1. Luspo v.

People
Issue: Was Tugaoen under custodial investigation when he was invited
and made statement before PNP investigating committee?

Ruling:
At any rate, even if we were to hold that the investigation
conducted by the PNP was custodial in nature, the improprieties that
Tugaoen bewail would not prevail against strong and overwhelming evidence
showing her and her co-conspirators guilt. Allegations of impropriety
committed during custodial investigation are material only when an
extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction. In the present
case, the conviction of Montano, Duran, and Tugaoen was not deduced solely
from Tugaoens admission, but from the confluence of evidence showing their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2. People v. Ibanez
Issue: Was Nabilgas provided with a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice when he executed the extra judicial confession?

Ruling: No. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession,
to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the confession
must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel[,] preferably of the confessant's chaoice; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. Nabilgas confession was not
made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel. The
services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas behalf, were
provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas the NBI itself; she
was assigned the task despite Nabilgas open declaration to the agencys
investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo
Paglinawan.

3. People v. Guillen
Issue: Was appelants silence during the investigation an implied admission
of guilt?

Ruling: No. Clearly, when appellant remained silent when confronted by the
accusation of "AAA" at the police station, he was exercising his basic and
fundamental right to remain silent. At that stage, his silence should not be
taken against him. Thus, it was error on the part of the trial court to state
that appellants silence should be deemed as implied admission of guilt. In
fact, this right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of

counsel and any admission obtained in violation of this rule shall be

inadmissible in evidence

4. Tanengge v. People
Issue: Is the Petitioners written statement admissible in evidence if the
questioning was initiated an internal affairs management bank?

Ruling: Yes. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of

admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is
applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain
rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain
silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.19 In the
present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he
managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a
law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the
bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in
any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be
said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the
constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.

De la Cruz v. People

Issue: Is the drug test on urine samples admissible in evidence if they were
obtained from the suspect (arrested for extortion) during custodial
investigation and without the assistance of counsel?

Ruling: No. The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended
or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article
II of R.A. 9165. Extortion is not one of those enumerated under the particular
section. Making the phrase a person apprehended or arrested in Section 15
applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only
under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug
testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend
the application of this provision would run counter to our pronouncement in
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy

guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug
testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which
the arrest is being made.

Rights of the Accused; Counsel of his Choice

2005 BAR Mariano was arrested by the NBI as a suspect in the
shopping mall bombings. Advised of his rights, Mariano asked for
the assistance of his relative, Atty. Santos. The NBI noticed that
Atty. Santos was inexperienced, incompetent and inattentive.
Deeming him unsuited to protect the rights of Mariano, the NBI
dismissed Atty. Santos. Appointed in his place was Atty. Barroso, a
bar topnotcher who was in the premises visiting a relative. Atty.
Barroso ably assisted Mariano when the latter gave a statement.
However, Mariano assailed the investigation claiming that he was
deprived of counsel of his choice. Was the NBI correct in dismissing
Atty. Santos and appointing Atty. Barroso in his stead? Is Mariano's
statement, made with the assistance of Atty. Barroso, admissible in
evidence?
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The NBI was not correct in dismissing Atty. Santos and appointing Atty.
Barroso in his stead. Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution
requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice " This is meant to stress the primacy accorded to the
voluntariness of the choice under the uniquely stressful conditions of a
custodial investigation' Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the
individual undergoing questioning. The appointment of Atty. Barroso is
questionable because he was visiting a relative working in the NBI and thus
his independence is doubtful. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever
testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence,
are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers
and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. Considering that Mariano
was deprived of counsel of his own choice, the statement is inadmissible in
evidence. (People v. Januario, G.R. No. 98252, February 7, 1997)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The NBI was correct in dismissing Atty. Santos as he was incompetent. The
1987 Constitution requires counsel to be competent and independent. Atty.
Barroso, being a bar topnotcher ably assisted Mariano and there is no
showing that his having a relative in the NBI affected his independence.
Moreover, the accused has the final choice of counsel as he may reject the
one chosen for him and ask for another. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he raises no
objection against the lawyer during the course of the investigation, and the
accused thereafter subscribes to the truth of his statement before the
swearing officer. Thus, once the prosecution shows there was compliance

with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a

confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden
of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. A confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result
of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency which are
not present in this case. Accordingly, the statement is admissible. (People v.
Jerez, G.R. No. 114385, January 29, 1998)

2008
BAR
Having received tips that the accused was selling
narcotics, two police officers forced open the doors of his room.
Finding him sitting partly dressed on the side of the bed, the
officers spied two capsules on a night stand beside the bed. When
asked, Are these yours? the accused seized the capsules and put
them in his mouth. A struggle ensued, in the course of which the
officers pounced on the accused but failed to extract the capsules.
The officers handcuffed the accused, took him to a hospital where at
their direction, a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube
into the accuseds stomach against his will. This process induced
vomiting. In the vomited matter were found two capsules which
proved to contain heroin. In the criminal case, the chief evidence
against the accused was the two capsules.
a) As counsel, for the accused, what constitutional rights will you
invoke in his defense?
b) How should the court decide the case?
ANSWERS:
a) As counsel for the accused, I would invoke the Constitutional right to
be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures(Art. III, Sec. 2
of the Constitution) which guarantees:( 1) sanctity of the home, (2)
inadmissibility of the capsules seized, (3) and inviolability of the
person. A mere tip from a reliable source is not sufficient to justify
warrantless arrest or search(Peo v Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233 Feb. 22,
2007).
b) The court should declare the search and seizure illegal:
1) The entry into the accuseds home was not a permissible
warrantless action because the police had no personal knowledge
that any crime was taking place.
2) Due to the invalid entry whatever evidence the police gathered
would be inadmissible.
3) The arrest of the accused was already invalid and causing him to
vomit while under custody was an unreasonable invasion of
personal privacy(US v Montoya, 473 US 531(1985)).
2009
BAR
William, a private American citizen, a university
graduate and frequent visitor to the Philippines, was inside the U.S.
embassy when he got into a heated argument with a private Filipino
citizen. Then, in front of many shocked witnesses, he killed the

person he was arguing with. The police came, and brought him to
the nearest police station. Upon reaching the station, the police
investigator, in halting English, informed William of his Miranda
rights, and assigned him an independent local counsel. William
refused the services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be assisted
by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S. The request was
denied, and the counsel assigned by the police stayed for the
duration of the investigation. William protested his arrest. He
claimed that his Miranda rights were violated because he was not
given the lawyer of his choice that being an American, he should
have been informed of his rights in proper English and that he
should have been informed of his rights as soon as he was taken
into custody, not when he was already at the police station. Was
William denied his Miranda rights? Why or why not?
ANSWER: William was not denied with his Miranda rights. True that he has
the right to counsel preferably of his choice. But if he cannot afford the
services of a counsel, he should be provided with one. Moreover, the Miranda
rights are available only during custodial investigation that is, from the
moment the investigating officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of
eliciting admissions, confessions or any information from the accused.
Therefore, it is proper that he was only informed of his right at the police
station.
ALTENATIVE ANSWER: The fact that the police officer gave him the Miranda
warning in halting English does not detract from its validity. Under Section
2(b) of Republic Act No. 7438, it is sufficient that the language used was
known to and understood by him. William need not be given the Miranda
warning before the investigation started. William was not denied his Miranda
rights. It is not practical to require the police officer to provide a lawyer of his
own choice from the United States (Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCAR 642,
[1998]).
If William applies for bail, claiming that he is entitled thereto under
the international standard of justice and that he comes from a US
State that has outlawed capital punishment, should William be
granted bail as a matter of right? Reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: William is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. His
contention is not tenable. Observing the territorial jurisdiction of commission
of the offense, the applicable law in the case is Philippine laws not the law of
the country to where he is a national (Section 13, Art. III of the Constitution).
Under our law, bail is not a matter of right if the felony or offense committed
has an imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher and the evidence
of guilt is strong.
2011 BAR Mr. Brown, a cigarette vendor, was invited by PO1 White
to a nearby police station. Upon arriving at the police station, Brown
was asked to stand side-by-side with five (5) other cigarette
vendors in a police line-up. PO1 White informed them that they were
looking for a certain cigarette vendor who snatched the purse of a
passer-by and the line-up was to allow the victim to point at the
vendor who snatched her purse. No questions were to be asked
from the vendors.

