenses of PBP was that the 2 CTDs
were issued to a certain Johnny Lu. SIHI served written interrogatories to PBP, requesting answers to
questions meant to elicit information related to PBPs defense. Since the Rules are silent as to the period
within which modes of discovery may be utilized, the Court took into consideration the purpose of written
interrogatories (as stated in RP v. Sandiganbayan). Court ruled that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of TC when it allowed the written interrogatories to be served upon PBP. They
relate to the factual and principal issues in dispute.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review of the CA decision affirming the RTC
decision which dismissed the motion to quash interrogatories filed by Producers Bank
FACTS:

State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Producers Bank of the
Philippines (PBP). Causes of action: (1) for unpaid interest on 4 certificates of time deposit (CTDs);
and (2) principal amount of P2,000,000.00 covered by 2 CTDs.
PBP filed an Answer.
Trial on the merits ensued. SIHI presented evidence. As its defense, PBP presented evidence to
prove that it had no liability.
o PBP alleged, among others, that the 2 CTDs covered by the P2,000,000.00, which is the
subject of the second cause of action, were issued in the name of a certain Mr. Johnny Lu
and that they had already paid the principal amount to Lu.
SIHI presented rebuttal evidence when it presented its first witness.
SIHI served written interrogatories to PBP, requesting answers to certain questions.
o i.e. actions against Lu, any outstanding obligation of Lu to PBP on certain dates,
documents submitted by Lu to enable him to pre-terminate the 2 CTDs, the officers
involved in approving and effecting the pre-termination of the 2 CTDs,
PBP filed a motion to quash the interrogatories on the ground that they were improper since the trial
was about to be terminated.
TC: denied the motion to quash.
o The interrogatories will help facilitate the early disposition of the case and will assist the court
in determining the truth.
CA affirmed.
o Cited Sec. 1, Rule 24. The Rules do not provide any time frame in the filing of depositions
and other modes of discovery.

ISSUE: Whether TC committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the admission of the
written interrogatories filed by SIHI at the rebuttal stage of the proceedings
HELD: No.

Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not provide for any time frame within which modes of
discovery can be utilized, other than by stating that the same should be availed of with leave of court
after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant, or without such leave after an answer has
been served.
The rules are silent as to the period within which written interrogatories may still be requested.
Purpose of written interrogatories: (RP v. Sandiganbayan) What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of
information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of
relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying the opponents case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE # 03

discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period
preceding, thus the possibility of surprise. xxx

The question propounded in the written interrogatories were meant to elicit information
pertinent to the nature of PBPs defense.
Having allowed the written interrogatories to be served upon PBP, TC was in a better
position to examine the evidence already presented and to determine whether the
information sought by SIHI would expedite the resolution of the case.
The written interrogatories served by SIHI upon PBP relate to the factual and principal
issues in dispute.
Substantial rights of PBP would not be adversely affected, as it can likewise present its own
rebuttal evidence after SIHI rests its case.

RULING: PETITION DENIED. Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of TC in
allowing written interrogatories to be served upon PBP.

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE # 03

SECURITY BANK v. CA, SPS UY, DOMINGO UY

G.R. No. 135874
Jan 25, 2000
Panganiban
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Discovery; Production or inspection of documents or things
SUMMARY: Two motions were granted, ordering SBC to produce documents and permit its inspection by
Sps Uy and Uy. SBC questioned said orders alleging that there is no good cause and relevancy. The
Court held that there is good cause to issue the order and the evidence sought to be produced are
material and relevant. It is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties, before the trial if not indeed
even before the pre-trial, should discover all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to
them individually, but also those known to their adversaries. Courts are given wide latitude in granting
motions for discovery in order to enable parties to prepare for trial or otherwise to settle the controversy
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing CA decision which affirmed
the trial courts grant of the Motions, filed respectively by Domingo Uy and Spouses Agustin Uy and Pacita
Tang Sioc Ten, for the production and inspection of several documents
FACTS:
Sps Uy filed a case against SBC. They sought to enjoin SBC and the Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City
from proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure of a mortgage over a piece of property registered
under the respondent spouses names
February 25, 1997: TRO was issued by RTC judge Areola. It was lifted when Judge Areola resolved to
deny the spouses application for a preliminary injunction. Such prompted the said plaintiffs to file a
motion for the inhibition of Judge Areola. The case was re-raffled and presided over by respondent
judge Castillo.
Before filing his answer to SBCs cross-claim, Domingo P. Uy filed an Omnibus Motion (Production of
Documents and Suspension and/or Extension of Time to File Answer to Cross-Claim) on the ground
that all documents, papers and instruments made and executed by SBC on the evaluation, processing
and approval of the loans of Jackivi Trading Center, Inc., the real estate mortgages (REM) and the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) themselves must first be produced before he could prepare and file
the answer to SBCs cross-claim.
SBC filed its opposition to the said motion. Then, Domingo Uy filed a motion to admit reply with the
reply attached and on June 3, 1997 SBC filed its rejoinder.
Trial Court denied Uys Omnibus Motion (Production of Documents and Suspension and/or Extension
of Time to File Answer to Cross-Claim). Reconsideration also denied.
Sps Uy also filed their Motion (For Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents) praying for the
issuance of an order directing SBC to produce and allow them to inspect and copy the original and
additional mortgage contracts executed by Jackivi Trading Center, Inc. and/or Jose Tanyao.
October 2, 1997: Trial court ordered that SBC produce and permit defendant Uy to inspect, copy or
photograph the documents, papers and instruments made and executed on the evaluation, processing
and approval of the loans of Jackivi Trading Center, Inc., during usual business hours and day after at
least 3 day notice in advance. TRO was denied
CA affirmed trial court, holding that respondent has sufficiently shown the good cause, that of being
able to intelligently prepare his defenses against SBCs cross-claim. Also, that the motion for production
filed by Sps Uy is for good cause, it being necessary for a full determination of the issues raised in civil
case it filed against SBC.
"Good cause does not relate to the substance in the document but to the reason for producing relevant
or material matters therein; so that the enforcement of the rule entails exercise of sound discretion. The
burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the need for the documents sought beyond the relevancy
or materiality of the evidence.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: SBC claims that the order did not explain the basis for requiring it to produce the
requested documents, and that there was no good cause for their production, hence, it cannot be compelled to

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #5

produce the same. Also, that the CA erred in focusing only on the requirement of "good cause" and in ignoring
the prerequisite of relevancy.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in affirming the grant of the two Motions for production and inspection of
documents. - NO
HELD:
Sec 1, Rule 27 is a mode of discovery that aims to enable the parties to inform themselves, even before
the trial, of all the facts relevant to the action, including those known only to the other litigants. Through
this procedure, "civil trials should not be carried on in the dark."
It is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties, before the trial if not indeed even before the pretrial, should discover all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but
also those known to their adversaries
Courts are given wide latitude in granting motions for discovery in order to enable parties to prepare for
trial or otherwise to settle the controversy prior thereto.
No longer can the cry of fishing expedition serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying his opponents case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation.
In this case, the CA did not err in ruling that there was "good cause" for the grant of the Motions. Its
holding that the documents were not indispensable to the preparation of the answer of Uy to the crossclaim did not militate against respondents availment of this important mode of discovery. As he himself
averred in his Motion, the subject documents were "material and important to the issues raised in the
case in general, and as between Uy and SBC in particular.
The documents would enable Uy to intelligently prepare his defenses against the cross-claim of SBC.
Also the Motion of Sps Uy was for a good cause, because the documents were "necessary for a full
determination of the issues in the civ case they filed.
Litigation is essentially an abiding quest for truth undertaken not by the judge alone, but jointly with the
parties. Litigants must welcome every opportunity to achieve this goal; they must act in good faith to
reveal documents, papers and other pieces of evidence material to the controversy.
On the relevancy and materiality of the evidence, Section 1 of Rule 27 clearly provides that the
documents sought must be "material to any matter involved in the action."
Respondents have shown that the subject documents are indeed material to the present action. The
civil action instituted by the Spouses Uy sought the annulment of two deeds of Real Estate Mortgage
between Jackivi and SBC. They allegedly issued a Special Power of Attorney to Uy to mortgage their
property only for their benefit, not for that of Jackivi. Because he mortgaged the property as security for
Jackivis loan, they contend that he exceeded his authority and that the contracts of real estate
mortgage were consequently invalid.
Relevance of the documents sought by Uy is readily apparent. The papers executed by the petitioner
bank in evaluating and processing the real estate mortgage are manifestly useful in his defense against
its cross-claim.
Rule on discovery "requires the parties to play the game with cards on the table so that the possibility of
fair settlement before trial is measurably increased."

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #5

SAN LUIS v. ROJAS

G.R. No. 159127

03 March 2008
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Discovery; Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24)

Austria-Martinez, J.

SUMMARY: Berdex sued San Luis based on an alleged oral contract. After pre-trial, Berdex filed a Motion [to Authorize
Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories] of their witnesses in San Francisco. San Luis opposed, claiming
that testimonies should be made in open court, that proving oral contracts have stricter standards, and that he would
lose his right to cross-examine. SC says deposition of witnesses who live outside of the Philippines is an exception to
producing the deponent in open court (R24, S4 (c) (2)). Also, nothing in the rules of deposition bar their applicability to
oral contracts. Last, depositions are allowed departures from judicial proceedings where judges can observe. Crossinterrogatories afford the petitioner sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the deponent.
NOTE: DIGEST HASTILY MADE. RELY AT YOUR OWN RISK. NOT MY ASSIGNED CASE BUT THOUGHT NO ONE WOULD MAKE ONE E.

HOW IT REACHED SC: Rule 65 Certiorari of CA resolutions, which dismissed San Luis petition for certiorari from the
RTC decision granting Berdexs Motion to Authorize Written Interrogatories.
FACTS:
Jul 12 2001: Berdex International filed a complaint for sum of money against San Luis, alleging that:
o In June 1997, San Luis received certain amounts of money from Berdex, which were meant partly as advances or
loan and partly for the purchase of 40% shares in both Seanet and Seabest Corporations
o But not a single share was transferred to Berdex, so they agreed to treat the whole amount as a loan.
o San Luis proposed the payment of the loan within three years. Berdex agreed on the condition that in case of nonpayment of any installment, the entire amount shall be due and demandable.
o San Luis later refused to sign a formal contract of loan, but confirmed the loan the Berdex auditors.
o San Luis had only paid $20Km and Berdex is now asking to be paid $150,335.75 + interest.
San Luis filed his Answer, contending that:
o He received the total of $141,944.71 from Berdex with instructions that San Luis first deduct the amount of
$23,748.00 as his commission from other transaction.
o The money was intended to be used to buy 70% of the shares of Seanet. But, in view of substantial losses
incurred by Seanet and San Luis desire to maintain good business with Berdex, he offered that the amounts he
received by paid by Feugomar a company he owned (+ same business as Seanet).
o Fuegomar was to purchase at cost the stock investment of Berdex in Seanet, San Luis gave $20K while the
documentation of the agreement was being finalized. But then Berdex claimed this investment money was San
Luis personal loan.

o
o
o
o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

April 4 2002: (after pre-trial) Berdex filed a Motion [to Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories]
alleging that:
Initial presentation of its evidence is set on May 3, but all of its witnesses are Americans.
One of its witnesses is already of advanced age and travel may be difficult if not dangerous.
There is perceived danger to them in the aftermath of 9-11.
Written interrogatories are ideal in this case since factual issues are very few.
Mode of deposition-taking will save precious judicial and government time, and prevent delays.
San Luis files his Opposition and Comment, contending:
Documents attached to Berdexs complaint did not support its claim that there was an oral contract and San Luis
is liable to Berdex. In fact, the documents supported his position.
There is a very strict standard in proving an oral contract.
Taking the deposition through written interrogatories would deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the
general bearing and demeanor of witnesses.
His right to cross-examine the witnesses will also be prejudiced since he will only be limited to crossinterrogatories which will limit the scope and spontaneity of his cross-examiation.
It will not necessarily save precious judicial and government time but may in fact lengthen the trial, as both parties
will have the right to review and to object to interrogatories submitted by the other party.
Berdex has not presented evidence that the US government has prohibited its citizens from traveling to the
Philippines; and if ever there was such prohibition, it was not binding on our own legal system.
May 9 2002: RTC granted the Motion. CA then dismissed San Luis certiorari for lack of affidavit of service, blurred
documents (Annex H and J) and failure to attach the pleadings.

ISSUES:
1.

W/N dismissal based on mere technicality was proper? YES

2. W/N the motion for written interrogatories by a non-resident corporation of the foreign witnesses be allowed? YES
PAGE 1 OF 2

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
1.

CA focused on technicality rather than substantial justice.

2. CA failed to appreciate that grave injustice would be done to San Luis if Berdex would have all its foreigner
witnesses five their testimonies through written interrogatories. To allow the deposition would prevent the RTC
from testing witness credibility and would curtail his right to cross-examine.
HELD:
1.

Failure to attach the affidavit of service was not fatal to the petition since it showed that copies of the petition were personally served on the RTC and Berdexs counsel. Nonattachment is not fatal when the registry receipts clearly show that respondents were served copies of the petition.
Blurred copies of the annexes were satisfactorily explained. The blurred Annexes are not necessary for the resolution brought before the CA.
Attached documents sufficient for CA to base resolution. No need to attach all other pleadings.

2. Rule 23 Sec 11 does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact of Berdex
being a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial.
Dasmarias Garments v. Reyes: Depostions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of
informing themselves of all the relevant facts. They are not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in
open court of a party or a witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court
at the trial or hearing.
However, there are exceptions (aka when depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the
witness stand) as in enumerated in Rule 24, Sec 4., the pertinent one in this case being (2) That the witness is
out of the province2 and at a greater distance than fifty kilometers from the place of trial or hearing or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition. This
principle is found in Rule 132 Sec 473.
Clearly, the deposition of any person may be taken anywhere, even abroad. When he is in a foreign state or
country, the deposition shall be taken (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as
may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory (R24, S11). Leave of court is not necessary.
In this case, motion should be allowed, considering that the Berdex witnesses are all Americans and falls within the
exception under Rule 23, Sec 4 (c) (2).
San Luis contends its different because in Dasmarias, one witness already testified.
This case is the same with Dasmarias since it was already during the trial stage that the deposition through
written interrogatories was sought to be taken. Fact that one witness already testified is of no moment.
San Luis also contends that the written interrogatories would result in grave injustice to him as Berdex is seeking to
establish the existence of an oral contract which requires stricter standards in proving the same.
Deposition discovery rules are to be accorded broad and liberal treatment should not be unduly restricted if
the matters inquired into are relevant and not privileged, and made in good faith within the bounds of law.
Nothing in the rules on deposition limits their use in case of oral contract.
Admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the appropriate
time. Admissibility of evidence depends on relevance and competence, while weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and tendency to convince and persuade.
San Luis also says that this deposition will prevent RTC to observe witness credibility and right to cross-examine
Depositions are allowed as a departure form accepted and usual judicial proceedings.
Falls within the exception of examining witnesses in open courts.
Depositions are consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action or proceeding.
Depositions are allowed provided the deposition with leave of court if the summons have been served; or
without leave of court if an answer has been submitted; and that a circumstance for their admissibility exists.
Cross-interrogatories are sufficient to accord the opportunity for cross-examination.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. - By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer
has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by depositions upon oral examination or written interrogatories.
2 Out of the province is not in the present rules anymore.
3 SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties
and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
PAGE 2 OF 2

DASMARINAS GARMENTS, INC. v. REYES AND AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.

G.R. No. 108229
Aug. 24, 1993
J. Narvasa
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Discovery: Depositions before action or pending appeal: Rule 24
SUMMARY: Basically, APL sued Dasmarinas Garments for $53K. APL only presented 1 witness in open court.
APL filed a motion to allow the taking of depositions of 2 of its other witnesses in Taiwan. RTC granted and
Dasmarinas opposed. SC upheld the order of the RTC to conduct the depositions.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Appeal from the decision of the CA, which affirmed the order of the RTC in
granting the depositions of 2 of APLs witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan.
FACTS:
American President Lines, Ltd. (APL) sued Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. (DGI) to recover $53,228.45 with
RTC Manila
In its answer, DGI specifically denied any liability to APL and set up compulsory claims against APL.
Trial commenced and APL was able to present its 1st witness, who completed his testimony.
At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its 2 other witnesses, APL filed a motion praying
that it intended to take the deposition of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taiwan, and prayed that for this
purpose, a commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular
agent of RP in Taipei.
5 days later, APL filed an amended motion stating that since there is no consulate in Taiwan (only 1
consulate for China; 1 China Policy), the commission or letters be issued to Dir. Races of the Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. who has an office set up by the President (of the Philippines) in Taipei.
DGI opposed the motion (contentions in HELD)
An extensive argument through various pleadings were filed, with APL submitting to the RTC (1) a
letter received by its counsel from Dir. Races advising APL that "this Office can only take deposition
upon previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance with the
Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests
through the Department of Foreign Affairs.
RTC: ruled in favor of APL; Dir. Roces is hereby COMMISSIONED to take down the deposition.
MR by DGI was denied because it was filed out of time and being a mere rehash of arguments settled
CA: Denied DGIs petition for certiorari and upheld RTC.
ISSUE: WON the order of the RTC granting the deposition of 2 witnesses while the case is on trial is valid YES
HELD:
1. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. The object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case
to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings
or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and
completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
Deposition is not generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The
deponent must, as a rule, be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. (Sec. 1, Rule 132 of
ROC).
Any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay: the party against whom it is
offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered.

SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #07

However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent,
under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4(c),
Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. (SEE ROC because it is long)
The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise
unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad.
If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before
such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has
already been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24).

DGI contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial."
Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.
There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against
the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses
before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their
testimony for use in the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, ROC), and even during the
process of execution of a final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R).
Contention that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its oneChina policy."
This is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in
accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of
the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.
Contention that the taking of deposition under the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge."
Yes but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls
within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and
testimony of the deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is
allowed provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any
of the exceptions for its admissibility -- e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance 50 kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or ** that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." is first
satisfactorily established (Lopez v. Maceren).
Furthermore, even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to
cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting
to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross-interrogatories.

PETITION DENIED. CA and RTC affirmed.

SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #07

NORTHWEST AIRLINES v. CRUZ

03 November 1999
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Discovery; Depositions before action or pending appeal (Rule 24)

G.R. No. 137136

Kapunan, J.

SUMMARY: Cruz filed a breach of contract of carriage suit against Northwest Airlines. NWA filed a notice for
oral deposition for Garza (one of its witnesses). After the deposition Cruz filed motion to suppress the
deposition for not meeting certain requirements. SC ruled in favor of Cruz, saying that the general rule for
examining witnesses must be followed. This case does not fall under the exceptions because the deposition
here was not used for discovery purposes, but only for the convenience of Garza, who resides in
Massachussets. SC also said that while the rules gives the court in which the action is pending discretionary
powers as to whether or not to allow the deposition, it shall forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid
to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress the deponent or the adverse party, or both.
HOW IT REACHED SC: Certiorari of CA decision, which set aside the trial courts decision. Trial court denied
Cruzs manifestation and motion to suppress deposition, to grant her right to cross-examine Northwests
deponent, and to present rebuttal evidence.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE (not important but interesting):
Aug 24 1992: Camille Cruz (first time to travel alone) brought a round-trip ticket for Manila to Boston via
Tokyo (and vice versa) from Northwest Airlines (NWA). The scheduled departure date from Manila was
Aug 27, 1992, while her return flight was set to depart from Boston (business class) on Dec 22 1992.
Nov 25 1992: Cruz rescheduled her flight to Dec 17 1992.
o NWA booked her on a flight with the route: Boston Chicago Tokyo Manila.
o NWA reconfirmed this flight at least 72 hours prior to the scheduled flight.
However, barely a day before the scheduled date of departure, NWA called Cruz and informed her that
instead of the above flight, she should board a TWA flight from Boston to New York. Cruz was instructed
to proceed to the NWA counter in the Boston airport before boarding the TWA flight.
Dec 17 (day of supposed departure): the NWA counter in the airport referred Cruz to the TWA counter,
where she was informed that she may not be able to board the TWA flight. Despite this uncertainty, she
was made to proceed to the International Gate. She was then informed that the TWA flight was cancelled.
She went back to the TWA counter. She was told to proceed to the Delta Airlines terminal and take Delta
flight to the La Guardia Airport in NY, where she would take a service car to reach Kennedy International
Airport (NY). In her haste, she tripped and fell down, causing slight physical injuries and embarrassment.
She was able to take the flight and it landed in La Guardia Airport in NY. In her rush to get to the service
car, Cruz tripped again, causing more physical injuries, embarrassment, and great inconvenience. [LOL]
When she got to the NWA counter in Kennedy Airport, she was informed that she was issued a wrong
ticket (to Seoul instead of Tokyo). Although this was rectified at the airport itself, Cruz was, by then,
extremely nervous, worried, stressed out, and exhausted.
To make matters worse for her, Cruz was demoted from business class to economy class on two legs
(Boston-NY / Tokyo-MNL) of her flight without notice nor apology nor an offer to refund the excess fare.
MORE IMPORTANT FACTS IN CIV PRO (important but not that interesting):
August 6 1993: Cruz filed a complaint against NWA for breach of contract of carriage for changing her
original itinerary, and downgrading her from business to economy class.
Trial progressed until 1995 when it was NWAs turn to present its witness on three scheduled dates.
o Two of the settings were cancelled when NWA filed notice for oral deposition of its witness, Mario
Garza, in New York.
o Cruz filed an opposition and suggested written interrogatories instead.
o Jul 26 1995: Trial court denied this opposition and issued an Order allowing the deposition to proceed
The oral deposition took place in NY on Jul 24 1995 two days before the TC order re: deposition.
This deposition revealed that:
o The change of Cruzs Dec 17 flight was brought about by a maintenance problem.
o Cruz was presented with two options, and she chose the one that will take her to La Guardia airport.
SULIT, LEOR JYLE C.

PAGE 1 OF 3

CASE #08

o
o

o
o
o
o
o
o

Her downgrading to economy that there are no business class seats on domestic flights (Boston-NY),
and that business class was sold out in Tokyo-Manila flight.
She was given first class seats (instead of business class) on the New York-Tokyo flight.
Upon presenting the deposition record in trial, Cruz reserved her right to cross-examine and present
rebuttal evidence and likewise questioned the conduct of the oral deposition. She moved for its
suppression based on the following grounds:
Deposition was taken on July 24 when the Court only ruled on the matter on July 26, 1995
No certification given by the officer taking the deposition that the same is a true record of the testimony
given by the deponent (Rule 24, Sec 20)
Deposition was not securely sealed in an envelope (Rule 24 Sec 20)
Officer taking the deposition did not give notice to the plaintiff of the filing of deposition (R24, Sec 21)
Person designated as deposition officer is not among those authorized to take depositions in foreign
countries (R24, Sec 11)
No showing that the deponent read and signed the deposition (R24, Sec 19).
Jul 23 1996: Trial court denied Cruzs motion. It admitted NWAs formal offer of evidence and gave Cruz
three days to signify her intention to present rebuttal evidence.
Aug 2 1996: Cruz filed a manifestation and motion stating that the court failed to rule on her motion to
suppress deposition and to grant her the right to cross-examine petitioner's deponent. She also
manifested her intention to present rebuttal evidence.
Sep 5 1996: Trial court denied this manifestation and motion.
On certiorari, CA reversed and set aside the trial courts denial. SC affirms CA decision.

ISSUES:
1. W/N certiorari to the CA is the proper remedy? YES
2. W/N deposition should be admitted into evidence? NO [! MAIN ISSUE]
3. W/N Cruz has waiver her right to cross-examine witness and present rebuttal evidence? NO
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
1. Certiorari before the CA was improper. Appeal after the case is decided is the proper remedy.
2. The case is an exception to the general rule in Rule 132 Sec 11 since the witness is outside the
Philippines. NWA has the right to take the deposition of its witness since Mario Garza (the witness
deposed) resides and woks outside the Philippines.
3. Cruzs failure to attend the deposition-taking despite due notice , or her failure to timely reserve her
right to serve written interrogatories shall be taken as a waiver of her right to cross-examine Garza.
HELD:
1. General rule is that certiorari will not lie to review a discretionary action of any tribunal. And that certiorari
only available to review final judgment of decrees. Discovery orders are interlocutory ant appealable
considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceedings.
However, the rule is subject to exception as 1) where the court has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, 2) where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and
may reasonable cause material injury throughout the subsequent proceedings for which the
remedy of appeal will be inadequate; or 3) where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion.
(While it did not make an express declaration, it would seem that the SC characterizes this case as falling
under the second exception.)

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.- The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
SULIT, LEOR JYLE C.

PAGE 2 OF 3

CASE #08

2. Rule 24 (now 23), Section 16 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral
examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the
deposition shall not be taken.
This provision confers discretion on the court to rule w/n a deposition may be allowed.
But this discretion must be exercised not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and
in consonance with the spirit of the law.
This provision affords the adverse party sufficient protection against abuses that may be committed
by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. "Any discovery involves a prying into
another person's affairs - prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not
justified if it is not to be such an aid."
As such, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to
litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress the deponent or the adverse party, or both.
Here, the deposition of Garza was not used for discovery purposes, as Garza was the employee of NWA.
The purpose was to accommodate Garza, who resides in Massachusetts, USA.
Therefore, the general rule on examination of witness under Rule 132 should be observed.
3. Cruzs objections to the oral deposition had been made promptly, but the trial court wrongly disregarded
these as immaterial. Cruz has not waived her right to cross examine nor present rebuttal evidence.
The deposition was not a mode of discovery but rather a direct testimony by the defendants
witness, and it appears there was a strategy to exclude Cruzs participation from the proceedings.
o A months notice would have ordinarily be sufficient. But this case was different.
" Two days of trial were cancelled and notice for oral deposition was given in lieu of the 3rd date.
" The locus of oral deposition is not easily within reach of ordinary citizens. It requires time to get a
travel visa to the USA, book a flight in July to the USA and substantial airfare is needed.
" NWA could easily send its counsel to New York since its an international carrier.
" The ends of justice would have been better served if the witness was instead brought to the PH.
Written interrogatories were requested to balance this inconvenience, but was denied for simply
being too time-consuming. While time is a factor, the thorough presentation and deliberation of a
case to ensure that the ends of justice are met are more important.
Rule 24, Section 112 enumerates the persons who may take depositions. While the consul swore in
the witness and the stenographer, it was another officer in the Philippine Consulate who undertook
the entire proceedings, as reflected in the records. The presumption of regularity of official function
should fail when the record itself bears out the irregularity.
Rule 24, Sec 29 indicate that objections to the oral deposition will be waived unless made with
reasonable promptness.
o The objections have been prompt and vehement, but they were disregarded as immaterial.
o The language of the rules is mandatory, and it should not be modified in practice.
Cruzs right to cross examine and to present rebuttable evidence need no reiteration.
As NWAs oral deposition was admitted (despite substantial and technical issues raised against it),
so too should Cruzs right to cross-examine and present rebuttal evidence should be granted.
An even handed treatment of the parties would require the same attitude towards the acceptance of
Cruzs right to cross-examine and present its rebuttal evidence on the same.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

Rule 24 Sec 11. In a foreign state or country, depositions shall be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul
or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.
SULIT, LEOR JYLE C.

PAGE 3 OF 3

CASE #08

SON v. SON
29 Dec. 1995 G.R. No. 73077 Kapunan, J.

TOPIC: Pre-Trial (delimitation of issues in pre-trial conference/order)

SUMMARY: Parties claim

ownership of a parcel of land. At pre-trial, they agreed to limit the issue to the validity of a
1957 Deed of Absolute Sale. On MR, CFI reversed based on a 1951 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase. SC
held that the respondents' failure to raise any objection and their cross-examination of witnesses constitute
an implied assent on their part to depart from the issue contained in the PTO.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) to reverse and set aside the CA decision

Petitioners: Heirs of Anastacio Son (Pedro Son's brother)

Private respondents (PR): Heirs of Sps. Pedro and Marcella Son who died in 1957, 1972 respectively.
Pedro inherited from his parents a 2-hectare and 7-centare parcel of land in Medellin, Cebu.
1972 - PR discovered that a portion of the land was being occupied by petitioners and demanded the return
of the land to their possession. Petitioners refused and claimed ownership, presenting a Deed of Absolute Sale
(DOAS) allegedly executed by Pedro in Nov. 1957 (month he died).
1976 - PR filed a complaint for annulment of the DOAS (forged) + recovery of property @ CFI Cebu.
During the pre-trial conference (PTC), parties argeed to limit the issue to the validity of the DOAS.
CFI: Declared the DOAS null and void, ordered petitioners to return the land to PR.
Petitioners filed MR, insisting that by virtue of an earlier Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by
Pedro (dated Dec. 1951), they acquired ownership by virtue of Pedro's failure to redeem.
o CFI on petitioners' MR: reversed.
CA: Ruled in favor of PR (reversed the reversal). Petitioners had waived the question of the validity of the
Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase because the delimitation of issues at a PTC bars the consideration
of other questions on appeal. Failure to disclose this defense is contrary to the purpose and spirit of pre-trial
procedure established and conducted by our courts. It deprived the plaintiffs of the opportunity to study and
prepare to meet this defense. Both as a weapon of attack and defense, surprise should not be tolerated.

Relevant Issue: W/N the parties are bound by the delimitation of issues in the Pre-trial Order (PTO) NO.

Rule 20, Sec. 4: "... such order shall limit the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel and
when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice."

A pre-trial hearing is meant to serve as a device to clarify and narrow down the basic issues between the
parties, to ascertain the facts relative to those issues and to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.
Pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly
raised. Thus, to obviate the element of surprise, parties are expected to disclose at a PTC all issues of law and
fact which they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or impeaching matters. The
determination of issues at a PTC bars the consideration of other questions on appeal.
However, the rules are not applied with rigidity. To prevent manifest injustice, some exceptions are admitted.
The rules itself, specifically Sec. 5 of Rule 10 on Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, says, "When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in
all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings..."
Velasco v. Apostol: "A PTO is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every issue that is to be or may
be taken up during the trial. Issues that are impliedly included therein or may be inferable therefrom by
necessary implication are as much integral parts of the PTO as those that are expressly stipulated...
Furthermore (...) evidence to prove such late payment was introduced without any objection by the adverse
party. This lack of objection amounts to an implied consent conferring jurisdiction on the court to try said issue."
o This case falls under the exception. Petitioners raised the issue of the 1951 Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase as early as in their answer to the original complaint.
o PRs' failure to raise any objection constitutes an implied assent on their part to depart from the
issue contained in the PTO. Implied consent to try the issue was further demonstrated by their own
counsel's extensive cross-examination of petitioners' witnesses.
PR were not "caught in surprise". They had every opportunity to present rebuttal/ counter-evidence.

Petiton GRANTED. CA judgment REVERSED and SET ASIDE. CFI decision (on MR) REINSTATED.
VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S.

PAGE 1 OF 1

CASE # 09

MONARCH v. CA
June 30, 1993
PRE-TRIAL

G.R. No. 92735, 94867, 95887

J. De Leon Jr.

SUMMARY: Two companies were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Aboitiz because of their lost properties
(cargoes) in the latters ship which sank. After it secured the writs of execution, Aboitiz filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA saying that allowing the execution would be against the hypothecary rule of liability. The CA
granted the petition and the companies went to the SC saying that the CA should ot have allowed the Aboitiz to present
evidence it did not present during trial. (Aboitiz did not present any evidence as it was declared in default for failure to
appear in the pre-trial and trial). SC ruled that being declared that a judgment of default does not imply a waiver of
rights except that of being heard and presenting evidence in defendant's favor. It does not imply admission
by the defendant of the facts and causes of action of the plaintiff. This is especially true if the defendant
submitted its Answer which contained its affirmative defenses. The CA can review and take cognizance of
the defenses.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: M/V Aboitiz, a common carrier owned and operated by the Aboitiz Shipping Corp.
sank and the shippers, insurers and their successors (a whopping total of 110) filed their claims for their lost cargoes. Three
consolidated petitions: GR 92735 is petition a for review under Rule 45 assailing the CA decision which set aside the writ of
execution issued by the lower court for the indemnification of two insurance companies against Aboitiz Shipping Corp; GR
94867 is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the order of the CA to stay the writ of execution issued by the lower
court as the pro-rate rights of other claimants are impaired; GR 9558 is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the
order of the CA which modified a judgment and applied the hypothecary rule on limited liability. (N.B. The case pertinent

for this topic is GR 92735.)

FACTS: On October 31, 1980, M/V Aboitizm a ship owned and operated by the Aboitiz Shipping Corporation sank on her
voyage from HK to Manila. 110 claims were filed by shippers, successors-in-interest and cargo insurers for their lost cargoes
before the RTC for a total amount of P41M although the actual amount of the lost cargoes is only P14.5M.
GR 92735 Monarch and Tabalera are insurance carriers of cargoes. They indemnified the shippers and were consequently
subrogated to their rights, interests and actions against the Aboitiz Corp. Aboitiz refused to compensate Monarch and they
filed 4 actions which were consolidated against Aboitiz. Aboitiz rejected responsibility for the claims on the ground that the
sinking of the vessel was due to force majeure or act of God. Aboitiz was subsequently declared to be in default for failure
to appear during pre-trial. Aboitiz filed a motion to declare default and withdraw counsel but the presiding judge was
promoted so the motion was never acted upon. The new judge did not resolve the motion and set the case for hearing.
Aboitiz repeatedly failed to appear during the trial and the judge eventually denied the motion and allowed Monarch and
Tabalera to present evidence ex part.
The trial court rendered judgment against Aboitiz. Aboitiz filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision and/or
for new trial to lift order of default (DENIED). Aboitiz appealed to the CA (DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO FILE APPELLANTS
BRIEF). Aboitiz filed a petition for review before the SC which was denied for being filed out of time. It filed an MR which
was also denied. Entry of judgment was made on the case.
Monarch and Tabalera moved for the execution of judgment and the trial court issued the writs of execution.
However, on April 1989, Aboitiz invoked the real and hypothecary nature of liability in maritime law and filed an urgent
motion to quash the writs. It said that to indemnify the two companies would be prejudicial to the other claimants as the
value of the vessel is not enough to satisfy all claims. Before this motion could be heard, the sheriff levied upon the
properties although this was also frozen through another motion.
Aboitiz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or TRO before the
CA. The CA granted the writ of certiorari, annulled the writs of execution, the auction sale and certificates of sale already
made as the value of the properties exceeded the pro rate shares of Monarch and Tabalera. It also granted the writ of
prohibition against the RTC for the same reason and ordered that the factual issue of how much Aboitiz really owes to be
determined by the lower court.
The judge in the RTC (Judge Purisima), Monarch and Tabalera filed the present petition.
Petitioners ARGUMENT: Petitioners Monarch and Tabacalera remind this Court that from the inception of G.R. No.
92735 in the lower court and all the way to the Supreme Court, Aboitiz had not presented an iota of evidence to
exculpate itself from the charge of negligence for the simple reason that it was declared as in default
ISSUE RELEVANT TO TOPIC: W/N Court of Appeals erred when it allowed Aboitiz the benefit of the limited liability rule
despite its failure to present evidence to prove its entitlement thereto in the trial court.
Rivera

CASE # 10

HELD: YES
It is true that for having been declared in default, Aboitiz was precluded from presenting evidence to prove its
defenses in the court a quo. But this does not mean that the Court of Appeals is barred from taking cognizance
of Aboitiz' defenses on appeal. It should be noted that Aboitiz was declared as in default not for its failure to
file an answer but for its absence during pre-trial and the trial proper.
In Aboitiz' answer with counterclaim, it claimed that the sinking of the M/V P. Aboitiz was due to an act of God or
unforeseen event and that the said ship had been seaworthy and fit for the voyage. Aboitiz also alleged that it
exercised the due diligence required by law, and that considering the real and hypothecary nature of maritime
trade, the sinking justified the extinguishment of its liability for the lost shipment
A judgment of default does not imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard and presenting
evidence in defendant's favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the facts and causes
of action of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires the latter to adduce evidence in support of his
allegations as an indispensable condition before final judgment could be given in his favor. Nor could it be
interpreted as an admission by the defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find support in the law or that the
latter is entitled to the relief prayed for.
This is especially true with respect to a defendant who had filed his answer but had been
subsequently declared in default for failing to appear at the trial since he has had an opportunity to
traverse, via his answer, the material averments contained in the complaint. Such defendant has a
better standing than a defendant who has neither answered nor appeared at trial. The former should
be allowed to reiterate all affirmative defenses pleaded in his answer before the Court of Appeals.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals may review the correctness of the evaluation of the plaintiff's evidence by the lower
court.
Petition of the plaintiff is denied and the resolution of the CA upheld in this case.

Rivera

CASE # 10

Ramnani v. CA
April 28, 1993
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Pre-Trial

G.R. No. 101789

Cruz, J.

SUMMARY: Josephine and Bhagwan Ramnani failed to show at the pre-trial and were declared
in default; they filed a motion to lift the order, claiming Josephines illness meant she had to be
abroad at the time for treatment, and that they had a meritorious defense. TC denied this, as did
the CA. SC: affirmed CA, as there was no showing of a satisfactory reason for their nonappearance, which must concur with a meritorious defense in order to lift an order for default
due to non-appearance at the pre-trial.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: This is a Petition for Certiorari to the SC of the CAs
dismissal of a petition for certiorari of an RTC denial of MR. (phew)
FACTS: Juliette and Cenen Dizon filed a complaint in Makati RTC against Josephine and
Bhagwan Ramnani for the collection of a sum of money representing the alleged unremitted
value of jewelry received by Josephine from Juliette on consignment basis. Josephine Ramnani
submitted an answer with counterclaim in which she alleged that although she did receive
pieces of jewelry worth P934,347.00 from Dizon, Dizon also received from her jewelries worth
P1,671,842,00, plus cash and unpaid checks in the amount of P159,742.50; that she paid
Dizon P50,000; and that Dizon still owes her P787,495.00.
TC set the case for pre-trial, but the Ramnanis did not appear, so they were declared in default.
The Ramnanis filed a motion to lift the order of default, but this was denied. The Dizon spouses
evidence was received ex parte. Subsequently, the TC rendered judgment against the
Ramnanis, holding them liable. The Ramnanis filed an MR on the ground that a "personal
obligation contracted by the wife without the consent of the husband (was) being made
enforceable against the spouses' conjugal partnership despite absence of any allegation and
proof that the same redounded to the benefit of the family as required by Article 121 of the
Family Code." The MR was denied. Bhagwan Ramnani then filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA, which the CA dismissed. Hence this petition for certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of default for non-appearance at the pre-trial shouldve
been lifted
HELD: NO. CA DECISION AFFIRMED. According to Sec. 2, Rule 20 (old rules): "A party who
fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default." The
court also cited Lina v. CA:
The remedies available to a defendant in the regional trial court who has been declared in
default are:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment,
file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a
meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but
before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he
may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or

Bries

CASE #11

to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec.
2, Rule 41)
The Ramnanis did A, which was denied: the TC stated that invoking Josephines deteriorating
health (hence her trip to the US for treatment), is ineffective as there was no medical certificate
to attest to her illness. At the time of the hearing (October 19, 1990), their counsel admitted
Josephine had yet to arrive, despite the averment in their motion she would "only be back late
September or early October of this year." Bhagwan did not submit a plausible explanation for his
absence in the pre-trial.
A satisfactory showing by the movant of the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect is an indispensable requirement for the setting aside of a judgment of default or the
order of default. There was no compliance with this requirement. Even if the Ramnanis insist
they had a meritorious defense which the trial court should not have disregarded, a meritorious
defense is only one of the two conditionsit must concur with the satisfactory reason
for the non-appearance of the defaulted party.
Current applicable rule is Sec. 5, Rule 18: Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the
plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless other-wise ordered by the
court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

Bries

CASE #11

RODOLFO DE LEON V. CA, SPS. ESTELITA & AVELINO BATUNGBACAL

JUNE 6, 2002
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: JUDGMENT

G.R. No. 138884

QUISUMBING, J.

SUMMARY: The RTC granted a partial judgment on the pleading resolving one issue in the case. Trial
ensued and the court rendered judgment on the remaining issues. The respondent appealed, but this was
contested by the petitioner because the first judgment had become final and was already partially
executed. The Court ruled that the partial judgment was merely interlocutory because it leaves other things
for the trial court to do and does not decide with finality the rights and obligations of the parties.
Interlocutory orders are unappealable, thus appeal only became an available remedy after the TCs
second judgment.
HOW DID THE CASE REACH THE SC: Special Civil for Certiorari and Prohibition, seeking to annul the denial
of petitioners motion to dismiss by the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
De Leon filed a case for a claim for a sum of money plus damages against the Spouses.
o Estelita had an unpaid loaned P500,000 in favor of de loan. Payments through checks were dishonored.
o

Estelita admitted the loan obligation, but Avelino denied liability on the ground that his wife had no authority
to bind the conjugal partnership. (Avelinos contention is wrong, Art. 124 of FC)

Due to Estelitas admission, a Motion for Partial judgment on the pleadings by De Leon was granted on
May 14, 1996, and such judgment was thereafter executed against the paraphernal property of the Sps.
o The partial judgment only resolved to make Estelista individually liable.
Pre-trial and trial proceeded to adjudicate on the remaining issues of the case.
o Two issues involved (1) WON the husband gave consent to the loan and if the loan was used for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership and (2) WON the capital of the husband could be made liable for the payment.

June 2, 1997- Judgment was rendered in favor of De Leon. The Spouses appealed to the CA, but De
Leon filed a Motion to Dismiss. This was denied by the CA, leading to the case at bar.

DE LEONS ARGUMENT: The decisions of the trial court promulgated on May 14, 1996 had become final and
executory as to private respondent Estelita Batungbacal. This is because Estelita never appealed the partial
judgment promulgated on May 14, 1996. In fact, there has been a partial execution of said judgment with notice
to and without objection from private respondent spouses.
SPS. BATUNGBACALS ARGUMENT: The resolutions being assailed are interlocutory in character, certiorari does not lie.

