The Italian Military Enigma

4/8/2015
TheItalianMilitaryEnigma
WhitePapers
Magazines
SubscribeNow!
SignIn
JobOpportunities
Home::Military::Library::Reports::1988::
MILITARY
CSC1988
SUBJECTAREAGeneral
THEITALIANMILITARYENIGMA
EricG.Hansen
Major,USMC
2May1988
CommandandStaffCollege
EducationCenter
MarineCorpsCombatDevelopmentCommand
Quantico,Virginia22134
FurtherReading
Title:TheItalianMilitaryEnigma
Author:MajorEricG.Hansen,U.S.MarineCorps
Date:2May1988
Italyasanationisfamousfor,amongotherthings,itsart,
fashion,racingcarsandbeautifulwomen.Throughoutitshistory
greatgeniusesfromdaVincitoMarconihavecontributed
immeasurablytothewellbeingofmankind.FromItaliansoil
haveemergedgreatRomanlegionsandmilitarygiantssuchas
Napolean,MachiavelliandGaribaldimenwhohaveshapedthevery
courseofhistory.
Inviewofthisgreatculturalandmilitaryheritage,oneof
thegreatenigmas,atleasttothecasualstudentofmilitary
history,isthatofmodernItaly'sfailuretoproduceamilitary
systemcapableofeffectivelyprojectingthecountry'snational
policy.Butmorethanthat,whyisitthatItaly,amongall
thosecountrieswhichhavebeenrelativelyunsuccessful
militarily,beensingledoutasbeingparticularlyinept?Has
thisjudgmentbeenpassedjustbyAmericanswhobasetheirviews
onhearsay,badjokesandshallowknowledge,orisitalsoshared
byothercountrieswhobasetheircriticismonthehardfactsof
history?
Inreality,oneisnotjustifiedinmakingadefinitive
judgmentofanythingimportantwithouthavingdelvedintothe
factsofthematter.Thisseminarwillthereforeexaminethe
Italianmilitarysystemfromitsinceptioninthemid1800sunder
aunifiedgovernmenttoitspresentstatusasanimportantNATO
ally.Tothatend,analysesandopinionsofforeignaswellas
domesticItalianwriterswillbeincludedinthisseminarto
provideabroadbaseofstudy.Politicalandsocialinfluences
willbeaddressedinanattempttodeterminetheireffecton
Italianmilitaryperformance.
Perhapsthemostimportantaspectofthisseminarwillbeto
determineifItalyhaslearnedfromitspastmistakesandhas
correctedperceivedandactualdeficiencies.Alongwiththe
purposeofbroadeningthemilitaryofficer'scapabilitythrough
thestudyofanimportanthistory,thisseminarwillmakea
judgmentastoItaly'scurrentcapabilityofassistinginthe
defenseofNATO'ssouthernflank.
TABLEOFCONTENTS
CHAPTERTITLEPAGE
Introduction2
IThe19thCenturyandItaly'sUnification8
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/HEG.htm
1/51
4/8/2015
IIItalyEntersWorldWarI17
IIIItalySeeksHerNationalIdentityUnder
Mussolini:TheTragedyofWorldWarII39
IVOperationsInNorthAfrica57
VNeartheEnd71
VIConclusion80
Endnotes87
Bibliography90
INTRODUCTION
Throughouthistory,Italyhasheldgreatfascinationboth
foritswouldbeconquerorsanditsinnocuoustourists.Its
importantgeographiclocationintheMediterraneanhasmadeita
targetofinvadingarmiessincethebeginningofrecorded
history.Infact,Italianlanguageetymologyreadilyidentifies
theinfluencethattheseoccupyingforeigncultureshaveexerted
onmoderndayspeech.However,tostudyItalianlinguisticsis
notthepurposeofthispaper,butrathertodeterminewhy,in
lightofitsparticularlystrategiclocation,Italyfailedto
produceamodernmilitarysystem(atleastfromthemidl800s
throughWorldWarII)whichwascapableofachievingits
governmentsforeignpolicieswhentheresorttoforcerequired
it.Andwhy,amongallthosecountrieswhichhavebeen
relativelyunsuccessfulmilitarily,hasItalybeensingledoutas
beingparticularlyinept?.
TheItalianmilitaryhas,infact,beenthesubjectof
historians'criticism,pastallies'irritationandcurrent
Americanhumor.Eventhosewhoknowverylittleaboutmilitary
historycanreadilyproduceajokedealingwithsomeaspectof
Italianmilitaryinability.Thereiscommonreference,for
example,toItaliantankswhichhaveoneforwardandthree
reversegears,ortousedItalianmilitaryriflesforsalewhich
have"beendroppedonlyonce".Ethnicjokesare,ofcourse,
common,arenottoldmaliciously,andmanyareadmittedlyfunny,
butthisparticularnegativeassociationbetweenItaliansand
militarycapabilityneverthelessraisesinterestingquestions.
MartinBlumenson,thehistorian,inhis1988addresstothe
MarineCorpsCommandandStaffCollege,saidthatforhistoryto
beproperlywritten,itmustfirstbeobserved,thenidentified
andfinallyjudged.IfweweretotakeItalianmilitaryhistory
atfacevalueandsimplyaddedupbattleswonandlost,without
applyingMr.Blumenson'sformula,wewouldfindittobevery
cruelindeed.Asheindicates,thereismoretostudying
militaryhistorythansimplydeclaringwinnersandlosers.Akey
issueforthestudentofhistoryiswhywarsandbattlesarewon
andlost.WhywastheUnitedStates,forexample,sosuccessful
inWorldWarII(especiallytheUSMarineCorps)andyetso
frustratedandultimatelyunsuccessfulinVietnam?Whydidwe
winmostofthebattlesandyetlosethewar?Todetermine,
then,ifanarmyiscapableorinept,onemustdelvenotonly
intohowthatarmyoperates,butalsointotheimportant
peripheralmattersofitspoliticalandpopularsupport.
Thepurposeofthisstudy,then,istobetterunderstandthe
Italianmilitaryforcesaswellastounderstandthepolitical
andsocialsystemswhichdeterminethepoliciesfortheir
implementationandthenthrustthemintobattle.Asstated,
thesethreeareasareinseparableandmustbestudiedin
parallel.
Therearetwowaysofapproachingastudyofthistype.One
couldselectasignificantbattle,operationorwar,andstudyin
depthitscommandstructure,operationsorders,training,
logistics,personnellosses,etc.Suchadissectionservesto
lookintotheheartofthemilitarymachineandallowadetailed
2/51
4/8/2015
understandingofitsfunction;however,atthecompletionof
suchastudy,onecanonlypresumehowthemilitarysystemhas
functionedorwillfunctioninotherbattles.Becausecommanders
change,andbecausenotwosituationsinwarareexactlythe
same,narrowselectiveanalysesfromwhichgeneralizationsare
drawnlimitunderstandingofthebroaderissue.Forthatreason,
Ielectedtocoverabroadspectrumoftimewiththepurposeof
pursuingamoregeneralstudytodeterminetrendsbothinItalian
militaryoperationsandinthepoliticalsupportstructure.
Withthisapproach,itwillbereadilyapparentthatdetails
ofbattlesarenotprovided(thiswillbepursuedinfuture
studies);rather,averygeneraloverviewwillbegiven,followed
bymyanalysisorthatofmilitaryorpoliticalfiguresofthe
countriesinvolved.
Thetimeperiodselectedforthisstudybeginsin1848and
endsin1945.Thisperiodissignificantbecauseitencapsulates
asegmentofItalianhistorywhichisparticularlytumultuous.
Thisisnottosaythatperiodspriorto1848andsubsequentto
1945werenotalsowroughtwithconfusionandinstability,but
forthepurposeofstudyingmilitaryhistory,thisperiodis
representativeofthedifficultiesthattheItalianmilitary
systemhasalwaysfaced:
Itmustbesaidattheoutsetthatnoearthshaking,Nobel
Prizewinningdiscoveriesweremadeduringthisresearchsuchas
awarlosinggenefoundonlyinItalianchromosomes.Butserious
deficienciesbothinthemilitaryandpoliticalstructure
surfacedthroughoutthistimeperiod,andtheyarebothvery
interestingandverydidactic.
Whenstudyingtheexternalinfluenceswhichaffectthe
efficiencyofamilitarysystem,racial,regionalandethnic
cultureareimportantfactors.Thepointisthat,cultural
influencesaffectthebehaviorofthesoldieronthe
battlefield.Someculturesinstillaggressiveness(oreven
fanaticism)incombat,whileothersseemtoinstillamore
passivebehavior.Iranisperhapstheprimaryexampleof
fanaticismonthebattlefieldtoday.Religiousextremism
combinedwithunrelentingstatepropagandaresultinaculture,
theyouthofwhicharewillingtosacrificethemselvesinsuicide
attacksagainsttheenemiesofthatculture.Incontrasttothis
fanaticalextremearenonviolentsocietiessuchasIcelandor
CostaRicawhichbelievethathavingmilitaryforcesinvites
aggression.Theythereforepossessnoforcesandcanonlyhope
thattheirallieswillcometotheirrescueintheeventofenemy
attack.MostculturesandcountrieslikeItaly,aresomewherein
betweenthesetwoextremes.Itisinthesemoremoderate
cultureswhereindividualismprevailsandwheretheinfluencesof
thestateoroftheprevailingreligionarelesspronounced.It
isobviousthatculturalandsocietalinfluencesmaybecyclical
andmaychangesignificantlyfromoneyeartothenext.Iranis,
again,theprimeexample;havingtransitionedfroma
semiwesternsociety(atleastinlargecitiesandatthetopof
thesocietalpyramid)toastrictIslamiccultureinamatterof
months,ithasassumedatotallynewidentity..AlthoughItaly
hasseenagreattransitionfromcitystates,toprincipalities,
andfinallytotheunificationofthepeninsulainthelast
severalhundredyears,theculturehasnotmadesuchdrastic
changes.TheCatholicChurchhasremainedagreatunifyingforce
andcommonthreadamongItaliansespeciallysincethefinal
unificationofItalyin1870.Thecommonlanguage,eventhough
somewhatmodifiedfromdialecttodialect,alsobindsthe
Italiansinacommonheritage.And,finally,thesenseof
isolationengenderedbythelargepeninsulaprotectedfromthe
3/51
4/8/2015
restofEuropebytheAlpsgivestheItaliansacommonidentity.
ButthegreatdichotomyoftheItaliancultureisthat,despite
theseunifyingfactors,therehasalwaysexistedadivisive
regionalismwhichhasbeenviewedasacursetobothmilitary
successandpoliticalstability.
Andso,thefactremainsthattheItalianculturehasnot
anddoesnot,becauseofthisregionalism,lenditselfto
militaryfanaticismoreven,inmanycases,toanyinterestina
strongnationalmilitarysystem..
Fascism'sattemptatmilitary,socialandeconomic
glorificationwasforcedonapopulationwhich,aswillbeseen,
waswillingtoacceptsomeofitsbenefitsbutrejectedits
precepts.Wewillalsosee,though,thatsomeaspectsofthe
culture,suchastheparticularlyclosefamilytieswhichareso
typicaloftheItalians,hadabearingontheoutcomeofatleast
oneofItaly'swars.TheItalianhasneverhadanyrealinterest
inpoliticsorgovernmentexceptastheydirectlyaffecthimand
hisfamily.Thisisnottosaythatthereisn'talsoasenseof
nationalismundertheItalianflag,butregionalloyaltieshave
alwaysbeenstrongandremainso.Italiansthemselvesadmitthat
theItalianvictoryinthe1986SoccerWorldCuppromotedgreater
nationalpridethananyothereventinrecenthistory.
AproblemassociatedwiththestudyoftheItalianmilitary
systemisthatofstereotyping.Morethananyothermilitary,
thatoftheItaliansisassociatedwithfailure.Admittedly,the
Italianshavelostmanymorebattlesthantheyhavewon,and
thereisthecuriousphenomenonofwhatoftenseemstobeearly
surrenderinmanybattles.Theresultisthatthecasual
observerofhistoryautomaticallyequatestheItalianmilitary
withweaknessandtheindividualsoldierwithcowardice.Such
conclusionsareerroneousandarefalselydeduced.Thatisnot
tosaythat,justasinanyotherarmy,therearenotweaknesses
andindividualsoldierswhoarelessthancourageous,butbefore
overgeneralizing,anentiresystemincludingthepolitical,must
bestudiedtodeterminewhvanarmyfunctionsasisdoesandwhy
thesoldiereitherfightstothedeathorsurrenderswithout
usingeverymeansathisdisposaltoavoiddefeat.Herewithis
anattemptatsuchananalysis.
CHAPTERI
THE19THCENTURYANDITALY'SUNIFICATION
In1848,Italywasstillseekingitsnationalidentity.
SincetheNapoleonicwarswhichbroughttheFrenchArmyacross
thenorthernplainsofItalyin1796,manyprominentItalians
fromallpartsofthebigbootwereseekingunificationofthe
manydivergentstateswhichwereboundtogetherbynothingmore
thanageographicallyisolatedpeninsula,byacommonlinguistic
heritageandbytheinfluenceoftheChurch.Thelanguage
commonalitywasculturallybindingandyetthevariousItalian
dialectswerediverseenoughtopromoteregionalprideand
microculturaldiversity.TheregionsofcentralItaly,for
example,werequitesimilarlinguisticallyandwere,infact,the
birthplaceofmodernItalianasitisspokentoday,whereasthere
isagreatdifferencebetweenthedialectsspokeninthenorth
andthosespokeninthesouth.Thoseofthenortharemore
similartotheEuropeanlanguageswhosecountriestheyjuxtapose,
whilethoseofthesouthresembleinsomewaysthelanguagesof
theinvaderswhichancientlyoccupiedtheirlandssuchasthe
ArabsandtheSpanish.
Suchwasthelinguisticflavorandregionaldiversityin
1848,when,promptedbyterritorialdisputes,thenorthernstate
ofPiemonte(Italianspelling)declaredwaronAustria.Thiswas
thefirsttimethatthesesomewhatdivergentstateshadunified
4/51
4/8/2015
themselvesagainstanexternalfoe,andtheventurewas,forthe
mostpart,enthusiasticallysupported.On23March,troopsof
thePiemonte,(whichwasapowerfulandautonomousstate)
supportedbyNeapolitanandotherarmies,pushedintoAustrian
occupiedLombardia(northcentralItaly)andVenezia(inthe
Northeast).Thewarwentwellforthefirsttwomonths,butby
JuneandJulythe"Italian"forceshadsufferedmanyserious
defeatsandwereforcedtowithdrawtheirforcesbacktotheir
originallines.
Therewereseveralreasonsforthisdefeat.Amongthemwere
PopePius'IXwithdrawalofsupportforthecauseofthestruggle
againstAustria(whichwasaCatholicstate),thewithdrawalof
Neapolitanforcesfromthewar,andthefeelingbyotherItalian
statesthatPiemonte'scausewasnotforItalybutratherfor
selfaggrandizement.Thefinalreasonforthismilitaryfailure
wasthatofanillcoordinatedandineptmilitarycommand.1
InMarch1849,therewasstillgreatItalianhatredforthe
AustrianswhowerenowholdingVeniceundersiege.Withrenewed
supportfromotherItalianstates,thePiemontesiagainresumed
hostilitiesagainsttheAustrians,butinjustthreedaysthey
hadsufferedamajordefeatatNovara.Althoughcourageousin
theirstandagainstthedetestedAustrianinfluence,thissecond
failureofItalianarmspointedtotheneedforforeign
alliances.Hadtherenotbeensuchpoliticalturmoilwithin
Italy,itispossiblethatthemotto"L'Italiafaradase"(Italy
willgoitalone),couldhavebeenareality.Buthowcouldthe
armyfunctioneffectivelyaloneagainstawellestablishedenemy
whenthePopehadpulledhissupportforfightinganother
Catholiccountry?Andhowcouldasoldierfeelanyobligationto
fightforanationalcausewhentheredidnotappeartobeone?
BorderdisputescontinuedwithAustriaupto1859andin
Marchofthatyearwarbrokeoutagain.Afterseveralbloody
battlesinwhichtheItaliansfinallydominated,anarmisticewas
signedinwhichsometerritorieswererealigned.Butmistrust
andhatredwouldnotallowprotractedpeace;however,theresult
ofthearmisticeandbriefrespitefrombattleprovidedtimefor
improvedpeninsularaffairsandtheofficialunificationofItaly
in1861althoughnotallstateswereincluded.Wouldthis
unificationnowmeanthatthemilitaryforceswouldbeunited
withthefirmsupportofasolidpoliticalsystem?
Amazingly,by1866perhapsbecauseofthefailuretoever
reallydecisivelydefeattheAustrians,aunifiedItaly(atleast
officially)onceagaindeclaredwaronitsnorthernneighbor.
TheresultofthiswarwasthefamousbattleofCustozzainwhich
theItalianswereagaindefeatedonthesamesitewheretheyhad
beendefeatedinthefirstbattleof1848.Perhapsthegreatest
embarrassmenttotheItalianforceswasthefactthattheyhad
outnumberedtheAustrianstwotoone.Thisisnottosaythat
duringthisbattle,orthoseprevious,someItalianunitsdidnot
farequitewell.ThegreatGiuseppeGaribaldi,forexample,with
his40,000manindependentcorpsofPiemontesevolunteers,fought
verysuccessfullyusingguerrillatacticsduringCustozzaand
somewhatvindicatedthepoorshowingoftheregularItalian
Army.Inthemidstofthecontinuinginternalandexternal
politicalturmoil,Garibaldiwasoneofthefewwiththe
leadershipabilityandbravadotounifyhistroopsagainsta
commonfoe.Historytellsusthatthattypeofleadershipwas
generallylackingduringthebattleofCustozza.Attributedto
thedefeatwere,"divisionoffieldcommand,confusionofplans
andpoorstaffwork."2TheItalianArmywasnotaloneinthis
failure.ThefleetalsosufferedadefeatintheAdriatic,
presumablyforthesameshortcomings.
5/51
4/8/2015
Thisisaverysimplisticreviewandanalysisofthisperiod
ofItalianhistorybutthebasicprobleminconductingmilitary
operationsisselfevident.Becauseoftheinternalturmoiland
regionaldifferencesduringitsunificationandconflictswith
Austria,therewasnosoundpoliticalbasefromwhichtodirecta
welldefinednationalcause.andcompoundingtheproblemwasthe
ineptitudeofthemilitaryleadershipingeneral.
Thesedifficultieswerestillnotsolvedbytheendofthe
19thcentury.Theywere,rather,intensifiedinaperiodof
turmoilwhichwasnottoberivaledinmodernItalianhistory.
Thiswasaperiodofsocialandpoliticalreformwhichsawthe
birthofItaliansocialismandtheadventofforeignadventurism
andcolonialisminAfrica.Thisadventurismwouldreturnto
haunttheAxispowersinWorldWarIIwhentheywouldbeforced
tospreadtheirforcesthininthedesertsofNorthandEast
AfricatoprotecttheirholdingsfromtheAllies.
TheItalianswereinitiallyfairlycomfortableand
successfulinmanagingtheirholdingsinEritrea,thenorthern
provinceofAbyssinia(Ethiopia).Theyhadalsobeensuccessful
inmilitaryskirmisheswiththeAbyssinianstothesouthandthus
feltconfidentinsendingexpeditionsintotheheartofAbyssinia
toseekadditionallands.Butpoliticalandmilitary
overconfidencebroughtwithitthedestructionofatwo
thousandmanadvanceforceofItaliansoldiersandnative
levies.Theendresultofthegovernment'smiscalculationof
enemystrength(theItalianswereoutnumbered80,000to14,500)
wastheItaliandefeatatAduwain1896(inAbyssinia)inwhich
8000of14,500menwerekilledorwounded.Twogeneralswere
killedand2,000menwerecaptured.
Twoaspectsofthisbattlewereparticularlydifficultfor
Italiansathometoaccept.Thefirstwasthatthewithdrawalof
theremainderofthetroopswassodisorderlythatchargesof
cowardiceresulted,andthesecondwasthefactthattheir
capturedcountrymenwerebrutalizedbytheAbyssinians,anact
forwhichtheItalianswouldreturnyearslaterforvindication
andrevenge(aswellasforanexcusetocontinuetheircolonial
expansion).
WhatisthesignificanceofthebattleofAduwainlightof
theanalysisalreadymadeofpreviouswarsagainstAustria?A
basicdeficiencyinpoliticalunityandforeignpolicystill
existedwhichcreatedasituationunfavorabletotheItalian
militaryforces.
InanalyzingactualItalianmilitarycapabilitiesofthe
period,theydonotappeartobetoodifferentfromthoseof
otherEuropeanarmies.Italy'sconscriptionandnationalservice
policieswere,infact,verysimilartothoseofGermanyand
France.Inhisbook,ArmiesofAsiaandEurope,EmoryUpton
describesindetailtheprescribedrequirementsfor
noncommissionedandcommissionedofficerselectionandtraining
asitappliedin1875.Again,itwasverysimilartothatof
otherarmies.OneweaknesswhichUptonnotedintheItalian
academysystemwasthat,becauseofthegreatneedforofficers,
only3percentwereattritedforacademicorotherfailure.
ItaliantacticswerealsoconsideredstandardforaEuropean
army.TheywerebasedontheGermanmodelsinceGermanywas
consideredtobethesuperiormilitaryforceatthetime.
Upton'sstudyreveals,then,noseriousflawsintheItalian
militarysystem;however,hedidnotaddressmorale,orcultural
aspectswhichmighthaveaffectedthefightingeffectivenessof
theArmy.
AnimportantaspectoftheItalianofficercorpswasthe
factthatparentswererequiredtopayforthecadets'education
6/51
4/8/2015
(unlessthecadet'sfatherhadbeenanofficerkilledin
battle).Thismeantthatonlyaverysmallpercentageofthe
malepopulationcouldfinanciallyqualifyforacademytraining.
