REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

TAMANI CASE
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for
new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the defendant or his attorney.
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a
copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not welltaken. The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" (see
section 6 of Rule 120), while the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That
construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each;
referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let each be put in its proper
place, that is, the words should be taken distributively" (76 C. J. S. 175).

VERBAL OR CLERICAL ERRORS

LAMBS vs PHIPPS CASE
Our attention has been called to what appears to be a typographical error in the wording of
section 222 of Act No. 190. That section reads in part as follows:
When the complaint in an action in a Court of First Instance alleges that any inferior
tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . and
the court, on trial, finds the allegations of the complaint to be true, it may, if there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law, . . . .
It is asserted that the phrase "courts of law" should read "course of law." Many of the provisions of
said Act No. 190 were copied verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. Section
222 of Act No. 190 was taken from section 1085 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The
section of the California Code reads "course of law," instead of "courts of law." We believe that a
mistake or error has been made in the printing of said section. We believe that it was the intention
of the legislative department of the government to follow exactly the provision of the California
Code and that they intended to use the phrase "course of law" and not "courts of law." It will be
noted in section 226, the section relating to the writ of prohibition, the legislature used the phrase
"course of law." An examination of the Spanish translation of said section (222) more clearly
indicates what the legislative department of the government intended. In spanish the other
remedy is not limited to the ordinary "courts of law." We are permitted under Act No. 63 as
amended by Act No. 1788 to refer to the Spanish text, for the purpose of explaining the English
text. Act No. 1788 provides:
In the construction of all Acts or laws which may be enacted by the Philippine Legislature,
the English text shall govern, except that in obvious cases of ambiguity, omission, or
mistake the Spanish text may be consulted to explain the English text.

We cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of this court in mandamus
to the cases where there was no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law.
It is our duty, therefore, to give the statute a sensible construction; such as will effectuate the
legislative intention and, if possible, avoid an injustice or an absurd conclusion (Lau Ow Bew vs.
U. S., 144 U. S., 47, 59). Clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the
statute unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will not vitiate
the act; they will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true
meaning is obvious, and the real meaning of the legislature is apparent of the face of the whole
enactment. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 77; Lancaster, vs. Frey, 128 Pa., 593; Lancaster
County vs. City of Lancaster, 160 Pa., 411.)

PP vs DUQUE CASE
FACTS: The evidence in chief of the prosecution consisted principally of the testimony of the
following witnesses: Agustin Ulat, Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco. Their
testimonies were summarized in the trial court's decision as follows:
. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was invited by the accused to
his house in Calamba, Laguna. Thereat accused informed him that he was
recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was interested in getting (sic) him.
Accused likewise presented to him that he (accused) was a licensed recruiter
(TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told him to secure his birth certificate,
an NBI clearance and medical certificate. He was able to secure an NBI
clearance which he showed to the accused. The latter thereafter told him that he
would secure the rest of his papers like passport, visa and medical certificate for
him and for this, accused asked him to prepare the amount of P20,000.00. He
did not have that money, so he mortgaged his lot for P20,000.00 to the cousin of
the accused, Socorro Arlata. He immediately gave this amount to the accused
who assured him that he would be able to leave within two months. The accused
did not issue a receipt for that amount despite his request. He did not persist in
asking the accused because he trusted him, accused coming from an affluent
family and a member of a well-known Catholic organization, the "Cursillo" (TSN,
22 Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9). However, accused failed to employ him at Saudi Arabia
within two months despite repeated promise (sic) to do so. Thus, he demanded
the return of his money but accused failed. Finally, he decided, together with the
other complainants, to file a complaint against accused before the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). . . .
Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco individually testified to
the following: sometime also in January 1986, they went to the house of accused
for work abroad as the latter had earlier told them that he was recruiting workers
for the Saudi Arabia. The accused asked money to process their papers. Alcaraz
was able to give the accused on 22 February 1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but
the accused failed to issue him a receipt and he did not persist in asking for it
because he trusted the accused on (TSN, 5 Nov. 1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida was
able to give the accused on 18 Feb. 1986, the amount of P7,000.00 as
placement fee for which the accused did not issue a receipt although he
promised to issue one the next day. However, the following day, when he
reminded the accused of the receipt, he refused saying that he (Desepida)
should trust [the accused]. Francisco was able to give the accused P9,000.00 on
21 February 1986 in the presence of the other applicants (TSN, 26 Nov. 1990, p.
5). But, the accused again failed to issue a receipt despite demand. She was told
by the accused to trust him (Ibid., p. 6). However, the accused failed to return

