The Battle of Arnhem (Operation Market Garden)

By Mark Fielder
Last updated 2011-02-17

Mark Fielder discovers how Operation Market Garden could have shortened World War Two by six months, and
how the plan failed at the last moment.

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Monty's daring plan

Intelligence warning

The first day

So near yet so far

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Monty's daring plan

In May 1945 it was the Russians who hoisted their flag over the ruins of the Reichstag building in Berlin. In this
way World War Two, in Europe, was signalled as being effectively over. However, the troops who captured Berlin
could easily have been British or American, if events around a small town in Holland had turned out differently.
If Operation Market Garden, planned to take place in the area near Arnhem, in Holland, had succeeded, the western
Allies could have punched their way across one of the last great natural barriers between them and the German
fatherland.
Their tanks and troops might have reached Berlin weeks before the Russians, ending the war by Christmas 1944.
The fate of post-war Europe might have been very different.
The glittering triumph of the D-Day landings in France had become bogged down in the slow and costly
progress through the Normandy fields and hedgerows ...
Market Garden was one of the boldest plans of World War Two. Thirty thousand British and American airborne
troops were to be flown behind enemy lines to capture the eight bridges that spanned the network of canals and
rivers on the Dutch/German border.

At the same time, British tanks and infantry were to push up a narrow road leading from the Allied front line to these
key bridges. They would relieve the airborne troops, and then cross the intact bridges.
The plan was conceived by General Bernard Montgomery, commander of the British forces in Europe. The glittering
triumph of the D-Day landings in France had become bogged down in the slow and costly progress through the
Normandy fields and hedgerows, which the Germans defended with skill and tenacity.
Despite this, after weeks of heavy fighting, the Allies had finally broken through. For the next three weeks they
rolled through France and Belgium, liberating Paris and Brussels. Victory for the Allies seemed close.
But Hitler's forces were regrouping, and as the Allies pushed nearer to Germany's borders, German resistance
stiffened. Montgomery believed that a powerful, narrow thrust deep into German lines would be more effective than
an advance on a broad front, which had become difficult to supply from the few ports controlled by the Allies, and
this was why he devised Operation Market Garden.

Top

Intelligence warning

Map showing the objectives of Operation Market Garden The

soldiers who would carry out

the operation were those of the First Allied Airborne Army, including one British and two American divisions. They
had been kept in reserve in England since D-Day. Operation after operation had been cancelled. Now their skills and
training could be used at last. Tony Hibbert was brigade Major of the 1st Parachute Brigade:
'My first reaction was one of enormous enthusiasm and excitement, because this was the first time that anyone on
our side, had contemplated the proper strategic use of airborne forces en masse.'
Dropping by parachute and in gliders these divisions would land near the Dutch towns of Eindhoven, Nijmegen and
Arnhem, to take the eight key bridges. The planners called this an 'airborne carpet', along which the advancing
British armour of XXX corps could push through to Germany.
The airborne commander, General 'Boy' Browning, had just seven days to prepare for the operation. The information
he was given on the German troops in the area, however, was alarming. It suggested that there were two SS Panzer
divisions around Arnhem, with many tanks and vehicles. Major Tony Hibbert recalls the bleak assessment of aerial
photographs made by General Browning's intelligence officer, Major Brian Urguhart:
'He showed me photographs of German Panzer 4's; mainly I think they were tucked in underneath woods. He went
to General Browning, and said that in his view the operation could not succeed, because of the presence of these two
divisions.'

The deadline for cancelling the operation was now close. General Browning had to weigh up the intelligence reports,
which might be wrong. He decided that the operation would go ahead. The huge risks inherent in Operation Market
Garden were now undermined by a series of dangerous compromises.
There were too few aircraft to deliver all the airborne troops in one go. Therefore they would be dropped over three
days. Anti-aircraft defences near Arnhem itself were thought to be too effective to land gliders near the town. The
troops would be dropped at a site seven miles away, losing any element of surprise.

Top

The first day

Monty dreamed up Operation Market Garden to shorten the war by six months On

Sunday 17

September, 500 gliders and 1,500 aircraft flew over the men of XXX corps, whose job was to follow beneath them
in their tanks and trucks. As the aircraft flew over, the Allied guns began a huge barrage to hit the Germans guarding
the road ahead. The weather that day was beautiful, with a cloudless blue sky and a warming autumn sun. Major
Tony Hibbert remembers:
'... an enormous feeling of excitement, and I think everyone at that stage felt totally confident they would win.
Certainly the flight over from England was absolutely beautiful. There was an absolute mass, an armada as far as the
eye could see, in both directions, and about 20 planes wide, the most extraordinary sight I've ever seen.'
Moffat Burriss was a company commander in the American 82nd airborne division, charged with taking one of the
crucial bridges at Grave.
'I remember standing in the door with a Sergeant, and we looked down as we flew over the bridge, and the tracer
started swinging toward us and we ducked back, looked at each other and started laughing, because why were we
ducking behind this little thin skin of the plane? It would not stop a bullet. And he stuck his head out and said you
dirty Krauts, we'll be down there and get you in a minute.'
The sergeant's prediction was right. American and British gliders and parachutists drifted down on target, gathered
up their equipment and began to move towards the bridges they had to take. The road up which XXX corps would
have to travel to reach the bridges was narrow, just wide enough for two vehicles to pass. It was defended by small
groups of determined German infantry.
As the XXX corps tanks approached, they picked off the leading nine vehicles, bringing the whole column to a
standstill. It was 40 minutes before they moved again. The Germans were quick to organise against the airborne
troops.

The British paratroopers began their advance towards Arnhem, and were soon under attack. They quickly found that
their radios didn't work properly. It was impossible to co-ordinate the attack properly, because no one could
communicate. However, one British battalion did find a way through the German perimeter around Arnhem, and by
8pm on the first day, they had captured the northern end of the road bridge across the Rhine. The Americans had also
reached their objectives. But most of the bridges had been blown up before they could be captured.
At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the
first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem
ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.

Top

So near yet so far

On 18 September, the second day, XXX corps began to make the progress expected of
them. Their tanks covered 20 miles in a few hours, hooking up with the Americans at one of
the intact bridges near Grave. On the third day they reached Nijmegen, where the
Americans were still fighting in the streets in their efforts to reach the bridge across the
might River Waal.
Once they had taken Nijmegen bridge, only Arnhem would be left, and the north end at
least was still in British hands. It seemed that Operation Market Garden might succeed.
But they could not get across the bridge. General Horrocks, XXX corps commander, ordered
American troops to attack across the River Waal, so that they could capture the German
end. The attack was enormously costly.
'The bullets hitting the water looked like a hailstorm, kicking up little spouts of water. When
we reached about the halfway point, then the mortar and artillery fire started falling. And
when a boat was hit with an artillery shell or a mortar shell, it just disintegrated, and
everybody was lost.' (Moffat Burriss)
Half of Burriss's company was killed or wounded on the crossing. The survivors reached the
far bank, and from there successfully stormed the Nijmegen bridge. At last the route to
Arnhem was in Allied hands. However, it was too late for the British parachute battalion at
the north end of the bridge. The Germans had moved their tanks into the town, and one by
one they were demolishing the houses in which the British were fighting.
By now the paratroops had few anti-tank weapons, they had no food, and, crucially, they
had little ammunition left. Major Tony Hibbert remembers the German tanks were now
devastatingly effective.
'We really had nothing we could do to them, and they drove up and down the street, firing
high explosive into the side of the building, to create the gap, and then firing smoke shells

through that. The phosphorus from the smoke shells burned us out. By about 8 o'clock, on
Wednesday evening, the fires got out of control and of course we had by this time about
300 wounded in the cellars.'
The Allied troops were forced to abandon their positions near the bridge, and to try and
fight their way out. Three miles from Arnhem British paratroops were holding a pocket of
land at the village of Oosterberck. By now XXX corps, commanded by General Horrocks, was
on the other side of the river from the airborne troops. They could not, however, cross.
German artillery controlled the river. Horrocks decided to evacuate the British survivors;
only some 2,500 eventually made the crossing. The Parachute division had left behind
nearly 1,500 dead, and more than 6,500 prisoners, many badly wounded.
Operation Market Garden had failed. It would be another four months before the Allies
crossed the Rhine again and captured the German industrial heartland. The war dragged on,
costing the lives of many thousands of civilians and servicemen.

Arnhem Timeline

September 17th 1944

Operation Market Garden began. The British landing near Arnhem is

met by heavy German resistance. The American 82nd Division
captured its targets at Waals but met heavy resistance at Nijmegen.

September 18th 1944

A German counterattack stopped the Americans entering Nijmegen.

The British landing zone near Arnhem was heavily attacked by
Bittich's SS in an effort to stop further British landings.

September 19th 1944

The leading elements of the British 30th Corps reached the Americans
at Nijmegen but all efforts to break through to the British at Arnhem
fail.

September 20th 1944

The bridge at Nijmegen was captured by a combined US/GB assault.

September 21st 1944

The British paratroopers defending the northern end of the bridge at

Arnhem were heavily attacked. Those British troops who did not get
through to Arnhem formed a defensive barrier west of Oosterbeek.

September 22nd 1944

The advance of British tanks to relieve Arnhem was delayed as a

result of German attacks.

September 23rd 1944

Attempts by the Poles and troops of 30th Corps to cross the river at

Arnhem failed.

September 25th 1944

The surviving British troops were evacuated but nearly 3000 were
captured. Over 1,200 British troops were killed in a plan that went a
'bridge too far.'

MLA Citation/Reference
"Arnhem Timeline". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2014. Web.
Operation Market Garden

Timeline

Authored By Dan Alex | Last Updated: 5/12/2014

General Montgomery's plan intended to deliver one fatal blow that would have the
war ending by Christmas of 1944 - fate would see it otherwise.

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After the successes encountered in the Normandy Breakout from July through August, it
was believed that the German Army was a beaten foe and in retreat. As such, British

General Montgomery lay forth a brazen plan to capture key bridges that would be
required conquests for the final push into Germany, perhaps ending the war in Europe by
Christmas of 1944. Montgomery relayed his plan and, following acceptance by Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe -US General Dwight Eisenhower -put the plan into action.
On September 17th - just seven days after the official approval, Operation Market Garden
was set in motion.

The operation was to be made up of two distinct forces - the airborne elements (falling
under the "Market" designation) and the ground forces (falling under the "Garden"
designation). The airborne groups would be charged with seizing key bridges and choke
points while the ground forces would be called to move Northwards and solidify any
gains. When enacted, Operation Market Garden would become the single most largest
airborne operation in the history of war, encompassing some 34,600 men, 1,700 vehicles
and about 260 artillery pieces dropped from the skies by glider or parachute. The plan
would secure key routes and bypass the fabled Sigfried defensive line, allowing for
unfettered access in a final push against German territory.

The initial embarkment consisted of over 1,500 Allied aircraft arising from no fewer than
22 airbases across southern England. The US 101st Division was earmarked for a drop
over Eindhoven. They were followed by the US 82nd Airborne Division marked for stops
over Grave and Nijmegen. American forces were joined by the British 1st Airborne
Division who were charged with taken the span at Arnhem from Oosterbeek. A total of
five bridges were targeted. In the south, the British 2nd Army was staged to advance
along the Eindhoven-Arnhem corridor.

Unknown to Allied warplanners was the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area.
The 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were located to the north and south of Arnhem
respectively, near the German frontlines. As such, Allied paratroopers - naturally lightly
armed and armored - would be going up against crack German troops with tanks and
machine gun support.

As with other large airborne landings, Pathfinder units were sent ahead of the main
invasion force to setup the predetermined drop zones. From there, the main landing
parties began appearing - much to the surprise of the Germans below. The 1st Airborne
Division was dropped far from its objective and would have to make due on foot, using
up priceless time from the element of surprise. Bad weather also meant that the 101st and
82nd Airborne Divisions would have to make due without artillery support for several
days. The British XXX Corps, delayed overall by unexpected German resistance along
the Eindhoven road, united with the 101st Airborne at Eindhoven and Veghel to the south
on September 18th. The next morning, XXX Corps met up with the US 82nd Airborne
Division at Grave. The British 2nd Parachute Battalion was slow to regroup and radios
were delivered with the wrong operating crystals but nonetheless headed towards the
bridge at Arnhem once teams were settled. The now-alert Germans had begun moving
their Panzer elements into action and threatened to sever 3rd Battalion from Arnhem.

With XXX Corps providing the necessary backing, the 82nd Airborne Division took the
bridge over the Waal River at Nijmegen. However, XXX Corps was further delayed once
it had started northwards towards Arnhem. North of Nijmegen, XXX Corps once again
came under fire and progress was halted.

Ammunition and general supplies soon worked against the pinned British troops at
Arnhem, despite reinforcement from the lightly-equipped paratrooper elements from the
4th Parachute Brigade. By September 20th, the bridge at Arnhem could no longer be
defended and the remaining British forces sought refuge within the town itself - the
structures now the target of a relentless German artillery barrage. Once the German
Panzers moved across the bridge and into the town, whatever British forces remained
were taken prisoner or killed during furious house-to-house fighting.

On September 22nd, General Sosabowski's Polish 1st Airborne Brigade leaped into
action in an attempt to rescue the remaining British forces at Arnhem. Their drop zone
was just southwest of Arnhem proper but their arrival did little to defuse the deteriorating
situation - being held in check by a smart German defense that was attempting to keep the
confined British from reaching the arriving Poles and alternatively keep the Poles buried
along the river banks. Some British forces were able to evacuate when XXX Corps was
brought up for fire support to cover the escape route. Assault boats governed by British
and Canadian troops were used to ferry the battered troops out of the area. On September
27th, the remaining Poles surrendered to the Germans - marking the end of Operation
Market Garden.

In all, Montgomery's master plan was a moderate success. Key bridges were in Allied
control with the exception of Arnhem. The action at Arnhem alone accounted for 1,000
Allied deaths and up to 6,000 personnel became prisoners of war. XXX Corps lost 1,500
additional personnel in their march northwards. In the months ahead, there would be
thousands more casualties south of Arnhem as the Germans would attempt to regain their
captured territory. Montgomery himself proclaimed that Operation Market Garden was
"...90% successful", admitting to have underestimated the German response and but laid
blame on the operation having lacked the requisite air an land power needed to be 100%

successful. In true Monty fashion, he never gave ground as to any argument against
Operation Market Garden's overall success to the Allied war effort.

The bridge at Arnhem is what was referenced in the phrase "A bridge too far."

The war, it seemed, would last long past Christmas of 1944. Arnhem bridge was
eventually destroyed by American bombers in a raid on October 7th, 1944, in an effort to
deny German use of the route. In 1948, it was rebuilt and named the "John Frost Bridge"
in honor of the British commander who unsuccessfully held it.

Arnhem was finally and officially liberated on April 14th, 1945 by Canadian troops.
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There are a total of 16 Operation Market Garden Timeline Events. Entries are listed
below by date of occurrence.

1944
Sunday
September 17th
General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in
Europe, approves General Montgomery's Operation Market Garden.

1944
Sunday
September 17th
Operation Market Garden is activated. Parachute landings take place at
Eindhoven, Veghel, Grave and Oosterbeek.

1944
Sunday
September 17th
The US 101st Airborne Division landing at Eindhoven and Veghel are
successful in their capturing of bridges.

1944
Sunday
September 17th
The US 82nd Airborne Division landing at Grave is successful in
capturing its target bridge.

1944
Sunday
September 17th
British paratroopers landing at Arnhem run straight into the 9th and
10th SS Panzer Divisions who are in the area ungoing refitting. The
bridge at Arnhem is captured by British forces but the group is quickly
cut off from help by the Germans.

1944
Monday
September 18th
The British XXX Corps fights its way through a dedicated German
resistance up the main artery road leading to Eindhoven. They finally
unite with the 101st Airborne forces having landed at Eindhoven and
Veghel.

1944
Tuesday
September 19th
The British XXX Corps officially unites with the US 82nd Airborne
Division forces having landed at Grave.

1944
Wednesday
September 20th
The US 82nd Airborne, backed by the British XXX Corps, take the
bridge over the Waal River at Nijmegen.

1944
Wednesday
September 20th
British XXX Corps is delayed a full day from reaching beleagured
paratrooper forces at Arnhem.

1944
Thursday
September 21st
British paratroopers at Arnhem give up control of their bridge against a
stronger German foe and instead concentrate on surviving by utilizing
the town of Arnhem itself as a defense.

1944
Thursday
September 21st
British XXX Corps is slowed down once more, this time by German antitank forces and artillery emplacements north of Nijmegen and along
the route to Arnhem.

1944
Friday
September 22nd

Elements of the Polish Parachute Brigade, delayed multiple times from

earlier participation in the operation, finally land south of Arnhem.
Their mission is to reinforce the battered British 1st Airborne Division.

1944
Monday
September 25th
Remaining elements of the British 1st Airborne Division out of Arnhem
make their way across the Neder Rijn River in retreat. They intend on
meeting up with XXX Corps still making their way to the area.

1944
Monday
September 25th
At Arnhem, some 6,000 Allied soldiers are taken prison by the
Germans. A further 1,000 lay dead from the fighting.

1944
Wednesday
September 27th
Despite valliant actions, the Polish Parachute Brigade is forced to
surrender at Arnhem.

1944
Wednesday
September 27th
South of Arnhem, Allied forces continue to hold their gains. Over the
next few months, some 3,500 casualties will be counted.

Operation Market Garden, 17-27 September 1944

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Origins
The Rival Plans
The Allied Landings
The Operation Begins in Earnest
The Weather Intervenes
The German Counterstroke
The Operation Falters
A Change of Plan
The End of Market Garden
Suggested Reading
"Where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his
country with troops for its defense, as that 10,000 men
descending from the clouds, might not, in many places, do
an infinite deal of mischief before a force could be brought
together to repel them?" Benjamin Franklin, 1784.
Operation Market Garden, which includes the Battle for Arnhem, in September 1944,
was the largest airborne battle in history, being bigger than Operation Mercury, the
German airborne invasion of Crete in 1941, which was the only successful strategic
airborne operation of World War Two. It was also the only real attempt by the Allies to
use airborne forces in a strategic role in Europe. It was a massive engagement, with its
principal combatants being 21 Army Group under Field Marshal Bernard
Montgomery for the Allies and Army Group B under Generalfeldmarschall Walter
Model for the Germans. It involved thousands of aircraft and armoured vehicles, and
hundreds of thousands of troops and was the only major Allied defeat of the Northwest
European campaign.
Origins
The origins of the operation lay in the unexpected success of Operation Overlord (the DDay landings) on 6 June 1944 and the Battle for Normandy in the immediate aftermath.
The Allies had assumed that they would make a slow but steady advance inland once the
invasion had taken place and that General Dwight D Eisenhower who commanded the
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) would take over the
overall conduct of the land campaign from Montgomery after a few weeks. Eisenhower
would then control all three Army Groups, the 21st Army Group under Montgomery,
12th Army Group under Lieutenant General Omar Bradley and 6th Army Group under
Lieutenant General Jacob Devers advancing from southern France against strong

German resistance. What actually happened was that the Allies were bogged down for
many weeks in a virtual stalemate in Normandy and that the German defence had
virtually collapsed overnight leading to the Falaise pocket, which was a complete
disaster for the Germans, of the same magnitude as Stalingrad had been on the Eastern
Front. The very size of this victory was to be Montgomery's undoing as success in
Normandy had depended upon close cooperation between the Allied commanders and
forces. Now that many believed the end of the war was only a matter of time (possibly
ending before Christmas), many commanders looked to the future development of their
careers.