Thisrestrictionobviouslyexcludedthegreaterpercentageofthe
populationfromwhichmuchtalentundoubtedlycouldhavebeen
drawn.
NotonlywaspoliticalimprudenceaprobleminAbyssiniabut
alsogeneralship.GeneralBaratieri,whowasincommandofall
forcesinAbyssiniahadlearnedthathehadfallenfromfavorby
politicalcirclesinItalyandthatanotherGeneralwasenroute
toreplacehim.Determinedtoenterbattlebeforehis
replacementarrived,hemarchedhisforcestoAduwa,wascutoff
anddefeated.
Asidefromthepoliticalandmilitaryreasonsforthis
defeat,theeconomicsituationathomeinItalywouldhavemade
theprospectofconductingaprolongedwarinEthiopiaagreat
struggletosaytheleast.Manycountrieshavecreatedwars
ostensiblytostimulateeconomicgrowth.Inthiscase,Italy
enteredAbyssinia,partlytodivertattentionfromitsindustrial
productionproblems,itsfinancialcrisesanditsdomestic
disorders.Theendgoalwouldhavebeencontinuedcolonization,
additionalmarketsforgoodsproducedathomeandincreasedtotal
agriculturalproduction.However,theeffort,atleastin
Abyssinia,wasselfdefeatingandItalywasforcedtopullback
toitsoriginalpositionsinEritreaandSomaliland.
DuringtheconductofoperationsinEastAfrica,therewas
muchdebatebothinternallyandabroadregardingthelegitimacy
ofItaly'spresenceinthatarea.Inhisdiscoursetothe
Italianparliamenton12May1888,FrancescoCrispi,whoheaded
thegovernmentfrom1887to1896,repliedtodemandsthatItaly
withdrawfromtheregion.Thefollowingisanexcerptfromthat
discourse.Thecommentsinparenthesesarethoseofthemembers
oftheparliamentinattendance:
Gentlemen,Italyarrivedfartoolateinthe
familyofgreatpowers.Shehadthehonorof
discoveringAmericabutdidnothavethestrengthto
imposeherdominionthere...
Coloniesareanecessityofmodernlife.We
cannotremaininertandallowtheotherpowersto
occupybythemselvestheportionsoftheworldasyet
unexplored.Ifthisweretooccur,wewouldbeguilty
ofagreatcrimetowardhistorybecausewewould
therebycloseforevertheavenuestoourshipsandthe
marketstoourproducts.(Good!).
Since1860Italyhasbeeninastateofcontinuous
economicprogress,andthedaymaycomewhenweshall
haveneedofeasyandsecuremarkets.Weshallnot
havethemexceptbyunfurlingourflagonalltheseas
oftheworld.
Someonehasthoughttoaskus:Butwhatwillyou
doatMassawa?Whatmaterialprofit,whatbenefit
shallwehaveaftertheexpensesanddangerswehave
undergone?
Gentlemen,inthepublicshopsbenefitsarenot
countedinlireandcents.Greatnationshavetheneed
toassertthemselvesinthevariouspartsoftheworld
fortheprotectionoftheircommerceandforthe
performanceofthatcivilizingmissioninwhose
triumphweareobligedtoparticipate.(Bravo!)
Isaidthatwebegintoday(incolonial
endeavors),andwewouldbeginverybadlyifatthe
firstsetback[asatDogaliin1887)weweretoflee
7/51
4/8/2015
fromtheplaceswehaveoccupied.(Verygood!
Bravo!Livelysignsofapproval).Wewouldgivea
verypoorshowofourselvesifweweretotireso
easilyandfailinperseverance.
Thispolicyoflookingonlytomaterialinterests
istoobourgeois.(Good!Bravo!)Thereissomething
muchgreater:itisthedignityofthefatherlandand
theinterestsofcivilization.(Verygood!Bravo!)
WeareatMassawa,[areainEritreaalreadyheld
bytheItalians]andweshallstay".3
WehavealreadydiscussedwhathappenedtotheItalians
preciselybecauseoftheirattemptedexpansionbeyondMassawa.
ThereferenceinCrispi'sspeechtoDogaliisthesiteabout18
kilometerswestofMassawawhereEthiopiansdestroyedanItalian
columnof500menwhowereattemptingtopenetrateintocentral
Ethiopia.
ThisparticularspeechofCrispiiscitedbecauseit
illustratesthemoodoftheItaliangovernment(andpeople)at
thetime.Italsodemonstrateshowthegovernmentforgedahead
blindlyandcreatedamilitarydefeatwherenoneshouldhave
occurred..PerhapsitwasablessingindisguisethatItalydid
nothavetoconductaprotractedwarbecause,althoughitwasa
developingcountry,itdidnothavetheresourcestosustain
itselfindefinitely.
WiththedefeatatAduwawhichresultedinCrispi's
downfall,Italyturnedinwardandconcentratedonitscontinuing
politicalturmoil.Themilitarywouldnotseeanysignificant
actionagainuntiltheLibyan(ItaloTurkish)warof19111912.
Thisparticularconflictwillnotbediscussedinthisstudy.
SufficeittosaythattheItaliansdidthrowtheTurksoutof
Tripolitaniaandestablishedacolonythere.But,ashistoryhas
shown,Libyawouldbecomejustanotherbattlefieldwhichwould
latertrythepoweroftheAxis.
CHAPTERII
ITALYENTERSWORLDWARI
By1914,practicallyallofEuropewasembroiledindisputes
overpolitics,boundaries,andeconomics.Italy'sproblem,among
otherthings,washerrelationshipwithAustria.Itwasa
strangerelationshipinthatshehadbeenamemberoftheTriple
AlliancewithAustriaandGermanysince1896andyetborder
disputesandbasicenmitybetweenthetwoneighborscaused
continualmistrustandtensionwithintheAlliance.TheTrentino
andTriesteareasofNortheasternItalyhadbeenindisputefor
years.ItalyfeltthatsincethisregionwasontheItalianside
oftheAlpsandsincethepeoplelivingtherespokeItalian,it
shouldnot,therefore,belongtoAustria.
Andso,withthemajorpowersofEuropeformingopposing
alliancestodobattle,Italyhadtomakethedecisiontoeither
remainneutral(theprudentthingtodo,consideringherrather
weakmilitarystatus)ortocomeinonthewinningsideand
hopefullyregainwhatshefeltwereherrightfulterritories.
On3August1914,Italyannouncedthatshewouldremain
neutralintheconflict.Therewerethreereasonsforthis
decision,themostimportantbeingthathermilitaryforceswere
simplynotprepared.Thesecondwasconcernfortheinternal
unrestcausedbyunrulysocialist,republicanandrevolutionary
factionsinthecountry,andthethirdwasthegovernment's
feelingthattheItalianpeopletrulywantedpeace.Itwasfelt
inParliamentthatItalytechnicallyhadalegitimatereasonfor
notenteringthewaronthesideoftheAlliancesinceAustria
haddeclaredwaronSerbiawithoutfirstnotifyingItalyas
requiredbytheAlliance.Inaddition,Germany'sdeclarationof
8/51
4/8/2015
waronRussiaandFrancenullifiedthepactsinceArticleIIof
samespecifieditsdefensivenature.1
Forninemonths,debateragedintheItalianparliamenton
whetherornottopersuadeAustriatocededisputedterritories
toItalyincompensationforthelatter'scontinuedneutrality,
ortosimplyenterthewaronthesideoftheEntente(whichwas
apactbetweenEngland,FranceandRussia)andhopetowinthe
spoilsofthevictor.
TofullyexplaintheconfusedpoliticalsituationinItaly
whichhad,naturally,adirecteffectonthefightingperformance
ofhermilitary,anexcerptmustbeincludedhereof
"L'intervento(1915):RicordiePensieri"(TheIntervention
(1915):MemoriesandThoughts)ofAntonioSalandrawhowas
ItalianheadofstateatthebeginningofWorldWarI:
"Bytheendof1914twocurrentsofopinionhad
graduallyformedandbecomepronouncedinthecountry,
whichhadreceivedwithalmostunanimousfavorthe
declarationofneutrality.Onecurrentwasfor
remainingindefinitelyinthepositionofspectatorsin
theenormousconflagration;theoldalliancebeing
brokeninfactifnotinlawcausedtheothercurrent
tofavorinterventionasquicklyaspossibleonthe
sidethathadbecomereputedtobetheonlyone
suitabletoItaliansentimentsandinterests....Those
whospokeandwrotethatis,theactiveminorities
whichineverygreatcountrycarryalongwiththemthe
mentallyinertmajoritybecamedividedbetween
interventionistsandneutralists.Thesetwocurrents
werenurturedbyreasons,passions,recollections,and
connectionsofvariednature,andintheirranksthere
metpoliticalgroupsthatuntilthenhadbeeninspired
bycontrastingidealities.Andso,Nationalistsand
Freemasonshadferventlyadoptedthecauseof
intervention,whereasirreligioussocialismjoinedwith
politicalCatholicisminpropoundingthecauseof
absoluteneutrality.
Itwasthearduousbutindeclinabledutyofthe
governmenttoconsiderthesituationandtheinterests
ofthecountrywithcourageousserenity,tosetagoal
foritself,andtopreparethemeansforits
realization.AfterthefirstbattleoftheMarne
(September1914)andaftertheRussianinvasionofEast
PrussiawasarrestedatTannenbergandtheMasurian
Lakes,bothsidesinthewarwerestrippedoftheir
illusionsaboutaquickendtotheconflict.Timewas
necessarilyinfavoroftheEntentewhich,although
muchlesspreparedattheoutbreakofwar,wasricher
inmenandmeans;butthesehadtobepreparedand
broughtintothefield.Meanwhile,noone,noteven
themosttenaciousneutralistsdaredmaintainthat,
whilethehurricaneofwarragednotfarfromits
bordersandagitatedtheseassurroundingit,Italy
couldremainidlyatrestanddisinterestedinthe
developmentandoutcomeoftheworldconflict.
Everyoneunderstoodthatthewarwouldleadtoa
profoundchangeininternationalrelationsandthatan
historicalcrisiswasdevelopinginwhichwecouldnot
avoidbecominginvolved.Thisconvictionnaturally
arousedtheinnerpatrioticpassionofthemenin
chargeofthegovernment,althoughitwasourdutyto
masterthispassionandcontrolitsexpression.We
thought,wefeltthatperhapsneveragainfor
9/51
4/8/2015
generationsandcenturieswouldtheoccasionarisefor
completingthetaskoftheRisorgimentobyacquiring
thosefrontierswhichnaturehadgiventotheItalian
peopleandbyestablishingsupremacyonourseas.
Consequently,asIhaveshown,wechoseourperilous
butinescapablepathandwepreparedtofollowit.But
althoughwehadcommittedourselvestoeachother,as
longaswaspossibleweabstainedfromcommitting
ourselveswithothersbecausewecouldnotexcludethe
possibilitythatunexpectedeventsandnewconditions
mightarisetomodifythedecisionswehadreached.We
hadreachedthesedecisionsfullyawareoftheir
enormousgravityandwithoutpretensionsof
infallibility.Thereforewestillretainedfull
freedomofactionwhilepreparingforintervention,
whichwethoughtinevitableinthespringof1915."2
Readingthispassagegivesonetheimpressionthat,although
theItalianswantedpeaceandfeltthatneutralitywasrightfor
*"Risorgimento"referstotheperiodinItaly
beginninginthe18thCenturyandendingin1870with
herfinalunification.
thecountry,fatewassomehowpropellingthemintothe"great
conflagration".ItisindeedsurprisingthatItaly,fully
consciousofitsmilitaryinadequacies,decidedthat"now"was
thetimetotakeitsrightfulterritories.Theymusthavefelt
thatluckalonewouldassurethemvictory.
ContinuedverbalconflictwithAustriaresultedinthePact
ofLondonofApril26,1915inwhichItalyseparatedherselffrom
AustriaHungaryandenteredtheTripleEntentebysidingwith
GreatBritain,FranceandRussia.Thiswasapoliticaldecision
whichresultedinthesuspicionothercountriesfelttowardItaly
bothpoliticallyandmilitarilyduringthisperiod.The
indecision,andthensuddenchangefromAlliancetoEntentecould
notpossiblyhaveinspiredandcultivatedfutureinternational
relationships.
Letuslooknowattheconflictfromthemilitary
perspective.ItshouldbenotedthatallItalianarmed
servicesArmy,AirServiceandNavywereinvolvedinWorldWar
I,and,asstatedpreviously,manyunits,especiallythoseofthe
Navy,performedadmirably;however,thegeneralperceptionof
Italianforces,basedontheirperformanceinbothworldwars,is
low.
PartoftheproblemfacedbyItalianunitsofWorldWarI
wasthepoliticalsituationinwhichtherewasalackof
unanimityamongyariousfactionsofthegovernment.Asforthe
troopsonthebattlefield,itisundeniablethattheyhadnot
establishedawinningtradition.Thereweremanyreasonsforthe
Italians'poorperformanceonthebattlefieldandtheywillbe
addressedlater,butasforthementalpreparationofthetroops,
thewinningspiritwassimplynotcultivatedinmostthemasthey
enteredtheconflict.
In1917,whenFirstLieutenantErwinRommelfirstmarched
withhismountaintroopsthroughAustriatowardItaly,that
nationhadalreadybeeninthewarfortwoyears.Rommel's
superbbook,Attacks,describesfirsthandhisexperiencesin
battleagainsttheItalians.Hiscommentaryseemstobe
unbiased,ashepraisesand,inturn,criticizeshisenemyashe
feelsappropriate.HerewithareRommel'sownwordsashebecame
partoftheAustroGermanoffensivewhichendedinthegreat
ItaliandefeatatIsonzo(knownasCaporettointheUnited
States)ofOctober1917:
ItwasearlyOctoberinthemagnificent
10/51
4/8/2015
countrysideofCarinthiawheretheWurttembergMountain
InfantryBattalionhadbeensentbytheroundaboutway
ofMacedoniawhenIagainassumedcommandofmy
detachment.WehadnoideawhattheArmyHighCommand
hadinstoreforus.TheIsonzofront?
SinceItaly'sentryintothewarinMayof1915,
thechiefoperationalobjectiveoftheItalianarmyhad
beenthecaptureofTrieste.Inthecourseoftwo
yearsofwarfare,tenbattleshadtakenplacealongthe
lowercourseoftheIsonzo,duringwhichtheAustrian
forceshadslowlybutpersistentlybeenpushed
backwards.InthesixthbattletheItalianshadgained
afootholdontheeastbankoftherivernearGorizia
andhadtakenthecityitself".
FortheeleventhIsonzobattle,whichbeganin
August1917,GeneralLuigiCadornapatternedhis
offensiveontheWesternFrontmodel.Supportedby500
guns,50divisionsattackedonthenarrowfrontbetween
Goriziaandthesea.Byfinefightingtheworthy
AustriantroopsnullifiedtheItalians'initial
success,butinthesecondpartofthebattlethe
ItalianscrossedthemiddlereachesoftheIsonzoand
tookthehighplateauofBainsizzawhere,byexerting
theirsupremeefforts,ouralliessucceededinhalting
theattack.Thisalloutattacklasteduntilthe
beginningofSeptemberwhenthingsquieteddownand
CadornabegantogetreadyforthetwelfthIsonzo
Battle.Thenewlywonterritoryeastofthemiddle
reachesoftheIsonzomateriallyimprovedtheItalian
prospectsforthenextbattleandtheirobjective,
Trieste,wasfinallywithinreach.TheAustriansdid
notfeelequaltoieetingthisnewattackandtheywere
obligedtoaskforGermanhelp.Inspiteofthe
tremendousexpenditureofforcesinthebattlesinthe
west(FlandersandVerdun),theGermanHighCommand
sentanarmyconsistingofsevenbattletried
divisions.AcombinedGermanandAustrianoffensiveon
theupperIsonzofrontwastoeffectthedesired
relief.TheobjectivewastothrowtheItaliansback
acrosstheimperialboundary,and,ifpossible,across
theTagliamento.
SuchwasthestrategicbackgroundasinterpretedbyRommel
asheandhismountaintroopspreparedforthebattle.Basedon
Rommel'sassessment,theItalianArmyinitiallydidquitewellin
systematicallypushingtheAustriansbacktothepointwherethey
(theAustrians)feltitimperativetoseekassistancefromthe
Germans.ItshouldbeunderstoodthattheAustrianArmy,atthe
beginningofthe20thCentury,wasoneofthesignificant
militarypowersoftheworld,whereasthatoftheItaliansstill
sufferedfromtheimbalanceofinfancy.But,althoughitappears
thattherewasinitiallyacertainunityofItalianeffort,
Rommel,inhisdescriptionsofbattleonthesmallunitlevel,
indicatesthatthereweregraveshortcomingsincommandand,in
manycases,afatallackofwillamongthetroops.Initially,
accordingtohisaccount,theyfoughttenaciouslybutthenbegan
toinexplicablysurrender.Thefollowing,then,areexcerpts
fromRommel's,Attacks:
...Thescoutsdidnotenjoyfavorableprospects;
fortheenemy,[Italians)obviouslyunshaken,wasfrom
timetotimetraversingthebaregrassyslopesinfront
ofhiswirewithburstsofmachinegunfireinvarious
directions.Thislocalenemygarrisonappearedtobe
11/51
4/8/2015
onitstoesandwasnotinclinedtosurrenderatany
price.
...IntheAlpinecorps,theBavarianInfantryLife
GuardsandtheWurttembergMountainBattalionwere
fightingatthecornerstoneofthethirdItalian
positiononHill1114.Schoerner'scompany(12thLife
Guards)heldthepeakproper,buttheItaliansheld
theirsurroundingpositionsandwereattemptingto
regaintheirlostpositionsbycounterattacks.The1st
JagerRegimentofthe200thDivisionwasstillfighting
forthesecondItalianpositionintheregionofHill
732...4
AftersomeoftheseencountersinwhichRommelprobably
determinedthathecouldcertainlynotunderestimatethisenemy,
hehadseveralexperienceswhichpuzzledhimsuchasthe
following:
...Whatwasgoingon?Thesoldiersattheheadof
the2dCompanyhaddiscoveredsomeItaliansasleepina
clumpofbushesdowntheslope.Insideofafew
minutestheyhadroutedoutanItaliancombatoutpost
offortymenandtwomachineguns.Notashot,nota
loudwordwasheard.Tobesure,afewhostile
sentriesfleddownhillasfastastheirlegscould
carrythem;butfortunatelyintheirexcitementthey
forgottowarnthegarrisonofthepositionsaboveby
shotsorshouts.Imadecertainthatnoonetriedto
shootthemastheyfled...
...Itrequiredallourstrengthtoclimbupoutof
thehollowandacrossthesteepslope.Inafew
momentsthehostileobstacleswerereachedandpassed
andthenwemovedacrossthehostileposition.The
longbarrelsofaheavyItalianbatteryloomedbefore
usandinitsvicinityStreicher'smenwerecleaning
outsomedugouts.AfewdozenItalianprisonersstood
neartheguns.LieutenantStreicherreportedthathe
surprisedtheguncrewswhiletheywerewashing
themselves...
...Downontheright,onthenorthslope,hand
grenadesburstastheassaultteamfromLudwig's
companyfoughtitswayalongthehostileposition.The
Italiangarrisonclungtenaciouslytoeverynookand
cranny,andourtroopsmadeslowprogresseventhough
theywereattackingdownhill...5
ThereweremanvinstancesinRommel'sexperiencewhere
Italiansoldiersweresimplycaughtunawareandwereeither
capturedortriedtoescapeasinthefollowingexcerpts:
...Meanwhile,toourgreatastonishment,Italian
trafficstartedupagainontheLuicoSavognaroad.
Fromnorthandsouthsinglesoldiersandvehiclescame
unsuspectinglytowardus.Theywerepolitelyreceived
atthesharpcurvesoftheroadbyafewmountain
soldiersandtakenprisoner.Everyonewashavingfun
andtherewasnoshooting.Greatcarewastakenthat
themovementofthevehiclesdidnotslackenonthe
curvestherebyalertinganywhatmightbefollowing.
Whileafewmountaintroopstookcareofthedrivers
andescorts,othersseizedthereinsofthehorsesor
mulesanddrovetheteamstoapreviouslydesignated
parkingplace.Soonwewerehavingtroublehandling
allthetrafficthatcamefrombothdirections.In
ordertomakeroom,thevehicleshadtobeunhitched
andmovedclosetogether.Thecapturedhorsesand
12/51
4/8/2015
muleswereputinasmallravineimmediatelybehindour
barricade.Soonwehadmorethanahundredprisoners
andfiftyvehicles.Businesswasbooming...
...Theheadofmydetachmentreachedthevalleya
mileandahalfsouthwestofLuicoat1230.Thesudden
apparitionoftheleadingsoldiers,amongthem
LieutenantsGrau,Streicher,Wahrenbergerandmyself,
whosuddenlyrosefromthebushesahundredyardseast
oftheroad,petrifiedagroupofItaliansoldierswho
weremovingunsuspectinglyalong,partlyonfootand
partlyawheel.Theyweretotallyunpreparedto
encountertheenemytwomilesbehindthefrontat
Golobiandtheyfledattopspeedintothebushesto
thesideoftheroad,probablyexpectingtobefiredon
atanymoment...6
AttheendofanoperationonMountKuk,Rommelgavehis
usualdidacticobservations:
ThedecisionoftheItaliancommanderonKukto
stoptheGermanbreakthroughintheKolovratposition
bycommittinghisnumerousreservesfordefensein
severallinesontheeastslopeofKukwasincorrect.