(a) Brown, afraid of a "set up" against him, demanded that he be

allowed to secure his lawyer and for him to be present during the
police line-up. Is Brown entitled to counsel? Explain
SUGGESTED ANSWER Brown is not entitled to counsel during the police lineup. He was not yet being asked to answer for a criminal offense. (Gamboa vs.
Cruz, 162 SCRA 642.)
(b) Would the answer in (a.) be the same if Brown was specifically
invited by White because an eyewitness to the crime identified him
as the perpetrator? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER Brown would be entitled to the assistance of a lawyer.
He was already considered as a suspect and was therefore entitled to the
rights under custodial investigation. (People vs. Legaspi, 331 SCRA 95.)
(c) Briefly enumerate the so-called "Miranda Rights".
SUGGESTED ANSWER The Miranda warning means that a person in custody
who will be interrogated must be informed of the following:
(a) He has the right to remain silent;
(b) Anything said can be used as evidenced against him;
(c) He has the right to have counsel during the investigation; and
(d) He must be informed that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him. (Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
2010 BAR Which statement best completes the following phrase:
Freedom from torture is a right_____
(A)subject to derogation when national security is threatened.
(B). confined only during custodial investigation.
(C) which is non-derogable both during peacetime and in a situation of
armed conflict.
(D) both (a) and (b)
(E) none of the above.
Article 2(2) of the U.N. Convention Against Torture provides that No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political in stability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture.
Because of the importance of the values it protects, the prohibition of torture
has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that
enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even
ordinary customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of this higher
rank is that the norm prohibiting torture cannot be derogated from by States
through international treaties or local or special customs or even general
customary rules not endowed with the same normative force. (Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, ICTY, December 10, 1998)

Page 128
2011 Bar

After X, a rape suspect, was apprised of his right to silence and to counsel,
he told the investigators that he was waiving his right to have his own
counsel or to be provided one. He made his waiver in the presence of a
retired Judge who was assigned to assist and explain to him the
consequences of such waiver. Is the waiver valid?
(A) No, the waiver was not reduced in writing.
(B) Yes, the mere fact that the lawyer was a retired judge does not cast doubt
on his competence and independence.
(C) Yes, the waiver was made voluntarily, expressly, and with assistance of
counsel.
(D) No, a retired Judge is not a competent and independent counsel.
2012 Bar
Under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent, etc. The investigation referred to is
called:
a. preliminary investigation;
b. summary investigation;
c. criminal investigation;
d. custodial investigation.
2013 Bar
A robbery with homicide had taken place and Lito, Badong and Rollie were
invited for questioning based on the information furnished by a neighbor that
he saw them come out of the victim's house at about the time of the
robbery/killing. The police confronted the three with this and other
information they had gathered, and pointedly accused them of committing
the crime.
Lito initially resisted, but eventually broke down and admitted his
participation in the crime. Elated by this break and desirous of securing a
written confession soonest, the police called City Attorney Juan Buan to serve
as the trio's counsel and to advise them about their rights during the
investigation.
Badong and Rollie, weakened in spirit by Lito's early admission, likewise
admitted their participation. The trio thus signed a joint extra-judicial
confession which served as the main evidence against them at their trial.
They were convicted based on their confession.
Should the judgment of conviction be affirmed or reversed on appeal?
Suggested Answer:
The judgment of conviction should be reversed on appeal. It relied mainly on
the extrajudicial confession of the accused. The lawyer assisting them must
be independent. City Attorney Juan Buan is not independent. As City
Attorney, he provided legal support to the City Mayor in performing his

duties, which include the maintenance of peace and order (People vs. Sunga,
399 SCRA 624).
Alternative Answer:
The judgment of conviction should be reversed. The police officers
committed an offense by confronting the three accused. This is a violation to
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which states that any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2014 Bar
Suggested Answer:
The evidence is inadmissible against Edward Gunman. The rule begins to
operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has
been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct
interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating statements. Edward
should have been informed of his Miranda rights when the policemen
interrogated him. Failure to do so, the evidence is inadmissible against him.
Page 134
CYRIL CALPITO QUI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196161
September 26, 2012
Facts: Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
The RTC in Quezon City convicted petitioner as charged, and sentenced her
to two equal periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of 5
years, 4 months, and 21 days of prision correccional in its maximum period,
as minimum, to 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as maximum.
Petitioner
then
appealed
and
subsequently
filed
an
Urgent
Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal. The OSG urged for the denial of
the bail application on the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law
and that she is a flight-risk. The CA denied petitioners application for bail
pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: Is the accused entitled to the right to bail?
Ruling: No. Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial

Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. xxx
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
xxx
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail;
xxx
Petitioner disobeyed court processes when she lied in order to justify her
non-appearance on the March 8, 2010 hearing before the RTC. She gave the
excuse that her father was hospitalized and died days later when in fact her
father died a year ago. The RTC notice sent to petitioners bonding company
was also returned with the notation "moved out," while the notice sent to
petitioners given address was returned unclaimed with the notation "RTS no
such person. The fact of transferring residences without informing her
bondsman and the trial court can only be viewed as petitioners inclination to
evade court appearance, as indicative of flight. Consequently, the Court
agrees with the appellate courts finding of the presence of the fourth
circumstance enumerated in the above-quoted Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Also, petitioners argument that she has the
constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt against her is not
strong is spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends.
Therefore, petitioner's application for bail pending appeal is denied.

Jorda vs Judge Bitas

A.M. RTJ-14-236 and 14-237
March 5, 2014

Facts: The complaint stemmed from 3 criminal cases for Qualified Trafficking
(RA 9208) and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7610, which were filed
against Miralles, et al. before the RTC Tacloban City where respondent Judge
Bitas presides.
Respondent judge issued an Order which states that the Court finds that
there is probable cause to hold the accused for trial for Violation of 4 (a & e)
of R.A. 9208.

Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his duties and

violated mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a
warrant of arrest against the accused Miralles, who was charged with nonbailable criminal offenses. Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced
bail of P40,000.00 for accused Miralles in the absence of a motion to fix bail,
and the prosecution was not given the opportunity to interpose its
objections.
Respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest Miralles, because the
court was still in the process of determining whether there is sufficient
evidence to hold the accused for trial. Respondent judge also claimed that
there was no more need for a petition for bail, because in the judicial
determination of probable cause the court found that the evidence against
accused was weak.
Issue: Is bail hearing required if the accused-applicant is charged with
Qualified Trafficking?
Ruling: Yes. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is
absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the
prosecutions evidence is weak or strong. In the instant case, Miralles was
charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No.
9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant
of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent
judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing.
With life imprisonment as one of the penalties prescribed for the offense
charged against Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Clearly, respondent judge's act of fixing the accused's
bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
People v Wagas
G.R. No. 157943
September 04, 2014
ISSUE
If Wagas innocence is in doubt but his identity is not established, is he
entitled to an acquittal?
RULING
Yes. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this case,
the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas
who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. The check delivered to
Ligaray was made payable to cash. Furthermore, under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be
negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must
have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law

punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless
check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had
issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly
show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by
means of the check.

Atienza v People
G.R. No. 188694
February 12, 2014
ISSUE
If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanation, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, does the evidence fulfill the test of
moral certainty to sustain a conviction?
RULING
No. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this
case.
In the case at bar, the discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of
the crimes charged dilutes the strength of the evidence required to produce
a conviction. Atibula attempted to bribe him to take out Volume 260 but the
alleged intercalation actually occurred in a different document that is Volume
266. Hence, the bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration of
interest on the part of Atienza over said subject matter and in this regard,
constitutes a mere proof of motive. Mere proof of motive, no matter how
strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction.

People v Feliciano
G.R. No. 196735
May 5, 2014
ISSUE
Was the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and
case of the accusation against them violated with the inclusion of the phrase
wearing masks and/or other form of disguise in the information?
RULING
No. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended pary; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed. Every aggravating circumstance
being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an
aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be

appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state

the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that
effect, to be admissible by the trial court. What is important in alleging
disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of
identity by the accused hence the inclusion of disguise in the information
was enough to sufficiently appraise the accused that in the commission of
the offense they were being charged with.
Sevilla v People
G.R. No. 194390
August 13, 2014
ISSUE
Can Sevilla be convicted of the felony of falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in
the Information was for the intentional felony of Falsification of public
document under Article 170 (4) of the RPC?
RULING
No. The proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public
documents through reckless imprudence. A variance exists between the
offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution the
Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to
prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents.
Moreover, Sevillas claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the
Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the
intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To
stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is
an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of
public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act
of falsification of public documents.
NOTE: The Sandiganbayan designation of Sevillas felony (falsification of
public documents through reckless imprudence) implies that reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it.
Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes
and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
1982 Bar
A, a taxpayer, a voter, and a member of the BAR, filed a petition for the
COMELEC to enjoin the latter form enforcing Section 4, BP Blg 52 which
provides for the disqualification as candidate of any person convicted of
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar offenses. Said law further
provides that the filing of charges for xxxx such crimes before a civil or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence

of such fact. A maintains that the above-quoted proviso is unconstitutional

because it contravenes the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the
Constitution. Is As contention tenable? Explain.
Answer
Yes, As contention is meritorious. Explicit is the constitutional provision,
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. It is clear
that the law challenged therein did in fact establish a presumption of guilt
from the mere filing of the information or criminal complaint, in violation of
the constitutional right to presumption of innocence. (Dumlao vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980)
1983 Bar
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A 1379) provided
that whenever a public officer has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
public officer and his other lawful income, the same property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquire. Under this law,
forfeiture proceedings against X, a customs collector, to confiscate his
unexplained wealth. X questioned the constitutionality of said Section 2 as
being violative of due process and the constitutional presumption of
innocence. He contended that thereunder, the respondent has the burden of
proving his innocence. Decide.
Answer
The presumption of innocence clause of the Constitution refers to criminal
prosecutions and not to forfeiture proceedings which are civil actions in rem.
The Constitution is likewise not violated by RA 1379 because statutes which
declare that as a matter of law a particular inference follows from the proof
of a particular fact, one fact becoming prima facie evidence of another, are
not necessarily invalid, the effect of the presumption being merely to shift
the burden of proof upon the adverse party. (Ong vs Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
126858, September 16, 2005)
1998 BAR (Question No. 5)
Norberto Malasmas was accused of estafa before the Regional Trial
Court of
Manila. After the trial, he was found guilty. On appeal, his conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. After the records of his case had been
remanded to the Regional Trial Court for execution, and after the latter Court
had set the date for the promulgation of judgment, the accused filed a
motion with the Court of Appeals to set aside the entry of judgment, and to
remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial on the ground that
he had just discovered that "Atty. Leonilo Maporma" whom he had chosen
and who had acted as his counsel before the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, is not a lawyer. Resolved the motion of the accused with reasons.
Suggested Answer:

The motion should be granted and the entry of judgment

should be set aside. An accused is entitled to be heard by himself or
counsel. (Art. III, sec. 14(2)). Unless he is represented by an
attorney, there is a great danger that any defense presented in his
behalf will be inadequate considering the legal requisite and skill
needed in court proceedings. There would certainly be a denial of
due process. (Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 357 (1986)).
2000 BAR (Question No. XV)
Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3,
2000, Pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8
and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its
postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal
and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had
to go abroad to fulfill a professional commitment. The judge instead
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute.
a) Would the grant of the motion for postponement have violated the
accused's right to speedy trial?
Suggested Answer:
The grant of the motion for postponement would not have
violated the right of the accused to speedy trial. As held In People v.
Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996). since the motion for postponement
was the first one requested, the need for the offended party to
attend to a professional commitment is a valid reason, no
substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced, and the
prosecution should be afforded a fair opportunity to prosecute its
case, the motion should be granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since continuous trial of cases is required and since the date
of the initial hearing was set upon agreement of all parties,
including the private complainant, the judge properly dismissed the
case for failure to prosecute.

2001 BAR (Question No. X)

For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with the crime of homicide
before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned. Due to
numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the
prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution
witnesses who could not be found or located, the criminal case was pending
trial for a period of seven years. Upon motion of accused Erning who invoked
his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case. Eventually, the
prosecution witnesses surfaced, and a criminal case for homicide, involving
the same incident was filed anew against Erning. Accused Erning moved for
dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution
objected, submitting the reason that it was not able to present the said
witnesses earlier because the latter went into hiding out of fear. Resolve the
motion.

Suggested Answer:
The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of
a criminal case predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy
trial amounts to an acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt and bars his subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

2004 BAR (Question No. 5-b)

OZ lost five heads of cattle which he reopened to the police as stolen
from his barn. He requested several neighbors, including RR for help in
looking for the missing animals. After an extensive search, the police found
two heads in RRs farm. RR could not explain to the police how they got
hidden in a remote area of his farm. Insisting on his innocence, RR consulted
a lawyer who told him that he has a right to be presumed innocent under the
Bill of Rights. But there is another presumption --- of theft arising from his
unexplained possession of stolen cattle --- under the penal law. Are the two
presumptions capable of reconciliation in this case? If so, how can they be
reconciled? If not, which should prevail?
Suggested Answer:
The two presumptions can be reconciled. The presumption of
innocence stands until the contrary is proved. It may be overcome
by a contrary presumption founded upon human experience. The
presumption that RR is the one who stole the cattle of OZ is logical,
since he was found in possession of the stolen cattle. RR can prove
his innocence by presenting evidence to rebut the presumption. The
burden of evidence is shifted to RR, because how he came into
possession of the cattle is peculiarly within his knowledge. (DizonPamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63 (1994)).
2012 BAR (Question # 46)
Criminal trial may proceed, notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified, and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable, after: ______.
a.
b.
c.
d.

Preliminary investigation
Arraignment ------ (Sec. 19, Art. III)
Sentencing
Prosecution has rested its case.

p. 146
2012 BAR (Question #47)
The requisites of a valid trial in absentia exclude: _____.
a. Wherein his/her failure to appear is unjustifiable;
b. Wherein he/she allows himself/herself to be identified by the
witness in his/her absence, without further unqualified
admitting that every time a witness mentions a name by

which he/she is known, it shall be understood to refer to

him/her; ------- (Carredo v. People, 183 SCRA 373)
c. Wherein he/she has been duly notified of the trial;
d. Wherein the accused has already been arraigned.
2012 BAR (Question # 99)
(Accused was charged with slight illegal detention. On the day set for
the trial,) [t]he trial court proceeded as follows:
Q: Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?
A: I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.
Accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty, was found guilty and
sentenced. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The accused was
deprived of his:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Right to cross-examination;
Right to be presumed innocent;
Right to counsel ;------- (People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752)
Right to production of evidence.

2012 BAR (Question #100)

The constitutional right of an accused to meet the witnesses face to
face is primarily for the purpose of affording the accused a n opportunity to:
a. Identify the witness;
b. Cross-examine the witness; ----- (People v. Montenegro, 436
SCRA 33)
c. Be informed of the charge;
d. Be heard.

2013 BAR (Question No. VII) (p.37 of the Complied Q&A 2007-2013)
As he was entering the bar, Arnold who was holding an unlit cigarette
in his right hand was handed a match box by someone standing near the
doorway. Arnold unthinkingly opened the matchbox to light his cigarette and
as he did so, a sprinkle of dried leaves fell out, which the guard noticed. The
guard immediately frisked Arnold, grabbed the matchbox, and sniffed its
contents. After confirming that the matchbox contained marijuana, he
immediately arrested Arnold and called in the police. At the police station,
the guard narrated to the police that he personally caught Arnold in
possession of dried marijuana leaves. Arnold did not contest the guards
statement; he steadfastly remained silent and refused to give any written
statement. Later in court, the guard testified and narrated the statements he
gave the police over Arnolds counsels objections. While Arnold presented
his own witnesses to prove that his possession and apprehension had been
set-up, he himself did not testify. The court convinced Arnold, relying largely
on his admission of the charge by silence at the police investigation and
during trial. From the constitutional law perspective, was the court correct in
its ruling? Explain.
Suggested Answer:

No. The court was wrong in relying on the silence of Arnold

during the police investigation and during the trial. Under Article III,
Section 12 off the 1987 Constitution, he had the right to remain
silent. His silence cannot be taken as a tacit admission, otherwise,
his right to remain silent would be rendered nugatory. Considering
that his right against self-incrimination protects his right to remain
silent, he cannot be penalized for exercising it. (People v. Galvez,
519 SCRA 521)

44. Lozada vs. Arroyo, et. al.; G.R. Nos. 184379-80; April 24, 2012
ISSUE # 1: Must the alleged threat be imminent or continuing for Petition for
Writ of Amparo to prosper?
HELD: Yes. The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that
this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to
the right to life, liberty, and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and
uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no
longer imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as
not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ.
ISSUE # 2: Were the petitioners entitled to the Writ of Amparo?
HELD: No. In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security
has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to
prove the existence of a continuing threat. The Court is in agreement with
the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally
deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft
up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he
voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents. Nevertheless, it
must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so
much so that his right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that
manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered
the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. In this case, the totality
of the evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the requisite
evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of the writ of amparo has already
been rendered moot and academic by the cessation of the restraint to
Lozadas liberty.
45. Navia vs. Pardico; G.R. No. 184467; June 19, 2012
ISSUE # 1: For the protective Writ of Amparo to issue, will the allegation and
proof that the persons subject thereof are missing be sufficient?
HELD: No. For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance
cases, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case

has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of

government participation.

ISSUE # 2: Can the writ be issued against private parties?