Photos courtesy of MarketGarden.Com and The Battle of Arnhem Archive

In mid-August, Montgomery first raised the idea of changing Allied strategy to
encompass a single thrust by his 21st Army Group, supported by the US First Army
under Major General Courtney Hodges, through northern France, the Low Countries
and into Germany. Montgomery's point was that there was not enough transport
available at the moment to supply all three Army Groups going at full speed across a
broad front. Even the fleet of Allied transport aircraft, which was supposed to be in
reserve to conduct airborne operations, was being pressed into service. As German
resistance had more or less collapsed against the 21st Army Group, it would make sense
to give priority to them, as they could also eliminate the V1 sites that had been attacking
southern England and liberate the ports along the north coast of France which would
help the Allied supply situation immensely. Montgomery even offered to serve under
Bradley, just so long as they would have first call on supplies.
The plan was firmly opposed by Bradley who believed that the Allies had won the Battle
of Normandy in spite of Montgomery, as opposed to because of him. Now that final
victory was in site, it was time for the Americans to take the lead. Also, such a plan
would mean halting the American forces that had advanced the farthest from the
Normandy beachhead - the US Third Army under Lieutenant General George S Patton
Jr., Montgomery's old rival. Montgomery however, eventually persuaded Eisenhower
that the 21st Army Group's thrust should have priority in supplies and that Bradley's US
First Army, which would advance north of Aachen, should support it. In a letter to
General George C Marshall, Eisenhower admitted to changing his "basic plan of

attacking both north and east in order to help Montgomery seize tremendously
important objectives in the northeast." Bradley however, quietly cooperated with Patton
to keep his Army moving east towards Germany. The Allied heavy bomber forces had
gone back to their strategic bombing campaign against German cities and so the tactical
air forces (RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force and USAAF 9th Air Force) split along national
lines, although there was little Luftwaffe resistance in the West. With Air Chief Marshal
Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory closing down the headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary
Air Forces, Eisenhower decided to form the Combined Airborne Forces Headquarters on
2nd August under Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton, the controversial former
commander of the 9th Air Force. On 16th August it became First Allied Airborne Army
as part of the Allied deception plan based around the fictitious US 1st Army Group. It
consisted of the US XVIII Airborne Corps (82nd, 101st, 17th Airborne Divisions under
the command of Major General Matthew B Ridgeway) and British I Airborne Corps (1st
and 6th Airborne Divisions as well as the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, all
of which were under the command of Lieutenant General F A M Browning).
Eisenhower was increasingly under pressure form Washington (Army Chief of Staff
General George C Marshall and Commander, Army Air Forces General Henry 'Hap'
Arnold) to mount a major airborne operation before the end of the war in Europe, and
so placed the First Allied Airborne Army under the control of the 21st Army Group. As
the Allied supply situation worsened and the rivalries and conflicting interests
deepened, an airborne solution, Operation Market Garden started to emerge. As the
Allied advance continued into northern France and Belgium, these factors and stiffening
resistance from the German forces under Army Group B forced the advance to a halt.
German resistance was helped by the escape of the Fifteenth Army under Von Zangen
across the Scheldt Estuary. Army Group B had come under the command of
Generalfeldmarschall Model and who had accomplished an amazing feat of
reorganisation in the time available to him.
The Rival Plans
The overall Market Garden plan called for the First Allied Airborne Army to assist the
rapid advance of the British Second Army from the Meuse - Escaut Canal to Nunspeet
on the Zuider Zee (Ijsselmeer), a distance of around 100 miles (160km) and who would
then turn east into Germany towards the industrial heartland of the Ruhr. A "carpet of
airborne troops" would capture the road bridges over the major rivers and canals that
lay along the route in three places: Eindhoven (around 13 miles / 20km from the start
line), Nijmegen (53 miles / 85km) and Arnhem (64 miles / 100km), as well as a couple
of smaller bridges at Veghel and Grave that lay between Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The
route that XXX Corps (under Lt General B G Horrocks) would take (the formation that
would head the British Second Army advance - the Garden part of the operation) was a
tree-lined double-track road that ran across country that was almost entirely flat,
consisted of sandy soil and polder (drained bogland) and broken by orchards, small
woods, streams and ditches. All of this would make cross-country movement difficult
and time-consuming. For the airborne (Market) operation, as far as possible USAAF

aircraft would fly the paratroopers while RAF aircraft would tow the gliders, for
simplicity. Brereton was keen to prove that a major assault could be attempted but sided
with Major General Paul Williams (Comander, IX Troop Carrier Command) who argued
that "owing to the reduced hours of daylight and distances involved, it would not be
possible to consider more than one lift per day . . . casualties would result from pilot and
crew fatigue". This meant that the airlift would take three days to complete, the fourth
day would be devoted to resupply operations and the next two days would herald the
52nd (Lowland) Division being flown into airfields north of Arnhem. Meteorologists
predicted at least two days of clear weather starting on Sunday 17 September, which
became the start date for the operation.
Lieutenant General F A M Browning's British I Airborne Corps would command the
Market part of the operation. The first wave of each division would land as a formed
body around six miles (ten kilometres) from their objectives and then advance to
capture them. The three divisions would have finished landing by the end of day three
and each holding an all-round perimeter of over 25 miles (forty kilometres) allowing the
ground forces to advance over them. Such timescales and distances only really made
sense if there were an indication the Germans would put up little, if any, resistance. As
Major Brian Urquhart, Chief of Intelligence British I Airborne Corps commented, "I
simply did not believe that the Germans were going to roll over and surrender." There
was poor coordination between SHAEF, 21st Army Group and the First Allied Airborne
Army, which meant that although the overall estimated strength of the German forces
was reasonably accurate, Allied intelligence lost the II SS Panzer Corps as it approached
the Arnhem area. Most assumed that they had moved east, rather than stay in the
general vicinity of Arnhem. Reports by the Dutch resistance and last minute aerial
reconnaissance photographs indicated the presence of an armoured formation, as Major
Brian Urquhart commented - "There, in the photos, I could clearly see tanks - if not on
the very Arnhem landing and drop zones, then certainly close to them." These reports
were however, dismissed all along the chain of command with the result being "the
evaluation of intelligence on the Panzers in the Arnhem area was magnificently
bungled." Major Urquhart was then visited by the Corps Medical Officer who suggested
he take some sick leave.
The initial phase of the Allied plan (as conceived by Browning) had the US 101st
Airborne Division under Major General Maxwell Taylor landing north of Eindhoven to
capture the bridges over the River Aa, Willems Canal, River Dommel (St Oedenrode)
and Wilhelmina Canal (Son) and then going on to capture Eindhoven. Securing the road
from Eindhoven to Grave would have given the 101st a perimeter of some 40 miles
(65km) to cover and Dempsey overruled Browning allowing the 101st to halt at Veghel,
with a gap of some 13 miles (20km) between the 101st and 82nd. The US 82nd Airborne
Division under Brigadier General James Gavin (Ridgeway's successor) also had a large
area to defend. As the expected threat was from the Kleve region, Browning assigned
Gavin the first priority of the capturing the Groesbeek Heights, an area of wooded hills
about 8 miles (12km) long to the east of Nijmegen. He was also to capture the bridges
over the River Maas (Grave), Maas-Waal Canal and finally the road bridge in the centre

of Nijmegen. The British 1st Airborne Division's landing zones were on the heathland
west of Arnhem, and their targets were the road bridge in the town centre, the railway
bridge out to the west on the lower Rhine and a pontoon bridge (which was discovered
to have been dismantled on the eve of the operation).
The ground forces that would link up with the paratroopers would be headed by XXX
Corps (2nd Household Cavalry Regiment, Guards Armoured Division, 43rd (Wessex)
Division, 8th Armoured Brigade, 50th (Northumbrian) Division and Royal Netherlands
Brigade 'Prinses Irene') advancing northward up the 'Club Route', with XII Corps (7th
Armoured Division, 15th (Scottish) Division and 53rd (Welsh) Division) supporting on
the left and VIII Corps (11th Armoured Division, 3rd Division, 4th Armoured Brigade
and 1st Belgian Brigade) supporting on the right. The Guards Armoured Division would
head XXX Corps' advance and as it linked up with each airborne division, it would take
control of them and hand off forces further south to VIII Corps. If any of the main
bridges were destroyed, the Guards would secure the river bank and 43rd (Wessex)
Division would mount an assault crossing. To their immediate front was Kampfgruppe
'Walther' with ten weak battalions with ten assault guns. Once this crust was broken, the
race would be on.
As such, there was no German 'plan' for Market Garden. The Germans expected there to
be an advance from the Meuse - Escaut Canal but had little real intelligence as to when
exactly that would happen and the forces that would be involved. Defensive plans
considered two possibilities. The first was an amphibious landing by the (fictitious)
Fourth British Army on the Dutch coast to cut off the remaining forces of the Fifteenth
Army; the second was a drive northwest by the 21st Army Group towards Wesel with an
eye to conducting a pincer movement around the Ruhr. The Germans expected there to
be landings fro the First Allied Airborne Army to support either of these eventualities
and Model deployed the meagre reserve of Student's First Parachute Army in central
Holland to cover them. As Student conceded, this was "grotesque improvisation on a
grand scale". Unfortunately, the deployment area was right in the path of Market
Garden. Model took up residence in the Hartenstein Hotel, which was just east of the
British drop zone. The II SS Panzer Corps was not officially part of Model's forces,
coming under Armed Forces Command Netherlands as it rested and
refitted. Obergruppenfhrer Bittrich was headquartered in Doetinchem (15 miles /
25km east of Arnhem) with his forces spread out between Arnhem and Deventer. SSKampfgruppe 'Hohenstauffen' (in reality the remnants of the 9th 'Hohenstauffen' SS
Panzer Division) was due to move to Siegen (near Koblenz) to be refitted on the 12th
September (the last elements would move on the 17th). SS-Kampfgruppe 'Frundsberg'
(the remnants of the 10th 'Frundsberg' SS Panzer Division) would move to Aachen after
that. Such was the perceived situation that on the 16th September, Bittrich sent
Brigadefhrer Harmel to SS Headquarters in Berlin to personally plead for
reinforcements. Such a shortage of troops had already been noted by Rundstedt in a
letter to OKW stating that "the danger of new reverses . . . can be removed only by
speeding up the dispatch of the reinforcements that have repeatedly been requested."

Meanwhile, Obersturmbahfhrer Harzer continued organising the troops for the move
east. The landings the next day would take them completely by surprise.
The Allied Landings
Operation Market Garden started just before midnight on Saturday 16 September 1944
when 200 Lancasters and twenty-three Mosquitos from RAF Bomber Command
pounded four German fighter airfields in northern Holland. This was followed by 822 B17 Flying Fortresses from the 8th Air Force the next day bombing the 117 identified antiaircraft positions along the route the transports would take, as well as airfields at
Eindhoven, Deelen and Ede. These were backed up by another fifty-four Lancasters and
five Mosquitos, while another eighty-five Lancasters and fifteen Mosquitos attacked
Walcheren Island. Losses were light (two B-17s, two Lancasters and three Mosquitos)
and the attacks barely registered as unusual with the Germans as the Allies had massive
air superiority in the west - to quote one German soldier "If you see a white plane, it's
American, if you see a black plane it's RAF. If you see no planes at all it's the Luftwaffe".
The Dutch Government who were in exile in London, called for a strike of all transport
workers to coincide with the operation.
Sunday 17 September dawned bright and sunny. The airborne troops boarded their
aircraft with the gliders and tugs taking off first at 09.30 and the C-47 Dakotas taking off
later. The 101st took the southern route into Holland, while the 82nd and British 1st
Airborne taking the northern route. The two columns of aircraft stretched for 94 miles
(150km) in length and 3 miles (5km) in width. There were a total of 1,051 troop carriers
and 516 glider / tug combinations (2,083 aircraft in all). Escorts amounted to 371
Spitfires, Tempests and Mosquitos on the northern route, and 548 P-47 Thunderbolts,
P-38 Lightnings and P-51Mustangs on the southern route. The 117 anti-aircraft
positions along the Market garden route were once again bombed and strafed by 212
Thunderbolts, while fifty Mosquitos, forty-eight B-25 Mitchells and twenty-four Bostons
bombed military facilities around Nijmegen, Deelen, Ede and Kleve. Resistance from
German fighters and anti-aircraft fire was minimal overall, but stronger nearer
Eindhoven. The Allies lost some sixty-eight aircraft and seventy-one gliders from all
causes, as well as two RAF and eighteen USAAF fighters.
The first gliders of the British 1st Airborne Division touched down just after midday (1st
Airlanding Brigade) followed by the divisional artillery and troops. Losses in gliders
were light, the majority of which had landed in England and would arrive the following
day. The only major loss was the failure of two gliders to arrive, each carrying a 17pdr
anti-tank gun. The 101st jumped north of Eindhoven. The 501st Parachute Infantry
Regiment landed correctly on its drop zone south of Veghel, apart from the 1st Battalion,
which dropped by mistake at Heeswijk, 3 miles on the wrong side of the Willems Canal
and the River Aa. The 502nd Parachute Infantry and 506th Parachute Infantry landed
with the divisional headquarters just north of the Sonsche Forest. The 82nd Airborne
dropped with the minimal loss of two Dakotas. The 504th Parachute Infantry dropped
at Grave (with a company of the 2nd Battalion dropped west of the bridge) while the

505th Parachute Infantry and 508th Parachute Infantry dropped on the Groesbeek
Heights with the 376th Parachute Artillery Battalion (the first ever parachute
deployment of artillery into battle). The British 1st Airborne Corps headquarters landed
near to Groesbeek village at around 13.30 while the 1st Parachute Brigade dropped at
13.53 west of Arnhem to complete the British landings. Some 20,000 troops, 511
vehicles, 330 artillery pieces and 590 tons of stores had arrived safely. As the transports
departed, Brereton flew back to IX Troop Carrier Command Headquarters at Eastcote to
oversee the second wave. Once that had taken off, the Market deployment would be
fixed and his role would be over. There would be no-one in England to coordinate the
land battle with the air plan and no contingency plans had been made.
The Operation Begins in Earnest
At 14.00 on the 17 September, 408 guns of XXX Corps opened fire to support the initial
attack at Joe's Bridge. The Irish Guards battlegroup (led by Lt Col J Vandeleur)
advanced "on a front two tanks wide" with infantry from the 231st Brigade (50th
(Northumbrian) Division) keeping pace. The initial breakthrough went well, with
Kampfgruppe 'Walther' being unable withstand the superior Allied firepower. The
Guards Armoured Division (under Major General A H Adair) halted at Valkenswaard at
19.30. The XII Corps (under Lt General N M Ritchie) attacked north with the 15th
(Scottish) Division and 53rd (Welsh) Division against Kampfgruppe 'Chill' but made
slow progress.
The 101st Airborne had seized most of its objectives by 16.00 with 501st Parachute
Infantry securing the road and rail bridges at Heeswijk and Veghel, 502nd Parachute
Infantry capturing the St Oedenrode bridge but at Son, the road bridge was blown in the
faces of the 506th Parachute Infantry and a push by the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Parachute
Infantry (2/502nd) towards another bridge south of Best was turned back.
At this point General Student, watching things develop from his headquarters in Vught,
ordered the 59th Infantry Division (15th Army) to reinforce the LXXXVIII Corps at Best.
General Otto Sponheimer (LXXXVII Corps) moved the 719th Coastal Division eastwards
to Tournhout. Meanwhile, the 508th and 505th Parachute Infantry Regiments had set
up defensive positions either side of Groesbeek village, while the 504th Parachute
Infantry had seized Grave Bridge. Unfortunately, two of the three bridges over the Maas
- Waal Canal were blown by the Germans before troops from the 504th and 505th
Parachute Infantry Regiments arrived. This left the bridge nearest Heumen in American
hands. A company of the 1/508th was sent into Nijmegen to reconnoitre the bridge
across the River Waal but was stopped short by Kampfgruppe 'Henke'. Model, on first
hearing of airborne landings had left the Hartenstein Hotel and relocated to Terborg,
some 30 miles (50km) to the east. He assumed direct control of II SS Panzer Corps from
Armed Forces Command Netherlands. Despite Bittrich arguing that both bridges should
be blown up, Model refused claiming that they would be needed for the counterattack.
Hitler, upon hearing the news of the Allied airborne landings, decided to give the defeat
of the operation top priority. Virtually the entire frontline strength of the Luftwaffe

(around 300 fighters) was given to Model, as was the reserves and training detachments
in Wehrkreiss VI, the military district of Germany adjacent to Holland, as well as those
in transit or on leave near Wesel (some 3,000 men). Armed Forces Command
Netherlands (under General Friedrich Christansen) also promised reinforcements under
Generalleutnant Hans von Tettau. The reinforcements that had been promised to II SS
Panzer Corps would also start to arrive in 48 hours. The sort of battle that was unfolding
was just the sort of improvised engagement that Model excelled at, and soon after the
initial Allied landings, his plan was ready. General Student was to handle the operations
near Eindhoven, using Kampfgruppe 'Chill' against XII and XXX Corps, along with 59th
Infantry Division and 107th Panzer Brigade (promised by OB West) against the 101st
Airborne. The forces from Wehrkreiss VI (under General Kurt Feldt) were to recapture
the Groesbeek Heights from 82nd Airborne with the help of II Parachute Corps moving
from Cologne. SS-Kampfgruppe 'Frundsberg' was to move across Arnhem Bridge
towards Nijmegen to prevent any crossing while SS-Kampfgruppe 'Hohenstauffen' held
the British west of Arnhem.
By mid-afternoon, the 1st Airlanding Brigade (1/Border, 7/KOSB & 2/South Staffs under
Brigadier P H W Hicks) had started to secure the dropping zones west of Arnhem, and
were already in action against the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Depot Battalion
(Hauptsturmfhrer Sepp Krafft) and scratch units from the SS NCO Training School
'Arnheim' at Wolfheze, Luftwaffe troops from Deelen in Kampfgruppe 'Weber' and
Dutch SS-Wachbattalion III (loosely translated as the 3rd SS Guard Battalion), a 1,200
man concentration camp guard unit set up under "Hhere SS und Polizeifhrer HSSPF" Nordwest. The first 47 prisoners taken by the British were from 27 different
parent units. The 1st Parachute Brigade (under Brigadier G W Lathbury) started to
advance towards Arnhem using three routes, 'Lion' (3/Para with the brigade
headquarters) which was the main Oosterbeek Highway, 'Leopard' (1/Para) to the north
and 'Tiger' (2/Para) to the south. At this point, most of the division's radios were
working, but communication problems had started to appear as the division's sub-units
moved away from each other. A false rumour reached Urquhart that many of the special
gliders containing Major C F H 'Freedie' Gough's reconnaissance squadron had failed to
arrive and so he set off to check the situation out for himself. By the time the brigade
had reached Oosterbeek, it was encountering increased German resistance from the
blocking force SS-Kampfgruppe 'Spindler' (part of SS-Kampfgruppe 'Hohenstaufen'
under Obersturmbahfhrer Harzer) which gradually absorbed Krafft's force and formed
a solid line by the early hours of 18 September, blocking most of 1st Parachute Brigade
from the high ground and the bridge in the town centre. The exception to this was
2/Para (Lt Col. John Frost) who having seen the railway bridge blown in their faces,
carried on and reached the town centre where they secured the northern end of the
bridge and were later joined by other elements of 1st Parachute Brigade. When elements
of SS-Kampfgruppe 'Frundsberg' (Brigadefhrer Harmel) tried to cross the bridge on
their way to Nijmegen, they found their way blocked.