ISSUE/HELD: WON the CA erred in taking cognizance of their appeal. NO. Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO
The judgments rendered are not several
A several judgment is proper only when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from
that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject of separate
suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.
In this case, private respondents are sued together under a common cause of action and are sought to
be held liable as solidary debtors for a loan contracted by Estelita. This is the clear import of the allegation
in the complaint that the proceeds of the loan benefited the conjugal partnership.
The partial judgment is not a final order
A final order is that which gives an end to the litigation. When the order or judgment does not dispose of
the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory.
The partial judgment ordering Estelita to pay petitioner is an interlocutory order because it leaves other
things for the trial court to do and does not decide with finality the rights of the parties. There still remained
other issues including whether the husband Avelino had any liability under Art. 121 of the FC.
The partial judgment should be taken in conjunction with the decision dated June 2, 1997. Together,
these two issuances form one integrated decision.
The partial judgment dated May 14, 1996 was rendered only with respect to one issue in the case and is not the
final and appealable order or judgment that finally disposes of the case on the merits. It must only be appealed
together with the decision dated June 2, 1997. Thus, the CA may entertain the contested appeal.
CABALLA

CASE # 1

SA TINGIN KO, YUNG MGA RELEVANT STUFF NASA FIRST PAGE NA. PERO KUNG GUSTO NIYO PA
MAGBASA NG MGA COPY PASTED STUFF, KAYO BAHALA.
On filing the appeal beyond the reglementary period.
As regards the decision dated June 2, 1997, petitioner contends that the same had become final for failure to
file the notice of appeal within 15 days, counted from the time counsel of record for private respondent spouses
received a copy on June 6, 1997 and not from the time Estelita received a copy on June 10, 1997.
Private respondents appeal had been taken within the reglementary period since Avelino Batungbacal had filed
a notice of appeal on June 19, 1997 or 13 days from their counsels receipt of the decision on June 6,
1997. Respondent spouses having been jointly sued under a common cause of action, an appeal made by the
husband inures to the benefit of the wife. The notice of appeal filed by Estelita was a superfluity, the appeal
having been perfected earlier by her husband.
On certain formal defects in appellants brief.
The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion when, in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, it ruled that
the citations contained in the appellants brief were in substantial compliance with the rules. Where the citations
found in the appellants brief could sufficiently enable the appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions of
the record referred to, there is substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13(c) and (d), Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court. Such determination was properly within the appellate courts discretion. Nothing in the
records indicate that it was exercised capriciously, whimsically, or with a view of permitting injury upon a party
litigant. For the same reasons, we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals also did not err when it did not
dismiss the appeal based on the allegation that appellants brief failed to comply with the internal rules of said
court.
On admitting the amended appellants brief without being filed with leave of court.
Petitioner contends that the virtual admission into the record by the respondent court of the amended appellants
brief of the private respondents under the resolution dated January 13, 1999 and its corresponding action to
require the petitioner to respond thereto, constitute grave abuse of discretion and blatant disregard of due
process of law because the amended brief was filed without leave of court.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring petitioner to file the appellees brief in response to the amended
appellants brief. Note that the amended brief was filed without the proper motion for leave to do so and
corresponding order from the respondent court. Even more significant, it was filed beyond the extensions of
time granted to appellants. The discretion in accepting late briefs conferred upon respondent court which this
Court applied in the cases of Maqui vs. CA and Vda. de Haberer vs. CA, finds no application under the present
circumstances because, unlike in these two cases, here no valid reason was advanced for the late filing of the
amended brief. While the amended briefmight contain no substantial and prejudicial changes, it was error for
the respondent court to accept the amended brief as filed and then require petitioner to file appellees brief
because admittedly the amended brief was filed beyond August 31, 1998, the last period of extension granted
to private respondents.
ISSUE 2: WON the appellate court erred or committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered the appeal
as submitted for decision without petitioners brief.
On the second issue, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in considering
the appeal submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case of denial of the motion to dismiss is to file the
appellees brief and proceed with the appeal. Instead, petitioner opted to file a motion for reconsideration which,
unfortunately, was pro forma. All the grounds raised therein have been discussed in the first resolution of the
respondent Court of Appeals. There is no new ground raised that might warrant reversal of the resolution. A
cursory perusal of the motion would readily show that it was a near verbatim repetition of the grounds stated in
the motion to dismiss; hence, the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period for filing the
appellees brief. Petitioner was therefore properly deemed to have waived his right to file appellees brief.

CABALLA

CASE # 1

MANNING v. NLRC
MARCH 13, 1991
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: JUDGMENT

G.R. NO. 83018

NARVASA, J.

SUMMARY: Private respondent Benedicto was hired by petitioners as a truck driver in Saudi Arabia. He got
injured while working and lost two legs. He filed a case against petitioners with the POEA for recovery of
salary and medical benefits. POEA granted the benefits. Petitioners filed an MR+New Trial with the NLRC;
was denied. When the POEA judgment became final and executory, Benedicto moved for the computation of
his benefits. Unsatisfied, he filed a motion for partial reconsideration with the NLRC, claiming more benefits.
NLRC granted the motion. Petitioners filed the case with the SC. SC held in favor of petitioners. Nothing is
more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The only recognized exceptions are (1) the correction of clerical errors or
the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to the party, and (2) where
the judgment is void. The case does not fall under either of these exceptions.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, assailing the
decision of the NLRC which set aside the decision of the POEA.
FACTS
Francisco Benedicto (AKA Lazaro Benedicto according to his passport AKA private respondent) was hired by a
foreign firm, Abdulasis & Mohamed A. Aljomaih Co. (Abdulasis), thru its Philippine Representative Manning
International Corporation (Manning) as a truck driver in Saudi Arabia for a term of 2 years. He left for Saudi in
Dec 1980. Some months before the expiration of his contract, Benedicto got into an accident and was injured,
losing two legs.
On Oct 1982, he filed a case with the POEA against his employers (Manning and Abdulasis AKA petitioners)
for the recovery of his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract and other benefits. Petitioners did not
participate in court proceedings despite proper service, due notice, and a final warning.
Judgment was rendered by POEA, which dismissed Benedictos claim for recovery of the salary, but granted
him, in accordance with the contractual undertaking to provide workmens compensation for service-connected
injuries, P12,000 as disability benefit as well as the actual medical expenses incurred by him for at least 120
days, to be paid solidarily by petitioners.
Respondents filed an MR and New Trial with the NLRC, which was not deemed meritorious. The latter affirmed
the judgment of the POEA. The judgment having become executory, Benedicto moved for the computation of
the amounts due him. Discovering that he would get around P31,450 as benefits and medical expenses,
Benedicto filed a motion for partial reconsideration with the NLRC, protesting the limitation of his award for
medical expenses to 120 days. NLRC set aside the POEA order, and on the considerations of equity and
social justice granted him a total of P65,621.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: (1) Benedicto is estopped from further claims having been fully compensated (Not

really relevant) (2) The challenged decision is without legal basis and unjust.
ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WoN the decision of the NLRC, which set aside the POEA order, was valid. (NO)
RATIO
(1) No, the new judgment of the NLRC, which set aside the POEA judgment, is not valid and is void ab
initio, the POEA judgment having become final and executory when the NLRC set it aside.
Nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.

GASTANES

Case #2

The only recognized exceptions are (1) the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to the party, and (2) where the judgment is void.
The case does not fall under either of these exceptions. The alteration by the NLRC judgment cannot in any
sense be characterized as a nunc pro tunc entry, nor is the POEA judgment void in any aspect.
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc placing in placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that has
been previously rendered to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was,
not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of
the one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may
have bee. (Lichauco v. Tan Pho, quoting Wilmerding v. Corbin Banking Co *Quoteceptioooon*)
(Interesting part) Another reason to strike down the NLRCs new judgment is that it is made to rest on
considerations of equity and social justice, which the court held was impermissible.
RULING: Petition granted. NLRC decision annulled and set aside. POEA order reinstated and affirmed.

GASTANES

Case #2

LICHAUCO v. TAN PHO

G.R. No. 19512
1923 NOVEMBER 21
ROMUALDEZ, J.
T OPIC IN S YLLABUS : Judgment
S UMMARY : [This is a very messy 20-page case from 1923 whew lord. I hate this case, but I tried. ] The validity of a contract of lease
between the Lichaucos and Tan Pho, et al. over a parcel of land is in dispute. The lower court impliedly granted
Tan Phos petition that a nunc pro tunc order be issued approving the contract of lease. The contract of lease
was ruled to be partially invalid as it was not actually authorized by the court, and there was no basis for the
nunc pro tunc order. For the entry of a nunc pro tunc order, it is required that the record present some visible
data of the order which it is sought to be supplied by said nunc pro tunc order. In this case, there was no data,
partial or integral, in the record regarding the judicial act of approving the lease in question. Although the lease
in question could be approved by the court, such approval was neither obtained in due time, nor subsequently,
as the approbatory nunc pro tunc order impliedly entered was invalid on account of having been entered
without a sufficient legal basis therefor.
NUNC PRO TUNC : "The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which was not then carried into
the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial action which has been actually
taken. It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. If the court has not
rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these
errors or omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to
construe what the judgment means, but only to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of record
as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to
a judgment will not furnish the basis for such an entry."

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC/SLIGHT FACTS: Three cases jointly submitted by both parties in
their oral argument:
Case #1 [G.R. No. 19512] Deals with nullity of contract of lease of land and consequent rendition of
accounts. CFI Manila rendered judgment finding, among others, that the contract of lease is valid.
o LEASE executed by: Galo Lichauco in his own behalf, Geronimo Jose as guardian of
incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco (spendthrift), and Am paro N. Jose as guardian of the minors
Luis and Julita Lichauco (lessors), and by Tan Pho (lessee).
o PRESENT CASE instituted by: Faustino Lichauco, guardian ad litem of Zacarias and Luis &
Julita; against Tan Pho, his principal Tan U, Tan Us children, and Galo Lichauco
Case #2 [G.R. No. 19511] Initiated in the original proceedings of the guardianship of Zacarias, wherein Tan
Pho petitioned the court to issue a nunc pro tunc order as of December 1, 1913, approving the contract of
lease. Amparo N. Jose, as guardian of Zacarias, objected to said petition and moved that the case be
considered together with the one on the nullity of the lease. This petition for a nunc pro tunc order was
impliedly granted in the decision rendered in the case which is now Case #1. Amparo N. Jose appealed
from that judgment.
Case #3 [G.R. No. 19595] Same as Case #2, except guardianship proceedings were re: Luis & Julita
The many errors assigned by appellants raise two fundamental questions: (a) the validity of the contract of
lease; and (b) WON the registration of said lease in the registry is final and conclusive between the parties.
MORE FACTS/PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
The land in question is a 1,812 sqm parcel of land in Tondo, Manila. At the time the contract of lease was
executed, the owners of this land were: Galo Lichauco, 1/3 pro indiviso; Zacarias Lichauco, at that time
incapacitated (spendthrift), 1/3 pro indiviso; and Luis and Julita Lichauco, minors and co-owners of the
remaining 1/3 pro indiviso.
Oct. 14, 1913 Galo Lichauco and the guardians of Zacarias and Luis & Julita executed a deed of lease of
this land in favor of Tan Pho. Among the conditions were:
o Lessee to erect a building of strong materials for the period of 20 years from date of execution of
the instrument, for the price/rent of P1,560 monthly
o Upon termination of the period of lease, all improvements/buildings constructed on the land shall
become the property of the land owners, without the lessee being entitled to payment/compensation
As the lease was for a period greater than six years, appellants [Faustino Lichauco & Amparo N.
Jose] maintain that the guardians of Z, L&J could not, without special power, make such a contract, based on
the prohibition contained in CC 1548 [OLD CC]: "No lease for a term of more than six years shall be made by
the husband with respect to the property of his wife, by the father with respect to that of his children, by the
guardian with respect to that of his ward, or by a manager in default of special power with respect to the
property entrusted to him for management."
ISSUES:
1.

W ON the contract of lease was valid PARTIALLY INVALID. IT IS NULL INSOFAR AS IT EXCEEDS
SIX YEARS AND AFFECTS THE PLAINTIFFS.
a. WON the guardians of Zacarias and the minors Luis & Julita could execute it YES

b. W ON it was actually authorized by the court NO

2.

c. WON Tan Pho had power to enter into it YES

WON the registration of the lease is final and conclusive between the parties

LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #03

HELD:

1. a. YES, THE GUARDIANS OF Z AND L&J COULD EXECUTE THE LEASE CONTRACT :

APPELLANTS ARGUE: Not only did the guardians lack the special power required, but no one could grant them
such power on the date when the contract was entered into (Oct. 14, 1913), because such power could only come from
the family council (Old CC 269, par. 5) which had already been abolished by Sec. 552 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(effective Oct. 1, 1901). Moreover, our courts lacked authority to grant such special power until Act No. 2640 was
promulgated (in 1916), years after the lease had been executed. And while it is true that, accdg to Enriquez v. A. S.
Watson & Co., CFIs of the Philippines are empowered to authorize guardians to execute, in the name of their wards,
leases for more than six years, such a decision is erroneous because the Spanish jurisprudence upon which it is based,
was revoked by the Supreme Court of Spain.
SC SAYS: It is true that the guardians needed, and still need, special power to execute leases for more than six years;
it is also true that the family council that could grant such special power had already been abolished. But it is not
true that at that time, CFIs lacked the power to grant authorization to that effect. The doctrine laid down
in Enriquez vs. A. S. Watson & Co. must be respected in this jurisdiction. "The minor in the case at bar having been
represented by his legally appointed guardian and the action of the latter in signing the lease having been formally
approved by the court, makes the contract of lease binding upon the minor." This is the doctrine applicable to the
present case, and no Spanish decision is cited therein to support it, nor do the appellants invoke any decision of the SC
of Spain contrary to this ruling. Where this court did invoke Spanish jurisprudence is in connection with the second
reason for holding the lease in the Enriquez case to be valid, in holding that in cases of that nature "the interests of the
majority govern the minor, the latter having the right to appeal to the courts when the decision of the majority is gravely
prejudicial to him." This latter doctrine is not in point in this case, inasmuch as there is no question between the rights of
a majority and those of any minor of the lessors. Furthermore, Spanish jurisprudence promulgated after the withdrawal
of the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, while always worthy of consideration by our courts, is no longer binding.
SC says there is no sufficient reason to diverge in any way from the ruling laid down in the aforesaid Enriquez case, or
for ignoring the important rule of stare decisis without a strong reason therefor.

1. b. WAS JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF THE LEASE GIVEN EVEN VERBALLY, AND IF SO, DOES
THIS CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR A NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER? NO.

[MORE FACTS HERE.

SORRY. But this part shows why the SC was unable to definitively rule that the lease was actually approved.]

After the contract of lease had been executed on Oct. 14, 1913, Geronimo Jose (Zs guardian) presented to
the court the ff. day in Case #2 a motion praying (1) that he be authorized to employ an attorney and (2) to
approve said contract of lease. The petition to employ an attorney was duly granted. But WRT the petition
for approval of the contract of lease, no written order, either favorable or unfavorable, was issued and there
is nothing in any of the corresponding records to show, or even to indicate, that the court granted said
petition.
Hon. A. S. Crossfield, who was then presiding over the TC and tried these guardianship cases, is no
longer judge, and resigned years before this action for annulment. As to what Crossfield would have
declared, and also Am paro N. Jose, the parties stipulated that if Crossfield were to testify, he would say
that to the best of his recollection, Jose requested and obtained his verbal permission to execute said lease.
Am paro Jose on the other hand, would positively deny ever making this request from Crossfield.
In his affidavit, the Hon. A. S. Crossfield says, among many other things: "8. I, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance, approved of the same, in the presence and with the complete approval of all the parties
interested, and I ordered the clerk to prepare orders for entry in the record in the above entitled case, and in
the record of the case of the Guardianship of Zacarias Lichauco approving of the said leases in all the
parts thereof.
BUT!!! In his affidavit, Atty. Felipe Canillas, deputy clerk at the time referred to, says: during the
period of affiant's incumbency there was a book known as a 'libro de actas' kept in said Probate Division,
affiant has examined the said 'libro de actas' for the year 1913 and that there is no entry therein of any
authorization or approval of the leases mentioned in the affidavit of the said A. S. Crossfield nor of the
orders mentioned in said affidavit, nor of any other order with reference to such leases; that affiant
remembers the pendency of the above entitled guardianship proceedings but the said A. S. Crossfield
while presiding over said Probate Division at no time ordered affiant to prepare orders for entry in the
record approving the said leases, nor did the said A. S. Crossfield give affiant any orders or instructions
whatever with reference to the approval of said lease; that if any such instructions or orders had been given
to affiant by the said judge he would immediately have made a note thereof and prepared the same.
o "[T]here were a number of seals of the Probate Division of said Court which were
accessible to attorneys and litigants and which could be used by them or by the
Judge himself without the necessity of applying therefor to [Atty. Canillas] as assistant clerk
SC SAYS: This shows how easy it was at that tim e to use the seal of the probate division of
the court, and seems to detract from the value of the seal stamped upon one of the copies of
the contract of lease, where said Hon. A. S. Crossfield approved the same over his signature.
o No order was entered of record upon [Geronimo Joses] petition, but some time after the
execution of the said lease by the said Geronimo Jose, the LESSEES DUPLICATE of the lease,
signed by Tan Pho and Geronimo Jose, was endorsed by Crossfield.
o "It is also stipulated that the said Crossfield would testify that while he does not remember
positively when he endorsed his approval on the said lessee's duplicate of said lease, to the best of
his recollection the said Geronimo Jose requested and obtained it from him for the purpose of
registering the lease, but that he is unable to recall the date of his signature more accurately by
reason of the great lapse of time"
LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #03

BUT!!! No such endorsement was placed upon the LESSORs copies of said lease nor upon the
copies retained by the notaries public, and the guardian of said minors had no notice or knowledge
of such endorsement. No order of approval of said lease was entered in the
guardianship proceedings, the only record thereof being the endorsement set forth
above.
o This copy of the lease, at the bottom of which appears said approval signed by Judge Crossfield,
was not attached to the court records of the case, nor did it ever form a part thereof.
The evidence of record that the lease was judicially approved are: (1) motion presented by Zacarias on
Aug. 1, 1913, which says: "It having been decided by this court that the land be leased to the administration of
the testamentary estate of Chua Piengco," etc.; and (2), the guardian's accounts from 1913 to 1919, approved
by the court, wherein appear the payments of the rents stipulated in the contract of lease. SC
DISPUTES BOTH OF THESE
o (1) As to Zacarias Aug. 1, 1913 motion It is no proof of the judicial approval of the lease. Supposing
them to be true, the allegations therein would only indicate that the court had decided that the land
should be leased, but not that the contract was actually approved.
o (2) As to the guardian's accounts from 1913 to 1919 They comprise the period of only six years, and
their approval does not in any way indicate that the court in approving them, likewise approved the
lease for more than six years, which is the lease requiring judicial approval.

OKAY THEN, NOW WHAT? WHY DID YOU MAKE ME GO THROUGH ALL THAT?? WHAT DOES
NUNC PRO TUNC MEAN ANYWAY??
SC NOTES: We have no positive statute governing nunc pro tunc orders. What is established in our laws
and jurisprudence is, that our CFIs, being courts of record, the orders and judgments rendered by them must
appear in writing in the records of the court. In the present case it does not appear that there was any
written order in the records of the CFI approving the lease in question. Neither is there any entry in the
records of these cases that might serve as a basis for the conclusion that the court in due time approved
such a contract.
NUNC PRO TUNC: "The office of a judgm ent nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the
court done at a form er tim e which was not then carried into the record, and the power of a
court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the record evidence of judicial
action which has been actually taken. It may be used to make the record speak the truth,
but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. If the court has
not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has rendered an
imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by
ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment. Hence a court in entering a
judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the judgm ent m eans, but only to
enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not be en
entered of record as rendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments
nunc pro tunc presupposes the actual rendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a
judgment will not furnish the basis for such an entry."
"The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies 'now for then,' or that a thing is done now that shall have the same
legal force and effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done. A court may order an act done nunc
pro tunc when it, or some one of its immediate ministerial officers, has done some act which for some
reason has not been entered of record or otherwise noted at the time the order or judgment was made or
should have been made to appear on the papers or proceedings by the ministerial officer."
CAN A NUNC PRO TUNC ORDER BE ENTERED WHEN NOTHING APPEARS FROM THE FILES
FORMING A PART OF THE RECORD, UPON WHICH SUCH AN ORDER MAY BE BASED ? NO!!!
o Gagnon v. US: "But the exercise of a power to recreate a record where no memorandum whatever
exists of such record is evidently a dangerous one... As the evidence upon which such restoration is
made cannot be inquired into, if the jurisdiction to recreate the record exists, it might well happen
that, upon the testimony of a single interested witness, the court would order a new record to be
entered after a lapse, as in this case, of over thirty years, and when the judge and clerk have both
died, and there was no possibility of contradicting the testimony of such single witness."
APPELLEE ARGUES: In the case of Wight-Nicholson it was held that it is a sufficient basis for a nunc pro
tunc order to resort to parol evidence to supply the part omitted from the record, and that said case is
even cited in Gagnon v. US.
SC REPLIES: The parol evidence admitted in the case of Wight-Nicholson referred to, is not to
supply the whole of a proceeding of which not a trace is to be found in the record, but to supply the
part omitted from the record.
o In Wight-Nicholson, the principal part (the denial) appeared in the record; only the accessory part (the
remanding) was not in the record.
APPLICABLE DOCTRINE BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE CITED: For the entry of a nunc pro tunc
order, it is required that the record present some visible data of the order which it is sought to be supplied
by said nunc pro tunc order, whether it is the data referring to the whole of the order or merely limited to
such portion thereof, that the part lacking from the record constitutes a necessary part, an inevitable and
ordinary consequence of the portion appearing in the record.
LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #03

NUNC PRO TUNC APPLIED: There exist no data, partial or integral, in the record regarding
the judicial act of approving the lease in question. Although the lease in question could be
approved by the court, nevertheless, such approval was neither obtained in due time, nor
subsequently, inasmuch as the approbatory nunc pro tunc order impliedly entered in the
judgment appealed from, is invalid on account of having been entered without a sufficient
legal basis therefor.

1. c. YES, TAN PHO HAD POWER TO ENTER INTO THE LEASE CONTRACT :

It has been proven that at the time of the execution of the contract of lease Tan Pho was the general attorney-in-fact
of Tan U and that said contract was later expressly approved and ratified by Tan U herself. SC finds that Tan Pho's
authority as attorney-in-fact for Tan U has been sufficiently proven.
WRT his authority re: heirs of Chua Piengco, the parties have admitted in the agreed statement of facts: "That on the
date of the execution of the said contract of lease, said Tan Pho was the administrator of the estate of the deceased
Chua Piengco, which was not as yet partitioned among the heirs, etc." The same is stipulated in the stipulation of facts.
Tan Pho, as administrator of the estate of Chua Piengco, then had the power to manage the property of said estate.
The employment of funds of the latter for the construction of a building on leased land, for the purpose of obtaining
rents from such building is an investment of capital which may be considered as included in the powers of an
administrator of a decedent's estate. We cannot force ourselves to believe that, in view of the facts of the case, Tan
Pho took part in this lease as direct attorney-in-fact of the heirs of the deceased Chua Piengco. If at the time, the estate
had not been partitioned, as it appears in the case, such heirs had as yet no hereditary property to dispose of, nor to
answer for their acts, seeing that the estate was legally in the hands of the administrator.

SC: Summarizing our conclusions with respect to the fundamental question touching the validity of the
lease, we find that the lease in question must be held null in so far as it exceeds six years and affects
the plaintiffs, for the reason that it lacked judicial approval.

2. IF THE CONTRACT SUFFERS FROM THE VITAL DEFECT ABOVE POINTED OUT, WAS THIS CURED BY
ITS REGISTRATION IN THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE?
Some time after the execution of the said contract of lease Galo Lichauco petitioned the Court of Land Registration for
the registration of the leased land, the petition being signed by Amparo N. Jose in behalf of L&J, and by Geronimo Jose
in behalf of Z. On April 3, 1914, the Court of Land Registration rendered judgment, adjudicating the land as follows: To
Galo Lichauco, 1/3 part pro indiviso; to Zacarias Lichauco, 1/3 part pro indiviso, and to the minors Luis and Julita
Lichauco, in equal parts, 1/3 part pro indiviso; it being understood that the land is subject to a contract of lease for
twenty years in favor of Tan U, administratrix of the property of the heirs of Chua Piengco, counting from October 14,
1913, at the rate of P1,560 monthly in advance, and upon the other conditions mentioned in the said contract."
If the registered real right arising from the lease in question is, as it should be, declared invalid and without effect in so
far as it affects the plaintiffs, being in excess of six years counted from the execution of said contract, such a
declaration of nullity extinguishes said real right, as to the plaintiffs, which, without it, should have continued legally to
exist, since such a contract is not void per se, but only voidable.
The contract of lease in question is not void ab initio nor with respect to all the lessors, but only voidable, and only
with respect to the plaintiffs. It is not void ab initio because, in regard to the plaintiffs, it contains the indispensable
requisites for its existence. And it is voidable as to them because it lacks judicial approval, which defect invalidates it
according to the law.
Since it is a contract that is merely voidable it has all the effects of being valid and efficacious,
even with respect to the plaintiffs, so long as it is not declared void. For this reason, even though six
years have elapsed since execution, the contract has been in effect in regard to the rights and
obligations of the contracting parties between themselves, including the plaintiffs, demandable up to
the date of the commencement of this action, to which the effects of the declaration of the partial
nullity of the said contract shall retroact, because the reason for such nullity already existed before the
commencement of this action, the present judgment being limited to declaring it judicially. And the fact that the
registration of the lease remains unaltered even after the commencement of this action, does not prevent the present
declaration of nullity from being retroactive in its effects, as it does not appear from the record that there is any third
party right, based on said registration.
NOTE: The contract in question remains unimpaired and valid with respect to Galo Lichauco, who did not join with the
plaintiffs, but rather with the defendant Tan Pho, and to whom the reason for the annulment of the contract with respect
to his colessors, the plaintiffs, does not apply. And the contract is null only in so far as it affects the incapacitated
Zacarias Lichauco and the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco.

LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #03


ST. AVIATION SERVICES v. GRAND INTERNATIONAL
AIRWAYS
October 23, 2006
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Judgment

G.R. No. 140288

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

SUMMARY: Grand International Airways (domestic corporation) engaged the services of St. Aviation Services Co.
(Singaporean company) for the repair and maintenance of its two aircrafts. They agreed to submit any suit arising
from their agreement to the jurisdiction of Singapore courts. Grand International failed to pay thus St. Aviation filed
a collection suit in Singapore. Grand was declared in default and in the default judgment, was ordered to pay the
debt. St. Aviation then filed a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment in the Philippines at RTC Pasay. The SC
ordered the RTC to give due course to the petition as the Singaporean court properly acquired jurisdiction through
proper service of summons and the judgment of default rendered is enforceable in the Philippines.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the order of the CA
FACTS:
-January 1996: Grand International Airways (domestic corporation) engaged the services of St. Aviation Services Co.
(Singaporean company) for the repair and maintenance of its two aircrafts. They executed two contracts
where they agreed that the construction, validity and performance thereof shall be governed by the laws
of Singapore. They further agreed to submit any suit arising from their agreement to the non-exclusive
jurisdiction of the Singapore courts.
-December 1997: Grand International failed to pay thus St. Aviation filed a collection suit in Singapore. Writ of
Summons was issued by Singaporean court which may be served extraterritorially. It was served in Grands
office (received by the secretary of the General Manager) with the help of RTC Pasay sheriff. No answer
from Grand thus it was declared in default.
-February 1998: Default judgment rendered by Singaporean court; ordered Grand to pay the debt.
-August 1998: St. Aviation then filed a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment in the Philippines at RTC Pasay. Grand
filed Motion to dismiss (see arguments)
-RTC: denied motion to dismiss (grounds cited are not under Rule 16); MR denied
-CA: granted motion to dismiss (Singaporean court did not acquire jurisdiction, improper service)

GRANDS ARGUMENTS:
(1) the Singapore High Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person
(2) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced is void for having been rendered in violation of its right to due
process.

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
(1) WON the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by the service of
summons upon its office in the Philippines YES
Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon
a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, which in this case is the law
of Singapore. Here, St. Aviation moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons
outside Singapore. The Singapore High Court granted leave to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the
Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of any originating
process issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229
Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines. This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with the
Rules of Court of Singapore, which provides: c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country for
service of any originating process issued by that country.
In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or
other proper court officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted service. In
this case, the Writ of Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served upon respondent at its office. The
Sheriffs Return shows that it was received by the Secretary of the General Manager of Grand but they completely
ignored the summons, hence, it was declared in default.
(2) WON the judgment by default by the Singapore High Court is enforceable in the Philippines YES

Dino-Poblete, Ma. Katrina Loris

CASE # 04


The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our legal system are contained
in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
THUS, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by:
1) want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or
2) by want of notice to the party against whom it is enforced.
The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules,
jurisdiction was acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of default
rendered by that court against respondent is valid.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. CA Decision SET ASIDE. RTC ordered to hear the case with dispatch

Dino-Poblete, Ma. Katrina Loris

CASE # 04

G.R. No. 139325

MIJARES v. RANADA
April 12, 2005
Tinga, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Judgment
SUMMARY:
Petitioners, victims of HR violations during martial law, filed a complaint against the Marcos
Estate in the US. US District Court awarded them $1.9 billion. Petitioners filed a complaint
before the RTC for enforcement, but complaint was dismissed for failure to file the proper filing
fees (RTC relied on Sec. 7(a) of Rule 171). SC held that RTC applied the wrong provision in
computing for filing fees. Sec. 7(b)(3) should apply.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:

Foreign judgment awarded $1.9 billion to petitioners, petitioners filed complaint for enforcement
of foreign judgment, RTC dismissed, petition for certiorari
FACTS:
Petitioners were victims of human rights violations during martial law. They filed a
complaint on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals
(consisting of more than 10,000 members) against the estate of Marcos before the US
District Court of Hawaii, and were awarded $1.9 billion dollars.
Petitioners filed a complaint before the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the final
judgment of the US District Court.
The Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that petitioners had only paid 410
pesos as docket and filing fees.
RTC judge Ranada dismissed the complaint on the basis that petitioners had failed pay
the proper filing fee of 472 million pesos, as estimated by the RTC. MR was denied, and
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
Ranada relied on Rule 171, Sec. 7(a), which covers money claims against an estate not based
on judgment.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
The proviso under Rule 171, Sec. 7(b), on filing fees for actions where the value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated should apply, as Rule 39, Sec. 48 limits the
actionable issues in cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments to a review of
jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or
mistake of fact or law all of which cannot be estimated in pecuniary value.
The claim in such a case is not for a sum of money, but for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, and any adjudication of a sum of money arising from such judgment would
merely be incidental to the principal relief sought.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in applying Sec. 7(a) YES.
HELD:
Although the claim involves the enforcement a judgment and not a sum of money, there
is no denying that enforcement of the foreign decision would necessarily result in the
award of a definite sum of money.
Hence, the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of
pecuniary estimation.

Vicencio, Solomon

[CASE # 05]

Respondent, however, erred in applying Sec. 7(a). Although petitioners complaint may
have been lodged against an estate, it was clearly based on a judgment, thus placing it
beyond the ambit of Sec. 7(a).
Sec. 7(b)(3) should apply, involving as it does, other actions not involving
property.
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for
"other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of
filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied
instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
Furthermore, the preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this
country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally
accepted practices and principles in international law. Conditioning the amount of the
filing fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign
decision could translate into an award virtually unenforceable in this country, considering
inflation and the relative low-income capacity of the Filipino.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE,
and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.
PROVISIONS:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on
judgment, or for filing with leave of court a thirdparty, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in
intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or
the started value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00 - P 500.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more but less than P 150,000.00 - P 800.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but less than P 200,000.00 - P1,000.00
4. P 200,000.00 or more but less than P 250,000.00 - P1,500.00
5. P 250,000.00 or more but less than P 300,00.00 - P1,750.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but not more than P 400,000.00 - P2,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00 - P2,250.00
8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of P 400,000.00 - P 10.00
(b) For filing
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated --- P 600.00
2. Special civil actions except judicial foreclosure which shall be governed by paragraph (a) above -- P 600.00
3. All other actions not involving property --- P 600.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value, thereof shall be
alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; In either case, the judgment or final order may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.

Vicencio, Solomon

[CASE # 05]

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, as Judge, RTC of Quezon City Branch 101, FALCON
GARMENTS CORPORATION, QUALITY LABELS, INC., ROBERT SY doing business under the name and style
Jobert Printing Services; EUGENIO POA, MAGIN TABUSO, MAKILITO MAHINAY, EFREN CACHERO, CESAR M.
TORIO and EFREN C. GUMBAC, respondents.
G.R. No. 126158 September 23, 1997
MELO, J.:

HOW THE CASE REACHED SC

Sought to be set aside in the instant petition is the decision of respondent CA dismissing petitioners petition
forcertiorari impugning an order granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal
issued by the RTC.

SUMMARY
Falcon successfully sued PBCom for unauthorized withdrawals made in its account. It was able to obtain a
writ of execution pending appeal. The CA affirmed its issuance. The SC ruled that the issuance of the writ
was without good reasons, hence improper.

FACTS
In 1989, Falcon Garments Corporation opened an account with Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom).
Subsequently, on November 1992, Falcon obtained a loan from petitioner of P4,700,000.00. Falcon failed to
pay its loan on due date and went in default in December, 1993.

On February 1995, Falcon filed a complaint with the RTC against PBCom. The complaint prayed for the
restoration to Falcon's account of alleged unauthorized withdrawals totalling P12,729,092.78 which were
made from 1990 to 1992. PBCom denied liability and interposed a compulsory counterclaim in the sum of
P4,700,000.00.

The trial court rendered a decision against PBCom. Falcon filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion for
Writ of Execution claiming that with its strained relations with PBCom, it was no longer practicable to bank
with petitioner, and prayed that the money judgment be not restored to its current account but instead be
directly paid to it. The RTC granted the same and authorized the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal.

The CA upheld the validity of the writ of execution pending appeal.

ISSUE
WON issuance of writ of execution pending appeal proper

HELD / RATIO
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

No, issuance of writ of execution improper.

When the RTC resolved the first ex parte manifestation and motion, the applicable provision was Section 2,
Rule 39 of the former Rules of Court which provided
Sec. 2. Execution pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party, the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue, even before the expiration of the
RUIZ

time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed
thereafter the motion and the special order shall be included therein.

The prevailing doctrine and principle then which continues to be the same as provided in Paragraph 2,
Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is that discretionary execution is permissible
only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal
or even before the expiration of the time to appeal.

Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment
becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the lapse of time become unable to enjoy it, considering
the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no case except to delay.

The supposed good reasons relied upon by RTC was that it was not remote that plaintiffs' survival hangs on
the balance. It considered that its only hope for survival and arresting threats of civil and criminal cases, is
the immediate execution of the judgment. (NOTE: The civil & criminal cases being referred to relate to the
loan Falcon obtained from PBCom i.e., money claims, replevin, violation of BP22)

The reasons relied upon are not compelling and thus can not constitute good reason.

Falcon is a juridical entity and not a natural person. Even assuming that it was indeed in financial distress,
the immediate execution of a judgment in its favor pending appeal cannot be justified as Falcon's situation
may not be likened to a case of a natural person who may be ill or may be of advanced age. Even the danger
of extinction of the corporation will not per se justify a discretionary execution unless there are showings of
other good reasons, such as for instance, impending insolvency of the adverse party or the appeal being
patently dilatory. But even as to the latter reason, it is not for the trial judge to determine the merit of a
decision he rendered as this is the role of the appellate court. Hence, it is not within competence of the
trial court, in resolving a motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory
and rely on the same as its basis for finding good reason to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can
appreciate the dilatory intent of an appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution
pending appeal which may have been issued by the trial court for other good reasons, or in cases where the
motion for execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate court in accordance with Section 2,
paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

Worse, only one case was actually filed against Falcon and this is the complaint for collection filed by
Solidbank. The other cases are "impending". Falcon's survival as a body corporate can not be threatened by
anticipated litigation. Even assuming that there was a serious threat to Falcon's continued corporate
existence, it is not tantamount to an impending death of a natural person. The material existence of a
juridical person is not on the same plain as that of human life. The survival of a juridical personality is
clearly outweighed by the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments.

When the period of appeal has not expired, execution of the judgment should not be allowed, save only if
there be good reasons therefor, in the court's discretion. As provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of the . .
Rules . . , the existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a Court . . to issue a writ of
execution pending appeal. The reasons allowing execution must constitute superior circumstances
demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal
of the judgment.

RUIZ

Terry v. People
G.R. No. 136203

September 16, 1999

Summary: A civil case was decided in in favor of Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla and against plaintiffs Eugenio and Maria
Arcilla and third party defendant Loreo Terry. In that civil case, Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla were declared the lawful
owners of lots under dispute. Loreo Terry did not appeal from the decision and on November 22, 1979, the trial court
issued a writ of execution against petitioner. Apparently, the writ was not served on petitioner and became stale by
operation of law five years thereafter. Terry re-entered the disputed lots and exercised of acts of ownership. TC held that
these acts constitute indirect contempt. SC reversed, held that even if it be a fact that petitioner re-entered the lots in
question after he was judicially evicted therefrom, there can be no contempt of court because the case below for eviction
has become functus officio. At that time the trial court issued an alias writ of execution, this could no longer be lawfully
done. The rule is that the court could issue a writ of execution by motion within five years from finality of the decision,
which in this case was in 1979. A writ of execution issued after the expiration of that period is null and void. There is a
need for the interested party to file an independent action for revival of judgment. The judgment may be enforced after
the lapse of this period and before the same is barred by the statute of limitations, by instituting an ordinary civil action.
When Leoncia Arcilla filed with the trial court a motion for contempt in the civil case, the trial court no longer had
jurisdiction over the case. Its orders dated March 19, 1996, and May 2, 1996 are void. There can be no contempt for
disobedience of an order issued without authority, or which is void for want of jurisdiction

Facts:
On August 13, 1979, Court of First Instance of Virac, Catanduanes, in a civil case, "Eugenio Arcilla vs. Pedro Arcilla"
decided the case in favor of Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla and against plaintiffs Eugenio and Maria Arcilla and third
party defendant Loreo Terry, declaring Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla the lawful owners of Lot Nos. 13118 and
10627. Petitioner did not appeal from the decision and on November 22, 1979, the trial court issued a writ of
execution against petitioner. Apparently, the writ was not served on petitioner and became stale by operation of
law five years thereafter.
On December 9, 1985, after the lapse of more than six years, the trial court, reorganized into a regional trial court,
issued an alias writ of execution.
On January 13, 1986, Deputy Sheriff Carlos M. Ubalde submitted his sheriff's return stating that upon service of
the alias writ upon petitioner, he learned that petitioner was no longer in occupation over the aforesaid Lot Nos.
13118 and 10627. Sheriff Ubalde further stated in his return that petitioner is allegedly not in possession of
any land or real estate property declared in his name as per certification issued by the Office of the Provincial
Assessor of Catanduanes.
On the same date, Deputy Sheriff Ubalde certified that pursuant to the alias writ of execution, possession of the
lots was turned over to Leoncia S. Arcilla "for and in behalf of the heirs of Pedro S. Arcilla." Leoncia S. Arcilia
acknowledged the turn-over of the lots.
July 5, 1991, Leoncia S. Arcilla filed with the Regional Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes an action for reconveyance
or annulment of sale, recovery of possession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 1586,
entitled Leoncia Vda. de Arcilla vs. Loreo and Violeta Terry, involving one of the lots subject of the civil case
above.
On October 27, 1992, the trial court dismissed the case. By filing such action for reconveyance and recovery of
possession, Leoncia Arcilla acknowledged that petitioner was occupying the lots in question.
On March 27, 1995, Leoncia Arcilla filed with the trial court, a motion for contempt against petitioner for re-
occupying Lot No. 13118.
On March 19, 1996, the trial court issued an order finding petitioner guilty of contempt and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of two months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500.00. However, on May 2, 1996, the trial
court reduced the penalty to one (1) month imprisonment and a fine of P100.00 and to vacate Lot Nos. 13118
and 19627.
Respondents appealed from the aforesaid order to the Court of Appeals.
October 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming with modification the trial court's order
and sentencing petitioner to two months imprisonment and a fine of P500.00. The appellate court likewise
affirmed the trial court's order for petitioner to vacate Lot Nos. 13118 and 10627.

Solicitor General: Even if indeed there was no effective service of the writ and alias writ of execution on him, as he was
admittedly served with a copy of the decision, petitioners re-entry upon the land is contemptuous and punishable.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner's re-entry on the disputed lots and exercise of acts of ownership constitute indirect
#08

contempt.

Held: No. Petition granted. Even if it be a fact that petitioner re-entered the lots in question after he was judicially
evicted therefrom, there can be no contempt of court because the case below for eviction has become functus officio.
On August 13, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Virac, Catanduanes, renderedjudgment in Civil Case No. 740,
against petitioner, declaring Pedro and Leoncia Arcilla owners of Lot Nos. 13118 and 10627.
On November 22, 1979, the trial court issued a writ of execution as against petitioner. This writ was not served on
him which implies that petitioner remained in possession of the disputed lots.
On December 9, 1985, the trial court issued an alias writ of execution. At that time, this could no longer be lawfully
done. The rule is that the court could issue a writ of execution by motion within five years from finality of the decision,
which in this case was in 1979. A writ of execution issued after the expiration of that period is null and void. There is a
need for the interested party to file an independent action for revival of judgment. The judgment may be enforced after
the lapse of this period and before the same is barred by the statute of limitations, by instituting an ordinary civil action.
The reason is that after the lapse of the five-year period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which
judgment must be enforced, as all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in the regular form. Such action
must be filed within ten years from the date the judgment became final.

Assuming that the decision became final and executory on November 22, 1979, when the trial court issued the original
writ of execution, the court could no longer issue an alias writ of execution, by motion, on December 5, 1985, six years
later. And the Sheriff could not lawfully enforce and execute such invalid writ on January 13, 1986. Indeed, even the trial
court's original decision dated August 13, 1979 had become stale in September, 1989, ten years after its finality.