HegavetheRommeldetachmenttheurgentlyneeded
respite(fororganizationofthedefense,reassembly,
bringingupofsupport).Itwouldhavebeenmore
advantageoustousetheseforcestorecaptureHill
1192.Thenecessaryfiresupportcouldhavebeengiven
fromthenumerouspositionsonthenorthslopeofKuk.
Ifthehostilecommandhadsucceededingettingan
attackgoingfromtheeastagainsttheRommel
detachment,thelatterwouldhavebeeninavery
difficultposition.
Further,itwasnotprofitabletolocatethethree
positionsonthesteep,bareandstonyeastslopeof
Kuk(forwardslope).InhoursofworktheItalian
soldiersbarelysucceededindentingthegroundeven
thoughtheirworkwasnotdisturbedbyanyharassing
fire.Reverseslopepositionsonthewestslopeof
Hill1192wouldhavebeenmuchmorefavorableforthe
enemysincetheywouldhavebeenoutofreachofour
artilleryandmachineguns.Furthermore,theenemy
delayedinblockingtheridgeroadonthesouthslope
ofKukandincoveringthebareslopesbelowtheridge
roadwithfire.
AtthestartoftheattackagainstKuk,twoor
threeItalianbattalionsopposedtheRommeldetachment
withnumerousmachinegunsincommandingpositions,in
partwelldeveloped;inparthastilyinstalled.The
detachmentfirstattackedonlywithtwoassaultteams
of16meneachunderthefiresupportofone
machineguncompany,sixlightmachinegunsandtwo
heavybatteries.Theseteamsfeltoutthe
possibilitiesofapproachingtheenemyandIthenused
themainbodytoencircletheentireKukgarrisonwhich
wascapturedduringthelaterhoursofthemorning
assaultandunitsfromWurttembergMountainBattalion
andacompanyoftheBavarianInfantryLifeGuards.
Intheattacktheeffectsofthemachinegunand
heavyartilleryfireagainstthehastilyentrenched
enemyprovedtobeespeciallystrong.Inmanyplaces
theenemywasunabletostandupunderthissevere
nervousstrain.Thisfirewouldhavehadlittleeffect
hadtheItaliansbeenproperlyentrenched.
13/51
4/8/2015
OurownmachinegunfirefromHill1192provedto
beamagnetandattractedtheentireattentionofthe
Italianfireunits,thuspermittingourinitialassault
teamandthentheentiredetachmenttoreachthe
easternslopeofKukwithoutsufferinglossesbymeans
ofthecamouflagedroadwhichwasopentoenemy
observation.Aregimentofthe4thBersaglieri
Brigade,inmarchcolumn,unexpectedlybumpedintoour
roadblockinthenarrowvalley.Eventhoughthe
leadingunitswerepinneddownbyfire,therearward
unitscouldhavemasteredthesituationbyattackingon
theslopestotheeastorwest.Clearthinkingand
vigorouscommandwerelackinghere.7
Asidefromsomeoftheinattentionandpoorcommand
decisionsnotedherebyRommel,therewereincidentswhichraise
questionsabouttheItalianleadershipofWorldWarI.Oneof
themostcuriousiscontainedinthefollowingaccountof
Rommel'sattackonMountMrzli:
...Alreadyduringourattackwehadobserved
hundredsofItaliansoldiersinanextensivebivouac
areainthesaddleofMrzlibetweenitstwohighest
prominences.Theywerestandingabout,seemingly
irresoluteandinactive,andwatchedouradvanceasif
petrified.TheyhadnotexpectedtheGermansfroma
southerlydirectionthatis,fromtherear...
...ThenumberofenemyinthesaddleonMrzliwas
continuallyincreasinguntiltheItaliansmusthavehad
twoorthreebattalionsthere.Sincetheydidnotcome
outfighting,Imovednearalongtheroad,wavinga
handkerchief,withmydetachmentechelonedingreat
depth.Thethreedaysoftheoffensivehadindicated
howweshoulddealwiththenewenemy.Weapproached
towithinelevenhundredyardsandnothinghappened.
Hadhenointentionoffighting?Certainlyhis
situationwasfarfromhopeless!Infact,hadhe
committedallhisforces,hewouldhavecrushedmyweak
detachmentandregainedMountCragonza.Orhecould
haveretiredtotheMatajurmassifalmostunseenunder
thefiresupportofafewmachineguns.Nothinglike
thathappened.Inadensehumanmassthehostile
formationstoodthereasthoughpetrifiedanddidnot
budge.Ourwavingwithhandkerchiefswent
unanswered...
Wedrewnearerandmovedintoadensehighforest
sevenhundredyardsfromtheenemyandthusoutofhis
lineofsight,forhewaslocatedaboutthreehundred
feetuptheslope.Heretheroadbentverysharplyto
theeast.Whatwouldtheenemyuptheredo?Hadhe
decidedtofightafterall?Ifherusheddownhillwe
wouldhavehadamantomanbattleintheforest.The
enemywasfresh,hadtremendousnumericalsuperiority,
andmoreoverenjoyedtheadvantageofbeingableto
fightdownhill...
...Wereachedtheedgeoftheforestunhindered.
Wewerestillthreehundredyardsfromtheenemyabove
theMatajurroad;itwasahugemassofmen.Much
shoutingandgesticulatingwasgoingon.Theyallhad
weaponsintheirhands.Upfrontthereseemedtobea
groupofofficers..Withthefeelingofbeingforcedto
actbeforetheadversarydecidedtodosomething,I
lefttheedgeoftheforestand,walkingsteadily
forward,demanded,bycallingandwavingmy
14/51
4/8/2015
handkerchief,thattheenemysurrenderandlaydownhis
weapons.Themassofmenstaredatmeanddidnot
move.Iwasaboutahundredyardsfromtheedgeofthe
woods,andaretreatunderenemyfirewasimpossible.
IhadtheimpressionthatImustnotstandstillorwe
werelost.
Icametowithin150yardsoftheenemy!Suddenly
themassbegantomoveand,intheensuingpanic,swept
itsresistingofficersdownhill.Mostofthesoldiers
threwtheirweaponsawayandhundredshurriedtome.
InaninstantIwassurroundedandhoistedonItalian
shoulders."EvvivaGermania"[LongliveGermany]
soundedfromathousandthroats.AnItalianofficer
whohesitatedtosurrenderwasshotdownbyhisown
troops.FortheItaliansonMrzlipeakthewarwas
over.Theyshoutedwithjoy.TheItalianofficers
becamepugnaciousseeingtheweakRommeldetachmentand
theytriedtoreestablishcontrolovertheirmen.But
nowitwastoolate.SomecapturedItalianshadtold
meshortlybeforethatthe2ndRegimentoftheSalerno
BrigadewasontheslopesofMatajur;itwasavery
famousItalianregimentwhichhadbeenrepeatedly
praisedbyCadornainhisordersofthedaybecauseof
outstandingachievementsbeforetheenemy.They
assuredmethatthisregimentwouldcertainlyfireon
usandthatwewouldhavetobecareful.
Theirassumptionwascorrect.Theheadofthe
Rommeldetachmentnosoonerreachedthewestslopeof
MrzlithatstrongmachinegunfireopenedupfromHills
1497and1424.Thehostilemachinegunfirewas
excellentlyadjustedontheroadandsoonsweptit
clear.8
WithoutfurtherusingRommel'sdescriptionofevents,it
happenedthatthehighlypraisedSalernoBrigade,too,laiddown
itsarmsapparentlyagainstthewillofitscommandingofficer,
forasRommelstated,"Hesatattheroadside,surroundedbyhis
officers,andweptwithrageandshameovertheinsubordination
ofthesoldiersofhisonceproudregiment.9
OtherItalianunitswerecapturedinasimilarmannerbythe
RommelDetachmentduringthebattleforMountMatajur.Inhis
usual"endofparagraph"observations,hetellsofhis"bag"and
analyzeshissuccess:
...Intwentyeighthoursfivesuccessiveand
freshItalianregimentsweredefeatedbytheweak
Rommeldetachment.Thenumberofcaptivesandtrophies
amountedto:150officers,9000men,and81guns.Not
includedinthesefiguresweretheenemyunitswhich
aftertheyhadbeencutoffonKuk,aroundLuico,in
thepositionsontheeastandnorthslopesofMrzli
peak,andonthenorthslopesofMountMatajur,
voluntarilylaiddowntheirarmsandjoinedthecolumns
ofprisonersmovingtowardTolmein.
Mostincomprehensibleofallwasthebehaviorof
the1stRegimentoftheSalernoBrigadeonMrzli.
Perplexityandinactivityhavefrequentlyledto
catastrophes.Thecouncilsofthemassunderminedthe
authorityoftheleaders.Evenasinglemachinegun,
operatedbyanofficercouldhavesavedthesituation,
oratleastwouldhaveassuredthehonorabledefeatof
theregiment.Andiftheofficersofthisregimenthad
ledtheir1500menagainsttheRommeldetachment,Mount
MatajurwouldsurelynothavefallenonOctober26.
15/51
4/8/2015
InthebattlesfromOctober24to26,1917,
variousItalianregimentsregardedtheirsituationas
hopelessandgaveupfightingprematurelywhentheysaw
themselvesattackedontheflankorrear.TheItalian
commanderslackedresolution.Theywerenotaccustomed
tooursuppleoffensivetactics,andbesides,theydid
nothavetheirmenwellenoughinhand.Moreover,the
warwithGermanywasunpopular.ManyItaliansoldiers
hadearnedtheirlivingsinGermanybeforethewarand
foundasecondhomethere.Theattitudeofthesimple
soldiertowardGermanywasclearlydisplayedinhis
"EvvivaGermania!"onMrzli.10
Rommel'slastpointcouldcertainlybeargued.Werethe
troopsshowingsomekindofendearmentforGermanyorwerethey
hopingforsurvivalinthehandsoftheircaptors?Italian
evaluationofthedefeatatCaporettoindicatesthat,infact,
therehadbeenheavye,nemypropagandaandthatthetroopshad
beeninsufficientlypreparedtodealwithit.
ItmustbenotedherethatRommelgivesfurtherpositive
evaluationofsuccessiveencounters:"Afewweekslaterthe
mountainsoldiershadItaliantroopsopposingthemintheGrappa
region,whofoughtsplendidlyandweremenineveryparticular,
andthesuccessesoftheTolmeinoffensivewerenot
repeated".11Asanexampleofthis,Rommeltellsofaviolent
firefightagainsttheItaliansinwhichhewasnearlycaptured
andhisDetachmentnearlylost:
AgroupofhowlingItalianscamedowntheroadand
Ididnotknowwhethertheywereattackersor
prisoners.Ihadnoideaofwhathadbecomeofmy
leadingelements(3dCompanyandthemachinegun
companyofthe26thRifleRegiment).Idecidedtouse
acoupleofflaresandclearupthesituation.Ifired
themjusttotherightofthehighwaybridgenearthe
lowwasleadingtothemilland,intheirlight,Isaw
acloselypackedmassofhandkerchiefwavingmen
rushingtowardPirago.Theheadofthegroupwasa
scanthundredyardsawayandthelightoftheflares
mademeanexcellenttarget.TheshriekingItalians
didnotfireashotastheyapproached,andIwasstill
undecidedregardingtheirstatus...Whentheenemywas
withinfiftyyardsIshouted"Halt!"anddemandedtheir
surrender.Theansweringroarwasneitheraffirmative
nornegative.Noonefiredandtheyellingmassdrew
nearer.Irepeatedmychallengeandgotthesame
answer.TheItaliansopenedfireattenyards.Almost
allwhowereontheroadfellintotheenemy's
hands.TheItaliansracedalongtheroadtothe
south....Atthelastmoment,Iescapedcaptureby
jumpingovertheroadwallandIracedtheItalians
movingalongtheroad....Thehostileadvanceslowed
downimmediatelyandtheItalianmachinegunsbeganto
rattle,sprayingtheirfireagainstthewallswhich
shelteredtheStyriantroops.Theenemyappearedtobe
attackingtorightandleftoftheroad.Athousand
menwereyelling"Avanti,avanti!"("Forward!").12
Withoutquotinghim,Rommelcontinuesthedescriptionof
thisandotherbattlesintheGrapparegion.Thebattleswith
theItaliansarecharacterizedbyheavyItalianartillery
activitywhichwasalwaysdescribedasveryeffectivebyRommel,
andbysignificantclosecombatandhandtohandfighting.There
continuedtobelargegroupsofItalianssurrenderingunderthe
weightoftheGermanAustrianadvance;however,therearein
16/51
4/8/2015
Rommel'saccountnootherrecurrencesofsurrenderwithout
fighting.
InanalyzingwhytheItaliansfailedinthismajoroperation
ofthewar,onekeypointemergesthatofunityofpurpose.It
seemsthatalargenumberoftheItalianforceswerenot
sufficientlyconvincedthattheyshouldbefightingfortheir
country;hence,theshoutbysurrenderingtroops,"Evviva,
Germania".WasthisthefaultoftheItalianofficercorpswhich
somehowdidnotcommunicatetotheirtroopsthesignificanceof
theirmission?Orwasitaproblemwithastillrelativelyyoung
andrecentlyunifiedcountrywhichdidnotknowwhatitsforeign
policywasandwhoitshoulddesignateasfriendandfoe?Based
onRommel'sdescriptionofItaliantroopsoverpoweringtheir
officers,itwouldappearthat,insomecasesatleast,therewas
alackofconfidenceofthetroopsintheirofficers.
AnotherconsiderationinanalyzingCaporettowasthe
tremendousamountoftime(twoyears)thattheItaliansspent
againsttheAustriansintheIsonzocampaign.Therewereatotal
oftwelvebattlesfoughttherewithonlyveryslowprogressto
showfortheirefforts.Whateffectdoesconstantbattlehaveon
menwhenfightingundersuchcircumstances?Inthebook,Faceof
Battle,JohnKeeganstates:
Thereisnosuchthingasgettingusedto
combat'...Eachmomentofcombatimposesastrainso
greatthatmenwillbreakdownindirectrelationto
theintensityanddurationoftheir
exposure...psychiatriccasualtiesareasinevitableas
gunshotandshrapnelwoundsinwarfare....Mostmenwere
ineffectiveafter180oreven140days.Thegeneral
consensuswasthatamanreachedhispeakof
effectivenessinthefirst90daysofcombat,that
afterthathisefficiencybegantofalloff,andthat
hebecamesteadilylessvaluablethereafteruntilhe
wascompletelyuseless...Thenumberofmenonduty
after200to240daysofcombatwassmallandtheir
valuetotheirunitswasnegligible"13
WeretheItaliantroopswhofacedRommeljustsuch
casualties?Hadtheylostthewilltofightbecauseofexcessive
exposuretodangeranddeath?ConsiderthatatCaporettothe
ItalianSecondArmywith25divisionsfaced37AustroGerman
divisionsandlost10,000dead,30,000wounded,293,000
prisoners,and350,000missinginthefirsttwoweeksofthe
battle..Itwouldseemthatthisincrediblybloodycampaign
wouldindeedtakeitstollinpsychologicalcasualties,
especiallywiththeaforementionedlackofleadershipand
insufficientinculcationofthespiritofnationalisminthe
soldier.
TheItalianArmyChiefofStaff,GeneralLuigiCadornawas
outragedbythedisasterandsaidinhismilitarybulletinof28
October,"LackofresistanceonthepartofunitsoftheSecond
Armycowardlyretreatingwithoutfightingandignominiously
surrenderingtotheenemyhasallowedtheAustroGermanforces
tobreakourleftflankontheJulianfront."14
ItmustbenotedherethattheItalians,withthehelpof
theirBritishandFrenchallies,finallystoppedthe
AustroGermanadvanceatthePiaveRiverinDecember.
Eventually,theItalians,underGeneralArmandoDiaz,succeeded
insplittingtheAustroGermanforcesanddefeatingthem.
Despitethisfinalcontainment,though,theItaliangovernment
viewedtheIsonzo(Caporetto)asadefeat.Itwouldbeuseful
heretoreviewexcerptsoftheItaliangovernmentCommissionof
Inquiryrelatingtothebattle:
17/51
4/8/2015
TheeventsofOctoberNovember1917thatledto
thewithdrawaloftheItalianarmyfrombeyondthe
IsonzoRivertobehindthePiaveRiverhavethe
characterofamilitarydefeat.Thedeterminingcaused
ofamilitarynature,bothoftechniqueandofmorale,
certainlypredominatedoverthoseotherfactors,alien
tothearmedforces,whoseallegedinfluencethis
reporthasshowntobeexaggerated.Somepersonshave
attemptedtodeducefromtheinfluenceoftheseother
factorsthattheeventsinquestionaretobe
attributedlargelytopoliticalcauses.
Inadditiontolocalandchancecauses,thedefeat
derivedalsofromtheconfluenceofcomplexfactorsof
amilitarynaturewhichhadbeenactinguponthearmy
forsometimeandwhich,becauseofexceptional
contingencies,wereabletoexerciseamosteffective
influence,demoralizingthearmyanddestroyingits
verycohesion.
Amongthosecauseswhicharejudgedtohavebeen
beyondhumancontrol,whosepresenceandinfluencehave
beenascertainedwithcertaintybytheCommissionand
whichmitigatepersonalresponsibilities,arethe
following:
Thepowerandcapacitiesoftheenemy.The
AustroGermansundertooktheOffensiveanimatedbya
spiritofemulationandsustainedbyanirresistible
impetusderivingfromthegreatmilitarysuccesses
obtainedagainstSerbia,Rumania,andRussia...They
wereperfectlyinformednotonlyofourtechnical
militarypreparationbutalsoofthestateofour
morale;theywereabletoexploiteveryingenious
expedientandeveryconsummatestratagemofwarto
concealtheirveryrapidmovementofforcesaswellas
thedirectionoftheirattack,toallayourvigilance
inthesectorsoftheattack,andeverywherepossible
toweakenourresistancebymeansofadebilitating
propaganda...Withtheserenitywhichmaybegrantedus
byreasonofourultimatevictory,wemustacknowledge
thattheenemy'splanwastheworkofgeniusandmost
boldandthatitwasputintooperationwithenergyand
intelligence,andwiththeemploymentofmethodsnewto
us.Theresultwasthattheenemywasabletoachieve
asurprise,notsomuchwithregardtotimeandplace,
astomethodsemployed;andsurpriseistheprincipal
factorinvictory.*
"Theconditionsofinferiorityofourcountryand
ourarmy.Theseconditionsderivedfromour
geographicalsituation,...fromhistoricalevents,from
theparticularcircumstancesinwhichthecountry
enteredthewar,andfromthedevelopmentofoperations
intheothertheatersofwar.Amongtheseconditions
ofinferioritythefollowingseemparticularly
notable:thestrategicallymostunfavorablenatureof
ourfrontierwithAustriaHungary;ourscanteconomic
potentialanddifficultiesinmuchofoursupplies,
withtheresultthatwelackedanabundanceofcertain
*ThisselfanalysisjibesperfectlywithRommel's
numerousaccountsofcatchingtheItalianseithersleeping,
washingthemselves,orsimplywalkingalongaroad"inthe
rear"withoutanyconsciousnessoftheirimminentdanger.
Rommelgivesnoaccountofpropagandausedagainstthe
Italians.Perhapsathislevelhewouldhavebeenunaware
18/51
4/8/2015
ofanysucheffort;however,thiswouldaccountforthe
hugenumbersoftroopswhosurrenderedtohimtroops,who,
asalreadymentioned,probablyreceivedlittleor
ineffective"counterpropaganda"fromtheirofficers.
Warmaterialsandthushadtoundergogreater
sacrificesinthestrugglethandidothercountriesand
armies;Italianpolicyofthelastfewdecades,
resultinginourarmybeinglesswellpreparedthat
others;themilitarycollapseofSerbia,Rumania,and
finallyandverygravethatofRussia,resultinginthe
concentrationofmostAustroHungarianforcesonour
front.
Weatherconditionsquiteunfavorabletous,such
as,amongothers,thebadweatherprevailingduringthe
monthofOctoberwhichmadelandandairobservation
moredifficult;thefog,whichnotablefavoredthe
AstroGermanartillery,aimedatknownandfixed
targets,aswellastheadvanceofenemyinfantryin
manysectorsoftheattack,butmadedifficultandat
timesimpossibleourdefensivebarragesandthe
adequatemaneuverofoursupportandreserveforces;
therainsfromOctober24to27...andthefullnessof
therivers,whichobstructedthemovementofourvery
heavycolumnsinretreatandthecrossingofthe
rivers...
Thefollowingmustbenumberedamongthefactors
whichdidindeedexerciseaninfluencebutonlyinsofar
asmilitaryconditions(andparticularlytheconduct
andtheresultsofthewaraswellasthemanagementof
thearmy'spersonneluntilOctQber1917)madepossible
thegrowthofthesefactorsandtheirevilinfluence,
whichotherwisewasnogreaterthantheaveragelevel
influenceexercisedonotherarmiesandpeople:
Thenaturalandpronouncedrepugnancefeltbymany
towardsacrifices,harmanddiscomforts,aswellas
familytiesthatattimeswereevenunhealthy.
Theconfluenceofsomepartiesincondoningand
favoringthelessdesirabletendenciesandactivities
ofthemasses;therefusalonthepartofthese
partiestoacceptresponsibilityforthewarwhenfate
wasunkindtothefortunesoftheEntente.(Thisand
theprecedingfactorconstitutetheessenceofthat
partofdefeatismnotnurturedbytheenemy.)
Theenemy'sintelligentandcunninglyeffective
propagandainthecountryaswellasamongthetroops.