The Weather Intervenes

The predictions from the Allied Meteorologists proved optimistic and on Monday 18th
September, the weather effectively disrupted much of the air operations and the take-off
of the second wave in England was delayed. The air support planned for the operation
was drastically curtailed thanks in part to the weather but also to Browning's failure to
arrange RAF and USAAF liaison officers for British I Airborne Corps and Brereton's
insistence that aircraft in Belgium remain grounded while his were flying. In Germany
and northern Holland, the weather cleared just in time for the Luftwaffe's full effort to
begin. Market Garden was the only battle in the campaign for Northwest Europe to be
fought with Allied air inferiority, much of it self-inflicted.
The advance by the Guards Armoured Division (preceded by the 2nd Household Cavalry
Regiment) resumed at first light, with 231st Brigade remaining at Valkenswaard. The
Grenadier Guards Battlegroup took over the lead, with the Welsh Guards Battlegroup
opening up the second route ('Heart') towards Helmond, although its advance bogged
down in the face of resistance from Kampfgruppe 'Walther' and it subsequently rejoined
the main effort. The 506th Parachute Infantry cleared Eindhoven of a small German
presence and the Guards continued around the town and had reached the destroyed Son
Bridge by the evening where work on a Bailey bridge started. On the German side, the
LXXXVI Corps (under General Hans von Obstfelder with 176th Infantry Division and
Division 'Erdmann') arrived between Weert and Helmond. An attempt by 2/502nd and
3/502nd Parachute Infantry to seize the bridge at Best was foiled with the bridge being
blown by the 59th Infantry Division. All now depended on how quickly the Bailey bridge
at Son was completed.
At Nijmegen, the 1/508th and 3/508th tried time and again to capture the road bridge,
but time and again the German defence held. SS-Kampfgruppe 'Frundsberg' started to
ferry men and equipment across the Pannerden Canal (the canalised stretch of the
Lower Rhine east of Arnhem) in their efforts to get to Nijmegen. The first troops from
Corps 'Feldt' appeared (elements of the 406th Landesschtzen Division) and started to
attack the Groesbeek Heights. Kampfgruppe 'von Tettau' attacked 1st Airlanding
Brigade from the direction of Renkum, gradually absorbing all the other German forces
along the route. 3/Para continued its advance against Kampfgruppe 'Spindler' (with
Lathbury and Urquhart) and managed to get within 2,000m of the bridge where
confused street fighting was the order of the day. Urquhart's party was cut off after
Lathbury was wounded and Brigadier Hicks took command of the division, sending
2/South Staffs to reinforce 1st Parachute Brigade's advance on the bridge. In Arnhem,
2/Para was in a strong position vis--vis SS-Kampfgruppe 'Knaust' (part of
'Hohenstauffen') who the Germans found to be formidable opponents and would require
artillery support to blast them out of their positions. Elements of the 9th SS
Reconnaissance Battalion returned from Nijmegen mid-morning and tried to blast their
way through Frost's position, only to suffer heavy casualties. Time it seemed was not on
Frost's side, as the battalion only had rations for forty-eight hours and limited supplies
of ammunition. The desperate attempts to reach 2/Para by the rest of the brigade failed

as Kampfgruppe 'Splindler' eventually halted them. Reinforcements were now starting

to arrive from all over Germany, including Flak Brigade 'Von Swoboda', and the German
forces in the area could only get stronger as time went on.
None of this was known to Browning, who was discovering the difference between an
administrative headquarters and commanding in the field. There were endless problems
with the radio equipment, for which Browning blamed his signals section. But there
were other means of communications available, such as the GHQ Liaison Regiment that
was in contact with London through its special radios, as was a BBC news team with a
VHS set. British 1st Airborne had direct contact with 2/Para and with the Corps rear
headquarters at Moor Park that was also in intermittent contact with Browning. The
Dutch resistance were sending coded messages to 82nd Airborne warning them that
British 1st Airborne was in trouble on a telephone system that reached as far south as
Son and 101st Airborne. The failure was not primarily one of communications (although
there were undoubtedly problems) but one of staff work and experience. British I
Airborne Corps asked Moor Park for copies of the signals and contact was established
the next day, but for the first two vital days of the operation, Browning was never in
complete control.
The delayed second wave took off from England late in the morning, and two battalions
of the 327th Glider Regiment reached the 101st Airborne. 502nd Parachute Infantry
supported by British tanks attacked the 59th Infantry Division's positions at Best, taking
over a thousand prisoners. The 59th also probed towards Veghel, but were beaten back.
Meanwhile, the morning attacks by Corps 'Feldt' had overrun part of 101st Airborne
Division's landing zones, but they were cleared by an assault by the 505th Parachute
Infantry just as the remainder of the divisional artillery landed. Both the American
divisions also received resupply from B-25 Liberators of the US 8th Air Force. The
British second wave arrived (the remainder of the South Staffordshires, divisional
troops and the 4th Parachute Brigade under Brigadier J W Hackett with 10/Para,
11/Para and 156/Para) just as 1st Airlanding Brigade was skirmishing with the 3rd
Dutch SS Police Battalion who beat a hasty retreat. Short Stirlings and Dakotas arrived
on resupply, but the intended supply drop zone was still in German hands and most of it
failed to get to the British. Hackett was told on his arrival that Hicks was commanding
the division and wanted to send the remainder of the South Staffs and 11/Para to
reinforce the 1st Parachute Brigade's attack towards Arnhem, and send the remainder of
his brigade in support. Hackett protested that he needed a plan and that it would be
better if his brigade attacked towards its original objective of the high ground. An
argument ensued, but Hicks eventually agreed to a delay. What mattered at this point
was a bridgehead over the Lower Rhine. If Hicks had given up the original objective of
Arnhem, he could have secured the ground on either side of the Heveadorp ferry and
waited for XXX Corps.
With XXX Corps having reached the intersection of 101st and 82nd Airborne, the 101st
now came under XXX Corps control and 50th (Northumbrian) Division passed to VIII

Corps (Lt General Sir Richard O'Conner) which started its delayed attack with an assault
by the 3rd Division across the Meuse - Escaut Canal at Lille St Hubert. At this point the
battle was starting to swing against the Allies. The airborne troops had lost any element
of surprise, XXX Corps was delayed at Son and the supporting attacks on either flank
had yet to make any real impact. There was little information available to make an
assessment and no British reserve with which to influence the battle. Meanwhile, Model
was ready to launch his response.
The German Counterstroke
The weather for Tuesday 19th September was even worse with the only significant
reinforcement involving the remaining battalion of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment
and divisional artillery being dropped to the 101st Airborne. The two battalions of the
325th Glider Infantry (82nd Airborne) and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade that were
due to drop (apart from a small number of gliders) failed to move. First Allied Airborne
Army failed to inform the 2nd Tactical Air Force in Belgium of these changes who
continued to fly support according to the original plan. The airborne troops in Holland
failed to get any close support, compared to the support given by the Luftwaffe who flew
125 sorties.
1st Parachute Brigade started its attack eastwards along the line of the Lower Rhine
(1/Para and 3/Para) and towards Arnhem Bridge (11/Para and 2/South Staffs) before
dawn while 4th Parachute Brigade moved towards the high ground. The fog lifted soon
after daybreak as 1 and 3/Para found themselves in a crossfire between anti-aircraft
guns firing from the southern bank and SS-Kampfgruppe 'Spindler' to the north. They
could advance no further and the attack had collapsed by mid-morning with heavy
casualties. The advance by 11/Para and 2/South Staffs met with little success either, but
they did advance far enough to free General Urquhart who moved quickly to the
divisional headquarters by jeep and start to reorganise the remains of the division.
Hackett's attack to the northeast was reinforced by 7/KOSB leaving just 1/Border in
reserve. Warnings were also broadcast to the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade not to land on
its original drop zone as the Germans controlled the area.
At Son, the Bailey bridge had been completed and the Guards Armoured Division
resumed its advance at first light, and had reached Grave Bridge by mid-morning. With
XXX Corps now starting its final advance to Nijmegen, 82nd Airborne now came under
Horrocks who was increasingly unwell. A joint headquarters was set up near Heumen
between Browning, Gavin, Adair and Horrocks. With the 325th delayed, Gavin
organised 450 glider pilots into an ad hoc battalion and gratefully received the support
of the Guards Armoured Division and 8th Armoured Brigade. Another attack towards
Nijmegen Bridge by the 2/505th Parachute Infantry and Grenadiers failed whereupon
Gavin suggested an amphibious assault across the Waal to take the bridge at both ends
and so Horrocks ordered XXX Corps' assault boats forward from Hechtel. As it happens,
107th Panzer Brigade had arrived east of Son to support Student's planned attack with
59th Infantry Division from Best but was pre-empted by an attack by the 101st Airborne
Division and 8th Armoured Brigade in the early afternoon which forced the 59th

Infantry to retreat. 107th Panzer Brigade itself attacked and almost overran Taylor's
headquarters before a successful defence could be mounted. More gliders arrived with
some additional divisional troops and half the expected divisional artillery, while only
40 tons of stores arrived on target.
At Arnhem, the attack by the British 1st Airborne had finally come to a halt through high
casualties, low supplies and sheer exhaustion. More German armour and artillery was
arriving by the hour, including the 208th Assault Brigade from Denmark and Flak
Brigade 'Von Swoboda'. The German forces on either side of the British seemed unable
to coordinate their attacks but 4th Parachute Brigade also found its route firmly
blocked. At this point, Hackett began to pull his brigade back south of the railway line.
The few Polish gliders that had flown to Arnhem dropped on their intended landing
zone (the warning having failed to get through in time) and quickly found it to be in
German hands. Needless to say, the Poles quickly regrouped and hastily made their way
to join the British forces over to the west. Once again, only a fraction of the intended
resupply reached the British despite almost 400 tons being dropped by sixty-three
Dakotas and 100 Stirlings. At Arnhem itself, 2/Para was slowly being ground down by
artillery and air attacks and issues such as protecting the wounded, ammunition, food
and water had all become pressing. The Germans however still found their way blocked
by the British who continued to hold out.
The drive by XII Corps on the left flank had reached the Turnhout - Eindhoven Road but
53rd (Welsh) Division had exhausted itself doing so. 7th Armoured Division took over
the Aart bridgehead while 15th (Scottish) Division passed through the 53rd next day. On
the right flank, 3rd Division had almost reached Weert and 11th Armoured Division was
moving towards Helmond. Pressure on 101st Airborne led Dempsey to assign another
armoured battalion to Taylor from the 4th Armoured Brigade.
The Operation Falters
The bad weather continued into Wednesday (20th September), once again grounding
the Poles and the 325th. Only resupply drops were possible, and 82nd Airborne received
about eighty percent of its intended tonnage. British 1st Airborne meanwhile had pulled
back to form a position around Oosterbeek with its a base on the river. Using the GHQ
Liaison Regiment radios, Urquhart agreed with Corps headquarters that the Poles
should land at Driel and establish a bridgehead. The supply drop zones were also
changed but dropping supplies into the woods and streets of Oosterbeek was a difficult
undertaking, especially with intense German anti-aircraft fire. British 1st Airborne
received only thirteen percent of its intended supplies. Opposing forces were often
intermingled in woods and houses, and neither side was strong enough to make a
decisive assault (an attack just after daybreak by Kampfgruppe 'von Tettau' and SSKampfgruppe 'Kraft' was repulsed) so the fighting slowed down into an affair dominated
by mortars, skirmishes and snipers. In at least one house the British and Germans held
different floors and British 1st Airborne managed to produce a one-sheet newsletter. By
this time, most of the battalions in the division had been reduced by up to 75 percent
and the movement and care of the wounded inside the perimeter had become so

hazardous that the British pulled back slightly at midday in a truce to allow the Germans
to take possession of a number of the main dressing stations to tend the wounded
properly. This was but one example of enemies cooperating in a battle that was intense
and hard-fought. At Arnhem, 2/Para stubbornly hung onto a shrinking perimeter while
the Germans tried to blast them out of the houses with artillery and flamethrowers. The
British had water for only one day and were very short of supplies. A truce was
negotiated and over 200 wounded (from both sides) were evacuated, including Frost
who had become a casualty.
The German attacks on what the 101st Airborne had started to call 'Hell's Highway'
began again at dawn. The 107th Panzer Brigade once again advanced against Son, but
was beaten back by the 101st Airborne and 8th Armoured Brigade. XXX Corps
continued to advance up the road as best it could, but the 43rd (Wessex) Division (under
Major General G I Thomas) found it slow going (as did the boats coming from Hechtel).
The Guards Armoured Division was broken up to provide support to the 82nd Airborne
with the Grenadiers and Irish Guards preparing for the assault crossing, the Welsh
Guards covered Grave bridge and the Coldstream Guards supported the Groesbeek
position. The Irish Guards, in conjunction with the 504th Parachute Infantry started to
clear Nijmegen's suburbs in preparation for the river assault, while the 505th and
Grenadiers moved towards the bridge. By mid-afternoon the assault started after the
boats had arrived and a Typhoon rocket attack and smoke / artillery barrage had taken
place. Two companies of the 3/504th crossed the river under heavy artillery fire and six
successive journeys brought the rest of the 1/504th and 3/504th across. The 3/504th
Parachute Infantry attacked eastwards clearing the railway bridge and road bridge while
the 505th Parachute Infantry and the Grenadiers attacked through the town towards the
road bridge. Brigadefhrer Harmel attempted to blow the bridge but the charges failed
to go off, and so instructed a subordinate "Tell Bittrich. They're across the Waal".
Meanwhile, Corps 'Feldt' had been reinforced with the II Parachute Corps and
continued its attacks against the Groesbeek positions. The attacks met with considerable
success and it was only the intervention of the 508th Parachute Infantry and the
Coldstream Guards that restored the position.
The Germans were continuing to grow in strength (with the 180th and 190th Infantry
Divisions expected within a week) and the flank attacks by XII and VIII Corps continued
to make slow progress. Kampfgruppe 'von Tettau' was put under II SS Panzer Corps
command to check an expected breakout by British 1st Airborne and Harmel was given
orders by Bittrich to retake Nijmegen the next day. However, with only three battalions
of 'Frundsberg' between Nijmegen and Arnhem, it seemed nothing could stop the
Guards Armoured Division reaching Arnhem Bridge. But the Guards had been fought to
a standstill and had to wait for resupply and their infantry before moving off. "Arnhem
and those paratroopers were just up ahead, and almost within sight of that last bloody
bridge, we were stopped. I never felt such morbid despair." (Lt John Gorman, Guards
Armoured Division)

A Change of Plan
The bad weather failed to lift as the operation moved into Thursday (21st September)
and the day was very cold as well. Corps 'Feldt' was instructed to hold its positions on
the Groesbeek Heights (it was exhausted and there was little point trying to reach
Nijmegen with XXX Corps moving up the highway) and all the troops in the north of the
area (as far south as Elst) was to come under II SS Panzer Corps command who were to
finish off the British at Arnhem and contain any drive northwards. The rest came under
Student's First Parachute Army who was to organise a pincer attack between LXXXVIII
and LXXXVI Corps.
At Arnhem, the last fight started at about 09.00 with Gough and the remainder of the
battalion trying to break through SS-Kampfgruppe 'Knaust' and make their way back to
the division. There was no formal surrender and small groups of British either
disappeared, ran out of ammunition or were overwhelmed. By midday, the Germans
finally crossed Arnhem Bridge. 2/Para had fought for some 88 hours without relief.
"The hardest thing to bear was the feeling that we had just been written off." (James
Sims, British 1st Airborne)
Back at Oosterbeek, Urquhart was reorganising the division, and placed Hicks in
command on the west facing Kampfgruppe 'von Tettau' and Hackett in command in the
east, facing SS-Kampfgruppe 'Hohenstauffen'. An attack by 'von Tettau' drove 1/Border
of the vital Westerbouwing Hill (the crucial high ground overlooking the Heveadorp
ferry) during the morning but because of exhaustion and confusion, neither side really
appreciated the significance of the terrain. Hick's troops were pushed back some 800m
during the day but the German attack petered out as the forces available were not strong
enough.
At Nijmegen, the two bridges were now clear, and so the Irish guards led off with the
Welsh guards while the Grenadiers reorganised themselves. The attack came up against
SS-Kampfgruppe 'Knaust' which had just crossed Arnhem Bridge. The Guards
Armoured pushed up as far as Elst and then halted. As Major General Adair
commented, "You can't imagine anything more unsuitable for tanks; steep banks with
ditches on each side that could easily be covered by German guns." Meanwhile, 43rd
(Wessex) Division was clearing out the last pockets of German resistance while waiting
for its last brigade to arrive. Upon its arrival, the division was ordered to take over the
advance from the Guards Armoured and advance through Driel to make contact with
British 1st Airborne at Heveadorp. Relieved of much of the responsibility for Nijmegen,
the 82nd Airborne mounted an attack with the 504th and 508th Parachute Infantry
Regiments on the Groesbeek Heights and pushed Corps 'Feldt' off for good. As XXX
Corps advanced, Urquhart could call on the Corps' artillery and so reduce the German
advantage north of the river. In response to this, Model called for additional
reinforcements and was promised the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion (equipped with King
Tiger tanks) as well as specialist street fighting troops and equipment.
The Poles finally took off from England but some forty-one out of 114 Dakotas had to
turn back or land (almost the entire 1st Battalion) due to the weather and over a

hundred Luftwaffe fighters were in the air to greet them as they approached the landing
zone. A number broke through the fighter screen and claimed several more Dakotas,
however Major General S Sosabowski landed with over 750 men, but with no heavy
equipment (which had been lost in the gliders two days previous).
Obersturmbahnfhrer Harzer rapidly organised some 2,500 men as a blocking force
('Sperrverband Harzer') between the Poles and Arnhem Bridge. Another resupply drop
occurred and only some forty-one tons of supplies got through to the British. The Poles
began to plan for a crossing of the Lower Rhine.
At the other end of the corridor, 101st Airborne continued to push the Germans back on
either side of the highway in a series of limited attacks supported by British armour. The
drives by VIII Corps and XII Corps had virtually come to a halt and Lt General Dempsey
began to transfer the Second Army Headquarters to St Oedenrode, while Field Marshal
Montgomery established 21st Army Group Tactical Headquarters just south of
Eindhoven. Montgomery demanded that Eisenhower made good his commitment to the
effort in the north by halting Patton's US Third Army and placing Hodges US First Army
under British control. Patton demanded more troops for the attack across the Rhine and
so Eisenhower called for a conference between his Army Group and Army commanders the first since D-Day.
The next day was very misty (Friday 22nd September) but the weather at last started to
lift. By mid-morning, General Student's attack on the highway was underway with
Kampfgruppe 'Huber' (from 59th Infantry Division) attacking from the west and
Kampfgruppe 'Walther' (mainly 107th Panzer Brigade) from the east. The attack cut a
largely undefended part of the road between Uden and Grave, and cut the 69th Brigade
(50th (Northumbrian) Division) in two as it was travelling along the highway. The 101st
Airborne rapidly reorganised for a counterattack and managed to obtain a number of
ground-attack sorties from RAF 83 Group. "Our situation reminded me of the early
American west, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any
point along great stretches of vital railroad" lamented Major General Maxwell Taylor.
He had received some warning of the German attack from the Dutch resistance and
managed to rush elements of the 506th Parachute Infantry to Uden and move the 502nd
Parachute Infantry to Veghel. Horrocks was forced to turn the 32nd Guards Brigade
around and drive south clearing the road of Germans as they had managed to effectively
block the road at Veghel and put the bridge under fire. Critically, for most of that day,
supplies and equipment could not travel beyond Veghel.
Further along the highway, XXX Corps renewed its attempts to reach British 1st
Airborne with 43rd (Wessex) Division attacking north from Nijmegen with the aid of the
Irish Guards Battlegroup. Finally, elements of the Household Cavalry managed to make
their way to the Poles at Driel, as did the 5th Battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light
Infantry, while Lt Col Mackenzie managed to cross the Lower Rhine and sent a message
to Horrocks and Browning. The Poles attempted a river crossing later that evening and a
number of men managed to make it across, but a plan to transfer the 5/DCLI was