Consequently, on March 27, 1995, when Leoncia Arcilla filed with the trial court a motion for contempt in the civil case,
the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the case. Its orders dated March 19, 1996, and May 2, 1996 are void. There
can be no contempt for disobedience of an order issued without authority, or which is void for want of jurisdiction. The
disobedience which the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willful disobedience to a valid order. For, at
bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or disobedience. The court must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and
sparingly with utmost self- restraint.

Finally, in the order declaring petitioner in contempt, the trial court and the Court of Appeals likewise ordered petitioner
to vacate Lot Nos. 13118 and 10627, subject of the civil case. That case was stale since 1989. It was seven (7) long years
a dead case when in the guise of a contempt order, the trial court practically revived the judgment by ordering petitioner
to vacate the contested lots, without the institution of an independent action for revival of judgment. Such an order is
improper in a judgment for contempt. In contempt, the sentence is limited to the penalty prescribed in the Revised Rules
of Court.

#08

REPUBLIC v. CA
August 7, 1996
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Revival of Judgment

GR No. 91885
Panganiban, J.

SUMMARY:
Laureano Bros. undertook to supply the Republic with plumbing materials for NAWASA. These delivered
materials were rejected for being unsatisfactory. Laureano Bros. was ordered to pay around USD 356; this
judgment was final and executory on July 1968. Laureanos property was attached, and a writ of execution was
issued on September 1972. However, enforcement was delayed. Laureano endeavored to sell the property
themselves, and the validity of the sale was later questioned in the CA and SC. Republic sent a demand letter
on November 1985, 17 years after the final judgment on 1968. The SC ultimately allowed execution beyond
the 5-year period for enforcement allowed by Rule 39, Sec. 6, because the delay was occasioned by the
debtors initiatives and incurred for their benefit/ advantage. To rule otherwise would encourage debtors to
escape their payment by trickery. The purpose of the law is to prevent obligees from sleeping on their rights.
The Republic here meticulously pursued its rights of action.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review after denial of MR
FACTS:
v Private Respondent Laureano Brothers, Inc. undertook to supply petitioner Republic of the Philippines
with plumbing materials for the use of the National Water and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA).
v However, all the materials delivered to NAWASA were rejected because they didnt conform to the
agreed specifications.
v CFI Republic sued Laureano Bros. after the latter refused to refund the money paid.
o Decision was based on a compromise agreement, where Laureano Bros. agreed to pay
Republic USD358,882.02 or its equivalent in PHP.
o July 27, 1968 - The judgment became final and executory.
v CFI ordered the attachment of the property of Laureano Bros., consisting of a 5,000 sqm lot with a 2storey building, located along Pasong Tamo, Makati.
o September 2, 1972 a writ of execution was issued.
v Actual enforcement was delayed because of several alternative payment proposals made by Laureano
Bros., including several extensions of time to pay.
o Upon their request, the Natl Economic Devt Authority (NEDA) authorized them to look for
buyers of the attached property.
v April 16, 1973 the CFI issued an order authorizing them to sell the attached property.
o Firma Techno Machineries purchased the lot and building thru a Deed of Sale; Laureano Bros.
remitted the net proceeds of P881k to NEDA.
o NEDA disapproved the sale for the price being too low and the conditions imposed by the TC
not being followed.
o NEDA returned the checks and filed an action to annul the sale.
v CFI nullified the sale for undue delay in delivering the net proceeds of the sale.
v CA reversed the CFI; the delay was NEDAs fault for procrastination in accepting payment.
v SC affirmed the CA decision.
v November 7, 1985 Republic sent a letter of demand asking for the turn-over of the net proceeds of
the sale, which Laureano Bros. ignored.
o May 12, 1986 - Republic filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution.
This was DENIED on the ground that the 5-year period allowed by the Rules has lapsed,
the running period not having been interrupted while the question of the legality of the
sale of Laureano Bros. property was pending in the CA.
v The MR having been denied, Republic filed this Petition for Review.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
The May 12, 1985 motion for execution was 17 years after the decision became final and executory.

M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 09

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
v The decision sought to be enforced became final and executory on July 27, 1968. The initial writ of
execution issued on September 2, 1972, was well within the 5 year period.
v However, the Republics attention was diverted to the validity of the sale of the Pasong Tamo property
(which was attached but not levied upon) instead of the enforcement of the issued writ.
ISSUE:
WON the 5-year period within which to enforce the decision was interrupted by the period when the question
of legality of the sale of Laureano Bros. properties was pending in the CA and SC YES!
HELD:
v Under Rule 39, Sec. 6, a judgment may be executed within 5 years from the date of its entry or from
the date It becomes final and executor. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
v HOWEVER, there is an exception to this general rule: when the delay is caused or occasioned by
the actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
o While the delay wasnt caused by direct acts of the debtor, it was occasioned by said debtors
own initiatives an unarguably resulted in immeasurable benefits.
o NEDAs grant of authority to Laureano Bros. to sell the property enabled the latter to realize a
brokers fee of P50k. If it were sold at a public auction, Laureano wouldnt have gained
anything.
v Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, namely, that (a) a writ having been issued within the
five-year period, (b) an attachment on real property having been duly made, (c) sale thereof having
been made through the active intervention of the judgment debtor who selected the buyer and
earned a commission in the process, and (d) the delayed enforcement having been indirectly
caused by the importuning of, and having unarguably resulted in benefits to the judgment debtor, we
therefore hold that the 5-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion, and
for that matter, the 10-year prescriptive period allowed by law for enforcement by action, are
deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended by the period during which the
legality or validity of the sale was being litigated.
v To rule otherwise would deprive the Republic of any remedy to enforce a clear and adjudged right and
would encourage judgment debtors to escape the payment of their firm obligations through trickery,
chicanery, gimmickry or other modes of persuasion, fair or foul.
v The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent
obligors (I think they meant obligees) from sleeping on their rights.
v Far from sleeping on its rights, the Republic meticulously pursued its rights of action -- even to the
point of rejecting what it perceived to be an erroneous or invalid sale resulting in less proceeds
accruing to it.
v After all, the Rules themselves mandate liberal construction "in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceedings."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to issue the writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 44566 for the enforcement of the decision therein. No costs.

M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 09

PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. v. HON. RAMOLETE, PALMES & BORBON

G.R. No. 60887
November 13, 1991
Feliciano, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Kinds of execution; section 9-11, 39-43, Rule 39
SUMMARY:
A Cimarron PUJ collided with a private jeep. The collision caused physical injuries to a minor and the death of
the driver of the private jeep. The kin of the driver and the minor filed a complaint for damages against the
registered owner and driver of the Cimarron PUJ. The court ruled in favor of the deceaseds wife. The CFI
judgment became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The
judgment debtor (the owner of the Cimarron) said that the said PUJ is insured by Perla via a TPL insurance
policy. The court then issued an alias writ of garnishment on the TPL insurance policy. Perla contested the
Order of the Judge, hence, this Rule 65 Petition. The SC held that the petition is unmeritorious and the Order
of the Judge is proper.
DOCTRINE:
The proceeding by garnishment is a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment
debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. By means of the citation, the stranger becomes a
forced intervenor; and the court, having acquired jurisdiction over him by means of the citation, requires him
to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor, who is creditor in the main litigation. The
issuance of a Writ of Garnishment would cause the court to acquire jurisdiction over the garnishee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering garnishment of the third-party liability insurance contract issued
by petitioner Perla in favor of the judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez.
FACTS:

June 1, 1976a Cimarron PUJ owned and registered in the name of Nelia Enriquez, and driven by
Gosme Casas, travelling from Cebu City to Danao City while passing through Liloan, Cebu, collided with a
private jeep owned and driven by Calixto Palmes. Calixto Palmes died as a result of the collision. The
accident also caused physical injuries to the two-year-old Adeudatus Borbon.

June 25, 1976Primitiva Palmes (the widow of Calixto) and Honorato Borbon, Sr. (the father of
Adeudatus) filed a complaint against Casas (driver) and Enriquez (registered owner) before the CFI of
Cebu City claiming actual, moral, nominal and exemplary damages as result of the accident.

Judge Ramolete excluded the claim of Borbon from the above-mentioned complaint because it should be
in the jurisdiction of an inferior court. Without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.

April 4, 1977CFI ruled in favor of Palmes. CFI ordered Enriquez to pay P10,000 (moral), P12,000
(compensatory for the death of Calixto), P3,000 (exemplary), P5, 000 (actual), and P1,000 (Attorneys
Fees).

CFI judgment became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued. The writ was returned
unsatisfied.

July 23, 1979Judgment debtor Enriquez was summoned before the TC. Enriquez declared under oath
that the Cimarron PUJ was covered by a Third Party Liability (TPL) insurance policy issued by Perla
Compania de Seguros, Inc.

July 31, 1979Palmes filed a motion for garnishment to be issued against the insurance policy issued by
Perla in favor of Enriquez.

August 6, 1979Judge Ramolete issued an Order directing Provincial Sheriff to garnish the TPL
insurance policy.

Perla appeared before the TC and moved for an MR of the August 6 Order of the court alleging that Perla
was not summoned in the case at bar, hence, the TC had no jurisdiction over its juridical person.

The TC denied Perlas MR. TC issued an Order for an Alias Writ of Garnishment on April 8, 1980.

June 25, 1982More than two years since the Alias Writ of Garnishment was issued, Perla filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete
in ordering garnishment of the third-party liability insurance contract issued by petitioner Perla in favor of
the judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez.

Case #10

Petitioners Argument(s):
(1) Not a party to the case and the TC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Perla.
(2) The writ of garnishment had been issued solely on the basis of the testimony of the judgment debtor during
the examination on 23 July 1979 to the effect that the Cimarron PUJ was covered by a third-party liability
insurance issued by Perla, without granting it the opportunity to set up any defenses which it may have under
the insurance contract.
(3) Contrary to Economic Insurance Co., Inc. v. Torres, et.al, which held that under Rule 39, Section 45, the
Court "may only authorize" the judgment creditor to institute an action against a third person who holds
property belonging to the judgment debtor.
ISSUE(S): WON the garnishment of the TPL insurance policy issued by Perla in favor of Enriquez is valid
YES.
HELD: Rule 65 Petition DISMISSED.

GARNISHMENT
- A species of attachment for reaching any property or credits pertaining or payable to a judgment debtor
- In legal contemplation, it is a forced novation by the substitution of creditors
- A warning to a person having in his possession property or credits of the judgment debtor, not to pay
the money or deliver the property to the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff's suit.

The judgment debtor, who is the original creditor of the garnishee is, through service of the writ of
garnishment, substituted by the judgment creditor who thereby becomes creditor of the garnishee.

The garnishee need not be impleaded nor summoned so that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the garnishee. No such requirements are found in the ROC.

Only requisite to acquire jurisdiction: service upon the garnishee of writ of garnishment. Through
service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a "virtual party" to, or a "forced intervenor" in,
the case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind him to compliance with all orders and
processes of the trial court with a view to the complete satisfaction of the judgment of the court.

The proceeding by garnishment is a species of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the judgment
debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. By means of the citation, the stranger becomes a
forced intervenor; and the court, having acquired jurisdiction over him by means of the citation, requires
him to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor, who is creditor in the main
litigation.[Tayabas Land v. Sharruf as cited in Bautista v. Barredo]

The garnishment of property to satisfy a writ of execution operates as an attachment and fastens upon the
property a lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is
brought into custodia legis, under the sole control of such court.[RCBC v. De Castro]

In the case at bar, there was a writ of garnishment issued. Hence, the court acquired jurisdiction over
Perla. A separate action need not be commenced to hold the petitioner liable as the writ of garnishment
would suffice.

Every interest which the judgment debtor may have in property may be subjected to execution. In the
instant case, the judgment debtor Nella Enriquez clearly had an interest in the proceeds of the third-party
liability insurance contract. In a third-party liability insurance contract, the insurer assumes the obligation of
paying the injured third party to whom the insured is liable. The insurer becomes liable as soon as the
liability of the insured to the injured third person attaches. Prior payment by the insured to the injured third
person is not necessary in order that the obligation of the insurer may arise. From the moment that the
insured became liable to the third person, the insured, acquired an interest in the insurance contract,
which interest may be garnished like any other credit.

Case #10

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA
AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO
DEL MUNDO, NAMELY: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR AND CARMEN, ALL SURNAMED DEL
MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 43, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 141524
Corona J.
September 14, 2005
Topic in Syllabus: New Trial/MOR
Summary: March 3, RTC dismissed the case. Petitioner filed an MOR on March 18. RTC denied the MOR and
received the notice on July 22; Petitioner filed an appeal on July 27. Court a quo denied it for being late. SC: t o
standardize, allow a fresh period of 15 days to file notice of appeal in RTC counted from receipt of order
dismissing the motion for new trial or MOR
Facts:
Petitioner Neypes filed an action for annulment of judgement and titles of land and /or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before RTC against respondents.
Petitioners filed motion to declare the respondents in default while respondents LBP and Heirs of Del
Mundo filed a motion to dismiss.
RTC declared Bureau of Lands and BFD in default except the heirs because the substituted service of
summons was improper and the motion to dismiss denied.
Respondent Heirs filed MOR as the action had already prescribed. RTC granted.
Petitioner received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and filed a MOR in March 18,
1998.
RTC denied the MOR and petitioner received a notice on July 22, 1998.
On July 27, petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was denied by court a quo for being filed 8 days
late.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under rule 65. CA dismissed the petition. CA
denied their MOR.
Petitioners argument: upon denial of MOR, they have a fresh 15 day period to file the notice of appeal.
Trial Court: MOR only interrupted filing of notice of appeal.
Issue: WON there is a fresh 15 period after denial of MOR. Yes
Held:
the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Failure to do so
often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and
procedural rules; under BP 129, Sec 39 it is 15 days from notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from. Also Rule 41 Sec 3 of Rules of Civil Pro states that it be 15 days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Final order; Defined
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues
raised there.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial
court. We ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice
of appeal. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Also needs definite time for finality.

According to BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the appeal period
previously consisted of 30 days. BP129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. Reason:
shorten period of appeal and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however,
we declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and rules of procedure should not be
applied rigidly.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain
acts must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may
be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules
42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize, allow a fresh period of 15 days to file notice of appeal in RTC counted from receipt of
order dismissing the motion for new trial or MOR.

this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to

1. Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts;
2. Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
3. Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and
4. Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Rule not inconsistent with Rule 41, Sec 3

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the
appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.Hence, the use of
"or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to
refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Rule not inconsistent with BP 129, Sec 39
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this
case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration

VELASCO v. ORTIZ
G.R. No. 51973
April 16, 1990
Feliciano, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Post-judgment Remedies Motion for New Trial / Motion for Reconsideration
SUMMARY: TC granted respondent TSTs motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
and accepted the excuse offered by the new counsel as excusable negligence. Petitioner Velasco is now
assailing said grant. Court held that TC erred in granting MNT as the certification was already known to
TST during trial and cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. Also, new counsels
explanation as to the late filing of the MNT cannot be considered excusable negligence which would
allow the court to relax procedural rules.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari and prohibition.
FACTS:
Respondent Tan Sim Te (TST) was the ward of petitioner Ely Chan Sa Velasco and her husband
Lorenzo Velasco.
o TST was not the daughter of Lorenzo; neither had she been formally or legally adopted by
petitioner and her husband.
1974 Lorenzo suffered paralysis of his right hand and lost the use of that hand.
o He converted his then existing bank accounts standing in his own name into joint accounts under
his name and that of TST; amounts withdrawable by either or both Lorenzo and TST.
Jan 28, 1975 Lorenzo was examined by Dr. Raul Idea, a neurologist, who found him suffering from
asphasia (inability of a person to understand or comprehend what is being spoken and the inability
to express oneself), and a brain tumor.
Feb 5, 1975 TST withdrew the entire balance of P99,504.83 in one of Lorenzos bank accounts and
closed the same; she also withdrew P37k from another bank account.
Feb 28, 1975 Lorenzo died.
May 24, 1975 Ely in her personal capacity and in her capacity as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Lorenzo, filed with CFI a complaint for the recovery of property and annulment of certain
documents alleging that TST had misappropriated and converted to her own use the bank deposits of
Lorenzo.
o TSTs answer The withdrawals had been made by her upon the instructions of Lorenzo to
whom the monies were allegedly given and who allegedly used the same to pay his creditors and
to defray his hospitalization and medical expenses.
Mar 17, 1979 CFI decision in favor of Ely.
Apr 6, 1979 A copy of the decision was received by TST through her former counsel.
May 19, 1979 (4 days after the reglementary period to appeal had lapsed) TST through her new
counsel filed a Motion for New Trial (MNT) on the ground of newly discovered evidence
consisting of a certification issued by Dr. Hinigio Tan of Chinese General Hospital, relating to the
physical and medical examination undergone by Lorenzo during his confinement at the hospital.
o MNT sought to impugn the diagnosis of Dr. Idea, contending that the diagnosis was indirect and
speculative and that Dr. Idea had not categorically ruled out the possibility of Lorenzos ability to
comprehend questions and to indicate his assent or dissent to said questions which may have
been addressed to him regarding the withdrawals from his bank accounts.
o New counsel sought to excuse the tardiness of the filing of the MNT by pleading
excusable negligence.
!

Believing in good faith that the undersigned counsel still have thirty (30) days from April 18, 1979 within which to file
the appropriate pleadings and/or motions to vacate and/or appeal the judgment and due to daily court appearances
and other professional engagements, he deferred action on the matter. It was only yesterday (i.e. 9 May 1979) that
the undersigned counsel was informed that the former counsel of defendant, Atty. Jose Acejas, has not filed any
petition or motion insofar as the decision is concerned despite the fact that he realized that the period within which
the defendant can have the judgment set aside or vacated has already lapsed.

TC decision granted MNT; that the excuse offered by TSTs new counsel constituted excusable
negligence and that the newly discovered evidence would probably alter the result of the case; MR
denied.

ISSUE: WON TC erred in granting the MNT. Yes.

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 02]

HELD:
There is no dispute that at the time the MNT was filed, the reglementary period to appeal had already
lapsed and that judges decision had already become final and executory.
o It is firmly established that a judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be
altered and modified, and much less set aside by the court which rendered it since such court has
already lost jurisdiction over the case.
o Thereafter, the power and prerogative to order suspension of the rules of procedure is reposed,
not in the court which had rendered such decision, but rather in an appellate court and ultimately
the Supreme Court, and then only upon a showing that otherwise the imperious demands of
substantial justice will be thwarted.
In granting the MNT, TC judge invoked Reyes v. CA as authority for the proposition that the TC judge
could, "in the interest of justice, extend the period within which a motion for new trial may be filed by
the defendant provided there was excusable negligence on her part, which prevented her from filing
the said motion within the reglementary period."
o SC It is useful to note that Reyes is far more rigorous than TC judge apparently believed it was.
Where the reglementary period to appeal has not yet expired, a MNT under Rule 37 is the
appropriate remedy.
Where the judgment has already become final, the appropriate recourse is either to a petition
for relief from judgment under Rule 38, or in an appropriate case, a petition for annulment of
judgment.
It is not mere coincidence that the principal grounds which justify grant of MNT under Rule 37,
are the same grounds which must be shown in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38:
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
In the case at bar, the Court is unable to adopt the view taken by TC judge on this matter.
o Even a novice litigator would have instinctively ascertained the date of finality of the judgment he
is retained to reverse.
o The Court finds it difficult to understand how a lawyer as distinguished and experienced as TSTs
new counsel could have supposed, without asking his client, that he had the full reglementary
period to file a MNT or to appeal, from the day his services were retained.
o The Court has also frequently rejected claimed volume of work and a loaded calendar as an
excuse for failure to comply with the reglementary periods established by the Rules.
As to the newly discovered evidence, the Court held that the same cannot be considered for
the following reasons:
o The certification was known and available to TST during the trial of the case, as the same had
been submitted by TST as part of her evidence as respondent in a preliminary investigation for
falsification of public document in the late 1975 or early 1976.
o Also, the certification is clearly in the nature of impeaching evidence, for it seeks merely to
weaken or controvert the written findings of Dr. Idea. Being merely impeaching evidence in
character, the certification certainly by itself would not have resulted in a different decision.
TC decision annulled and set aside.
------------Sec. 1, Rule 37:
Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial. - Within the period for perfecting appeal, the
aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial for one or more
of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights;
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result:
(c) Award of excessive damages, or insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, or that the
decision is against the law.

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 02]

FAJARDO v. CA

G.R. No. 140356

March 20, 2001

Puno, J.

TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Post-Judgment RemediesMotion for New Trial/MR

SUMMARY: Bugaring sued Fajardo for non-payment of attys fees. Court declared Fajardo in default and ruled
in favor of Bugaring. Bugaring filed a motion for correction of judgment. Fajardo filed a Notice of Appeal, but
the court ruled that it was premature, considering the pendency of the motion for correction. Subsequently,
motion for correction granted and a writ of execution was also issued. Fajardo filed petition for certiorari to
annul orders of the RTC. SC granted the same and ruled that the motions filed by Bugaring before the RTC
were defective for not having proper notice of hearing. Thus, Fajardos Notice of Appeal tolled the finality of
the decision and therefore, the resolution ordering execution of judgment was without basis. RTC orders null
and void for being issued without jurisdiction.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA decision
FACTS:
- Bugaring filed a case against Fajardo for collection of attys fees. He alleged that Fajardo engaged his
services to represent her in several civil and criminal cases pending before various courts. But despite
successful termination of some cases and demands by Bugarin, Fajardo refused to pay.
- Fajardo was declared in default for failure to appear during pre-trial, hence Bugaring was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte.
- Oct 15, 1997, RTC ruled in favor of Bugaring. Ordered Fajardo to pay 3,532,170 as attys fees for 2 cases.
- Dec 10, 1997, Bugaring filed a motion for correction of judgment
- Feb 3, 1998, Fajardo filed Notice of Appeal (alleged that she only received copy of decision on Jan 19 98).
On the same day, RTC denied Notice of Appeal for being premature, considering that there was a pending
motion for correction of decision
- Feb 13, 1998, RTC granted Motion for Correction instead of specifying the 2 cases as basis for the fees,
the court stated that it was for unpaid attys fees covering the legal cases which he handled in favor of
defendant
- Bugaring then filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution GRANTED by RTC
- Fajardo filed a petition for Certiorari seeking annulment of the orders by the RTC. She claimed that the
motion for correction was a mere scrap of paper because she did not receive a copy of the same and it
contained no notice of hearing. Thus, when she filed her Notice of Appeal, the appeal was perfected and
thus RTC no longer had jurisdiction when it issued its subsequent orders (granting correction & execution)
- CA affirmed RTCs writ of execution. Oct 15, 1997 RTC decision became final and executory when
Fajardo failed to appeal therefrom within the reglamentary period after she has received a copy of the
amended decision.
o Also, the Notice of Appeal filed by Fajardo on Feb 3, 1998 was not sufficient to elevate the case to
CA because it was premature, as correctly held by RTC.
o Moreover, CA held that assuming that it was not premature, certification from post office states that
she received the copy of decision on Dec 15, 1997, and she only filed her appeal on Feb 3, 1998.
Hence, appeal was filed out of time.
o MR DENIED.
ISSUES: WoN the orders of the RTC were valid? NO.
HELD: Fajardo filed Notice of Appeal from Oct. 15, 1997 RTC decision on Feb 3, 1998. The pendency of her
appeal tolled the finality of the assailed decision. Thus, the resolution of the RTC ordering execution of
the judgment was without basis.
- Orders granting the correction and the subsequent execution rendered by the RTC were issued without
jurisdiction. The motion for correction was DEFECTIVEno proper notice of hearing. Hence, it was a mere
scrap of paper which may not be taken cognizance of by the RTC.
JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

CASE # 3

RoC require that every written motion be set for hearing by movant, except those which the court
may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. A motion w/o notice of hearing is
pro forma, a mere scrap of paper which presents no question which the court could decide.
Rationale: unless movant sets hearing, court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party
agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection.
Hence, orders dated Feb 3 and Feb 13 by the RTC were of no force and effect.
Argument that Fajardo failed to pay APPEAL DOCKET FEE Not well taken. A partys omission to pay
such does not automatically result in dismissal of appeal. It is a discretionary, not mandatory power by the
CA.
As to the timeliness of her appeal it was filed within reglamentary period. While the Chief of Records
Section of the QC Central Post Office certified that a copy was received by one Gloria Fajardo on Dec 15,
1997, the REGISTRY RETURN receipt shows that COUNSEL received it only on Jan 19, 1998, which is
the effective service of the decision. When a party is represented by counsel, service of process must be
made on counsel, not on party. Thus, counting from Jan 19, 1998, Feb 3 appeal was timely.
o

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 4, 1999
and its Resolution dated September 30, 1999 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated February 3,
1998, Order dated February 13, 1998, and Resolution dated September 28, 1998, all issued by the trial court
are likewise SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition.

JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

CASE # 3

GOLDLINE TRANSIT v. RAMOS

G.R. No. 144813
August 15, 2001
BELLOSILLO, J.
Topic in Syllabus: Petition for Relief from Judgment: Rule 38
SUMMARY: GOLDLINE through counsel filed a Petition for Relief 139 days after they learned of the judgment
alleging that the counsels change in address prevented them from filing a timely relief. The SC ruled that the 2
periods in Sec. 1, Rule 38 must be strictly complied with and that GOLDLINE filed out of time. A petition for
relief from judgment must also be accompanied with fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
FACTS
A jeepney collided with a GOLDLINE bus which caused the death of Leanisa Ramos, a passenger of the
jeepney. Luisa (Leanisas mother) filed a complaint for damages.
GOLDLINE and its counsel, Atty. Leovigildo Mijares, II failed to appear at the pre-trial conference and was
declared in default upon motion of Ramos. TC rendered judgment on the basis of Ramos evidence and
adjudged GOLDLINE liable.
Atty. Mijares was furnished with a copy of the decision on November 20, 1998. The Decision of the trial
court became final and executory for failure of GOLDLINE to appeal.
On 8 April 1999 GOLDLINE through its counsel Atty. Leovigildo H. Mijares III filed a Petition for Relief
With Motion to Withdraw as Counsel alleging that they were furnished with a copy of the questioned
decision only in March 1999.
o Atty. Mijares had a misunderstanding with the owner of the building where he had his office regarding
the payment of rents and was forced to transfer to a new office. He omitted to inform the court of his
change of address, and that the notices, order of default, and trial court decision were not received by
him
TC: Denied the petition for relief for having been filed beyond the reglementary period
CA: Dismissed the petition
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
It came to know of the decision only on March 30, 1999 when its president verified the status of the case
thus the petition for relief from judgment filed April 8, 1999 was well within the time frame provided under
Sec. 3, Rule 38, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
ISSUE
WON GOLDLINE filed the petition for relief within the reglementary period NO
RATIO

Sec. 3, Rule 38: Time for filing petitions; contents and verification.A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be
verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than
six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.

The party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with the two reglementary periods:
(1) must be filed within 60 days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set
aside; and (2) within a fixed period of 6 months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding.
Strict compliance is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the
part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a
judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality.
Although the petition was filed within 6 months, it was not within 60 days, but only after 139 days, from the
time petitioner learned of the judgment. The absence of one of the 2 mentioned periods, which are
concurring elements, precludes GOLDLINE from availing of the remedy of relief from judgment.
The return card bears the signature of Atty. Mijares III, unequivocally showing receipt of the assailed
decision. The attorney's denial cannot prevail over the contrary statement of postal officials based on
official records. Postal officials enjoy the presumption of regularity of performance and acted in good faith
Even if really didnt receive the decision, remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on the
grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence, to be "excusable," must be one
which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.
o There was inexcusable negligence on Atty. Mijares part in failing to inform the lower court of his new
office address.

EMILIO TUASON VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON

G.R. No. 116607 | April 10, 1996 | PUNO, J.

TOPIC: Post Judgment Remedies->Petition for relief from judgment

SUMMARY: TC declared as null the Tuasons marriage based on Art 36. Husband filed petition for relief from
judgment saying that his absence (he was in rehab) was excusable so he was denied due process and that the
court should have appointed an intervenor to investigate collusion. Court denied: Under the rules, a final and
executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good,
substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to
hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Notice sent to
counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and
regular on its face.

HOW CASE REACHED SC: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:
1989 - private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with RTC Makati a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason and prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him.
May 8, 1990 or two days before the scheduled hearing for reception of petitioners evidence, a counsel for
petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and
due to return on the first week of June. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8,
1990.
June 8, 1990 - petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared
petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on
the basis of the evidence presented.
June 29, 1990 - the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondents marriage to
petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent.
August 24, 1990 - Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision. No appeal was taken from the
decision.
September 24, 1990 - private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties."
October 17, 1990 - Petitioner opposed the motion. Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner,
through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990
decision.
August 8, 1991 - Trial court denied the petition. July 29, 1994 CA denied appeal.

ISSUE: WON a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the case NO.

Petitioners arguments:
1. The decision of the trial court was null and void. He contends he was denied due process when, after
failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to
present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner
justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or
rehabilitation reasons." (drug dependency)
2. Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which provides
that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for

Giselle

1 of 2

the state because the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages
by default." He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should
have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-
appearance.

RATIO:
SC ON ARGUMENT #1:
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on
the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert
facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition
is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein.
The records, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this confinement.
And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which reason the
decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform
him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face.
Petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the
petition, cross-examined private respondents witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private
respondents motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where
there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him,
which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he
was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who
seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his
own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had
been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

SC ON ARGUMENT #2:
No proof of collusion. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60
of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer.
Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private
respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-
examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion
existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or
fabricated by any of the parties.

Giselle

2 of 2

Lazaro v. Rural Bank

August 15, 2003
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Petition for Annulment of Judgment

G.R. No. 139895

Quisimbing, J.

SUMMARY: Lazaro was held in default for failure to answer RFBIs services of summons. Lazaro filed petition for
annulment of judgment on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. He alleged that the summonses were not
served at his true address.
SC held that Lazaro failed to avail of the ordinary and appropriate remedies in assailing the questioned
judgments of the trial courts, and also failed to show that he could not have availed of the ordinary and
appropriate remedies under the Rules. Before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47; it is a
condition sine qua non that one must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for
relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies, through no fault attributable to petitioner.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Review of CA resolutions denying 1) petition for declaration of nullity of
decision and 2) MR.
FACTS:
Lazaro obtained a loan from Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas Inc (RFBI).
Lazaro failed to pay said loan on March 12, 1984. RFBI sued him before the RTC Bulacan.
Mar 16, 1984 Summons was served at Lazaros address as No. 856 Esteban Street, Dalandanan,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Lazaro did not answer so TC declared him in default.
TC ordered Lazaro to pay RFBI: 1) 35, 336.41 as balance and 2) 3000 as attys fees
RFBI then sought to enforce judgment against petitioners property
1988 RFBI instituted another suit against Lazaro. Summons was served to the same address and
Lazaro failed to file an answer or responsive pleading again. TC declared him in default.
Writ of execution was issued and served at Lazaros actual residence at No. 12 Ricardo Street, Brgy.
Katipunan, Quezon City.
Dec 15, 1998, RFBI caused the cancellation of Lazaros title to the subject land and secured a new one in
its name.
Lazaro filed a petition, for declaration of nullity of judgments in the previous civil cases before CA on the
grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. Lazaro alleged that RFBI did not indicate his true address thereby
depriving him the opportunity to participate in the hearing of cases and a violation of due process.
CA:

Denied the petition.

Lazaro failed to justify why he did not avail of the other ordinary and appropriate remedies provided in
Section 1, Rule 47 RoC, before filing petition for declaration of nullity of judgement.
Found nothing fraudulent in the misstatement of petitioners real address as Lazaro also owned the
property found in the address indicated in the complaints.
Regardless of whether or not it was his actual residence, Lazaro would eventually receive all his mail
matters addressed there.
Action to annul judgment had already prescribed because Section 3 of Rule 47, gave Lazaro only four (4)
years from discovery of fraud within which to file his action. Lazaro supposedly learned of the alleged fraud
sometime in 1985 and on May 5, 1988, respectively and yet he only filed on April 28, 1999. (11 years after)

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
Only became aware of judgments when RFBI tried to enforce writ of execution, so other remedies no
longer available
Contends lack of jurisdiction because he was not properly served with summons.
ISSUES:
W/N petition for annulment of judgment failed to allege that the ordinary remedies were not available to him after
the assailed decisions have been rendered? YES
W/N states a valid ground for annulment of judgment
Lopez, Catherine Nicole

CASE #

HELD:
Before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders,
and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal
from, or file a petition for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, through
no fault attributable to him.
Not only did Lazaro fail to avail of the ordinary and appropriate remedies in assailing the questioned
judgments of the trial courts, but he also failed to show that he could not have availed of the ordinary and
appropriate remedies under the Rules.
He could have moved to quash the writs of execution. But instead, he merely alleged that he approached
Atty. Gregorio Salazar, the banks counsel, for clarification and assistance (not one of the ordinary and
appropriate remedies in the Rules).
Failure to explain why he failed to avail of said remedies, which were still available to him at that time is
fatal to his cause.
To be sure, a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is not a substitute for ones own neglect in
not availing of the ordinary and appropriate remedies, but a peculiar remedy granted under certain
conditions to those who failed to avail of the ordinary remedies without their fault.
Re: Summons
Lazaro was personally served with summons. This is attested to by the certified true copies of the process
servers returns.
The sheriffs certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out.
Petition DENIED.

Lopez, Catherine Nicole

CASE #

Aminin Abubakar v. Aurora Abubakar

22 October 1999
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Post-Judgment Remedies; Ordinary Appeal; From RTC to CA

G.R. No. 134622

Davide, Jr., C.J.

SUMMARY: In a divorce proceeding between Aminin and Aurora, the issue was limited to how the properties subject of
the partition should be divided. The Circuit Court rendered an order granting the divorce, dividing the properties equally,
and ordering Aminin to pay Aurora P10,000 as support during the idda. Aurora appealed the matter only with regard to
the partition; however, the District Court modified the order by granting Aurora P110,000 as support in arrears, P50,000
as moral damages, and by ordering the partition of another property not included in the previous list. Court held that the
District Court, in acting as an appellate court, was not bound to go beyond what the appellant was asking for. Only errors
claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition praying that the District Court decision be reversed and set aside insofar
as it pertains to the award of moral damages to Aurora, the grant to her of support in arrears, and the partition of the lot in
Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur

FACTS: Aminin and Aurora were married in accordance with Islamic law. In 1996, Aurora filed a complaint against
Aminin for Divorce with Prayer for Support and Damages, premised on the alleged failure of Aminin to secure her
consent before contracting a subsequent marriage (in violation of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws). In the pre-trial
order, The Circuit Court limited the issue to be resolved at the trial to a determination of the rights or the respective
shares of the parties with respect to the property subject of the partition after divorce. Properties to be divided were a
half unit of a duplex and a 550-sqm. lot in Tumaga, Zamboanga City, and a house and lot in Jolo, Sulu.

Circuit Court judge issued an order dissolving the marriage, distributing the properties equally between the
two as co-owners, and ordering Aminin to pay Aurora P10,000 as support during the 3-month idda (waiting
period)
Aurora filed a notice of appeal only as far as it involves the issue of partition. Both parties were
concerned only with the conclusion that the properties were conjugal.
The District Court judge affirmed the Circuit Court decision, but modified it such that he included a real
estate in Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur as part of their common property to be partitioned, and ordered Aminin
to pay Aurora P110,000 as support in arrears and P50,000 as moral damages.
Aminin filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

AMININS ARGUMENT: The District Court erred in ordering the award of moral damages, grant of support in
arrears, and the partition of the land in Alicia, since these issues were never raised by Aurora in her
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the District Court erred in ordering the modifications
HELD: Yuh. Order of the District Court is reversed and set aside.

The purpose of pre-trials is the simplification, abbreviation, and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation.
The stipulations in a pre-trial order legally bind the parties. In this case, the parties agreed on the divorce, the idda,
and the limitation of partition of assets to the properties abovementioned.
The sole issue to be determined at the trial was: What are the rights or the respective shares of the herein plaintiff
and defendant with respect to the property subject of partition after divorce? which was answered by the Circuit Court
in its order.

The District Court, acting as an appellate court, was not bound to go beyond what the appellant was asking
for. Rule 51, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter
or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in
the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the
brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

Only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its
jurisdiction over the subject matter, errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the
proceedings therein.
Aurora lent the impression that she only wanted the court to determine how the properties should be
distributed between her and Aminin.
The District Court, in its modifications, not only defeated the intent and content of the pre-trial order but
also went beyond the sphere of its authority as delineated in the notice of appeal.
Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

CASE # 07

FIVE STAR BUS CO., INC. v. CA

July 17, 1996
Topic in Syllabus:
SUMMARY:

G.R. No. 120496

PUNO, J.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Case arose from civil case for breach of contract of carriage
and damages filed by respondents before the RTC. Current action is petition for review on
certiorari which seeks to set aside CA decision
FACTS:
Respondents Spouses Santos filed a case for breach of contract of carriage and
damages before the RTC of Kalookan against petitioners Five Star Bus Co., Inc. and
Carlos Salonga
Respondents sought indemnification for the death of their 22-year old son, Joey Santos, who
died aboard a passenger bus owned and operated by petitioner Five Star and driven by
Salonga
They alleged that their son rode the bus from Pangasinan to Manila when due to the gross
and wanton negligence, recklessness and imprudence of the bus driver, the bus hit an
oncoming trailer truck along the Urdaneta, Pangasinan Highwayimpact resulted in the death
of two passengers, one of whom was the respondents' son
Petitioner refused to pay them damages as heirs of the deceased, thus in the present action,
respondents prayed for Php50,000 for the death of their son, Php50,000 for moral damages,
Php20,000 for funeral expenses and Php20,000 attorney's fees
Petitioners: It was the negligence of the driver of trailer truck which encroached on the
oncoming bus' lane that caused the mishap resulting in Joey's death
September 22, 1992: Trial court set the pre-trial of the case on October 15, 1992 and
instructed counsels for both parties to notify their clients and to file their pre-trial briefscopies
of the pre-trial notice were sent to Atty. Emerico Lomibao, counsel for respondents and Atty.
Arnel Naidas, counsel for petitioners
October 15, 1992: Day of the pre-trial, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, neither did
they file a pre-trial brief. On motion by respondents' counsel, the TC declared petitioners as in
default and scheduled the reception of their evidence on October 30, 1992
October 30, 1992: Respondent Lydia Santos testified together with Roger Santos (copassenger); documents in support of their testimonies were also presented
November 4, 1992: TC rendered decision in favor of respondents awarding them the
following: Compensatory damages of Php50,000; Actual damages (funeral expenses) of
Php12,000; Attorney's fees of Php10,000 and costs of the suit
On the day of the promulgation of the TC decision, the law firm of Vivar, Lopez and
Associates entered its appearance as counsel for petitioners
November 10, 1992: Motion to set aside the order of default was filed by Atty. Romula of
aforementioned law firm; alleged that Atty. Naidas, former counsel of petitioners (to whom pretrial notice was sent) resigned as counsel and their law firm's services were engaged by
petitioner much later and records of the case were delivered to them only on October 28, 1992
(days after pre-trial conference)
November 18, 1991: Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the TC decisionboth
motions were denied
Petitioners appealed to the CA: Affirmed the TC decision BUT added an award of Php50,000
moral damages

MORTELL, Khriska Viktoria M.

CASE #08

ISSUE:
1. WON TC erred in declaring petitioners in default (as they were not notified) NO
2. WON TC decided the case with undue haste NO
3. WON CA erred in awarding moral damages even if respondents did not appeal the TC
decision - YES
HELD:
TC DID NOT ERR IN DECLARING PETITIONERS IN DEFAULT FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT
THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
Rule: When the court schedules a case for pre-trial, notices must be served on the party
separately from his counsel which may be made directly to both party and counsel BUT it is
preferred that service of such notice be made through or care of his counsel at counsel's
address with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying the party of the
date, time and place of pre-trial conference
It is the duty of counsel to see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial,
otherwise he will be liable for grave administrative disciplinary action
In this case, notice was sent to counsels of both parties with express instruction that they notify
their clients of the conference
Atty. Naidas (petitioners' counsel) received the notice seventeen days before the scheduled
conference and two days before his resignation as house counsel of Five Star, he had ample
time to notify petitioners of the pre-trial conferenceas far as the trial court was concerned, he
continued to be petitioners' counsel of record since no withdrawal of appearance had been
filed by him
After declaring a party as in default or non-suited, TC is not duty-bound to receive evidence exparte on the very same day it issued the default order: the hearing petitioners failed to attend
was a pre-trialpre-trial and trial on the merits are usually held on separate days to enable
parties to prepare for trial
Petitioners have no cause to complain for it was to their advantage that TC scheduled
reception of respondents' evidence 15 days after pre-trialtime gap gave them opportunity to
move for reconsideration
TC DID NOT DECIDE THE CASE WITH UNDUE HASTE
Petitioners argue that case was decided with undue haste because it promulgated its decision
only 4 days after receiving respondents' evidence
Records show that issues of the case were simple and only basic evidence (testimonies of
two witnesses which were short)
PERTINENT: CA ERRED IN AWARDING ADDITIONAL MORAL DAMAGES
Fairness dictates that a party who has not appealed from a judgment of the trial court is bound
by the terms of the judgment
An appellee, who is not an appellant, may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is
to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he may not do so if his purpose is to
have the judgment modified or reversed, in which case he must appeal
CA AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION: award for moral damages is deleted

MORTELL, Khriska Viktoria M.