HELD: Yes. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy

available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

46. Adonis vs. Tesoro; G.R. No. 182855; June 5, 2013

ISSUE: Is Adonis entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus?
HELD: No. In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC
Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. Since his detention was by
virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He
was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6)
others, on December 11, 2007. While it is true that a convict may be
released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of
his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground
for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole.
Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was
pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the instant petition
was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the
writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for
the Court to deny his immediate release at that time.
47. Mangila vs. Judge Pangilinan; G.R. No. 160739; July 17, 2013
ISSUE: Is Mangila entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus?
HELD: No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a
speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. With
Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully
issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate
remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the
restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired
into through habeas corpus. Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that the writ
of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available
remedy.
48. Caram vs. Atty. Segui; G.R. No. 193652; August 5, 2014
ISSUE: Can the issue of child custody and parental rights be the subject of a
Writ of Amparo?

HELD: No. In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers
caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action
amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo
rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of
the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian
was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before
the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari
that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC
during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is
therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo
rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from
her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without
complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but
asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the
issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who,
for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State,
the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

1997

BAR

When may the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be suspended? (b) If
validly declared, what would be the full consequences of such suspension?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus may be suspended when there is an invasion or rebellion and
public safety requires it.
(b) According to Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged with rebellion or offenses Inherent to or directly connected
with invasion. Any person arrested or detained should be judicially charged
within three days. Otherwise, he should be released. Moreover, under
Section 13. Article III of the Constitution, the right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
1997 BAR
A while serving imprisonment for estafa. upon recommendation of the Board
of Pardons and Parole, was granted pardon by the President on condition that
he should not again violate any penal law of the land. Later, the Board of
Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the
pardon granted him because A had been charged with estafa on 20 counts
and was convicted of the offense charged although he took an appeal
therefrom which was still pending. As recommended, the President canceled

the pardon he had granted to A. A was thus arrested and imprisoned to serve
the balance of his sentence in the first case. A claimed in his petition for
habeas corpus filed in court that his detention was illegal because he had not
yet been convicted by final judgment and was not given a chance to be
heard before he was recommitted to prison. Is A's argument valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The argument of A is not valid. As held in Torres vs. Gonzales. 152 SCRA 272
a judicial pronouncement that a convict who was granted a pardon subject to
the condition that he should not again violate any penal law is not necessary
before he can be declared to have violated the condition of his pardon.
Moreover, a hearing is not necessary before A can be recommitted to prison.
By accepting the conditional pardon, A, agreed that the determination by the
President that he violated the condition of his pardon shall be conclusive
upon him and an order for his arrest should at once issue.
2005 BAR
Bruno still had several years to serve on his sentence when he was
conditionally pardoned by the President. Among the conditions imposed was
that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
Bruno accepted all of the conditions and was released. Shortly thereafter,
Bruno was charged with 2 counts of estafa. He was then incarcerated to
serve the i expired portion of his sentence following the revocation by the
President of the pardon. Bruno's family filed a petition for habeas corpus,
alleging that it was error to have him recommitted as the charges were false,
in fact, half of them were already dismissed. Resolve the petition with
reasons.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The petition should not be given due course. The grant of pardon and the
determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
PURELY EXECUTIVE ACTS which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The
acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carried with it the authority or
power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the
pardon has or have been violated. Where the President opts to revoke the
conditional pardon given, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his
conditional pardon. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, is a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny. (Torres v. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 76872, July 23, 1987)
2012 BAR
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of:
a. imminent danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it;

b. grave danger of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it;
c. clear and present danger of invasion or rebellion when the public
safety requires it;
d. invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
2013 BAR
On March 1, 2013, Condrad informed his mother, Vannie, that uniformed
security guards had invited him for a talk in their office but he refused to
come. Later that day, however, Condrad appeared to have relented; he was
seen walking into the security office flanked by two security guards. Nobody
saw him leave the office afterwards. Condrad did not go home that night and
was never seen again. The following week and after a week-long search,
Vannie feared the worst because Col. Sangres reputation. She thus reported
Condrads disappearance to the police. When nothing concrete resulted from
the police investigation, Vannie-at the advice of counsel-filed a petition for a
writ of amparo to compel Col. Sangre and the Sagittatius Security Office to
produce Condrad and to hold them liable and responsible for Condrads
disappearance.
a.) Did Vannies counsel give the correct legal advice?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Vannies counsel gave the correct legal advice. The Writ of Amparo is
a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, or security has
been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Since there has been an enforced disappearance on the part of Conrad, the
writ is applicable.
b.)
If the petition would prosper, can Col. Sangre be held
liable and/or responsible for Conrads disappearance? (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Colonel Sangre, together with the Sagittarius Security Office should
be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Conrad because
of strong evidences supporting the claim of the Writ of Amparo as shown in
the case.
ASSIGNED CASE
Issue: Was Dacudaos right to speedy disposition of the case violated?
Ruling:

No. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory. The cases
against Delos Angeles, Jr. were consolidated in order to obtain expeditious
justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as
the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during
the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the
consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the
efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive investigation
of the cases. While there is a possibility that there would be more cases
reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and
other parties, yet, any delays in petitioners cases occasioned by such other
and subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182.

Braza vs. Sandiganbayan; GR No. 195032

Facts:

The Philippines was assigned for the hosting rights of the 12 th ASEAN
Leaders Summit. In preparation thereof, province of Cebu as the designated
venue, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) identified
projects relative to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads and
installation of traffic safety devices and lighting facilities. After the summit, a
complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention
Office (PACPO), Ombudsman Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN Summit
street lighting projects were overpriced. Braza, being the president of FABMIK
Construction was impleaded as one of the respondents. Braza was charged
for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act.He pleaded not guilty.
Issue:
Was Brazas right to speedy disposition of his case violated?
Ruling:
No. The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. It is a relative or
flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. Hence, the doctrinal rule
is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of the delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Using the foregoing yardstick, the Court finds that Brazas right to speedy
disposition of the case has not been infringed.

Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan; GR No. 191411

Facts:
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidental for
three (3) full terms. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special
Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales subordinate, and Malvas as
Provincial Health Officer. A complaint was received by the Office of the
Ombudsman for the Visayas, to to investigate the anomalous purchase of
medical and agricultural equipment for the Province a month before
Coscolluela stepped down from office. Petitioners were charged for violating
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash
the Complaint, arguing that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only
after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted.
Issue:
Were petitioners right to speedy disposition of their case violated?
Ruling:
Yes. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative
in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. The right
to speedy disposition of cases is a relative or flexible concept such that a
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient.
This right is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause
or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.
In this case, the petitioners right to a speedy disposition of their
criminal case had been violated. First, it is observed that the preliminary
investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete.
Second, the Ombudsmans
delay in the resolution of the case largely
remains unjustified. Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be
faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of
cases. Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the
petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.

People vs. Perez; GR No. 188165

Facts:
Cong. Wilfrido B. Villarama of Bulacan delivered a privilege speech
denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking
government official whom he then called the "2 Million Dollar Man." In
reaction, the Office of the President directed the Presidential Anti- Graft and
Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the expos of Cong. Villarama.
Cong. Villarama responded by letter to PAGCs invitation by confirming that
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez was the government official who had
knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose. Secretary
Perez denied being the Million-Dollar Man referred to in Cong. Villaramas
privilege speech. Thus, Information was filed alleging the violation of Section
3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Issue:
Did the Ombudsman violate respondents right to speedy disposition of
their case?
Ruling:
Yes. The right to the speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. In this case, there was a delay on the part of the
Office of the Ombudsman which is vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. The
fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of the
Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months. It is clear from the
foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long
period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine
whether to criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such
long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar
circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents right
under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases.

2000 BAR:

Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3,

2000. Pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8
and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its
postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal
and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had
to go abroad to fulfill a professional commitment. The judge instead
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Would the Reversal of the trial
courts assailed dismissal of the case place the accused in double jeopardy?
Answer:
Since the postponement of the case would not violate the right of the
accused to speedy trial, the precipitate dismissal of the case is void. The
reversal of the dismissal will not place the accused in double jeopardy.
2001 BAR:
For the death of Joey, Eming was charged with crime of homicide
before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned. Due to
numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance of the
prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of prosecution
witnesses who cannot be found or located, the criminal case has been
pending for a period of seven years. Upon motion of accused Eming who
invoked his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case. Eventually,
the said prosecution witnesses surfaced and a criminal case for homicide,
involving the same incident was filed anew against Eming. Accused Eming
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. The
prosecution objected submitting the reason that it was not able to present
said witness earlier because the latter went into hiding out of fear. Resolve
the motion.
Answer:
The motion should be granted. As held in Caes vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of a criminal case
predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.