scrapped. German attacks continued all around the Oosterbeek pocket and Urquhart
signalled browning that relief was critical.
The conference called by Eisenhower at Versailles started to repair some of the mistakes
in the original Market Garden plan and Eisenhower insisted that there be a coordinated
broad front advance to the Rhine, stressing that First Canadian Army's attack to clear
the Scheldt and open Antwerp was vitally important now that the war was likely to drag
on for a while yet. Bradley was instructed to halt Patton while the US First Army swung
northwards towards Aachen with the US XIX Corps (temporarily reduced to two
divisions under Major General Charles H Corlett) cooperating with the British VIII
Corps. British Second Army would change the direction of its advance with VIII Corps in
the lead, moving northeast toward Venlo and Kleve instead of XXX Corps moving north
past Arnhem. Montgomery visited a number of formations to explain the new plan
where XXX Corps' operations at Arnhem were to become secondary with the rescue of
British 1st Airborne the priority, not advancing past Arnhem. 101st Airborne would now
come under VIII Corps, and together with a reinforced 50th (Northumbrian) Division
(having received 131st Brigade from 7th Armoured Division, XII Corps) and the Royal
Netherlands Brigade 'Prinses Irene', would guard against attacks form the west and
northwest while 11th Armoured Division and 3rd Division would drive northeast to the
Rhine, keeping pace with the US XIX Corps. XXX Corps was left with those formations
that were north of Grave - 43rd (Wessex) Division, 82nd Airborne and the Guards
Armoured Division. British I Airborne Corps would still command the survivors of the
division and the Poles. Permission was finally given to withdraw the British 1st Airborne
Division.
The End of Market Garden
The first good weather since the start of the operation finally appeared on Saturday 23rd
September and the Allied air force was once again heavily active in the area. With
artillery and air support, British 1st Airborne held its perimeter against continued
attacks from 'von Teettau' and 'Hohenstauffen'. Model was furious and gave Bittrich
twenty-four hours to wipe out the British. He also changed the command structure
putting all German forces west of Market Garden under Fifteenth Army and those east
of it under First Parachute Army. The Germans renewed their attacks against Veghel
with the 6th Parachute Regiment (part of Kampfgruppe 'Chill') and Kampfgruppe
'Walther' but both were repulsed and the 506th Parachute Infantry with British
armoured support reopened the highway.
In the early afternoon, the delayed third wave took off from England, comprising 654
troops carriers and 490 gliders on the northern route. 82nd Airborne received its 325th
Glider Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne received the 907th Glider Field Artillery
Battalion and the remainder of the 327th Glider Infantry. The 1st Battalion of the Polish
Brigade dropped at Oude Keent, a disused airfield that had been intended for resupply.
It marched north to join the other two battalions, which had been placed under 130th
Brigade, 43rd (Wessex) Division. Little progress was made against SS-Kampfgruppe
'Frundsberg', while the corridor further south continued to be cleared. Mackenzie finally

made it through to Browning who gave him a greeting to send back to Urquhart, but
apart from his disgust with the slowness of 43rd (Wessex) Division had nothing else to
offer. 130th Brigade linked up with the Poles at Driel and after dark, Sosabowski sent
200 of his men across to join the British.
On Sunday 24th September, the weather remained reasonable and British 1st Airborne
started to receive close support from 2nd Tactical Air Force. Through this, XXX Corps
artillery support and its continued espirit d'corps, British 1st Airborne continued to hold
its perimeter, although a truce was negotiated to transfer some 1,200 wounded to the
Germans. The troops however, were starting to suffer from exhaustion and lack of
supplies. Both sides had been fighting for a week without rest and one fresh formation
might swing the battle. This arrived for the Germans in the form of the 506th Heavy
Tank Battalion, two companies of which were sent to 'Frundsberg' near Elst and one
company to the east side of the Oosterbeek pocket. Progress had continued to be slow
for XXX Corps whose only success was in taking Bemmel.
Horrocks together with Thomas and Sosabowski, surveyed the far side of the Lower
Rhine from the church spire at Driel. Thomas came away believing that Horrocks had
issued orders for the withdrawal of British 1st Airborne and began to make plans.
Horrocks went to British Second Army headquarters to consult Dempsey (he later
denied he had ever given those orders). In any event, Montgomery informed London of
the decision and of the forthcoming thrust by VIII Corps northeast, while First Allied
Airborne Army tried to arrange for more supplies to be dropped to the British at
Oosterbeek.
The Germans meanwhile began another assault on the corridor, and while most were
replulsed, the 'Jungwirth' Parachute Battalion and a company of Jagdpanthers from
559th Assault Battalion cut the road again near Veghel. Horrocks found he had been cut
off from XXX Corps headquarters and stranded with Dempsey. No attack however took
place from Kampfgruppe 'Walther' which was finally forced to retreat by 11th Armoured
Division's capture of Deurne, east of Helmond.
Very early on Monday 25th September, 43rd (Wessex) Division attempted an assault
crossing of the Lower Rhine, but the assault was disrupted by strong winds and heavy
rain and the troops that got across (from 4/Dorset) achieved little. Kampfgruppe 'von
Allworden' attacked (with the newly arrived King Tigers) and drove deep into the British
position. Artillery and close air support partially restored the position and helped the
British to hold out for another day. Urquhart however, signalled that the evacuation
(now codenamed Operation 'Berlin') must take place the following night. XXX Corps on
the other hand, finally managed to secure Elst and Boxmeer and the Household Cavalry
found that the part of the Lower Rhine west of Arnhem was virtually undefended but
Horrocks decided that 43rd (Wessex) Division make a simulated crossing at Renkum,
some four miles west of Oosterbeek to draw attention away from the operation. 506th
and 502nd Parachute Infantry, with help from 50th (Northumbrian) Division and 7th

Armoured Division, cleared Hoevering and reopened the road for good. VIII Corps
advanced against the retreating Kampfgruppe 'Walther' and 180th Infantry Division
with 11th Armoured Division linking up with the XXX Corps at Boxmeer on the Maas.
With only two divisions advancing northeast, there was a danger O'Connor would
become dangerously overextended, but was saved by the arrival of the US 7th Armoured
Division returned to US XIX Corps, coming back into the line beside 3rd Division.
Operation 'Berlin' began that evening with a sustained bombardment from 43rd
(Wessex) Division and XXX Corps artillery while British and Canadian Engineers
crossed the Lower Rhine to start ferrying the survivors of British 1st Airborne back
across the river. The wounded were left with a number of volunteers and the British
retreated through a gap barely 700m wide. The evacuation proceeded until first light.
The survivors of the division marched from Driel to Nijmegen where the seaborne tail of
the division was waiting with clean uniforms and equipment. The Germans had
occupied the pocket by 14.00 the next day and taken prisoner the troops who could not
be moved. With the end of the evacuation, Operation Market Garden also ended. First
Allied Airborne Army had undertaken 4,852 troop-carrying aircraft sorties of which
1,293 had delivered paratroopers, 2,277 had delivered gliders and 1,282 resupply. 164
aircraft and 132 gliders had been lost with USAAF IX Troop Carrier Command suffering
454 casualties, RAF 38 and 46 Groups another 294 casualties. 39,620 troops had been
delivered by air (21,074 by parachute and 18,546 by glider) as had 4,595 tons of stores.
Only 7.4 percent of stores intended for British 1st Airborne had reached it. Another
6,172 aircraft sorties were flown in support of Market Garden for the loss of 125 aircraft,
against 160 enemy aircraft destroyed. 10,300 troops of the British 1st Airborne Division
and Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade had landed at Arnhem, some 2,587
escaping (1,741 from British 1st Airborne, 422 from the Glider Pilot Regiment, 160 Poles
and 75 from the Dorset Regiment) in Operation 'Berlin' and some 240 later with the
help of the Dutch resistance. The Germans claimed to have taken 6,450 men prisoner.
The Poles took 378 casualties, with 101st Airborne suffering 2,110 and 82nd Airborne
suffering 1,432. The British ground forces suffered some 5,354 casualties, while the
German casualties, like their unit strengths are almost impossible to calculate
accurately, but are likely to range somewhere between four to eight thousand. Five
Victoria Crosses were awarded, as were two posthumous Medals of Honour.
The new salient threatened to cut off the German forces left in western Holland, but
with the Allies now concentrating on an advance to the Rhine, with the ultimate
objective of crossing it in the spring, the main attacks were by the First Canadian Army
to clear the Scheldt estuary and open Antwerp to cargo ships. It cost 21st Army Group
over 30,000 casualties but was completed by 28 November. The additional frontage
meant that Montgomery needed to retain the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in the
line until the 13th and 27th November respectively and both divisions suffered high
casualties as a result. In response to the Dutch strike timed to coincide with Market
garden, the Germans stopped all civilian transport in the country and over 18,000
Dutch civilians died during the winter. Montgomery estimated that the operation was

ninety per cent successful but the failure to take the final objective, that of Arnhem
Bridge, had nullified the whole thing. "My country can never again afford the luxury of
another Montgomery success". (Bernhard, Prince of the Netherlands) "In return for so
much courage and sacrifice, the Allies had won a 50-mile salient - leading nowhere." (Dr
John C Warren)
There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all
deserving of consideration:

The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than
one day as the main reason for the failure.

The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly
and too far from the Allied frontline.

General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the
failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps. In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model
deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him,
particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the
importance of the Nijmegen bridges.

Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but
had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery
and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem.

Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for British 1st Airborne
were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day.

Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the
German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway, the
weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide
adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his
command for his increasingly hostile attitude.

Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor
in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame
on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and
given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it
would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of
2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area."

There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern
Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt
estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank
front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September,
the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was
unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence
(from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had
moved into the Arnhem area.

Market Garden had forced Bradley to redeploy First US Army northwards and halt Patton. In
October he placed US Ninth Army in charge of the XIX Corps on the boundary with 21st Army
Group that left the US First Army with two army corps around Aachen and one dangerously
overextended in the Ardennes region in order to keep in touch with the US Third Army. It was
here the Germans chose to take advantage of this error and deliver a counterattack that became
known as the Battle of the Bulge and was perhaps the final result of the failure of Operation
Market Garden.

Operation Market Garden

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please

help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced
material may be challenged and removed. (October 2011)
Operation Market Garden
Part of the Allied advance from Paris to the
Rhine

Waves of paratroopers land in the Netherlands during

Operation Market Garden in September 1944

Date
Locati
on

1725 September 1944

The Netherlands and Germany
5159N 0555ECoordinates:

51

59N 0555E

Result

Allied operational failure[i][a][b]

Belligerents
United Kingdom

Germany

United States
Canada
Free Polish Forces
Netherlands

Commanders and leaders

Bernard

Gerd von

Montgomery

Rundstedt

Lewis H. Brereton

Walter Model

Miles Dempsey

Kurt Student

Frederick Browning

Wilhelm Bittrich

Brian Horrocks

Gustav-Adolf von
Zangen

Strength
41,628 airborne

Unknown[c]

troops[5]
1 armoured division
2 infantry divisions
1 armoured brigade[6]

Casualties and losses

15,32617,200

incomplete estimates:[ii]

casualties[ii]

3,30013,300

88 tanks[d]

casualties[10][11][12][13]

144 transport aircraft[9]

30 tanks and SP guns

159 aircraft[14]

1.

Jump up^ More detailed information

regarding the outcome of this operation can be
found in the 'Aftermath' section.

2.

^ Jump up to:a b More detailed information

is available in the 'Losses' section.

[show]

Western Front

[show]

West European Campaign (1944

1945)

[show]

Siegfried Line Campaign

Operation Market Garden (1725 September 1944) was an unsuccessful Allied military operation,
fought in the Netherlandsand Germany in the Second World War. It was the largest airborne
operation up to that time.[e]

Field Marshal Montgomery's goal was to force an entry into Germany over the Lower Rhine. He
wanted to circumvent the northern end of the Siegfried Line and this required the operation to seize
the bridges across the Maas (Meuse River) and two arms of the Rhine (the Waal and the Lower
Rhine) as well as several smaller canals and tributaries. Crossing the Lower Rhine would allow the
Allies to encircle Germany's industrial heartland in the Ruhr from the north. It made large-scale use
ofairborne forces, whose tactical objectives were to secure the bridges and allow a rapid advance by
armored units into Northern Germany.
Several bridges between Eindhoven and Nijmegen were captured at the beginning of the operation
but Lieutenant-GeneralBrian Horrocks' XXX Corps ground force advance was delayed by the
demolition of a bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal, an extremely overstretched supply line at Son, and
failure to capture the main road bridge over the river Waal before 20 September. At Arnhem,
the British 1st Airborne Division encountered far stronger resistance than anticipated. In the ensuing
battle, only a small force managed to hold one end of the Arnhem road bridge and after the ground
forces failed to relieve them, they were overrun on 21 September. The rest of the division, trapped in
a small pocket west of the bridge, had to be evacuated on 25 September. The Allies had failed to
cross the Rhine in sufficient force and the river remained a barrier to their advance until offensives
at Remagen, Oppenheim, Rees and Wesel in March 1945. The failure of Market Garden ended
Allied expectations of finishing the war by Christmas 1944. [18]
Contents
[hide]

1 Background
o

1.1 Logistics problems

1.2 Strategy

1.3 Geography

1.4 Allied preparation

1.4.1 Market

1.4.2 Garden

1.5 German preparation

1.6 Intelligence

1.6.1 German

1.6.2 Allied

2 Battle
2.1 Day 1: Sunday, 17 September 1944

2.1.1 Early successes

2.1.2 British landings

2.1.3 Communication breakdown

2.1.4 XXX Corps advance

2.1.5 German reactions

2.2 Day 2: Monday, 18 September

2.2.1 1st Airborne zone

2.2.2 82nd Airborne zone

2.2.3 101st Airborne zone

2.3 Day 3: Tuesday, 19 September

2.3.1 Arnhem

2.3.2 Oosterbeek

2.3.3 Nijmegen

2.3.4 Wijchen

2.3.5 EindhovenVeghel
2.4 Day 4: Wednesday, 20 September

2.4.1 Arnhem bridge

2.4.2 Oosterbeek

2.4.3 Nijmegen
2.5 Day 5: Thursday, 21 September

2.5.1 Oosterbeek

2.5.2 Polish paratroopers enter the battle

2.5.3 Nijmegen
2.6 Day 6: Friday, 22 September ("Black Friday")

2.6.1 Link-up between the Poles and XXX Corps

2.7 Day 7: Saturday, 23 September

2.8 Day 8: Sunday, 24 September

2.9 Day 9: Monday, 25 September

3 Losses
3.1 Transport Command Victoria Cross

4 Aftermath
4.1 Debate on Allied strategy and tactics

4.1.1 Optimistic planning

4.1.2 Weather

4.1.3 Priority of operation

4.1.4 Missed opportunities

4.1.5 Intelligence failure

4.1.6 Allied reflections

4.2 Subsequent combat in the Netherlands

4.2.1 Famine in the Netherlands

5 Commemoration
o

5.1 Memorials and remembrance

5.2 Film

6 Notes

7 References

8 Further reading

9 External links

Background[edit]
After major defeats in Normandy in July and August, 1944, remnants of German forces withdrew
across the Low Countries and eastern France towards the German border by the end of August. [19] In
the north, in the first week of September, the British 21st Army Group, under Field Marshal Bernard
Montgomery, sent its British Second Armycommanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Miles
Dempsey advancing on a line running from Antwerp to the northern border of Belgium while its First
Canadian Army, underLieutenant-General Harry Crerar, was pursuing its task of recapturing the
ports of Dieppe, Le Havre and Boulogne-sur-Mer.[20] To the south, the U.S. 12th Army
Group underLieutenant General Omar Bradley was nearing the German border and had been
ordered to orient on the Aachen gap with Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges' U.S. First Army, in
support of Montgomery's advance on the Ruhr. Meanwhile, the group's U.S. Third Army, under
Lieutenant General George S. Patton, moved eastward towards the Saar.[21] At the same time,
the U.S. 6th Army Group under General Jacob L. Devers was advancing towards Germany after
their landings in southern France.[22]

Logistics problems[edit]
The "Red Ball Express" was an attempt to resolve persistent Allied supply problems.

To disrupt German logistics efforts, the Allies had spent considerable effort, prior to D-Day, in
bombing the French rail network, although aware this would also affect their own operations in the
event of a breakout. The Overlord plan had foreseen this, calling for the exploitation of ports
inBrittany to move the supply points forward as the armies moved.[23] Eisenhower persisted with his

plans to capture these ports, but some argued that the capture of Le Havre and Antwerp made this
unnecessary.[24]
By August, supply sources for the armies were still limited to the original invasion beaches, the
nearby deep water port of Cherbourg at the tip of the Cotentin peninsula, and some minor ports in
Normandy.[25] Although over-the-beach supply operations outperformed expectations, September
saw deteriorating weather and rising seas and the end of their usefulness was clearly in sight.
[26]
Deep-water ports were therefore required; Cherbourg was useful, but far from the front. The
massive port of Antwerp was captured virtually intact by Montgomery's troops on 4 September,[27] but
the Scheldt Estuary leading to it was still under German control.[28] The failure to open the ports in
Antwerp has been called "One of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war." [29] Other important ports
on the English Channel coast, such as Dunkirk, remained in German hands until May 1945.[30]
Major efforts to re-open the rail network were started, and by the end of August, 18,000 men,
including 5,000 prisoners of war, were engaged in railway construction. After many delays, the first
trainload of supplies reached the US Third Army depot at Le Mans on 17 August. But these efforts
were far too late to have any effect on the battles taking place after Operation Cobra and the
subsequent breakout into France. Instead, all supplies for the armies had to be carried forward by
truck, and there were simply not enough trucks for this effort. [31] Advancing divisions of the US 12th
Army Group left all their heavy artillery and half their medium artillery west of the Seine, freeing their
trucks to move supplies for other units.[32] The 21st Army Group stripped two of its divisions of their
transport,[33] and four British truck companies were loaned to the Americans. [34]
Organisation of the Red Ball Express did much to lessen the impact of the transport shortage but
this ad hoc operation could not solve the problem.[35] As the Allied pursuit across France and Belgium
continued, distances increased beyond the range of a single truck, requiring fuel to be brought
forward in those trucks to re-fuel operations further from the ports. Fuel consumption soared. Soon it
took five times as much fuel to deliver supplies as was actually delivered. Fuel pipelines were
constructed to shorten supply lines, but were too time-consuming to build to be of much short-term
use. By 28 August the Communications Zone could no longer guarantee fuel deliveries and both the
US First and Third Armies reported less than a day's supply on hand.[36] Furthermore, the stripping of
the armies of their own transport had the effect of seriously slowing their own maneuverability.
On 30 August, the drastic steps were taken to suspend imports entirely; 21st Army Group would
draw on its reserves in Normandy until the ports of Dieppe and Boulogne-sur-Mercould be opened.
[37]
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that 1,400 British three-ton trucks were found to be
useless because of faulty pistons in their engines they could have moved 800 tons per day,
enough for two divisions.[38] Offensive operations slowed to a standstill, allowing the German forces
their first respite in weeks.