CASE #08

PAA v. CA, CSC, Dir AMOGUIS

Dec 4, 1997
T OPIC IN SYLLABUS: Extraordinary Appeals, From RTC to SC

G.R. No. 126560

DAVIDE JR

SUMMARY:
CSC dismissed Paas case. Paa filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of time to file Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 45. The CA denied such motion decreeing that petition under Rule 45 is the wrong.
SC upheld the CA decision. The Court held that the mode of appeal from a decision of the Civil Service
Commission, to bring it within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, is a petition for review to
be filed within the period therein fixed. This petition for review is the same as that contemplated in Section
29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 269), as amended, and in Circular No. 2-90, but not that treated
in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which refers to petitions filed in the Supreme Court for the review of
decisions or final orders of the Court of Appeals.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition to set aside, on ground of grave abuse of discretion
(which he designated in both the caption and the body as one for certiorari under Rule 65 or
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as amended), the resolution of Court of Appeals denying
petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court,
FACTS:
Paa was a DOLE Administrative Officer who was dismissed from the service for conduct
grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, frequent absences from duty during
office hours, and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations.
He appealed to the Civil Service Commission who also found him guilty isand imposed
penalty of dismissal.
On 12 April 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Certiorari Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, alleging that he received
a copy of the 13 February 1996 Civil Service Commission resolution on 29 March 1996
and he had then until 13 April 1996 within which to file a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court as amended; and that he needed three (3) weeks to secure
certified true copies of the resolutions and other pertinent documents [from] the Civil
Service Commission, Quezon City,
CA denied his motion, decreeing that the instant Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the wrong mode of appeal.
Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91)
specifically provides that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the
quasi-judicial agencies (which includes the Civil Service Commission) is Petition for
Review.
Petitioner filed this petition with the SC
PETITIONERS ALLEGATIONS:
CA committed grave abuse of discretion in adhering and limiting itself only to appeal by a
petition for review under Supreme Court revised administrative circular no. 1-95 (revised
circular no. 1-91)
Question of law as to whether decisions or resolutions of the CSC issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction can no longer be reviewed by
CA by a petition for review under rule 45 or 65 despite the patent grave abuse of
discretion in deciding a case based on documents/evidence introduced for the first time on
appeal.
Question of law as to whether a petition for certiorari under rule 45 or 65 can be
considered a mode of appeal and if so considered as a mode of appeal whether it is the
proper remedy to correct super [sic] grave abuse of discretion
OSG COMMENTS:
PUA, IRENE MA E

CASE #09

Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion as the petition which petitioner actually filed with the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40341 on 10 May 1996 was one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, as clearly shown by the grounds petitioner relied upon. Essentially, his grounds are: DOLE
Secretarys SUPER grave abuse of discretion in dismissing him when he is a good employee; CSC super
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the said order.
CSCs COMMENTS: Paas reliance on Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129 is misplaced. The said section
vests upon the CA exclusive original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The only mode of appeal from its decisions is a petition for review, in accordance with Revised
Circular No. 1-95 of this Court and Section 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902.
ISSUES: WON the CA committed error in denying petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. - NO
HELD:
A party aggrieved by any decision, final order or resolution of the Civil Service
Commission had only one remedy, namely, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to be filed with SC however, Congress passed R.A. No. 7902 vesting
upon the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over cases decided or resolved by the
Civil Service Commission, but not the other two Constitutional Commissions
Pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the mode of appeal from a decision
of the Civil Service Commission, to bring it within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, is a petition for review to be filed within the period therein
fixed. This petition for review is the same as that contemplated in Section 29 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 269), as amended, and in Circular No. 2-90,
but not that treated in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which refers to petitions
filed in the Supreme Court for the review of decisions or final orders of the Court
of Appeals.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review as a mode of appeal to the Court of
Appeals from decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CTA and quasi-judicial bodies, including the
Civil Service Commission, is governed by Rule 43
Considering that petitioner announced in his motion for extension of time that he would be
filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for peremptorily denying the motion.
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65)
Petition for review as a mode of appeal
based on questions of law which the raises the issue as to whether the lower
appellant desires the appellate court to court acted without or in excess of
resolve
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion
involves the review of the judgment,
may be directed against an interlocutory
award or final order on the merits
order of the court prior to appeal from the
judgment or where there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
must be made within the reglementary
may be filed not later than sixty (60) days
period for appeal
from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed.
stays the judgment, award or order
unless a writ of preliminary injunction or a
appealed from.
temporary restraining order shall have been
issued, does not stay the challenged
proceeding.
petitioner and respondent are the original
parties are the aggrieved,
PUA, IRENE MA E

CASE #09

parties to the action, and the lower court or

quasi-judicial agency is not to be
impleaded
prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is
not required
appellate court is in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction and power of review

party against the lower court or quasijudicial agency and the prevailing
parties, who thereby respectively become
the petitioner and respondents.
motion for reconsideration is a condition
precedent subject to certain exceptions.
higher court exercises original jurisdiction
under its power of control
and supervision over the proceedings of
lower courts

If, indeed, petitioner initially believed that he had the alternative remedy of a special civil
action for certiorari which would have been more effective and adequate, then it was not
necessary for him to ask for an extension of time to file the petition. Under Rule 65 he
had a reasonable period which is ninety (90) days.
The Court is however not persuaded that petitioner initially thought of filing a special civil
action. All along, what he had in mind was a petition for review, as evidenced by his
express reference in his motion to a petition for review under Rule 45
If petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari on 10 May 1996, it was
only because he had lost his right to appeal by way of the intended petition for
review.
The proffered justification then for his belated filing of a special action for
certiorari was nothing but a crude attempt to circumvent standing rules of
procedure, which we cannot tolerate.
It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari will not lie as a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal, and we find no special nor compelling reasons why we
should make out an exception here.
In any case, even if his recourse under Rule 65 is permitted, the end result would remain
unchanged since a perusal of the challenged resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
fails to disclose any grave abuse of discretion on its part.

PUA, IRENE MA E

CASE #09

Cuartero vs. CA. Aug. 5, 1992. Gutierrez, J.

Date
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS:
SUMMARY:Cuartero filed a complaint before the RTC of QC against the spouses Evangelista for
a sum of money plus damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
RTC ruled in his favor. The CA however cancelled the writ of preliminary attachment previously
issued by the RTC on the ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
said spouses. SC reversed the CA decision and reinstated the order and writ of attachment
issued by the RTC. The SC explained that writ of preliminary attachment can be applied for
and granted at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter upon fulfillment
of the pertinent requisites laid down by law ("at the commencement of the action" is
interpreted as referring to the date of the filing of the complaint which is a time before summons
is served on the defendant or even before summons issues).
However, said writ cannot bind and affect the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is
eventually obtained; thus, it is required that when the proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be simultaneously
made. In the case at bar, when the writ of attachment was served on the spouses Evangelista,
the summons and copy of the complaint were also simultaneously served.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:
FACTS:
August 20, 1990: Cuartero filed a complaint before the RTC of QC against the spouses
Evangelista for a sum of money (P2,171,794.91) plus damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

August 24, 1990: The RTC issued an order granting ex-parte Cuarteros prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

September 19, 1990: The writ of preliminary attachment was issued pursuant to the trial
courts order dated August 24, 1990. On the same day, the summons for the spouses
Evangelista were likewise prepared.

September 20, 1990: A copy of the writ of preliminary attachment, the order dated August
24, 1990, the summons and the complaint were all simultaneously served upon the spouses
Evangelista at their residence. Immediately thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Sila levied, attached
and pulled out the properties in compliance with the court's directive. Subsequently, the
spouses filed motion to set aside the order dated August 24, 1990 and discharge the writ of
preliminary attachment for having been irregularly and improperly issued.

October 4, 1990: RTC denied the motion for lack of merit. Spouses Evangelista then filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the CA questioning the orders of the lower court dated
August 24, 1990 and October 4, 1990 with a prayer for a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the judge from taking further proceedings below.

June 27, 1991: CA granted the petition for certiorari. It nullified the orders of the RTC dated
August 24, 1990 and October 4, 1990 and cancelled the writ of preliminary attachment
issued on September 19, 1990.

SOLIS, RAFAEL ALEJANDRO L.

CA grounded its decision on its finding that the RTC did not acquire any jurisdiction over the
person of the private respondents: It is not disputed that neither service of summons with a
copy of the complaint nor voluntary appearance of petitioners was had in this case before
the trial court issued the assailed order dated August 24, 1990, as well as the writ of
preliminary attachment dated September 19, 1990.

October 22, 1991: MR filed by Cuartero was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the CA promulgated on June 27, 1991
and October 22, 1991.

PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
ISSUES:
1.
WON issuance of writ of preliminary attachment is valid. YES
2.
W/N lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. YES.
HELD:
1.
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of
the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the
defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
whatever judgment might be secured in said action by the attaching creditor against the
defendant.
2.
Under section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the only requisites for the issuance of the
writ are the affidavit and bond of the applicant.
3.
As has been expressly ruled in BF Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, citing Mindanao
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, no notice to the adverse party or
hearing of the application is required inasmuch as the time which the hearing will take could be
enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of
attachment issues.
4.
The writ of preliminary attachment can be applied for and granted at the commencement
of the action or at any time thereafter (Section 1, Rule 57, Rules of Court). "At the
commencement of the action" is interpreted as referring to the date of the filing of the complaint
which is a time before summons is served on the defendant or even before summons issues.
5.
A writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons is served upon the
defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the defendant
until jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore, it is required that when the
proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should
be simultaneously made. In the case at bar, when the writ of attachment was served on the
spouses Evangelista, the summons and copy of the complaint were also simultaneously served.
Dispositive Portion: Petition granted. CA decision is reversed. Order and writ of attachment
issued by the RTC Judge are reinstated.

SOLIS, RAFAEL ALEJANDRO L.

LIBERTY INSURANCE CORP. v. CA

G.R. No. 104405
May 13, 1993
J. Bidin
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Preliminary Attanchment; Grounds
SUMMARY: Liberty paid Coke in accordance to the performance bond it issued in favor of Imperial
Organizations. Liberty demanded reimbursements but it was to no avail. It asked the RTC to issue a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment on the ground of fraud. RTC initially issued the Writ upon a finding of fraud, but on
MR, it was lifted because fraud was not sufficiently proven. The SC found that there was fraud, and stated
that to constitute fraud, the debtor intended to defraud the creditor; the fraud must relate to the execution
of the agreement; it is the reason which induced the other party into giving consent; must be committed
upon contracting the obligation sued upon.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review on certiorari for CA decision denying Libertys MR.
FACTS:
May 1988: Jose Imperial Organizations, Pty., thru Atty. Imperial, entered into an agreement with CocaCola Bottlers Philippines (Coke) to promote and sponsor 2 concerts featuring Earth, Wind and Fire.
Coke required Imperial Organizations to put a performance bond to ensure compliance with the
agreement, specifically to guarantee the cash sponsorship and cash advances of Coke.
Liberty issued a P3M bond in exchange for an indemnity agreement executed by by Imperial
Organizations, Atty. Imperial, Arkin, and Madlangbayan to indemnify the former for any and all
damages, including attyss fees.
Imperial Organizations and private respondents (PR) failed to comply with their obligation so Liberty
paid Coke P3M.
Liberty demanded reimbursement but to no avail so it filed with the RTC Manila a complaint for
damages with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against PRs.
TC: Writ of attachment is issued from a finding of fraud in accordance with Sec. 1, par (d), Rule 57 1.
o

Arkin filed a Motion to Quash/ Recall Writ of Attachment. Denied by the new judge of the same RTC.
o

Arkin made 3 conveyances of properties, though made before the institution of the action, is a
circumstance tending to show fraudulent conveyance with intent to defraud his creditors.

Arkin filed an MR. Granted MR and RTC lifted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
o
o

There was fraud by Madlangbayan because she mortgaged a land she did not own, as seen in the TCT
and by Arkin when he mortgaged a Mercedes Benz representing it to be free from any lien but actually
not.

Fraud should be committed prior to or simultaneous with the birth of the obligation but evidence shows
that the offering of the collaterals was done 2 days after the bonds issuance.
Alleged disposition of Arkin was not specific and Liberty did not prove the intent of Arkin to defraud.

CA: Dismissed the special civil action for certiorari by Liberty.

o Premature petition; MR still an available remedy

ISSUE:
1) WON the writ of preliminary attachment in question was properly or regularly issued YES

2) WON petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned orders of the court a quo bars the filing
of a special civil action for certiorari before the respondent court.

1'Section

1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. - A plaintiff or any party may, at the commencement of the action or at
anytime thereafter, have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may
be recovered in the following cases:
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the obligation upon which the action is brought.
SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #07

HELD:
1. In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
upon which the action is brought, Section 1 (d) of Rule 57 authorizes the plaintiff or any proper party to have
the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered therein. (See footnote)
[Doctrine]: Republic v. Gonzales: To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the
execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent
which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is
fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to
pay. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the
circumstances attendant in each case.
Case at Bar:
All the collaterals given by the respondent Arkin as security for the bond were either fraudulent or heavily
encumbered.

Fake TCT of Madlangbayan; Heavily encumbered Benz and was even disposed of and 2 condo units were sold to
a company Arkin owned.

No impropriety or irregularity in the issuance of the writ of attachment especially so where petitioner has fully
complied with the requirements for the issuance thereof
What was irregular was the lifting of the writ.
Arkin is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment on the ground that the writ has been
improperly or irregularly issued.

Mindanao Savings and Loan Assoc. v. CA: when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at
the same time the applicant's cause of action: e.g. [an action for fraud] the defendant is not allowed to file a
motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual
averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was based and consequently that the
writ based therein had been improperly or irregularly issued - the reason being that the hearing on such motion
for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial on the merits. Therefore, when the writ of attachment
is of this nature, the only way it can be dissolved is by a counterbond."

NICE TO KNOW:
2. Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless an inferior court, through a motion for reconsideration, had been given an
opportunity to correct the imputed errors. However, this rule admits of exceptions such as 1) when the issue raised is
one purely of law; 2) where public interest is involved; 3) in cases of urgency (Quirino vs. Grospe, 169 SCRA 702 [1989]);
or 4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action (People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 [1989]).
Case at Bar:
Petitioner's failure to file a MR in the trial court before commencing certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals is not
fatal considering the existence of special circumstances that warrant immediate and more direct action
The indecent haste with which respondent Arkin had been disposing of his properties demonstrates the
imperative need for a more adequate relief requiring an immediate and more direct action.
Filing a motion for reconsideration would have served no useful purpose nor can it be considered a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy since the order directing the sheriff to discharge or lift the writ of attachment was issued
on the same day the order granting the quashal was made.
We hold that respondent judge in issuing the contested orders (lifting the writ) has acted capriciously, whimsically and
arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction correctible by the special writ
of certiorari.
SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #07

ALEJANDRO NG WEE v. MANUEL TANKIANSEE

13 February 2008
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Attachment; Grounds.

G.R. No. 171124

Nachura, J.

SUMMARY: Wee invested with Wincorp. Without his consent/authority, Wincorp used his money to lend money to corporations. Wee
then filed a case against Wincorp officers and directors and an affidavit for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Tankiansee filed motion to discharge. SC lifts Writ of Preliminary Attachment, on the ground that Wees affidavits did not contain a
specific allegation of Tankiansees fraud which is required when filing for a WPA on Rule 57, Sec 1(d).

FACTS:
Alejandro Ng Wee made several money placements (total of P210,595,991.62) with Westmont Investment Corporation
(Wincorp), an affiliate of Westmont Bank that is engaged in the business of an investment house with authority and license
to extend credit.
Sometime in Feb 2000: Wee received disturbing news on Wincorps financial condition. Upon his investigation, he
discovered that Wincorp extended a loan equal to his total money placement to another corporation (Power Merge) whose
subscribed capital is only P35.7M. This credit facility, in turn, originated from another P1.5B loan extended by Wincorp to
another corporation (Hottick Holdings).
o When Hottick defaulted in its loan obligations, the parties agreed on a settlement when Luis Virata (Hotticks president)
assumed the obligation of the surety.
o The settlement scheme involved transferring Wees money placements without his knowledge and consent to Power
Merge in order to virtually free Virata from liability.
o It was allegedly through Wincorps (and its officers and directors) false representations that Wee was enticed to roll
over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the money to Virata / Power Merge.
Wee filed a case for damages against the officers and directors of Wincorp (among them is Vice Chairman and Director
Manuel Tankiansee), alleging that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit and onnived with said officers to
fraudulently obtain Wees money for Viratas own benefit, without intention of paying the amounts.
Based on the allegations of the complaint and an affidavit of Wee, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties not exempt from execution of all the defendants in the case, subject, among others, to
petitioners filing of a P50M-bond.
Tankainsee and other defendants moved for the discharge of the writ, claiming that it was improperly issued and the bond
furnished was grossly insufficient. RTC denied all these motions.
o The denial of these motions were affirmed in the certiorari proceedings filed by the directors (except Tankiansee) before
the CA and the SC.
Despite the finality of the denial of the motion to discharge, Tankiansee filed another Motion to Discharge Attachment
before the RTC, re-pleading the same grounds as before, but adding that:.
o He was not present in Wincorps board meetings approving the questionable transactions; and
o He could not have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he was also victimized by its fraudulent
schemes.
RTC still denied the motion, claiming that the grounds were already passed upon it, and the additional grounds are
affirmative defenses that pertained to the merits of the case. MR also denied.
Tankiansee filed a certiorari petition before the CA. CA granted, and lifted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment (but only to
the extent that it concerned Tankiansees propertees). MR by Wee denied. SC now affirms CA.
ISSUE: W/N Writ of Preliminary Attachment should be lifted? YES.
PETITIONERS (WEE) ARGUMENTS:
CA should not have given due course to the certiorari petition, since it merely raised errors in judgment.
Grounds for lifting the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already relate to the merits of the case, which cannot be used as
bases for discharging such writ.
These issues had already been resolved with finality.
RESPONDENTS (TANKIANSEE) ARGUMENTS:
The general and sweeping allegation of fraud against respondent in Wees affidavit (that respondent as an officer and
director of Wincorp allegedly connived with the other defendants to defraud petitioner) is not sufficient basis for the trial
court to order the attachment of respondents properties.
o Nowhere in the affidavit mentions Tankainsee and any specific act committed by the latter to defraud Wee.
o A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting
perfunctorily the words of the Rules.
o Connivance cannot also be based on mere association but must be particularly alleged and established as a fact.
RTC, in resolving the Motion to Discharge Attachment, need not actually delve into the merits of the case. All that the
court has to examine are the allegations in the complaint and the supporting affidavit.
Wee cannot rely on the finality of other decisions to support his claim because Tankiansee was not a party to those cases.
SULIT, LEOR JYLE C.

PAGE 1 OF 2

CASE #03

HELD: The Writ should be lifted.

The basis of the application of Wee for the Writ of Preliminary Attachment is Rule 57, Sec 1 (d).
o Rule 57, Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the action or at any time
before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security
for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
For a writ to issue under the rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud
because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtors mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply
with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.
Under Liberty Insurance v. CA:
o It must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt / incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor.
o The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party
into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given.
o Fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if, at the time
of contracting it, the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be
proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case.
In this case, Wees Affidavit is does not contain any factual statement that Tankiansee committed a fraud.
The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge. (This
explains why the SC previously affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter.)
As to the participation of Tankiansee in the said transaction, the affidavit merely states that Tankiansee, an officer and
director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants in the civil case to defraud Wee of his money placements. No
other factual averment or circumstance details how Tankiansee committed a fraud or how he connived with the other
defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued upon.
In other words, Wee did not show any specific act/deed to support the allegation that Tankiansee is guilty of fraud.
The general averment in the affidavit that Tankiansee is an officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the
other defendants to commit a fraud is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Since the affidavit is the foundation of the writ, it must contain particulars as to how the fraud imputed to Tankiansee was
committed so that the Court can decide whether or not the writ should be issued.
o It did not contain any statement of other factual circumstances to show that Tankiansee, at the time of contracting
the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
o Neither did it show how Tankiansee committed the alleged fraud.
In the application for the writ under Sec 1 (d), the applicant is compelled to to give a hint about what constituted the fraud
and how it was perpetrated because it is established that fraud is never presumed.
The mere fact that Tankiansee is an officer and director of Wincorp does not necessarily give rise to the inference that he
committed a fraud or that he connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud.
While under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons, to whom liability
will directly attach, this is only done when the wrongdoing has been clearly and convincingly established.
The remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance.
Therefore, the rules governing its issuance are strictly construed against the applicant.
If the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the court shall refrain from issuing it.
Otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.
Likewise, the writ should not be abused to cause unnecessary prejudice. If it is wrongfully issued on the basis of false or
insufficient allegations, it should at once be corrected.
Since Wee has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed
by Tankiansee, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the Writ against the properties of Tankainsee.
The merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment. Otherwise, an applicant for the dissolution
could force a trial of the merits of the case on his motion.
However, the principle finds no application in this case because Wee has not yet fulfilled the requirements for the
issuance of the writ against the Tankiansees properties. The evil sought to be prevented by the said ruling will not arise,
because the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the writ in this case can be determined by simply reading the
complaint and the affidavit in support of the application.
Also, the prior rulings of the SC affirming the Writ of attachment is not binding on Tankiansee because he was never a party
therero. He is also not in the same situation as the petitioners therein. The other parties were attributed with specific allegations
of fraud, while Tankiansee was only attributed with general averments of fraud.
SULIT, LEOR JYLE C.

PAGE 2 OF 2

CASE #03

D A V A O LIG H T & PO W ER CO ., IN C. v. CA
29 Nov. 1991 G.R. No. 93262 Narvasa, J.
TOPIC: Preliminary attachment; Procedure for grant ( 2-4, Rule 57)
SUMMARY: Davao Light filed a collection suit with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
The writ issued upon submission of the attachment bond, The defendants filed a motion to discharge the
attachment due to lack of jurisdiction to issue. SC held that provisional remedies may be granted even before
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, subject to the requirements under the Rules.
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari

5/2/89 - Davao Light filed a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages
against Queensland Hotel/Motel/Queensland Tourist Inn and Teodorico Adarna (defendants).
o Complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment (P.A.).
o 5/3 - RTC Davao Judge Nartatez granted the application + fixed the attachment bond at P4.6M.
5/11 - Davao Light submitted the attachment bond. The writ of attachment issued.
5/12 - The summons, writ of attachment, and copies of the complaint and attachment bond were
served on the defendants. Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff seized their properties.
Defendants filed a motion to discharge the attachment. Ground: lack of jurisdiction to issue, since
at the time the order of attachment was promulgated (May 3) and the attachment writ issued (May
11) RTC had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the defendants.
o RTC: Denied the motion. Defendants filed an action for certiorari at the CA.
o CA: Granted the petition. It annulled the RTCs orders and discharged the attachment.
Citing Sievert v. CA, said that the critical time when the TC acquires authority under the
law to act coercively against the defendant/his property is the time of the vesting of
jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant.

W/N a writ of P.A. may issue ex parte before acquisition of jurisdiction over defendants person YES.
It is incorrect to theorize that after commencement of the action but before acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff/court.
During this period, different acts may be done by the plaintiff/court, such as: appointment of a
guardian ad litem, the grant of authority to prosecute the suit as a pauper litigant, the amendment
of the complaint by the plaintiff as a matter of right, authorization by the Court of service of
summons by publication, the dismissal of the action by the plaintiff on mere notice.
o This is also true with regard to the provisional remedies. They may be validly and properly
applied for and granted even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (P.A.) - provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other
proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property
of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered.
o Purely statutory; law requires a strict construction of the provisions. No principle, statutory or
jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance before acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant.
o Rule 57 clearly states that after an action is commenced, the plaintiff may apply for and obtain
a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law,
and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant.
Immemorial practice sanctioned by the courts: Party incorporates the application for attachment in
the initiatory pleading. If sufficient in form and substance, TC issues the writ ex parte.
HEARING
Hearing on a motion/application for P.A. is generally not necessary unless otherwise directed by the
TC in its discretion. Only pre-requisite: That the Court be satisfied that:
o A sufficient cause of action exists, upon consideration of the affidavit of the applicant/ some
other person who personally knows the facts
o The case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 (Rule 57)
o There is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and
o The amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is
entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order (of attachment) is granted above
all legal counterclaims. (Sec. 3, Rule 57)
VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S.

PAGE 1 OF 2

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES CASE # 04

If granted, the writ shall issue upon the applicant's posting of "a bond executed to the adverse party
in an amount to be fixed by the judge, not exceeding the plaintiff's claim, conditioned that the latter
will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may
sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not
entitled thereto." (Sec. 4, Rule 57)
No hearing is required on an application for preliminary attachment, with notice to the defendant,
for the reason that this "would defeat the objective of the remedy [] (since the) time which such a
hearing would take, could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property
before a writ of attachment issues." (Mindanao Savings & Loan Association v. CA)

DEFENDANTS RECOURSE
The relative ease with which a P.A. may be obtained is matched and paralleled by the relative
facility with which the attachment may legitimately be prevented or frustrated. The defendant has
modes of recourse against a P.A. (even before property is levied, or even after property has been
released from a levy on attachment):
o Posting of a counterbond (Sec. 5, Rule 57)
o A showing of its improper/irregular issuance (Sec. 13, Rule 57)
BUT a P.A. may not be dissolved by the 2nd mode (i.e., only a counterbond is allowed) if:
1. P.A. is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action, or
2. In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought
because hearing such a motion for dissolution would be tantamount to a trial on the merits.
WHEN PROVISIONAL REMEDIES MAY BE EFFECTED
Provisional remedies may issue ex parte, but whatever the acts done by the Court prior to the
acquisition over the person of the defendant do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until
and unless such jurisdiction is eventually obtained.
Hence, when the sheriff/other proper officer implements the writ of attachment, it is essential that
he serve on the defendant the following (Sec. 5, Rule 57):
o Service of summons
o Copy of the complaint, application for attachment, affidavit, and bond
o Order and writ of attachment
Service of all such documents is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, but also upon considerations of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the
complaint against him; to accord him the opportunity to prevent attachment of his property.
COURTS SUMMARY OF THE RULING:
For the guidance of all concerned, the Court reiterates and reaffirms the proposition that writs of
attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor
have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its discretion, require prior hearing on the application
with notice to the defendant; but that levy on property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly
effected unless preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy
of the complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment (if not
incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment, and the plaintiffs
attachment bond.

Petition GRANTED; CA REVERSED; order and writ of attachment issued by RTC REINSTATED.

VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S.

PAGE 2 OF 2

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES CASE # 04

MASTER TOURS & TRAVEL CORP. V. CA

March 1, 1993

G.R. No. 105409

J. Padilla

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT; PRIOR OR CONTEMPORAENOUS SERVING OF SUMMONS

SUMMARY: Petitioner questioned the validity of an Order of Attachment (AKA preliminary attachment) issued by the court
ex-parte and served upon him together with the summons. The Court ruled that an application for preliminary attachment
may be made at the time of the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, which means it may be issued before
or after summons is served or even issued.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: MTR on a failed petition for certiorari.
FACTS: On February 28, 1991, summons together with a complaint for sum of money filed by respondent company (Cathay
Pacific) coupled with an Order of Attachment dated February 21 was served upon and received by petitioner. On March 25,
the petitioner moved to set aside the Order of Attachment saying that there was no prior notice and hearing and that the
averments in the complaint failed to satisfactorily allege the basis for the attachment as required by the Rules of Court.
Pending resolution of this motion, the petitioner (the defendant in that case) filed an Answer. The motion was subsequently
denied, and the petitioner moved for an MR.
Pending the MR, the parties executed a compromise agreement but before the trial court can approve of the
compromise agreement, the petitioner moved to withdraw the compromise agreement saying it was coerced and harassed
into signing the same. The earlier MR and this motion were submitted for resolution. However, the petitioner did not wait for
the resolution and filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA denied as the MR and motion to withdraw were still
pending. The RTC denied both motions so the petitioner appealed to the CA again. Denied again. Hence this petition.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: There was a denial of due process by the TC when it issued the ex-parte writ of preliminary
attachment without notice and hearing, before the court had even acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
(herein petitioner).
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: (None mentioned)
ISSUES:
1. W/N it was proper for the RTC to issue the Order of Attachment prior to notice and hearing and with
summons served simultaneously with the order.
2. W/N the withdrawal of the compromise agreement should be permitted.
HELD:
1. YES. As held in Davao Light, Rule 57 speaks of the grant of the remedy at the
commencement of the action or any time thereafter Davao Light and Power Co. v CA lays
down the rules for the issuance of the writ of attachment ex-parte. A preliminary attachment may
be defined, , as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at
the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party
taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered. (Rule 57) The phrase, at the commencement of the action, obviously refers to the date
of the filing of the complaint - is the date that marks the commencement of the action - by the filing
of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees - the plaintiff may apply for
and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by
law, and that he may do so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the
defendant. The party should attach the application or writ with the complaint and the only prerequisite is that the court is satisfied that the case falls under Sec 1 of Rule 57.
2. The Court said that rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is
immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be taken against the order denying the motion and
then discussed that the signature of the VP in a compromise greement is binding without the showing
of fraud, mistake or duress. The Court ruled that this was a question of fact and did not
conclusively settle this point. (HAHAHA.)
PETITION IS DENIED.

Rivera, Ma. Anne Tonette

CASE # 10

Eleazar Adlawan v. Hon. Judge Valeriano Tomol

G.R. No. L-63225
April 3, 1990
Fernan, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Provisional Remedies - Preliminary Attachment - Duration, discharge
SUMMARY: Adlawan was awarded contracts, and he sought financial assistance from Aboitiz, but
defaulted on payments, hence Aboitiz filed a complaint and an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment over his property. Later on, Aboitiz withdrew its complaint, so
Adlawan alleged his property should be returned to him. SC: the remedy of attachment is adjunct
to the main suit, and has no independent existence apart from a suit on a claim of the plaintiff
against the defendant. The writ of preliminary attachment issued is already dissolved and thus
non-existent since the complaint was withdrawn.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: This is a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus
seeking to annul the Order of Judge Tomol denying Adlawans motion to require the Provincial
Sheriff of Cebu to deliver to him the properties seized by the Sheriff of Davao City, and to annul
the Order of Judge Dulay denying for lack of merit Adlawan's Omnibus Motion to reconsider,
dissolve and set aside the Writ of seizure and Replevin.
FACTS: Adlawan was awarded by National Irrigation Administration (NIA) and the Bureau of
Public Highways (BPH) contracts for the construction of government infrastructure projects. He
sought financial assistance from Aboitiz, but failed to pay the installments, so Aboitiz filed a
complaint with Cebu CFI for the collection of a sum of money and damages, and an ex-parte
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Adlawans property.
The Executive Judge issued an order (without notice and hearing) directing the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment against Adlawans properties, real and personal, upon the filing of
an attachment bond for Php 4M. The case was raffled to Tomol, and writs of preliminary
attachment were issued to the Sheriffs of Cebu, Davao City, Quezon City, Davao del Sur and
del Norte, directing them to attach Adlawans real and personal properties in their jurisdictions.
Aboitiz filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion asking to take possession and custody of the attached
properties to protect its interest and to avoid any damage or deterioration, as the sheriff has no
proper place to store or deposit said properties. Tomol granted this. Conversely, before
submitting an answer to the complaint, Adlawan filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars and to Set
Aside the Ex-Parte Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
Tomol: the discharge of the writ of attachment is unavoidable on the ground that it was issued
ex-parte (no notice or hearing), based on the alleged removal by the defendants of their
properties with intent to defraud the plaintiff, which allegation was limited to a bare assertion and
not persuasively substantial. Tomol issued an Order lifting and vacating the Order of attachment
Aboitiz filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a stay of the Order dissolving the writ of preliminary
attachment, and prayed for the court to direct the sheriff of Davao City to stop the enforcement
of the order lifting the attachment and to grant them 15 days to elevate the matter to the
Appellate Court. Judge Tomol issued an Order granting this.
3 Deputy Sheriffs of Cebu implemented the Order lifting the Writ of Attachment and were able to
take out some of Adlawans personal properties. They were not able to take out all of said
properties because of the Order to stay its implementation filed by Aboitiz. Adlawan then filed an
Application for Award of Damages, for rentals on the attached heavy construction equipment
and other properties for P30k per day from the date of seizure until those properties were
returned to him.

Bries

CASE #6

Aboitiz filed a Notice of Dismissal or Withdrawal of Complaint. Tomol issued an Order

confirming the dismissal of the case. Adlawan filed a Motion praying for the issuance of an order
to the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu to implement and enforce the Order of Tomol dissolving the writ
of preliminary attachment and to secure the delivery of the attached properties to Adlawan.
Tomol issued an Order denying the Motion, because Aboitiz filed a civil case for delivery of
Personal Properties with Replevin and Damages before the Cebu CFI, and Adlawan filed a case
for damages before the same CFI, related to the seizure of his properties under the writ of
preliminary attachment. Re: the replevin case filed by Aboitiz, the CFI of Cebu, issued an Order
for the seizure and delivery of the properties described to Aboitiz. The seized properties were
delivered to Aboitiz.
Adlawan filed an Omnibus Motion to dissolve and set aside the Writ of Seizure and Replevin
and to direct that the properties seized be returned, and to dismiss the complaint. In support of
this motion, Adlawan alleged that the personal properties seized are in custodia legis by virtue
of a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the CFI of Cebu, presided by Tomol. Judge Dulay
of the CFI Lapu-Lapu denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari and mandamus impleading Tomol, Judge Dulay in Lapu-Lapu City, and Aboitiz.
ISSUE: WON the properties should be returned to the possession of Adlawan.
HELD: YES. The attached properties left in the custody of Aboitiz are to be returned to Adlawan
without prejudice to the outcome of the cases filed by both parties. A writ of preliminary
attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending,
to be levied upon the property of the defendant therein. This property will then be held by the
Sheriff as security for the satisfaction of the judgment secured in that action by the attaching
creditor against the defendant.
What attachment or garnishment does:
1. it seizes upon property of an alleged debtor in advance of final judgment and holds it
subject to appropriation, which prevents the loss or dissipation of the property by fraud
or other means.
2. it subjects property of the debtor to the payment of a creditor's claim in cases where
personal service cannot be obtained upon the debtor
Attachment is an ancillary remedy which enables the attaching party to realize upon relief
sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. It has no independent
existence from a suit on a claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. Courts have no jurisdiction
to order the delivery of personal property (replevin) to the plaintiff if the property is under
attachment. Only courts having supervisory control or superior jurisdiction in the premises,
have the right to interfere with and change possession of property in custodia legis. The
garnishment of property to satisfy a writ of execution operates as an attachment and places
upon the property a lien by which said property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court
issuing the writ. It is brought into custodia legis under the control of said court.
The writ of preliminary attachment issued is already dissolved and thus non-existent in view of
the withdrawal of the complaint by Aboitiz. Even if the writ of attachment can be considered
independently of the main case, the same, having been improperly issued as found by Tomol
himself, is void and can no longer justify holding properties in custodia legis. The attached
properties of Adlawan which are in the custody of Aboitiz should be returned.

Bries

CASE #6

SOFIA DEVESA V. CRISPIN ARBES

MARCH 23, 1909
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; GROUNDS

G.R. No. 4891

CARSON, J.

SUMMARY: TC ordered a preliminary injunction restraining the enjoyment of the Arbes over the disputed
land. SC held that the PI was improper because it was granted without giving the defendant an opportunity
to be heard, and so the right of plaintiff over the land was not yet determined. PI, as a rule, cannot be
granted to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has
not been established by law.
NATURE: Appeal to the SC.
FACTS
Sofia Devesa filed a complaint alleging that the Crisipin Arbes, administrator of the estate of Gregoria
Arbes, deceased, had unlawfully taken possession of certain rice lands and cocoanut groves, the
property of the Devesa.
Devesa prayed for an injunction restraining Arbes from continuing in possession and enjoying the fruits
of the land until and unless he obtained a final judgment in a proper action declaring these lands to be
the property of the estate of which he is administrator.
TC: Apparently without giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard, granted the preliminary
injunction prayed for, conditioned upon the execution of a bond for costs and damages, whereupon the
defendant presented a motion which though irregular in form may fairly be regarded as a demurrer to the
complaint on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and prayed that the
preliminary injunction be dissolved.
TC: found that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the land, and rendered final judgment in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint, granting a final injunction perpetually restraining the
defendant administrator from continuing in possession of the land in question or enjoying its fruits.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the preliminary injuction was proper. NO.
RATIO
We are of opinion that the remedy by injunction sought by the plaintiff and allowed by the trial court was
not the proper remedy for the cause of action set out in the pleadings and established by the evidence,
and that, in accordance with the provisions of section 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court should
have granted "relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and supported by the evidence and
embraced within the issue," and to that end should have required an amendment of the complaint by
striking out the prayer for an injunction and substituting therefor a prayer for judgment for possession of
the land described in the complaint, and upon the complaint thus amended, judgment should have been
rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
An injunction is a "special remedy" adopted in that code from American practice, and originally borrowed
from English legal procedure, which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of
equity, and limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain,
adequate, and complete remedy at law", which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties
are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done,"
which cannot be compensated in damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will
not, as a rule, be granted, to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that
of another whose title has not been established by law.
A preliminary injunction must issue where a prima facie showing is made of the existence of the
circumstances under which such injunctions may be granted. In this case, there was no showing that the
PI should be granted.

The term injunction is translated interdicto prohibitorio, but interdictal actions of the Spanish procedural law is
distinct. (so guys, dont get confused about this.)

RULING: Judgment of the trial court is reversed and dissolving the preliminary and permanent injunctions
issued therein. The case is remanded to trial court with amendment of the complaint along the lines therein indicated,
judgment will be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Devesa to the possession of the lands described. (di ko alam bakit
kailangan pa iremand, maske in order na ng Court yung TC to rule a certain way, ganyan talaga siguro noong unang panahon.)
CABALLA

CASE # 7

Marquez v. Sanchez
FEBRUARY 13, 2007
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: PRELIMINARY INJUCTION, GROUNDS

G.R. NO. 141849

PANGANIBAN, J.

SUMMARY: Marquez was an incorporator/principal in Lucena Entrepeneur and Agri-Industrial Development

(LEAD). LEAD obtained two loans from DBP to fund its fishing objective, with Marquez solidarily liable and his
property was among those mortgaged to obtain the loan. Subsequent events led to LEAD defaulting in its
loan payments. DBP filed for an application for foreclosure of the mortgages, but Marquez opposed, praying
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC denied, CA affirmed. SC held that the trial court was
correct in not issuing a writ of preliminary injunction. Based on Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, the requisites of preliminary injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory
are the following: (1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to
prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. In this case, the requisites for injunctive writ were
not present.

FACTS
Marcial Marquez was an incorporator and officer of Lucena Entrepeneur and Agri-Industrial Development
Corporation (LEAD), a company engaged in commercial deep-sea fishing. To carry out its objectives, it applied
for a loan with respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). It was approved, and LEAD was
granted a loan of P2,105,000 to fund the construction of a fishing vessel. As a requirement to be approved,
DBP required that the principals of LEAD, including Marquez, be held jointly and severally. Some principals of
LEAD entered into Real Estate Mortgages to secure the loan.
The construction of the vessel were subject to DBP's local competitive bidding in consonance with
standing policies. Trigon Engineering and Shipbuilding Corporation (Trigon). The construction of the boat,
however, was fraught with complication, which interfered with the implementation of the loan. The construction,
which was supposed to last 150 days, was delayed for over two years, and thus the initial loan was insufficient
to cover the costs. Construction was later handed over to LEAD. An additional loan was granted, for around
P700,000, with Marquez undertook an additional mortgage to cover the 2nd loan. LEAD then finished
construction. The ship, however, later sank.
DBP informed LEAD of its arrears in its loan, but LEAD was unable to pay. DBP later demanded
payment, but LEAD was still unable to pay. Thus DBP filed with the Clerk of Court of the Quezon RTC an
application for foreclosure sale of the mortgages.
Marquez instituted an action for damages, cancellation of mortgage, and certiorari with prayer for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. On the scheduled day of the extra judicial sale,
respondent presiding Judge issued a TRO pending the resolution of the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The prayer was denied however, and so was Marquez MR. Thus his property was
subsequently sold at auction.
Marquez filed a petition with certiorari with the CA, and the latter issued a TRO to prohibit the issuance
of the certificate of sale. The CA however later affirmed the decision of the RTC. Marquez died later and was
substituted by his heirs.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: RTC held in favor respondents, and denied the prayer for the issuance
of an injunctive writ. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WoN the trial court should have issued the injunctive writ. /WoN the trial court acted in grave abuse of
discretion in denying the writ of preliminary injunction. (NO)
(2) WoN PD 385 applies (YES)
(3) WoN Marquez was denied of due process (NO)
RATIO
(1) No, the court was correct in not granting the prayer for the issuance of the injunctive writ.
GASTANES

Case #8

The writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear and
unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the
applicant.
Based on Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the requisites of preliminary
injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse;
there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

In this case, the requisites for injunctive writ not present Marquez and petitioners failed to establish the
essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
The issuance of injunctive writ is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the
existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary,
peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court.
Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should be granted only when
the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The very foundation of the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of
irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where
facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused.
In the instant case, both the trial court and the appellate court found that Marquez was not entitled to the
injunctive writ. Verily, the trial court has exercised its sound discretion in denying the writ.
Petitioners failed to show a right in esse to be protected. The applicant's right must be clear or
unmistakable, that is, that the right is actual, clear and positive especially calling for judicial protection. Thus,
an injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise or to restrain an act which
does not give rise to a cause of action.
While not preempting the disposition of the main case, a close review of the records at hand would show that
the loan and the REM seem to be above scrutiny. Respondent DBP had shown documentary evidence of how
the assailed transactions transpired, and how and why Marquez and other LEAD principals signed and agreed
to be solidarily liable for LEAD's loans as well as their voluntary mortgage of their properties to secure said
loans.
Be that as it may, if indeed there were defects and lack of consideration in the contracts, Marquez was in delay
in pursuing an action to defend his rights until the time that the foreclosure sale was already well nigh
imminent.
Applications for injunctive relief are construed strictly. The allegations in Marquez's complaint did not
clearly make out his entitlement to the injunctive relief prayed for. The rule requires that in order for a writ of
preliminary injunction to issue, the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances showing the
existence of the requisites. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly
against the pleader. As previously discussed, the trial court and the CA were not convinced, based on the
pleadings and the evidence presented in the hearing for the issuance of the injunctive writ, that petitioners
demonstrated a strong basis for the grant of the injunctive writ. The allegations of the complaint on the defense
that the agreement was that of a partnership is at war with the loan and mortgage documents they signed.
Apparently, in resolving the prayer for injunction, the courts a quo relied more on these documents than the
bare averments of petitioners on the alleged partnership.
GASTANES

Case #8

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. BAYONA

G.R. No. L-13555
1962 MAY 30
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
T OPIC IN S YLLABUS : Provisional Remedies Preliminary Injunction Grounds
S UMMARY : The Faculty Club of UST, Inc. and the San Beda College Lay Faculty Club, Inc. filed a petition for
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction, alleging, among others, that the Social Security Commission tried
to compel them to integrate their private systems into the SSS, and that since their private systems grant more
benefits to members than the SSS, the integration would be detrimental to the members. Judge Bayona issued
ex parte a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Commission from compelling the integration sought. SC
ruled that the ex parte writ of PI should be dissolved. There is no irreparable injury to justify the issuance of
injunction. An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated
and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture,
and not by any accurate standard of measurement. The array of figures laid out by the faculty clubs merely
succeeded in proving that the damage they may suffer, if any, is susceptible of mathematical computation. It is
not then irreparable. Irreparable injury does not have reference to the amount of damages that may be caused
but rather to the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted. If full compensation can be obtained, by way of
damages, equity will not apply the remedy of injunction.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by the Social
Security Commission
FACTS:
Aug. 30, 1957 The Faculty Club of UST, Inc. and the San Beda College Lay Faculty Club, Inc. filed a petition
for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction before the CFI of Manila, alleging that:
o They have existing agreements with their respective employers (UST and SBC) for the establishment
of gratuity and retirement funds which have been in operation prior to Sept. 1, 1957
o The Social Security Commission tried to compel them to integrate their private systems into the SSS
o Their private systems grant more benefits to the members than the SSS; thus, the integration of their
private systems would deprive their members of property without due process of law and would
impair the obligation of their contract, to the members detriment
The Faculty Clubs prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction ex parte commanding the Social Security
Commission to desist from compelling them to integrate during the pendency of the case, on the ground that
unless the Commission is enjoined, it might enforce the penal provisions of the Social Security Act
Aug. 30, 1957 Judge Froilan Bayona issued ex parte a writ of prelim inary injunction
enjoining the Commission from compelling the integration sought
Sept. 7, 1957 The Commission moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction on the grounds that: (1) a
statute is presumed constitutional; (2) there is no irreparable injury shown to justify the issuance
of injunction; (3) injunction does not lie against laws for public welfare; (4) injunction does not lie against
enforcement of penal laws; (5) injunction does not lie to stop the collection of contributions under the Social
Security Law; and (6) the preliminary injunction was barred by laches
o Motion to dissolve denied MR denied Commission filed the present petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction; also charged Judge Bayona with having acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the writ of PI ex parte
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS:

Judge Bayona enjoined the enforcement of the Social Security

Law for the benefit of an insignificant few who had manifested
their defiance against its implementation. It is his sworn duty to
enforce the law and not to tamper with it.
The order of Judge Bayona in effect enjoined the enforcement of
a penal statute which he has no power to do.