Marcos vs. Republic; GR No. 189434

Facts:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a Petition
for Forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the forfeiture law,
Republic Act No. 1379. It sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy

corporations and entities established by nominees of Marcos and his wife,

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal properties
manifestly out of proportion to the spouses lawful income. PCGG and the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also sought the declaration of Swiss
bank accounts and two treasury notes as ill-gotten wealth.

Issue:
Can the right against self-incrimination be invoked in forfeiture
proceedings?
Ruling:
Yes. Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and
in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment
or other proceedings in civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any
defect or want of form is applicable to them. The proceeding is one against
the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws which
has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be
forfeited. The prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a
witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by
reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the
penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. Forfeiture cases partake of
a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the right against selfincrimination is applicable to the proceedings.
The right of the Marcoses against self-incrimination is amply protected
by the provisions of R.A. 1379, which prohibits the criminal prosecution of
individuals for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which they are compelled, after having claimed the privilege against selfincrimination , to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise.

61. De la Cruz vs People, GR 200748, 23 July 2014

FACTS: Petitioner was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When
he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was,
however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to
the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
ISSUE: Can the urine drug test of the petitioner arrested of extortion be used
against him without violating his right against self-incrimination?
RULING: No. Because the urine test was conducted without the presence of
counsel and he was nevertheless compelled to do so by the NBI, petitioners
right against self-incrimination under Sec. 17, Article III in relation to his right
to privacy under Sec. 2, Article III was violated.
62. 1986 BAR Q: At the trial of a rape case, the prosecution
submitted in evidence a pair of pants which the victim in her
testimony, identified as the very pair of pants left by the accused
when he hurriedly jumped from the window to escape rescuers who
heard cries for help while being raped. When it was the accuseds
turn to testify on his defence, the fiscal, on cross-examination asked
the accused to put on the pair of pants. The defence objected,
invoking the right of the accused against self-incrimination. As
judge, would you sustain or overrule the objection?
Answer: I would sustain the objection. The right of the accused against selfincrimination would be violated if he is not allowed to refuse, via counsels
objection, to put on the pair of pants. Unlike with ordinary witnesses, the
right is given broader application with regard to the accused, who may thus
refuse to take the witness stand and/or refuse to answer any and all
questions or request asked of him. (Chavez vs CA, 24 SCRA 663) To compel
the accused to wear the pants amounts to a deprivation of his right to testify
to a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the
commission of a crime. (Fernando vs Maglanoc, 1954).
Alternative Answer: I would overrule the objection. In the case of People
vs Otadora, the Supreme Court, citing Wigmore, ruled that the right of the
accused against self-incrimination does not cover the act of being asked by
the court to remove or replace his garmentsin this case, the pair of pants.

63. 1988 BAR Q: Dr. Juan Sto. Tomas is a practicing dentist in

Marikina, Metro-Manila. He was charged with immorality before the
Board of Dentistry by a lady patient, who claims that Dr. Sto. Tomas
took liberties with her person and kissed her while she was under
treatment at the latters clinic. At the initial hearing of the
administrative complaint, the complainants counsel called the
respondent as his first witness. The respondent, through counsel,
objected vigorously, claiming his constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. Decide.

A: The objection should be sustained. In the case of Pascual Jr vs Board of

Medical Examiners, it was ruled that a doctor who faces an administrative
complaint for immorality and malpractice enjoys the right against selfincrimination since the revocation of his license could even be a more
serious deprivation than forfeiture of property. The constitutional right grants
the accused the right to refuse to take the witness stand altogether. The
objection of respondents counsel is a rightful invocation of said right.

64. 1998 BAR Q:Suppose Congress passed a law to implement the

Constitutional principle that public office is a public trust, by
providing as follows: No employee of the Civil Service shall be
excused from attending and testifying or from producing books,
records, correspondence, documents or other evidence in any
administrative investigation concerning the office in which he is
employed on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required
of him may tend to incriminate him or subject to a penalty or
forfeiture but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall
not he used against him in criminal prosecution based on the
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled ,
after invoking his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or
produce evidence. Provided, however, that such individual so
testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed in so testifying nor shall he be exempt from
demotion or removal from office. Any employee who refuses to
testify or produce any documents under this Act shall be dismissed
from service. Suppose further, that Ong, a member of the
Professional Regulatory Board, is required to answer question in an
investigation regarding a LEAKAGE in a medical examination.

i.

Can Ong refuse to answer questions on the ground that

he would incriminate himself?
No. The law gives Ong protection from self-incrimination while
positively requiring him to testify. Thus, his constitutional right
remains enforced and his testimony is prohibited by law to be
used as evidence to prosecute him.

ii.

Suppose he refuses to answer, and for that reason, is

dismissed from the service, can he plausibly argue that
the Civil Service Commission has inferred his guilt from
his refusal to answer in violation of the Constitution?
No. The law clearly provides that refusal to testify is a ground for
dismissal. Thus, his dismissal is not on the ground of an inference
of guilt, but a clear disobedience of the law. No constitutional
right was violated because the law also provided that Ongs
testimony would not have been used in any proceedings against
him.

iii.

Suppose, on the other hand, he answers the question on

the basis of his answers, he is found guilty and is
dismissed. Can he plausibly assert that his dismissal is
based on coerced confession?
Yes. In such a case, the power of the lawwith the threat of
dismissalwas used precisely to coerce self-incriminating
testimony out of Ong.

65. 2000 BAR Q: A man was shot and killed and his killer fled.
Moments after the shooting, an eye-witness described to the police
that the slayer wore white pants, a shirt with floral design, had
boots and was about 70 kilos and 1.65 meters. Borja, who fit the
description given, was seen nearby. He was taken into custody and
brought to the police precinct where his pants, shirt and boots were
forcibly taken and he weighed, measured, photographed,
fingerprinted and subjected to paraffin testing. At his trial, Borja
objected to the admission in evidence of the apparel, his height and
weight, his photographs, fingerprints comparison and the results of
the paraffin test, asserting that these were taken in violation of his
right against self-incrimination. Rule on the objection.
Answer: The objection should be overruled. All information inferred from the
listed pieces of evidence do not partake of a communicative nature;
therefore, there is no testimonial compulsion. Various jurisprudence have
ruled that paraffin tests (People vs Gamboa, 25 Feb. 1991), mugshots
(People vs Gallarde, 17 Feb. 2000), fingerprinting, and seized personal
effects (People vs Malimit, 14 November 1996) are not covered by the right
against self-incrimination.

66. 2010 BAR Q: A, the wife of an alleged victim of enforced

disappearance, applied for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before
the RTC in Tarlac. Upon motion of A, the court issued inspection and
production orders addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff to allow entry
at Camp Aquino and permit the copying of relevant documents,
including the list of detainees, if any. Accompanied by a courtdesignated Commission on Human Right (CHR) lawyers, A took
photographs of a suspected isolation cell where her husband was
allegedly seen being held for three days and tortured before he
finally disappeared. The CHR lawyers requested one Lt. Valdez for a
photocopy of the master plan of Camp Aquino and to confirm in
writing that he had custody of the master plan. Lt. Valdez objected
on the ground that it may violate his right against selfincrimination. Decide with reasons.
Lt. Valdezs objection is untenable. The act of providing a photocopy of the
master-plan does not constitute testimonial evidence; thus, the act does not
partake of communicative nature which the right against self-incrimination
only covers. As for confirming custody of it in writing, the rule enunciated in
Beltran vs Samson is that a witness may be not required to furnish a sample
of his handwriting of it is tantamount to creating evidence against himself of

falsifying documents. In this case, however, the purpose was merely to

confirm Lt. Valdez to be the custodian of the master plan.

2011 BAR: [Page 160]

The right of the State to prosecute crimes by available evidence must yield
to the right of:
A.
B.
C.
D.

the accused against self-incrimination.

another State to extradite a fugitive from justice.
the State to deport undesirable aliens.
the complainant to drop the case against the accused.

2012 BAR: [Page 160]

The right of the accused against self-incrimination will be violated if:
A. he is charged with violation of the Anti-Money Laundering Act
and he was required to produce his bank passbook;
B. he is a public officer charged with amassing ill-gotten wealth and his
statement of assets and liabilities will be presented as evidence;
C. his gun was subjected to a ballistics test;
D. a sample of his blood was taken if his blood type matches the blood
type found at the scene of the crime.
2014 BAR: [Page 160]
Alienmae is a foreign tourist. She was asked certain questions in regard to a
complaint that was filed against her by someone who claimed to have been
defrauded by her. Alienmae answered all the questions asked, except in
regard to some matters in which she invoked her right against selfincrimination. When she was pressed to elucidate, she said that the
questions being asked might tend to elicit incriminating answers insofar as
her home state is concerned. Could Alienmae invoke the right against selfincrimination if the fear of incrimination is in regard to her foreign law?