their money notwithstanding. Thus, all of them decided to file a complaint with the
POEA against the accused. There, they executed a joint affidavit (Exh. "A"). 2
EXPLANATION: Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A
literal reading of Section 2 appears to suggest that two (2) elements must coincide for the
beginning of the running of the prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of the
commission of the violation of the special law; and second, the "institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment." It is then argued by appellant that because the co-existence
of these two (2) requirements is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the relevant
prescriptive period would never begin to run.
Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the literal reading that
appellant suggests, does not benefit appellant, for the prescriptive period in the case at bar had
not in any case been exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few months
after the POEA and the complainants had discovered that appellant had no governmental
authority to recruit for overseas work and was merely pretending to recruit workers for overseas
employment and to receive money therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to locate
employment abroad for complainants. Secondly, we do not think there is any real need for such a
literal reading of Section 2. As is well-known, initiation of proceedings for preliminary investigation
of the offense normally marks the interruption of the period of prescription. Under appellant
Duque's literal reading, the prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by the same
occurrence; the net effect would be that the prescription period would not have effectively begun,
having been rendered academic by the simultaneous interruption of that same period. A statute
providing for prescription of defined criminal offenses is more than a statute of repose and
constitutes an act of grace by which the State, after the lapse of a certain period of time,
surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act. A statute on prescription of crimes is
an act of liberality on the part of the State in favor of the offender. 5 The applicable well-known
principles of statutory interpretation are that statutes must be construed in such a way as to give
effect to the intention of the legislative authority, 6 and so as to give a sensible meaning to the
language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd results, 7 departing to the extent
unavoidable from the literal language of the statute. Appellant's literal reading would make
nonsense of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment"
may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until."
Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;
or as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
(Emphasis supplied)
We believe and so hold that the applicable prescriptive period in the case at bar began to run
from the time the recruitment activities of appellant Duque were ascertained by the complainants
and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government.
The discovery by the complainants and by the POEA was, as a practical matter, simultaneous in
character and occurred sometime in December 1989 when the complainants went to the POEA
with the complaint for recovery of the placement fees and expenses they had paid to appellant
Duque, and the POEA, acting upon that complaint, discovered and informed the private

complainants that Duque had operated as a recruiter without the essential government license or
authority. Accordingly, the offense of illegal recruitment had not prescribed when the complaint
was filed with the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was filed
in court in May 1990