The Social Security Law, regardless of any injunction, continues to be in force except
only WRT those who have private plans of their own in existence at the time of the
effectivity of the law.

Judge Bayona cannot enjoin the collection of contributions under

the Social Security Law for the same have the category of taxes
which are collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code.

A writ of prelim inary injunction should

be issued only to prevent great and
irreparable injury. The injury must be
actual, positive, substantial and
irremediable at law. Respondent
corporations ( faculty clubs ) have not
shown that they would suffer such
injury if the injunction were not issued.

There are cases in this jurisdiction which hold that, under penal statutes affecting
persons and property rights, where their constitutionality is doubtful, courts may grant
preliminary injunction.
While under the law the contributions to the system shall be collected in the same
manner as taxes under the NIRC, the same may be enjoined if special circumstances
exist having relation to the existence of irreparable injury.

The injury consists of the following:

(a) Lifting the injunction would mean taking away the
availability of the funds of the faculty clubs from their
members who may borrow in case of necessity;
(b) The clubs may never be able to get their funds back as
Sec. 31 of the Social Security Act says no person shall be
deemed to be vested with any property or right by virtue of
the enactment of said Act;
(c) If respondent corporations refuse to join the SSS, criminal
prosecution would ensue against their officers and members

The order places the government in a worse position than a

private litigant for the latter may secure the lifting of an injunction
by filing a counterbond. Such right cannot be exercised by the
government for the latter is not by law required to file a bond.

LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #09

ISSUE: W ON the writ of PI issued by Judge Bayona should be lifted/dissolved YES

HELD:
SC Notes: The faculty clubs, in order to avoid being recreant to their duty which may result in their
prosecution, filed the present petition seeking a judicial declaration on its constitutionality. But pending such
action, they sought the restraining hand of the court on the plea that unless the enforcement
of the law is restrained, they would suffer an irreparable injury.
o At this stage of the proceeding, it is not the task of the Court to pass on the question of
constitutionality of the law. This concerns the merits of the case. We shall confine our inquiry into the
propriety of the issuance of the writ which is the main issue raised in this petition.

SC Notes II: A law is presumed constitutional until otherwise declared by judicial interpretation. The task of suspending the
operation of a law even if alleged to be unconstitutional is a matter of extreme delicacy because it is an interference with the official
acts not only of the duly elected representatives of the people but also of the highest magistrate of the land.

WHAT IS IRREPARABLE INJURY?

Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where
there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy
(Crouch v. Central Labor Council)

"An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a
repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be
estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of m easurement" (Phipps vs.
Rogue River Valley Canal Co.)

An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of "a serious charge of, or is destructive to,
the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and
enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary
value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof" (Dunker v. Field and Tub Club)

IS THERE IRREPARABLE INJURY IN THIS CASE?

The array of figures laid out by the faculty clubs merely succeeded in proving that the
damage they m ay suffer, if any, is susceptible of mathematical computation. It is not then
irreparable.
o This term has a definite meaning in law. It does not have reference to the amount of damages that
may be caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted.
o If full compensation can be obtained, by way of damages, equity will not apply the
remedy of injunction.
OTHER POINTS:
The faculty clubs also cannot contend that their integration would mean the destruction of their existing
private systems. The most that can happen would be a diminution of benefits in proportion to the reduction
of the contributions to their private systems. But while they may suffer such reduction in benefits they also
stand to benefit under the government system.
o Integration does not mean the discontinuance of the private system. Under the law, three alternatives
are open in effecting the integration: (a) To abandon totally their private systems and be integrated
into the government system; (b) to integrate into the government system so much of their
contributions as required by law and continue with their systems with respect to the excess of their
contributions; and (c) to be covered by the government system and continue in full force their private
systems.
o The faculty clubs may continue with whatever private may have at present as a complement to the
benefits afforded to them under the government system without prejudice to their integration into the
government security system.

Concededly, if the injunction is lifted, the possible damages respondents may suffer are their contributions
and those of their employers to the SSS. But restoration of said contributions had been assured by the
Commission should the provision under consideration be declared unconstitutional and invalid.
o There can always be an appropriate arrangement to provide for refund in the event of such
circumstance. Surely, the millions of pesos available to the Social Security System would be more
than sufficient to compensate respondents for the contributions they have made.
o If the enforcement of the law is restrained, the faculty clubs would be more harassed and prejudiced
in case the constitutionality of the law is upheld, since they will have to pay all the back contributions
from September 1957, including interests, up to the time the preliminary injunction is dissolved.
TL;DR: Refunding is easier than making back payments!

DECISION: Petition GRANTED. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent judge is
hereby LIFTED.

LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #09

[G.R. No. 88384. July 14, 1995.]

FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES and VIC TAGLE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
PATRICIO M. PATAJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Rizal, and JAIME T. TORRES
Topic: Prelim Injunction; Duration, discharge
How the case reached SC: Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated May 16, 1989 of the Court of Appeals
which dismissed the petition for certiorari questioning the orders of the trial court, which allegedly violated the rule
that a temporary restraining order issued by a court shall have a lifespan of only 20 days.
Summary: Squatter files complaint for injunction against DENR to prevent latter from ejecting him from his property in
Antipolo. RTC issues restraining order. Prior to expiration of 20 day period, parties agree to maintain the restraining
order and form a committee that will conduct survey of the land. FLRFP intervenes and questions the validity of the
restraining order. SC rules that the restraining order continues to be valid as the parties themselves asked for the
extension.
Facts:
On May 1988, respondent Jaime T. Torres was ordered by the DENR to vacate a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal. He
refused claiming that he had been in actual possession thereof for more than 30 years. His case was referred to the
Secretary of Justice, who rendered an Opinion holding he could be ejected therefrom as a squatter and for unlawful
occupation of forest lands under Revised Forestry Code.
The DENR formally demanded that private respondent vacate the land. Again, he refused. Instead, he filed a complaint
for injunction before the RTC to enjoin the DENR from ejecting him.
DENR alleged that private respondent was squatting on a watershed and forest reservation. It also alleged that private
respondent had not exhausted all administrative remedies and that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction as such issuance was proscribed by Section 1 of P.D. No. 605. This decree banned the issuance
by courts of preliminary injunctions in cases involving concessions, licenses and other permits issued by administrative
officials or agencies for the exploitation of natural resources.
On August 8, 1988, the RTC issued an order setting the hearing of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On August 10, 1988, the RTC issued an order for the maintenance of the status quo and restrained the defendants from
ejecting private respondent to prevent the application for preliminary injunction from being moot and academic.
On August 23, 1988, upon the agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered that the status quo be maintained and
created a committee to conduct a survey and ocular inspection for the purpose of pinpointing the areas allegedly titled
in private respondent's name and the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Before the issuance of the August 23 Order, petitioner FLRFP, through its president, Vic Tagle, filed a motion for
intervention on the ground that it had entered into a MOA with DENR for the lease of 500 hectares of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation.
The trial court, noting that petitioner FLRFP's interest as a lessee was merely collateral and that such interest may be
protected in a separate proceeding, denied the motion.
Petitioner FLRFP also filed a motion to declare without force and effect the restraining order earlier issued by the trial
court arguing that said order had long become functus officio because under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of
Court a temporary restraining order has a lifespan of only 20 days and that by its failure to decide whether to grant the
writ of preliminary injunction within said period, the trial court could no longer grant the said writ.
Later, the trial court set aside its Order denying FLRFPs motion to intervene (i.e., it was allowed to intervene). The
Court, however, denied FLRFP's motion to declare the restraining order without force and effect stating that the
RJARuiz

maintenance of status quo is necessary since the Court has still to wait for the result of the relocation survey and
ocular inspection.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by FLRFP saying it was upon the agreement of the parties that the
status quo was maintained.
Issues:
1. WON restraining order still valid
2. WON intervention proper
Held / Ratio:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the trial court is DIRECTED to consolidate
Civil Case Nos. 1223-A and 1300-A and to proceed with dispatch in resolving them.
1. Restraining order VALID
The "20-day Rule" is found in Section 5, Rule 581 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Counted from August 8, 1988 (NOTE: I dont know why the SC used Aug8 and not Aug10 as the reckoning point),
the temporary restraining order automatically expired on August 28. Thus, when the trial court issued the Order of
August 23, 1988 directing the maintenance of the status quo upon agreement of the parties, the temporary
restraining order was still in full force and effect.
Ordinarily, the efficacy of a temporary restraining order is non-extendible and the courts have no discretion
to extend the same considering the mandatory tenor of the Rule. However, there is no reason to prevent a
court from extending the 20-day period when the parties themselves ask for such extension or for the
maintenance of the status quo.
This Order was issued to maintain the status quo while the committee ascertained facts necessary in resolving
whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction should be issued. By issuing said Order, the trial court should be
deemed as merely exercising its inherent power under Section 5(b), Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court "to
enforce order in proceedings before it" in the absence of any showing that it has gravely abused its discretion in so
doing.
2. Intervention IMPROPER
The MOA between petitioner FLRFP and DENR may only be implemented in the event that private respondent
should fail to obtain the writ of preliminary injunction for only then may DENR eject private respondent.
Petitioner FLRFP's interest is not merely contingent and expectant but also inchoate and subordinate to that
of DENR's. It is not actual, direct and immediate.
We held that sublessees cannot invoke any right superior to that of their sublessor, as they do not have a clear and
positive right to the protection of the ancillary relief of preliminary injunction against a third party. By the same
token, a lessee cannot have a right superior to that of his lessor over the premises in a dispute between the
lessor and a third party regarding the ownership or possession of the said premises.

"Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining order. No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without notice to the defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom the application for
preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty days from date of its
issuance. Within the said twenty-day period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant, requiring him to show
cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine within the same period whether or
not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application
for preliminary injunction is denied, the restraining order is deemed automatically vacated.
RJARuiz

PARAM OUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION V. CA AND DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORP

G.R. No. 110086








July 19, 1999
Damages
Sum mary: McAdore and DECORP entered into a contract whereby the latter shall provide power to the
formers hotel. There were discrepancies in the billings so McAdore filed a suit against DECORP for damages
with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction. RTC ruled in favor of McAdore. PARAMOUNT, appealed to the
CA, contended that it was not given its day in court because it was not notified by DECORP of its intention to
present evidence of damages against its injunction bond, as mandated by Sec. 9 of Rule 58, in relation to Sec.
20 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. SC held that there was sufficient evidence to establish the
liability of the petitioner on its injunction bond; PARAMOUNT cannot hide under the cloak of non-liability on
its injunction bond on the mere expediency that it was deprived of due process. It bears stressing that what
the law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to ventilate a
party's side. Petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due process where it was given the chance to be
heard.

Facts:

McAdore Finance and Investment, Inc. was the owner and operator of the McAdore International
Palace Hotel in Dagupan City. Dagupan Electric Corporation (DECORP), on the other hand, was the
grantee of a franchise to operate and maintain electric services in the province of Pangasinan, including
Dagupan City.
McADORE and DECORP entered into a contract whereby DECORP shall provide electric power to
McADORE's Hotel. During the term of their contract for power service, DECORP noticed
discrepancies between the actual monthly billings and the estimated monthly billings of McADORE.
Upon inspection, it was discovered that the terminal in the transformers connected to the meter had
been interchanged resulting in the slow rotation of the meter. Consequently, DECORP issued a
corrected bill but McADORE refused to pay. As a result of McADORE's failure and continued refusal
to pay the corrected electric bills, DECORP disconnected power supply to the hotel on November 27,
1978.
McADORE commenced a suit against DECORP for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. McADORE posted injunction bonds from several sureties, one of which was herein
petitioner PARAMOUNT, which issued an injunction bond on July 7, 1980 with a face amount of
P500,000.00. Accordingly, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued wherein DECORP was ordered
to continue supplying electric power to the hotel and restrained from further disconnecting it.
Regional Trial Court of Quezon Cit rendered judgment in favor of DECORP.

WHEREFORE, there being preponderance of evidence, the court hereby dismisses the amended
complaint. Further, the court rescinds the service contract between the parties, and orders McAdore
to pay Decorp the following:

1. Actual damages consisting of total arrearages for electric services rendered from February 1978
to January 1983, in the sum of P3,834,489.62, plus interest at the legal rate, computed from the date
of demand until full payment;

2. Moral damages in the sum of P600,000.00;

3. Exemplary damages in the sum of P400,000.00;

4. Attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00; and

5. Costs of the suit.
While this case was under litigation, the court issued a number of restraining orders or injunctions.
During these incidents, McAdore filed the following bonds: Policy No. 8022709 by Paramount
Insurance Corporation for P500,000.00; No. 00007 and No. 00008 by Sentinel Insurance Company, Inc.
for P100,000.00 and P50,000.00; and No. 1213 by the Travelers Multi- Indemnity Corporation for
P225,000.00.
Pursuant to the dispositive portion of this decision, the court holds that these bonding companies are

#14

jointly and severally liable with McAdore, to the extent of the value of their bonds, to pay the
damages adjudged to Decorp.
McADORE did not appeal the above decision. PARAMOUNT, however, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. PARAMOUNT contended that it was not given its day in court because it was not notified by
DECORP of its intention to present evidence of damages against its injunction bond, as mandated by
Sec. 9 of Rule 58, in relation to Sec. 20 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Paramount Insurance Corporation was denied due process when the trial
court found the injunction bond it issued in favor of McADORE liable to DECORP. Stated otherwise, was
there sufficient evidence to establish the liability of the petitioner on its injunction bond?
Held: Petition denied.

Injunction is an extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve the status quo of things and to prevent
actual or threatened acts violative of the rules of equity and good conscience as would consequently
afford an injured party a cause of action resulting from the failure of the law to provide for an
adequate or complete relief. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in
which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Its sole purpose is not to correct a
wrong of the past, in the sense of redress for injury already sustained, but to prevent further injury.
A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when, among others, the
applicant, unless exempted by the court, files with the court where the action or proceeding is
pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to
the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason
of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was
not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be
issued. At the trial, the amount of damages to be awarded to either party, upon the bond of the
adverse party, shall be claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure prescribed in
Section 20 of Rule 57.
The above rule comes into play when the plaintiff-applicant for injunction fails to sustain his action, and
the defendant is thereby granted the right to proceed against the bond posted by the former. In the
case at bench, the trial court dismissed McADORE's action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and eventually adjudged the payment of actual, moral, and exemplary damages
against plaintiff-applicant. Consequently, private respondent DECORP can proceed against the
injunction bond posted by plaintiff-applicant to recover the damages occasioned by the issuance by
the trial court of the writ of injunction.
In order for the injunction bond to become answerable for the above-described damages, the following
requisites must concur:

1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the bond was issued;

2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment; and

3. After hearing with notice to the surety.
The records of this case reveal that during its pendency in the trial court, DECORP filed its Answer
raising compulsory counterclaims for rescission of contract, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. PARAMOUNT as well as the other sureties were properly
notified of the hearing and given their day in court. Specifically, notice was sent to Atty. Cordero of the
hearing on April 27, 1985, which was set for the purpose of determining the liability of the sureties.
The counterclaims for damages of DECORP were proven at the trial and yet PARAMOUNT did not
exert any effort to controvert the evidence presented by DECORP. Given these circumstances,
PARAMOUNT cannot hide under the cloak of non-liability on its injunction bond on the mere
expediency that it was deprived of due process. It bears stressing that what the law abhors is not the
absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to ventilate a party's side.
Petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due process where it was given the chance to be heard.

#14

 PARAMOUNT argues that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, there is a need for a separate
hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence on the alleged damages claimed by DECORP on
petitioner's injunction bond. NO. It is neither mandatory nor fatal that there should be a separate
hearing in order that damages upon the bond can be claimed, ascertained and awarded, as can be
gleaned from a cursory reading of the provisions of Rule 57, Section 20. What is necessary only is for
the attaching party and his surety or sureties to be duly notified and given the opportunity to be heard.
PARAMOUNT also argues that assuming it is liable on its injunction bond, its liability should be limited
only to the amount of damages accruing from the time the injunction bond was issued until the
termination of the case, and not from the time the suit was commenced. NO. Rule 58, Section 4(b),
provides that a bond is executed in favor of the party enjoined to answer for all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the injunction. The Court already had occasion to rule on this matter in
Mendoza v. Cruz, where it held that "(t)he injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case
it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been granted. It is designed to cover all
damages which the party enjoined can possibly suffer. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined
party against loss or damage by reason of an injunction." No distinction was made as to when the
damages should have been incurred. It can be safely deduced that the bond answers for any and all
damages arising from the injunction, regardless of whether it was sustained before or after the filing of
the injunction bond.
PARAMOUNT further maintains that it is liable to pay actual damages only. NO. Rule 58, Section 4(b),
clearly provides that the injunction bond is answerable for all damages. "The bond insures with all
practicable certainty that the defendant may sustain no ultimate loss in the event that the injunction
could finally be dissolved. Consequently, the bond may obligate the bondsmen to account to the
defendant in the injunction suit for all: (1) such damages; (2) costs and damages; (3) costs, damages and
reasonable attorney's fees as shall be incurred or sustained by the person enjoined in case it is
determined that the injunction was wrongfully issued." Thus, PARAMOUNT is liable, jointly and
severally, for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of the suit,
to the extent of the amount of the bond.
The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is
usually conditioned accordingly. Thus, the bondsmen are obligated to account to the defendant in the
injunction suit for all damages, or costs and reasonable counsel's fees, incurred or sustained by the
latter in case it is determined that the injunction was wrongfully issued.
The posting of a bond in connection with a preliminary injunction (or attachment under Rule 57, or
receivership under Rule 59, or seizure or delivery of personal property under Rule 60) does not
operate to relieve the party obtaining an injunction from any and all responsibility for the damages that
the writ may thereby cause. It merely gives additional protection to the party against whom the
injunction is directed. It gives the latter a right of recourse against either the applicant or his surety, or
against both. In the same manner, when petitioner PARAMOUNT issued the bond in favor of its
principal, it undertook to assume all the damages that may be suffered after finding that the principal is
not entitled to the relief being sought.

#14

PEZA v. VIANZON
July 20, 2000
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: No Injunctions (but

G.R. No. 131020

Gonzaga-Reyes, J..

SUMMARY:
PEZA unceremoniously cancelled a subsisting lease agreement with SSI, and demanded them to vacate. The
SSI obtained a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. PEZA appealed these Orders as a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge, but to no avail. In considering the facts (P55M was already
invested and SSI would stand to lose much if it were unceremoniously evicted), the SC held the 3 requisites for
an issuance of a preliminary injunction were PRESENT: 1) The invasion of the right is material and substantial;
2) The right of complainant and unmistakable; 3) There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS:
! July 21, 1992 Petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) and private respondent Saffirou
Seacrafts, Inc. (SSI) entered into a 15-year lease Registration Agreement, where PEZA leased
1,500sqm of land in the Bataan Export Processing Zone for SSIs business of manufacture and repair
of seacrafts.
o The agreement provided for a schedule to be followed for SSI for the building construction and
importation of machineries.
o A Supplemental Agreement was later entered into, which provided that the leased area be used
for launching or staging of SSIs boats or export, and construction of additional buildings for
storage and administration offices.
! SSI failed to comply with the agreements.
! After requiring SSIs explanation, PEZA thru its Board of Trustees promulgated a resolution cancelling
the agreements and demanded from SSI to vacate the leased premises within 30 days from notice.
! February 13, 1997 SSI received the resolution.
! March 7, 1997 SSI filed in the RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for
TRO and preliminary injunction against PEZA and its officers.
o RTC issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining the PEZA from
enforcing and implementing its Board Resolution and the Notice of Cancellation, Termination
and Demand to Vacate pending the hearing of the case and until further notice from the court.
! PEZA appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision.
! Hence, this petition.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
! The CA erred in not finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction and thus acted without jurisdiction.
! The respondents had no factual or legal basis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction for said writ
may only be issued if it is shown that the applicant had a clear and unmistakable right to protect.
! It cannot be granted when the right is doubtful or disputed.
! SSI lost its right to occupy the leased land when it violated the terms of agreement with PEZA.
! There was a valid cancellation because under the agreement, PEZA was authorized to cancel the
same without need of judicial action.
ISSUE-HELD:
WON the RTC validly issued an injunction " YES.
RATIO:
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a
particular act. An applicant for preliminary injunction must file a verified complaint showing facts entitling
him to the relief demanded accompanied with a bond which shall answer for all the damages which the party
sought to be enjoined may sustain by reason of the injunction.
M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 15

The requisites for an issuance of an injunction were present in this case:

1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial.
! The right protected is under the Registration Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement it
entered into with PEZA.
2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable.
! SSI has a clear and unmistakable right to protect its contractual right to lease the property lest it
suffer business losses from its investments within the processing zone.
! The Retainer Agreement and Supplemental Agreement granted SSI 15 years to lease the
premises.
! At the time of demand to vacate, SSI still had 10 years to go.
! Only after a proper hearing in the RTC can it be duly established that PEZA has the valid ground to
revoke the arguments between the parties.
3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
! Said private respondent allegedly had already infused a capital of P55M in establishing its business
in the leased premises, and considering that it has not even recouped said investment under the
agreements with petitioner, not to mention its already paid rentals, the loss of employment for its
workers as well as its business goodwill, private respondent stands to lose so much if it will just be
unceremoniously evicted from its place of business.
OTHER ISSUES:
WON the CAs determination of the status quo was correct ! YES.
! The status quo is the last actual peacable uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.
! The status quo should be that existing at the time of the filing of the case.
! At the time of the filing of the case, SSI was still in actual physical possession of the property in
question as the lessee thereof.
! Although SSI received the letter of cancellation of the lease agreement on Feb 13, 1997, the
demand was never effectively implemented due to petition for injunction on March 7, 1997.
! Thus, at the time of the filing of the case, SSI was still the lessee of the subject property and this is
precisely the status quo existing ante litem motam1, which an injunction seeks to preserve.
WON the basis of PEZA in revoking the agreement was valid ! NOT TO BE RULED IN THIS PETITION.
! The SC limits itself to only the determination of whether injunction was properly issued
lest it preempts the trial court's decision in the main action in a Special Civil Action where
a thorough hearing on the merits of the case must be held by the lower court to resolve
the respective litigants' claims.
! In general, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which in
effect disposes of the main case without trial.
WON PEZA is guilty of forum shopping in raising the same issues it raised in the CA ! NO.
! The petitioners question of whether the CAs ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing a writ of injunction by virtue of a petition for certiorari to this Court is a
pure question of law.
! There is only forum shopping when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion other than by appeal or certiorari in another.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Latin; before a law suit is brought

M.A.G. Butalid

CASE # 15

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) & MANILA FLOATING

G.R. Nos. 115786-87.
SILO CORPORATION (MAFSICOR) v. CA, MARINA PORT
SERVICES, INC (MPSI), et.al.
February 5, 1996
Romero, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Injunction
SUMMARY: PPA and MAFSICOR entered into a contract for the setting up of floating bulk terminal facilities at
the South Harbor of the Port of Manila. MPSI asked for an injunction alleging that the PPA-MAFSICOR contract
is in complete derogation of MPSIs rights under the contract of March 13, 1992 and only serves to promote
chaos, instability and labor unrest in the South Harbor and that, having invested US$27M pursuant to said
contract, it would lose 50% of its projected P40M to P45M gross revenues in wheat and soybean for July 1993 to
June 1994 upon the operation of the floating grains terminal. MPSI filed a petition against PPA and MAFSICOR
for declaratory relief, final injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory
injunction in the Manila RTC. The RTC denied the WPI. The CA reversed and granted WPI. The SC reversed
CA.
Doctrine:
PD No. 1818 prohibits the issuance of injunction against government infrastructuresstevedoring contracts
included. This case does not fall in the two exceptions: grave abuse of discretion and stave off govt project).
Assuming arguendo there is grave abuse of discretion, the terms of the party must be so precise that neither
party could misunderstand them (otherwise declaratory relief should be sought).
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari questioning the issuance by the Court of
Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction which, in effect, enjoins the implementation of a contract between
petitioners PPA and MAFSICOR for the setting up of floating bulk terminal facilities at the South Harbor of the
Port of Manila.
FACTS:
June 27, 1980 PPA and Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI) entered into a management contract
whereby the former granted the latter the exclusive right to manage and operate stevedoring services at the
South Harbor. OTSI and the PPA entered into a supplemental management contract on November 2, 1983 on
the same services.
March 10, 1987PPA also granted the Marina Port Services, Inc. (MPSI) the exclusive management and
operation of arrastre and container terminal handling services in all piers, slips and wharves at the South
Harbor Terminal, Port of Manila. This contract was renewed on Nov. 28, 1991.
April 2, 1992PPA entered into a contract with petitioner MAFSICOR whereby it granted MAFSICOR the
right, privilege, responsibility and authority to provide, operate and manage floating bulk terminal facilities for
bulk cargoes bound for South Harbor, Port of Manila, with the proviso that the use or availment of such
floating terminal facilities shall not be compulsory to bulk shippers, consignees or importers.
July 30, 1992 PPA and MPSI entered into an agreement wherein the former authorized the latter to
construct a land-based bulk grain and compatible storage terminal in Mariveles, Bataan.
September 8, 1992 the PPA and MAFSICOR signed a supplemental agreement re: hiring of qualified
stevedores.
MPSI prays for the issuance forthwith of a TRO directing PPA & MAFSICOR to maintain the status quo and to
prevent the latter from bringing in the floating bulk terminal scheduled to arrive in the South Harbor, Port of Manila
in the middle of August 1993 to enjoin, prohibit and stop defendants, its agents, privies, sympathizers and
anybody acting for in behalf or in the interest of the defendant, from interfering, hindering, or in any way
diminishing MPSIs rights under the CONTRACT of March 13, 1992; subject, to further orders of this Honorable
Court.
RTC (Judge Veridiano): issued a TRO, set the hearing for the WPI. MAFSICOR filed a motion to lift TRO (not
available for declaratory relief) and motion to dismiss (not proper remedy; MAFSICOR not a party-in-interest). And
then, the RTC denied the WPI and cancelled the TRO. Grounds for denial:
PPA-MPSI contract had not vested on the MPSI the right to operate the floating grains terminal and neither did
the PPA-MAFSICOR contract recognize such right.
De Mesa, Athena Christa D.G.

CASE # 16

 The contract with MAFSICOR for the operation of the floating grains terminal was non-exclusive so that even
MPSI may apply to operate a similar terminal. The contracts actually complement each other.
An injunctive relief may not be granted in the action for declaratory relief which merely seeks the
construction or interpretation of the contract between PPA and MPSI.
MPSI is not a party to the PPA-MAFSICOR contract.
Side issues:
A case was also filed by KAMADA (bargaining agents of 4,000 stevedores) in a separate RTC (Judge
Mabunay) where they allege that the PPA-MAFSICOR contract would duplicate their function as stevedoring
and would eventually deprive them of employment. Ultimately, the case was dismissed for failure to present
clear & convincing evidence of the damages to be suffered.
Another case was filed in a separate RTC (Judge Bayhon) by Chamber of Customs Brokers, Inc. alleging that
it was never informed of the hearings conducted by PPA and that the PPA-MAFSICOR contract would cause
delay, more charges, and would be in violation of PPAs duty. Injunction was granted.
PPA&MAFSICOR filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI
with the SC. SC referred the petition to the CA pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Ultimately, CA Issued a WPI to
maintain the status quo ante litem motam and to prevent them from deploying the floating grains terminal.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
(a) violates P.D. 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, the constitutional principle of separation of judicial and executive
powers and the proscription against forum shopping;
(b) supplants the discretion of the trial court to pass upon the propriety of a preliminary injunction, and
(c) is contrary to the evidence on record.
ISSUES: WON Injunction may issueNO.
HELD: Granted. CA order which issued a WPI was reversed.
PD No. 1818 includes stevedoring contracts. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1818 aforequoted provides that no
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction may be issued by any court in a
case involving an infrastructure project, or natural resource development project of the government or any
public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or
commodities, Stevedoring and arrastre contracts which would prohibit any person or persons, entity or
government official from proceeding with the operation of a public utility. Clearly, the prohibition in P.D. No.
1818 does not cover infrastructure projects alone. It includes the implementation of stevedoring contracts. The
law being clear, there is no room for interpretation or construction. Verbis legis non est recedendum.
PD No. 1818 applies whether entity being enjoined is public or private. A myopic conception of the law,
such contention betrays a failure to comprehend the functions of the PPA as defined in its Charter, PD. No. 505,
as amended by P.D. No. 857. x x x Paragraph (b) (vi) of the same section empowers the PPA (t)o make or
enter contracts of any kind or nature to enable it to discharge its functions under this Decree. Said duty and
power of the PPA have been affirmed in:
o
Albano vs. Reyesthe Court held that the PPA may contract with International Container Terminal
Services, Inc. (ICTSI) for the management, operation and development of the Manila International
Container Port (MICP).
o Section 1 of P.D. No. 1818clearly states that an injunction may not be issued to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government official from undertaking the protected activities enumerated therein.
The prohibition, therefore, applies regardless of whether or not the person or entity being enjoined is a public or
a private person or entity, provided that the purpose of the law to protect essential government projects in
pursuit of economic development is attained.
There are instances when PD No. 1818 is not applicable. While its sole provision would appear to
encompass all cases involving the implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource
development and public utilities, there are actually instances when PD. No. 1818 should not find application:
(a) where there is clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of the government authority or private person
being enjoined, and
(b) where the effect of the non-issuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be to stave off
implementation of a government project. Such effect would be in contravention of the very purpose
enunciated in the whereas clause of P.D. No. 1818 not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential
government projects.
De Mesa, Athena Christa D.G.

CASE # 16

CAB: the operation of a floating bulk terminal would augment and improve, not stave off or hamper, the overall
operations at the Port of Manila and/or the stevedoring services awarded to MPSI.
Entering into a contract for the operation of a floating grains terminal, notwithstanding the existence of
other stevedoring contracts pertaining to the South Harbor, is undoubtedly an exercise of discretion on
the part of the PPA. The exercise of such discretion is a policy decision that necessitates such procedures as
prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation and deliberation. No other persons or agencies are in a
better position to gauge the need for the floating grains terminal than the PPA; certainly, not the courts.
Because the presumption of regular performance of its powers and functions has not been overturned, the PPA
should be deemed to have performed its functions in accordance with law and duly considered all factors in the
operation of the floating grains terminal, including its effects on manual stevedoring and the traffic of vessels in
the South Harbor. The prohibition in P.D. 1818 applies in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. It is founded on the principle that to allow the courts to determine such matters
would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery.
Assuming arguendo that PPA gravely abused its discretion in entering into the contract with MAFSICOR, the
issuance of an injunction against it should be in accordance with law. In other words, to authorize the
issuance of an injunction, the terms of the agreement involved must be so precise that neither party
could misunderstand them.
CAB: When MPSI filed the petition for declaratory relief below with the specific prayer that its contractual and
vested rights under the PPA-MPSI contract of March 13, 1992 be declared and respected, MPSI in effect
manifested its uncertainty as to the exclusivity of said contract with respect to stevedoring
operations. Under Sec. 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief is filed to determine
any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his
(petitioners) rights or duties thereunder. Considering the nature of the petition filed in Civil Case No.
93-67096, the lower court presided by Judge Veridiano, therefore, correctly denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The parties should have filed a declaratory relief, NOT ask for an injunction.

De Mesa, Athena Christa D.G.

CASE # 16

DAVID v. ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396
May 3, 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Special Civil ActionsCertiorari, Prohibition, MandamusPublic, private actions
SUMMARY: Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of the issuance of PP 1017, declaring a state of
national emergency, and GO No. 5, implementing PP 1017. As to standing of petitioners, the Court held
that they have locus standi. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as
contained in Section 2, Rule 3. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest. In public suits, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. However, to prevent just
about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed
with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, this Court
adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion (see issue
#2 for the exceptions).
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
FACTS:
th
Feb 24, 2006 As the nation celebrated the 20 anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, PGMA
issued PP 1017, declaring a state of national emergency, and commanding the AFP to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any
act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by PGMA herself or upon her direction.
o PGMA cited these facts as bases of declaration:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

On the same day, PGMA issued GO No. 5 implementing PP 1017, and directing AFP and PNP to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
Petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and GO No. 5:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

political opposition have allegedly conspired with authoritarians of the extreme left represented by NDF-CPP-NPA
and the extreme right represented by military adventurists;
these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;
the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;
this series of actions is hurting the state by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy
and sabotaging the peoples confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country;
these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme left and the extreme right the opening to intensify their
avowed aims to bring down the democratic state; and
these activities, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the
safety and integrity of the state and the Filipino people.

th

Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20 anniversary
celebration of EDSA People Power I, and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier.
DOJ Sec. Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies are cancelled.
Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including
media, can already be implemented.
Undeterred by the announcements, groups of protesters marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of
converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near EDSA were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot
police.
According to Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
During the dispersal, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf David, a UP professor and newspaper columnist,
and Ronal Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
Feb 25, 2006 Operatives of the PNP-CIDG raided Daily Tribune offices in Manila, and confiscated news stories by
reporters, documents, pictures and mock-ups of the Saturday issues. Policemen were stationed onside the editorial and
business offices of the newspaper and some outside the building. Policemen also surrounded the premises of another
pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

Mar 3, 2006 Exactly one week after the declaration, PGMA lifted PP 1017, and issued PP 1021,
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 02]

ISSUES/HELD: (Only procedural issues)

1. Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic. No.
Judicial review as enunciated in Marbury v. Madison The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the

people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the
government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in
control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as
expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial
review.

Courts may exercise judicial review only when the following requisites are present:
a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
b) petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality;
c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
d) the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
st
nd
Respondents maintain that the 1 and 2 requisites are absent, hence, the Court limited its
discussion on the said requisites.
Actual case or controversy A conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.
o Sol Gen Refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the
petitions were rendered moot and academic by the issuance of PP 1021.
o SC Such contention lacks merit.
! Moot and academic case One that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.
! Issuance of PP 1021 did not render the petitions moot and academic. During the 8 days
that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal
acts in implementing it.
! Are PP 1017 and GO No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal
acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be
stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no
duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.
! The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic:
a) if there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
b) if the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
c) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public; and
d) if the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
! All the exceptions are present here and justify the Courts assumption of jurisdiction over
the instant petitions.
a) Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO No. 5 violated the
Constitution.
b) There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public's interest, involving
as they do the people's basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the
press.
c) The Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar,
and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
d) Respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition.
! In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited CJ Artemio
Panganiban's Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary. However, they failed
to take into account the CJs very statement that an otherwise moot case may still be
decided provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 02]

prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance. The present case falls right
within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the CJ.
2. Whether petitioners have standing. Yes. (RELATED TO THE TOPIC)
Locus standi A right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
o Real-party-in interest The party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
o The plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
In public suits, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger or in the category of a
citizen or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
o However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the US SC laid down the more stringent direct injury
test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.
o This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. The following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
o the cases involve constitutional issues;
o for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
o for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
o for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
o for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.
Applying the above principles in this case, the Court held that:
o In 171396 and 171409, David and Llamas, and Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co,
Inc. have standing as they alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful
search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
o In 171485, opposition congressmen alleged that there was usurpation of legislative powers
and they also raised the issue of WON the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever
the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Also, it is in the interest of justice that
those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their congressmen in bringing to the
attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.
o In 171400, ALGI has standing, the Court applying the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,
that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and
has an interest in the execution of the laws.
o In 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and GO No. 5 violated its right to peaceful
assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted
standing to assert the rights of their members.
o In 171489, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the
IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No.
1017 and G.O. No. 5. In IBP v. Zamora, the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of
Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 02]

its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient
to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other
groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the
issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
o In 171424, Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are
no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former senator is
of no consequence. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue
involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the liberality
doctrine on legal standing.
o It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP 1017 and GO No. 5 is a judicial question which is
of paramount importance to the Filipino people.
o To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath
the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter.
o The petitions thus call for the application of the transcendental importance doctrine, a
relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cases.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the
Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of
its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Anna Isabella Galvez

[CASE # 02]

SEVERINO v. GOVERNOR-GENERAL
August 3, 1910
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Special Civil Actions STANDING

G.R. No. 6250

Trent, J.

SUMMARY: Severino applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor General to hold a special elections
following the decision of the CIR in an election protest that no one was legally elected as municipal president. The
Governor General acting on the said CIR case, directed the Provincial Board to fill up the position by appointment
instead. The respondents raise the issue of standing against Severino and the lack of jurisdiction of the court to
compel the Governor General by mandamus to perform an official act. The Court held that since he is seeking to
enforce a public right, the real parties in interest is the public, or the qualified voters of the town of Silay. US
cases are different and cannot be applied because in our jurisdiction, it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character. Hence, if petitioner is precluded from
filing, then these issues will never be raised.
FACTS:
Severino is a resident, duly qualified elector and local chief of Nacionalista party. During the 1909 local
elections, Gaston was the Nacionalista candidate, while Hernaez the Progregista candidate for the office of
municipal president.
According to the returns, Hernaez was elected. But Gaston filed a protest in the CFI. After the trial, CFI
rules that no one was legally elected municipal president. Case was certified to the Governor General,
who instead of calling a special election as required by law, has directed the Provincial Board to fill the
vacancy by appointment, and to submit to him the name of the appointee for his approval.
Hence this application for a writ of mandamus to the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, to
compel him to call a special election for the purpose of electing a municipal president in the town of Silay,
Negros Occidental, and also for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain him and the Provincial Board
from appointing a municipal president during pendency of this case.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT: Mainly that: (1) Severino has no beneficial interest in the act sought to be
performed/restrained as to make him a proper party. And that the (2) court has no jurisdiction to control by
mandamus or injunction the official acts of the Governor General.
ISSUES: WoN Severino has standing to institute this case? YES.
The complainant, Lope Severino, is a private individual of the Philippine Islands. Should the GovernorGeneral appoint a president of the municipality of Silay and fail to call a special election, if any injury
should result it would be of a public nature and Severino would suffer no substantial injury different from
that suffered by the public at large. So his status as complainant in these proceedings is that of a
private citizen of the town of Silay.
May a private citizen institute the action? US cases upon this issue are not uniform.
Two schools of thought are:
1. Individual citizen is not entitled to institute proceedings in mandamus against public officers to compel
the performance of a public duty, unless such citizen shows some specific or peculiar interest in
himself different from that shared by the public at large, and in such cases the relief should be sought in
the name of the public and by its legal representative.
2. When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator
at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws.
The Supreme Court chose #2: It is true, as we have stated, that the right which he seeks to enforce is not
greater or different from that of any other qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the
injury which he would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different from
that of the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce, a public right as distinguished from a private
right. The real party in interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each
elector has the same right and would suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis
with reference to maintaining a petition to determine whether or not the relief sought by the relator
should be granted.
JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

Page

CASE # 3

We have examined the cases wherein the courts of the United States have held that private individuals are
not proper parties in cases where a public right is to be enforced, unless such private persons have some
particular interest to be subserved or some particular right to be protected independent of that which they
hold in common with the public at large. In these cases the courts hold that it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the relief when such rights are to be subserved. In such cases it is the duty, by
express provisions of law, of public officers to enforce such rights.
o In this jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute and defend therein all causes
to which the Government of the Philippine Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a
party. In compliance with this duty by law, he appeared for the respondents in this case.
o On the other hand, there is no law imposing upon any law officer to appear for the petitioner. SO IF
THE RELATOR (petitioner) is precluded from maintaining these proceedings, these
questions could not be raised.
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced.