Answer:
The US Supreme Court that absent immunity, one federal jurisdiction may
not compel a witness to give testimony that might incriminate him in a
second jurisdiction.1

However, the decisions in some of its circuit courts have ranged from
denying the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege under foreign law 2

1 Murphy v. Waterfront, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)

2 US v. (Under Seal) Araneta, the Fourth Circuit denied the Aranetas the protection
of the Fifth Amendments privilege against self-incrimination with regard to their
foreign law.

to extending the privilege if there is a reasonable fear of foreign

prosecution3.

1980 BAR: [Page 162]

D, a resident of Davao, borrowed PHP9,666.00 from E, his employer, a
resident of Manila. D agreed in writing that he would work as helper in the
house of E; that his account would be paid back to him at the rate of
PHP400.00 a month; and that in case D fails to pay in cash, he would
continue to render service as domestic helper in Es household. On the sixth
month, he requested to be allowed to leave Es service because he had a
better opportunity in Davao, salary-wise. E refused to release D from his
service and insisted on Ds compliance with his agreement even as D
promised to continue remitting from Davao the monthly amounts due until
his debt was fully paid. Evaluate the rights of the parties based on the
Constitution. Which of the conflicting rights should prevail?

Answer:
D is invoking his right to liberty, specifically the freedom to choose whom to
work for and where. E is invoking his right to property, or the right to collect
the sum of money he previously lent to D.

Ds right to liberty must prevail over Es right to property. In the hierarchy of

rights, the right to liberty is above that of property. Furthermore, Section 18,
Article III of the Constitution specifically provides that there shall be no
involuntary servitude unless as a punishment for a crime and the party has
been duly convicted. In the present problem, D was never convicted of a
crime of which he must be forced to render his services as punishment. As
such, the general rule that no involuntary servitude shall exist is applicable.
Ds rights must prevail over Es.

1986 BAR: [Page 162]

Mabagal, a court stenographer, transfers to the Far East Bank before she can
finish transcribing stenographic notes taken during the intestate proceedings
in the Cebu Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, where the RTC
decision was elevated, orders Mabagals arrest and detention for ignoring the
courts repeated orders to submit the transcript of stenographic notes.
Mabagal files a habeas corpus petition with the Supreme Court stating that
her small children are deprived of their mothers care and that she is being
subjected to involuntary servitude, never having been charged, tried, or
convicted of any crime. How would you resolve the petition? Explain.

3 Moses v. Allard(in re Moses), 799 F. Supp. 857, 970-83 (E.D. Mich. 1991), Yves
Farms, Inc. v. Rickett, 659 F. Supp. 932, 939-41 (M.D.Ga. 1987), etc.

Answer:
Her petition must fail. There is no involuntary servitude in the instant case.
Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory service of
one to another or the condition of one who is compelled by force, coercion,
or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor for another, whether he is paid
or not.4

The order of the CA compelling Mabagal to submit the transcript of

stenographic notes is an ancillary or incidental prerogative of the appellate
court in its appellate jurisdiction, is a part of its inherent powers which are
necessary to the ordinary and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction, and is
essential to the due administration of justice.

The traditional sanctions of a negligent stenographer are to hold her in

contempt or to imprison her until she obeys the order. The court may also
hold her resignation or clearance until she completes her transcription.

In the present case, despite Mabagals transfer to a private institution, she

remains to be a court stenographer with unfinished duties. As such, she is
still subject to Section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the Clerks order
to attach the copies of the transcript of the oral evidence on the record on
appeal. Hence, the court deemed it still proper to require her to submit her
transcribed stenographic notes.

Her habeas corpus petition must also fail because her detention was a
consequence of her disobedience of a lawful court order. Such detention is
lawful.

Section 19, Article III

Wilkins v. Gaddy, No. 08-10914

Feb. 22, 2010, 559 US __ (2010)

Issue: May the use of excessive physical force against a prisoner constitute
cruel and unusual punishment even when the inmate does not suffer serious
injury?

Ruling:

4 In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus. SEGIFREDO L. ACLARACION v.

Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-39115, May 26, 1975

Yes, the US Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the use of excessive
physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment even when the inmate does not suffer serious injury. The core
judicial inquiry, was not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained,
but rather whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. When
prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are violated whether or not
significant injury is evident. A contrary ruling would then result to the Eighth
Amendment permitting any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or
inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.
2012 Bar The death penalty shall not be imposed:
a) unless reasons penalty for compelling death the involving crimes and
executive hereafter provides for it;
b) unless reasons for compelling heinous involving crimes and a
constitutional amendment provides for it;
c) unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes and
Congress hereafter provides for it;
d) unless reasons crimes for compelling heinous Supreme involving and
the Court hereafter upholds it.
Answer: C, Equal Protection; Subsidiary Imprisonment
(1990) No. 4: "X" was sentenced to a penalty of 1 year and 5 months
of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of solvency. After serving his prison
term, "X" asked the Director of Prisons whether he could already be
released. "X" was asked to pay the fine of P5,000.00 and he said he
could not afford it, being an indigent. The Director informed him he
has to serve an additional prison term at the rate of one day per
eight pesos in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code,
The lawyer of "X" filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that
the further incarceration of his client for unpaid fines violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Decide.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) The petition should be granted, because Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code is unconstitutional. In Tate vs. Short, 401 U.S. 395, the United States
Supreme Court held that imposition of subsidiary imprisonment upon a
convict who is too poor to pay a fine violates equal protection, because
economic status cannot serve as a valid basis for distinguishing the duration
of the imprisonment between a convict who is able to pay the fine and a
convict who is unable to pay it.
(2) On the other hand, in United States ex rel. Privitera vs. Kross, 239 F Supp
118, it was held that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for inability
to pay a fine does not violate equal protection, because the punishment
should be tailored to fit the individual, and equal protection does not compel

the eradication of every disadvantage caused by indigence. The decision was

affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals in 345 F2d 533, and
the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in 382 U.S.
911. This ruling was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People vs.
Williams, 31 ALR3d 920.

G.R. No. 195032 February 20, 2013

Braza v. Sandiganbayan
Issue: Will there be double jeopardy if the first information charged an
offense different from that charged in the second information but both
charges arose from the same transaction?
Held: No. Braza cannot plausibly rely on the principle of double jeopardy to
avoid arraignment under the second information because the offense
charged therein is different and not included in the offense charged under
the first information.
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or
set of acts.33 Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is
forbidden is the prosecution for the same offense.
(Can be omitted) To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the accused
has the burden of demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as in the first.29 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.30 The test for the third element is
whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it
or a frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.

G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

Disini v. Secretary of Justice
Issue: Does Sec. 7 of the Cybercrime Law, insofar as online libel and child
pornography are concerned, violate the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy?
Held: Online Libel. Yes. If the published material on print, said to be libelous,
is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the
subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A.
10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the
same offense. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.

Child Pornography. Yes. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs scope so
as to include identical activities in cyberspace. ACPAs definition of child
pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

G.R. No. 179080, November 26, 2014

Geroche v. People
Issue: Can the accused who were charged with Violation of Domicile but
convicted with Less Serious Physical Injuries invoke double jeopardy if on
their appeal they were found guilty of Violation of Domicile?
Held: No. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question including one not raised by the parties. When an accused
appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render
such judgment as law and justice dictate. An appeal confers upon the
appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial courts judgment of conviction for
Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their
right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty
of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed
judgment.

Villareal vs People, GR 151258

FACTS: Accused are members of the Aquila Fraternity and in one of their
initiation rites held last February 9, 1991, a neophyte by the name of Lenny
Villa died as a result of the multiple traumatic injuries inflicted upon him.
ISSUE: Can the dismissal of the criminal case against Escalona, et. Al on
account of speedy trial be appealed or reconsidered without violating their
rights against double jeopardy? Can the completion by Tecson et al, of the
terms and conditions of their probation be annulled and reconsidered without
violating their rights against double jeopardy?
RULING:
We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona
et al. to speedy trial, the CAs dismissal of the criminal case against them
amounted to an acquittal, and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof
would result in a violation of their right against double jeopardy. Though we

have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where
there has been a grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is
convincingly established that the CAs Decision dismissing the case was
attended by whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness
thereof. Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and
lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified
offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right
to appeal. Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the
state or its government of any of the latters prerogatives, rights or
remedies.

People and AAA vs Carampatana, GR 183652

FACTS: Accused were convicted of raping AAA, but the judgment was
reversed by the CA, thus this appeal.