SHALL AND MAY // MANDATORY AND PERMISSIVE

DIOKNO vs REHABILITATION FINANCE CORP CASE
FACTS: Plaintiff is the holder of a backpay certificate of indebtedness issued by the Treasurer of
the Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304 of a face value of P75,857.14 dated
August 30, 1948. On or about November 10, 1050, when the action was brought, he had an
outstanding loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, contracted therewith on January 27,
1950, in the total sum of P50,000, covered by a mortgage on his property situated at 44
Alhambra, Ermita, Manila, with interest at 4 per cent per annum, of which P47,355.28 was still
unpaid. In this action he seeks to compel the defendant corporation to accept payment of the
balance of his indebted with his backpay certificate. The defendant resists the suit on the ground
that plaintiffs' demand is not only not authorized by section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 but contrary
to the provisions thereof, and furthermore because plaintiff's loan was obtain on January 27,
1950, much after the passage of Republic Act No. 304, and because the law permits only
"acceptance or discount of backpay certificates," not the repayment of loans. The court a quo
held that section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 is permissive merely, and that even if where
mandatory, plaintiff's case can not fall thereunder because he is not acquiring property for a home
or construing a residential house, but compelling the acceptance of his backpay certificate to pay
a debt he contracted after the enactment of Republic Act No. 304. It, therefore, dismissed the
complaint with costs.
EXPLANATION: The appeal involves the interpretation of section 2 of Republic Act No. 304,
which provides:
. . . And provided, also, That investment funds or banks or other financial institutions
owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to the availability of loanable funds,
and any provision of the their charters, articles of incorporation's, by-laws, or rules and
regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, accept or discount at not more than two per
centum per annum for ten years such certificate for the following purposes only: (1) the
acquisition of real property for use as the applicant's home, or (2) the building or
construction of the residential house of the payee of said certificate: . . .
It is first contended by the appellant that the above provision is mandatory, not only because it
employs the word "shall", which in its ordinary signification is mandatory, not permissive, but also
because the provision is applicable to institutions of credit under the control of the Government,
and because otherwise the phrases "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "any provisions
of this charter, . . . and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding" would be superfluous.
It is true that its ordinary signification the word "shall" is imperative.
In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary signification, the term "shall" is a
word of command, and one which has always or which must be given compulsory
meaning; as denoting obligation. It has a preemptory meaning, and it is generally
imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or when
addressed to public officials, or where a public interest is involved, or where the public or

persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent
appears. People vs. O'Rourke, 13 P. 2d. 989, 992, 124 Cal. App. 752. (39 Words and
Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 90.)
The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used is an imperative, and not in a
directory, sense. If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the
character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different meaning.
Haythorn vs. Van Keuren & Son, 74 A. 502, 504, 79 N. J. L. 101; Board of Finance of
School City of Aurora vs. People's Nat. Bank of Lawrenceburg, 89 N. E. 904, 905 44 Ind.
App. 578. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 93.)
However, the rule is not absolute; it may be construed as "many", when so required by the
context or by the intention of the statute.
In the ordinary signification, "shall" is imperative, and not permissive, though it may have
the latter meaning when required by the context. Town of Milton vs. Cook, 138 N.E. 589,
590, 244 Mass. 93. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 89.)
"Must" or "shall" in a statute is not always imperative, but may be consistent with an
exercise of discretion. In re O'Hara, 82 N.Y.S. 293, 296, 40 Misc. 355, citing In re
Thurber's Estate, 162 N.Y. 244, 252, 56 N.E. 638, 639. (Ibid. p. 92.)
The word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative, but in some context it is given a
permissive meaning, the intended meaning being determined by what is intended by the
statute. National Transit Corporation Co. vs. Boardman, 197 A. 239, 241, 328, Pa. 450.
The word "shall" is to be construed as merely permissive, where no public benefit or
private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning Sheldon vs. Sheldon, 134 A.
904, 905, 100 N.J. Ex. 24.
Presumption is that word "shall" in ordinance, is mandatory; but, where it is necessary to
give effect to legislative intent, the word will be construed as "may." City of Colorado
Springs vs. Street, 254 p. 440, 441, 81 Colo. 181.
The word "shall" does not necessarily indicate a mandatory behest. Grimsrud vs.
Johnson, 202 N. W. 72, 73, 162 Minn. 98.
Words like "may," "must," "shall" etc., are constantly used in statutes without intending
that they shall be taken literally, and in their construction the object evidently designed to
be reached limits and controls the literal import of the terms and phrases employed.
Fields vs. United States, 27 App. D. C. 433, 440. (39 Words and Phrases, Permanent
Ed., 89, 92).
In this jurisdiction the tendency has been to interpret the word "shall" as the context or a
reasonable construction of the statute in which it is used demands or requires. Thus the provision
of section 11 of Rule 4 of the Rules requiring a municipal judge or a justice of the peace to render
judgment of the conclusion of the trial has been held in the directory. (Alejandro vs. Judge of First
Instance1 40 Off. Gaz., 9th Supp., 261). In like manner section 178 of the Election Law, in so far a
it requires that appeals shall be decided in three months, has been to the directory for the Court
of Appeals. (Querubin vs. The Court of Appeals,2 46 Off. Gaz., 155).
In the provision subject controversy, it is to be noted that the verb-phrase "shall accept or
discount" has two modifiers, namely, "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "at not more