ISSUE 2: WoN the Governor General may be compelled by mandamus to perform the act? NO. It would
violate separation of powers.
The duty which the court was asked to compel the governor to perform was one imposed upon him by
statute. The relators insisted that the question involved in this case was a purely judicial one, involving
nothing but a proper construction of the law.
The relators submitted the following proposition to the court which was made the basis of the decision.
They claimed that, "where the act is purely ministerial, and the right of the citizen to have it performed is
absolute (vested right), the governor, no more than any other officer, is above the laws, and the obligation
of the courts, on a proper application, to require him to obey the laws, is the same that exists in any other
case where an official ministerial duty is disregarded."
SC RULED: For better reasons we conclude that this court has no jurisdiction, either by mandamus
or injunction, to control the official acts of the Governor-General, inasmuch as we have seen that
his duties, powers, and responsibilities are more comprehensive than those conferred upon any
State Governor.
When the Philippine legislative body confers upon the Governor-General powers and duties, it does so for
the reason that he is in a better position to know the needs of the country than any other member of the
executive department, and with the full confidence that he will perform such duties, under his official oath,
as his best judgment dictates.
It no doubt is sometimes very necessary for the Governor-General to perform certain important executive
duties without delay, and should this court attempt to distinguish between purely ministerial and
discretionary duties, conferred upon him by law, and attempt to determine in each case which are purely
ministerial, which are political, or which are discretionary, the Governor- General, to that extent, would
become subservient to the judiciary. To avoid this is why the three great coordinate departments of the
Government were created and made independent of each other.
President McKinley in creating civil government in this country took into consideration these fundamental
principles of separate and independent departments, which have been demonstrated to be essential to a
republican form of government, and conferred upon the Governor-General, as the Executive of the
Philippine Islands, the power to execute the laws according to his best judgment, holding him responsible
to the President of the United States, without interference on the part of the judiciary. The President
realized that the final decision of every question in controversy must be left somewhere, and when such
decision has been made it must be accepted as correct. The presumption is just as conclusive in favor of
executive action, as to its correctness and justness, as it is in favor of judicial action.
In the case at bar we are called upon to compel the Governor-General to call a special election in the town
of Silay for the purpose of electing a municipal president. We are not disposed, neither will we attempt
on any grounds, to distinguish this case from any other case of executive duty, with a view, as was
said in the case of Sutherland vs. Governor (supra), "to lay down a narrow rule which, while disposing of
this case, may leave the grave question it presents to be presented again and again in other cases." But
after due consideration, and being fully aware of the seriousness of the question, we have reached
the conclusion that we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands,
as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts.
JALASCO, JENAIRA MAE A.

Page

CASE # 3

KILOSBAYAN v. GUINGONA
G.R. No. 113375
M ay 5, 1994
DAVIDE, JR.
Topic in Syllabus: Standing to Challenge
SUM M ARY: PCSO entered into a Contract of Lease with PGMC to establish an on-line lottery system. This was
opposed by the petitioners suing as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN, taxpayers, concerned
citizens, and members of Congress. The public respondents questioned the petitioners locus standi. The SC
ruled that due to the transcendental importance of the issue, the procedural technicality of locus standi will be
set aside in the exercise of its sound discretion.
FACTS
Pursuant to Sec. 1 of PCSOs charter granting it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries, and other similar activities, PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system to increase
its revenue base and diversify its sources of funds
Berjaya Group Berhad (Malaysian company) organized with some Filipino investors a Philippine
corporation know as Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC)
PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of the on-line lottery system
PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO and all the bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Committee and its Bid Report was submitted to the Office of the President
o Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate
the country's on-line lottery system
A Contract of Lease was executed by PCSO and PGMC which was approved by President Ramos
A special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease"
was filed by petitioners:
o KILOSBAYAN avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens,
pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national
renewal
o The rest of the petitioners1, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and
Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of
KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
o Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of
Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines.
PETITIONERS ARGUM ENTS
Contract of Lease violates Sec. 1 (B) of PCSO charter prohibiting it from holding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with
any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic; a lease of facilities is not within the
contemplation of "collaboration" or "association
Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a telecommunications network that will
connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory however, PGMC does not have a franchise from
Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the network
Articles of Incorporation of PGMC do not authorize it to establish and operate an on-line lottery and
telecommunications systems
RESPONDENTS ARGUM ENTS
Private Respondent (PGMC)
o It is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work and thus not a co-operator of the lottery
franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration, association or joint venture'
with PGMC
Public Respondents (Exec. Sec. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Exec. Sec. Renato Corona, and PCSO)

Jovito R. Salonga, Cirilo A. Rigos, Erme Camba, Emilio C. Capulong, Jr., Jose T. Apolo, Ephraim Tendero, Fernando Santiago, Jose Abcede, Christine
Tan, Felipe L. Gozon, Rafael G. Fernando, Raoul V. Victorino, Jose Cunanan, Quintin S. Doromal
JAVELLANA, Maria Yolanda A.
Case No. 116

Contract of Lease does not violate Sec. 1 of PCSOs charter and interpretation of the phrase "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" in Sec. 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of
logic"
Establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the Contract of Lease does not require a
congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility; PGMC's establishment of a
telecommunications system is not intended to establish a telecommunications business
Petitioners have no standing to m aintain the instant suit

ISSUES
W ON petitioners had locus standi YES (Yes- 7; No-6)
WON the Contract of Lease was in valid in light of Sec. 1 of PCSOs charter YES (Yes-7; No Opinion-6)
RATIO
[M AIN ISSUE] Petitioners had locus standi.
A party's standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised.
The rule is the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
In the Emergency Powers Cases, the Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure
o Emergency Powers Cases: ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were
invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objective that they were not proper parties and ruled that the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside technicalities of procedure. It has since then applied this exception in many other
cases.
In line with the liberal policy of the Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and
even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute
actions before the Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or
orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
THE PETITION IS OF TRANSCENDENTAL IM PORTANCE TO THE PUBLIC
o Affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of
the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery
system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise
The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
this Court brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.
The Contract of Lease violates Sec. 1 of PCSOs charter
PCSOs charter prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or
joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."
The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct
charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO cannot exercise it "in
collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be allowed since the
privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities is a franchise
granted by the legislature to the PCSO
An analysis of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the acts of the PCSO and PGMC
disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an
independent contractor for a piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or
association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties.
JAVELLANA, Maria Yolanda A.

Case No. 116

SYMACO TRADING V SANTOS | G.R. NO. 142474 | August 18, 2005 | CALLEJO SR., J.
FACTS:
Respondent Malabon Fish Brokers Association non-stock corporation established to erect and operate
the Malabon Fish Brokers Association Fish Market.
Linda Sioson elected as treasurer.
Apr 30 1980 Mariano Guison (LESSOR) and MFBAI (LESSEE) executed a contract of lease over a
portion of five parcels of land in Malabon, which included a portion that was occupied by Rudy Symaco.
Lease 10 year period, renewable by agreement.
MFBAI constructed the market on the leased property where its members installed their respective stalls.
Aug 13 1983 a group of MFBAI members, led by Marcos Valle Jr., approved the corporations By-Laws.
Aug 18, 1983 ANOTHER set of MFBAI members, led by Lino Buhain, met and amended the By-Laws
which the SEC approved on Sept 7.
VALLE and 10 others filed a petition with SEC for the nullification of the amended By-Laws; to give due
course to the Aug 13 by-laws and to declare VALLE ET AL as the duly-established members of the Board
of Directors.
SEC dismissed the petition + directed the hold-over officers to call for a membership meeting to elect the
new Board of Directors and Officers. According to the hearing officer, MFBAI had ONLY 35 legitimate
members, and Respondent Luisito T. Santos was not listed as one of them.
SEC dismissed appeal.
VALLE ET AL elevated the decision to the CA via petition for review.
MEANWHILE, Guison died intestate.
Apr 30, 1990 Heirs of Mariano Guison and petitioner Norma Symaco (then President and Chairman of
the Bd of Directors of petitioner Symaco Corp) executed an unnotarized contract of lease over a portion
of the property previously leased to MFBAI. 4-year period.
Norma Symaco was then also a member of the MFBAI Bd of Directors.
Symaco had the stallholders evicted from the market and filed a COMPLAINT for forcible entry against
them with MeTC.
MeTC issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the defendants.
MeTC = judgment in favor of the CORPORATION.
May 31, 1990 CA rendered judgment affirming the SEC decision. This became final and executory.
Oct 29, 1990 Santos, for and in behalf of the MFBAI, filed a complaint for the annulment of the Apr 30
contract of lease, with injuctive relief against the Heirs of Guison, Symaco Corp and Norma Symaco in the
RTC.
22 stallholders of the fish market, some of whom were MFBAI members, sought to intervene, seeking the
same reliefs prayed for by the latter. Court allowed the complaint-in-intervention.
Santos argument:
Santos alleged that as an MFBAI member, he was a NOMINAL PARTY. He filed the DERIVATIVE SUIT for
and in behalf of MFBAI. He further alleged that the Apr 30 contract of lease executed was null and void
because it was executed in violation of the principle of corporate opportunity.1 The complaint was filed since
the officials of the corporation had virtually accepted the Apr 30 contract, leaving no room for redress within
the corporation itself.
Petitioners argument: Santos had filed the complaint simply because the sublessees of his stall in the fish
market had been evicted based on the MTC decision. The petitioners specifically denied the allegation that (a)
Luisito T. Santos was a member of MFBAI and as such, had no standing to file the complaint for and in its

He further alleged that the April 30, 1990 Contract of Lease executed by the defendants was null and void since it was
executed by Symaco Corporation, through Norma Symaco, who was the president and chairman of the Board of Directors of
the said corporation and still a member of the MFBAI Board of Directors; hence, the contract was executed in violation of the
principle of corporate opportunity under Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was also pointed out
that Symaco Corporation was actually owned by Norma Symaco's family. It was, likewise, stated that the MFBAI failed to
provide market stalls for its members on account of the April 30, 1990 Contract of Lease between Symaco Corporation and the
Heirs of Mariano Guison.

behalf; (b) the petitioner Estate could not be compelled to execute a contract of lease in favor of MFBAI after
the expiry of the 1980 Contract of Lease; and (c) petitioner Norma Symaco was not personally liable for the
execution of the 1990 Contract of Lease.
Lower courts:
TC: dismissed complaint and complaint in intervention. Santos and most of the intervenors were not bona
fide members of MFBAI no cause of action against petitioners. Norma did not violate principle of
corporate opportunity.
CA: reversed. The CA held that as early as 1987, Norma Symaco had negotiated with the Heirs of
Mariano Guison for the lease of the property; hence, she was guilty of violating the doctrine of corporate
opportunity. The appellate court failed to rule on the issue of whether Santos was a member of MFBAI or
not.
CA GRANTED PETITIONERS MR. Relying on the decisions of the SEC Hearing Officer and the SEC, the
appellate court ruled that Santos was not a member of MFBAI; hence, he had no standing to file a
complaint for and in behalf of the said corporation.
CA GRANTED RESPONDENTS MR and rendered an amended decision. Based on the respondent's
claim in SEC Case No. 2521, the MFBAI had 42 legitimate members, including the 35 original members
and respondent Santos; moreover, the RTC resolved that Santos was a member.
ISSUES:
WON LUISITO T. SANTOS WAS A BONA FIDE MEMBER OF MFBAI - NO
RATIO:
FROM SEC DECISION: There was but one meeting for the election of the members of the board of
directors and officers of MFBAI that took place in 1983 and that was the alleged membership meeting
conducted by the petitioners' group held on August 13, 1983. Said meeting, however, was not attended by
the majority of the aforesaid thirty-five (35) legitimate members of MFBAI; hence, there was no quorum.
Since there were no legally elected directors and officers of MFBAI for the year 1983, and the by-laws
purportedly adopted on August 13, 1983, filed by the petitioners, has not been legally adopted and
approved by the general membership of MFBAI since the meeting of the sixty- four (64) alleged members
held on August 13, 1983 was not valid.
FROM CA DECISION WHICH AFFIRMED SEC: The thirty (30) alleged members showed up later on, i.e.,
long after the incorporation, and they failed to comply with the requirements laid down in the by-laws
aforementioned. They were never accepted as members even informally by the association.
In its Amended Decision, the appellate court relied on the statement in the RTC decision, that the
petitioners (defendants therein) adduced evidence that Santos was an MFBAI member. The CA failed to
consider the RTC decision in its entirety and the ratio decidendi of the ruling. RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners (defendants therein), and relied on the decisions of the Hearing Officer, the SEC on appeal
and the CA; the trial court did not rely on the parties' evidence aliunde. In fine, the RTC correctly
considered the decisions of the Hearing Officer, the SEC and the CA on appeal as conclusive and binding
on it, prescinding from the parties' evidence aliunde.
Respondent Santos was not a legitimate MFBAI member, he had no standing to file a derivative
suit for and in its behalf. One of the requisites of a derivative suit is that the party bringing the suit
should be a stockholder/member at the time of the action or transaction complained of. The right
to sue derivatively is an attribute of corporate ownership which, to be exercised, requires that the
injury alleged be indirect as far as the stockholders/members are concerned, and direct only
insofar as the corporation is concerned. The whole purpose of the law authorizing a derivative suit
is to allow the stockholder/member to enforce rights.
Contrary to the CA ruling, all the MFBAI members are not indispensable parties in a derivative suit. It is
enough that a member or a minority of such members file a derivative suit for and in behalf of the
corporation. After all, the members/stockholders who filed a derivative suit are merely nominal parties, the
real party-in-interest being the corporation itself for and in whose behalf the suit is filed. Any monetary
benefits under the decision of the court shall pertain to the corporation which are derivative (secondary) in
nature. A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder/member to enforce a corporate cause of action.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA | G.R. No. 122846 | Jan 20, 2009 | Tinga J. |
Topic in Syllabus: Special Civil Actions Facial Challenge
Summary: Operators of motels and other similar establishments seek to have Manila Ordinance 7774, which
prohibits short-time admission rates, declared unconstitutional. SC held that Ordinance was unconstitutional and that
the petitioners could invoke the rights of their patrons because they fall within the exception of third party standing.
DOCTRINE: if the litigant has the capacity to invoke the constitutional rights of others, through the over breadth
doctrine, or third party standing, a facial challenge is viable. (#TBT Consti 1)
FACTS:

Manila Ordinance No 7774 signed into law by Mayor Alfredo Lim which provided that short-time admission
rates, wash-up rates, or other similarly concocted terms were prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging,
houses, pension houses and other similar establishments

Malate Tourist District and Devt Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declatory relief with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

As the owner of Victoria Court (lol), MTDC asked that the ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

White Light Corp (WLC), Titanium Corp (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Devt Center (STDC) filed a motion to
intervene claiming that ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels and
motels.

RTC granted motion to intervene. MTDC eventually withdrew from complaint.

RTC:

Declared ordinance null and void noting that ordinance impinged on the personal liberty of individuals and got
in the way of the right to operate economic enterprises.
The illicit relationships sought to be dissuaded could be consummated by paying for the 12-hour stay.

CA

Reversed RTC and affirmed constitutionality of Ordinance

No violation to the right of privacy or freedom of movement.
Lawful objective of ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities, and method is lawful because
establishments are still allowed to operate.
Well-being of constituents justifies adverse effect on establishments.

ISSUES:
W/N petitioners have standing? YES
W/N Manila Ordinance No 774 is valid? NO
HELD:
Petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients who patronise their establishments for
a wash-rate time frame.
Concept of third party standing as an exception and over breadth are appropriate in CAB:
o Crux of the matter is w/n these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of
their patrons equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi ability of the party to demonstrate to court sufficient connection to and harm from
the law or action challenged to support that partys participation in the case.
o GR: existence of direct and personal interest presents the most obvious cause, as well as standard
test for petitioners standing
o EXC: over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, 3rd party standing, doctrine of transcendental importance.
Applicability of third party standing clothes petitioners with standing.
Criteria
CAB
Litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact
Business interests of petitioners are injured by
Ordinance
Litigant must have close relation to third party
Petitioners continued viability depends on patronage
of customers, which is threatened by Ordinance
lopez, catherine nicole

case # 6

There must be some hindrance to the third partys

ability to protect his/her own interests

The lack of special interest groups that can advocate

on behalf of the customers can be construed as
hindrance to bringing of suit.
Applicability of over breadth doctrine clothes petitioners with standing
o In over breadth doctrine, challengers to govt action are, in effect, permitted to raise the rights of third
parties

Re: Constitutionality of Ordinance

Ordinance is an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of establishments as well as their patrons
Needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as the rights of the patrons without
sufficient justification
Valid Ordinance requirements:
o Within corporate powers of LGU to enact and pass according to procedure prescribed by law
o Must conform to substantive requirements
Not contravene any statute or Constitution
Not unfair or oppressive
Not partial or discriminatory
Not prohibit but must regualte trade
Must be general and consistent with public policy
Not unreasonable
Goal of Ordinance is to minimize, if not eliminate, the use of covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use,
and the like. These goals fall within police power of State.
However, desirablity of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
Test for validity
Strict Scrutiny
Rational Basis
Intermediate Review
Laws dealing with freedom of Economic legislation
Substantive due process
the mind or accepting the
cases (in the US)
political process; regulation
of speech, gender or race,
other fundamental rights
Nature of govt interest
Compelling, not just
Legitimate
Governmental interest is
substantial
extensively examined
Methods of Enforcement
Absence of less restrictive
Availability of less restrictive
means for achieving interest
measures considered.
Recognition of petitioners capacity to invoke constitutional rights of their patrons means that rational basis will not
suffice.
o Rights of married couples and single consenting adults will also be curtailed in the pursuance of the goal to
curtail sexual behaviour. These are fundamental rights to liberty
It must appear tha the interests of public generally, as distinguished from those of a prticular class, require an
interference with private rights. Means must be reasonably necessary for accomplishment of purpose, not unduly
oppressive of private rights.
Reasonable relation must exist between purposes of measure and means employed for accomplishment.
Behaviour by which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is already prohibited and could be diminished by applying existing
laws.
To what?

lopez, catherine nicole

case # 6

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

19 November 2001
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Special Civil Actions; Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus; Facial Challenge

G.R. No. 148560

Bellosillo, J.

SUMMARY: Estrada mounted a facial challenge to the Plunder Law, alleging its unconstitutionality on the ground of
vagueness, overbreadth, and dispensing with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Court held that the
Plunder Law is constitutional. It further explained that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth and vagueness doctrines are analytical
tools developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases only. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to
a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This
rationale does not apply to penal statutes because criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence.

FACTS:
Joseph Estrada, prosecuted under RA 70801 (Plunder Law), assails the constitutionality of certain
provisions2 of the Plunder Law on the following grounds, which are purportedly violations of the rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him:
1. It suffers from the vice of vagueness.
2. It dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal prosecutions.
3. It abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
4 April 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandigabyan 8 Informations, one of which is for
violation of RA 7080.
11 April 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation and for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses.
o Grounds raised: lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses,
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause
25 April 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that probable cause for the offense of Plunder
exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of Estrada. MR was denied.
14 June 2001: Estrada moved to quash the Information charging Plunder.
o Grounds raised: Law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness; the Amended
Information charged more than 1 offense.
o Motion to Quash (MTQ) denied by Sandiganbayan.
Estrada filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion (GAD) in denying his MTQ the Information charging Plunder.
PETITIONERS
ARGUMENTS:
RA 7080
is RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS: RA 7080 is constitutional
unconstitutional because:
because:
1.) It violates the due process clause for being vague 1.) Elements constituting the crime of Plunder are stated with
and overbroad on its face.
definiteness and certainty.
The law does not afford an ordinary person
Assuming there is vagueness in the law, it need not be
reasonable notice that his actuation will
declared unconstitutional but may be clarified by judicial
constitute a criminal offense.
construction.
The terms combination and series are not
Ordinary import of the terms combinations and series
defined under the statute.
should prevail.
a. Series of overt criminal acts simply means a
It violates the constitutional right of the accused to
repetition of at least 2 of any of those enumerated
know the nature and cause of the accusation against
acts in Sec. 1 (d).
him.
b. Combination means a product of combining of at
least one of any of those enumerated acts in Sec. 1
(d) with at least any of those enumerated.
2.) The Plunder Law dispenses with the requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt (PBRD).

2.) Plunder law does not dispense with the requirement of

PBRD.

An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder.

Sec. 1 (d) enumerates the means of acquiring ill-gotten wealth. Sec. 2 defines the crime of plunder and the penalties. Sec. 4 provides for the
rule of evidence to establish the crime.
2

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

This digest is for Civil Procedure purposes only. Do not rely on this digest if the subject is Constitutional Law or Evidence.

CASE # 07

Section 4 does not require that each and

every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy be
proved, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy.
3.) It is beyond the constitutional power of the
legislature to delimit the reasonable doubt standard
and to abolish the element of mens rea in mala in se
crimes by converting these to mala prohibita.

HELD:

While there is no need to prove each and every act done

by the accused in furtherance of the scheme to acquire
ill-gotten wealth, prosecution still has to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well
as other elements of the offense.
3.) It is within the inherent powers and wisdom of the legislature
to determine which acts are mala prohibita in the same way that
it can declare punishable an act which is inherently not criminal
in nature.

RATIO:
Section 2 of the Plunder Law is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct
and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty.

The Plunder Law is not

vague or ambiguous.
The Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and
well-defined
parameters
which would enable the
accused to determine the
nature of his violation.
The
void-for-vagueness
doctrine can only be invoked
against
that
specie
of
legislation that is utterly vague
on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a
saving
clause
or
by
construction.

It can be easily understood that what the statute punishes is the act of a public officer
in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series
or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d).
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
Words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning.
Websters New Collegiate Dictionary
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To
combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.
Deliberations of the bicameral committee on Justice, 7 May 1991, would show that
legislature intended to mean that:
Combination refers to at least 2 acts falling under different categories of enumeratrion
in Sec. 1, par. (d)
Series refers to 2 or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par (d).
Pattern is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4
Pattern consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated
in subsections (1) to (6)
The reasonable doubt standard is indispensable in all criminal prosecutions.

The Plunder Law did not

dispense
with
the
requirement
of
proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

Sec. 4 requires the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving
an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.

(RELEVANT) ON THE CONTENTION THAT ESTRADA CANNOT MOUNT A FACIAL CHALLENGE TO THE PLUNDER LAW:
Argument
SC (adopting the observations of Justice VV Mendoza during deliberations)
Estrada cannot mount a facial Correct! The allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad
challenge to the Plunder Law. do not justify a facial review of its validity.
Facial or on its face challenges
seek the total invalidation of a A facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.
This digest is for Civil Procedure purposes only. Do not rely on this digest if the subject is Constitutional Law or Evidence.

CASE # 07

statute.

successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of

circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma: Claims

of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken
words; overbreadth claim, if
entertained at all, have been
curtail when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected
conduct.
On its face invalidation
statutes has been described
manifestly strong medicine to
employed sparingly and only
a last resort.

of
as
be
as

Effect of on its face invalidation of statutes: It results in striking them

down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected
The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
are analytical tools developed for testing on their faces statutes in
free speech cases only.
As to overbreadth doctrine:
Claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which seek to regulate only spoken words.
Overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech.
o
o

The transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected

expression justifies allowing attacks on overly broad statutes.
The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

As to vagueness doctrine:
A litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications.
A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct
of others.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
1. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence.
2. If facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct.
3. In the area of Criminal Law, the law cannot take chances, as in the
area of free speech.

Lua, Maria Carmela Cyril E.

This digest is for Civil Procedure purposes only. Do not rely on this digest if the subject is Constitutional Law or Evidence.

CASE # 07

LIMPIN v. IAC
G.R. No. 70987
September 29, 1988
NARVASA, J.
Topic In Syllabus: Special Civil Actions - Foreclosure
SUMMARY: Lots which were mortgaged to respondent Ponce were later on acquired by petitioner Sarmiento when
they were sold to him by petitioner Limpin (who bought them after obtaining a money judgment against the original
owners). Before the lots were levied upon, Ponce initiated judicial proceedings for the foreclosure of the mortgage and
judgment was rendered in his favor. TC confirmed said sale subject to the equity of redemption of Sarmiento, however
the latter was too late, invoking such equity of redemption more than 9 months after it was recognized by the Court
FACTS:
1973: Two lots, which, together with two others, were mortgaged to respondent Ponce by their former
owners, Sps. Jose and Marcelina Aquino
1978: Lots were sold by the spouses to Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation
1979: Petitioner Limpin obtained a money judgment against Butuan Bay Wood Export Corp, and to satisfy
said judgment, the two lots were levied on and sold at public auction; Limpin was the highest bidder and he
later on sold the lots to petitioner Sarmiento
HOWEVER, a day before levy was made on the lots, Ponce had initiated judicial proceedings for the foreclosure
of the mortgage over the lots
Judgment was rendered in his favor and became final and at the foreclosure sale, lots were acquired by
Ponce as the highest bidder
Ponce moved for confirmation of the foreclosure sale, but the Court confirmed the sale of only two lots,
refusing to do so as regards the two which had been subject of the execution sale in
Limpin's favor
Ponce instituted a special civil action in the IAC to resolve the matterCourt rendered judgment in Ponce's
favor, and appeal of Limpin and Sarmiento was denied
SC dismissed Sarmiento's and Limpin's petition for review on certiorari; Affirmed appellate court's decision
which ordered the TC to confirm the sale and issue a writ of possession to Ponce with respect to the aforesaid
lots, subject to the equity of redemption of Rogelio Sarmiento
Sarmiento was aware that the TC had the ministerial duty to execute the appellate court's decision, subject to
the equity of redemption explicitly recognized in his favor in the court's decisions; He knew that he had the
prerogative to exercise his equity of redemption, if not from the moment that the judgment of the Court
became final and executory, atleast until the Court, subsequently confirmed the sale and issued a writ of
possession in favor of Ponce
Sarmiento however, did not try to exercise that right before, at or about the time of the confirmation of the
foreclosure sale, instead he instituted two actions, attempting to re-litigate the same issues which the SC and
IAC had already passed upon and resolved--He and his counsel were found guilty of contempt
It was only on March 11, 1988 (nine months or so after entry of the judgment recognizing his equity
of redemption) that Sarmiento attempted to exercise his unforeclosed equity of redemption
Sarmiento filed a motion with the Court, manifesting that he would exercise the right, and asked the Court to
fix the redemption priceCourt opined that this should be the subject of the agreement between Ponce and
Sarmiento
Sarmiento wrote Ponce offering Php2.6M as redemption price for the two lotsPonce rejected the offer and
averred that the period within which Sarmiento could have exercised the right had already lapsed
Sarmiento filed a motion with the Court asking it to fix the redemption price and that the
implementation of the writ of possession be provisionally deferredopposed by Ponce
According to Ponce, from the moment Sarmiento's predecessors-in-interest defaulted in their
obligations over the mortgaged properties up to the confirmation of the auction sale of the properties,
Sarmiento could (and should) have exercised his equity of redemption
PETITIONER SARMIENTO'S ARGUMENT:
The confirmation of the sale of the lots could not have cut off his equity of redemption, in fact, Ponce himself
precisely prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession 'subject to the equity of redemption of Rogelio
Sarmiento' thereby recognizing Sarmiento's equity of redemption beyond confirmation date
ISSUE: WON the equity of redemption recognized in favor of Petitioner Sarmiento in the court's previous judgment still
subsists and may be exercised more than a year after that judgment had become final and executory - NO

MORTELL, Khriska Viktoria M.

CASE # 08

HELD:
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION IS DIFFERENT FROM THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage (understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire
mortgaged property after registration of foreclosure sale) exists only in the case of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage; No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure EXCEPT only
where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking institution
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption
within 1 year from the registration of the sheriff's certificate of foreclosure sale
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, no equivalent right of redemption exists
The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an order of the court, shall operate to
divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights
of redemption as may be allowed by law."
Such rights exceptionally "allowed by law" are those granted by the charter of the Philippine
National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337)
These laws confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure -- after confirmation by the court of
the foreclosure sale -- which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the
date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
But, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is
not the PNB or a bank or banking institution.
In such a case, the foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an order of the court, shall operate to divest
the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser." There then exists
only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor
to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within
the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even
after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation. After order of confirmation, no
redemption can be effected any longer.
It is this same equity of redemption that is conferred by law on the mortgagor's successor-in-interest,
or third persons acquiring rights over the mortgaged property subsequent and subordinate to the
mortgagee's lien. If the subsequent lien-holders were not joined in the foreclosure action, the judgment
in the mortgagor's favor is ineffective as to them and they retain an unforeclosed equity of
redemption and a separate foreclosure proceeding should be brought, within 90 daysnot applicable
in this case as Sarmiento was impleaded
Under the circumstances of this case, the intent of IAC was to give Sarmiento, not the unforeclosed equity of
redemption pertaining to a stranger to the foreclosure suit, but the same equity of redemption possessed by
the mortgagor himself
Judgment cannot be construed as contemplating or requiring the institution of a separate suit by Ponce to
compel Sarmiento to exercise his unforeclosed equity of redemption, or as granting Sarmiento the option to
redeem at any time that he pleases, subject only to prescription. Judgment plainly intended that
Sarmiento exercise his option to redeem as successor of the mortgagor
SARMIENTO NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS
Decision of the IAC specifically ordered the TC to confirm the judicial foreclosure sale in favor of Ponce over the
two lots
Given the fact that the appealed orders of the TC had been issued upon motion for confirmation earlier made
by Ponce (which was duly served and heard) the IAC Decision can be construed in nowise than as a
peremptory command to the TC to confirm the sale as directed, motu proprio, and without the need of any
further motion or other action on the part of Ponce
The rejection by this Court of Sarmiento's and Limpin's appeal in its own Decision, which imported nothing less
than a total affirmance of the Decision of the Appellate Court, should have sufficiently alerted Sarmiento that
confirmation could come at any time after this Court's Decision became final, with or without any action from
Ponce. He cannot, in the circumstances, claim unfair surprise
He should, upon being notified of this Court's Decision, have taken steps to redeem the properties in question
or, at the very least, served the Trial Court and Ponce with notice of his intention to exercise his equity of
redemption.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION CLAIMED AND INVOKED BY SARMIENTO LAPSED AND CEASED TO EXIST WITH TC CONFIRMATION OF SALE

MORTELL, Khriska Viktoria M.

CASE # 08

LOOYUKO v. CA, FGU INSURANCE, GUTANG

July 12, 2001
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Foreclosure

G.R. No. 102696 etc

Kapunan

SUMMARY: Looyuko attached the lot of Sps Mendoza, a new TCT was eventually issued to him. Guntang, on
the other hand, also executed on the same property of the Sps and a TCT was also issued to her. Earlier on,
Sps mortgaged the property to FGU who eventually foreclosed it. FGUs case became final and executory
but before a TCT could be issued to it, Looyuko and Guntang intervened. According to the rules, motion for
intervention should be filed "any time before rendition of judgment." There is exception only when the
intervenors were indispensable parties which is not the case here.
Section 1, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court requires all persons having or claiming an interest in the premises
subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage be made defendants in the action for foreclosure.
The requirement for joinder of the person claiming an interest subordinate to the mortgage sought to be
foreclosed, however, is not mandatory in character but merely directory, in the sense that failure to comply
therewith will not invalidate the foreclosure proceedings. The failure of the mortgagee to join the subordinate
lien holders as defendants in the foreclosure suit did not have the effect of nullifying the foreclosure
proceeding, but kept alive the equity of redemption acquired by the purchasers in their respective execution
sales. Registration may be granted in the name of the mortgagee but subject to the subordinate lien holders'
equity of redemption, which should be exercised within ninety (90) days from the date the decision becomes
final.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Disputed in these consolidated cases is a house and lot previously
owned by the Spouses Tomas and Linda Mendoza. Contesting the property are the spouses' various creditors
as well as the creditors' alleged assignee.
FACTS(This would include the facts related to the issue on foreclosure only. Facts regarding the assignment to
Tanuliong is excluded; that issue was not discussed by the court anyway for being moot and academic):
1st set of creditors - Albert Looyuko and Jose Uy; their lawyer, Atty. Cuyos, has also annotated her attorney's
lien over the property
2nd set of creditors - Antonia Gutang and her children David and Elizabeth, who have substituted their father
3rd set of creditors - FGU Insurance Corporation and Schubert Tanuliong, who purports to be Looyuko et al.'s
and the Gutangs' assignee.

Civil Case 82-5792: April 22, 1977 Looyuko filed a complaint against the Spouses Mendoza and RTC
issued a writ of preliminary attachment over the property and a notice of levy on attachment bearing the
date April 22, 1977 was annotated at the back of the TCT No. 1702. Then, on February 12, 1986, the
Manila RTC issued a writ of execution and the property was sold at public auction with Looyuko and Uy
as the highest bidders. A new TCT was issued over the property, TCT No. 10107, in Looyuko and Uy
names.
Civil Case No. 13122: Antonia Gutang filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages against
Tomas Mendoz. Judgment was rendered in her favor. On July 1, 1981, she caused to be annotated on
the same TCT No. 1702 a notice of levy on execution. Then, the property was sold at public auction to
Antonia Gutang. Eventually, TCT No. 1702 was cancelled and TCT No. 242 in the name of Antonia
Gutang, married to Jose Gutang, was issued on December 23, 1987.
Civil Case No. 82-9760: On December 2, 1976, spouses Tomas and Linda Mendoza executed a
mortgage over the property in favor of FGU Insurance Corporation. It was registered on December 3,
1976. Spouses failed to satisfy the obligation so FGU on June 1, 1982 filed an action. Sps Mendoza
were declared as in default and evidence were received ex-parte. RTC rendered a decision in favor of
FGU, ordering the Sps to pay.
FGU filed a motion for partial reconsideration, pointing out that the action was not for a sum of money
but for foreclosure of mortgage. It prayed that in accordance with Section 2, Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court, "the decision be amended by ordering the sale of the property mortgaged in case defendant
should not satisfy the judgment in favor of plaintiff within ninety (90) days from notice of decision."
MR was granted and decision was modified. Should defendants fail to pay said amounts within 90
days from receipt of the Decision dated Jan. 22, 1988, the mortgaged property described in par. 6 of
PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #09

the complaint shall be sold in the manner and under the regulations governing sales of real estate
under execution No appeal was taken and the order became final and executory.
On November 24, 1988, the deputy sheriff in a public bidding sold the parcel of land covered by TCT
1702 to FGU, the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was thereafter issued in FGU's favor, which was
confirmed by the RTC on March 2, 1989. On August 23, 1989, the RTC issued an order for the
cancellation of TCT No. 242 and the issuance of a new TCT in FGU's name.
Before the new TCT could be issued, however, the Spouses Gutang filed a motion for intervention and
to set aside the judgment of the RTC, alleging that they are the new registered owners of the property.
RTC allowed the motion for intervention, holding that the failure of FGU to implead the Spouses in the
action for foreclosure deprived the latter of due process.
On October 11, 1990, Looyuko et al. filed a motion for intervention, which the RTC granted
In the CA it was decided that ruled that the action before the RTC was not actually an action for
foreclosure but one for collection of a sum of money. The court also affirmed the order of the RTC
allowing intervention
CA: RTC had just and valid reasons to allow the private respondents to intervene in the case. Had it
denied the intervention, the execution in satisfaction of the money judgment against the judgment
debtors, would be violative of section 15 of Rule 30. FGU should have impleaded in its action "all
persons having or claiming an interest in the (mortgage) premises subordinate in right to that of the
holder of the mortgage, all of whom shal be made defendants in the action" (sec. 1, Rule 68, Rules of
Court) and without their inclusion there can be no final determination in the action. FGU did not include
Looyuko and Gutang both of whom hold liens on the same property.

INTERVENORS ARGUMENT: FGUs failure to implead Looyuko and Guntang rendered the proceedings in
FGUs case void.

ISSUES: Was the motion for intervention filed by the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. in Civil Case No. 829760 proper considering that the case was already final and executory? NO
Whether or not the failure to implead Looyuko and Gutang affected the FGUs foreclosure? NO
HELD:
SC assumes for purposes of discussion that the action was indeed for the foreclosure of the mortgage
over the subject property. Present Rules have clarified that the motion for intervention should be
filed "any time before rendition of judgment."
In the present case, the motions for intervention were filed after judgment had already been rendered,
indeed when the case was already final and executory. Thus, intervention can no longer be allowed in a
case already terminated by final judgment. BUT..
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an
independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case
between the original parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding
wherein the intervention may be based.
Intervention is legally possible only "before or during a trial," hence a motion for intervention filed
after trial--and, a fortiori, when the case has already been submitted, when judgment has been
rendered, or worse, when judgment is already final and executory--should be denied.
In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of
judgment by the trial court BUT only in cases where the intervenors were indispensable parties.
This is not so in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court requires all persons having or claiming an interest in the
premises subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage be made defendants in the action for
foreclosure. The requirement for joinder of the person claiming an interest subordinate to the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed, however, is not mandatory in character but merely directory, in the sense
that failure to comply therewith will not invalidate the foreclosure proceedings.

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #09

A subordinate lien holder is a proper, even a necessary, but not an indispensable, party to a
foreclosure proceeding. Appropriate relief could be granted by the court to the mortgagee in the
foreclosure proceeding, without affecting the rights of the subordinate lien holders.
The effect of the failure on the part of the mortgagee to make the subordinate lien holder a
defendant is that the decree entered in the foreclosure proceeding would not deprive the subordinate
lien holder of his right of redemption. A decree of foreclosure in a suit to which the holders of a
second lien are not parties leaves the equity of redemption in favor of such lien holders
unforeclosed and unaffected.
Subordinate lien holders like the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. acquire only a lien upon
the equity of redemption vested in the mortgagor, and their rights are strictly subordinate to the
superior lien of the mortgagee.
An execution creditor who levies his execution upon property that the judgment debtor has mortgaged
to another can sell at most only the equity of redemption belonging to the mortgagor.
As it is the equity of redemption that the subordinate lien holders had acquired by the levy on execution
and that was sold in the public auction, this equity, not the property itself, was what the purchasers,
who incidentally are the subordinate lien holders themselves, bought at the execution sale.
The failure of the mortgagee to join the subordinate lien holders as defendants in the
foreclosure suit, therefore, did not have the effect of nullifying the foreclosure proceeding, but
kept alive the equity of redemption acquired by the purchasers in their respective execution
sales.
LIMPIN V. IAC: The Court held that, If these subsequent or junior lien-holders be not joined in the
foreclosure action, the judgment in the mortgagor's favor is ineffective as to them, of course. In that
case, they retain what is known as the "unforeclosed equity of redemption," and a separate
foreclosure proceeding should be brought to require them to redeem from the first mortgagee,
or the party acquiring title to the mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale, within 90 days,
under penalty of losing that prerogative to redeem.
Such equity of redemption does not constitute a bar to the registration of the property in the name of
the mortgagee. Registration may be granted in the name of the mortgagee but subject to the
subordinate lien holders' equity of redemption, which should be exercised within ninety (90)
days from the date the decision becomes final.
This registration is merely a necessary consequence of the execution of the final deed of sale in the
foreclosure proceedings.
Petition for review (G.R. No. 102716) of the mortgagee FGU, who was the first to register its
encumbrance, must be granted. The above ruling has rendered moot the proceedings from which
complaints by Tanunliong arose.
The Register of Deeds is ordered to cancel TCT No. 10107 in the names of Jose Looyuko and John Uy
and to issue a new one in the name of FGU Insurance Corporation, subject to the equity of redemption
of Jose Looyuko and John Uy, and Antonia Gutang, respectively. The equity of redemption of Jose
Looyuko and John Uy should be exercised within ninety (90) days from the date this decision becomes
final.

PUA, IRENE MAE

CASE #09

WICKER v. ARCANGEL
Jan. 29, 1996
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Special Civil Action; Contempt

G.R. No. 112869

J. Mendoza

SUMMARY: Wicker and counsel, Atty. Rayos moved for the inhibition of Judge Arcangel for being recruited from the
South through the help of opposing counsel. Judge Arcangel held them in contempt. SC upheld contempt of Atty.
Rayos and said the case is one for direct contempt because it involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending. In case of
indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor (guilty party) may be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel. In case of direct contempt, the
respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt. The judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable,
whereas in cases of direct contempt only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for certiorari assailing the orders of Judge Archangel of RTC Makati
FACTS:
Wicker with his wife and the Tectonics Asia Architects Engineering Co., brought suit in RTC Makati
against LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at
Forbes Park.
o Plaintiffs claimed that the house and lot was fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant
LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe.
Nov. 18, 1993: Wickers counsel, Atty.. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of Arcangel, which
was verified by Wicker.
o LFS was able to have 3 successive postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of
Mrs. Porcuna (witness) but the latter was never presented.
o Counsel of LFS did not go to a hearing because they allegedly knew that Judge Capulong was
not present, and that Judge Capulong was eased out of his station.
o Judge Arcangel was recruited by Atty. Santos, who Wicker filed an Admin. Case against.
o Plaintiffs doubt the partiality and integrity of Judge Arcangel.
Because of allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous, Judge Arcangel ordered
Wicker and counsel to appear before him on Nov. 26, 1993, and to show cause why they should not be
cited for contempt of court.
In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed
Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty. Rayos claimed that he merely signed the motion
in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering
o Funny part: Kelly was advised by a young man possibly employed by the Court had advised
the former to have the case reraffled because Atty. Santos knew Judge Arcangel and knew
when the latter would appear.
Judge Arcangel held them guilty of direct contempt (5 days imprisonment and P100 fine).
MR denied, hence this petition.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
When a person, impelled by justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit
himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty of contempt.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:He was appointed by SC through Administative Order No. 154-93, that Atty.
Rayos has a greater duty to the court than his client, and the plaintiffs failed to pick out the young man when
all male personnel was presented to Wicker and counsel.
ISSUE:
1. WON J. Arcangel committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable for direct contempt NO!
SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #10

HELD:
[DOCTRINE]: This is a case of direct contempt
The case involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending.
It has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71, 1.
In case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor (guilty party) may be punished only
[a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by
himself or counsel.
In case of direct contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged in contempt.
The judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only
judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.
CAB1: hearing was unnecessary, and even if this is a case of indirect contempt, Judge Arcangel gave
them a hearing before citing them in contempt of court.
Justice Malcolm: the power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the
administration of justice will fail. The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of merely
satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.
1. The allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of Judge Arcangel and constitute an unwarranted criticism
of the administration of justice in the country.
A reading of the allegations in petitioners motion for inhibition leads to no other conclusion than that
respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to
whose wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated easing out the former judge
to make room for such transfer.
The assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order
No. 154-93, precisely in the interest of an efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII
of the Constitution. This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos.
Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.
It would appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been personally recruited
by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been eased out were Atty. Rayos and not
Wickers.
Kelly Wicker should not be cited in contempt since the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do
not appear to have come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80)
and in failing health (suffering from angina).
LEGAL ETHICS ASPECT:
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. Even a hired gun cannot be excused for
what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears
as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.
Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by
others and not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case.