Strategy[edit]

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery

Following the Allied breakout from Normandy and the closure of the Falaise pocket, Supreme
Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhowerfavoured pursuit of the seemingly shattered German
armies northwards and eastwards across the Seine, and ultimately to the Rhine on a broad front.
While agreeing that Montgomery's drive towards the Ruhr should have priority, he still thought it was
important to "get Patton moving again". To that end, in the first week of September 1944,
Eisenhower authorised (U.S) First Army to cross the Rhine near Cologne, Bonn and Koblenz while
(U.S.) Third Army crossed near Mannheim, Mainz and Karlsruhe. Eisenhower relied on speed, which
in turn depended on logistics, which he conceded were "stretched to the limit". [39] This strategy was
contested by his subordinates, particularly Montgomery, who argued that with the supply situation
deteriorating, he would not be able to reach the Ruhr, but "a relocation of our present resources of
every description would be adequate to get one thrust to Berlin".[40] SHAEF did provide Montgomery
with additional resources, principally additional locomotives and rolling stock, and priority for air
supply.[41]
Montgomery initially suggested Operation Comet, a limited airborne coup de main operation that
was to be launched on 2 September 1944. Comet envisioned using the 1st Airborne Division, along
with the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade, to secure several bridges over the River
Rhine to aid the Allied advance into the North German Plain. The Divisional Headquarters for the 1st
Airborne Division, with the 1st Airlanding Brigade and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade
were to land at Nijmegen, 1st Parachute Brigade was to land at Arnhem, and 4th Parachute
Brigade was to land at Grave.[42] However several days of poor weather and Montgomery's concerns
over increasing levels of German resistance caused him to postpone the operation and then cancel
it on 10 September.[43]
Comet was replaced by a more ambitious plan to bypass the Siegfried Line by hooking around its
northern end, allowing the Allies to cross the Rhine with large forces and trap the German Fifteenth
Army between Arnhem and the shores of the IJsselmeer: Operation Market Garden. On 10
September Dempsey told Montgomery that he had doubts about this plan and that he instead
favoured an advance north-eastwards between the Reichswald forest and the Ruhr to Wesel.

Montgomery replied that he had just received a signal from London that something needed to be
done to neutralise the V-2 launch sites around the Hague (which were bombarding London) and that
the plan must therefore proceed.[44] Montgomery flew to Brussels that afternoon to meet Eisenhower.
Montgomery requested Eisenhower's Chief Administrative Officer to leave the meeting but insisted
on his own remaining. He then tore a file of Eisenhower's messages to shreds in front of him and
argued for a concentrated northern thrust, simultaneously demanding priority of supply.
Eisenhower, convinced that German forces faced imminent collapse, was equally adamant that
advance on a broad front was correct. However, he consented to Operation Market Garden, giving it
"limited priority" in terms of supplies but as part of his advance on a broad front. [45] Eisenhower
promised that allied aircraft and American trucks would deliver 1,000 tons of supplies per day.[46] In
vain, Montgomery complained about this to the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London,
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Nye.[47][f]
For Market Garden, the U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions would be maintained from British
stocks for all common items such as food and fuel. Non-common items like ammunition, ordnance
and signal and engineer stores were delivered by the Red Ball Express or by rail to No. 6 Army
Roadhead at Grammont.[48] Three newly arrived U.S. infantry divisions (the 26th, 95th, and 104th)
were stripped of their transport, which was used to form provisional truck companies. These were
assigned to the Red Ball Express, releasing eight companies to Red Lion, a special route to support
Market-Garden. Red Lion convoys exceeded their target, delivering 650 tons per day instead of 500.
Half of the tonnage hauled was supplies for the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. [49]
Eisenhower's decision to launch Market Garden was influenced by his desire to keep the retreating
Germans under pressure. However, he was also under pressure from the U.S. to use the Airborne
Army as soon as possible.[50] After Normandy, the airborne forces had been withdrawn to reform in
England, re-forming into the First Allied Airborne Army of two British and three U.S. airborne
divisions and a Polish brigade.[51] In the following months, plans for eighteen airborne operations had
been drafted but then cancelled at short notice, mostly when the rapidly moving Allied ground forces
overran the intended drop zones.[43][g]

Geography[edit]
Highway 69 (later nicknamed "Hell's Highway") leading through the planned route was two lanes
wide, generally raised above the surrounding flat terrain of polder. The ground on either side of the
highway was in places too soft to support tactical vehicle movement and there were numerous dykes
and drainage ditches. Dykes tended to be topped by trees or large bushes and roads and paths
were lined with trees. In early autumn this meant that observation would be seriously restricted. [53]
There were six major water obstacles between the XXX Corps' jumping-off point and the objective of
the north bank of the Nederrijn: the Wilhelmina Canal at Son 100 feet (30 m) wide; the Zuid-Willems
Canal at Veghel 80 feet (20 m); the Maas River at Grave 800 feet (240 m); the Maas-Waal
Canal 200 feet (60 m); the Waal River at Nijmegen 850 feet (260 m); and
the Nederrijn at Arnhem 300 feet (90 m).[54] Plans were made to seize bridges across all these
obstacles nearly simultaneously any failure to do so could result in serious delay or even defeat.
In case bridges were demolished by the Germans, XXX Corps had plans to rebuild them. To this
end, a vast quantity of bridging material was collected, along with 2,300 vehicles to carry it and
9,000 engineers to assemble it.[54]

Although the area is generally flat and open with less than a 30 feet (9 m) variation in altitude,
Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks, commander of XXX Corps recalled that "The country was
wooded and rather marshy which made any outflanking operation impossible." [55] There were two
important hills, 300 feet (90 m) high, that represented some of the highest ground in the
Netherlands; one north and west of Arnhem and one in the 82nd Airborne Division's
zone, Groesbeek ridge. Seizure and defence of this hill was considered vital to holding the highway
bridges.[53]

Allied preparation[edit]
Further information: Operation Market Garden order of battle
The plan of action consisted of two operations:

Market: airborne forces of Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton's First Allied Airborne
Army to seize bridges and other terrain, under tactical command of I Airborne Corpsunder
Lieutenant-General Frederick Browning, and

Garden: ground forces of the Second Army to move north spearheaded by XXX Corps under
Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks.[56]

Market[edit]

The Allied Plan

Market would employ four of the six divisions of the First Allied Airborne Army. The U.S. 101st
Airborne Division, under Major GeneralMaxwell D. Taylor, would drop in two locations just north of

XXX Corps to take the bridges northwest of Eindhoven at Son and Veghel. The82nd Airborne
Division, under Brigadier General James M. Gavin, would drop northeast of them to take the bridges
at Grave andNijmegen and the British 1st Airborne Division, under Major-General Roy Urquhart, with
the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade, under Brigadier General Stanisaw Sosabowski,
attached would drop at the extreme north end of the route, capturing the road bridge atArnhem and
the rail bridge at Oosterbeek. The 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division would be flown to the
captured Deelen Airfield on D+5.[57]
The First Allied Airborne Army had been created on 16 August as the result of British requests for a
coordinated headquarters for airborne operations, a concept approved by General Eisenhower on 20
June. The British had strongly hinted that a British officerBrowning in particularbe appointed its
commander. Browning for his part decided to bring his entire staff with him on the operation to
establish his field HQ using the much-needed 32 Horsa gliders for administrative personnel, and
six Waco CG-4A gliders for U.S. Signals personnel. Since the bulk of both troops and aircraft were
American, Brereton, a U.S. Army Air Forces officer, was named by Eisenhower on 16 July and
appointed by SHAEF on 2 August. Brereton had no experience in airborne operations but had
extensive command experience at the air force level in several theatres, most recently as
commander of Ninth Air Force, which gave him a working knowledge of the operations of IX Troop
Carrier Command.[58]
Market would be the largest airborne operation in history, delivering over 34,600 men of the 101st,
82nd and 1st Airborne Divisions and the Polish Brigade. 14,589 troops were landed by glider and
20,011 by parachute. Gliders also brought in 1,736 vehicles and 263 artillery pieces. 3,342 tons of
ammunition and other supplies were brought by glider and parachute drop. [59]
To deliver its 36 battalions of airborne infantry and their support troops to the continent, the First
Allied Airborne Army had under its operational control the 14 groups of IX Troop Carrier Command, [60]
[h]
and after 11 September the 16 squadrons of 38 Group (an organization of converted bombers
providing support to resistance groups) and a transport formation, 46 Group. [61]
The combined force had 1,438 C-47/Dakota transports (1,274 USAAF and 164 RAF) and 321
converted RAF bombers. The Allied glider force had been rebuilt after Normandy until by 16
September it numbered 2,160 CG-4A Waco gliders, 916 Airspeed Horsas (812 RAF and 104 US
Army) and 64 General Aircraft Hamilcars. The U.S. had only 2,060 glider pilots available, so that
none of its gliders would have a co-pilot but would instead carry an extra passenger.[62]

Infantry of 50th (Northumbrian) Division moving up past a knocked-out German 88mm gun near 'Joe's Bridge'
over the Meuse-Escaut Canal inBelgium, 16 September 1944

Because the C-47s served as paratrooper transports and glider tugs and because IX Troop Carrier
Command would provide all the transports for both British parachute brigades, this massive force
could deliver only 60 percent of the ground forces in one lift. This limit was the reason for the
decision to split the troop-lift schedule into successive days. Ninety percent of the USAAF transports
on the first day would drop parachute troops, with the same proportion towing gliders on the second
day (the RAF transports were almost entirely used for glider operations). [i] Brereton rejected having
two airlifts on the first day, although this had been accomplished during Operation Dragoon, albeit
with forty-five more minutes of daylight against negligible opposition. [64]
17 September was on a dark moon and in the days following it the new moon set before dark. Allied
airborne doctrine prohibited big operations in the absence of all light, so the operation would have to
be carried out in daylight. The risk of Luftwaffe interception was judged small, given the crushing air
superiority of Allied fighters but there were concerns about the increasing number of flak units in the
Netherlands, especially around Arnhem. Brereton's experience with tactical air operations judged
that flak suppression would be sufficient to permit the troop carriers to operate without prohibitive
loss. The invasion of Southern France had demonstrated that large scale daylight airborne
operations were feasible.[65] Daylight operations, in contrast to those in Sicily and Normandy, would
have much greater navigational accuracy and time-compression of succeeding waves of aircraft,
tripling the number of troops that could be delivered per hour. The time required to assemble
airborne units on the drop zone after landing would be reduced by two-thirds. [66]
IX Troop Carrier Command's transport aircraft had to tow gliders and drop paratroopers, duties that
could not be performed simultaneously. Although every division commander requested two drops on
the first day, Brereton's staff scheduled only one lift based on the need to prepare for the first drop by
bombarding German flak positions for half a day and a weather forecast on the afternoon of 16
September (which soon proved erroneous) that the area would have clear conditions for four days,
so allowing drops during them.[67]
After one week preparations were declared complete. The planning and training for the airborne
drops at Sicily and Normandy had taken months. One United States Air Forcehistorian noted that
Market was the only large airborne operation of the Second World War in which the USAAF "had no
training program, no rehearsals, almost no exercises, and a...low level of tactical training." [68]
Gavin, commanding the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, was skeptical of the plan. In his diary he wrote,
"It looks very rough. If I get through this one I will be very lucky." He was also highly critical of
Browning, writing that he "...unquestionably lacks the standing, influence and judgment that comes
from a proper troop experience... his staff was superficial... Why the British units fumble along...
becomes more and more apparent. Their tops lack the know-how, never do they get down into the
dirt and learn the hard way."[69]
Garden[edit]
Garden consisted primarily of XXX Corps and was initially spearheaded by the Guards Armoured
Division, with the 43rd Wessex and 50th Northumbrian Infantry Divisions in reserve. They were
expected to arrive at the south end of the 101st Airborne Division's area on the first day, the 82nd's

by the second day and the 1st's by the fourth day at the latest. The airborne divisions would then join
XXX Corps in the breakout from the Arnhem bridgehead. [57]
Four days was a long time for an airborne force to fight unsupported. In addition the Allied
paratroopers lacked adequate anti-tank weapons. Even so, before Operation Market Garden started
it seemed to the Allied high command that the German resistance had broken. Most of the German
Fifteenth Army in the area appeared to be fleeing from the Canadians and they were known to have
no Panzergruppen. It was thought that XXX Corps would face limited resistance on their route up
Highway 69 and little armour. Meanwhile, the German defenders would be spread out over 100
kilometres (62 mi) trying to contain the pockets of airborne forces, from the Second Army in the
south to Arnhem in the north.[70]

German preparation[edit]
The rout of the Wehrmacht during July and August led the Allies to believe that the German army
was a spent force unable to reconstitute its shattered units. During those two months
the Wehrmacht had suffered a string of defeats with heavy losses. Between 6 June and 14 August it
had suffered 23,019 killed in action, 198,616 missing or taken prisoner and 67,240 wounded. [71] Many
of the formations the Wehrmacht had possessed at the beginning of the Normandy campaign had
been annihilated or had been reduced to skeleton formations by the end of August. [71] As the German
armies retreated towards the German frontier, they were often harried by air attacks and bombing
raids by aircraft of the allied air forces, inflicting casualties and destroying vehicles. [72] Attempts to halt
the Allied advance often seemed fruitless as hurried counter-attacks and blocking positions were
brushed aside and at times there seemed to be too few German units to hold anywhere. [73] By early
September the situation was beginning to change. The failure of the British 21st Army Group to seal
off the Scheldt Estuary area had allowed the 65,000 troops of the German Fifteenth Army to be
extricated from the area with 225 guns and 750 trucks via a flotilla of commandeered freighters,
barges and small boats. From there they moved to the Netherlands.[74]
Adolf Hitler began to take a personal interest in the apparent disintegration of Army Group B, which
comprised the German armies in northern France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. On 4 September
he recalled Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, who had been in retirement since Hitler had
dismissed him as Wehrmacht Commander-in-Chief West on 2 July, and reinstated him in his former
command,[75] replacing Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, who had taken command just 18 days
previously and would henceforth command only Army Group B.[76] Rundstedt immediately began to
plan a defence against what Wehrmacht intelligence judged to be 60 Allied divisions at full strength,
although Eisenhower in fact possessed only 49 divisions.[77]

German soldiers at Arnhem

Model set out to stop the Allied advance. The German 719th Infantry Division, part of LXXXVIII
Corps, was dispatched south to the Albert Canal and Model requested reinforcements from
Germany, stating that he would require twenty-five infantry divisions and six armoured divisions to
hold; he envisioned a line stretching from Antwerp via Maastricht to Metz and from there to follow the
line of the Albert Canal to the Meuse and the Siegfried Line.[78] Meanwhile, Colonel General Kurt
Student, commander of theFallschirmjaeger, the German airborne forces, received orders
from Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of theOberkommando der Wehrmacht, to immediately
move from Berlin and proceed to the Netherlands, where he would collect all available units and
build a front near the Albert Canal, which was to be held at all costs.[79] This front was to be held by
the newFirst Parachute Army, a euphemistic name for a paper formation. Its units were scattered
throughout Germany and the Netherlands and consisted either of units in the process of being
formed or remnants cadred by survivors of previous units.[79][80]
Though the situation seemed dire, the German front was beginning to form into what Robert
Kershaw terms 'a crust'. Leadership, initiative and a good staff system were beginning to create a
defence out of chaos.[81] On 4 September the 719th infantry division began to dig in along the Albert
Canal and was soon joined by forces under the command of Lieutenant General Kurt Chill.
[82]
Although Chill only officially commanded the 85th Infantry Division, which had suffered heavy
casualties during the retreat from Normandy, he had assumed command of the remnants of the 84th
and 89th Infantry Divisions en route. Initially ordered to take his command to the Rhineland for rest
and reinforcements, Chill disregarded the order and moved his forces to the Albert Canal, linking up
with the 719th; he also had 'reception centres' set up at the bridges crossing the Albert Canal, where
small groups of retreating troops were picked up and turned into 'ad hoc' units. [81][82]By 7 September
the 176th Infantry Division, a Kranken division composed of elderly men and men with various
medical complaints, had arrived from the Siegfried Line and elements of the First Parachute Army
began to appear. At this stage the Army consisted of approximately
seven Fallschirmjaeger regiments composed of some 20,000 airborne troops along with a collection
of anti-aircraft batteries and a mix of 25 self-propelled guns and tank destroyers.[83] Kriegsmarine and
SS units were also allocated to Student's command, and Hitler had promised Model that
200 Panther tanks would be sent straight from the production lines; he also ordered all Tiger
tanks, Jagdpanther self-propelled guns and 88 mm guns that were available in Germany be
transferred to the West.[84]
On 5 September, Model's forces were bolstered by the arrival of the II SS Panzer Corps, which
consisted of the 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions under the command ofLieutenant
General Wilhelm Bittrich. The Corps had been reduced to approximately 6,0007,000 men, 2030%
of its original strength in the course of continuous action since late June including in the Falaise
pocket; losses in officers and NCOs had been especially high.[85] Model ordered the two divisions to
rest and refit in 'safe' areas behind the new German line; these areas coincidentally were to be
Eindhoven and Arnhem.[86] The 10th SS Panzer Division was to be restored to full strength in order to
provide an armoured reserve and thus the 9th SS Panzer Division was ordered to transfer all of its
heavy equipment to its sister division; it was intended that the 9th would then be transported to
Germany for replenishment.[85] At the time of Operation Market-Garden, the 10th SS Panzer Division
had an approximate strength of 3,000 men; an armoured infantry regiment, divisional
reconnaissance battalion, two artillery battalions and an engineer battalion, all partially motorized.
[j]
Other formations were appearing to strengthen the German defences. Between 16 and 17
September two infantry divisions from Fifteenth Army assembled in Brabant, understrength but well-

equipped and able to act as a reserve.[88] Near Eindhoven and Arnhem a number of scratch
formations were being assembled. Several SS units, including an NCO training battalion and
a panzergrenadier reserve battalion, were being prepared to enter combat
and Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel were being grouped
into Fliegerhorst and Schiffstammabteilung formations. There were also a number of training
battalions that were being equipped, several depot battalions from the Hermann Goering Panzer
Division and various artillery, anti-aircraft and field police units scattered throughout the north of the
Netherlands.[89]

Intelligence[edit]
German[edit]
Von Rundstedt and Model suspected that a large Allied offensive was imminent, having received
many intelligence reports that described a 'constant stream' of reinforcements to the right wing of the
British Second Army.[90] The senior intelligence officer of Army Group B believed the Second Army
would launch an offensive in the direction of Nijmegen, Arnhem and Wesel with a primary objective
of reaching the industrial area along the Ruhr river. He was convinced that airborne troops would be
used in this offensive but was unsure where they would be deployed, suspecting areas along the
Siegfried Line north of Aachen or possibly even near the Saar.[91] Second Army would assemble its
units at the Maas-Scheldt and Albert Canals. The right wing of the Army would be the assault force,
composed primarily of armoured units, which would force a crossing of the Maas and attempt to
break through to the Ruhr industrial area near Roermond. The left wing would cover the Army's
northern flank by moving up to the Waal near Nijmegen and isolating the German 15th Army situated
on the Dutch coast.[91][92]
Allied[edit]
A number of reports about German troop movements reached Allied high command, including details
about the identity and location of German armoured formations. Station X atBletchley
Park monitored and decrypted German Ultra intelligence reports and sent them to senior Allied
commanders but they only reached army headquarters level and were not passed down any lower.
[87]
On 16 September ULTRA decrypts revealed the movement of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions to
Nijmegen and Arnhem, creating enough concern for Eisenhower to send his Chief of Staff,
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, to raise the issue with Montgomery on 10 September;
however, Montgomery dismissed Smith's concerns and refused to alter the plans for the landing of
1st Airborne Division at Arnhem.[93] Further information about the location of the German Panzer
Divisions at Arnhem was revealed by aerial photographs of Arnhem taken by a photoreconnaissance Spitfire XI from RAF's No. 16 Squadron,[94] as well as information from members of
the Dutch resistance.[95] Fearing that 1st Airborne Division might be in grave danger if it landed at
Arnhem the chief intelligence officer of the division, Major Brian Urquhart, arranged a meeting with
Browning and informed him of the armour present at Arnhem. Browning dismissed his claims and
ordered the division's senior medical officer to send Urquhart on sick leave on account of 'nervous
strain and exhaustion.'[96]

Battle[edit]
Further information: Battle of Arnhem

Day 1: Sunday, 17 September 1944[edit]

Early successes[edit]

Allied Landings near Nijmegen

The 82nd Airborne Division drops near Grave (National Archives)

Operation Market Garden opened with Allied success all round. In the first landing, almost all troops
arrived on top of their drop zones without incident. In the 82nd Airborne Division, 89% of troops
landed on or within 1,000 metres (3,300 ft) of their drop zones and 84% of gliders landed on or
within 1,000 metres (3,300 ft) of their landing zones. This contrasted with previous operations where
night drops had resulted in units being scattered by up to 19 kilometres (12 mi). Losses to enemy
aircraft and flak were light; German flak was described in reports as "heavy but inaccurate". [this quote needs a
citation]

In the south, the 101st met little resistance and captured four of five bridges assigned to them. After
a brief delay caused by an 88 mm gun and a machine gun post, the bridge at Son was blown up as
they approached it. Later that day several small attacks by the German 59th Infantry Division were
beaten off. Small units of the 101st moved south of Son, towards Eindhoven. Later that day it made
contact with German forces, and was given as attachment the 44th Royal Tank Regiment elements
of which were advancing in the VIII Corps sector.[97]

101st Airborne Paratroopers inspect a broken glider.