ISSUE: Can a judgment of acquittal be challenged on certiorari? Can it be

filed by the private respondent without the intervention of the Solicitor
General?
RULING: Judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment,
but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed
judgment null and void.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional
grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil
aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so
doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of
the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said
complainant.
1981 BAR
X was accused of Libel before the CFI in 1975. After the
arraignment, no further proceedings were had because of the
unavailability of prosecution witnesses. Finally, at the trial on
February 10, 1981, the complaining witnesses testified on direct
examination. However, on February 15, 1981, the day set for his

cross examination, the complainant failed to appear. The court

sustained the defenses objection to the postponement, dismissed
the case, but qualified the dismissal as provisional. The next day,
the Fiscal moved for reconsideration of the order if dismissal on the
ground that the complainant was not able to attend the trial
because he was delayed by the traffic. The court reconsidered the
order and reset the case for trial. Is the order reinstating the case
valid? Reason.
No, it is invalid. Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states that a
case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of
the accused and with notice to the offended party. The dismissal, without
his express consent, would bar the revival of the case based on the rule on
double jeopardy.
1986 BAR
Mabilis, charged with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, pleads Guilty and is accordingly convicted and
sentenced in open court. The following day, the Fiscal filed an
amended information for homicide through reckless imprudence
since it turns out that the victim died from his injuries three days
before Mabilis was arraigned and convicted. Defense counsel moved
to quash the amended information invoking double jeopardy. The
fiscal opposes the motion. Resolve the motion.
Doctrine of supervening event is "where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur. 66), the accused cannot
be said in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." That rule applies
to the present case where, after the first prosecution for a lesser crime, new
facts have supervened which together with those already in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, have made the offense graver and the penalty
first imposed legally inadequate.
1986 BAR
The Filipino seamen detained at Kota Kinabalu, allegedly fishing in
Malaysian territorial waters, had been acquitted, after trial by the
sessions court in the same city. They could not be released and
returned to the Philippines, because the prosecution had appealed
the judgment of acquittal to the Supreme Court of Malaysia. Assume
the situations had been reversed and a Malaysian had been
apprehended in Shasi, Sulu for an alleged offense, charged before
the RTC and after trial, acquitted. May the Province Fiscal of Sulu
appeal such judgments of acquittal to the Supreme Court, like what
the Malaysians did in the case of the Filipino seamen at Kota
Kinabalu. Explain your answer.
No, because it would place the accused in double jeopardy, contrary to Art.
III, sec. 21 of our Constitution. A judgment of acquittal in criminal
proceedings is final and unappealable whether it happens at the trial court
level or before the Court of Appeals. This right is guaranteed to aliens
(People v. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475)

1997 Bar The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila approved an ordinance

(No. 1000) prohibiting the operation in the streets within the city limits of
taxicab units over eight years old (from year of manufacture). The imposable
penalty for violation thereof is a fine of P4,000.00 or imprisonment for one
year upon the erring operator. Thereafter and while the city ordinance was
already in effect. Congress enacted a law (Republic Act No. 500) prohibiting
the operation in the streets of cities throughout the country of taxicab units
beyond ten years old. The imposable penalty for violation thereof is the same
as in Ordinance No. 1000. A, an owner/operator of a taxicab unit operating in
the City of Manila, was charged with violation of the city ordinance. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty; whereupon, trial was set five days
thereafter. For failure of the witnesses to appear at the trial, the City Court
dismissed the case against A. The City Prosecutor of Manila forthwith filed
another information in the same court charging A with violation of Republic
Act No. 500 for operating the taxicab unit subject of the information in the
first case. The accused moved to dismiss the second case against him
invoking double Jeopardy
Answer: If I were the judge, I would grant the motion. The dismissal of the
first case for failure of the witnesses to appear terminated the first jeopardy.
As held in Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54, the dismissal
of a case for failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear
constitutes an acquittal. The acquittal of A for violation of Ordinance No.
1000 bars his prosecution for violation of Republic Act No. 500. Under Section
21, Article in of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either bars another prosecution for
the same act.
2000 Bar Charged by Francisco with libel, Pablo was arraigned on January 3,
2000, Pre-trial was dispensed with and continuous trial was set for March 7, 8
and 9, 2000. On the first setting, the prosecution moved for its
postponement and cancellation of the other settings because its principal
and probably only witness, the private complainant Francisco, suddenly had
to go abroad to fulfill a professional commitment. The judge instead
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Would the reversal of the trial
court's assailed dismissal of the case place the accused in double jeopardy?
Answer: Since the postponement of the case would not violate the right of
the accused to speedy trial, the precipitate dismissal of the case is void. The
reversal of the dismissal will not place the accused in double Jeopardy. As
held In People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238 (1996). since the motion for
postponement was the first one requested, the need for the offended party
to attend to a professional commitment is a valid reason, no substantial right
of the accused would be prejudiced, and the prosecution should be afforded
a fair opportunity to prosecute its case, the motion should be granted.

2001 Bar For the death of Joey, Erning was charged with the crime of
homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. He was arraigned.
Due to numerous postponements of the scheduled hearings at the instance
of the prosecution, particularly based on the ground of unavailability of
prosecution witnesses who could not be found or located, the criminal case
was pending trial for a period of seven years. Upon motion of accused Erning
who invoked his right to speedy trial, the court dismissed the case.
Eventually, the prosecution witnesses surfaced, and a criminal case for
homicide, involving the same incident was filed anew against Erning.
Accused Erning moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of double
jeopardy. The prosecution objected, submitting the reason that it was not
able to present the said witnesses earlier because the latter went into hiding
out of fear. Resolve the motion.
Answer: The motion should be granted. As held in Caes us. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 54 (1989), the dismissal of a criminal case
predicated on the right of the accused to a speedy trial amounts to an
acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and bars his
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
2002 Bar A Tamaraw FX driven by Asiong Cascasero, who was drunk,
sideswiped a pedestrian along EDSA in Makati City, resulting in physical
injuries to the latter. The public prosecutor filed two separate information
against Cascasero, the first for reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, and the second for violation of an
ordinance of Makati City prohibiting and penalizing driving under the
influence of liquor. Cascasero was arraigned, tried and convicted for reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. With
regard to the second case (i.e., violation of the city ordinance), upon being
arraigned, he filed a motion to quash the information invoking his right
against double jeopardy. He contended that, under Art. III, Section 21 of the
Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act He argued that the two criminal charges against him stemmed
from the same act of driving allegedly under the influence of liquor which
caused the accident. Was there double jeopardy? Explain your answer
Answer 1: Yes, there is double jeopardy. Under the second sentence of
Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution, if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act. In this case, the same act is involved
in the two cases. The reckless imprudence which resulted in physical injuries
arose from the same act of driving under the influence of liquor. In Yap v.
Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959, the Supreme Court held that an
accused who was acquitted of driving recklessly in violation of an ordinance
could not be prosecuted for damage to property through reckless
imprudence because the two charges were based on the same act. In People
v, Relova, 148 SCRA 292 (1987), it was held that when there is identity in the
act punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall bar prosecution under the other.
Answer 2: There is no double jeopardy because the act penalized under the
Revised Penal Code is different from the act penalized by the ordinance of
Makati City. The Revised Penal Code penalizes reckless imprudence resulting

in physical injuries, while the ordinance of Makati City penalizes driving

under the influence of liquor.
2008 Bar JC, a major in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is facing
prosecution before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the murder of
his neighbor whom he suspected to have molested his (JC's) 15-year old
daughter. Assume that upon being arraigned, JC entered a plea of guilty and
was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. JC then
testified to the effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense because
the latter was strangling him and that he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities. Subsequently, the trial court rendered a decision acquitting JC.
Would an appeal by the prosecution from the decision of acquittal violate JC's
right against double jeopardy? Why or why not?
Answer: JC will not be placed in double jeopardy because he had no valid
plea. One of the requisites to constitute double jeopardy is that there must
be a valid plea. The fact that he was allowed to present evidence to prove
mitigating circumstances and he testified for an incomplete self-defense and
for a voluntary surrender to the authorities has the effect of vacating his plea
of guilt. Therefore, there was actually no standing plea for JC. As a
consequence, JC cannot invoke double when the prosecution appeal from his
judgment of acquittal.