Case at bar
SOLLANO, JOSE GABRIEL

CASE #10

QUINIO v. CA
July 13, 2000
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Special Civil Actions - Contempt

G.R. No. 11867

Purisima, J.

SUMMARY:
Lower court issued Writ of Replevin in favor of Toyota. Quinios car was seized. She filed a
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA,
which ruled in her favor. Toyota did not comply, so Quinio moved before the RTC that private
respondents be cited in contempt. RTC found them guilty of indirect contempt but only imposed
a P500 fine. Quinio filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC, arguing that private
respondents should have been indefinitely incarcerated until obedience with the Order. SC held
that indefinite incarceration should have been imposed, as private respondents showed clear
and contumacious refusal to obey for failing to comply and give a justifiable reason.
FACTS:
Toyota Bel-Air, Inc. commenced a civil case for recovery of damages and prayer for
replevin of 3 cars purchased by Manila Construction Development of the Philippines,
Austria Fil-Homes, Inc., and Atty. Honor P. Moslares.
Lower court issued a Writ of Replevin for the 3 cars. Of the 2 units seized, one was that
of Carolina Quinio.
Quinio filed an MTD, but the trial court deferred resolution until trial on the merits.
On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, Quinio filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the CA to annul the order
deferring resolution of the MTD and the Writ of Replevin.
Oct. 31, 1991 CA ruled in favor of Quinio, ordering the return of the seized cars.
Toyota failed to appeal, and the decision became final.
May 25, 1992 Quinio filed with RTC of Makati a Motion to Order Plaintiff to Comply
with the Court of Appeals Final Resolution.
RTC directed the President (Bahia) and General Manager of Toyota (Yupangco) to
return the cars within 5 days from receipt of the order, but they failed to comply.
Quinio resorted to a motion to cite Bahia, Yupangco, and their counsel, in contempt.
Trial court found them guilty of indirect contempt and fined them P500.
Quinio filed an MR before the trial court, Petition for Certiorari before the CA, and an MR
before the CA. All were denied.
She then filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC, arguing that
instead of merely being fined P500 each under Rule 71, Sec. 6 (now 7), private
respondents should have been indefinitely incarcerated, pursuant to Rule 71, Sec.
7 (now 8), until the act ordered by the court has been obeyed.
ARGUMENT OF CA:
Sec. 6 (now 7) provides for the punishment if the accused is adjudged guilty of contempt
while Section 7 (now 8) provides for imprisonment to compel the accused to perform an
act which is within his power to do. It is discretionary on the court to avail itself of that provision.

ISSUE:
WON private respondents should have been indefinitely incarcerated YES.
HELD:

Vicencio, Solomon

[CASE # 11]

Under the rules, the court is given the power to decide if a fine, or imprisonment of not
more than 6 months, or both, should be imposed.
Section 7 (now 8) of the same rule provides for indefinite incarceration in civil
contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply with the order of the court. This may
be resorted to where the attendant circumstances are such that the noncompliance with the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court which
has then no other recourse but to use its coercive power.
Reason behind indefinite incarceration is that it is remedial, preservative, or coercive in
nature. Its object is to compel performance of the orders of the court which the
contemnor refuses to obey, although able to do so.
However, in applying the two sections, it should be kept in mind that the power to punish
for contempt should only be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle.
Contempt power should not be availed of unless necessary in the interest of justice.
Although the courts have inherent power to penalize for contempt, it must be reasonably
commensurate with the gravity of the offense.
Courts should be slow in jailing people for noncompliance with their orders, but
where there exists a clear and contumacious refusal to obey court orders or
processes, the power to order indefinite incarceration can definitely be imposed.
In the present case, private respondents showed a clear and contumacious behavior
warranting indefinite incarceration for failing to comply with the Order and failing to show
any justifiable reason for the same.
Imposition of a fine of 500 pesos only would set a precedent for the courts orders to be
easily disregarded and rendered inutile.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP. No. 29810 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. It is hereby ordered that private
respondent Toyota Bel-air, Inc. thru its officers Robert L. Yupangco, Leonardo Bahia and
their counsel, Atty. Rudy B. Canal be placed in custody and kept in confinement by the
Sheriff in the case until the Order, dated July 1, 1992, directing them to return the subject
car is complied with, or until further orders. No pronouncement as to costs.

Vicencio, Solomon

[CASE # 11]

SAN LUIS v. CA + HON. NELSON BAYOT (RTC Judge) & TN LAL & CO, LTD

G.R. No. 142649

13 September 2001
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Special Civil Actions; Contempt

Davide, Jr., C.J.

SUMMARY: For failing to follow an order of RTC-Pasay Branch 111, TN Lal & Co filed an indirect contempt case against Antonio San
Luis. The indirect contempt case was raffled to Branch 118. San Luis filed a motion to dismiss. The Branch 111 judge did not act on
such MTD, instead transferring the case to Branch 118 (the same court which issued the order allegedly violated). SC ruled that the
Judge Bayot was correct in transferring the case, holding that it is the court who issued the order violated that has the power to try
the contempt case.
FACTS:

Antonio San Luis is the Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA).

TN Lal & Co, Ltd. filed a motion for indirect contempt against San Luis, for the latters alleged failure/refusal to comply with the
order of Hon. Ernesto Reyes (presiding judge of RTC-Pasay Branch 111).
o The Branch 111 order directed LRTA to immediately restore the power supply of TN Lals sound system in all places, sites, and
locations in its area of responsibility within 224 hours from receipt of the order.

This petition (indirect contempt case) was raffled to Branch 118.

San Luis filed a Motion to Dismiss for failing to state a cause of action and forum shopping on the part of TN Lal
o July 15 1999: Hon Nelson Bayot (presiding judge of Branch 118) ordered that the indirect contempt petition be transferred to
Branch 111 for disposition and appropriate action, since Branch 111 was in a better position to determine whether or not its
own order was violated.
o Aug 9 1999: San Luis received such order transferring the case to 111.

Aug 18 1999: San Luis filed an MR on Bayots decision, which was denied on Oct 22 1999.
o Nov 8 1999: San Luis receved the order of denial of his MR.

Jan 7 2000: San Luis then filed a certiorari and mandamus case with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion when Bayot did
not act on San Luis motion to dismiss and MR, and instead transferred the case to Branch 111.
o CA dismissed the petition for having filed out of time. MR and Motion to Admit Petition were both denied.
ISSUES:
1.

W/N petition before CA was filed out of time? NO

2.

W/N Bayot committed grave abuse of discretion in transferring the case to another branch and not ruling on San Luis MTD
and MR? NO.

HELD:
1. Petition was not filed out of time..

In dismissing the certiorari case, CA relied on the old Rule 65.

o
The old Rule prescribes that in certiorari cases, the 60-day period reglementary period is interrupted by a timely MR or MNT. If such
MR or MNT is denied, the movant may file the certiorari case within the balance of the 60 days before the MR/MNT was filed, but shall
not be less than 5 days.

However, Rule 65 was amended on Sept 1 2000.

o
Under the amended rule, the 60 day period for filing a certiorari case runs from the movants receipt of the order of the denial of his
MR, if such was filed.
o
As such, the 60-day period only started on Nov 8, 1999. When San Luis filed the certiorari case before the CA on Jan 7, 2000; he did
so during the last day of the said period for fling.

Supposedly, because petition was not filed of time, the logical step should have been to remand to CA for it to judge on the merits.
But here, it would only unduly prolong the disposition of the main action. SC will settle the issues instead.
2. Hon. Bayot was correct in transferring the indirect contempt to the branch whose order was allegedly violated.

"Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the court
and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt to
properly rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy."

Only the court which rendered the order commanding the doing of a certain act is vested with the right to determine whether or
not the order has been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason has been given for noncompliance, and, therefore, whether
a contempt has been committed.
o The power to determine the existence of contempt of court rests exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized
to punish contempt against another.

RATIONALE: Contempt proceedings are sui generis and triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are
charged. The power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its
presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in order that a court may compel obedience to its
orders. Thus, it must have the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency."

Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides, in effect, that a charge for indirect contempt must be filed with the court
contemned. Although this provision is permissive in nature, in the event of concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of
court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferential right of the court against which the act of contempt was
committed to try and punish the guilty party.
SULIT, LEOR JYLE C.

PAGE 1 OF 1

CASE #12

PEOPLE v. GODOY
29 Mar. 1995 G.R. No. 115908 Regalado, J.
TOPIC: Special Civil Actions; Contempt (Rule 71)
SUMMARY: RTC judge filed a complaint to cite in contempt a newspaper reporter and the publisher for an article
about death threats received by the judge as a result of his imposition of the death penalty on an accused. SC
ruled that the article was not contumacious, and discussed the concept of contempt. V.LONG digest, sorry! L
NATURE: Complaint filed by Judge Gacott (J.Gacott) of RTC Palawan to cite Reynoso (columnist) and Ponce de
Leon (publisher and chairman of the editorial board) for indirect contempt.

The Palawan Times, a newspaper of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City, published
Reynosos article, entitled On the Beat. It was about the alleged death threats received by J. Gacott
from the family of Godoy on whom he imposed the death penalty (statements reproduced below).
PETITIONER J. Gacott avers that the article:
1. Tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice;
2. Contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory;
3. Casts aspersions on his integrity and honesty as a judge and on his ability to administer justice
objectively and impartially + imputes that he is biased and he prejudges the cases;
4. Is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.
RESPONDENTS Reynoso and Ponce de Leon argue among others that the article:
1. Was no longer sub judice as the same was published only after complainant had rendered his
decision and had already lost jurisdiction;
2. Will not affect or influence the review by the SC of the criminal case, considering that the
Palawan Times is circulated only in the City of Puerto Princesa;
3. Constitutes a valid exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press/ fair criticism.

W/N the specified statements are contumacious NO; merely fair criticism, taken out of context.
Statements and Courts Analysis
Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbantaan siya ng mga
Godoy. Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi
niya kasuhan ang mga ito?
o Statements do not even deal with the merits of the case but with the public accusations
made by J. Gacott that he is receiving death threats; only a justifiable query as to why he
does not file the appropriate charges if his accusations are true
Meron ding 'balita' ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa Provincial Jail pa ay
dinadalaw siya ni Taha at kumakain pa sila sa labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang
dahilan kung bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa National Bilibid
Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka- apela pa.
o Merely a report of rumors regarding the accused; not presented as facts
Malaking epekto ang desisyon ng Korte Suprema sa dalawang tao, kay Danny Godoy at Judge
Gacott. Kung babaliktarin ng Supreme Court ang decision ni Gacott, lalaya si Godoy, si Gacott
naman ang masisira, ang kanyang aspirations na maitaas sa Court of Appeals at eventually
makasama sa mga miyembro ng korte suprema ng bansa. Kung papaboran naman si Gacott ay
sigurado na ang kamatayan ni Godoy, at double pa pero si Gacott maitataas pa ang puwesto.
o Nothing more than a fair analysis
Discussion of Contempt
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is
actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Neither do we believe that the publication in question was intended to influence this Court for it could
not conceivably be capable of doing so. The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial
comment and criticism.
Besides, it has not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and
that the degree of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and
sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.
VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S

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SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS CASE # 13

TWO PRIMARY ISSUES WHICH DESERVE A MORE EXTENDED DISQUISITION:

1. W/N there can be contempt of court in case of post-litigation statements/publications
2. Which court has jurisdiction over a contempt against TC while the case is pending appeal

I. Prefatorial Considerations
Power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect:
1. Primarily, proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect for the court
2. Secondarily, compulsory performance of some act/duty required by the court which he refuses
Contempts are classified as CIVIL or CRIMINAL, but the line of demarcation is indistinct.
CIVIL CONTEMPT
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
A. As to the Nature of the Offense
Failing to do something ordered to be done by a Conduct that is directed against the dignity and
court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is
party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the an act obstructing the administration of justice which
party in whose behalf the violated order is made
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect
Proceedings to punish are remedial and for the Directed against the dignity and authority of the
purpose of the preservation of the right of private court, hence an offense against organized society;
persons; neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a
also held to be an offense against public justice
power of the court
which raises an issue between the public and the
accused; the proceedings to punish it are punitive
Since the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is Intent is a necessary element
remedial, the defendant's intent in committing the
contempt is immaterial.
B. As to the Purpose for Which the Power is Exercised
Primary purpose is to provide a remedy for an Primary purpose is to preserve the court's authority
injured suitor and to coerce compliance with an order and to punish for disobedience of its orders
If the contempt consists in the refusal of a person to No element of personal injury; directed against the
do an act that the court has ordered him to do for the power and dignity of the court.
benefit of a party, and the contemnor is committed
until he complies with the order, the commitment is in
the nature of an execution to enforce the judgment of
the court; the party in whose favor that judgment was
rendered is the real party in interest.
C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding
Generally held to be remedial and civil in their Generally held to be in the nature of criminal or
nature; proceedings for the enforcement of some quasi-criminal actions; punitive in nature; Strictly
duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person speaking, however, they are not criminal
to do the thing required.
proceedings or prosecutions, even though the
contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The
proceeding has been characterized as sui generis,
partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and
criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither.
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be The Government, the courts, and the people are
instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or interested in their prosecution. The State is the real
someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to prosecutor.
be protected.
Instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a Purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the
private party to an action and to compel obedience to authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for
a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a disobedience of its orders.
party litigant. So a proceeding is one for civil
contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is
VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S

PAGE 2 OF 5

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS CASE # 13

wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a

special order made in behalf of the other party and
the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the
purpose of the punishment is to aid in an
enforcement of obedience.
The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt
proceedings/ criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are
inapplicable. A proceeding for contempt to enforce a
remedy in a civil action is a proceeding in that action.
Where there has been a violation of a court order in
a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an
independent action. It has been held, however, that
while the proceeding is auxiliary to the main case in
that it proceeds out of the original case, it is
essentially a new and independent proceeding in
that it involves new issues and must be initiated by
the issuance and service of new process.
In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no
presumption, although the burden of proof is on the
complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond
reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a
mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said
that the burden of proof in a civil contempt
proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal
"reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair
preponderance" burden.

In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be

conducted in accordance with the principles and
rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such
procedure is consistent with the summary nature of
contempt proceedings.

In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant

is presumed innocent and the burden is on the
prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable
doubt.

II. W/N post-litigation publications can be the subject of contempt proceedings YES.

Different schools of thought re: freedom of speech and of the press

1. English Doctrine - there can be contempt of court even after the case has been terminated.
2. American Doctrine - general rule is that defamatory comments on the conduct of a judge with
respect to past cases/ matters finally disposed of do not constitute contempt, even though
libelous and reflecting on the integrity of the judge and the court (with certain exceptions).
3. Philippine Doctrine
a. Earlier cases (In re Lozano, In re Abistado, People v. Alarcon) The rule was that
contemptuous publications were actionable only if committed with respect to pending
suits (consistent with American doctrine).
b. Two latest cases (In re Brillantes, In re Almacen) The rule that there can be no
contempt in post-litigation publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain
situations; one may still be cited for contempt of court even after a case has ended,
where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its dignity and to
vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated to degrade, ridicule or bring the
court into disfavor and thereby erode or destroy public confidence in that court.
o The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair
criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed.
However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been
terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances:
(1) Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect/ to scandalize the court; or
(2) Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would
be impeded.
A line has to be drawn between protected speech and an abuse thereof, in determining whether an
allegedly scurrilous publication/statement is to be treated as contempt of court.

VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S

PAGE 3 OF 5

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS CASE # 13

True criticism differs from defamation in the following particulars:

1. Criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention or call for public comment.
2. Criticism never attacks the individual but only his work. In every case the attack is on a man's
acts, or on some thing, and not upon the man himself. A true critic never indulges in
personalities.
3. True criticism never imputes or insinuates dishonorable motives, unless justice absolutely
requires it, and then only on the clearest proofs.
4. The critic never takes advantage of the occasion to gratify private malice, or to attain any other
object beyond the fair discussion of matters of public interest, and the judicious guidance of the
public taste.
So long as critics confine their criticisms to facts and base them on the decisions of the court, they
commit no contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be; but when they pass beyond that line
and charge that judicial conduct was influenced by improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such
conduct was affected by political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to create distrust and destroy
the confidence of the people in their courts.

III. Jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged contumely is committed against a lower
court while the case is pending in the appellate or higher court

General rule: Power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned, because:
o Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose
authority the contempts are charged;
o Power to punish for contempt exists to enable a court to compel due decorum and respect in
its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders, and processes;
o In order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire
whether there has been any disobedience thereof. To submit the question of disobedience to
another tribunal would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency
Exceptions recognized under PH and US jurisprudence:
(1) Indirect contempt committed against an inferior court may also be tried by the proper RTC,
regardless of the imposable penalty.
(2) Indirect contempt against the SC may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and
the charge may be filed in and tried by the RTC, or the case may be referred to it for hearing and
recommendation where the charge involves questions of fact.
(3) People v. Alarcon - The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last
court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the
perfection of the appeal (reason: punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded
as the resentment of personal affronts offered to judges).
(4) A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or
agencies, as in the case of a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions.
(5) Biggest factor in exceptions is where there has been a transfer of jurisdiction to another court;
most common reason is improper venue. While generally a change of venue is not available in a
contempt proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances.
(6) A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders
entered by its predecessor, although where the successor court is created by a statute which
does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before
the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act.
(7) Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where contempt
against the trial court has been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa.
(8) A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case,
which circumstance may require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in
the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the
regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding.
(9) Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt
proceedings in one of them that there is also a contempt against the other.

VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S

PAGE 4 OF 5

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS CASE # 13

(10)
To the substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary
measures imposed by another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to the rule
against punishing for contempt of another court.
(11)
Some contemptuous acts are also crimes, usually misdemeanors, which are often
punishable in other courts than those against which the contemptuous act was done.
(12)
A conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the basis that
the failure of the defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be tried
before the court actually contemned.
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident: Where the entire case
has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court
where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency
to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
o Accordingly, this Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt, it
has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.

IV. Appropriate remedies where the alleged contemptuous statement is also claimed to be libelous
American doctrine: Prosecution for libel is usually the most appropriate and effective remedy;
remedy of a judge is the same as that given to a private citizen.
Philippine doctrine: The availability of the power to punish for contempt does not and will not prevent
a prosecution for libel, either before, during, or after the institution of contempt proceedings. In other
words, the fact that certain contemptuous conduct likewise constitutes an indictable libel against the
judge of the court contemned does not necessarily require him to bring a libel action, rather than
relying on contempt proceedings.
o Principle stems from the fundamental doctrine that an act may be punished as a contempt
even though it has been punished as a criminal offense.
o Defense of double jeopardy would not lie in bar of the contempt proceedings, on the
proposition that a contempt may be an offense against the dignity of a court and, at the same
time, an offense against the peace and dignity of the people of the State.
o To compel judge to descend from judicial office would be a greater humiliation of a court.
That conduct would be personal; the court is impersonal.
V. W/N the same contemptuous conduct of a member of the Bar can be the subject of both a
contempt proceeding and an administrative disciplinary action YES
Basic rule here is that the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate
and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other.
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court,
while the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue
in that office.
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not
considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct .
2 related powers which come into play: (1) the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and (2)
contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the
power to punish for contempt.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the SC. Where the
respondent is a lawyer, however, the SC's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of
court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority
of the Court over lawyers.

Complaint for indirect contempt DISMISSED.

VILLARAMA, BIANCA DANICA S

PAGE 5 OF 5

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS CASE # 13

PEDRO M ENDOZA V. RAY ALLAS AND GODOFREDO OLORES

G.R. No. 131977







Quo Warranto Private Action

February 04, 1999

Sum mary: Petitioner Mendoza was terminated from employment, in view of respondent Allas' appointment
by the President. He filed a petition for quo warranto which the RTC granted. Pending the appeal, Allas was
promoted and the position in dispute is now occupied by Olores, who is not a party to the quo warranto case.
CA dismissed the appeal and denied execution of the RTC decision. Mendoza is now praying for the execution
of the decision of the trial court granting his petition for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement. SC
held that in the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent
Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the
contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did
not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision. Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in
regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto
cases.

Facts:

Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972.

On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil
Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular
No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function
and duties of said office.
On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection
District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director
III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued
to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario,
informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas'
appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.
Mendoza wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and
without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.
He filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court,
Paranaque.
The case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a decision was rendered granting the petition. The
court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office without due process of law and in
violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the
appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of
respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the reinstatement of
petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other benefits appurtenant
thereto.
Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was pending before said
court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of
Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to
dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry
of judgment was made on March 19, 1996.
Mendoza filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court
denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now
being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition.
Mendoza filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning
the order of the trial court. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

#14 Anatalio for Lopez, K. for Rivera

Petitioners Argument: He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores'
appointment because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and
he was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same.
Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his
successor-in-interest.Issue:

Held: CA did not err in refusing execution.
A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he
has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced for the Government by
the Solicitor General or the fiscal against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer
whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as
a corporation without being legally incorporated.
The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. If the court
finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office.
If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or
unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered
that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case
may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to
the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires."

If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully
holding the same, the court may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise
of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of
the court and on the relief sought.
The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that respondent Allas be
ousted from the contested position and that Mendoza be reinstated in his stead. Although petitioner
did not specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and
other monetary benefits".
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office.
This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind
the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same
source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer
as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally
authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the
case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What
was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested
position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not
err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.
Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was merely
appointed to the subject position by the President in the exercise of his constitutional power as
Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and
benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warranto.

#14 Anatalio for Lopez, K. for Rivera

Ombudsman v. Hon. Ibay

Sept. 3, 2001
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Special Civil ActionsDeclaratory Relief

G.R. No. 137538

Quisumbing, J.

SUMMARY: Ombudsmans investigation of the Amari scam led to issuing an order directing
Union Bank branch manager Marquez to produce several documents for in-camera inspection
relating to 4 accounts. Marquez refused to comply under the Bank Secrecy Law, so the
Ombudsman threatened to hold her in indirect contempt. Marquez filed a petition for declaratory
relief with Makati RTC, presided by Ibay. Ombudsman moved to dismiss, claiming RTC has no
jurisdiction. SC: Under Rule 63 of RoC, petitions for declaratory relief are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of RTCs.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: SCA for certiorari to annul the Aug. and Dec. 1998
Orders of Ibay, and to dismiss the case initiated by Marquezs petition for declaratory
relief with the Makati RTC
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman investigated the alleged scam on the Public Estates
Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp. An initial investigation revealed that the scam
was committed through the issuance of checks deposited in several financial institutions.
The Ombudsman issued an Order directing Lourdes Marquez (Union Bank Julia Vargas branch
manager) to produce several bank documents for inspection concerning 4 bank accounts
reportedly maintained in that branch. The inspection would be done in-camerathe banks
records would be examined without bringing the documents outside its premises.
Marquez did not comply, stating the accounts pertain to Interbank, which merged with Union
Bank in 1994, and that despite diligent efforts, the bank could not identify the accounts since the
checks were issued in cash or bearer forms, and that she had to first verify from the Interbank
records in its archives the whereabouts of the accounts.
The Ombudsman told her that her acts constitute disobedience or resistance to a lawful order,
punishable under Sec. 3 (b), Rule 71 of the RoC, in relation to Sec. 15 (9) of R.A. 6770 as
indirect contempt, as well as willful obstruction of the lawful exercise of the Ombudsmans
functions, under Sec. 36 of R.A. 6770. The Ombudsman issued an order to produce the
documents for inspection, or else show cause why she should not be cited for contempt and
charged for obstruction.
Marquez filed a petition for declaratory relief with an application for TRO and/or preliminary
injunction before the Makati RTC branch presided by Judge Ibay. In her petition, Marquez
claimed under Secs. 2 and 3 of R.A. 1405 (Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits), she had the
legal obligation not to divulge the requested information. But the Ombudsmans Order cited
Sec. 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 stating that the Ombudsman had the power to examine and have
access to bank accounts and records. Meanwhile, Marquez filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC, assailing the Ombudsmans order to institute indirect contempt
proceedings against her.
The Ombudsman moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Aug.19, 1998: Ibay denied the motion to dismiss. The Ombudsman
then filed an ex-parte motion for extended ruling. Dec. 22, 1998: Ibay issued an order declaring
the RTC has jurisdiction over the case since it is an action for declaratory relief.

Bries

CASE #17

The Ombudsman filed a petition assailing the Orders, claiming Ibay assumed jurisdiction and
issued orders with grave abuse of discretion and clear lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman
sought to have the orders nullified, and to have Marquezs petition dismissed, and the
prohibition of Ibay from exercising jurisdiction on the investigation being conducted in the
alleged PEA-AMARI land scam.
ISSUE: WON Hon. Ibay acted without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
HELD: NO. Ibay has jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion. PETITION DISMISSED.
The Ombudsman contends that the Makati RTC lacks jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief. It asserts that Ibay should have dismissed the petition outright in view of
Sec.14 of R.A. 6770, which provides:
No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of RTCs. It is not among the actions within
the SCs original jurisdiction even if only questions of law are involved. The RoC states in Sec.1,
Rule 63: Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are all present here:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy
-the extent of the Ombudsmans power to examine bank accounts under Sec.15 (8) of R.A.
6770 vis-a-vis the duty of banks under RA 1405 not to divulge any information relative to
deposits of whatever nature
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
-assertion of a legal right (the power of Ombudsman to examine bank deposits), and the denial
of this by Marquez who refused the inspection
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversythis is Marquez
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination
-the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination as litigation is inevitable. Note that the
Ombudsman has threatened Marquez with indirect contempt and obstruction charges in the
event of non-compliance.
Additionally, in Marquez vs. Desierto, it was ruled that before an in-camera inspection of bank
accounts may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction, the account must be clearly identified, and the inspection limited to the subject
matter of the pending case before said court. The bank personnel and the account holder must
be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account
identified in the pending case. Since there is no pending litigation yetonly an investigation by
the Ombudsmanany order for the opening of the bank account for inspection is premature.

Bries

CASE #17

COMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) V. PROVINCE OF CEBU

NOVEMBER 29, 2001
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF

G.R. No.141386
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

SUMMARY: Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief to find out if charging salaries of teachers against the
SEF is proper. Despite the contention of COA that such use of funds is already in violation of RA5447, the
Court ruled that the petition for declaratory relief was proper because the applicability of the statute in
question to future transactions still remains to be resolved.
NATURE: Petition for Review of RTC decision.
FACTS
The province of Cebu was audited and it was found that the salaries and personnel related benefits of
the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes from January to June 1998, as well as,
the college scholarship funds were charged against the provincial Special Education Fund (SEF).
COA took this act as violative of RA 5447 which created and determined the purpose of the SEF.
Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA, the province of Cebu, represented by its
governor, filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court.
TC ruled that Cebu is vested with such authority.
COA contesting the decision filed a petition for review in the SC.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO
WON Cebus Petition for Declaratory Relief was the proper remedy. YES

Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for declaratory relief may
be filed before there is a breach or violation.
o The Solicitor General claims that the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA to the respondent
province amounted to a breach or violation, and therefore, the petition for declaratory relief should
have been denied by the trial court.
The Court DISAGREES.
o Any breach of the statute (in this case, RA 5447 in relation to the Local Govt Code) subject of the
controversy will not affect the case; the action for declaratory relief will prosper because the
applicability of the statute in question to future transactions still remains to be resolved.
o Absent a definite ruling in the instant case for declaratory relief, doubts as to the disposition of the
SEF will persist.
Hence, the trial court did not err in giving due course to the petition for declaratory relief filed by the
province of Cebu.

WON the SEF may be used to pay for salaries of teachers for extension classes. YES
The salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the provincial school board of Cebu in
connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes are declared chargeable against the
Special Education Fund of the province by doctrine of necessary implication
WON the SEF may be used to pay for scholarship grants. NO
Applying the Doctrine of Casus Ommisus pro Omisso Habenduses. A person, object, or thing omitted from an
enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such
grant of scholarship where the legislature has omitted it. The expenses incurred by the provincial government
for the college scholarship grants should not be charged against the Special Education Fund, but against the
General Funds of the province of Cebu.

RTC Affirmed with Modifications.

CABALLA

CASE # 18

MADDAMMU v. JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT

June 22, 1943
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: FORCIBLE ENTRY/UNLAWFUL DETAINER

G.R. NO. 48940

MORAN., J.

SUMMARY: elibrary.judicary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/10231 (Its 2 pages long) Sanchez filed a

case for forcible entry, in the Municipal Court of Manila, against Maddammi. The latter lost, and then he filed
a petition for certiorari with the SC. SC held that the action Sanchez filed was not one for forcible entry. In
forcible entry cases, the only issue is physical possession or possession de facto of a real property.
To confer jurisdiction upon the MC, the complaint should have alleged prior physical possession of
the house by Sanchez or his vendors. No such allegation was made. Thus, the Municipal Court had no
jurisdiction.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Respondent filed a complaint with the Municipal Court against
petitioner. MC held In favor of Respondent, Petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari with the SC.
FACTS:
Nicasio Sanchez (Plaintiff in TC case/Respondent in SC case) filed in the Municipal Court (MC) of Manila a
complaint against Mateo Maddammu (Defendant in TC case/Petitioner in SC case) alleging that Sanchez
bought a house from a certain Calipayan, but before he could possess and occupy the house Maddammu
occupied the same without the knowledge and consent of Sanchez.
Aside from damages, the latter prayed specifically for the following reliefs: (a) Defendant to deliver the
plaintiff possession of the house (b) Defendant permits plaintiff to remove the house from defendants lot (c)
Defendant pays the plaintiff the reasonable value of the house.
MC held that the house belonged to Sanchez by virtue of the sale, thus he has the right to the
possession of the house. Sanchez sued for a writ of immediate execution, which was granted thus prompting
Maddammu to file a case for certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WoN certiorari should lie. (YES)
(2) WoN the respondent Court had jurisdiction over the action of Sanchez. (NO)
RATIO
(1&2) Yes, certiorari should lie. The respondent Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
action of Sanchez.
Sanchez complaint purports to be one for forcible entry, but the facts show that such is not the nature of the
action. In forcible entry cases, the only issue is physical possession or possession de facto of a real
property. To confer jurisdiction upon the MC, the complaint should have alleged prior physical
possession of the house by plaintiff or by his vendors and deprivation of such possession by
defendant through any means specified by the Rule(s of Court; Rule 72 in the case but now Rule 70).
Had Sanchez alleged that defendant unlawfully turned him out of possession of the property in
litigation, the allegation would have been sufficient because Sanchez prior physical possession may be
implied therefrom. No such allegation was made. On the contrary, the allegation made is that before plaintiff
could take possession and occupy the house which indicates conclusively that he had no prior physical
possession. There was no allegation either with regard to prior possession by the vendors (aka Calipayan).
DISPOSITION: Writ of execution and judgement rendered by the respondent Court are set aside.

GASTANES

Case #52

SY OH v. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-29328
1969 JUNE 30
FERNANDO, J.
T OPIC IN S YLLABUS : Special Civil Actions Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer Grounds
S UMMARY : [The original is only 2 pages lol. (Baka wala ka palang galit sa akin Mia HAHA) Just read it in full. This doesn't even need a digest. :))]
Pivgeth Industries, owner of the Arias Building, filed ejectment suits against Sy Oh and Lim Chi, actual
occupants of the building. Suits were filed on July 21, 1967 before Judge Garcia of the City Court of Manila. Sy
Oh and Lim Chi moved to dismiss, alleging Judge Garcias lack of jurisdiction as the first notice of demand to
vacate was sent on April 27, 1964. Judge Garcia denied motion to dismiss as the FINAL letter of demand/notice
to vacate was sent on Sept. 30 and Sept. 29, 1966 (for Sy Oh and Lim Chi, respectively), making the filing within
the one-year period for ejectment suits. CFI upheld Judge Garcias jurisdiction. SC upheld CFI and Judge Garcia.
The one-year period is to be counted from the last letter of demand. This is based on the theory that [the
lessor] has the right to waive his action based on the first demand and to let the lessee remain in the premises.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Exact mode not specified; only says appeal
FACTS:
Sy Oh and Lim Chi were actual occupants of the Arias Building (corner of Carriedo and Estero Cegado
Streets, Manila), each under a verbal contract of lease. They were made defendants in ejectment suits by
private respondent Pivgeth Industries & Development Corp., the owner of the building.
Suits filed on July 21, 1967 before the sala of Judge Gregorio Garcia of the City Court of Manila.
[PETITIONERS ARGUMENT] Sy Oh and Lim Chi moved to dismiss the case on ground of lack of
jurisdiction, alleging that the first notice of dem and to vacate was sent as far back as April 27, 1964
[RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT] Motion to dismiss denied by Judge Garcia as the FINAL letter of
demand or notice to vacate was sent on Sept. 30, 1966 (for Sy Oh) and Sept. 29, 1966 (for Lim
Chi). Judge Garcia ruled that the suit was filed clearly within the one-year period.
o Sy Oh and Lim Chi assailed this ruling in separate petitions for certiorari before the CFI of Manila.
Sy Ohs case decided by CFI Judge Puno on May 10, 1968; Lim Chis case decided by CFI
Judge Santos on July 6, 1968
o Both petitions failed; Judge Garcias jurisdiction was sustained. Petitioners now appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: If there are various letters of demand, should the one-year period in ejectm ent suits be
counted from the first or last letter sent by the lessee? FROM THE LAST/LATEST LETTER
HELD: SC affirms the respective decisions of the CFI judges, and concludes that the
jurisdiction of City Court Judge Garcia is immune from attack. This conclusion is based on previously
adjudicated cases:
Racaza v. Susana Realty, Inc. Decided in 1966, cited by both CFI judges: "even if the action were based
on nonpayment of rent, the one-year period should be reckoned from the second notice, on the
theory that respondent has the right to waive his action based on the first demand and to
let the lessee rem ain in the prem ises."
Calubayan v. Pascual 1967 case, cited by CFI Judge Santos: "Even assuming, for the sake of argument,
that the various notifications for defendant to see the plaintiff could be construed as demands upon the
defendant to vacate, the length of time that defendant detained the premises is to be reckoned
with from the date of the last demand."
Lucido v. Vita 1913 case, mentioned by SC; views enunciated above have been steadfastly adhered to by
SC since this case.
SC Says: What would have been objectionable would have been a departure therefrom by the lower
courts. Fortunately, such a thought did not occur to either Judge Santos or Judge Puno. They decided the
matter before them correctly.
The one-year period is to be counted from the last letter of demand.

Necessarily then, any attempt to distinguish the situation present in each of the above two cases is far from persuasive. Moreover,
to crown such an effort with success is to frustrate and defeat the basic objective underlying the procedural rule on ejectment suits.
This resort to a technicality so clearly apparent on its face and thus devoid of merit cannot possibly succeed. Otherwise, the
summary character of unlawful detainer actions, which even now, through maneuvers of the lessees affected, may at times
be set at naught, vanishes. It is not for us to give the seal of our approval to any argument, even if sought to be clothed with
deceptive plausibility, that would contribute to such a far-from commendable result.

DECISION: CFI Decisions AFFIRMED; costs against Sy Oh and Lim Chi.

LOPEZ, KATRINA MARGARITA D.

CASE #21

REPUBLIC V. PHIL-VILLE DEVT & SY CHI SIONG

G.R. NO. 17243
June 26, 2007
GARCIA, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - EXPROPRIATION
SUMMARY: The Republic through the Toll Regulatory Board filed a complaint for expropriation for the acquisition of two
parcels of land belonging to Phil-Ville Devt and Sy Chi Siong Co. Inc. for the North Luzon Expressway Project. The RTC
found the expropriation proper but deferred the issuance of Order of Expropriation pending the determination of just
compensation. The CA affirmed RTC and held that in the Two Stages of Expropriation, the Order of Expropriation in the
first stage is a mere procedural formality thus the second stage for determination of just compensation may proceed. The
SC however, held that the first stage ends with the issuance of the Order, paving the way for the second stage re just
compensation. The Order determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain; there would be no point in
determining just compensation if the right to expropriate was not first clearly established.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review of CA decision
FACTS: Republic of the Philippines, through the Toll Regulatory Board, sought to widen the Balintawak Toll Plaza for the
expansion and rehabilitation of the North Luzon Expressway which would necessarily affect two (2) parcels of land
registered under the names of Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation, and Sy Chi Siong and Co., Inc.
Description of the properties:
Owner

TCT No./
Lot No.

Total Area
(sq. m.)

Assessed Value of
Entire Area

Affected Area

Assessed Value of
Affected Area

Zonal Value of the

Affected Area

Phil-Ville

243189

425

P45,900.00

425

45,900.00

P1,062,500.00

Sy Chi Siong

29737

8,425

P658,690.00

2,924

P228,606.47

P7,310,000.00

- Republic filed Complaint for Expropriation at RTC Caloocan (January 3, 2001)

- Amended Complaint filed to reflect proper schedule of valuation of the properties sought to be expropriated
- Deposited Php2,311,200 (representing total zonal value of properties) at Land Bank
-Filed Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession
- Phil Ville and Sy Chi Siong filed Motion to Dismiss
-Ground: RTC lacked jurisdiction over the res
-RTC DENIED, asserted its jurisdiction (April 3, 2002)
-RTC later denied their MRs, and ordered issuance of Writ of Possession in favor of Republic (June 18, 2002)
-RTC required them to file their answers to the complaint
-Only Sy Chi Siong filed an Answer:
1) reiterated lack of jurisdiction as ground for dismissal
2) in the alternative, prayed for just compensation
-Republic filed Motion for Issuance of Order of Expropriation and Appointment of Commissioners (Jan. 27, 2005)
-Rationale of their motion: respondents had never challenged its right to expropriate the subject properties
-RTC deferred action on the motion. Although it found the motion meritorious, it deferred action and set it for
hearing for March 7, 2005 so that the parties may nominate commissioners who will ascertain and report to the
court re just compensation
-Republic filed Motion for Partial Reconsideration
-Argument: Order of Expropriation must be issued before determination of just compensation (Sec. 4, Rule 67)
-RTC DENIED, Sec. 4, Rule 67 is clear that Order of Expropriation declares that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated upon the payment of just compensation. Thus just compensation
must first be determined and paid before Order can be issued.
-Republic went to the CA on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
-CA DENIED, upheld RTC ruling.
-Republic went to the SC via petition for review
RELEVANT RULE: Sec. 4, Rule 67 on Expropriation
Section 4. Order of expropriation. - If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Dino-Poblete,
Ma. Katrina Loris
1

Dino-Poblete, Ma. Katrina Loris

of 2

Civil Procedure* Law 125 * Case #22

Civil Procedure* Law 125 * Case #22

There are Two Stages in every Action for Expropriation evident from the above Rule:
1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
WON Order of Expropriation may be deferred
pending determination and payment of just compensation
SC held:
NO.

Stages of Expropriation
(or Condemnation)

CA says:
YES.

Authority of Plaintiff
and Propriety of
Exercise of Power of
Eminent Domain

- The order can be issued unless there are

objections and defenses against the
condemnation proceedings that would
require the presentation of evidence. Only
after an adjudication of these objections
and defenses can a court proceed with the
second stage of the expropriation
proceedings

-CA is correct here. If a defendant denied or

objected to plaintiffs right to expropriate, a
hearing would have been held to decide upon
whether the land was private, and whether the
purpose was, in fact, public. However, once the
objections and defenses against the right of the
plaintiff to expropriate are overruled, an order
of expropriation may issue.

Is the Order necessary

before going to the
Second Stage?

- The Second Stage may proceed without

issuance of the Order where there is no
more issue with respect to stage 1
(authority and propriety).
- In this case where there is no more
dispute/issue, issuance of the Order may
only be permissive and discretionary on
the part of the trial court; it is a mere
formality

- The Order is necessary. It determines the

authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of such exercise. It
puts an end to ambiguity re right of petitioner.
There is no point for the Second Stage for
determination of just compensation if the
plaintiffs right to expropriate was not clearly
established.

What is the effect of nonissuance of the Order?

-It is not a major procedural flaw that is

fatal to the action for expropriation

- The first stage is not properly terminated.

- In CAB, there is no more issue with

respect to authority and propriety to
expropriate. The lot owners themselves
acknowledged and admitted this. The
State has been given the right to enter and
use the lots. In fact, the project has already
been completed.

- In CAB, since there is no more issue with the

plaintiffs right to expropriate, all the more that
the Order should have been issued.

Just Compensation
When can the Court
ascertain just
compensation?
Is
payment
of
just
compensation a condition
sine qua non for issuance
of the Order?

- The court may proceed with this without

issuing the Order

-The Court can appoint commissioners to

ascertain just compensation only after rendition
of the Order (Sec. 5, Rule 67)

- Deferral of issuance of Order is to secure

prompt adjudication and payment of just
compensation

- Such payment is not a condition sine qua non

for issuance of the Order
-Sec. 4 (2), Rule 67 clearly states that
defendant may still appeal the Order (SCs
note: via record on appeal), but such appeal
does not prevent court from determining just
compensation. This further shows that the
Order is issued prior to determination of j.c.

When will title to the

properties
expropriated
vest in the State?