To their north, the 82nd arrived and the small group dropped near Grave took the bridge in a rush.
They also succeeded in capturing one of the vitally important bridges over the Maas-Waal canal, the
lock-bridge at Heumen. The main effort of the 82nd was to seize the Groesbeek Heights and set up
a blocking position there to prevent a German attack out of the nearby Reichswald and to deny the
heights to German artillery observers. Gavin and Browning, who established his HQ at Nijmegen, felt
this must be the Division's priority in stead of taking Nijmegen bridge as soon as possible. The 508th
Parachute Infantry Regiment was tasked with taking the 600-metre (2,000 ft) long Nijmegen highway
bridge if possible but because of miscommunication they did not start until late in the day. They
faced the same disadvantage as the British at Arnhem in dropping many miles from their objective.
Had they been dropped nearer their objective or attacked earlier they would have faced only a dozen
Germans. By the time the 508th attacked, troops of the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion were
arriving. The attack failed, leaving the Nijmegen bridge in German hands.
This was vital; unlike some of the bridges to the south which were over smaller rivers and canals that
could be bridged by engineeringunits, the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges crossed two arms of the
Rhine that could not be bridged easily. If either of the Nijmegen or Arnhem bridges were not
captured and held, the advance of XXX Corps would be blocked and Operation Market Garden
would fail.
British landings[edit]
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improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced
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British 1st Parachute Battalion at Arnhem 17 September 1944

Burning British Horsaglider

The 1st Airborne Division landed at 13:30 without serious incident but problems associated with the
poor plan began soon after. Only half of the Division arrived with the first lift and only half of these
(1st Parachute Brigade) could advance on the bridge. The remaining troops had to defend the drop
zones overnight for the arrival of the second lift on the following day. Thus the Division's primary
objective had to be tackled by less than half a brigade. While the paratroopers marched eastwards
to Arnhem, the Reconnaissance Squadron was to race to the bridge in their jeeps and hold it until
the rest of the Brigade arrived. The unit set off to the bridge late and having traveled only a short
distance the vanguard was halted by a strong German defensive position; the squadron could make
no further progress.
This had grave consequences. Five hours after the initial landing, feeling that the British were tied
down in Arnhem, the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 9th SS Panzer Division was able to cross the
Arnhem bridge and drive to Nijmegen and the bridge over the Waal branch of the Rhine. No British
airborne unit was at the bridge.
Two of the three battalions of the 1st Parachute Brigade were slowed down by small German units of
a training battalion which had quickly established a thin blocking line covering the obvious routes into
Arnhem. Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost's 2nd Parachute Battalion, advancing eastwards along the
southernmost road into Arnhem near the Rhine, found its route largely undefended. They arrived at

the bridge in the evening and set up defensive positions at the north end. They were joined by
Brigade HQ, led by Major Tony Hibbert, which was the only other unit to reach the bridge. [98][99][100]
Two attempts to capture the arched steel bridge and its southern approach failed. Of the other
battalions, the 3rd Parachute Battalion had only covered half the distance to the bridge when they
halted for the night, the rear of their column being under attack and needing time to catch up.
The 1st Parachute Battalion was similarly fragmented, yet pushed on around the flank of the
German line throughout the night. Frequent skirmishes resulted in their making little more progress.
The 3rd Battalion under Captain James Cleminson,KBE, MC, ambushed a German staff car and
killed the commander of Arnhem's garrison, Major-General Friedrich Kussin, as well as his aide and
his driver.
Communication breakdown[edit]

John Frost leading officer of the Bruneval Raid (operation Biting) on 27 February 1942. Photo: Photographed
after receiving the Military Cross for his part in the Bruneval Raid, 1942. At this time the Parachute Regiment
did not have its own insignia or uniform, and so members wore the uniforms of their previous Regiment, in
Frost's case, the Cameronians.

Some loss of communication between the bridge and Divisional Headquarters in one of the drop
zones was expected, because 13 km (8.1 mi) separated them and the main radio used throughout
the Division was the Type 22 set designed to have an effective range of 5 km (3.1 mi).[101] The British
radios did not function at any range; some had difficulty receiving signals from just a few hundred
metres and others received nothing at all. It was found after landing that the radios had been set to
different frequencies, two of which coincided with those of German and British public broadcasting
stations.[101] Other theories have been advanced to explain the greatly reduced range of the 1st

Airborne Division's radio sets. Thus communication between 1st Airborne units was poor while
German defences were being coordinated and reinforced. John Greenacre's study points out that
radio communications failures were experienced by the Division before, were warned about prior to
the operation, and provisioned for by bringing extra field telephone wire. The more powerful
WS19HP set was used by 1st Brigade on D+1.[102]
The only means of calling for close air support was through two special American units dropped with
the 1st Airborne Division. These units were equipped with "Veeps": jeeps having Very High
Frequency SCR-193 crystal sets. It was found impossible to communicate with aircraft on the higher
of two frequencies for this and the sets could not be tuned to the lower frequency.[103] Despite efforts
to re-tune them, one set was soon destroyed by mortar fire and the other abandoned the next day,
cutting the 1st Airborne's only possible link withRAF fighter-bombers. The pilots were under orders
not to attack on their own initiative since from the air there was no easy way to distinguish friend
from foe; together with poor weather, this led to a critical lack of air support.
After the war it was identified that the Royal Corps of Signals was either unaware, or did not make
aware Divisional Signals of the communication problems identified in November 1943 due to sun
spots by the Scientific Advisor's Office to the 21st Army Group. Consequently Urquhart ordered the
4m antennae to be used, which were useless due to physics of radio propagation. The wrong
frequencies were part of the same problem due to Signals personnel not being aware of the
scientific considerations behind radio communications.[104]
XXX Corps advance[edit]

Irish Guards Sherman tanks advance past knocked out Shermans, 17 September 1944

On the morning of 17 September Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks was given confirmation that the
operation was to take place that day.[105] At 12:30 hours Horrocks received a signal that the first wave
of the airborne forces had left their bases within the United Kingdom and set the time for the ground
attack to start at 14:35 hours.[105] At 14:15 hours[106] 300 guns of the Corps artillery opened fire, firing
arolling barrage in front of XXX Corps start line[105][107] that was 1 mile (1.6 km) wide and 5 miles
(8.0 km) in depth.[108] The barrage was supported by seven squadrons of RAF Hawker
Typhoons firing rockets at all known German positions along the road toValkenswaard.[105][107] The
advance was led by tanks and infantry of the Irish Guards[105] and started on time when Lieutenant
Keith Heathcote, commanding the lead tank, ordered his driver to advance. [108] The lead units of the
Irish Guards Group had broken out of XXX Corps bridgehead on the Meuse-Escaut canal and
crossed into the Netherlands by 15:00 hours.[105][108] After crossing the border the Irish Guards were

ambushed by infantry and anti-tank guns dug in on both sides of the main road. [105][108] Portions of the
artillery barrage were refired and fresh waves of Hawker Typhoons were called in.
[105]
The Guardsmen moved forward to clear the German positions, manned by elements from two
German parachute battalions and two battalions of the 9th SS Division,[105] and soon routed the
German forces flanking the road.[109] Interrogation of captured German soldiers led to some of them
willingly,[107] others after being threatened, pointing out the remaining German positions. [107][109][110] The
fighting soon died down and the advance resumed. By last light the town of Valkenswaard had been
reached and occupied by the Irish Guards Group. [105][111][112]
Horrocks had expected that the Irish Guards would have been able to advance the 13 miles (21 km)
to Eindhoven within two-three hours; however, they had only covered 7 miles (11 km). The operation
was already starting to fall behind schedule.[112] In Valkenswaard engineers were moved up to
construct a 190 foot (58 m) Class 40 Bailey bridge over a stream, which was completed within 12
hours.[111]
German reactions[edit]

SS troops advancing on bicycles

On the German side, it was soon clear what was happening. Field Marshal Walter Model was
staying at the Tafelberg Hotel inOosterbeek, a village to the west of Arnhem, when the British began
to land in the countryside to the west of Oosterbeek. He rapidly deduced the likely focus of the attack
and after evacuating his headquarters, organised a defence. Wilhelm Bittrich, commanding the 2nd
SS Panzer Corps, sent a reconnaissance company of the 9th SS Panzer Division to Nijmegen to
reinforce the bridge defences. By midnight, Model had gained a clear picture of the situation and had
organised the defence of Arnhem. The confusion usually caused by airborne operations was absent
at Arnhem and the advantage of surprise was lost. During the operation, the Germans recovered a
copy of the Market-Garden plan from the body of an American officer, who should not have carried it
into combat.[113]

Day 2: Monday, 18 September[edit]

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help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced
material may be challenged and removed. (September 2014)
Allied weather forecasters correctly predicted that England would be covered in fog on the morning
of 18 September. The Second Lift was postponed for three hours and thick low clouds began to
develop over the southern part of the battle zone, spreading during the day over the area, hampering

supply and air support (Seven of the next eight days had poor weather and all air operations were
cancelled on 22 and 24 September).
1st Airborne zone[edit]

British landings in Arnhem

The 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions pushed towards the Arnhem bridge during the early hours and
had made good progress but they were frequently halted in skirmishes as soon as it became light.
With their long and unwieldy columns having to halt to beat off attacks whilst the troops in front
carried on unaware, the Germans delayed segments of the two battalions, fragmented them and
mopped up the remnants.

Four Waffen SS troopers[original research?] taken prisoner from 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion at Arnhem Bridge, 18
September 1944.

Early in the day the 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion (sent south the day before) concluded it was
not needed in Nijmegen and returned to Arnhem. Though aware of the British troops at the bridge, it
attempted to cross by force and was beaten back with heavy losses, including its commanding
officer, SS-Hauptsturmfhrer Grbner.
By the end of the day the 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions had entered Arnhem and were within
2 km (1.2 mi) of the bridge with approximately 200 men, one-sixth their original strength. Most of the
officers and non-commissioned officers had been killed, wounded or captured. The Second Lift was
delayed by fog and jumped onto a landing zone under heavy attack but landed at full strength (the
4th Parachute Brigade consisting of the 10th, 11th and 156th Battalions of the Parachute Regiment,

commanded by Brigadier-General John Winthrop Hackett) and C and D Companies of the

2nd South Staffordshire Regiment.
82nd Airborne zone[edit]
Grave proved to be well defended and German forces continued to press on the 82nd deployed on
the Groesbeek heights to the east of Nijmegen. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment defended
against German attacks in Horst, Grafwegen and Riethorst. Early in the day, German counterattacks
seized one of the Allied landing zones where the Second Lift was scheduled to arrive at 13:00. The
508th Parachute Infantry Regiment attacked at 13:10 and cleared the LZ by 14:00, capturing 16
German flak pieces and 149 prisoners. Delayed by weather in Britain, the Second Lift did not arrive
until 15:30. This lift brought in elements of the 319th and 320th Glider Field Artillery battalions, the
456th Parachute Field Artillery battalion and medical support elements. Twenty minutes later, 135 B24 bombers dropped supplies from low level.
101st Airborne zone[edit]

Map of US landings near Eindhoven

Faced with the loss of the bridge at Son, the 101st unsuccessfully attempted to capture a similar
bridge a few kilometres away at Best but found the approach blocked. Other units continued moving
to the south and eventually reached the northern end of Eindhoven. At 06:00 hours the Irish Guards
Group resumed the advance while facing determined resistance from German infantry and tanks.
[111]
Around noon the 101st Airborne were met by the lead reconnaissance units from XXX Corps. At
16:00 radio contact alerted the main force that the Son bridge had been destroyed and requested
that a Bailey bridge be brought forward.[citation needed] By nightfall the Guards Armoured Division had
established itself in the Eindhoven area however transport columns were jammed in the packed
streets of the town and were subjected to German aerial bombardment during the night. XXX Corps
engineers, supported by German prisoners of war, constructed a class 40 Bailey bridge within 10

hours across the Wilhelmina Canal.[114] During the day the British VIII and XII Corps, supporting the
main attack, had forged bridgeheads across Meuse-Escaut Canal while facing stiff German
resistance; 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division was transferred from XXX Corps to VIII Corps so to
relieve XXX Corps from having to secure the ground gained thus far. Throughout the day German
attacks were launched against XXX Corps and against the newly gained bridgeheads over the
MeuseEscaut Canal, all without success.[115]

Day 3: Tuesday, 19 September[edit]

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Arnhem[edit]
During the early morning hours the 1st Parachute Brigade began its attack towards Arnhem Bridge,
with the 1st Battalion leading supported by remnants of the 3rd Battalion, with the 2nd South
Staffordshires on the 1st Battalion's left flank and the 11th Battalion following. As soon as it became
light the 1st Battalion was spotted and halted by fire from the main German defensive line. Trapped
in open ground and under heavy fire from three sides, the 1st Battalion disintegrated and what
remained of the 3rd Battalion fell back. The 2nd South Staffordshires were similarly cut off and, save
for about 150 men, overcome by midday. The 11th Battalion, (which had stayed out of much of the
fighting) was then overwhelmed in exposed positions while attempting to capture high ground to the
north. With no hope of breaking through, the 500 remaining men of these four battalions withdrew
westwards in the direction of the main force, 5 km (3.1 mi) away inOosterbeek.[citation needed]
The 2nd Battalion and attached units (approximately 600 men) were still in control of the northern
approach ramp to the Arnhem bridge. The Germans recognised that they would not be moved by
infantry attacks such as those that had been bloodily repulsed on the previous day so instead they
heavily shelled the short British perimeter with mortars, artillery and tanks; systematically
demolishing each house to enable their infantry to exploit gaps and dislodge the defenders. Although
in battle against enormous odds, the British clung to their positions and much of the perimeter was
held.[citation needed]
Oosterbeek[edit]

British paratroopers in Oosterbeek

To the north of Oosterbeek the 4th Parachute Brigade led an attempt by the 1st Airborne Division to
break through the German lines but communication difficulties and enemy resistance caused the
attack to fail with heavy losses. The Division, scattered far and wide and hard pressed by the enemy

on all sides had lost its offensive capability. Unable to help Lt.-Col. Frost at the bridge, the remaining
soldiers attempted to withdraw into a defensive pocket at Oosterbeek and hold a bridgehead on the
north bank of the Rhine.
The parachute elements of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade had remained in England
because of dense fog. Their gliders, mainly carrying anti-tank guns and vehicles, were able to take
off but had the misfortune to arrive above the landing zone just as the 4th Parachute Brigade was
retreating across it and the gliders came under fire from German units pursuing the Brigade.
Nijmegen[edit]
At 08:20, the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment made contact with the Grenadier Guards of
the XXX Corps at Grave. This enabled the Regiment to move on to other missions and place the 3rd
Battalion in division reserve. By this time, according to the plan, they were due in Arnhem. XXX
Corps were eight miles (13 km) from Arnhem with six hours in hand, 'The earlier delays had been
made up' (Neillands).[this quote needs a citation] A combined effort to take the Nijmegen bridge was mounted by
two companies from the Guards Armoured Division and the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry
Regiment. The attack got within 400 metres (440 yards) of the bridge before being stopped;
skirmishing continued throughout the night. A plan was made to attack the south end of the bridge
again while the 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, planned to cross the river in boats
2 km (1.2 mi) downstream and then attack the north end. The boats were requested for late
afternoon but did not arrive at that time. Once again XXX Corps was held up in front of a bridge
which should have been captured before they arrived.
The 1st and 5th battalions, Coldstream Guards, were attached to the division. A supply attempt by
35 C-47s (out of 60 sent) was unsuccessful; the supplies were dropped from a high altitude and
could not be recovered. Bad weather over English bases prevented the scheduled big glider mission
carrying the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment from taking off, ending any hope for the scheduled
reinforcements for the 82nd Airborne.
Wijchen[edit]
At 09:50 the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was going forward to Wijchen, to attack the
Edithbridge from its south end. The bridge was secured. After this fierce engagement they pushed
on to the traffic bridge south of Wijchen. Another fierce engagement followed and this bridge was
secured.
EindhovenVeghel[edit]
To their south, units of the 101st sent to take Best the day before, were forced to yield to
German counter-attacks during the morning. British tanks arriving during the day helped push back
the Germans by late afternoon. Later a small force of Panther tanks arrived at Son and started firing
on the Bailey bridge. These too were beaten back by anti-tank guns that had recently landed and the
bridge was secured. On the night of 19/20 September, 78 German bombers took off to attack
Eindhoven and 75 aircraft bombed Eindhoven without loss. The city centre was shattered, inflicting
over 1,000 civilian casualties, including 227 dead. An ammunition convoy and trucks
carrying gasoline were also hit.[116] Elements of the 101st, based in and around the city, escaped loss.
The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment rushed into the burning city and rescued civilians during the

night. According to Rick Atkinson, this was "the only large, long-range air strike by
German bombers during the fall of 1944." [117]

Day 4: Wednesday, 20 September[edit]

Arnhem bridge[edit]
Lt. Colonel John Frost's force at the bridge continued to hold and established communication via the
public telephone system with 1st Division around noon learning that the division had no hope of
relieving them and that XXX Corps was stopped to the south in front of Nijmegen bridge. By the
afternoon the British positions around the north end of Arnhem bridge had weakened considerably.
Casualties, mostly wounded, were high from constant shelling. An acute lack of ammunition,
especially anti-tank munitions, enabled enemy armour to demolish British positions from point-blank
range. Food, water and medical supplies were scarce, and so many buildings were on fire and in
such serious danger of collapse that a two-hour truce was arranged to evacuate the wounded
(including Lieutenant-Colonel Frost) into German captivity. Frederick Gough took over as
commander when Frost left. While leading a remnant group in withdrawal from the bridge, toward
Oosterbeek, for a joining with the rest of the 1st Division, Major Hibbert was captured. [98][99][100]

British POWs at Arnhem

The Germans overcame pockets of resistance throughout the day, gaining control of the northern
bridge approaches and permitting reinforcements to cross the span and reinforce units further south
near Nijmegen. The remaining British troops continued to fight on, some with just fighting knives but
by early Thursday morning almost all had been taken prisoner. The last radio message broadcast
from the bridge "Out of ammo, God save the King" was heard only by German radio intercept
operators.
While it was estimated that the 1st Airborne Division, 10,000 strong, would only need to hold the
Arnhem bridge for two days, 740 had held it for twice as long against far heavier opposition than
anticipated. While 81 British soldiers died defending Arnhem bridge, German losses cannot be
stated with any accuracy, though they were high; 11 units known to have participated in the fighting
reported 50% casualties after the battle. In memory of the fighting there, the bridge has been
renamed the "John Frost Bridge".