Page 176
1. (2011 Bar) There is double jeopardy when the dismissal of the first case
is
(A) made at the instance of the accused invoking his right to fair trial.
(B) made upon motion of the accused without objection from the
prosecution.
(C) made provisionally without objection from the accused.
(D) based on the objection of the accused to the prosecution's
motion to postpone trial.
2. (2012 Bar) In which of the following would there be no double jeopardy
even if a subsequent case is filed?
a. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable
postponements against Pots wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of the
right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor objected. Dismissal granted;
b. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After
innumerable postponements against Pots wishes, the prosecutor
moves for dismissal with the consent of Pot. Granted;
c. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable
postponements against Pots wishes, he moves for dismissal for denial of the
right to a speedy trial. Prosecutor posts no objections. Dismissal granted;
d. Pot is accused before the RTC of qualified theft. After innumerable

postponements against Pots wishes, the prosecutor moves for dismissal

over the objections of Pot. Granted.
(2012 Bar) Butchoy installed a jumper cable. He was prosecuted under a
Makati ordinance penalizing such act. He moved for its dismissal on the
ground that the jumper cable was within the territorial jurisdiction of
Mandaluyong and not Makati. The case was dismissed. The City of
Mandaluyong thereafter filed a case against him for theft under the Revised
Penal Code (RCP). Is there double jeopardy?
a. No. The first jeopardy was terminated with his express consent;
b. Yes. This is double jeopardy of the second kind prosecution for the same
act under an ordinance and a law;
c. Yes. He is prosecuted for the same offense which has already been
dismissed by the City of Makati;
d. No. The second kind of double jeopardy under Section 21, Article
III only contemplates conviction or acquittal which could terminate a
first jeopardy.
Page 183.
3. Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
Issue: Is Sec. 20 of the Cybercrime Law a bill of attainder?
Held: No. The act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be
done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of
guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and
justifications for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid
insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down
by the Court.
4. (1982 Bar) A municipal ordinance required every municipal employee
every municipal employee, as a condition for continued employment, to take
an oath of loyalty which included an affirmation that during the period of (5)
years immediately preceding the effectivity of the ordinance. He had not
advocated or taught the overthrow of the government by force and that he
had not, during the said period belonged to any organization advocating or
teaching such doctrine. He challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance
on the ground that it is a bill of attainder. Is his contention tenable? Reason.
Answer: The municipal employer is not disabled because it is an agency of
the State from inquiring of its employees as to matters that may prove
relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service. Past conduct
may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable
relationship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into in
determining fitness for both high and low positions in private industry and
are not less relevant in public employment. While the amendment deprived
no one of employment with or without trial, yet from its effective date it
terminated any privilege to work for the city in the case of persons who
thereafter engaged in the activity proscribed. The ordinance would be ex
post facto if it imposed punishment for past conduct lawful at the time it was

engaged in. Bills of attainder are 'legislative acts that apply either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to
inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. Punishment is a
prerequisite. Whether legislative action curtailing a privilege previously
enjoyed amounts to punishment depends upon 'the circumstances attending
and the causes of the deprivation. We are unable to conclude that
punishment is imposed by a general regulation which merely provides
standards of qualification and eligibility for employment. (GARNER v. BOARD
OF PUBLIC WORKS OF LOS ANGELES)
5. (1987 Bar) Congress passed a law relating to officials and employees
who had served in the Government for the period from September 21, 1972
up to February 25, 1986. One provision of the law declared all officials from
the rank of assistant head of a department, bureau, office or agency "Unfit"
for continued service in the government and declared their respective
positions vacant. Is the provision valid? Why?
The law is a bill of attainder by which Congress, by assuming judicial
magistracy, in effect declares all officials and employees during martial law
(September 21, 1972- February 25, 1986) as disloyal and, on this basis,
removes some while subjecting others to a loyalty test. With respect to the
provision declaring positions vacant, even the power to reorganize cannot be
invoked because under the Freedom Constitution such power can be
exercised only by the President and only up to February 25, 1987. Since the
law under question was presumably passed after February 25, 1987 and by
Congress, it is unconstitutional.
[1988 BAR] Because of the marked increase in the incidence of labor strikes
and work stoppages in industrial establishments, Congress intending to help
promote industrial peace, passed, over the objections of militant labor
unions, an amendment to the Labor Code, providing that no person who is or
has been a member of the Communist Party may serve as officer of any
labor organization in the country. An association of former NPAs (New
Peoples Army) who had surrendered, availed of amnesty, and are presently
leading quiet and peaceful lives, comes to you asking what could be done
against the amendment. What would you advise the association to do?
Explain.

ANSWER: The disqualification of members of the CPP and its military

arm, the NPA, from being officers of a labor organization would (1)
nullify the amnesty granted by the President with the concurrence,
it may be assumed, of the majority of the members of Congress and
(2) permit the condemnation of the former NPA members without
judicial trial in a way that makes it contrary to the prohibition
against the enactment of bill of attainder and ex post facto law. The
amnesty granted to the former NPAs obliterated their offense and
relieved them of the punishment imposed by law. (Barrioquinto v.
Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 1949). The amendment would make them
guilty of an act, that of having been former members of the NPA, for
which they have already been forgiven by Presidential amnesty.

For these reasons, I would advise the association to work for the
veto of the bill and, if it is not vetoed but becomes a law, to
challenge it in court.

[2005 BAR] The Philippines and Australia entered into a Treaty of Extradition
concurred in by the Senate of the Philippines on September 10, 1990. Both
governments have notified each other that the requirements for the entry
into force of the Treaty have been complied with. It took effect in 1990. The
Australian government is requesting the Philippine government to extradite
its citizen, Gibson, who has committed in his country the indictable offense of
Obtaining Property by Deception in 1985. The said offense is among those
enumerated as extraditable in the Treaty. For his defense, Gibson asserts that
the retroactive application of the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post
facto law. Rule on Gibsons contention.

ANSWER: Gibsons contention is wrong. The prohibition against ex

post facto laws applies to penal laws only and does not apply to
extradition treaties. Extradition does not define crimes. It merely
provides a means by which a State may obtain the return and
punishment of a person charged with or convicted of having
committed a crime, who has fled the jurisdiction of the State whose
law has been violated. It was held that an extradition treaty applies
to crimes committed before its effectivity unless the extradition
treaty expressly exempts them. It is therefore immaterial whether
at the time of the commission of the crime for which extradition is
sought no treaty was in existence. If at the time extradition is
requested there is in force between the requesting and the
requested States a treaty covering the offense on which the request
is based, the treaty is applicable.

[2007 BAR] Lawrence is a Filipino computer expert based in Manila who

invented a virus that destroys all the files stored in a computer. Assume that
in May 2005, this virus spread all over the world and caused $50million in
damages to property in the United States, and that in June 2005, he was
criminally charged before United States courts under their anti-hacker law.
Assume that in July 2005, the Philippines adopted its own anti-hacker law, to
strengthen existing sanctions already provided against damage to property.
The United States has requested the Philippines to extradite him to US courts
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

(a) Is the Philippines under an obligation to extradite Lawrence? State the

rule and its rationale.

ANSREW: The Philippine is under no obligation to extradite

Lawrence. Under the principle of dual or double criminality, the
crime must be punishable in both the requesting and requested
states to make it extraditable. In this case, only the United States

had an anti-hacker law at the time of the commission of the crime in

May 2005. The rationale for the principle of dual criminality rests on
the basic principle of reciprocity and of the legal maxim nulla poena
sine lege.

(b) Assume that the extradition request was made after the Philippines
adopted its anti-hacker legislation. Will that change your answer?

ANSWER: No. The Philippines is still under no obligation to extradite

Lawrence. The rule is that the crime must be punishable in both
countries at the time of the commission of the offense. Since there
was yet no such crime in the Philippines at the time when the acts
complained of were done, in so far as the Philippines is concerned,
Lawrence did not commit any crime. Hence, an extradition of
Lawrence would tantamount to an ex post facto application of the
Philippine anti-hacker law, prohibited by Section 22, Article III of the
Constitution.

[2008 BAR] The Philippine National Police (PNP) issued a circular to all its
members directed at the style and length of male officers hair, sideburns
and moustaches, as well as the size of their waistlines. It prohibits beards,
goatees, and waistlines over 38 inches, except for medical reasons. Some
police officers questioned the validity of the circular, claiming that it violated
their right to liberty under the Constitution. Resolve the controversy.

ANSWER: Although the National Police is civilian in character, it

partakes of some of the characteristics of military life, thus
permitting the imposition of reasonable measures for discipline,
uniformity in behavior and presentableness. The circular does not
go beyond what is reasonable and therefore passes the test of due
process. It is the policy of the state to secure peace and order
through the PNP. Therefore, it is reasonable to require them to be
physically fit in order to secure peace and order in the community.
This is to boost the confidence of the public that they are not lazy
and they are doing their job with dedication.

[2012 BAR] An ex post facto law has been defined as one: _____.
(A) which aggravates a crime or makes it lesser than when it was committed;
(B) which mitigates a crime or makes it lesser than when it was committed;
(C) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed;
(D) which aggravates a crime or makes it non-criminal after it was
committed.

[2012 BAR] A bill of attainder is: _____.

(A) an executive act which inflicts punishment without tender;
(B) a judicial act which inflicts punishment without tender;
(C) a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial;
(D) a legislative act which pardons punishment after tender.