- What will complete the vesting of title in

favor of the State is the actual payment of
just compensation to the owners of the
condemned properties

-CA is correct here, but it used this reasoning

to justify deferral of issuance of Order. It is only
the transfer of title that must wait until the
compensation/indemnity is paid, not the Order.

When can the Order of

Expropriation be issued?

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. CA decision ANNULED & SET ASIDE. RTC directed to issue Order of Expropriation.
Dino-Poblete,
Ma. Katrina Loris
2

Dino-Poblete, Ma. Katrina Loris

of 2

Civil Procedure* Law 125 * Case #22

Civil Procedure* Law 125 * Case #22

REPUBLIC V. PHIL-VILLE DEVT & SY CHI SIONG

G.R. NO. 17243
June 26, 2007
GARCIA, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS - EXPROPRIATION
SUMMARY: The Republic through the Toll Regulatory Board filed a complaint for expropriation for the acquisition of two
parcels of land belonging to Phil-Ville Devt and Sy Chi Siong Co. Inc. for the North Luzon Expressway Project. The RTC
found the expropriation proper but deferred the issuance of Order of Expropriation pending the determination of just
compensation. The CA affirmed RTC and held that in the Two Stages of Expropriation, the Order of Expropriation in the
first stage is a mere procedural formality thus the second stage for determination of just compensation may proceed. The
SC however, held that the first stage ends with the issuance of the Order, paving the way for the second stage re just
compensation. The Order determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain; there would be no point in
determining just compensation if the right to expropriate was not first clearly established.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Petition for review of CA decision
FACTS: Republic of the Philippines, through the Toll Regulatory Board, sought to widen the Balintawak Toll Plaza for the
expansion and rehabilitation of the North Luzon Expressway which would necessarily affect two (2) parcels of land
registered under the names of Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation, and Sy Chi Siong and Co., Inc.
Description of the properties:
Owner

TCT No./
Lot No.

Total Area
(sq. m.)

Assessed Value of
Entire Area

Affected Area

Assessed Value of
Affected Area

Zonal Value of the

Affected Area

Phil-Ville

243189

425

P45,900.00

425

45,900.00

P1,062,500.00

Sy Chi Siong

29737

8,425

P658,690.00

2,924

P228,606.47

P7,310,000.00

- Republic filed Complaint for Expropriation at RTC Caloocan (January 3, 2001)

- Amended Complaint filed to reflect proper schedule of valuation of the properties sought to be expropriated
- Deposited Php2,311,200 (representing total zonal value of properties) at Land Bank
-Filed Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession
- Phil Ville and Sy Chi Siong filed Motion to Dismiss
-Ground: RTC lacked jurisdiction over the res
-RTC DENIED, asserted its jurisdiction (April 3, 2002)
-RTC later denied their MRs, and ordered issuance of Writ of Possession in favor of Republic (June 18, 2002)
-RTC required them to file their answers to the complaint
-Only Sy Chi Siong filed an Answer:
1) reiterated lack of jurisdiction as ground for dismissal
2) in the alternative, prayed for just compensation
-Republic filed Motion for Issuance of Order of Expropriation and Appointment of Commissioners (Jan. 27, 2005)
-Rationale of their motion: respondents had never challenged its right to expropriate the subject properties
-RTC deferred action on the motion. Although it found the motion meritorious, it deferred action and set it for
hearing for March 7, 2005 so that the parties may nominate commissioners who will ascertain and report to the
court re just compensation
-Republic filed Motion for Partial Reconsideration
-Argument: Order of Expropriation must be issued before determination of just compensation (Sec. 4, Rule 67)
-RTC DENIED, Sec. 4, Rule 67 is clear that Order of Expropriation declares that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated upon the payment of just compensation. Thus just compensation
must first be determined and paid before Order can be issued.
-Republic went to the CA on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
-CA DENIED, upheld RTC ruling.
-Republic went to the SC via petition for review
RELEVANT RULE: Sec. 4, Rule 67 on Expropriation
Section 4. Order of expropriation. - If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Dino-Poblete,
Ma. Katrina Loris
1

Dino-Poblete, Ma. Katrina Loris

of 2

Civil Procedure* Law 125 * Case #22

Civil Procedure* Law 125 * Case #22

There are Two Stages in every Action for Expropriation evident from the above Rule:
1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
WON Order of Expropriation may be deferred
pending determination and payment of just compensation
SC held:
NO.

Stages of Expropriation
(or Condemnation)

CA says:
YES.

Authority of Plaintiff
and Propriety of
Exercise of Power of
Eminent Domain

- The order can be issued unless there are

objections and defenses against the
condemnation proceedings that would
require the presentation of evidence. Only
after an adjudication of these objections
and defenses can a court proceed with the
second stage of the expropriation
proceedings

-CA is correct here. If a defendant denied or

objected to plaintiffs right to expropriate, a
hearing would have been held to decide upon
whether the land was private, and whether the
purpose was, in fact, public. However, once the
objections and defenses against the right of the
plaintiff to expropriate are overruled, an order
of expropriation may issue.

Is the Order necessary

before going to the
Second Stage?

- The Second Stage may proceed without

issuance of the Order where there is no
more issue with respect to stage 1
(authority and propriety).
- In this case where there is no more
dispute/issue, issuance of the Order may
only be permissive and discretionary on
the part of the trial court; it is a mere
formality

- The Order is necessary. It determines the

authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of such exercise. It
puts an end to ambiguity re right of petitioner.
There is no point for the Second Stage for
determination of just compensation if the
plaintiffs right to expropriate was not clearly
established.

What is the effect of nonissuance of the Order?

-It is not a major procedural flaw that is

fatal to the action for expropriation

- The first stage is not properly terminated.

- In CAB, there is no more issue with

respect to authority and propriety to
expropriate. The lot owners themselves
acknowledged and admitted this. The
State has been given the right to enter and
use the lots. In fact, the project has already
been completed.

- In CAB, since there is no more issue with the

plaintiffs right to expropriate, all the more that
the Order should have been issued.

Just Compensation
When can the Court
ascertain just
compensation?
Is
payment
of
just
compensation a condition
sine qua non for issuance
of the Order?

- The court may proceed with this without

issuing the Order

-The Court can appoint commissioners to

ascertain just compensation only after rendition
of the Order (Sec. 5, Rule 67)

- Deferral of issuance of Order is to secure

prompt adjudication and payment of just
compensation

- Such payment is not a condition sine qua non

for issuance of the Order
-Sec. 4 (2), Rule 67 clearly states that
defendant may still appeal the Order (SCs
note: via record on appeal), but such appeal
does not prevent court from determining just
compensation. This further shows that the
Order is issued prior to determination of j.c.

When will title to the

properties
expropriated
vest in the State?

- What will complete the vesting of title in

favor of the State is the actual payment of
just compensation to the owners of the
condemned properties

-CA is correct here, but it used this reasoning

to justify deferral of issuance of Order. It is only
the transfer of title that must wait until the
compensation/indemnity is paid, not the Order.

When can the Order of

Expropriation be issued?

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. CA decision ANNULED & SET ASIDE. RTC directed to issue Order of Expropriation.
Dino-Poblete,
Ma. Katrina Loris
2

Dino-Poblete, Ma. Katrina Loris

of 2

Civil Procedure* Law 125 * Case #22

Civil Procedure* Law 125 * Case #22

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS)
V. THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR.
G.R. No. 157314
July 29, 2005
Summary: Pacilan had an account with the petitioner bank which he used to issue multiple checks. One of
the checks he issued was dishonored. He found out that his account was closed on the ground that it was
"improperly handled." He had an overdraft (his money in da bank wasnt enough). He filed with the RTC a
complaint for damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado (the branch accountant). RTC and CA held
in favor of Pacilan based on CC, Art. 19. SC reversed. The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a)
the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. In this case, second and third elements were not present. SC held that the
respondent's case is clearly one of damnum absque injuria. Whatever damages the respondent may have
suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficiently funded checks, would have to be borne
by him alone.
Pacilan opened a current account with petitioner bank's Bacolod Branch. Pacilan issued several postdated
checks to different payees drawn against the said account. Sometime in March 1988, the respondent
issued Check No. 2434886 in the amount of P680.00.
Upon its presentment Check No. 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner bank. The next day, the Pacilan
deposited to his current account the amount of P800.00. The said amount was accepted by petitioner
bank; hence, increasing the balance of the respondent's deposit to P1,051.43.
Subsequently, when the Pacilan verified with petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check No. 2434866, he
discovered that his current account was closed on the ground that it was "improperly handled."
The records of petitioner bank disclosed that between the period of March 30, 1988 and April 5, 1988, the
respondent issued four checks, to wit:
Check No. 2480416

P6,000.00

Check No. 2480419

P50.00

Check No. 2434880

P680.00

Check No. 2434886

TOTAL

P680.00
P7,410.00

At the time, however, the respondent's current account with petitioner bank only had a deposit of
P6,981.43. Thus, the total amount of the checks presented for payment on April 4, 1988 exceeded the
balance of the respondent's deposit in his account. For this reason, petitioner bank, through its branch
accountant, Villadelgado, closed the respondent's current account effective the evening of April 4, 1988 as
it then had an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence of the overdraft, Check No. 2434886 was
dishonored.
Pacilan wrote to petitioner bank complaining that the closure of his account was unjustified. When he did
not receive a reply from petitioner bank, the respondent filed with the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod
City, Branch 54, a complaint for damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado.
Pacilan, as complainant therein, alleged that the closure of his current account by petitioner bank was
unjustified because on the first banking hour of April 5, 1988, he already deposited an amount sufficient to
fund his checks. He is claiming that check was delivered at the close of banking hours on April 4, 1988 and,
following normal banking procedure, the bank had until the last clearing hour of the following day. Further,
the petitioner bank's act exposed him to criminal prosecution for violation of BP 22.
Petitioner bank and Villadelgado maintained that the respondent's current account was subject to
petitioner bank's Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of Regular Demand
Deposits which provide that "the Bank reserves the right to close an account if the depositor frequently

draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits" and that "the Bank reserves the right
at any time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any reason."
They showed that the respondent had improperly and irregularly handled his current account. For
example, in 1986, the respondent's account was overdrawn 156 times, in 1987, 117 times and in 1988, 26
times. In all these instances, the account was overdrawn due to the issuance of checks against insufficient
funds. The respondent had also signed several checks with a different signature from the specimen on file
for dubious reasons.
RTC: Rendered judgment in favor of the respondent as it ordered the petitioner bank and Villadelgado, jointly and severally, to
pay the respondent the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs of suit. Held
that Pacilan as depositor, had the right to put up sufficient funds for a check that was taken as a returned item for insufficient
funds the day following the receipt of said check from the clearing office. In fact, the said check could still be recleared for one
more time. Several instances before, he would be informed of overdraft and would be allowed to deposit. As a result of the
closure of his current account, several of the respondent's checks were subsequently dishonored and because of this, the
respondent was humiliated, embarrassed and lost his credit standing in the business community.
CA: Affirmed with modification. The CA, however, reduced the amount of damages awarded by the court a quo as it found the
same to be excessive.

Petitioners MR denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

SC: Petition granted.
A perusal of the respective decisions of the court a quo and the appellate court show that the award of
damages in the respondent's favor was anchored mainly on Article 19 of the Civil Code. The elements of
abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Petitioner bank has the right to close the account of the respondent based on the provisions of its Rules
and Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of Regular Demand Deposits.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate court, do not establish that, in the exercise of this
right, petitioner bank committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third elements for abuse of
rights are not attendant in the present case.
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations is petitioner bank required to notify the
respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of the closure of the account for frequently drawing checks
against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could be imputed on petitioner bank.
Pacilan had thus failed to discharge his burden of proving bad faith on the part of petitioner bank or that it
was motivated by ill-will or spite in closing his account.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria
Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury
The respondent's case is clearly one of damnum absque injuria. Whatever damages the respondent may
have suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficiently funded checks, would have to be
borne by him alone.

LUCAS v. JUDGE FABROS

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226
January 31, 2000
Quisumbing, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS:
SUMMARY:
Lucas charged Judge Fabros with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion for granting an MR on an
ejectment case. Lucas alleged that an MR is a prohibited pleading in an ejectment case. Judge Fabros argued that she is
aware that it is a prohibited pleading but she only granted it in the interest of justice. OCA ruled that Judge Fabros be
fined. SC ruled otherwise.
DOCTRINE:
A motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
However, this rule applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits.
FACTS:

Lucas is the respondent in the ejectment case "Editha F. Gacad, represented by Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas
while Judge Amelia A. Fabros is the presiding judge therein.

January 13, 1997Judge Fabros issued an Order which dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to
appear at the Preliminary Conference. The Order also awarded Attorneys Fees.

January 17, 1997 Atty. Suing (Gacads lawyer. Maybe Castelo is not a counsel, IDK.) filed an MR stating that he
failed to appear due to a sudden excruciating stomach pain. He further stated that his Secretary called the Court but
to no avail until finally the call came through and she was informed that the case was dismissed.

February 26, 1997Judge Fabros issued an Order granting the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration.

May 20, 1997 Gloria Lucas charged Judge Fabros of the Br. 9 Manila MTC with Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Discretion.

August 25, 1997The OCA recommended that Judge Fabros be fined P2K for grave abuse of discretion. OCA:
Respondent failed to realize that the first duty of the court is to apply the law and that when the law is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation. Although her intention was good, this could not free her from
liability.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT(S):

Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure provides that a Motion for Reconsideration is prohibited.
However, Judge Fabros granted an MR.

Even if Judge Fabros already pointed out in open court that the case is governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, the judge ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to
complainant.

Judge acted in blatant disregard of the rules on procedure. The doctrine of IPSA LOQUITOR may be applied.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT(S): (culled from Judge Fabros comment dated Sept. 16, 1997)

Even if the MR is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case, it was granted in the interest of justice.

Are the actuations of judges to be governed strictly by the Rule on Summary Procedure despite their belief in good
faith that in special cases, its observance would result in a miscarriage of justice? This Presiding Judge does not
think so. Judges are supposed to [be] responsible Public Officials and should be able to perceive and discern
circumstances which might lead to miscarriage of justice, thus, negating the very purpose and essence of the Rule
on Summary Procedure. The Rule on Summary Procedure is not a straight jacket and it is believed it was never
meant to be that.

Rules of Court Section 5 (g) of Rule 135 provides for the inherent powers of the Court to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

Ignorance of the law is the act of a judge in taking legal steps or adopting procedure unknowingly aware that they
are contrary to established Rules which should be known to the judge. I am fully aware that it is a prohibited
pleading but I chose to consider it to avoid miscarriage of justice.

WRT the allegation that the charge of ignorance of the law was compounded by the failure to issue a writ of
execution, it bears stressing that the Order dated January 13, 1997 never gained finality because the plaintiff was
able to file the Motion for Reconsideration within the fifteen (15) day period. Even if it is argued validly that the
Motion for Reconsideration being a prohibited pleading did not interrupt the running of the period of appeal, still
the said Order did not gain finality as far as defendant Gloria Lucas is concerned because as the record shows, it was
she who received the Order, not her lawyer, Atty. Sulit."
ISSUE(S): WON an MR is a prohibited pleading. Not in this case because the order sought to be reconsidered was not
one rendered on the merits.

HELD: Case against Judge Fabros is dismissed.

As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.
xxx
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
xxx"
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the merits.
As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c)
of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this
Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the
case."
Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to appear during the
preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the
reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present
Rule on Summary Procedure.
Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in
giving due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint.

SMITH BELL AND COMPANY v. CA

MAY 20, 1991
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: ADDITIONAL CASES

G.R. NO. 56294

FELICIANO., J.

SUMMARY: elibrary.judicary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/10231 (Its 2 pages long) Sanchez filed a

case for forcible entry, in the Municipal Court of Manila, against Maddammi. The latter lost, and then he filed
a petition for certiorari with the SC. SC held that the action Sanchez filed was not one for forcible entry. In
forcible entry cases, the only issue is physical possession or possession de facto of a real property.
To confer jurisdiction upon the MC, the complaint should have alleged prior physical possession of
the house by Sanchez or his vendors. No such allegation was made. Thus, the Municipal Court had no
jurisdiction.
HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC: Respondent filed a complaint with the Municipal Court against
petitioner. MC held In favor of Respondent, Petitioner filed a petitioner for certiorari with the SC.
FACTS:
On May 3, 1970. M/V Don Carlos, operated by respondent Carlos Go Thong (heh Thong) collided with M/S
Yotai Maru, a Japanese vessel. As a result, the cargo of Yotai Maru was damaged. The consignees of the
cargo got paid by their insurance companies. Now the insurance companies are commencing actions against
Go Thong for the Damages.
Two lines of cases are relevant:

CFI Case #1 AKA Fernandez Case

CFI Case #2 AKA Cuevas Case

Filed: Mar. 13, 1971

Petitioner: Smith Bell and Company &
Sumitomo Marine and fire Insurance Company Ltd.
Respondent: Go Thong
Presided by: Judge Fernandez

Filed: Mar. 15, 1971

Petitioner: Smith Bell and Company &
Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Company, Inc.
Respondent: Go Thong
Presided by: Judge Cuevas

Petitioners won, Don Carlos at fault, . Respondent Petitioners won. Respondent appealed to CA.
appealed to CA.

CA Case #1 AKA Reyes Case

CA Case #2 AKA Sison Case

Rendered: Aug. 8,1978

Presided by: Reyes, L.B, J.

Rendered: Nov. 26, 1980 (2 years after Reyes Case)

Presided by: Sison, P.V., J.

Affirmed Fernandez Case. Respondent MR denied,

appealed to SC via petitioner for review.

REVERSED Cuevas Case, held Yotai Maru at fault.

SC Case #1

SC Case #2

Rendered: Dec. 6, 1978

This case.

Petition denied via minute resolution.

ISSUE/HELD:
(1) WoN Sison in CA Case #2 had disregarded Res Judicata. (YES)
(2) WoN M/V Don Carlos was at fault. (YES)
RATIO
(1) Res Judicata should apply.
Respondents argument: Res Judicata should not apply since the petitioner for review of the Reyes
case was merely dismissed by a minute resolution, thus Reyes case had not been affirmed in toto.
SC: Argument rejected. The minute resolution did not in any way diminish the legal significance of the
denial so decreed by the Court. It has long been settled that the Court has discretion to decide whether a
minute resolution should be used in lieu of a full blown decision in any particular case, and that a minute
GASTANES

Case #52

resolution of a dismissal of a petition for review on Certiorari constitutes adjudication on the merits of the
controversy or subject matter of the petitioner. It can only mean that the Court agrees with or adopts the
findings and conclusions of the CA.
Respondents argument: Res Judicata cannot be invoked because of lack of identity of parties and
cause of action.
SC: Argument rejected. There were two common petitioners in the cases (Smith Bell), and the cases
were brought against the same defendant (Go Thong). The cause of action is also the same, mainly the right of
the cargo owners to the safety and integrity of their cargo had been violated by the same casualty. The
judgments were rendered on the merits, and jurisdiction was never questioned.
The petitioners concede however, that the subject matter of the cases was not identical, in the sense
that the cargo which had been damaged in the one case was not the same in both cases. The court is of the
opinion, however, that the absence of identity of subject matter, there being substantial identity of parties and
identity of cause of action, will not preclude the application of res judicata.
The court distinguished between Bar by Prior Judgment and Conclusiveness of Judgment, applying the
latter to this case.
In Lopez v. Reyes, res judicata and its aspects were further discussed:
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are
commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily involved
in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference
thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented.
Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular
matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily
presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition
assumed or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as
the ultimate question which is finally solved.

In the case, the issue of which vessel had been negligent was an issue that was actually, directly, and
expressly raised, controverted and litigated in the Reyes case, where it was held that it was the Don Carlos
that was at fault. The case having become final and executory, and applying the rule of conclusiveness of
judgment, Go Thong was certainly bound by the ruling in the Reyes Case and that of the SC Case #1. The CA
fell into clear and reversible error when it disregarded SC Case #1.
Respondents argument: there was a compromise agreement between the owner of the Yotai Maru and
Go Thong, where the former paid the latter.
SC: Argument rejected, wanting in both factual and legal substance. Although there was a compromise
agreement, nowhere in it did the owner of the Yotai Maru admit or concede that the Yotai maru had been at
fault for the collision. The rule is that an offer of compromise is not an admission that anything is due, and is
not admissible in evidence against the person making the offer.
NICE TO KNOW TERRITORY: There were another line of decisions, pero Admin cases na. The Board of
Marine Inquiry rendered a decision which found both vessels negligent. Both parties appealed to the Philippine
Coast Guard, which in its decision absolved the Yotai Maru of Liability. Go Thong appealed to the Ministry of
National Defense, which reversed and set aside the PCGs decision. The owners of the Yotai Maru appealed
to the Office of the President, which recognized that Go Thong had failed to appeal to the MND in a
seasonable manner. The OP however, still held Yotai Maru liable due to supervening events, mainly citing
the Sison Case.
The SC held that it was a misapprehension on the part of the OP because (1) the Sison case was
subject to review in the case at bar and thus was not finals (2) the Reyes case was conveniently ignored and
(3) the OP mistakenly believed that a decision of the Cebu CFI, which decided upon the compromise
agreement between the parties, held Yotai maru solely responsible, but it merely rendered a judgment of
dismissal on the basis of the compromise agreement.
So who was ultimately liable for the collision? It was the M/V Don Carlos for three main reasons:
(1)
Don Carlos failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 18(a) of the International Rules of
the Road, which states that When two power driven vessels are meeting end on or nearly
GASTANES

Case #52

(2)

(3)

end on so as to involve risk of collision, each shall alter her course to starboard (right) so
that each may pass on the port (left) side of the other. Don Carlos moved port side, (to the
left) instead of starboard (right), inadvertently causing the incident at hand.
Don Carlos failed to have on board that night a proper look out. A proper look out is one who
has been trained as such and who is given no other duty save that. The evidence in the
case shows that there was no such proper look out. (The look out of the Don Carlos had
other duties AKA not proper look out). The lack of a proper look out lead to the failure of Don
Carlos to recognize in a timely manner the risk of collision with the Yotai Maru.
The Second Mate Benito German (who was in command of the ship) did not have the level
of experience, judgment, and skill essential for recognizing and coping with the risk of
collision as it presented itself.

The Sison case not only overlooked the above acts of negligence but also in effect used the very
negligence on the part of the Don Carlos to absolve it from responsibility and to shift that responsibility
exclusively onto the Yotai Maru.
DISPOSITION: CA decision (Sison case) reversed and set aside. Cuevas case affirmed.

GASTANES

Case #52

OLIVAREZ REALTY CORP v. CASTILLO

G.R. No. 196251

09 July 2014
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Additional Cases
SUMMARY:

Leonen, J.
This ones about Summary Judgment

ORC/Olivarez entered into a contract with Castillo denominated as a contract of conditional sale.

ORC/Olivarez did not pay, so Castillo filed for rescission. During pre-trial proceedings, Castillo moved for summary
judgment. RTC granted, and SC affirmed. While ORC/Olivarezs answer to the motion tendered an issue, Castillo
properly availed of a motion for summary judgment; the issues tendered in the answer are not genuine issues of
material fact. If the issue could be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
other papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham, and the trial court may grant summary judgment.
Also, SC says here that an action to cancel a contract to sell, similar to an action for rescission of contract of
sale, is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
FACTS:

Benjamin Castillo was the registered owner of a 346,918 sqm. parcel of land located in Laurel, Batangas.

The Philippine Tourism Authority [PTA] allegedly claimed ownership of the same parcel of land. They had a title.

Castilo and Olivarez Realty [ORC] (represented by Dr. Pablo Olivarez1) entered into a contract of conditional
sale. The pertinent provisions of the deed of conditional sale include;
o

Castillo agreed to sell the Laurel property to Olivarez for P19M.

ORC agreed to pay a down payment of P5M, pay P5M over 9 months (following a schedule of payments), and
pay the balance in 30 monthly installments, from the month the parties would receive the decision nullifying
the title held by the PTA.

ORC takes the responsibility of taking the legal action with full assistance of Castillo to have the title PTA
voided

Should the action against PTA fail, Castillo agreed to reimburse, without interest, all the amounts paid by ORC.

As to legitimate tenants occupying the property, ORC also undertook to pay them disturbance compensation.
Castillo, on the other hand, undertook to clear the land of the tenants within 6 months from the execution of
deed.
Should Castillo fail, ORC may suspend its monthly down payment until the tenants vacate.

ORC may immediately occupy the property upon signing the deed. Should the contract be cancelled, ORC
agrees to return to Castillo the possession of the property and forfeit the improvements it introduced on the
property.

Sept 2 2004: Castillo filed for rescission against ORC and Dr. Olivarez, alleging that they committed breach:
o

Dr. Olivarez convinced him to sell his property to ORC, on the representation that ORC would be responsible in
clearing the property of the tenants and in paying them compensation.

Dr. Olivarez prepared the deed by himself and Castillo was made to sign the contract with the terms not
adequately explained to him in Tagalog.

ORC immediately possessed the property, but it only paid P2.5M of the purchase price.

FUN FACT: Dati siyang Mayor ng Paranaque. Binoto siya ng tatay ko nun.
PAGE 1 OF 3

It did not file any action against the PTA. Neither did it clear the land nor pay compensation to the tenants. It
also refused to fully pay the purchase price despite demand by ORC.

Olivarez, + ORC, filed a motion to dismiss, as well as a compulsory counterclaim for litigation and attorneys fees

Jan 10 2205: Castillo filed a request for admission, requesting Dr. Olivarez to admit under oath the
genuineness of the deed of conditional sale and RCR R-19972. In addition, he requested Olivarez to admit
the truth of factual allegations such as Olivarez causing the preparation of the deed of conditional sale, him (and
ORC) not filing any action against PTA, them not paying the disturbance compensation, and them only paying
P2.5M of the price.
o

Olivarez and ORC filed the objections to the request for admission, stating that they reiterated the allegations
and denials in their answer.

Dec 17 2005: The court conducted pre-trial conference.

Mar 8 2006: Castillo filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings, alleging that
Olivarez and ORC substantially admitted the material allegations of his complaint, specifically that ORC failed to
fully pay the purchase price for his property, failed to file an action to void the PTAs title, and failed to clear the
property of tenants and pay them disturbance compensation.
o

Castillo prayed that should judgments on the pleadings be improper, summary judgment may still be
rendered as there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.

Castillo attached an affidavit of

Marissa Magsino, attesting the truth of the material allegations of the

complaint.

Olivarez and ORC opposed the motion, for being devoid of merit.
o

They reiterated that they withheld payments of the price because there had been no decision voiding PTAs
title.

Also that Castillo sold the property to another person.

ORC and Dr. Olivarez argued that the case should proceed to trial and have Castillo be required to prove that
his title is not spurious not fake and that he had not sold his property to another person.

Olivarez and ORC then filed a supplemental memorandum on Castillos motion for summary judgment, saying
that:
o

There was an obvious ambiguity as to which should occur first payment of disturbance compensation (by
ORC/Olivarez) or clearing of the property (by Castillo). Thus, this is a genuine issue that ought to be settled in
trial.
In Castillos reply, he said that common sense dictates that the legit tenants of the property shall not vacate
without being paid any compensation. Thus, payment should come first.

RTC granted the summary judgment, which the CA later affirmed.

o

RTC: ORC/Olivarez substantially admitted the allegations of Castillos complaint and did not raise any genuine
issue as to any material fact. ORC was responsible for suing PTA and paying the tenants compensation. Since
ORC did not do either, ORC had no right to withhold payments from Castillo. Also, Castillo clearly established
that the deed of conditional sale was a contract of adhesion, and the true agreement was that ORC would
both clear the land and pay disturbance compensation.

CA: RTC did not err. There is no genuine controversy to the facts involved in the case.
PAGE 2 OF 3

ISSUES:
1.

W/N RTC properly rendered summary judgment? YES

2.

W/N proper docket fees were paid in this case? YES

ORC / OLIVAREZ ARGUMENTS:

1.

Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be rendered except as
to the amount of damages. Also, there are genuine issues of material facts to be resolved, thus a trial is
required.

2.

Proper docket fees were not paid because it was not based on the propertys fair market value (and this is a
real action). Thus, the court had no jurisdiction to decide the case.

HELD:
1. RTC correctly rendered summary judgment. There were no genuine issues of material fact.
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court may dispense with trial and proceed to decide a
case if from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. In such a case, the judgment issued is called a summary judgment.

An issue of material fact exists if the answer or responsive pleading filed specifically denies the material
allegations of fact set forth in the complaint or pleading. If the issue of fact requires the presentation of
evidence, it is a genuine issue of fact. However, if the issue could be resolved judiciously by plain resort to
the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham, and the trial
court may resolve the action through summary judgment.

In this case, ORC admitted that it did not fully pay the purchase price as agreed upon in the deed of
conditional sale. As to why it withheld payments from Castillo, it set up affirmative defenses, such as Castillo
not filing a case to void PTAs title to the property, Castillo not clearing the land of the tenants, and Castillo
allegedly selling the property to a third person.

Since ORC/Olivarezs answer tendered an issue, Castillo properly availed of a motion for summary judgment.
o

However, the issues tendered by ORC/Olivarez are not genuine issues of material fact. These are issues
that can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers
on file; otherwise, these issues are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial.

He was able to prove that ORC didnt file an action against PTA, so Castilo could not assist ORC in the
action

PTAs adverse claim is not an excuse from paying the purchase price because ORC/Olivarez knew of this
adverse claim when it entered into a contract of conditional sale.

There is no obvious ambiguity. Parties should have coordinated to ensure that tenants on property were
paid disturbance compensation and were made to vacate the property 6 months after signing the deed.

The claim that Castillo sold the property is fictitious and was made in bad faith precisely to prevent the
RTC from rendering summary judgment. ORC/Olivarez did not even elaborate on this defense. This, the
defense did not tender a genuine issue of fact since the defense was bereft of details.
PAGE 3 OF 3

Castillos alleged prayer for the irreconcilable reliefs of rescission of contract and reformation of instrument is
not a ground to dismiss his complaint. A plaintiff may allege two or more claims in the complaint alternatively
or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or in separate causes of action per Section 2, Rule 8 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
o

It is the filing of two separate cases for each of the causes of action that is prohibited since the
subsequently filed case may be dismissed under Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules on splitting causes of
action.

Castillo is entitled to cancel the contract of conditional sale

Since ORC illegally withheld payments of the purchase price, Castillo is entitled to cancel the contract. However, we
properly characterize the parties contract as a contract to sell, not a contract of conditional sale.

The distinction is important to determine the applicable laws and remedies in case a party does not fulfill his
or her obligations under the contract. In contracts of conditional sale, provisions on sales under the Civil Code
apply. On the other hand, contracts to sell are governed by the Civil Code provisions on conditional
obligations.

Article 1191 on the right to rescind reciprocal obligations does not apply to contracts to sell.
o

in Ong v. CA, failure to fully pay the purchase price in contracts to sell is not the breach of contract under
Art. 1191. Failure to fully pay the purchase price is merely an event which prevents the [sellers] obligation
to convey title from acquiring binding force.

In this case, Castillo reserved his title to the property and undertook to execute a deed of absolute sale upon
ORCs full payment of the purchase price. Since Castillo still has to execute a deed of absolute sale to ORC
upon full payment of the purchase price, the transfer of title is not automatic. This is is a contract to sell.

As this case involves a contract to sell, Art. 1191 of the Civil Code not apply. The contract to sell is instead
cancelled, and the parties shall stand as if the obligation to sell never existed.
o

ORC shall return the possession of the property to Castillo. Any improvement that ORC may have
introduced on the property shall be forfeited in favor of Castillo.

As for prospective sellers, this court generally orders the reimbursement of the installments paid for the
property when setting aside contracts to sell. This is true especially if the propertys possession has not been
delivered to the prospective buyer prior to the transfer of title.
o

In this case, however, Castillo delivered the possession of the property to Olivarez Realty Corporation prior
to the transfer of title. We cannot order the reimbursement of the installments paid.

In Gomez v. CA, the City of Manila and Luisa Gomez entered into a contract to sell over a parcel of land.
The city delivered the propertys possession to Gomez. She fully paid the purchase price for the property
but violated the terms of the contract to sell by renting out the property to other persons. This court set
aside the contract to sell for her violation of the terms of the contract to sell. It ordered the installments
paid forfeited in favor of the City of Manila as reasonable compensation for [Gomezs] use of the
[property] for eight years.

In this case, ORC failed to fully pay the purchase price for the property. It only paid P2.5M out of the
P19M agreed purchase price. Worse, ORC has been in possession of Castillos property for 14 years since
PAGE 4 OF 3

May 5, 2000 and has not paid for its use of the property. Similar to the ruling in Gomez, we order the
P2.5M forfeited in favor of Castillo as reasonable compensation for ORCs use of the property.
Olivarez Realty Corporation is liable for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
While the RTC erred in rendering summary judgment on the amount of damages and attorneys fees, SC holds
that Castillo is entitled to moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

Sorry, di ko na ididiscuss kasi di na siya relevant. Important lang na bawal mag ajudge ng amount of
damages in summary judgments.
2.

The trial court acquired jurisdiction over Castillos action as he paid the correct docket fees

An action for rescission of contract of sale of real property is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Consequently, the docket fees to be paid shall be for actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, regardless if
the claimant may eventually recover the real property.

Although there is no rescission of contract in contracts of conditional sale, an action to cancel a contract to
sell, similar to an action for rescission of contract of sale, is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
o

Like any action incapable of pecuniary estimation, an action to cancel a contract to sell demands an
inquiry into other factors aside from the amount of money to be awarded to the claimant.

Specifically in this case, the trial court principally determined whether ORC failed to pay installments of
the propertys purchase price as the parties agreed upon in the deed of conditional sale. The principal
nature of Castillos action, therefore, is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

PAGE 5 OF 3

SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS [Special Former Twelfth Division], HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 26 (San Fernando City, La Union) & The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 143377 | February 20, 2001 | MELO, J.:
HOW THE CASE REACHED SC: Petition for certiorari
FACTS:
Oct 29, 1958 OCT was issued in favor of Rafael Galvez over 4 parcels of land, who conveyed Lots
1 & 4 to Mamaril, Llana, Bustos and Balatbat. TCT was issued.
Aug 16, 1960 - Mamaril et al sold Lots 1&4 to Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Deed of sale
inscribed on TCT, which was issued.
Feb 1, 1963 Unknown to Lepanto, CFI of La Union issued an Order in a Land Registration Case
(Rafael Galvez, Applicant, Eliza Bustos et al; Republic of the Phils, Movant) ordering the cancellation
of the OCT because it was null and void.
Oct 28, 1963 Lepanto sold Lots 1&4 to PETITIONER. TCT issued and the PETITIONER started
exercising proprietary rights over the lots.
Jan 25, 1965 - In the meantime, Galvez filed an MR but it was denied.
Aug 14, 1973 CA ruled in favor of RP.
Oct 23, 1973 CA issued an Entry of Judgment, certifying that the Aug 14 decision had become
final and executor.
Apr 22, 1974 TC in Land Registration case issued a writ of execution which was served on the
Register long deeds.
Jan 14, 1999 (after 12 years!) the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter dated January 11,
1999 from Mr. Victor G. Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation,
stating that the aforementioned orders and decision of the trial court in L.R.C. No. N-361 have not
been executed by the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union despite receipt of the writ of
execution.
Apr 21, 1999 Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for revival of judgment and
cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region (Branch 26, San
Fernando, La Union) docketed therein as Civil Case No. 6346 entitled, "Republic of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Heirs of Rafael Galvez, represented by Teresita Tan, Reynaldo Mamaril, Elisa
Bustos, Erlinda Balatbat, Regina Bustos, Shipside Incorporated and the Register of Deeds of La
Union, Defendants."
The evidence shows that the impleaded defendants (except the Register of Deeds of the province of
La Union) are the successors-in- interest of Rafael Galvez (not Reynaldo Galvez as alleged by the
Solicitor General) over the property covered by OCT, namely: (a) Shipside Inc. which is presently the
registered owner in fee simple of Lots No. 1& 4(b) Elisa Bustos, Jesusito Galvez, and Teresita Tan
who are the registered owners of Lot No. 2; and (c) Elisa Bustos, Filipina Mamaril, Regina Bustos
and Erlinda Balatbat who are the registered owners of Lot No. 3.
In its complaint in Civil Case, OSG argued that since the TC ruled that the OCT was null and void
(affirmed by CA als), the defendants-successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez have no valid title over
the property and the subsequent Torrens titles issued in their names should be consequently
cancelled.
Jul 22, 1999 PETITIONER Shipside filed MTD, based on the following grounds: (1) the complaint
stated no cause of action because only final and executory judgments may be subject of an action
for revival of judgment; (2) .the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest because the real property
covered by the Torrens titles sought to be cancelled, allegedly part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air
Station), were under the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) under Republic Act No. 7227; (3) plaintiff's cause of action is barred by

prescription; (4) twenty-five years having lapsed since the issuance of the writ of execution, no
action for revival of judgment may be instituted because under Paragraph 3 of Article 1144 of the
Civil Code, such action may be brought only within ten (10) years from the time the judgment had
been rendered.
Aug 23, 1999 - An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the Solicitor General, alleging
among others, that: (1) the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the Philippines; and (2)
prescription does not run against the State.
TC denied MTD and MR.
CA dismissed PETITIONERS petition for certiorari and prohibition on the ground that the verification
and certification in the petition, tinder the signature of Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was made without
authority, there being no proof therein that Balbin was authorized to institute the petition for and in
behalf and of petitioner.
May 23, 2000 - CA denied petitioner's MR on the grounds that: (1) a complaint filed on behalf of a
corporation can be made only if authorized by its Board of Directors, and in the absence thereof, the
petition cannot prosper and be granted due course; and (2) petitioner was unable to show that it
had substantially complied with the rule requiring proof of authority to institute an action or
proceeding.

SHIPSIDES ARGUMENTS:
Mr. Balbin had authority to sign the petition despite the clarity of laws, jurisprudence and
Secretary's certificate to the contrary;
The 1999 Complaint for Revival of a 1973 judgment should have been dismissed.
SOLGENS ARGUMENTS:
Lorenzo Balbin, who signed for and in behalf of petitioner in the verification and certification of nonforum shopping portion of the petition, failed to show proof of his authorization to institute the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, thus the latter court acted correctly
in dismissing the same
The real party-in-interest in the case at bar being the Republic of the Philippines, its claims are
imprescriptible.
ISSUES: (1) whether or not an authorization from petitioner's Board of Directors is still required in order
for its resident manager to institute or commence a legal action for and in behalf of the corporation YES; and (2) whether or not the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the action for revival of
judgment herein NO.
RATIO:
ISSUE #1:
The power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors
that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of
documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate
by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.
It is undisputed that on October 21, 1999, the time petitioner's Resident Manager Balbin filed the
petition, there was no proof attached thereto that Balbin was authorized to sign the verification and
non-forum shopping certification therein, as a consequence of which the petition was dismissed by
the Court of Appeals. However, subsequent to such dismissal, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, attaching to said motion a certificate issued by its "board secretary stating that on
October 11, 1999, or ten days prior to the filing of the petition, Balbin had been authorized by
petitioner's board of directors to file said petition.
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is
simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an

assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may
order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
On the other hand, the lack of certification, against forum shopping is generally not curable by the
submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of civil
Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should
accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping
signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said
signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit
a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized
to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary's certificate attesting that Balbin was
authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise, mitigates this oversight.
While the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the
requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping.

ISSUE #2:
The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court is one for revival of judgment which is
governed by Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure. Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10
years from the time the right of action accrues." On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that
a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry, but that after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. Taking these two provisions into consideration, it
is plain that an action for revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said
judgment becomes final.
The action for revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or more than twenty-five (25) years
after the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is barred by extinctive prescription
considering that 'such an action can be instituted only within ten (10) years from the time the cause
of action accrues.
While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the
government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While Camp Wallace
may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's title was ordered cancelled in
Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today.
With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or interest to
protect. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant
action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases
where the government is a party in interest.
To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he
must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced. A real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
Being the owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by
TCT issued in the name of petitioner is cancelled.

The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary
or ministrant. While public benefit and public welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic
and social development of Central Luzon, may be attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is
certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion
of economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country's goal for
enhancement, in general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the Government. Other corporations
have been created by government to act as its agents for the realization of its programs, the SSS,
GSIS, NAWASA arid the NIA, to count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these entities,
although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, are not
government-function corporations invested with governmental attributes. It may thus be said that
the BCDA is not a mere agency of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary
functions.
Having the capacity to sue or be sued, it should thus be the BCDA which may file an action to
cancel petitioner's title, not the Republic, the former being the real party in interest. One having no
right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action.
A suit may be dismissed if the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest. If the suit is not
brought in the name of the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed, as was done by
petitioner in this case, on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action.
E.B. Marcha is, however, not on all fours with the case at bar. In the former, the Court considered
the Republic a proper party to sue since the claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports
Authority against the petitioner therein were the same. To dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha
would have brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter since the PPA would have to
refile the case on the same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case here since to allow the
government to sue herein enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim which is not
available to the BCDA. The rule that prescription does not run against the State does not apply to
corporations or artificial bodies created by the State for special purposes, it being said that when
the title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees, although artificial bodies of its own creation,
are in the same category as ordinary persons. By raising the claim of imprescriptibility, a claim
which cannot be raised by the BCDA, the Government not only assists the BCDA, as it did in E.B.
Marcha, it even supplants the latter, a course of action proscribed by said case.
To recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in this case would set a bad precedent as it
would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled corporations,
causes of action which have already prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the real party
in interest against whom prescription does not run, said corporations having been created merely as
agents for the realization of government programs.
Parenthetically, petitioner was not a party to the original suit for cancellation of title commenced by
the Republic twenty-seven years for which it is now being made to answer, nay, being made to
suffer financial losses.
Petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired the property in
1963, or 5 years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third transferee. If only not
to do violence and to give some measure of respect to the Torrens System, petitioner must be
afforded some measure of protection.
Since the portion in dispute now forms part of the property owned and administered by the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority, it is alienable and registerable real property.
Sorry for the long digest but the case is pretty interesting anyway!
-Giselle