that two per centum per annum for ten years." As to the second modifier, the interest to be
charged, there seems to be no question that the verb phrase is mandatory, because not only
does the law use "at not more" but the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the
backpay certificate for the benefit of the holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued,
can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. But as to when the discounting or
acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. The
phrase "subject" means "being under the contingency of" (Webster's Int. Dict.) a condition. If the
acceptance or discount of the certificates to be "subject" to the condition of the availability of a
loanable funds, it is evident that the Legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on
the condition that there are "available loanable funds." In other words, acceptance or discount is
to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.

MCGEE vs REPUBLIC CASE

FACTS: Appellee Clyde E. McGee, an American citizen is married to Leonardo S. Crisostomo by
whom he has one child. The minors Maria and Amada, both surnamed Magpayo are Leonarda's
children by her first husband Ernesto Magpayo who was killed by the Japanese during the
occupation. McGee filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to adopt his two minor
step-children Maria and Amada.
At the hearing, the Government filed its opposition to the petition on the ground that petitioner has
a legitimate child and consequently, is disqualified to adopt under article 335, paragraph 1, of the
new Civil Code which provides:
ART. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction;
ART. 338. The following may be adopted:
(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.
EXPLANATION: Another possible reason for the insertion of section 766 in the Code of Civil
Procedure and article 338, paragraph 3, in the new Civil Code, authorizing the adoption of a stepchild by the step-father or step-mother is that without said express legal sanction, there might be
some doubt as to the propriety and advisability of said adoption due to the possibility, if not
probability, of pressure brought to bear upon the adopting step-father or mother by the legitimate
and natural parent.
One additional reason for holding that article 338 of the new Civil Code should be subordinated
and made subject to the provisions of article 335 so as to limit the permission to adopt granted in
article 338, to parents who have no children of their own, is that the terms of article 335 are
phrased in a negative manner the following cannot be adopted, while the phraseology of
article 338 is only affirmative the following may be adopted. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory.
. . . negative (prohibitory and exclusive words or terms are indicative of the legislative
intent that the statute is to be mandatory, . . . (Crawford, Statutory Construction, sec. 263,
p. 523.)

Ordinarily ... the word "may" is directory, . . . (Crawford, op. cit., sec. 262, p. 519.)
Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, or, as it has been aptly
stated, there is but one way to obey the command "thou shalt not", and that is to
completely refrain from doing the forbidden act. And this is so, even though the statute
provides no penalty for disobedience. (Crawford, op. cit., sec. 263, p. 523.)
The principal reason behind article 335, paragraph 1 denying adoption to those who already have
children is that adoption would not only create conflicts within the family but it would also
materially affect or diminish the successional rights of the child already had. This objection may
not appear as formidable and real when the child had by the adopting parent is by the very
spouse whose child is to be adopted, because in that case, the legitimate child and the adopted
one would be half-brothers or half-sisters, would not be total strangers to each other, and the
blood relationship though half may soften and absorb the loss of successional rights and the
possible diminution of the attention and affection previously enjoyed. But as not infrequently
happens, the step-father or step-mother adopting a child of his or her second wife or husband
already may have a child of his or her own by a previous marriage, in which case, said child and
the adopted one would be complete strangers to each other, with no family ties whatsoever to
bind them, in which event, there would be nothing to soften and reconcile the objection and
resentment, natural to the legitimate child.

