RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.

DOMAGTOY
A.M. No. MJT-96-1088
July 19, 1996
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge
solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is
merely separated from his first wife. It is also alleged that
he performed a marriage ceremony between
FlorianoDadorSumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigaodel Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some
40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigaodel Norte.
Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte,
Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy
for exhibiting gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of
gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have
acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles
applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated; prompting us to
conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due
to a lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary
should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are
at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled
and competent in understanding and applying the law. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not
too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors
committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
ArlynBorga is considered bigamous and void, there being
a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida
Pearanda. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a sixmonth suspension and a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore
void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said

recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more

circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.

Pugeda vs Trias, G.R. No. L-16925, July 24, 1962

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16925 July 24, 1962
FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD
TRIAS, assisted by her husband ANGEL SANCHEZ,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband
VICTORIANO SALVADOR,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA
VINIEGRA and FERNANDO VINIEGRA,
JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem,
RAFAEL TRIAS, TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA
PUGEDA, assisted by her husband RAMON
PORTUGAL, defendants-appellants.
Placido C. Ramos and Fortunato Jose for plaintiffappellee.
Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants Teofilo
Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.
Jose T. Cajulis, Miguel F. Trias and Carlos T. Viniegra for all
other defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
LABRADOR, J.:
This resolution concerns a motion for the reconsideration
of the decision rendered by this Court. The main
argument in support of the motion is that the lots not
fully paid for at the time of the death of Miguel Trias,
which lots were, by provision of the Friar Lands Act (Act
No. 1120), subsequently transferred to the widow's name
and later paid for by her out of the proceeds of the fruits
of the lands purchased, and for which titles were issued
in the name of the widow, belong to the latter as her
exclusive paraphernal properties, and are not conjugal
properties of her deceased husband and herself. In our
decision we laid down the rule that upon the issuance of
a certificate of sale to the husband of a lot in a friar lands
estate, purchased by the Government from the friars, the
land becomes the property of the husband and the wife,
and the fact that the certificate of sale is thereafter
transferred to the wife does not change the status of the
property so purchased as conjugal property of the
deceased husband and wife. The reason for this ruling is
the provision of the Civil Code to the effect that
properties acquired by husband and wife are conjugal
properties. (Art. 1401, Civil Code of Spain). The provision
of the Friar Lands Act to the effect that upon the death of
the husband the certificate of sale is transferred to the
name of the wife is merely an administrative device
designed to facilitate the documentation of the

transaction and the collection of installments; it does not

produce the effect of destroying the character as
conjugal property of the lands purchased. Hence, the
issuance of the title, after completion of the installments,
in the name of the widow does not make the friar lands
purchased her own paraphernal property. The said lands,
notwithstanding a certificate of sale, continue to be the
conjugal property of her deceased husband and herself.
The case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654, cited by
the movants, is not applicable to the case at bar because
it refers to the superior rights of the widow recognized in
Section 16 of Act No. 1120 over transfers made by the
husband which have not been approved by the Director
of Lands. As a matter of fact the syllabus in said case is
as follows:
Widow's rights. The widow of a holder of a certificate
of sale of friar lands acquired by the Government has an
exclusive right to said lands and their fruits from her
husband's death, provided that the deceased has not
conveyed them to another during his lifetime and she
fulfills the requirements prescribed by the law for the
purchase of the same.
A minor ground for the reconsideration is that the
decision of Judge Lucero, having been set aside by
the Court of Appeals, could not be affirmed by Us. The
setting aside of the said decision was due to the fact that
newly discovered evidence was found regarding the
partition of the estate of the deceased. The setting aside
of the decision was not aimed or directed at the judge's
ruling that the properties acquired by the husband during
his lifetime from the friar lands estate were conjugal
properties of the husband and the wife..
The third ground raised is that the lots were never
partitioned as conjugal assets of Mariano Trias and Maria
C. Ferrer. One of the arguments adduced in favor of the
claim of the movants that the properties in question,
which were acquired during the lifetime of Mariano Trias,
were never partitioned is that, according to the records
of the Register of Deeds and according to the friar lands
agents, the alleged partition of the said properties as
conjugal properties of the deceased Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer had not been registered in said offices.
The failure to make the registrationis perhaps due to the
neglect the heirs. The fact, however, remains that the
exhibits presented in Court, especially Exhibit "3-Trias"
and Annex "E", which are the project of partition and the
approval thereof, cannot be ignored by this Court. The
neglect of the parties in not actually partitioning the
properties do not argue in favor of the fact that partition
was not a actually decreed. Adjudications may be
made pro indiviso without actual division or partition of
the properties among the heirs.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby

denied and the judgment rendered declared final. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and
Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
took no part.

Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in

1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in
1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was
granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground
of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they
prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the

decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in unions without marriage. During

the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint

affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be

based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,

regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family.