Oosterbeek[edit]

The Germans advance on Oosterbeek

Further west, the remnants of the 1st Airborne Division were gathering at Oosterbeek for their last
stand; those already there were not seriously challenged by the enemy that day. To the east of the
village, the 1st, 3rd and 11th Parachute Battalions and the 2nd South Staffordshires were organised
into a defensive position. In desperate fighting later in the day, they repulsed an enemy attack which
threatened to cut the division off from the Rhine and seal the fate of the bridgehead.
In the woods to the west of Oosterbeek the 4th Parachute Brigade fought its way towards the
divisional perimeter but was attacked by German troops supported by artillery, mortars and tanks,
(some mounting flame-throwers). The brigade had many casualties and the 10th Battalion reached
Oosterbeek in the early afternoon with only 60 men.
In the rear, the 156th Parachute Battalion fought off numerous enemy attacks before counterattacking; the Germans did not know they were fighting men who were in full retreat. The battalion,
down to 150 men, mounted a bayonet charge to capture a hollow in the ground in the woods where
they were pinned down by enemy attacks for the next eight hours. Towards the end of the day, 75
men fixed bayonets, broke through the German lines and retreated to the Allied pocket at
Oosterbeek.
Nijmegen[edit]

British tanks of XXX Corps cross the road bridge at Nijmegen.

Canvas assault boat

Boats ordered by the 82nd Airborne the day before, failed to arrive until afternoon and a hasty
daylight assault crossing was ordered. At about 15:00, the 3rd Battalion, 504th PIR, commanded by
Major Julian Cook, began their assault across the Waal. The American paratroopers were rowed
across the Waal by members of C/307th EN BN in 26 canvas assault boats provided by the British.
[118][page needed]
The American unit had no training on the British-made boats. A shortage
of paddles required some troopers to paddle the craft with rifle butts. About half the boats survived
the crossing under heavy fire and eleven survived the first two crossings. Before the day was over,
C/307th crossed the Waal five times while ferrying across two battalions of the 504th. [119][page needed] The
surviving paratroopers then assaulted across 200 metres (220 yards) of open ground on the far bank
and seized the north end of the bridge. The costly attack was nicknamed "Little Omaha" in reference
to Omaha Beach. 200 paratroopers were killed, while German losses exceeded 267. [120] German
forces withdrew from both ends of the bridge which was then rushed by Guards tanks and the 2nd
Battalion, 505th PIR, securing the bridge at 18:30, D+4.
British Army officer Robert Kershaw interviewed 10th SS Panzer Division commander Heinz Harmel
in the 1980s for his book "It Never Snows In September".[121] Harmel stated 'The four panzers
[Carrington's Grenadier tank troop] who crossed the bridge made a mistake when they stayed in
Lent. If they had carried on their advance, it would have been all over for us.' [122] In the hardback
Kershaw has a copy of Harmel's artillery map which shows German troops between Nijmegen and
Arnhem were extremely thin, a handful of security pickets with rifles at the Betuwe midpoint in Elst.
By 22:00, D+4 Frost and Hibbert had been overrun at the Arnhem bridge, 7 miles (11 km) away.
To the east, German attacks on the heights made significant progress, capturing the only remaining
bridge suitable for tanks. Acounterattack at Mook by elements of the 505th PIR and 1st Battalion, the
Coldstream Guards forced the Germans back to their line of departure by 20:00. The 508th PIR lost
ground at Im Thal and Legewald, when attacked by German infantry and tanks. By now it was
evident that the German plan was to cut the highway, split up the Airborne units and cut off the
advanced elements of XXX Corps. To the south, running battles between the 101st and various
German units continued. Eventually several Panther tanks managed to cut the roads but pulled back
when low on ammunition.

Day 5: Thursday, 21 September[edit]

Oosterbeek[edit]

A Dutch school damaged by mortar fire, being searched for German snipers by Sergeant J. Whawell and
Sergeant J. Turrell of the Glider Pilot Regiment. An empty weapons supply canister lies open on the ground in
the doorway of the school. 20 September 1944

Approximately 3,584 survivors of the 1st Airborne Division established themselves in the buildings
and woods around Oosterbeek with the intention of holding a bridgehead on the north side of the
Rhine until XXX Corps could arrive. Throughout the day their position was heavily attacked on all
sides. In the southeast, Lonsdale Force (the remnants of the 1st, 3rd, and 11th Parachute Battalions
and 2ndSouth Staffordshires) repulsed a big attack aided by the fire of the divisional light artillery. In
the north the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers were almost overrun during the afternoon but a
counterattack with bayonets restored the situation and the heavily depleted battalion moved further
south to occupy a narrower front. The most serious attack of the day was made at dawn against "B"
Company, 1st Battalion, Border Regiment which controlled a vital area of high ground in the
southwestern tip of the perimeter overlooking the Heveadorp ferry crossing at Driel, which was the
division's only straightforward means of receiving reinforcements from the south. The company was
attacked by enemy infantry and armour, including captured French tanks equipped with
flamethrowers, and the heights were lost. Counterattacks failed and the remnants of the company
were redeployed. The division was left in a precarious position, controlling just 700 metres (770
yards) of the riverbank. The division held ground to similar attacks elsewhere on their front.
A supply attempt by RAF Stirlings of 38 Group was disrupted by the only Luftwaffe fighter
interception during the operation. Fw 190sintercepted the Stirlings at low altitude and shot down
15. Anti-aircraft fire accounted for 8 further losses. The Fw 190s were able to penetrate the screen of
Allied fighters sent to cover the drop when the U.S. 56th Fighter Group was late in arriving in its
patrol sector between Lochem and Deventer. The 56th redeemed itself to an extent by shooting
down 15 of the 22 Fw 190s as they departed.[123]
Polish paratroopers enter the battle[edit]
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After two days of delay due to the weather, the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade under
Major-General Stanislaw Sosabowski entered the battle on the afternoon of 21 September, delivered
at about 17:15 by 114 C-47s of the U.S. 61st and 314th Troop Carrier Groups. Two of the brigade's
three battalions were dropped amidst heavy German fire, opposite the 1st Airborne Division's
position on a new drop zone south of the Rhine near the village of Driel. The third battalion was
dropped 1215 miles away near Grave. Overall, the poor coordination by the British air transfer
officers and persistent attacks by Luftwaffe aircraft caused their supplies to be dropped 15 km
(9.3 mi) away on the opposite side of the Rhine.
Intending to use the Heveadorp ferry to reinforce the division, they discovered that the opposite bank
was dominated by the enemy and that the ferry was missing; it was later found downstream past the
road bridge, completely unserviceable. Unable to help the British, the Polish withdrew to Driel for the
night and organised defence there, with the Rhine behind their backs and German units increasing
in strength around them. The brigade had lost 25% of its fighting strength, amounting to 590
casualties. Several attempts to cross the Rhine on improvised equipment could only be partly
successful due to heavy German fire and inability by the 1st Airborne to secure the landing area on
the Rhine's northern bank. The 1st Airborne Division made radio contact during the day with guns of
the 64th Medium Regiment of XXX Corps' artillery which had advanced with the ground forces and
were assigned to the division for support. Unlike many others, this radio link worked throughout the
battle and the regiment provided valuable fire support to the division.
Nijmegen[edit]

Nijmegen after the battle. 28 September 1944

Despite the capture of Nijmegen bridge and the clearing of the town on the previous evening, the
five tanks of Guards Armoured Division which were across the river did not advance. The Division
resumed its advance about 18 hours later, at noon. Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks claimed he
needed this delay to sort out the confusion among his troops that had resulted from the battle in
Nijmegen. This was a controversial decision that has been examined often in the years since. The
Coldstream Guards Group were repulsing an attack on the Groesbeek position, the Irish Guards
Group had gone back to Eindhoven to meet another attack, the Grenadiers had just captured the
approaches to the bridge with the US paratroops and got five tanks over it to support the Airborne
bridgehead and the Welsh Guards were in 82nd Airborne reserve. The Guards Armoured Division
was scattered over twenty-five square miles of the south bank of the Waal.
The Market Garden plan depended upon a single highway as the route of advance and supply. This
imposed a delay since other units could not be deployed on other routes to maintain momentum.
Brigadier General Gavin's diary comment was: "Had Ridgway been in command at that moment, we

would have been ordered up that road in spite of all our difficulties, to save the men at
Arnhem."[124] He is silent on the 36 hour delay caused by his failure to capture the bridge on schedule.
The historian Max Hastings wrote "It reflected poorly on the British Army...". Another version of
events quotes Captain Lord Carrington "... I certainly met an American officer ... the Airborne were all
very glad to see us and get some support; no one suggested we should press on to Arnhem.". 'Let
us be frank. The 82nd should have taken the Nijmegen bridge on D-Day, 17 September. By failing to
do so Gavin made a major contribution to the failure of the entire Arnhem operation and it will not do
to pass the blame for that failure on to the British or to Captain Lord Carrington.' (Neillands, 'The
Battle for the Rhine 1944', p. 122.).
The delay enabled the Germans to reinforce the defence already established at Ressen (an SS
infantry battalion, eleven tanks, an infantry battalion, two 88 mm batteries, twenty 20 mm flak and
the remnants of the fighting at Nijmegen [quoted from the US Official History in Neillands p. 125])
south of Arnhem aided by use of the bridge following their capture of its northern end. The advance
of the Guards, hindered by marshes that prevented off-road movement, was soon halted by a firm
German defensive line. The Guards not having the strength to outflank it, the 43rd Division was
ordered to take over the lead, work its way around the enemy positions and make contact with the
Polish at Driel. The 43rd was 16 km (9.9 mi) away and there was a traffic jam between it and
Nijmegen. It was not until the following day (Friday) that the whole division crossed the River Waal
and began its advance.
The Germans, clearly starting to gain the upper hand, continued their counterattacks all along the
path of XXX Corps, although the Corps still managed to advance and the 101st Airborne Division
continued to exploit its gains.
At about 15:00, 406 C-47 glider tugs and 33 C-47 cargo carriers delivered supplies to the 82nd
Airborne Division. About 60% of the supplies were recovered (351 of the gliders were counted
effective), partly with the help of Dutch civilians. Most of the 82nd and 101st, reinforced with British
armoured units, were engaged in defensive fighting with the objective of holding the highway
corridor. Small attacks were fought all along the corridor.

Day 6: Friday, 22 September ("Black Friday")[edit]

The Germans, wary after unsuccessful and costly attacks the previous day, shelled and mortared the
airborne positions heavily. By the end of the battle some 110 guns had been brought to Oosterbeek
as the Germans shifted to the tactics that had worked so well at Arnhem bridge. Attacks were limited,
conducted against specific positions and even individual houses. Numerous well-sited British antitank guns also caused German reluctance to attack. The survivors of the 1st Airborne were
outnumbered 4 to 1. The Polish 1st Parachute Brigade at Driel, unable to cross the Rhine,
nonetheless forced a redeployment of German forces. Fearing a Polish attempt to recapture Arnhem
bridge or, worse, an attempt to cut the road to the south and so trap the 10th SS Panzer Division
then blocking the route of the Guards Armoured Division to Arnhem, the Germans withdrew 2,400
troops from Oosterbeek. They were moved south of the river to engage the Polish paratroopers at
Driel, making attacks to little effect through the day.[citation needed]
Link-up between the Poles and XXX Corps[edit]
The fog lifted as leading elements of the 43rd Division attempted to advance to Driel, exposing them
to German fire. They arrived in Driel during the evening. Lacking assault craft, an unsuccessful

attempt was made that night to put elements of the Polish brigade across the river. British and Polish
engineers on both sides of the Rhine had worked through the day to improvise a crossing using
small boats linked by signals cable but the cable kept breaking forcing the Polish troops to slowly
row across against the strong current. The attempt was made under enemy observation and fire and
only 52 soldiers of the 8th Polish Parachute Company survived the crossing before a halt was called
at dawn.[citation needed]
While much of the corridor was firmly in Allied hands, German counterattacks were still being
mounted along its length. During the previous night, two mixed armoured formations on either side of
Highway 69 attacked between Veghel and Grave; one group managed to cut the highway and
prevent any further advance to Arnhem.[citation needed]

Day 7: Saturday, 23 September[edit]

The Germans had figured out what the Poles were attempting to do and they spent the rest of the
day trying to cut off the British in their northern bridgehead from the riverside. The British managed
to hold on and both sides suffered heavy losses. The Germans also attacked the Poles on the south
side in order to tie them down but several tanks arrived from XXX Corps and they were beaten off.
Boats and engineers from the Canadian army also arrived that day and another river crossing that
night landed 150 troops of the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion on the north bank of the Rhine.
To the south several more German attacks from their position astride the road were stopped but the
road was still cut. XXX Corps then sent a unit of the Guards Armoured Division 19 km (12 mi) south
and re-took the road. The rest of the force to the north continued to wait for infantry to move up, still
only a few kilometres south of Arnhem.
The 325th GIR was finally delivered to reinforce the 82nd Airborne, originally planned for 19
September, and while it was immediately 75% effective, arrived far too late to affect the battle in that
sector.

Day 8: Sunday, 24 September[edit]

Another German force cut the road to the south of Veghel and set up defensive positions for the
night. It was not clear to the Allies at this point how much of a danger this represented but the
principal objective of Operation Market Garden, i.e. the Allied crossing of the Rhine, was abandoned
this day and the decision made to go over to the defensive with a new front line in Nijmegen.
Nonetheless, an attempt was made on Sunday night to reinforce the 1st Airborne Division with the
4th Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment. Two companies were put across the river but the location
of the crossing point was ill-advised and the Dorsets landed among German positions. Fragmented
by their landing and immediately pinned down, of the 315 men who crossed only 75 reached
Oosterbeek; the remainder were taken prisoner. As a result of this failure, it was decided to withdraw
the 1st Airborne Division from its bridgehead on the northern side of the Rhine.

Day 9: Monday, 25 September[edit]

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Main article: Operation Berlin (Arnhem rescue)

At dawn the 1st Airborne Division received their orders to withdraw across the Rhine; this was
called Operation Berlin. This could not be done until nightfall and in the meantime the division
struggled to survive. In a departure from their cautious attritional tactics of the previous days, the
Germans formed two potent SS battlegroups and made a significant thrust along a narrow front in
the eastern sector. This succeeded in breaking through the thin front line and for a time the division
was in peril. The attack met with increasing resistance as it pushed deeper into the British lines and
was finally broken up by a heavy bombardment of the 64th Medium Regiment.
Employing every ruse to give the Germans the impression that their positions were unchanged, the
1st Airborne Division began its withdrawal at 22:00. British and Canadian engineer units ferried the
troops across the Rhine, covered by the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion on the north bank. By early
the next morning they had withdrawn 2,398 survivors, leaving 300 men to surrender on the north
bank at first light, when German fire prevented their rescue. Of approximately 10,600 men of the 1st
Airborne Division and other units who fought north of the Rhine, 1,485 had died and 6,414 were
taken prisoner of whom one third were wounded.
To the south the newly arrived 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division attacked the Germans holding
the highway and secured it by the next day. Allied positions in the Nijmegen Salient as it came to be
known, were manned throughout the rest of September and October by airborne units, then handed
over to the First Canadian Army in November 1944 and remained unchanged until February 1945
when Operation Veritable was launched on the Rhineland, advancing east instead of north towards
Arnhem.

Losses[edit]
XXX Corps suffered fewer than 1,500 casualties, which stands in stark contrast to the 8,000
casualties suffered by the 1st Airborne Division. On several occasions, units of the flanking British
Corps made contact with paratroopers before units of XXX Corps, and fought on to support them
until the end of the operation. The higher toll by the 101st Airborne Division reflects the reality that
aside from contending with the local German defenders, they also had to combat German troops
retreating from the XXX Corps advance.

The grave of an unknown British airborne soldier at Arnhem, photographed after its liberation 15 April 1945.

Casualties

Total

Grand Total

Dutch civilians

Less than 500[k]

Less than 500

Second Army and

I Airborne Corps

11,78413,226[l]

XVIII Airborne Corps

3,542[125] 3,974[10][m]

15,32617,200

German casualties are harder to determine, as the records are mostly incomplete. The official
casualties estimated by Rundstedt are 3,300 but these numbers are challenged by historians.
Conservative estimates range from 6,400, 8,000, to as high as 9,80013,300. [11][12][127] Kershaw gives a
detailed but incomplete list of the participated German units and their casualties and concludes with
6,315 8,925 overall German casualties.[13] A contemporary paper of the 21st Army Group mentions
that 16,000 German prisoners were taken during Operation Market Garden, but it is unclear how
those numbers relate to later casualty estimates. [14][n]

Transport Command Victoria Cross[edit]

On 19 September, RAF Douglas Dakota Mk. III, KG374, c/n 12383, (ex-USAAF C-47A-DK, 4292568), 'YS-DM', of 271 Squadron, RAF Down Ampney, Gloucester, piloted by F/Lt. David S. Lord,
was hit by AA in the starboard engine while on a supply sortie for beleaguered troops at Arnhem.
Despite fire spreading to all of the starboard wing, the pilot spent ten minutes making two passes
over very small dropzones (which, unknown to the crew, had been overrun by German forces) to
drop eight ammunition panniers. Just after the last one was dropped, the fuel tank exploded, tearing
off the wing, and only navigator F/O Harry A. King escaped from the stricken aircraft, descending by
parachute. He was captured and made POW the following morning, spending the rest of the war
in Stalag Luft I atBarth. Killed While Flying (KWF) were pilot Lord, second pilot P/O R. E. H. "Dickie"
Medhurst (son of Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Medhurst), wireless operator F/O Alec F. Ballantyne,
and four air despatchers of 223 Company RASC, Cpl. P. Nixon, Dvr. A. Rowbotham, Dvr. J. Ricketts
and Dvr. L. Harper. Following the release of King from prison camp, full details of the action became
known and pilot Lord received a posthumous Victoria Cross on 13 November 1945, the only VC
awarded to any member of Transport Command during the Second World War. In May 1949 the
Dutch Government awarded Harry King the Netherlands Bronze Cross. [128]

Aftermath[edit]
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Debate on Allied strategy and tactics[edit]