BERSABAL vs SALVADOR CASE

FACTS: It appears that private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment suit,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6926 in the City Court of Caloocan City, against the petitioner. A
decision was rendered by said Court on November 25, 1970, which decision was appealed by the
petitioner to the respondent Court and docketed therein as Civil Case No. C-2036.
During the pendency of the appeal the respondent court issued on March 23, 1971 an order
which reads:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6031, the Clerk of Court of Caloocan
City, is hereby directed to transmit to this Court within fifteen (15) days from
receipt hereof the transcripts of stenographic notes taken down during the
hearing of this case before the City Court of Caloocan City, and likewise,
counsels for both parties are given thirty (30) days from receipt of this order
within which to file their respective memoranda, and thereafter, this case shall be
deemed submitted for decision by this Court.
which order was apparently received by petitioner on April 17, 1971.
The transcript of stenographic notes not having yet been forwarded to the respondent court,
petitioner filed on May 5, 1971 a 'MOTION EX-PARTE TO SUBMIT MEMORANDUM WITHIN 30
DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES TAKEN DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE BEFORE THE CITY
COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY' which was granted by respondent court on May 7, 1971.
However, before the petitioner could receive any such notice from the respondent court, the
respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1971 which says:
For failure of the defendant-appellant to prosecute her appeal the same is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against her.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on September 28, 1971, citing as a
ground the granting of his ex-parte motion to submit memorandum within 30 days from notice of
the submission of the stenographic notes taken before the City Court. Private respondents filed
their opposition to the motion on September 30,1971. In the meantime, on October 20,1971,
petitioner filed her memorandum dated October 18, 1971. On October 30, 1971 the respondent
Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Then on January 25, 1972, petitioner filed a motion
for leave to file second motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent
court on March 15, 1972. Hence this petition.
EXPLANATION: The second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296, otherwise known as the
Philippine Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows:
Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the
evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided,
That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so
requested ... . (Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise
than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on
the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a
logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the
party waiving the submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit the
memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. In other words,
the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to
submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court's mandatory duty to decide the case on the
basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it.
As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to
confer discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced (Dizon vs. Encarnacion, L-18615, Dec. 24, 1963, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717). The
implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda
and/or brief with oral argument duly submitted and/or made on request.

FULE vs CA CASE
FACTS: a) That this Court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of this case;
b) That the accused was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation on or before
January 21, 1981;
c) That on January 21, 1981, the accused issued and made out check No. 26741, dated
January 24, 1981 in the sum of P2,541.05;
d) That the said check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness, Roy Nadera;
e) That the check was drawn in favor of the complaining witness in remittance of
collection;

f) That the said check was presented for payment on January 24, 1981 but the same was
dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed;
g) That the accused Manolo Fule has been properly Identified as the accused party in this
case.
At the hearing of August 23, 1985, only the prosecution presented its evidence consisting of
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C." At the subsequent hearing on September 17, 1985, petitioner-appellant
waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a Memorandum confirming
the Stipulation of Facts. The Trial Court convicted petitioner-appellant.
On appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the judgment
of conviction. 1

EXPLANATION: The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1,
1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission
made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against
the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. (Rule
118) [Emphasis supplied]
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative
words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory (McGee vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 [1954]). The use of the term "shall" further
emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty
which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador, No. L-35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176). And
more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by
consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused (People vs. Terrado No. L-23625, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648).
The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in
evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation
of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to
sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the
accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to
establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the
accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt
of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt.