Certainpoliticalevents,suchastheRussian
revolution,andpublicmanifestationsoccurringwithin
abriefspanoftime,suchastheremarkmadebythe
HonorableDeputyTrevesinParliament*,theSocialist
assembliesattendedbyRussianemissaries,theTurin
*OnJuly12,1917,ClaudioTreves,Official
Socialist,hadappealedtoallgovernmentsofEuropeto
hearkentothe"ultimatumoflifetodeath:bythe
comingwinter,notamaninthetrenches."
riots**andthePope'snoteonpeace.***
Andtheattitudeassumedbyapartofthepress
which,bydirectingpublicopiniontowardanexaltation
oftheHighCommand,contributedtotheweakeningof
thegovernment'sfunctionofcontrolovermilitary
operations.
Themilitarycausesofthedefeatmaybedivided
intotwocategories,inaccordancewiththeirinfluence
19/51
4/8/2015
ontheeventsinquestion.Thefirstofthese
categoriesisoflesserimportanceandconsistsofthe
technicalmilitarycauses.Theseare:
Defectsinthemilitaryapparatus.Althoughin
certainrespectsthesedefectswerenotableatthe
beginningofthewarandexercisedaninfluenceon
operationsinthefirstseveralmonths,theywerein
timelargelyeliminated.
Errorsintheconductofthewar,inoperationsas
wellasinthemannerinwhichtroopswereemployed.
Hadtheseerrorsbeenavoided,ourarmywouldhavebeen
abletomeettheenemyattackbetterpreparedwithmen
andequipmentandwithstrongermorale.
Faultsinthedeploymentofdefensesandinthe
arrangementofreserves.Someimprovidencein
logistics,especiallyinthearrangementanddeployment
ofcommunicationsandtransport.Thislackofadequate
prearrangementhadrepercussionsinthedifficulties
encounteredandlossessufferedduringthewithdrawal.
Thesecondcategoryincludesmilitarycauses
predominantlyofamoralenature.Inthejudgmentof
theCommission,thesecauseshadatrulyefficient
effectinthedisaster,butresponsibilityforthemis
notlimitedtothemilitarycommanders.Inseveral
instancesresponsibilityfallsalsoonthegovernment,
whichdidnotalwaysinterveneattheopportune
moment.Insubstance,theseappeartobethetrue
causes,whereastheonesnotedabovearerevealedas
concomitantcausesorfacilitatingcircumstances.
Thesetruecausesare:
Personaldefectsrevealedinthemannerofcommand
ofseveralgenerals,andtherepercussionsthese
defectshadamongtheirsubordinateofficers.
Adeformationinthefunctioningofthemilitary
hierarchy.Thisdeformationwasparticularlyevident
intherelieffromcommandofanexcessivenumberof
officersandintherelationsbetweensuperiorsan
subordinates.Theserelationshadbecomecharacterized
**LateinAugust1917breadriotsbrokeoutin
Turinwhichwererepressedbythemilitarywith41
dead,152woundedandinjured,andover600arrests.
***PopeBenedictXV'sNoteofAugust1,1917,
appealedtoallbelligerentstoendthe"useless
slaughter."
byfear,suspicion,insincerity,andattimeswereeven
spiteful.
Errorsinthemaintenanceofdisciplineandmorale
amongthetroops.Theseerrorswererevealed
particularlyintheinconsistencywithwhichdiscipline
wasapplied;inthetoofrequentdisregardofthe
regularproceduresofmilitaryjustice;inthe
applicationofnotalwaysjustifiedsummary
executions;andinthescantconcernshownforthe
moraleoftroopsandforadequateindoctrination.
Failuretoeliminatecertaininjusticesand
disproportionsinallottingtheburdensandsacrifices
ofwar;and,ontheotherhand,failuretoengagein
persuasiveactiontofightthewidespreadandmost
exaggeratednotionsregardingtheblightofdraft
evasion.*
Discouragementoccasionedbythewidespread
convictionnomatterwhetherjustifiedor
20/51
4/8/2015
exaggeratedthatthebloodsacrificesalready
performedandthosethatmightcomehadbeenandwould
befruitless.
Withpersonalregardtopersonalresponsibilities
andaccordingtotheabovementionedcauses,the
Commissionholdsthatresponsibilityshouldbeassessed
against:
GeneralCadorna,forimpropersuperintendenceof
cadresbyeliminatinganexcessivenumberofgeneral
andseniorofficers,byinspiringmeasureswhichwere
frequentlyandinopportunelycoerciveandwhichin
consequencedisturbedthemoraleoftheofficercorps
without,ontheotherhand,producingtheappropriate
improvementinmilitarytechniquethatmightjustify
themoralsacrificesincurred;fornottaking
appropriatecareineconomizingthephysicalandmoral
energiesofthetroopsand,especially,fortolerating
unrewardingsacrificesofbloodandforinciting
frequentdisregardoftheregularproceduresof
militaryjustice;andfinallyfornothavingattached
dueimportancetotheproblemofmaintainingthe
cohesionoftheseveralpartsinlargemilitaryunits.
GeneralCapello,forhavingemployedintheSecond
Armyasystemofpersonalcoercionwhichattimes
reachedthepointofvexationandwhichaggravatedthe
repercussionsensuingfromGeneralCadorna'smannerof
superintendence;andforhavingcontributedtothe
depressionofthetroops'moralebyexcessively
drainingtheirphysicalandmoralenergiesandbybeing
prodigalwithbloodindisproportiontotheresults
achieved.
*Accordingtorumorsthencurrenttherewereperhaps
asmanyasahalfmilliondesertersanddraftevaders
byJune1917.
GeneralPorro[DeputyChiefofStaffoftheArmy
underCadorna,fornothavingperformedhisdutiesin
suchawayastomoderatetheexcessiveeliminationof
officersandfornothavinginquiredintoandmade
knownthosefactorsthatdepressedthemoraleofthe
troops,thusbeingremissinhisdutytoprovidethe
ChiefofStaff[Cadorna]withthatcontribution
necessarytoinducethelattertotakemeasuresto
preventdegenerationinthefunctioningofthemilitary
hierarchy,tocorrectthesuperintendenceofthe
troops,andtomaintaintheorganiccohesionofthe
armedforces.
TheCabinetheadedbytheHonorableBoselli,for
nothavingperformedinapropermeasureitshighduty
ofsupervisionandcontrolofthearmy'smoraleandfor
nothavingtakenthemeasuresappropriatetothis
end".15
Theabovequotedexcerptsfromthecommissionsreportis
veryinterestinginthatitsupportsRommel'sobservationsonthe
battlefield.TheItaliangovernmentdidattempttocorrectthe
problembyreplacingCadorna.Cadornahad,infact,relievedan
excessivenumberofofficersandhisrapportwiththeCommander
oftheSecondArmy,GeneralLuigiCapello,wasverypoor.
Concernedwithprospectoftotaldefeat,thecountry'sany
politicalpartiesralliedbehindthecauseandwiththearrival
ofalliedreinforcements,Italywasabletocontaintheenemyat
thePiaveRiver;however,bytheendofthe11thIsonzobattle,
despiteitsrecognitionoftheaforementionedproblems,the
21/51
4/8/2015
ItalianArmyhadlost40.000dead,108,000woundedand18,000
missingallwithnegativeresultsinterritorygained..
So,byitsownadmission,theItaliangovernment,Italian
politicsandveryseniorofficersweretheculpritsinthepoor
performanceoftheItalianArmyinWorldWarI.Canone,then,
blametheItaliansoldierforthefailingsofthesystemthat
senthimtowar?
Anadditionalissuerelatingtothe"ignominy"ofdefeatis
thatofsurrender;specifically,whenisitacceptabletolay
downone'sarmsandcapitulatetotheenemy.Isthereastandard
bywhichonecanmeasurecourageandcowardiceinthefaceof
battle?Whatisthesignificanceoftheterm"meanstoresist"
inthefightingman'scredowhenreferringtothealternativeof
surrender?Thesearerhetoricalquestionswhichshouldbe
consideredbythereader.
Asbitterapillasitistoswallow,therehashardlybeen,
ifever,acountrywhosemilitaryforcesorunitsofitsforces
hasnothadtodealwiththeproblemofsurrender.Thepointis
thatitisnotlegitimatetopointthefingerinblameatthe
Italiansoldierforhisratherreadysurrenderwithout
consideringallthefacts,manyofwhichwehavealready
examined.
TheItalianarmedforces,bythebeginningoftheFirst
WorldWar,hadnotestablishedatraditionofvictoryinbattle
aspreviouslydiscussed.Withthatlackofconfidenceinthe
systemandinthatbaseofsupport,especiallywhenalarge
segmentofthepopulationwasopposedtothewar.itmusthave
beenexceedinglydifficulttoinspirethecommonsoldierwithan
aggressivespirit.ThePopealsoexertedatremendousinfluence
inthedailylivesofthetheItalianpeople.Wouldnotthe
common,faithfulsoldierhavebeeninclinedtoobeythePope's
edictandthrowdownhisrifleasanalternativetoriskinglife
andlimbforacausewhichwasnotclearlydefinedorsupported?
Thesethoughtsarenotconveyedtosomehowexculpatethe
manyItalianarmyunitswhichappeartohavesurrendered
prematurely.Theyareaddressedforthepurposeofdemonstrating
theeffectsofexternalinfluencesonmilitaryperformance.
Withoutdwellingontheeventsofthelastdaysofthewar
orthedifficultiescreatedbythearmisticewhichwassignedby
thecombatants,sufficeittosaythatthepoliticalcrises
whichgeneratedthewarwerenotsolvedinEuropeorwithin
Italy.Aftertheendofthewar,Italycontinuedtosufferfrom
instabilityandfromradicalismonbothendsofthepolitical
spectrum.ThischaospavedthewayfortheriseofFascismand
ultimatelyforthenextworldwarwhichsodevastatedthe
peninsula.
CHAPTERIII
ITALYSEEKSITSNATIONALIDENTITYUNDERMUSSOLINI:
THETRAGEDYOFWORLDWARII
In1921,theradicalFascistPartyofyoungBenitoMussolini
gainedafootholdintheItalianParliament.ByOctober31,
1922,theFascisterabeganwhenhebecamePrimeMinister(as
wellasMinisteroftheInteriorandMinisterofForeign
Affairs).Onthesurface,Mussolini'sgovernmenthadthe
appearanceofamoderatecoalitioninthat,besidesFascism,
therewasrepresentationbytheNationalists,SocialDemocrats,
andthePopularParty.Butby1924,Mussolinihadbecomea
dictatorinitstruestsense,andwiththattransitionto
dictatorship,Italywasonherwaytowarunderthetenuous
leadershipoftheblackshirts.
"Waralonebringsuptoitshighesttensionallhumanenergy
andpatsthestampofnobilityuponthepeopleswhohavethe
22/51
4/8/2015
couragetomeetit".1SuchwasMussolini'sutteranceashe
triedtomakehispeopleunderstandtheir"destiny".Butwithor
withouttheirconsent,hewouldattemptmakethatdestinycometo
pass.In1935,Ethiopia,thelastunclaimedlandbytheEuropean
powersinAfrica,becamethetarget.
PartlyoutofrevengeforthedisasteratAduwain1896,and
intheorytoestablishanoutletforherexcesspopulationandto
bindthevariousclassesofthenationtogether,Mussolini,with
theconsentofothermajorEuropeanpowers,movedhisforcesinto
positionfortheattackagainstthepoorlyequippedbitvery
warlikeEthiopians.Europeanobserversbelievedthat,
consideringthedesolatetheaterofoperations,theenemy
advantageoffightingontheirownsoil,andthegreatdistance
fromhome,itwouldtaketheItalianstwoyearstowintheir
war.ButItalywasabletofairlyquicklyovercomethenative
forcesinatwoprongedattackfromEritreaandSomaliaand
proceedtoAddisAbabawithinsixmonths.
Granted,EthiopiadidnothavemuchofanAirForceandthe
Italiansusedtheiraircrafteffectively(sometimesemploying
mustardgas),butthetriumphofthiswarwasintheefficient
useofengineering,technologyandlogistics.AstheItalians
movedtowardAddisAbaba,theirengineersconstructedroadsfor
logisticalsupplyandtelegraphforcommunications;therefore,
theywereabletomoveaheadsurefootedlybutrapidly.
ManywouldarguethattheEthiopianswerepushovers,
especiallyinviewoftheirowninternaldiscordandlackof
totalunityagainsttheirforeigninvader.(Manywentovertothe
Italiansideformoney).Buthoweverviewed,thiswasa
wellplannedandwellexecutedmilitaryoperation,atleast
comparedtopreviousfiascos..
AsaresultofthissuccessItaliansathomefeltvindicated
frompastfailuresandcouldnowholdtheirheadshighinthe
neighborhoodofEurope;however,thisnewfeelingofpower,
invincibilityandtrustinMussoliniwasshortlived.The
operationinEthiopiacreatedfalsehopeandconfidenceinthe
Italianarmedforces.OperationsatthebeginningofWorldWar
IIquicklydemonstratedtheactualcapabilitiesoftheItalian
armedforces,andtheyleftmuchtobedesired.
In1936,Mussolinibeganagenuinecampaignof
troublemakingintheEuropeanMediterraneanarea.Hemadepacts
withothernationsandthenignoredthem,heengagedina
propagandawaragainstGreatBritaintoundermineherinfluence,
andhesenttroopstoSpainbothassupportforFranco'sfellow
Fascistrevolutionandasaprovinggroundforhistroopsand
weapons.
In1939MussoliniswiftlytookthecountryofAlbaniaand
shortlythereaftersignedapactof"aggression"(waralliance)
withHitlerwhich,however,stipulatedthatnomajorcrisiswould
beinitiatedpriorto1942.WhenHitlerranacrossPolandin
1939andtheSecondWorldWarbeganinSeptemberofthatyear,
MussolinideclaredItalyanonbelligerent.Hisintentwas
twofoldtoallowmoretimeforhisarmedforcestorecoverfrom
theiradventuresinEthiopiaandSpain,andtowaitforeasy
victoriesasGermany'swarunfolded.
In1940,itappearedthatGermansuccessesinPoland,France
andNorwaywouldbringthewartoarapidclose.Concernedthat
Italymightlosehershareofthespoils,Romedeclaredwaron
BritainandFrance.MussoliniorderedattacksonBritish
positionsinEastAfricaandcoastalEgypt,buttheseoffensives
werebroughttoahaltrelativelyquicklybecauseofinadequate
equipment.
ButPerhapsoneofthegreatestmiscalculationsofthewar
23/51
4/8/2015
wasMussolini'sdecisiontoinvadeGreeceinanattempttosnatch
upasmuch"easy"landaspossiblebeforetheconflictended.
TheGreekcampaigntypifiesItalianpoliticalblundering.inthat
theFascistregimemisreadthestrategicsituationandgotthe
armedforcesinvolvedinanunwinablewar.
ItalycertainlyhadthemanpowertosupporttheFascists'
ambitionsbutitsindustrialbaseanditspreparationinmilitary
equipmentcouldnotsupportaprotractedwaragainstaresolute
enemy.
SinceMussolini'srisetopower,hehadsurroundedhimself
withmenwhofearedtocounterhiswill.Mussolinidecided
almostautonomously,thathewantedtheGreekIslandsofZante,
CephaloniaandCorfu,aswellasSalonikawithhisfinal
objectivebeingtheoccupationoftheentirecountry.
Mussolini'simpetuousnessisindicatedbyhisstatementtohis
staff,"Havingthusdefinedtheissue,Ihavealsodecidedthe
date,[oftheinitialattackonGreece],whichinmyopinionmust
notbepostponedevenbyanhour;thatis,the26thofthis
month.
Itwouldseemthat,inordertoplanfortheinvasionofa
foreigncountry,morethanpassingconsiderationshouldbegiven
tothestrategicinfluenceofneighboringstatesaswellasto
theresponseofenemyforcesofthetargetcountry;however,the
"Duce"wantedandreceivedonlycursoryinformationonboth.For
theGreekoperation,theDuce'sstaffthoughtthatitwouldbe
wisetoinvolveBulgaria,Greece'sneighbortothenorthtohelp
tieupGreekforceswhileItaliantroopsattackedtothesouth,
butasimportantasitwas,itwasonlyconsideredinpassingin
theplanningstages.ConfidentthattheBulgarianswouldrespond
intheaffirmativetohisrequest,Mussolinipostponedhis
approachtothem.
Estimatesofenemyresistancewerealsotoosketchyandnot
seriouslystudied.Mussoliniwastoldbyhisstaffthatthe
Greeksweremanifestlyindifferenttoaninvasionoftheir
countrybutinthecamemeetingtheyqualifiedthatwith,"From
informationsuppliedbyourinformantsitappearsthat,whiletwo
monthsagotheGreeksdidnotseeminclinedtoputupserious
resistance,nowtheyseemdeterminedtoopposeouraction".3
Mussolinididnotwanttohearofanydifficultiesinthe
operationandpersistedindraggingoutwordsofencouragement
fromhistimidstaff.CountGaleazzoCiano,MinisterofForeign
Affairs,finallystatedthat,"Itappearsthatthegreatmassof
theGreekpopulationisindifferenttoeverything,includingthe
prospectofourinvasion".Mussoliniwasalsotoldthatthe
Greekswerenot"peoplewholikefighting"Whatisamazing,
however,isthatduringtheplanningforthisoperation(crude
thoughitwas)otherinformationwascominginfromreliable
sourcesattheItalianministryinAthens.Grazzi,theminister
inAthenssaid,
ItisincomprehensiblethatCountCiano,whomust
havereadmyreports,letters,andtelegrams,should
havespokenofasharpdivisionbetweenthepeopleand
theleadingpoliticalandplutocraticclass,andthat
heshouldhavestatedthat,apartfromthisrestricted
classofbureaucrats,therestoftheGreekpeoplewere
indifferenttoalleventsthatmighttakeplace,
includinganinvasionbyus.Ifthereweregood
reasonsforsupposingthatourinformationwasso
totallyfalseasnottodeservesomuchascomparison
withthatsuppliedfromothersources,onlytwo
hypothesesarepossible:eitherwewerecomplete
idiotsorweactedinbadfaith.Ineithercasethe
24/51
4/8/2015
questionariseswhythegovernmentcontinuedatgreat
expensetomaintaininAthensadiplomaticmission
staffedbyidiotsortraitors".4
Thereason,though,thatthislegitimateinformation
regardingtrueGreeksentimentstowardanItalianinvasion,was
ignored,wasduetothepoliticaljealousiesandpersonal
ambitionsofMussoliniandhisgenerals.Mussoliniviewed
himselfasinaracewithHitlerforprestigeandhisgenerals
werecompetingwithoneanotherforpromotion.Theirattackon
Greecewouldbebasedstrictlyonhope,luck,andcontrived
reportsofGreekweaknessandlackofwill.
Duringthecourseofthismeeting,ViscontiPrasca,the
GeneralwhowastoleadtheinvasionofGreece,wastoldby
Mussolininottoworrytoomuchaboutcasualtiesandthathemust
continuetheattackeveniffacedbya"division".(Thatvery
statementdemonstratedafatalunderestimationofGreek
resistance).WhenthesubjectaroseofthenumberofDivisions
requiredtotakeAthens,theresponsefromPrascawasfiveorsix
divisions.Andwhenaskedhowmanydivisionswouldberequired
tooccupytheterritorybetweenItalyandAthens,Prascastated,
"duringtheinitialperiod,withthreemountaindivisions".5
AnindicatorofMussolini'sgeneralstrategiclackof
understandingisalsoseeninareplywhichhemadetohis
ForeignMinistryregardingthepotentialoftheUnitedStates
counteringItalianandotherauthoritarianpowers.Hestated,
"Americahasnomilitaryimportance".
ButdespiteMussolini'sblindnesstoforeignaffairs,hehad
anaggressiveandfightingspirit.Heconstantlyexhortedhis
generalstoattackwithdeterminationandviolence.Hischarisma
andaggressivenessdidseemtohaveaneffectonthetroopsin
thefieldandonhisstaunch,highrankingfascistfollowers;
however,therewasstillmuchreservation,thoughmostly
unexpressed,inlaunchingtheGreekcampaign.
MarshallPietroBadoglio,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff,
himselfhadverystrongreservationsabouttheoperationthatit
wasillconceived,buthewasnotresoluteenoughtoexpresshis
feelingstoMussolini.Badogliodidconfide,however,inthe
foreignminister,CountGaleazzoCianotoexpresshisconcern.
Cianoreferredtothemeetinginhiswritings:
MarshallBadogliocametoseemeandspoketome
veryseriouslyabouttheoperationinGreece.The
threechiefsofstaffareunanimouslyopposedtoit.
Hesaidthatthepresentforcesareinsufficient,and
thenavydoesnotbelieveitwillbeabletocarryout
anyunloadingatPreveza,becausethewateristoo
shallow.TherewasapessimisticnoteaboutBadoglio's
wholespeech;heforeseesaprolongationofthewar,
andwithittheexhaustionofourmeagerresources7"
Ciano,whowantedwar,disregardedBadoglio'sconcernsas
wellasthoseofthe"experts"suchasGeneralCavagnariwhosaid
thathewouldneedthreemonthstotransfermoredivisionsto
Albania,andGeneralPricolowhosaidthathewouldnotbeable
todeployforcesbeforeNovember.Cianooftenactedasabuffer
betweenMussolini'sGeneralsandtheDucehimself.Cianoreports
ofonemeetingwithMussoliniwhereinhewrote,
IwenttoseetheDuce.IntheantechamberI
foundSoddu[oneofhisGenerals]whohadspokento
Badoglio,whosaysthatiftheGreekoperationtakes
place,he[Badoglio]willresign.Ireportedallthis
totheDucewhowasalreadyinaveryillhumorbecause
oftheGrazianiaffair.Hehadaviolentoutburstof
angerandsaidhewouldgotoGreeceinpersonto
25/51
4/8/2015
witnesstheincredibleshameofItalianswhowere
afraidoftheGreeks.Heintendstomarchatall
costs.andifBadogliohandsinhisresignation,he
willacceptitonthespot.ButnotonlydidBadoglio
notsubmithisresignation,hedidnotevenrepeatto
Mussoliniwhathesaidyesterdaytome.Infactthe
DucesaidthatBadolglioinsistedonlyonafewdays
postponement,atleasttwo".8
Finally,onOctober28,1941,warwasdeclaredonGreece.A
majorblowwasfelt,however,whenonlyshortlybeforethe
declarationofwar,wordwasreceivedfromBulgariathatshe
wouldnot,infact,assistItalyinherendeavor.Mussolinihad
feltsoconfidentofhimselfthathehadonlypursuedthis
assistance16dayspriortotheassault.