Operation Market Garden has remained a controversial battle for several reasons. Allied tactics and
strategy have been much debated. The operation was the result of a strategy debate at the highest

levels of Allied command in Europe. Much post-war analysis has thus probed the alternatives that
were not taken, such as giving priority to securing the Scheldt estuary. Some historians maintain that
Market Garden was a good idea that was executed poorly, and that concentrating one's forces in an
attempt to break through at one point is a more effective strategy than trying to advance on a broad
front.[citation needed]
Optimistic planning[edit]
Among the controversial aspects of the plan was the necessity that all the main bridges be taken.
The terrain was also ill-suited for the mission of XXX Corps.[69] Brereton had ordered that the bridges
along XXX Corps' route should be captured with "thunderclap surprise".[129] It is therefore surprising in
retrospect that the plans placed so little emphasis on capturing the important bridges immediately
with forces dropped directly on them. In the case of Veghel and Grave where this was done, the
bridges were captured with only a few shots being fired.
The decision to drop the 82nd Airborne Division on the Groesbeek Heights, several kilometres from
the Nijmegen Bridge, has been questioned because it resulted in a long delay in its capture.
Browning and Gavin considered holding a defensive blocking position on the ridge a prerequisite for
holding the highway corridor. Gavin generally favoured accepting the higher initial casualties
involved in dropping as close to objectives as possible in the belief that distant drop zones would
result in lower chances of success. With the 82nd responsible for holding the centre of the salient,
he and Browning decided the ridge must take priority. Combined with the 1st Airborne Division's
delays within Arnhem, which left the Arnhem bridge open to traffic until 20:00, the Germans were
given vital hours to reinforce their hold on the bridge.
At Arnhem, the RAF planners selected the drop zones, refusing to drop near the town on the north
side of the target bridge because of flak at Deelen. Another suitable drop zone just to the south of
the bridge was rejected because it was thought to be too marshy for landing gliders containing the
force's heavier equipment, however that same drop zone was selected for the 1st Polish
Independent Parachute Brigade in the third lift, which suggests they were well aware of its suitability.
Urquhart made his objections to the RAF planners who were unmoved, even when he informed
them that the troops and glider pilots were willing to take whatever risks landing closer to the
objectives entailed. Urquhart made the best of the RAF planners' decision and thus the three main
landing and drop zones were 810 km (5.06.2 mi) from the bridge, with the fourth being 13 km
(8.1 mi) away.[130][131]
Weather[edit]
A precarious timetable at the mercy of the weather resulted in the 101st Airborne Division being
without its artillery for two days, the 82nd Airborne without its artillery for a day and without its glider
infantry regiment for four days and the British 1st Airborne division without its fourth brigade until the
fifth day. The more time required to complete the air drops, the longer each division had to devote
forces to defending the drop and landing zones, weakening their offensive power.
Priority of operation[edit]
Several weeks prior to the plan taking shape, the British had captured Antwerp and its all-important
port facilities. This action had the potential to greatly shorten the Allies' supply lines and trap GustavAdolf von Zangen's 15th Army of 80,000 men on the south side of the Scheldt Estuary. Instead, Von

Zangen's men, with most of their heavy equipment including their artillery, escaped by boat to the
South Beveland peninsula. In September, the peninsula could have been sealed by a short advance
of only 24 km (15 mi) past Antwerp. Instead, because priority on supplies went to Market Garden,
the First Canadian Army paused at Antwerp and then fought the costly Battle of the Scheldt in
October. In the aftermath of Market Garden, Antwerp was not made operational until 28 November.
By 1 October, over 240 Allied supply ships were waiting, unable to unload their cargo because of the
limited port facilities on the continent.
Missed opportunities[edit]
Arnhem bridge was not the only Rhine crossing. Had the Market Garden planners realized that a
ferry was available at Driel, the British might have secured that instead of the Arnhem bridge. Being
a shorter distance away from their western drop and landing zones, the 1st Parachute Brigade could
have concentrated to hold the Oosterbeek heights, instead of one battalion farther away at the road
bridge; in this case, Arnhem was "one bridge too many". A contrasting view is that the attack into
Arnhem was intended to capture the rail bridge, the pontoon bridge and the road bridge; that the rail
bridge was blown in the face of Frost's 2nd Parachute Battalion, the pontoon bridge had been
disabled by the removal of several sections and that this left only the road bridge intact, the
Heveadorp ferry was no substitute for a bridge.[132]
Hypothetically, had XXX Corps pushed north, they might have arrived at the south end and secured
it (had the Guards Armoured sent more than five Shermans across the bridge and had they not been
later stopped by the German position at Ressen), leaving the way open for another crossing to the
north at some other point. There was the smaller possibility of arriving with Frost's force intact. This
perceived "lack of guts" caused some bitterness at the time among members of both the British 1st
Airborne and the US 82nd Airborne. As it was, XXX Corps did not resume the drive to Arnhem that
night but eighteen hours later.
The commander of XXX Corps advocated another course of action. About 25 km (16 mi) to the west
was another bridge at Rhenen, which he predicted would be undefended, because of all the efforts
being directed on Oosterbeek. This was true but the corps was never authorised to take the bridge; if
they had, it is almost certain they would have crossed unopposed into the rear of the German lines.
By this time, it appears that Montgomery was more concerned with the German assaults on Market
Garden's lengthy 'tail'.

Gen. Sosabowski (left) with Gen. Browning.

Despite the heroism, bad choices were made throughout and opportunities were ignored. The
commander of the Glider Pilot Regimenthad asked for a small force with gliders to land on the

southern side of the bridge at Arnhem to quickly capture it but he was denied. This was surprising in
light of the fact that in Normandy, the British 6th Airborne Division had used such coup-de-main
tactics to take Pegasus Bridge. In Britain, the commander of the British 52nd (Lowland) Infantry
Division, whose troops were slated to fly into a captured airfield, pleaded with his superiors to allow a
brigade to fly in with gliders to assist Major-General Urquhart's trapped forces. [133] Browning declined
the offer, "as situation better than you think" and reaffirmed his intention to fly the 52nd Division in to
Deelen airfield as planned.[134] This was probably fortunate, as glider landings on undefended landing
zones before the eyes of an alert enemy could have resulted in catastrophe. There was another
airfield near Grave and the 52nd Lowland could have been landed there, as the 1st Light Anti-Tank
Battery did on 26 September.[135] The Polish 1st Parachute Brigade commander MajorGeneral Stanisaw Sosabowski, was prepared to try a dangerous drop through the fog which held up
his deployment but again was refused.
Market Garden was a risky plan that required a willingness to gamble at the tactical, small-unit level.
Unfortunately, the detailed planning and leadership required at that level was not always present.
The 1st Airborne Division, the least experienced in working as a whole division was given the most
difficult distant objective. The failure of the 82nd Airborne Division to attach maximum importance to
the early capture of Nijmegen Bridge was a fatal mistake. XXX Corps was also criticized for its
"inability" to keep to the operation's timetable. The most notable example of this was on Wednesday
20 September, when Nijmegen Bridge had finally been captured and the Guards Armoured Division,
after crossing, promptly came to a halt for the night to rest, refuel and rearm. XXX Corps was
delayed at Son by a bridge demolition and the delay at Nijmegen (having arrived by D+3, within the
maximum time estimate, having compensated for the delay to build a Bailey Bridge at Son) was
caused by having to help the 82nd's paratroopers capture the town and bridges. The lead unit of
XXX Corps, the Guards Armoured Division, was led by a commander (Allan Adair) whom
Montgomery had sought to remove prior to D-Day. This action was blocked due to Adair's popularity.
Gavin regretted giving his division's most important tasks (Groesbeek ridge and Nijmegen) to
the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment rather than his best regiment, Tucker's 504th Parachute
Infantry Regiment.
Intelligence failure[edit]
Unlike the American airborne divisions in the area, British forces at Arnhem ignored the local Dutch
resistance. There was a good reason for this: Britain's spy network in the Netherlands had been
thoroughly and infamously compromised the so-called England game, which had only been
discovered in April 1944. Perhaps assuming that the Dutch resistance would be similarly penetrated,
British intelligence took pains to minimise all civilian contact. U.S. units, without this bad experience,
made use of Dutch help. As things turned out, knowledge of the Driel ferry or of the underground's
secret telephone network could have changed the result of the operation, especially since Allied
radio equipment failed, having to rely on messengers. The latter was very important: it would have
given the XXX Corps and Airborne High Command knowledge about the dire situation at Arnhem.
After the war, claims arose that the Dutch resistance had indeed been penetrated. One high-ranking
Dutch officer who had worked in counter-intelligence at SHAEF, Lieutenant-Colonel Oreste
Pinto published a popular book, Spy Catcher, part-memoir and part counter-intelligence handbook.
Pinto, who had made a name for himself in World War I for his part in uncovering Mata Hari, claimed
that a minor figure in the Dutch resistance, Christiaan Lindemans (nicknamed "King Kong") had
been a German agent and had betrayed Operation Market Garden to the Germans. [136] Lindemans

was arrested in October 1944, but committed suicide in his cell in 1946 while awaiting trial. In 1969,
French journalist and historian Anne Laurens concluded that Lindemans had been a double agent. [137]
Allied reflections[edit]
In 1948, Eisenhower wrote that "The attack began well and unquestionably would have been
successful except for the intervention of bad weather." [138] Eisenhower was isolated in the SHAEF HQ
at Granville, which did not even have radio or telephone links, so his staff were largely ignorant of
the details of the operation. Bedell Smiths objections were brushed aside by Montgomery, as were
those of Montgomerys chief of staff Freddie de Guingand who went to England on sick leave.
Responsibility for the failure "began with Eisenhower and extended to Montgomery, Brereton,
Browning, and, on the ground side, Dempsey and Horrocks, neither of whom ... galvanised their tank
units while there was still time to have seized and held Arnhem bridge". In the end Browning and
Montgomery made Sosabowski (who had been ignored) and the Poles the scapegoat. [139] D'Este
notes that Montgomerys admission of a mistake was unique: "the only admission of failure by a
senior Allied commander".[140] Eisenhower wrote to Urquhart: "In this war there has been no single
performance by any unit that has more greatly inspired me or more highly excited my admiration,
than the nine days action of your division between 17 and 26 September". [141]
Montgomery predicted that "in years to come it will be a great thing for a man to be able to say: 'I
fought at Arnhem'."[142] Montgomery claimed that Market Garden was "90% successful" and said:
It was a bad mistake on my part I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to
Antwerp ... I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was
wrong ............. In my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed from its
inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it
would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd
SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate. [143]
CBS war correspondent Bill Downs, who was assigned to Montgomery's campaign since the
Normandy invasion, famously said of Nijmegen that it was "...a single, isolated battle that ranks in
magnificence and courage with Guam, Tarawa, Omaha Beach...a story that should be told to the
blowing of bugles and the beating of drums for the men whose bravery made the capture of this
crossing over the Waal River possible."[144]

Subsequent combat in the Netherlands[edit]

The front line in the Low Countries after Operation Market Garden

After Operation Market Garden failed to establish a bridgehead across the Rhine, Allied forces
launched offensives on two fronts in the south of the Netherlands. To secure shipping to the vital port
of Antwerp they advanced northwards and westwards, taking the Scheldt Estuary in the Battle of the
Scheldt.[145] Allied forces also advanced eastwards in Operation Aintree to secure the banks of the
Meuse as a natural boundary for the established salient. This attack on the German bridgehead west
of the Meuse near Venlo was for the Allies an unexpectedly protracted affair, which included
the Battle of Overloon.[146]
In February 1945, Allied forces in Operation Veritable advanced from the Groesbeek heights which
had been taken during Market Garden, and into Germany,[147] crossing the Rhine in March
during Operation Plunder.[148] As a result of Operation Plunder, the city ofArnhem was finally
liberated by I Canadian Corps on 14 April 1945 after two days of fighting. [149] A surrender of the
remaining German forces in the west of the Netherlands was signed on 5 May.[150]
Famine in the Netherlands[edit]
A tragic consequence of the operation's failure was the Hongerwinter (Hungerwinter). During the
battle Dutch railway workers, incited by the Dutch government in London, went on strike in order to
aid the Allied assault. In retribution Germany forbade food transportation, and in the following winter
more than twenty thousand Dutch citizens starved to death.

Commemoration[edit]
Memorials and remembrance[edit]

Monument for the Dutch at Sint-Oedenrode

The prized Arnhem bridge for which the British had fought so hard did not survive the war. As the
front line stabilised south of the Rhine,B-26 Marauders of 344th Bomb Group, USAAF destroyed it
on 7 October to deny its use to the Germans.[151] It was replaced with a bridge of similar appearance
in 1948 and renamed John Frost Bridge (John Frostbrug) on 17 December 1977.[152][153]

The Polish Monument in Driel at the 'Polenplein'

There are a number of monuments in the Arnhem area. A memorial near Arnhem reads
To the People of Gelderland; 50 years ago British and Polish Airborne soldiers fought here against
overwhelming odds to open the way into Germany and bring the war to an early end. Instead we
brought death and destruction for which you have never blamed us. This stone marks our admiration
for your great courage remembering especially the women who tended our wounded. In the long
winter that followed your families risked death by hiding Allied soldiers and Airmen while members of
the resistance led many to safety. You took us then into your homes as fugitives and friends we took
you forever into our hearts. This strong bond will continue long after we are all gone." [154]
On 16 September 1994, 101st Airborne veterans unveiled a "Monument for the Dutch" in SintOedenrode. The monument is a gift from the veterans to the civilians who fought alongside of the
U.S. troops, much to the surprise and relief of the U.S. soldiers. The inscription on the monument is
in English and reads "Dedicated to the people of the Corridor by the veterans of the 101st Airborne
Division, in grateful appreciation of their courage, compassion and friendship". [155]

Airborne Museum Hartenstein

On 31 May 2006, Polish 1st Independent Airborne Brigade was awarded the Dutch Military William
Order by HM Queen Beatrix for gallantry at Arnhem during Operation Market Garden in 1944.[156] The
American 82nd Airborne Division had previously been awarded the same order for gallantry during
the operation on 8 October 1945.
Several museums in the Netherlands are dedicated to Operation Market Garden, including the
National Liberation Museum 19441945 inGroesbeek, Wings of Liberation Museum Park in Best
(near Eindhoven) and Airborne Museum Hartenstein in Oosterbeek.[157][158][159]
"Il Silenzio (song)" is a memorial piece commissioned by the Dutch and first played in 1965 on the
20th anniversary of the liberation of the Netherlands. In a cemetery near Margraten, about 6 miles
(9.7 km) from the city of Maastricht lie buried 8,301 American soldiers who died in "Operation Market
Garden" in the battles to liberate the Netherlands in the fall and winter of 19445. Everyone of the
men buried in the cemetery, as well as those in the Canadian and British military cemeteries has
been adopted by a Dutch family who tend the grave and keep alive the memory of the soldier they
have adopted. It is the custom to keep a portrait of "their" American soldier in a place of honour in
their home. Annually on "Liberation Day", Memorial Services are held for the men who died to
liberate the Netherlands. The day concludes with a concert, at which "Il Silenzio" has always been
the concluding piece. In 2008 the soloist was a 13-year-old Dutch girl,Melissa Venema, backed
by Andr Rieu and the Royal Orchestra of the Netherlands.[160]
A Commemorative Project plaque was unveiled on 23 June 2009, to commemorate the unique
military and historical ties between Canada and the Netherlands. A hole, a par five, on the south
course (Hylands Golf Course Uplands) in Ottawa, Ontario was named "Arnhem, in honour of the
Royal Canadian Artillery squadrons that took part in Second World War allied airborne Operation
MARKET GARDEN from September 17 to 26, 1944. The operation, intended to secure a series of
bridges so the allies could advance into Germany, fell short when the allied forces were
unsuccessful in securing the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem."[161]

Film[edit]
Operation Market Garden was the subject of the 1946 film Theirs Is the Glory. This film mixed
original footage from the battle with re-enactments, shot on location in Arnhem. Many of the actors
portraying the paratroopers were soldiers who fought in the battle. Some played themselves,
including Kate ter Horst, Frederick Gough, John Frost and Stanley Maxted, the Canadian journalist
who posted gripping reports from the front at Arnhem.[162] A Bridge Too Far is a 1977 epic war film,
based on the 1974 book A Bridge Too Far byCornelius Ryan. It was adapted by William Goldman,
directed by Richard Attenborough and had an all-star cast. Unlike the earlier film from which it
lifted some scenes it covered the entire operation from all sides, British, American, German, Polish
and Dutch. Dramatizations of the actions of the 101st Airborne Division, 506th PIR during the battle
(with cameo scenes also of XXX Corps, British paratroopers and Canadian engineers) formed part
of the HBO television miniseries Band of Brothers.

Notes[edit]
Footnotes

1.

Jump up^ Dr. John C Warren wrote: "Thus ended in failure the greatest airborne operation of
the war .... All objectives save Arnhem had been won, but without Arnhem the rest were as nothing. [1]

2.

Jump up^ Montgomery said that "Had good weather obtained, there was no doubt that we
should have attained full success".[2] [General] Student, when interrogated by Liddell Hart, did not go
quite so far as this, but gave the weather as the main cause of the failure [of the operation]". [3] Chester
Wilmot wrote: "Summing up the overall results of Market Garden, ... [Montgomery claiming 90%
success] .... This claim is difficult to support, unless the success of the operation is judged merely in
terms of the numbers of bridges captured. Eight crossings were seized but the failure to secure the
ninth, the bridge at Arnhem, meant the frustration of Montgomery's strategic purpose. His fundamental
objective had been to drive Second Army beyond the Maas and Rhine in one bound." [4]

3.

Jump up^ While the size of the German force used to oppose Market Garden is currently
unknown, Michael Reynolds notes that Fifteenth Army, based to the west of the axis of advance,
contained over 80,000 men. The strength of First Parachute Army is not given. However, Reynolds
notes it had just been reinforced with over 30,000 men from the Luftwaffe, including paratroopers in
various stages of training. Finally, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions each contained in the
neighborhood of 67,000 men.[7]

4.

Jump up^ XXX Corps lost 70 tanks while VIII and XII Corps lost c. 18 tanks. [8]

5.

Jump up^ Operation Varsity in 1945 involved more planes, gliders, and troops on D-Day than
in Market, but additional airborne troops flown in on subsequent days made Market Garden the larger
operation.[17]

6.

Jump up^ The CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, was absent as he was attending
the Second Quebec Conference

7.

Jump up^ "Handsup", a drop on Quiberon, was cancelled after naval objections and
"Beneficiary", a drop on Saint-Malo, because defences were too strong.[52]

8.

Jump up^ After 25 August, IX TCC was removed from Ninth Air Force and placed directly
under US Strategic Air Forces.[52]

9.

Jump up^ 655 of the 700 scheduled RAF sorties on the first two days towed gliders and the
RAF only dropped 186 total troops by parachute. [63]

10.

Jump up^ The 9th SS Panzer Division was onganized into the divisional reconnaissance
battalion and nineteen Alarmheiten (Alarm Companies) trained to head towards the sound of gunfire,
each being about 130 men.[87]

11.

Jump up^ Ryan claims civilian casualties in the Arnhem area are said to be less than 500
while he had heard of claims of up to 10,000 killed, wounded or displaced civilians in the entire Market
Garden operation area.[10]

12.

Jump up^ According to Ellis Second Army casualties (excluding the 1st Airborne Division)
amounted to 3,716 men from 1726 September.[125] Ryan states that total British casualties amounted
to 13,226: 1st Airborne Division (including Polish forces and glider pilots), 7,578; RAF pilot and crew
losses, 294; XXX Corps, 1,480, while supporting operations by VIII and XII Corps resulted in 3,874
casualties.[10] VIII Corps staff place their losses at 663 men.[126] Michael Reynolds arrives at a slightly
different figure to Ryan for the airborne losses; 1,446 men of the 1st Airborne and Glider Pilot
Regiment were killed while 6,414 were taken prisoner. Furthermore 97 Poles were killed and a further
111 captured.[5]

13.

Jump up^ 82nd Airborne Division: 1,432. 101st Airborne Division: 2,118. Glider pilots and air
crew: 424.[10]

14.

Jump up^ Historian Cornelius Ryan states that "complete German losses remain unknown
but that in Arnhem and Oosterbeek admitted casualties came to 3,300 including 1,300 dead. ... I
would conservatively estimate that Army Group B lost at least another 7,50010,000 men of which
perhaps a quarter were killed." [10] Michael Reynolds counters these figures stating, while "precise
details of German casualties do not exist" they totalled about 6,400 based on research by Robert
Kershaw. Kershaw estimates that 2,565 Germans were killed north of the lower Rhine and a further
3,750 were lost fighting around XXX Corps corridor.[11] Stephen Badsey states that "other calculations
place [German losses] at 2,000 dead and 6,000 wounded". [12] A contemporary paper of the 21st Army
Group mentions that 16,000 men were captured during the course of the operation. [14]