2 OR MORE CONSTRUCTIONS

TYSUE vs HORD
FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting a
judgment upon the pleadings in favor of the plaintiffs for the recovery of P4,485.88, paid by the to
the Collector of Internal Revenue under protest as an internal revenue tax upon opium which the
plaintiffs, as importers, had in their possession on April 1, 1906, when the Opium Law, No. 1461,
went into effect, and which thereafter withdrawn to be prepared for commercial use. The tax at
the rate of P2.50 a kilo laid upon the crude drug had already been paid and the sum sued for this
amount of the additional withdrawal tax at the rate of P5 a kilo. The court below held that crude
opium in the hands of dealers at the time the Act went into effect was not subject to this additional
duty when matter is regulated by section 20 of Act No. 1461, which reads:
SEC. 20 (a) Before imported crude opium or imported prepared opium in any of its forms
shall be released from the custom-house, there shall be paid thereon an internalrevenue tax as follows: On the crude opium two pesos and fifty centavos a kilo, net
weight; and on prepared opium seven pesos and fifty centavos a kilo, net weight. This tax
shall be paid to the Collector of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the head of the
proper department.
Before any crude opium which is in the Philippine Islands at the time this Act shall
become effective is cooked or prepared for sale or for human consumption or use, every
wholesale dealer shall pay on such crude opium to the Collector of Internal Revenue, or
his duly authorized representative, an internal-revenue tax of two pesos and fifty
centavos per kilo, net weight. On opium cooked or prepared in the Philippine Islands for
sale or for human consumption are use, every wholesale dealer shall pay on the removal
or withdrawal of such opium from the place in which it is lawfully kept or stored, to the
Collector of Internal Revenue, or his duly authorized representative, an internationalrevenue tax of five pesos on each kilo, net weight. The burden of proving that the internal
revenue tax hereby imposed has been paid is imposed on the whole sale dealer:
Provided, however, That no tax shall be paid on opium removed or withdrawn for
exportation and actually exported and not relanded in the Philippine Islands.
All opium in the possession, or under the control, or subject to the order or disposition of
any retail dealer at the time this Act becomes effective on which the internal revenue tax
provided by this Act has not been paid by a whole sale dealer, shall be subject to such
tax, and said retail dealer, shall pay on such opium before manufacture, sale,
consumption, or use thereof, an internal revenue tax, as follows: Crude opium, two pesos
and fifty centavos for each kilo, net weight; cooked or prepared opium, or opium,
prepared for human consumption or use, five pesos for each kilo, net weight. The burden
of proving that such internal revenue tax has been duly paid is hereby imposed on the
retail dealer. Net weight shall be determined by the customs rules and regulations
covering the importation of opium into the Philippine Islands.

EXPLANATION: We do not think this consequence follows the construction of the Act contended
for by the Government, which is to the effect that the other provisions of the Act reach all classes
of opium whether crude or prepared, and whether in the hands of wholesalers prepared either
before or after the law went into effect, that it is reasonable, therefore, to infer that this section
was designed to reach both of these classes otherwise untouched rather than only one of them
and that this purpose is fully met by the natural interpolation of any understood phrase, inasmuch
as the words "opium cooked or prepared in the Philippine Islands for sale or for human
consumption or use" naturally apply to the cooking or preparation without respect to a particular
date.

It is further urged that the inequality resulting from this construction is much less that which would
follow from subjecting cooked opium, imported as such. to a tax of P7.50 and the similar article,
imported as such, to a tax of P2.50 without the additional P5, there existing no reason for such a
wide difference in the duty upon the two classes of cooked opium which is of the same quality, is
destined to the same use and is of equal commercial value.
In the interpretation of this as well as of some other sections of the opium law it is impossible to
satisfactorily harmonize its complicated and sometimes perplexing provisions so that it becomes
the duty of the courts to choose between conflicting theories that which best accords with the
letter of the law and with its purpose. In the construction of the paragraph of section 20 under
discussion, we are satisfied that the weight of argument both as to the natural interpretation of the
words of the law and as to its reasonable effect lies with the Government,

US vs TORIBIO CASE
FACTS: t appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under
such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are
as follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before issuing
the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal
treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of
ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit,
and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership
of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in
no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any kind which is not
fit for human consumption.
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued
by him, and such record shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class,
sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and
other marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and
the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically
arranged in the record, together with date of permit.
A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the
provincial treasurer, who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the
owner, together with date of permit.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption
or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit
duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten
nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less
than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the
prohibition contained in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter
of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that
the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the
prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in
that municipality.

EXPLANATION: Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more

constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the
statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of
opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit
provided for in section 30.
It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the
"killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this
prohibition is clearly included in the general prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human
consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the requirement for the issue of a permit in
such cases was expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of precaution, and
to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be
disposed to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or
regulations for the control of municipal slaughterhouse.
Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same
conclusion. One of the secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the
slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for
human consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and penalties prescribed in
the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and
unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the
purpose and object of the legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the
statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already indicated, the language of the statute is
clearly susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends to make
effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.