Inthefinalanalysis,thereweretwofatalblunderswhich
affectedtheoutcomeofthewarwithGreece.Onewasthis
illconceivedrelianceonBulgariatotieupGreece'snorthern
flank.Thesecondwasthattheattackwasbasedonfalseand
contrivedinformationrelatingtounstableGreekinternalaffairs
andcorruptionamongitsgenerals.Mussoliniandhisclosest
blackshirtswerecompletelyblindedbythepleasantprospectof
conqueringtheGreekswithlittleornoeffort.Butoncethe
assaultbegan,itbecameplainlyclearthatthepredictionsand
concernsofthegeneralswerejustified.
TheattackonGreecewasimmediatelyboggeddown.Thegreat
offensivewhichMussolinihadenvisionedwasmetwitha
determinedGreekdefensewhichlefttheillequippedItalianArmy
instaticpositions.Thepatheticandseeminghalfheartedeffort
madebytheItaliangeneralswasfrustratingtoMussoliniandhe
continuallyblamedthemforhavinggivenhimincorrect
informationandfortheirdemonstratedlackofaggressive
spirit.Inreality,itwashewhowastoblameforthis
operation.Anditwashewhohadclosedhiseyestothereality
ofthesituation.Thefollowingisanexcerptofadiscussion
thatMussolinihadwithhisDeputyChiefofStaffwhich
demonstrateshisfrustrationwiththewareffort:
MUSSOLINI:TheGreeksnowhaveatenmilesalient.
ThesalientmaneuverIhavebeenhearingaboutforsuch
alongtimemustbecarriedoutwithoutdelay.Wehave
gottomaneuver.
BARTIROMO:Ordershavealreadybeengiven.
MUSSOLINI:Wehavegottostartmaneuvering,engaging
theenemy'sattention,wemustputanendtothis
passivity.
BARTIROMO:Yes.
MUSSOLINI:ButthemaneuveringIhaveheardtalked
abouthasneverresultedinourcounterattackinginany
direction.
BARTIROMO:Unfortunatelyithasneverbeenpossibleto
assembletheforces.
MUSSOLINI:Butyouhavedivisions.
BARTIROMO:Theyarenotcomplete.
MUSSOLINI:Aretheremanyprisoners?
BARTIROMO:Wehavenonewsofthe77thInfantry;I
thinksomehavebeenlost(onJanuary16the19th
BattalionoftheGreek15thDivisionhadsurprisedthe
77thRegimentbelongingtotheLupidiToscanaDivision
andhadtakenabout300prisoners).
MUSSOLINI:Bartiromo,thereisonlyonewayout.
Attack,attack!Ihavebeensayingthatfortwoweeks.
BARTIROMO:IknowthatthatishisExcellency
Cavallero's[CavallerowasChiefofStaffatthistime]
26/51
4/8/2015
intention,butsomethinghasalwaysbeenlacking,in
particular,ammunition.
MUSSOLINI:Theytellmethatshiploadsofammunition
leftyesterday.
BARTIROMO:Ihavebeeninformedthatsomethinghas
left.
MUSSOLINI:Bartiromo,wemustcounterattack,wemust
breakthespellthatforthepastninetydayshasbeen
makingusloseground,positionafterposition.Ifit
goesonlikethis,weshallfindourselvesinthesea,
andtherewillbenomoreposition.TheGreekswill
soonreachtheSkumbi,whichtheyaremakingfor.
BARTIROMO:Thereisnotimetolose.
MUSSOLINI:Inshort,forcesmustbeassembledonthe
rightprinciples.Wemustmaneuverandavoidthis
passivity.
BARTIROMO:Thatiswhatwearedoingandhavealways
beentryingtodo.
MUSSOLINI:IamgoingtoGermany.Thefirstquestion
theywillputtomeiswhetherIshallbeabletohold
thepresentline.WhatamItoanswer?
BARTIROMO:HisExcellencyCavallerotoldtheGerman
colonelthathewasconfidenthewouldbeabletohold
on.
MUSSOLINI:Thereisonlyonewayout.Attack!
BARTIROMO:Thatistrue,anditishisExcellency
Cavallero'sintention.
MUSSOLINI:ReportwhatIhavesaidtohisExcellency
Cavallero.9
BothMussolini'sfrustrationandBartiromo's"passivity"are
quiteapparentinthisdialogue.Butagain,itwasMussoliniwho
hadforcedthewaronhisgeneralswithoutallowingthem
sufficienttimetoprepare.Thatisnottosay,though,thatthe
generalswouldhavebeencompletelysuccessfulevenwithadequate
preparation.Aswillbeseen,theywereoftenflawednotonlyin
determinationbutalsointactics.
Agreatprincipleofleadershipisfoundintherelationship
betweenleaderandandfollower;thatis,theremustexist
betweenthemmutualconfidence,respectandloyalty.Forthe
Italians,thisprinciplewaslackinginthisandother
campaigns.Mussolinineverhadrespectforthefightingspirit
oftheItalianpeople.Hisfeelingsarereflectedinastatement
fromCountCiano'sdiary:
"Grimfacedandnervy,heisshakenbythenews
fromAlbania.Nothingdramatichashappened,butagain
wehavewithdrawnandleftmanyprisonersinthe
enemy'shands.Themostseriousthingisthattheunit
concernedwastheLupidiToscana,adivisionof
excellentreputationandgreattradition,recently
arrivedinAlbania,onwhichgreathopeswerebased.
Hetalkedatlengthaboutallthis;hereiteratedhis
pessimismabouttheItalianarmyandpeople.Hecannot
explainthereasonforthings.Herepeatedseveral
times:"IfonOctober15anyonehadpredictedwhathas
actuallyhappenedsince,Ishouldhavehadhimshot".
Asthestalematecontinued,moreItalianDivisionsarrived
inAlbaniaasthejumpingoffpointfortheoffensive.Itwas
hopedbyMussolinithatthisincreaseinmanpowerwouldhave
allowedhimtocontinuetheassaultthroughGreece;however,
majorproblemsprecludedthis.Themajorlimitationwasinthe
trainingofthesoldierssenttothisverydifficultterrain
underextremelydifficultweatherconditions.Thetrainingof
27/51
4/8/2015
thereservebattalionssentinwasdescribedbyCavalleroas
being"summaryornil".Buteventhethemosthighlytrained
battalions,suchasthepreviouslymentionedLupidiToscana,
werenotabletoaccomplishtheirmissions.
ThefieldgradeofficerssenttoGreeceasreplacementswere
equallyweakincombattraining.Manyhadbeenpulleddirectly
fromcivilianlifeandwereexpectedtoperformunderthemost
difficultofcombatconditions,andyetforthemostpartthey
didnotevenrememberbasictactics.Theywerecalleduponto
leadmenwhomtheydidnotknow,againstanenemyaboutwhomthey
knewnothinginacountrywithwhichtheywerecompletely
unfamiliar.
Thetacticsthatthesemenwereforcedtoemploywere
createdatthetopbygeneralswhobothsufferedfromlackof
judgementandwhowereafraidtorisktheircareersbymaking
boldmoveswhichmighthavefailed.Suchfailuresinjudgement
andlogicareevidencedinCavallero'stacticofattackingthe
enemy'sstrongestpointto"wearhimdown".Hisson,whowas
withhiminAlbaniasaidofhisfather:
"TheoffensiveintheSesnizzaValley,thevalue
andprospectsofwhichweredeniedbythetabletop
strategists,hadthedefiniteaimofrelievingthe
pressureonthedefenseintheadjoiningValonasector,
notbymakingourmaximumeffortattheenemy'sweakest
point,whichistheclassicalaimofeveryoffensive
operation,buybystrikinghimwherehewasstrongest
inordertoweardownhisstrength.12
MarioCevo,authorofthebook,TheHollowLegionsalsosays
thefollowingofCavalleroandtheItaliangenerals:
Cavallerohadatlastconstructedhis"wall".He
hadtakenoverabankruptsituationandhadmanagedto
staveofftotaldisaster.Havingsucceededinthat,he
relapsedintothedefensivementalityofItalian
generals,alwaysovercautiousandterrifiedofrisking
theirepauletsbyanalloutattack.Therewasone
ItaliangeneralwhohadtheimpulsivenessofaRommel,
andthatwasViscontiPrasca,butimpulsivenesswasthe
onlyqualityofRommel'sthathepossessed.Theother
generals,almostwithoutexception(oratanyrate
withoutnoticeableexceptions),likedgood,solid
fronts,massedwithmennotwithmaterials,whichwere
alwaysshort...Cavallerointendedtoensurethatno
catastrophehappenedtohim.13
GeneralGastoneGambaraoftheItalianVIIICorpsplanned
foralimitedoffensiveduringtheendofFebruarywiththe
intentofbreakingtheformidableGreekline;however,despite
hisaggressivenessandgoodintent,thefailureofproper
logisticalplanningresultedinshortagesofpackanimals,
artilleryandgeneralsupplies.Anadditionalproblemwasthat
Gambaraintendedtomakethebreakthrough"atapointwherethe
Greekswerenotonlystrongbutaggressivelypoised".Basedon
thisandotherevents,thereseemedtobeafundamentalflawin
tacticalandlogisticalthinkingbytheItaliangenerals.
Despitereservationsintheprospectofsuccess,"offenses"
continuedtobeplannedandfought,althoughneverwiththedrive
andenthusiasmthatMussoliniwanted.Onesuchdrivewasthat
conductedbytheIV,VIIIandXXVCorpswhichwastofinallyget
theItalianArmymovingontowardAthens.ButasMussolini
lookedon,hisDivisionsagaingotboggeddowninattacksand
counterattacks,manyofwhichwerefoughtwithgrenadesand
bayonets.OneDivisioncommanderwas"ill"onthedayofthe
offensivewhichpromptedMussolinitosay,
28/51
4/8/2015
Thesegeneralswhoaretakenillonthedayofan
offensivemakeonewonder.Don'tyouthinkthatthese
generalswouldshowalittlespirit,alittleelan,and
aboveallhavealittleinitiative?LookatRommel,
whoisrestoringthesituationinLibyawithasingle
divisionandareconnaissancegroup".14
Cervicharacterizesthebattleofthenextdayasan
offensivewhichhad,..."becomearoutine,abloody,heroic,
desperate,kindofafuriousknockingatadoorthatrefusedto
openinsteadofablowwithabatteringramthatknockeditfrom
itshinges".Mussolinicontinuedtorantandraveathis
generalstryingtogetthemtomove.Priortodepartingbackto
Italy,hesaidtoGeneralGeloso:
Itisabsolutelynecessarytopersist.The
operationalplancannotbechangedafterfourdays.
Hill1308ontheTrebescinesanditseasternslopes
mustbeneutralized,andthentheattackingcolumns
mustgoforward.Wemustattacktomorrow,otherwise
thetroopswillbegintogetrootedtothegroundand
thinktheoperationisover.TheGreeksmustbekept
underfireallday.Theanswertothemortarisrapid
movement.Wemustinsistontheplanaslaiddown.A
militaryvictorybeforetheendofthemonthis
absolutelyessentialtotheprestigeoftheItalian
army.Ihavealwaysdoneeverythinginmypowerto
keepthereputationandprestigeoftheItalianarmy
high,butnowabreakthroughisabsolutelyessential.
IhaveinstructedhisExcellencyGuzzonitosendhere
alltheammunitionthereisinItaly,becausethe
Italianarmyishere,thewarishere,anditishere
thatwemustwin"15
Andso,despiteonlyaveryremoteprospectofsuccess,
Mussolini'sarmycontinuedtoflailfarawayfromhome.The
descriptionofbattlebythosewhofoughtinGreeceisagraphic
portrayalofdefeat.Itisapictureofpitifulpreparedness.
Thiswasanarmywhosepoliticalleadershadthrownitintothe
breachonlyhopingsomehowthatitwouldendure.Captain
FernandoCampione,whowasattachedtotheSienaDivision,
describesonsuccessivedatesinhisdiaryhow,overashort
periodoftimehisDivisionwadtransformedfromanenthusiastic,
althoughcautiousgroupofsoldiers,toadisillusionedbandof
menfightingtheelementsandenemybulletsfortheirvery
existence:
[Datenotindicated]"Cavalry,mingledwiththe
infantry,withdrawalongtheslopesoftheserugged
mountains,andthissuddenandunexpectedretreatis
notunderstoodbythesevaliantmen,whocannot
understandthereasonforthischangeofdirection.
Anotherinfantrymanislyingontheroad.Hishands
arecontracted,ashellsplintertoreopentheright
sideofhisstomach,wheretheclottedbloodhadformed
ahugedarkfilthystainonhisjacket.Hewillbe
buriedthisevening,probablybesidetheriveratthe
footofasmallisolatedmountain."
21November...withdrawaloftheSienaDivision
grewhastierandlessorderly,assumedtragicand
grotesqueaspectsofallwarepisodes.Inspiteofthe
behaviorofafewundisciplinedmen,thetroopsasa
wholearemaintainingorderandhavefoughtwell.
29November"Somesoldiersaredragging
themselvesalonglimping,othershaveputtheir
knapsack,rifle,cartridgepouchonamason's
29/51
4/8/2015
pushcart...Theyaremarchingheavily,slowly".
2December"Whatwithkilled,wounded,missing,
sick,etc.wehavemorethan2,000menoutofaction".
4December"Thesightofourretreatingtroops
issadderthanever,becauseofthepainfulsightof
longcolumnsoftired,tatteredsoldiersslowly
draggingthemselvesalong".
14December"morethanninetymulesarelying
alongtheroad,eithersinglyoringroupsoftwoor
threeatvariousintervals;theycollapsedfrom
exhaustionandwereabandonedonthespotwithall
theirload.Themajorincommanddragshimselfalong
withhisfeetaffectedbythebeginningoffrostbite.
Hisserious,emaciated,lividfacebetraysthetragedy
ofthedaysandnightspassedinthecoldandsnow.He
coughscontinually,andinspiteofhisstateof
obviousexhaustion,hisserenityisadmirable.
17December"Signsofdisintigrationinunitsof
the32ndInfantryRegimentcreatepanicandalarmat
headquarters.Therearenoreserves,thereisnothing
tofallbackon.Sowehadtoturntothedivisional
carabinieriandaguardcompanyconsistingofoldermen
recalledtothecolors.Muledrivers,truckdrivers,
everyoneavailablehasbeenthrownintothedefense,
thewholegarrisonofHimarahasbeencollectedunder
thecommandofacolonel.Intheareawherethesnow
is,itissaidthatfortymenarefrozentodeath
daily.Itisnotthefightingthatkills,but
exhaustionthatbringsterrorandhumiliation.16
ThiskindofsufferingwaspracticallyuniversalforItalian
troopsfightinginGreece.Thesupplysystemhadfailedthe
resultbeinglittlefoodandinsufficientclothingagainstthe
cold.Simplereplacementforbootsanduniformswhichbecame
shreddedbytheelements,wasnonexistent.Nevertheless,the
Italiansfoughtwithwhattheyhad,asintheaccountofSecond
LieutenantPeppinoAntoliniofthe5thAlpiniDivision:
"...Weareonreducedrations...Mydetachmentis
protectedbyCaptainAdrianoAuguadri'sNo.44
Company;AuguadriisalibrarianatComowhomIshould
liketotalkaboutforalongtime,becauseheisthe
mostcompletesoldierIhaveevermet.Heattacked
Hills2109and2110onGuriiTopit.TheGreekswere
takenbysurprise.Iwasslightlywoundedby
handgrenadefragments,andmysergeantgotabulleton
hisforehead,fortunatelydivertedbyhishelmet.So
hegotawaywithastreakonhishairyhead.AGreek
leaptatmewithhisbayonet,whichcutthesleeveof
mywhitewindjacketwithouthurtingme.Ifiredmy
pistol,andmywindjacketwasreddenedwiththepoor
devil'sblood.Wealsotookabouttenprisoners.
Incrediblebuttrue,wewerethenorderedtoleavethe
positionswehadgained.SotheGreeksreoccupiedthe
twoheights.Iamsureweshallpaydearlyforthat
crazyorder".17
Thenumerousaccountsofclosecombatandofthebraveryof
theItaliansoldiersdespitetheaforementioneddeficiencies
speakswellforthem.Inspiteoftheirefforts,however,to
supportthewilloftheDuce,theywereabletodonomorethan
holdthelineandtheypaiddearlyfornothing12,000casualties
andnogaininterritory.
ItisarathersadcommentaryontheItalianpeople
that,despitethesacrificesthatthesecommonsoldiersmadeto
30/51
4/8/2015
fulfillsomehollowdestiny,Mussolinisaidofthemashe
departedforItalyonMarch21,"Iamdisgustedbythis
environment.Wehavenotadvancedonestep.Theyhavebeen
deceivingmetothisveryday.Ihaveaprofoundcontemptforall
thesepeople.18
Perhapsby"thesepeople"Mussoliniwasreferringtohis
generalswhomheusedasscapegoatsforthefailureofthewar.
Butonecanreadilyseethat,despitetherhetoricandthe
bombasticspeechestothepeopleinwhichheexaltedthemandthe
Italiannation,hesecretlyhadnoconfidenceinthem.
Onecanonlyguesshowthewarwouldhaveprogressedhadthe
generalsreceivedtheextratimetopreparethattheyhad
initiallyrequested.Thiswillremainunanswered,butashas
alreadybeenstated,asidefromlogisticproblems,theywere
deficienttacticallyandlackedaggressiveness.
Mussolinicouldsubjecthisarmytothishumiliationonlyso
long.Asrepugnantadecisionasitwas,Mussoliniwasforcedto
acceptthehelpoftheGermanArmytorescuehimfromwhatwould
havebeenanendlesswarofattritionifnotatotaldefeatat
thehandsoftheGreeks.Itisinterestingtonotethat,during
theearlieryearsofHitler'sandMussolini'srisetopower,
HitlershowedagreatdealofadmirationfortheDuce's
administrativeabilityandhisapplicationofFascisminrunning
Italy;however,asaresultofMussolini'militaryfailuresin
France,Greece,YugoslaviaandNorthAfrica,Hitlersooncameto
viewItalyasanally,withmixedfeelings.
Asthewarcontinuedonseveralfronts,theSupreme
HeadquartersinGermanynowwatchedcarefullyasItalyconducted
operationsinNorthAfrica.Strategically,NorthAfricawas
viewedasanItalianaffair,andaccordingtoGeneralmajor
EckhardChristianoftheSupremeHeadquartersOperationssection,
Thedecisioninthespringof1941todispatch
GermantroopstoItalianNorthAfricawasnotbasedon
aspecialmilitaryobjectiveoronastrategicplanon
broadlines.Itspranginitiallyfromthenecessityof
supportingtheItalianMediterraneanposition,checking
theBritishadvancetoTripoliandpossiblyregaining
Cyrenaica.19
DespiteHitler'sotherwisediabolicalqualities,hewas,at
leastloyaltohisallies,includingMussolini;however,
accordingtoGeneralChristian:
AdolfHitlerhadforalongtimecorrectly
appraisedtheactualworthoftheItalianWehrmacht.
Hedistrusteditsleadership,particularlythecorpsof
generalsandtheroyalhouse.Hefeltcontemptfor
Italianmilitarymorale,criticizedtheirequipmentand
deridedtheirtactics.Howeverhedidnotpermitthat
theseviewsofhisshouldreachtheDuceorthatGerman
troopcommandersintheItaliantheatersofwarshould
adoptexcessivelydrasticmeasuresindealingwith
theirItalianbrothersinarms.Hedemandedthat
Italiansensitivitiesandvanitybeaccorded
considerationunderallcircumstances".20
Mussolini'sinitialhopeofconductinganindependentand
"parallelwar"alongsidehisAxispartnerfaded.AstheGermans
movedintoItalytoassisttheItaliansintheconductoftheir
warintheMediterraneanandNorthAfrica,Italyfeltthe
dominationofGermanpower.ThegreatquestioninItalynow
became"Whoistheenemy?"
CHAPTERIV
OPERATIONSINNORTHAFRICA
Infightinghis"parallelwar",Mussolinihadintendedfor
31/51
4/8/2015
HitlertokeephisforcesintheNorthwhilehemaintained
controlof"MareNostro"theMediterranean.Hedefeatedhisown
purpose,however,becausehewasunabletosinglehandedlydefeat
hisenemies,andherequired,almostwithoutexception,German
assistanceinfightinghisbattles.TheGermansweretherefore
requiredtobecomedeeplyinvolvedinsupportingtheItalians
bothinmaterielandinactualcombatforces.Onethingcanbe
saidforHitlerhewas,atleast,aloyalallytohisfriend,
Mussolini.HitlerhadbeenopposedtoItaly'sentryintothewar
inthefirstplace,butwhenMussolinicouldresistnolonger,
enteredthewar,andmadeapoorshowing,Hitlersupportedhim
withallmeansavailable.Ofcourse,Germanassistancewasn't
completelyaltruisticlosingItalywouldalsomeanexposingthe
southernflankandpossiblylosingthewar.
OneofthebestpostwarevaluationsofAxisoperationsin
theMediterraneanandNorthAfricawasprovidedbyFieldMarshall
AlbertKesselring.HehadbeensenttoRomeinNovemberof1941,
alongwithhisSecondAirForce,toactasCommanderinChief,
South,fortheGermanWehrmacht.Hisspecificdutieswereto
supportRommel'sAfrikakorpsandtorestorethesupplysituation
whichhadbecomecriticalduetoBritishcommandoftheseaand
air.
Kesselring'sreportis,forthemostpart,anunbiased
appraisalofItalianperformancefromthehighestlevelsof
commanddowntothecommonsoldier.Hisopinionscorroborate
thoseofotherauthoritieswhohavebeenquotedinthisstudy;
therefore,muchofhisreportisincludedheretoallowthe
readeraccesstothemindofonewhosawtheItaliansoperate
firsthand.
Kesselringstatesinhisreportthat,
ItisanestablishedfactthattheItalianarmed
forceshavenotfoughtconvincinglyandsuccessfully
eitherinWorldWarIorII.Exceptionalperformances,
whichhavebeenregisteredinbothwars,willnotbe
discussedinthismanuscriptbecauseotherwisethe
picturedrawnbythebulkoftheItalianforceswill
onlybedistorted.Theresultofpartlyextremely
bloody,butunsuccessfulbattlesinWorldWarIwere
panickyretreatswhichcouldonlybeinterceptedby
measuresofsupportundertakenbytheEntente;during
WorldWarII,theseretreatsresultedinthevoluntary
withdrawalfromthecombatteambycapitulating.Both
finalsituationswereoflittlecomforttoItaly's
allies.Iwanttoomitthecolonialwarssince,
despiteseveralsimilarobservations,theiroriginal
situationsaretoodifferentfromamoderntechnical
war.1
Kesselringalsodiscussesregionaldifferencesbetween
Italians:
TheItaliansfromtheNorthcannotbecompared
withtheItaliansfromtheSouth.Apartfromthat,the
Sicilians,andinsomecasesalsotheSardinians,have
inadditionastrongaversion,whichgoesasfaras
openhostilitytowardtheItaliansofthemainland.
Thecitydwellers,suchasforexampletheNeapolitans,
areinacategorybythemselves,andthedifferences
betweenthewealthyandthefarmers,forinstance,can
scarcelybeovercome.Theconnectinglink[however]is
thecatholicchurchandthetremendousinfluenceofthe
churchonthesimpleItalianpeopleandItalian
womanhoodasawhole.TheItaliansaresoutherners,
andtheyarehotbloodedwithalltheadvantagesand
32/51
4/8/2015
disadvantagesinherentintheirorigin.Theupper
classesandtheworkerspossessasurprisingamountof
mentalandphysicalmobility,hightechnicalabilities,
andinitiative...ontheotherhand,theruralItalians
fromthesouthareamassofpeoplewho,likechildren,
canbeledanywhere.TheItalian[southern]iseasily
contented;heactuallyhasonlythreefashionable
passions:coffee,cigarettesandwomen.2
AccordingtoKesselring,theunevendistributionofwealth
broughtaboutanaturalanimositybetweenthefewrichandthe
majoritywhicharepoor,andhesaysofthis,"Inthis
connection,asinmanyothers,existfundamentaldifferences
whichsomehowaffectthearmedforces.[but]thesensefor
familytiesandcommunitylifeiscommontotheentire
population".3Kesselring'spointhereisthatthegreat
diversityofthepeopleresultedinamilitaryforcewhichlacked
cohesionandsenseofpurpose.Perhapsthoseatthehighest
levelsofgovernmentandthosefewwelleducated,understoodthe
conceptofnationalism,butthecommonsoldierwasoften
dedicatedonlytohisfamily,perhapstohisvillageandfinally
tohisownpreservation.Kesselringdiscussesinmoredetailthe
situationintheMediterraneanwhenhearrivedinNovember1941:
Itwascharacterizedbythebreakdownofthe
supplysystemservingAxisforcesinAfrica.This
breakdownwasbecomingincreasinglyevident.British
commandoftheseaandairoverMediterraneanwaters
becamemoreandmorepronounced.Maltawasanavaland
airbase.Assuchithadbecomethecenterof
attention.Rommel'spositioninAfricahadbecome
critical.Hewasfightingadelayingactioneastof
Derna.Hewashamperedinhisoperationbythe
presenceofinfantrydivisionsand,particularly,by
Italiandivisionsoflowcombatefficiency.4
InhisgeneralevaluationoftheItalianforces,hesays,
AfricawasthetheaterofwaroftheItalians.In
Albania,Greece,Croatia,andFranceforcesweretied
downinconsiderablenumbersandtoanextentwhichI
donotquiteunderstand.Thereservoirofyouthsof
draftableagehadbyfarnotbeendrained
sufficiently.Continuedcolonialwarshadcausedheavy
loses.ManycircleswereperceptiblytiredofwarThe
wareffortwasdirectedfromthehomelandandthe
homelanddidnotfeeltheimpactofthewar.Inmy
opinionthewarwasnotconductedinamanner
correspondingtotheresponsibilityoftherestofthe
nationtothefrontlinesoldier.Therewasacertain
listlessness.Whereatotaleffortofeveryman,woman
andmachinewasneeded,halfwaymeasureswere
adopted.Thisinsufficiencyinthepersonaland
materialeffortwasnotduetoeffectiveshortages,but
toanincomprehensiblerestraint.Iwasableto
establishthisfactafterItaly'sdefectionwhileIwas
observingmanpowerathandincampsandports".The
followingstatementisimportant,inthatKesselring
makesanobservationregardingthelossofthewar:
"Regardlessofwhetheritwastheabsenceofan
overallsurveyoveravailablestocksandthelackof
familiaritywiththerequirementsofthecampaign,
whetheritwastheideaoffacilitatingthetransition
topeacetimeeconomythroughsmallerinvestmentduring
thewar,orwhetheritwaspurebusinessspirit,there
isonefactthatstandsout,andthatisthetruththat
33/51
4/8/2015
theattendantdisadvantages[shortcomings]resultedin
thelossofAfricaandSicily".
"TheItalianarmedforceswereonthewholenot
preparedforwar.Ratherthantakecognizanceof
thingsastheyreallystood,theItalianCommandandI
believeImayexcludeCavalleroindulgedinwishful
thinking.Germanaidwasrequestedintherequired
amountswhenitwastoolateandwhentheusefuleffect
ofthataidwasnolongerinproportiontotheeffort
made.Igainedtheimpressionthatthisrestraintgrew
outoftheprestigeofaprideinheItalianarmed
forcesandtheirachievements.ShortlybeforeItaly's
defection,thelastChiefofStaff,General
(Generaloberst)Ambrosio,effectedachangeintactics
anddemandedsuchnonsensicallyhighperformancesof
troopsandmaterialthat,judgingfromthenatureand
scopeofthesedemands,subsequentshadyintentions
couldbeguessed."
"TheItaliansoldiercannotbecomparedtothe
Germansoldier.Training,initselfinsufficient,was
conductedonapeacetimebasisandonbarrackslevel;
fieldservicewasneglected.Therewasalackof
contactbetweenofficersandmen.Iftheenlistedmen
hadnotbeensopitifullynaiveandeasilysatisfied,
theconsequenceswouldhaveconsistednotonlyofa
defeat,butalsoofamutinywithintheArmedforces.
Thequalityofhighercommandrangedfromgoodtovery
good.Withwelltrainedandwellequippedtroopsit
shouldundoubtedlyhavebeensuccessful.Thequality
deterioratedrapidlytowardthelowerechelonsandyet,
exceptionsprovedtherule.Iobservedunitsofthe
threeservicesoftheItalianarmedforcesthatcould
competewithanyEuropeantroopsssfarascourageand
aggressivespiritareconcerned".5
Kesselring'sanalysisofhighercommandsisinterestingbut
debateableinthatitwasoftenthedecisionsofthehigher
commandswhichgottheItalianarmedforcesintotheir
predicaments.Politicalinfightingbetweenhighranking
officerswasaproblemwhichdatedbacktoWorldWarIandhada
negativeimpactthroughoutWorldWarII.Hisevaluation
continues:
"ArmyAfrica:Therewerenotenough[Italian]
motorizedunits.Tanksdidnothavesufficient
antitankprotection.Theirarmamentwas
unsatisfactory.Antitankweaponswereinsufficientin
numberandinefficientinperformance.Infantry
weaponswereinadequate.Artillerywasofhigh
quality,butnotadaptedforactionagainstAllied
artilleryduetoinsufficientrange.Signal
communicationsfacilitieswerenotdeveloped
adequately.Supply,includingthatofrations,was
unsatisfactory.
Thenumberofdivisionshardlyapproachedthe
levelofminimumrequirements.Thequalityofthe
divisionsleftmuchtobedesired.Divisionsof
highercombatefficiencywereavailableinItaly.The
problemsoffurlough,relief,andrationshada
destructiveeffectonmorale."
Sicily:Thereweretwodivisionsofmedium
quality;therestwerebelowaverage.Itisdifficult
tovisualizehowbadlycoastaldefenseshadbeen
neglected.6
34/51
4/8/2015
BecauseKesselringwaschargedwiththelogisticsupportof
NorthAfrica,aprimaryconcernwasthatofshipping.Hewas
quitecriticalofItaly'scontributioninthiseffortandrefers
toitasa"fairweatherfleet".Althoughhetermedthemorale
ofthefleettobehigh,deficienciesinequipment(duetothe
ageofthefleet)precludeddaytimeduelswithenemyfleets:
"TherewasacertainItalianreluctancetorisk
thelossofshipsperhapsinhopeofpreservingthe
fleetforthelongawaitedpeace.Themerchantfleet
wasnever,therefore,putonawartimefooting.In
fact,theItaliannationneverfeltcompelledto
totallymobilizeforwarbothinmanpowerandindustry
despitethedefeatsshehadsufferedinthepastpartly
forthosereasons.InpartialdefenseoftheItalian
fleet,therewasatremendousshortageoffueloiland
coalwhichoftenimmobilizedboththeGermanand
Italianfleets".Kesselringmakesapoignant
statementregardingwaringeneral,butitapplies
particularlywelltotheItalianfleetinthis
instance,andthatis:"Victorycannotbeexpected
whereactionisgovernedbyfearoflosses".8
OnefacetoftheItaliannavymustbementionedbefore
continuingwiththegeneralevaluationofthearmedforces.
DespitethefactthattheItalianbattlefleetwasneveremployed
againstenemyconvoys,theNavydidpossessanassetwhichcaused
considerableconcerntotheBritishTheDecimaFlottigliaMAS"
(theSeaDevils)Thisunitwasagroupofselectseamenwho
developedtechniquesforsinkingenemyshippingthroughtheuse
ofhumanguidedtorpedoescalled"maiali"or"pigs",aswellas
frogmenandexplosiveboats.Throughcourageanddaring,these
menwereabletosinkoveraquarterofamilliontonsofBritish
shippingbeforetheBritishrealizedwhatwashappeningtothem.
Thebook,TheSeaDevils,writtenbyValerioBorghese,Commander
oftheDecimaFlottigliaMAS,describesindetailtheexploitsof
thisgroupanddemonstratesnationalism,patriotismandcourage
rivalingthatofanyoftheworld'sgreatmilitaryforces.This
coincideswithKesselring'sobservationthattherewere
definitelyexceptionstothegeneralrulethatItalianforces
weresubstandard.
Rommel,inthemeantime,hadtocopewithforceswhich,
becauseoffactorsalreadymentioned,didnotfunctionnearlyas
wellastheDecimaFlottigliaMAS.BecauseofRommel'slackof
confidenceinItalianforces,heemployedthemaccordingtotheir
combatefficiencyandin"sectorswheretheirfailurewouldnot
causeadisaster".Theywereusuallyplacedincloseproximity
toGermanforceswherethelattercouldactasascreen.
KesselringsaidoftheItalianDivisionsfightinginTunisiain
January,1943,that,
...whenevertheenemyattackedtheItalian
mountainpositions,hesucceededinbreakingintothe
valleyandinflictingheavylosses.German
counterattackshadtorepairthedamage...theItalians
couldnotbetrustedevenwithmissionsofminor
importance".
WhileItalianandGermanforcesflounderedinNorthAfrica,
theslowpacedeffortathomeinItalyfrustratedtheGermans.
Mussolini'sresponsetoGermancomplaintsofItalianlackof
dedicationwasthattheItalianpeoplewere"warwearyfromlong
andexhaustingcolonialwars,andthattoomuchpreciousblood
hadbeenspilled".9
GeneralCavallero,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff,recognized
thedeficiencyintheItalianmentalitytowardthe"totalwar"
35/51
4/8/2015
conceptandhemadeeveryattempttocoordinategovernmentand
publicinstitutionstopullItalyoutofitspeacetimeattitude
butwhenCavallerowasreplacedthateffortended.Kesselring
saidthat,duringhisstayinRome,he
neverhadtheimpressionthatthepeopleknewfrom
thebeginningthattheywerefightingfortheirvery
existence,butthattheybecameawareofthedrama,
whichwasunfolding,onlyinthecourseofthewar,
whentheyhadtoundergotheairattacksandhadlost
theircolonialempireandtheislandsinfrontofthe
mainland...Ishallneverforgettheimpressionof
peacetimelifeRomemadeonmeatthetimeofthe
battlesfortheAnzioNettunobeachheadwhichwere
ragingnearby".10
AmajorGermanconcernwasthepoortraininggivento
Italianforces.Theyseemedtohaveagarrisonmentality,and,
infact,muchoftheirtrainingwasdoneingarrisonatotally
inappropriatepracticeforexposingtroopstothehardshipsof
thebattlefield.Kesselringsaid,"Thetrainingremained
superficial,withouthavingreachedasatisfactorylevel.One
onlyhastocloselywatchasimplechangingoftheguard
proceduretoarriveatthisjudgement.TheItaliansoldierwas
notasoldierfromwithin".11
Returningtothesubjectofarmamentandweaponsthe
Italianswerehopelesslyantiquatedinthisarea.Manyexperts
feelthattheItalianshadthepoorestsmallarmsofallthe
combatantsofthewar.Theirantitankandantiarmorweapons
wereextremelyscarceandwhattheydidhave,suchas40mm
antitankgunswerealmosttotallyineffectiveagainstenemy
armor.Italianshipshadnoradarandcouldnot,therefore,
fightatnight,nordidtheyhaveantisubmarinewarfare
capability,whichrenderedthemuselessforconvoyescorting.
TheAirForce,foritspart,wasequippedwithplanesdeficient
inarmament,speedandcommunications.Asforweaponsusedin
thedefenseofthehomelandwhatfewantiaircraftgunsexisted
wereentirelyantiquatedanduseless.
Wehavealreadynotedtheweakofficerenlistedrelationship
whichexistedduringWorldWarI.Thattraditioncontinuedinto
WorldWarIIandwasobservedwithconcernbyKesselring.He
said,
Theordinarysoldierreceivedeveninthe
fieldentirelydifferentrationsfromthoseissuedto
noncommissionedofficersandofficers.Thesizeof
therationwasmultipliedaccordingtorank,andlarger
amountsobviouslyalsomeantabetterchoiceofgood
food.Theofficersateaccordingtotheirranks,
increasinglywellandcopiously.Theordinarysoldier
wasissuedthemostfrugalration;haditbeen
plentifulandgood,theofficerwouldobviouslynot
haveneededthedouble,orstillhigher,ration
quantity.Theofficers,etc.ateseparatelyby
themselves,withoutcontactwiththeirmen,oftennot
knowingwhatandhowmuchtheyreceived.Thus,the
wartimecomradeship,themainfeatureofwhichisthe
communityoflifeanddeath,wasbeingundermined...I
haveoftenpointedouttoCavallero,whatadangerous
effecttheabovementionedconditionshadonthemorale
ofthemen...Ihavepersonallyexperiencedthatour
Germanfieldkitchenswerebeingpracticallybesieged
byItaliansoldiers,whileIwaseatingexcellentlyon
thecustomaryofficersrationintheItalianofficers
mess".
36/51
4/8/2015
ButKesselringcontinuedhisunbiasedappraisalwith:
Idonotintendtoexposedeficienciesbymaking
theabovestatements,butonlywanttoclarifythe
reasonsforthefailureoftheItaliansoldierinorder
togiveinterestedpersonsthepossibilityfortaking
correctiveactions.Ialsodonotwanttodenyinany
waythattherelationshipketweenofficersandmenwas
neverthelessagoodone".12
Kesselringdidnothesitatetoapplaudethe"fundamental
decencyofthesimpleItalianmanandofthepossibilityof
progressivelydevelopinghimintoagoodtoughfighterand
soldier".HisappraisalsoftheItaliansoldier'sabilitiesmust
beconsideredveryvalidbecausehesawthemfirsthand.He
said,
Ihaveseenmuchtoomanyheroicperformancesof
ItalianunitsandindividualssuchastheFolgore
DivisionnearElAlamein,theartilleryintheTunisian
battles,thecrewsoftheKleinstkampfmittel(smallest
meansofcombatsuchasonemantorpedoes)oftheNavy,
thecrewsoftorpedoboats,theunitsoftorpedo
bombers,etc.nottoexpressthisopinionwith
conviction.Butthedecision[outcome]inawarisnot
broughtaboutbytopperformancesofindividualsbutby
thetrainingconditionandmoraleoftheentire
army.ItisthereforewrongtorepresenttheItalian
soldiersandtheItalianpeoplealltogetheras
militarilyinferiorandunsuitableforatoughwar..In
thiscontext,Mussoloniandhisformerstate
secretariesareeitherguiltyofgrossneglect,or
Mussoliniisdefinitelyguiltyofnothavingdesisted
fromwarifhewasawareoftheseprecariousgaps.13
InWorldWarII,therewere,ofcourse,agreatmanyforces
operatingagainstoneanotherespeciallyintheMediterraneanand
NorthAfricantheaters.Analysesbytheseforces,togetherwith
thoseofItaly'sGermanallies,helptovalidateoneanotherand
providefocusontheirdeficienciesandstrengths.
JohnHerrington,inhisbookAirWarAgainstGermanyand
Italy1939l943,describescombatintheMediterraneanand
NorthAfricabetweentheAxisairpowersandthoseoftheBritish
andAustralians.Theauthordoesnotusuallyprovidedefinitive
evaluationsoftheItalianAirForce;however,onecandeduce
fromthereadingsthestateoftraining,theaggressiveness,and
overallcapabilitiesoftheItaliansinthisarena.Itis
interestingtonotethatinitialBritishestimatesofItalian
capabilitiesfarexceededreality.Perhapsthiswasaresultof
Mussolini'sgreatshowpriortotheoutbreakofhostilities
which,aspreviouslymentioned,werenothingmorethanafacade.
InreferringtotheLibyancampaign,Heringtonsays,
Againstthisscattered,obsolescentand
difficulttoreinforceBritishforce,itwasestimated
theItalianscouldimmediatelydisposeapproximately
twicethenumberofaircraftbothintheEastern
MediterraneanandEastAfricantheaters,andthatthe
formeratleastcouldbereadilyreinforcedatwill
fromItaly.However,Longmore[commanderofMiddle
Eastforces]feltconfidentthatwhathisforceslacked
inquantitywould,inanyrealprolongedtestof
strength,becompensatedbytheoffensivespiritand
moresolidexperienceandtrainingofhisairand
groundcrews.14
TheItalianshadsomehowgiventheimpressiontotheir
enemiesthattheywouldbeanaggressiveforceasindicatedby
37/51
4/8/2015
Herington's,"Facedwithapparentlyoverwhelmingenemynumbers
[Italian]theR.A.F.decidedthatwhenItalyactuallyenteredthe
waritwouldemployitssmallbutwelltrainedforcespromptly
andoffensively".15TheactualresponseoftheItalianswas
notatalltheoffensivespiritthattheBritishexpected.
Heringtonwrites,
LowflyingattacksbeganagainstItalianbases
bothinLibyaandEastAfricapunctuallyon11thJune
andsimilarattackscontinuedthroughoutthemonth.
ThegeneralresultwastoforcetheItaliansintoa
defensiveattitudeandtheymadelittleattemptto
exploittheirtheoreticalsuperiorityinnumbers...By
October,Italianinefficiency,theopeningofthe
Takoradiroute,andtheforcefulR.A.Ftacticshad
givenhopesofanevengreaterairoffensiveifonly
moresuppliesofaircraftandcrewscouldbe
obtained".Hesaid,inaddition:"Thepreceedingfive
months[oftheLibyancampaign]however,hadalready
shownthatthenumericallyinferiorR.A.F.by
determinedaggressioncouldpindownandharrassthe
ItalianAirForce...oneimportantresultofthe
initialdriveofthe7thArmoredDivisionwastoforce
theItalianstoabandoninhasteallairfieldsofthe
DernaMartubagroup,and,whilewaitingfortheirown
supplies,Britishsquadronswhichhadmovedforwardto
theselandinggroundsmadeuseofenemystores.
BombingattacksweresoonresumedonTobruk,Dernaand
BenghaziandsmallastheR.A.F.effortwasitexceeded
byaconsiderablemarginthatoftheItalianswhomade
onlysporadicbombingattackswithsingleaircrafton
Salum,Bardiaandforwardtroops.Enemyfightercover
waspracticallynonexistent,andtheRegiaAeronautica
wasalmostaspentforce.Sincethecampaignopenedon
8thDecemberithadlost154aircraftinbattle,while
oneverylandinggroundnowtakenoverbytheadvancing
[British]armyandairforce,aircraftinallstatesof
airworthinesswerefoundabandonedinlarge
numbers".16
Fromreadingthispassage,onecannotdeterminethereason
forsuchquickabandonement,butitseemsoddthatplaneswhich
wereprobablyflyablecouldnothavesomehowbeenmovedtothe
rear.
Herington'sbookgivesaverydetailed,accurate,and
unbiasedaccountofairwarfarewiththeItaliansandGermans.
ItmustbementionedthattheItaliansdidaccountforthemselves
fairlywellonoccasion,butneverseemedtoshowthe
aggressivenessorjointwilltotakeadvantageoftheirsuperior
numbers.AsKesselringsaid,"amilitaryforcecannotbeafraid
totakelossesifitistobeeffectiveinbattle".
WecannotleavethesubjectofItaliancombateffectiveness
withoutincludingaBritishevaluationonthesubject.Inhis
book,CondottaItalianadellaGuerra_(ItalianConductofWar),
theauthor,LucioCeviincludesasectionbyaBritishmilitary
analyistwhichwastranslatedintoItalianas"Analisibritannica
dellacapacitacombattivadelleforzeitalianeinAfrica,27
gennaio1941".Thefollowingismytranslationbackinto
English.Itistitled."Britishanalysisofthecombat
effectivenessoftheItaliansinAfrica,27January1941":
1.ThemaincharacteristicofItaliantacticsin
boththeatersofwarinLibyaandeasternAfrica,has
beenthatofrigidity.Theyhaveremainedattachedto
oneprinciplewhichconsistsoftheconcentrationof
38/51
4/8/2015
thegreatestmasspossibleforwhatevertasklayahead
ofthem.Intheattack,theyspreadthismassalong
thefrontandtheydependontheweightofnumbers
alonetobreakthrough.Itistruethatthey
demonstratethetendencytoadvanceinseparateand
parallelcolumns,andthattheyachievedwithsuccess
somepenetrationsinSomalia.Butinpracticethese
tacticsdidn'thavetheaimofencirclingourown
positionsandtheyweren'tabletopenetratethemand
theysucceededsimplyandsolelybecauseofthesmall
sizeofourforces.Sothemassoftheenemyadvanced
onafairlywidefrontwithits"wings"stretchedout
atagreatdistance...
2.Thefirstdirectionofacolumnwhichran
alongtheirregularterrainofSidiBarraniinitially
lookedlikeanencirclingmovement,butsuddenlyit
appearedthatthecolumnwassimplypartofthe
attackingmassalongthefront.Othersmaller
offensiveactionsfollowedthesameprocedure:
Kassala,Gallabat,Mojale.Inalloftheseitwas
possiblewithridiculouslyfewtroopstocausegrave
lossestothecompactmassesoftheenemybeforewe
retreated.
3.Inaddition,whentheyarehalted,theItalian
forcesarenotcapableofcontinuingtheirattackusing
lateralunitsforfiresupport,nordotheyusethe
leapfrogtacticwiththeirreserve.Itistruethat
duringtheattackonSidiBarrani,adivisionwasmade
toadvancethroughtheLibyandivisions,butthat
happenedwithoutanymilitarypurposeandonlytogive
theFasciststhegloryofenteringSidiBarranifirst.
Themethodofsupportintheoffenseconsistsof
successivepushesbythereservefromthereartothe
frontsothatbyweightofthemassesthemainbody
recommencesthemovement.Inevitablythatresultsina
greatlossoftroopsonthefrontline,asoccurredin
Somalia.
4.TheItalianmethodofdefenseisnotany
betterthantheiroffensivetactics.Eithertheyform
aseriesofstrongpointsinshallowdepthinwhich
theyammassasmanymenandmachinegunsaspossible,
orelsetheyformafrontofammassedunitswithno
reserve.
Thefirstmethodwasputtouseinthewestern
desertwherefortifiedareaswereorganized,strongby
themselves.butincapableofmutualsupport.At
Kassalasquadsofmenwerepushedaheadandwhenthey
realizedthattheirflankswereturned,theysentother
massestothewingsleavingthemselveswithouta
reserve.Itisevidentthattheenemythoughtvery
littleabouttheproblemofretreatandthatwhen
forcedtodoso,theywerenotabletoquickly
disengagetoretreat.
5.Theuseofthecounterattackseemedtobe
unknowntotheenemy.Henevercarriedoutan
organizedcounterattackinanytheaterofwar,although
inthewesterndesertandespeciallyatBardiahehad
allthemeanstodoit.
6.Itisnotdifficulttofindreasonsforthese
tacticalerrors.Firstofall,theyoungestelements
oftheItalianarmywereeducatedtoconsider
themselvesinvinciblejustbecausetheyareItalians
39/51
4/8/2015
andFascistsandbecausetheyhaveillustriousleaders
suchasMussoliniandhisclique.TotheItaliansit
hasbeentaughtthattheirenemiesareveryinferior
andthatit'senoughtoadvanceandyell"Anoi!"(To
us)andtheenemywillbedefeated...Secondly,the
advancementsystemaccordingtopoliticalmethods
producescommandersandstaffofficerswhoare
incapableandwhichcausessuspicionandjealousy.
7.Inconclusion,Italianmilitarytheoryand
practiceareveryantiquatedandtheirmilitary
hierarchy,supportedinpartbyformalismandinpart
bypoliticaljealously,can'tadapttomodern
warfare...butitwouldbeamistake,atthesametime,
tounderestimateindiscriminatelythecombativevirtues
oftheItaliansoldier.today,whippedbyreversals,
findinghimselfembarrassedbytheprolongationofa
warwhichhadbeenpromisedwouldbeofshortduration,
discouragedbyashortagesofequipmentandmaterial
whichisattributedtofavoritismamongtheheadsof
theparty,theItaliansoldierhasnodesiretofight
inconditionsoftensionandmisfortune.
AndsoitwentinNorthAfrica.Manytotallydiverse
sourcescriticizetheItaliansystemforitsantiquation,its
politicalcorruptionanditsgeneralmalaise.Butitshouldalso
benotedthatmanyalsopraisedtheItaliansoldierforhis
abilitywhenhewasproperlyledandequipped.Itisnot
individualsoldiers,however,whowinwars,butunited,
functioninggovernmentsandasupportivepopulace.Suchwasthe
dilemmaofItaly.CouldtheItalianspossiblychangethistrend
ofincompetenceinthemiddleofthewar?Perhapsthemore
importantquestionwas,"didtheywanttoremaininthewar?"
CHAPTERV
NEARTHEEND
BythetimeItalywastwoyearsintothewar,herleadership
realizedtheincredibleblundertheyhadmade.Theirfrustration
withthepoorperformanceofItaly'sforcescombinedwiththe
domineeringGermanoccupationcreatedextremeturmoilthroughout
thecountry.ItisimportantforthestudentofItalianmilitary
historytobefamiliarwiththedocumentswhichreflectthe
feelingsoftheleadershipofthecountryasthewarprogressed.
OneofthosedocumentsisFromtheAshesofDisgracebyAdmiral
FrancoMaugeri.AdmiralMaugeriwasDirectorofItalianNaval
Intelligenceinl94lwhenMussolinideclaredwarontheAllies
andassuch,hewasveryclosetothehighestofficialsinthe
Italiangovernment,includingCountCiano,theForeignMinister.
Maugeri'sbookincludesadialoguebetweenCianoandhimself
whichmustbeincludedherebecauseitisaperfectexampleof
theguilt,theconfusion,thehate,andutterexasperationwhich
permeatedthemindsofthoseinpower:
CIANO:ThetroublewiththeItalianNavyisthesame
thingthat'swrongwiththeItalianArmyandAirForce
andeverythingelseinItalytodaytheblockheaded,
arrogant,selfishGermanswine.Theyarethereal
causeofallourfailures.Onland,atsea,inthe
air.Don'tyouagree,Admiral?"
MAUGERI:Ithinkperhaps
CIANO:Yes,you'requiteright.There'stherootof
allourtroubles,allourmisfortunes.theGermans.
NotthatweItaliansaren'ttoblame,too.Wemustbe
realistic,Maugeri.Alwaysrealistic.Atallcosts.
That'swhatIkeeptellingtheDuce.There'snosense
foolingourselveswithrosecoloredpicturesandopium
40/51
4/8/2015
dreams.Thesituationtodaydoesn'tlooktoobright,
doesit?Notonlythemilitarysituation,Imean,or
thediplomaticoneDiomio,theyarebadenough!It's
thesituationItalythatworriesmemost,the
difficultiesanddangersitpresentsforus.And
they'regettingworseeveryday,Maugeri.Everyday!
Thespiritofthepeopleisextremelypoor.They're
notbackingthewareffortthewaytheyshould.Oh,I
knowhowtheyfeelaboutit,andIcan'taltogether
blamethem.TherearemanythingsaboutitI'mnotin
accordwithmyself.Mussolinisaysthatimmediate
incentivesarelacking.Whatincentiveisitforusto
pullHitler'schestnutsoutofthefire?Doyouknow
whatthey'resayinginMilanthesedays?Toendthe
war,let'sevenwinit.Howcananyoneexpectusto
winthewar,ifthepeoplehavethatattitude?It's
outofthequestion,Admiral.Itcan'tbedone!
MAUGERI:Perhapsit'sbecausethepeoplearerealists,
YourExcellency.
CIANO:They'reworsethanrealists!They're
pessimists!They'redefeatists!Yes,that'swherethe
troublelies.Ourpeoplehavenofaithinthewar,
orintheirleaders,orinanything.They've
completelylosttheirwilltowiniftheyeverhadit
tobeginwith.SometimesIwonder.MaybeMussoliniis
right.MaybetheItalianpeopledolackcharacter.
We'vespentmillionsuponmillions,givingthem
education,buildingschoolsforthem,training
teachers,supplyingbooks.Andwhatdowehavetoshow
forit?Apopulationonlyinterestedinitself,
utterlyunwillingtomakesacrifices,utterlylacking
inloyalty,ingratitudetotheDuceandtheFascist
Partythatmadeallthesewonderfulthingspossible.
Sometimes,Admiral,sometimesIgetquitediscouraged
anddisillusioned.Butit'snotjustthe
rankandfile.That'stheworstofit.That
miserable,selfseeking,niggardlyspirithasinfected
theParty,too,andthearmedforces.Maybenotthe
Navy,butcertainlytheArmyandAirForcearecrawling
withit.TakeamanlikeVidussoni.Whatrighthashe
gottoholdajoblikethat?Acretin!Anutter
incompetent!Theonlyreasonhegotthejobwas
becausehe'sbeensleepingwithoneoftheDuce's
mistresses.Whatcanhepossiblyknow?He'shardlya
boy,amereboy.He'snotmorethantwentysevenor
twentyeight,atmost.Yes!Yes!Iknowwhatyou're
goingtosayIwasonlythirtythreewhenIbecame
ForeignMinister.Butthere'salittledifference
betweenVidussoniandme,Maugeri.Isn'tthattrue?
AndlookatthespectacleofourArmy!Acrooklike
CavalleroholdingdownthejobofChiefoftheGeneral
Staff,thejobthatMarshalBadoglioheldforeighteen
yearsbeforehim.It'sridiculous,mydearMaugeri!
Utterlyridiculous!Howcanweexpecttowinawar
withamanlikehimrunningtheshow,amanwhohas
soldhimselfcompletelytotheGermans?Cavalleroisa
thoroughlydishonestindividual.Worsethanthat,he
doesn'tevenknowhisjob.He'sastupid,incapable,
meddlingbungler.Allheknowsistodojustwhatthe
Germanstellhim.No,no,Admiral.whatweneedisa
change,acompletechange.That'stheonlything
that'sgoingtopullpoveraftalia[poorItaly]outof
41/51
4/8/2015
thismess.Don'tyouagree?1
SuchwasthementalityofoneofthetopfiguresinItalian
government.Thoughchildishsounding,Cianofairlyaccurately
evaluatedtheattitudeoftheItalianpeople.Probablythemost
accuratestatementwas"They'vecompletelylosttheirwillto
winiftheyeverhadittobeginwith".Certainlytherewere
zealotsalloverItalywhowerelookingforafight,butthe
reservationandlackofaggressivenessonthepartofthe
majorityclearlyreflectCiano'sstatement.Whydieforacause
inwhichyoudon'tbelieve?Thisattitudedidnotchangeuntil
theItaliansdefectedtotheAlliedsideandformedthe
ResistanceMovement.
AfinalquotemustbemadefromMaugeri'sbookwhichwell
describestheItaliandilemmaasfollows:
"Thewinterof194243foundmostofuswhohoped
forafreeItalyfacedwiththishard,bitter,painful
truth:wecouldneverthrowoffourchainsiftheAxis
werevictorious.Ifintheautumnofthatyear,as
Cianohadsaid,thepeople'sattitudewas,"Toendthe
war,let'sevenwinit,"bymidwinterithadbecome,
"TogetridofFascismandtheGermans,let'sevenlose
it."Themorewelovedourcountry,themorewehadto
prayforitsdefeatonthefieldofbattle.Patriotic
Italiansknewthatvictorymeantonlyworseslaveryfor
Italy.Neverwouldwebeabletogetatriumphant
Germnanyoffourbacks.Oursolehopeofwinning
freedomlayinlosingthewar.SuchwastheTragic
Dilemmathatconfrontedus."2
ThedilemmafacedbyMaugeriandotherhighrankingofficials
ofthegovernmentwasfaced,perhapstoalesserextent,bythe
commonsoldierwhohadtodecidewherehisloyaltiesshouldlie.
ThemajorityoftheItalianpeoplewerefedupwithFascismand
theGermanoccupation.ShouldtheItaliansoldierwhoprobably
feltlittle,ifany,devotiontotheFascistregime,opposethe
alliedforceswhichwouldliftthatawfulyokefromthebacksof
thepeople?Everysoldierandeveryofficerhadtomakethat
decisionanditwasveryapparentwhenalliedtroopsfinally
invadedSicilyon10July1943whatthemajorityofItalian
forceshaddecidedtodo.Thearmisticewasnotsignedwiththe
Alliesuntil3September1943,andyetthemajorityofItalian
forceshadlongsincedecidedhowtheywantedthewartoend.
AnobserverofthiscollapseofItalianwillwasChristopher
BuckleywhowasawarcorrespondentwiththeBritishEigthArmy
whentheylandedinSicily.Hisdescriptionoftheassaultand
oftheItalian"resistance"theregivesaclearpictureofthe
attitudeofthepeopleandoftheirwearinessofwar.Hesays,
inhisbook,RoadtoRome,
Despitethepaucityofenemydefencesasrevealed
inaerialphotographs,Ihadvisualizedusdisembarking
ontoheavilywiredbeachesunderahailoffirefrom
hithertoconcealedandunsuspectedmachinegun
positions.Ihadimaginedusburrowingdownintothe
sandforprotection.YetherewasIwithinquarterof
anhouroflandinginEuropeseatedinaleafylane
feelingmildlydiscomfortedbecauseIwasdirtyand
unshaven.Itseemedtooridiculouslyprosaic...LaterI
learnedthattherehadbeensomelossesattheoriginal
landing,butveryfew.Oneofthebattalionsreported
onlyonemankilledandsixwoundedinthecourseof
theentireday.Resistance,infact,hadbeenalmost
negligible.OnlyintheAmericanareainthe
neighbourhoodofGelawasoppositionreallyserious
42/51
4/8/2015
wheretherewereGermanspresentamongthedefenders,
andtheycounterattackedwithtanks,penetrating
almosttothebeach".3
AlthoughBuckleysaysthattherewerepocketsofresistance
orisolatedsniperswhovainlyattemptedtoopposethelandingon
Sicily,forthemostpart,theItalianswantednopartofthe
battleashedescribesinthefollowingscenarios:
Downthelanecamenumbersofgreenuniformed
Italiansoldiers,abouttwohundredofthemintwoor
threeseparatebatches.Theyweren'tevenguarded;
theywerejustmarchingintosurrenderwiththeir
handsup.Someofthemwerelaughingandjoking.They
werequitereadytotalkandexplainawaytheirdefeat
intermsofthepoorqualityoftheirequipment."What
doyouexpect?Italyisapoorcountry;Britainand
Americaarerich.Whendoyousupposethewarwill
end?
...Sometimestheygavethemselvesuptoasingle
Britishsoldier,sometimestheydidn'tevenwaitfor
thatbutsimplywalkeddowntheroadtofindsomeoneto
whomtheycouldsurrender.
Groupsofmencarryingwhiteflagswereseen
approachingdowntheroad,andthefiringdiedaway.
Therewasnoapparentreason,fortheenemydidn't
appeartohavesufferedmanylossesandtheycertainly
hadn'tshotawaytheirammunition.Theyhadsimplyhad
enough.4
Inthemiddleofthismasssurrender,villagesthroughout
Sicilywerebeingliberated,andvariousmayorsannouncedthe
arrivaloftheAlliesanddecreedthatthepeoples'rightto
speechandwritinghadbeenrestoredandthatallpolitical
prisonerswouldbeimmediatelyreleased.Thesceneinvirtually
allofthevillageswasthatofjubilanceandgreatreliefthat
theAllieshadarrived.Unfortunately,thesescenesof
capitulationfurthermartheimageoftheItaliansoldier
especiallywhencoupledwithotherbattlessuchasthatof
Caporetto,wheretherewasalsomasssurrender.
PerhapsthemostcomicalscenedepictedbyBuckley
illustrateswithoutadoubtthattheItalianshadhadenoughof
GermansandFascistsandwantedtoassisttheAlliesanywaythey
could:"Meningreenfielduniformswereeagerlyassistingin
theunloading.Irubbedmyeyesandlookedagain.Therecould
benodoubtaboutit.ThiswastheItaliandefendingforce,and
theywerequeueinguptohelptheinvadersdisembarktheir
equipmentandstores.5
Buckleyalsomakesapoignantstatementwhichsumsup
somewhatthefeelingsofmanyregardingtheplightoftheItalian
soldierinWorldWarII:"Butitwasafactthatasthis
campaignprogressedoneseemedincreasinglytoregret,evento
resent,Italiandeaths.Itwasallsounnecessary.Whydidthey
havetogetinthewayandgetthemselveskilled?Ourquarrel
wasnotwiththem.Theyweresopatheticallyillarmed,their
uniformssoshabbyandsecondrate.6
ThecommonItalianpeopleincludingthesoldiersdid,in
fact,getinthewayofthiswar.Theydidnotwantitinthe
firstplacebutwereforcedtofightit.Manyfoughtthewarout
ofpatriotismdespiteaflawedcause,andmanyfoughtfor
personalhonor,butaunitedeffortwasnevermade.
Ithasbeenmentionedelsewhereinthisstudythatthe
guerrillaoperationsconductedbytheResistanceMovementafter
thedefectiontotheAlliedsidedidnotreflectthissamekind
ofpathos,confusionandlackoffightingability.Abrief
43/51
4/8/2015
accountofguerrillafightinginItalyisincludedheretoshow
bothsidesoftheItaliansoldierincombat.
TheItalianpartisanmovementwas,forthemostpart,a
politicaloneandwaspromotedbymanydifferentfactions
includingformermilitaryofficersandtroops,Communists,and
unaffiliatedcivilians.Butallwereunitedintheircommongoal
tofinallyridItalyoftheFascistsandtheGermans.They
operatedindependentlyoftheAllieswhichwasofconcernto
them,butthemostimportantpointisthattheywereeffective
andcreatedchaosfortheGermansbehindthelines.TheItalian
whohadpreviouslybeencharacterizedas"nottooseriousabout
anythingbutwine,womenandcigarettes"nowbecameatough
guerrillafighterwhowasruthlessincombat.
FieldMarshalAlbertKesselringhasalreadybeenextensively
quotedinreferencetotheItaliansasallies.Sinceheremained
incommandofnorthernItalyaftertheItaliandefection,healso
hadtofacethemasenemies.Kesselring'sfrustrationwiththe
situationisindicatedinhispostwaraccount:
ItalyenteredthewaragainstGermany'swill.
Germanarmyandnavyunitsaswellasairforceswere
requestedtosupportthecause.Theyarrivedand
foughtforItaly'slifeinterests.Theamountof
GermanbloodspilledinAfrica,Tunis,Sicilyand
southernItalywasimmensebutitwasendured.The
numericallyfarsuperiorItalianarmyunitsfought
almostwithoutexceptionnotnearlyashard;attimes
itwasobvioustheywereholdingback.Eventhiswas
enduredinviewoftheItalianfriendship.
Thesituationchanged,however,assoonasItaly,
withthefullsupportoftheAlliesandafter
withdrawingfromtheAxis,proclaimed"guerrilla
warfare".Itsoriginanditsmethodwascontraryto
internationallawandturnedthepreviousconradeship
inarmstobrutalmurder.7
Kesselringcommentsextensivelyonthelawlessnessand
"brutality"ofthePartisangroups,butwhetherornotthe
guerrillaswereoperatingwithintheframeworkofinternational
lawisnottheconcernhere.Whatisimportant,isthefactthat
theseunitsweresoeffective.Kesselringsayofthis
effectiveness:
GuerrillabandsinIstria,NortheasternLombardy,
withthepointofmaineffortatDoerzandintheAlps
areatothenorththereof,foughtinastillmore
ruthlessandbrutalmanner...theywerelocally
separatedandpossessedgreatfighting
qualities...reconnaissancegroupswereexpertlytrained
andappearedinverysmallgroupswhichcouldfully
dependuponeachother.Themenwerepartyfollowers
ofaveryhighcaliber,readytoriskanything.8
TheseItalianguerrillascausedthousandsofGerman
casualtiesandtheyforcedtheenemytodivertmanythousandsof
troopsfromthefronttocontrolguerrillaactivitiesinthe
rear.Thepeopleinthecitiesalsofinallyunderstoodwhothe
enemywasandunitedthemselvesagainsttheGermanoccupiers.
OneofthegreatestepisodesinItalianhistoryoccurredin
Napleswhenthestarvingandpracticallydisarmedpeopleofthe
cityroseupinresponsetoaGermanforcedlaborproclamation
anddefeatedtheircaptorsafterafourdaystruggle.Whenthe
AlliesfirstarrivedonOctober1,thecityhadalreadybeen
liberated.
TheResistanceMovementisdiscussedbrieflyheretoshow
thattheItaliannationwaswillingtosacrificeitselfincombat
44/51
4/8/2015
whenittrulyhadacause.Theirsacrificeispainfullyevident
inthepostwarfiguresofResistancecasualties.Datapublished
bytheItalianMinistryofForeignAffairsinOctober1945
indicatesthattherewere27,000deadand17,000woundedin
battle;20,000deadand986woundedinactsofreprisal;
victimsofcrimesconsequenttoNaziFascistatrocitiesanacts
ofreprisal:19,204(709ofwhomwerehangedand506burned
alive);plus33groupsofpeoplemassacred;atotalof66,204
dead.
Andso,fortheItalians,WorldWarIIendedinboth
disgraceandtriumph.Theyhadnotbeencapableoffieldingan
armywhichcouldbeattheenemywithoutGermanassistanceandyet
onceunitedinacommoncauseandfreeofregionalandpolitical
differences,theywerefierceandconvincingadversaries.
AndnowtheItaliansfacedthealmostinsurmountabletaskof
repairingthedevastationthatwarhadwroughtontheir
peninsula.Alongwiththeproblemofrebuildingthecountrycame
thepenetratingquestioncouldItalyeverdevelopapolitical
systemwhichwouldtrulyreflectthewillofherpeopleone
whichwouldactresponsiblyandunitedlyinimplementingforeign
policy.Butmorethanthat,couldsheeverfieldamilitary
forcewhosetraining,equippingandmoralewouldrenderit
effectiveagainstfuturefoes?
CHAPTERVI
CONCLUSION
What,finally,istobesaidoftheItalianmilitary
system?BasedonthisgeneralanalysisofItaly'sexperiencein
war,canitbesaidthat,whenviewedasasoleentity,without
thenegativeinfluencesofapoliticalsystem,itisanybetter
orworsethanotherEuropeanforces?Similarly,cantheItalian
soldierbeconsideredlesscapablethanhiscounterpartinother
armiesoftheworld?Itwasindicatedthat,atleastinthelate
19thCentury,theItalianArmywasnotsignificantlydifferentin
recruitmentortrainingfromthoseoftheothermajorpowersof
Europe.
Ithasalsobeenindicatedthatgeneticsplaynopartin
determiningthefightingabilityofapeople,exceptperhapsin
isolatedindividuals.TheGermanArmy'stremendousperformance
ofthe19thand20thcenturies,wasdue,nottothesupremacyof
the"Aryanrace",buttogenerationsofregimentationand
discipline.Whensuchgenerationsareexposedtothecunning
diatribeofaHitlerorotherpersuasivedictator,theresultis
anarmythecapabilities(althoughnotnecessarilythe
objectives)ofwhichserveasamodelforallothers.
Mussoliniwasalsoacutelyawareofthekindofsociety
requiredtofulfilltheaimsofamilitarist,imperialist
dictatorship.HemusthavegreatlyenviedGermansociety,the
duplicationofwhichheknewwasnotpossibleinItaly.Although
theFascistshadtaughtfortwentyyears,"Libroe
moschettofascistaperfetto"(Bookandriflemaketheperfect
fascist),theywerenotabletoproducethesameresultsthat
centuriesofGermanicrigidityhadaccomplishedintheNorth.
TheyattemptedtoimposestructureonItalianlife,butthe
culturecouldnotacceptit.TheItalianremaineddevotedtohis
family,tohischurchandtohisregionalculture.
BecauseMussolini'speasantsocietyfailedtotranspose
itselfintoamodernRomanlegion,helostconfidenceinits
abilityandyetthrustitintobattlewithlittlehopeof
success.
TheoutbreakofWorldWarIIbroughtthepeopleofthe
combatantcountriestogetherasonlywarcando.Mussolini,
however,facedthetaskofwinningthewarwithadivided
45/51
4/8/2015
nation.WithimagesofWorldWarIstillinmanyminds,most
Italianshadnodesiretobecomeinvolvedinanothermajor
conflict.
ManyItaliansfeltthattheircountrywasengagedinan
illegalactofaggression,andasthewarprogressedwithgreat
lossoflife,thepopulacebecameincreasinglydisenchanted.It
becameapparentearlyinthewarthatItaly'spreparationwas
pitiful,andasherforcesweredefeatedinbattleafterbattle,
humiliationwasheapedupontheguiltthathersocietyalready
felt.
Onecannotdivorcethesoldierfromorigins.Thesoldier
is,infact,areflectionofhissocietyandhethereforemirrors
itsmoresandspirit.Apartfromthededicatedandfanatical
Fascistblackshirtswhowholeheartedlysupportedthewar,the
commonsoldierharborednofeelingsofconquestandcertainlyhad
noreasontohatehisBritishortheAmerican"enemies".It
becameatragicdilemma,then,whenpushedbyasenseofduty,
thesoldierfoughtanenemywhichwascreatedbythegovernment
butwhichwasnotacceptedassuchfromwithin.
Suchistheplightofallsoldiers.Onemustservehis
countrybuthowdoesathinkingmanservearegimewhichisnot
onlyrepressivetoitsownpeoplebutbrutalinitsimperial
conquests.Wemust,then,viewtheItaliansoldierofWorldWar
IIwithacertainempathy.
Asindicatedthroughoutthisstudy,theentireperiod,from
1848to1945wasfraughtwithsuchregional,politicaland
internationalturmoil,thattheItalianmilitaryfacedgreat
trials,thegreatestofwhichwereachievingunitywithinitsown
ranksandreceivingsupportfromafirmpoliticalbase.
Throughoutthisperiod,poorlydefinednationalinterestsoften
conflictedwiththeregional,religiousandfamilyvaluesthat
Italiansinherentlyfelt.
Italy'sarmedforcestodayhavehadthebenefitofforty
yearsofselfanalysissinceWorldWarIIandtheyhaveprovento
beoneofourstrongestalliesinEurope,asevidenced,for
example,bytheearlydeploymentofPershingmissilesinSicily.
AsthisclosefriendshiphasdevelopedwithintheNATOstructure,
Italyhasbenefittedbothfromtheoperationaltechniquesofher
alliesaswellasfromtheirtechnologies.
Italy'sleadershipstructurestillseemstobeplagued,
however,bypoliticalinfightingalthoughdiscussionswith
officerswhohaveworkedwithItalianseniorstaffsrevealthat
Italianofficers,are,forthemostpart,verycapable.Two
recentoperationshighlightthehighlevelplanningandexecution
capabilitiesoftheItalianmilitary,carabinieri(special
police),andintelligenceagencies.TherescueofGeneralDozier
in1981fromRedBrigageterroristsandtheheavyItalian
involvementintheBeirutoperationdemonstratedthatthe
Italianscouldeffectivelycoordinatehighlysensitiveand
politicallysignificantmissions.
ItistheopinionofmanyU.S.officers,that,becauseof
theaforementionedsuccesses,andbecauseofherdemonstrated
performanceinNATOair,groundandnavalexercises,Italywill
becapableofeffectivelyperformingherroleofassistinginthe
defenseofthesouthernflankalongwithotherNATOforces.
DespitethefactthatItaly'smilitaryconsistsprimarilyof
conscripts,(theyviewourvolunteerforceasridiculously
expensive)theyareviewedasadequateforthetask.TheAlpini
troopswhoaretrainedinmountainwarfare,areparticularlygood
andtheydemonstratehighmorale,espritdecorpsandtheyhave
thebenefitofmuchbetterequipmentthanthatwhichwasseenin
WorldWarIIandpreviousconflicts..
46/51
4/8/2015
Throughoutthisstudy,equipmenthasbeenarecurring
issue.Ithasalwaysbeenpoor.DespitethefactthatItaly
continuestoresistspendinganysignificantamountofits
currentlyimpressiveGrossNationalProduct,Italiantroopsare
wellequipped,wellfedandwelltrained.Theyarethe
beneficiaryofaboomingItalianarmsindustrywhichprovides
themwithstateoftheartweaponry(ifnotintheamountsthey
wouldliketohave).
TheItalianNavyisasignificantforceintheMediterranean
andwouldbeconsideredadeterrenttoaggressionfromtheEast.
Aconcept,however,whichhasbeendifficultfortheItaliansto
dealwithisthatofpowerprojection.TheywantaNavycapable
ofdefendingtheirextensiveshoresbuttheydon'twantits
capabilitytoextendbeyondthosebounds.Arecentproposalby
theNavytobuyAV8aircrafthasbeenheldupinParliament
becausetheHarrierisviewedasaweaponssystemwhichcould
projectpowerbeyondthatwhichisnecessaryornational
defense.
TheItalianAirForceiscurrentlysufferingfromretention
problems,asaremanyAirForcesthroughouttheWesternworld,as
airlinesviefortheservicesofbothpilotsandmechanics.
However,theAirForceisconsideredadequate,althoughnotupto
thestandardsofsomeoftheotherEuropeancountriessuchas
thatofGermany,forexample.Jointtrainingexerciseswith
UnitedStatesandotherNATOforceshavesignificantlyimproved
pilotexpertise.
ThemostimportantaspectofItaly'scapabilitytodefend
herselfliesinherpoliticalsystem.Throughoutherhistory,
thisconfusedgoverningbodyhasbeenresponsible,inlargepart,
forgettingItalyinvolvedinconflictswhichshewasnot
preparedtofight.
AnalysingmodernItalianpoliticscannotbedoneinafew
paragraphsletaloneinvolumes.Themanypartieswhichmakeup
theparliamenthavestronginterestsandconcerns.Thetwo
primaryparties,theChristianDemocratsandtheSocialistsare
atoppositeendsoftheConservativeLiberalspectrum.The
CommunistPartyhasalsobeenverystronginItalysinceWorld
WarIIand,althoughitdoesnotespouseSovietcommunism,its
weightputsleftwingpressureonanotherwiseModerateor
ModerateRightgovernment.
Thedifficultywithacoalitionofsuchextremesasit
concernsthemilitaryis,ofcourse,thequestionofgovernment
supportintheeventofconflict.Willthegovernmentbeableto
reachaconsensusonacourseofactionandwillthegovernment
ultimatelygainthesupportofthegeneralpopulace.As
previouslystated,thememoryofWorldWarIItendstocreatea
conservativeattitudetowardtheinvolvementofItalianforcesin
conflict.TheuseofItalianforcesinBeirutandthePersian
gulfareexamplesofthisconcern.Thoseforcesdiddeploy(and
performedadmirably)butonlyaftersignificantdebatein
Parliament.
ToItaly'sadvantage,shehasexperiencedsignificant
economicandsocialchangesinceWorldWarIIandhasassumeda
newnationalidentityasaresultofheremergenceasaworld
industrialpower.Sheexports"hightech"productsthroughoutthe
worldincludingsophisticatedelectronicssystemsand
stateoftheartmilitaryweaponssystems.
ItalyandeverythingItalianhasbecomefashionable.
Italiancars,ItalianclothingandevenItalianweaponsarein
style.Itisverycommonontelevision,forexample,tosee
policecarryingthenewItalianBeretta92Fautomaticpistol,
and,ofcourse,thecarofchoiceforthetrulyelite,isthe
47/51
4/8/2015
ItalianmadeFerrari.
TheadventoftheindustrialageinItalyhasthuscreated
fortheItaliansanewimageabroadandhasgiventhemanew
senseofprideandnationalidentity.ModernizationinItalyhas
alsobroughtwithitimprovedcommunicationsintheformof
televisionandradio.These,too,havebrokensomewhat,regional
barriersandhavebroughtthepeopletogetherasanation.
Thefullpotentialofthisgreatpeopleremainsasyet
unrealized.TheheritageofdaVinci,Galileo,Michelangeloand
Marconiisreflectedinthegeniusofaprogressive,modern
society.Butthequestionremains...willthispeoplehavethe
nationalwilltoovercomethepoliticalandmilitaryfailuresof
thepasttodefendallthattheyhavegained?Thatquestionwill
beansweredinthenextwar.
ENDNOTES
ChapterI,The19thCenturyandItaly'sUnification
1ShepardB.CloughandSalvatoreSaladino,AHistoryof
ModernItaly,(NewYorkandLondon:ColumbiaUniversityPress,
1968),p.65.
2Ibid.,p.145.
3Ibid.,p.220.
ChapterII,ItalyEntersWorldWarI
1Clough,op.cit.,p.308.
3ErwinRommel,Attacks,(Vienna,Virginia:AthenaPress,
1979),p.202.
4Ibid.p.216.
5Ibid.,p.238.
6Ibid.,p.244.
7Ibid.,p.250.
8Ibid.,p.269.
9Ibid.,p.271
10Ibid.,p.274.
11Ibid.,p.274.
12Ibid.,p.310.
13JohnKeegan,TheFaceofBattle,(NewYork:Penguin
Books,1976),p.335.
ChapterIII,ItalySeeksItsNationalIdentityUnderMussolini:
TheTragedyofWorldWarII
1AnthonyJamesJoes,Mussolini,(NewYork:Franklin
Watts,1982),p.220.
2MarioCervi,TheHollowLegions,(NewYork:Doubleday
andCompany,Inc.,l97l),p.67.
3Ibid.,p.68.
4Ibid.,pp.6875.
5Ibid.,p.70.
6Ibid.,p.76.
7Ibid.,p.78.
8Ibid.,p.82.
9Ibid.,p.207.
10Ibid,,p.209.
11Ibid.,p.212.
12Ibid.,p.221.
13Ibid.,p.222.
14Ibid.,p.230.
15Ibid.,p.234.
16Ibid.,pp.245246.
17Ibid.,p.252.
18Ibid.,p.240.
19DonaldS.Detwiler,WorldWarIIGermanMilitary
48/51
4/8/2015
Studies,(NewYork:GarlandPublishing,Inc.,1979),p.
Dl45l5.
20Ibid.,p.D1457.
ChapterIV,OperationsinNorthAfrica
1Detwiler,op.cit.,p.C0l54.
2Ibid.,p.C0l54.
3lbid.,p.C0155.
4Ibid.,p.T3Pl63.
5lbid.,pp.T3Pl10.
6Ibid.,p.T3Pl12.
7Ibid.,p.T3Pl18.
8Ibid.,p.T3Pl12.
9Ibid.,p.T3Pl25.
10Ibid.,p.C0158.
11Ibid.,p.C015ll.
12Ibid.,p.C015ll13.
13Ibid.,p.C01510.
14JohnHerington,AirWarAgainstGermanyandItaly
193943,(Sydney:HalsteadPress,1962),p.54.
15Ibid.,p.55.
16Ibid.,p.60.
17LucioCervi,LaCondottaItalianadellaGuerra,
(Milano:Feltrinelli),p.191.
ChapterV,NeartheEnd
1FrancoMaugeri,Fromthe,AshesofDisgrace,(NewYork:
ReynalandHitchcock,1948),p.95.
2Ibid.,p.101.
3ChristopherBuckley,RoadtoRome,(London:Hodderand
Spoughton,1945),p.34.
4Ibid.,p.38.
5Ibid.,p.159.
6Ibid.,p.53.
7Detwiler,op.cit.,p.C032l.
8Ibid.,p.C0328.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AlbrechtCarrie,Rene.ItalyfromNapoleontoMussolini.New
York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1950.
Baldini,Alberto.Diaz.London:HumphreyToulmin,1935.
ThestoryofArmandoDiaz,theGeneralwhofinally
brokethroughtheGermanAustrianlinealongItaly's
Northeasternfrontier.
Barzini,Luigi.TheItalians.NewYork:BantamBooks,1964.
AstudyofItaliansbyanItalian.Barziniprovides
greatinsightintothecultureandmindsofhispeople.
Borghese,Valerio.SeaDevils.Chicago:HenryRegneryand
Company,1954.
DealswiththeextensiveoperationsofthisItalian
specialwarfaregroupofWorldWarII.Borghese,its
commander,detailstheuseofmannedtorpedoes,frogmenand
attackboats.
Buckley,Christopher.RoadtoRome.London:Hodderand
Spoughton,1945.
Buckleywasawarcorrespondentwhoaccompaniedthe
BritishEightArmyintoSicilyandfinallyintoRome.His
accountisawellwrittendocumentaryoftheItalian
capitulation.
Cervi,Mario.TheHollowLegions.NewYork:Doubledayand
Company,Inc.,1971.
ThestoryofItaly'sunsuccessfulattackonGreecein
1941.CriticalanalysisofthismajorFascistblunder.
TranslatedfromtheItalianbyEricMossbacher.
49/51
4/8/2015
Cevi,Lucio.LaCondottaItalianadellaGuerra.Milano:
Feltrinelli,nodate.
AstudyofItaly'sGeneralStaffsystemofWorldWar
II.BasedonthewritingsofChiefoftheGeneralStaff,
GeneralCavallero.Demonstratesthedisorganizationofboth
themilitaryandpoliticalsystemsofItaly.Inthe
originalItalian.
Clough,ShepardB.andSaladino,Salvatore.AHistoryofModern
ItalyDocuments,ReadingsandCommentary.NewYorkand
London:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1968.
HistoryofItalyfromtheearly1800stothe1960s.
Includedarenumeroustranslatedofficialdocumentswhich
theauthoranalyzes.Averycomprehensivework.
Deakin,F.W.TheBrutalFriendship.NewYork:Harperand
Row,1962.
IndepthstudyoftherelationshipbetweenHitlerand
Mussolini.Discussestheirstrategies,politicsand
analyzestheirfallfrompower.
Detwiler,DonaldS.WorldWarIIGermanMilitaryStudies.New
York:GarlandPublishing,Inc.1979.
Aseriesoftranslated,postwaranalysesasgivenby
highrankingGermanofficerstoU.S.Armyofficials.This
excellentpublicationmakesextensivereferencetoItaly's
contributionsasaGermanally.ItalsodiscussesItaly's
politicalandsocialproblemsinsupportingthewareffort.
Herington,John.AirWarAgainstGermanyandItaly19391943.
Sydney:HalsteadPress,1962.
AclinicalstudyoftheBritishandAustralianAir
ForcesintheEuropeanandAfricantheatersofWorldWar
II.DiscussesactionagainstItaliangroundandairforces.
Joes,AnthonyJames.Mussolini.NewYork:FranklinWatts,
1982.
OneofmanybibliographiesofMussolini.Itisfairly
wellbalanced,althoughinpartsissomewhatapologetic.
Keegan,John.TheFaceofBattle.NewYork:PenguinBooks,
1976.
Excellentcommentaryonhumanexperienceonthe
battlefield.Discussestheeffectsofcombatonthe
soldier.
Kogan,Norman.ItalyandtheAllies.Cambridge:Harvard
UniversityPress,1956.
Laquer,Walter.Guerrilla.Boston:Little,BrownandCompany,
1976.
Discussesguerrillaactivitythroughouttheworld.
IncludesanapplicablesectiononItalianpartisan
activitiesfrom1943to1945.
Maugeri,Franco.FromtheAshesofDisgrace.NewYork:Reynal
andHitchcock,1948.
AdmiralMaugeriwasdirectorofItalianNaval
IntelligenceduringWorldWarII.Hiswellwrittenaccount
oftheturmoilinsideItaliangovernmentduringthewaras
wellasthepostwarreconstructionareimportanttothe
studentofmodernItalianhistory.
Morgan,ThomasB.SpursontheBoot.NewYork:Longmans,Green
andCo.,1941.
ObservationsofanAmericanjournalistinItalyduring
therisetopowerofMussolinifrom1922tothebeginningof
WorldWarII.
Phillips,N.C.ItalyOfficialHistoryofNewZelandinthe
SecondWorldWar193945.Wellington:WarHistoryBranch,
DepartmentofInternalAffairs,1957.
AhistoryofWorldWarIIinAfricaandEuropefromthe
50/51
4/8/2015
perspectiveofaNewZelander.Basedontheofficialwar
recordsofcombatunitswhichparticipatedwiththeAllies
inthosetheaters.
Rommel,Erwin.Attacks.Vienna,Virginia:AthenaPress,1968.
TheoutstandingpersonalaccountofRommelasaFirst
LieutenantinWorldWarI.Ofparticularinterestishis
commentaryoncombatwiththeItaliansduringthefamous
Isonzocampaign.
Upton,Emory.ArmiesofAsiaandEurope.NewYork:Greenwood
Press.1968.
AuthoredbytheformerCommandantofWestPointwho,in
1875,madeaworldtourtostudytheorganizations,schools
andtacticsofsomeofthesignificantarmiesoftheperiod.
Villari,Luigi.ItalianForeignPolicyUnderMussolini.New
York:TheDevinAdairCo.,1956.
DiscussesItalianexpansionismduringMussolini's
controloftheState.TheauthordetailsItalianeconomic
supporttoitscoloniesinAfricaandexplainsits
occupationofAlbaniaandassaultonGreece.Itis
distinctlyslantedtosupporttheItalianposition.
Woodward,David.ArmiesoftheWorld,18541914.NewYork:
G.P.Putnam'sSons,1978.
Theauthorhascompiledbeautifulphotosand
interestingdataonthetraining,conscriptionand
employmentoftroopsinthearmiesofthemajorpowersof
18541914.
NEWSLETTER
JointheGlobalSecurity.orgmailinglist
EnterYourEmailAddress
SignUpNow!
AdvertisewithUs | AboutUs | GlobalSecurity.orgIntheNews | Internships | SiteMap | Privacy

Copyright20002015GlobalSecurity.orgAllrightsreserved.
Sitemaintainedby:JohnPike
51/51

The Italian Military Enigma

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Italian Military Enigma

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

4/8/2015

AdvertisewithUs | AboutUs | GlobalSecurity.orgIntheNews | Internships | SiteMap | Privacy

You might also like