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CANON 7

1.

BARBA V. PEDRO

Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the 1956 examinations, having obtained an average of
81.16%, but thus far unsuccessful in his efforts to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which had to be
deferred because of a complaint for immorality filed against him by Purisima Barba, reiterates his plea
for admission to the bar. It is unquestioned that he had amorous relations with the complainant resulting
in the birth of a child. He failed, however, to marry her, having thereafter chosen another woman for his
bride. After the lapse of eighteen years, and considering that his conduct in the meanwhile has not on
the whole shown to be blameworthy, this Court feels that he has sufficiently atoned for that youthful
indiscretion, having in mind likewise, that people of prominence in the municipality where he resides,
did intercede on his behalf. Accordingly the long-sought privilege of membership in the bar will not be
denied him any longer, but with this caveat. He must comply with his moral and legal obligation to his
child born out of wedlock with complainant Purisima Barba.
He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates back to January 15, 1969: "In the matter of the
petition of Hector S. Pedro to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar, alleging that while he
passed the bar examinations given by this Court in 1956 with an average of 81.16%, he was not
permitted to take his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar by reason of an administrative complaint
against him filed with this Court be a Miss Purisima Barba of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the complaint
alleging immorality in that petitioner, sometime in July, 1953, came to her house and with lewd designs
succeeded in gratifying his carnal desires, an act repeated thereafter on three different occasions
accompanied by pledges to marry, as a result of which a child was born on April 23, 1954, a matter
which when investigated resulted in a report that the complaint was well-grounded, petitioner being
prevented thus from taking his oath; the present petition alleging further that petitioner is now married to
Mrs. Estela U. Pedro, a public school teacher of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and that from January 4,
1960 up to the present, he has been employed as community development worker with the Presidential
Arm on Community Development (PACD) that he has since then conducted himself well in his relations
with the community as well as in the performance of his duties as such official, attaching to his petition
certifications of his good behavior from the Municipal Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the Provincial
Development Officer of the PACD, the President of the San Nicolas Bar Association, and the Grand
Knight of the Knights of Columbus of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a resolution of the Ilocos Norte Bar
Association and likewise enclosing an affidavit of complainant Miss Purisima Barba attesting to
petitioner's good conduct and behavior and expressing that she no longer has any opposition to his
taking his oath as a lawyer this Court resolved to defer action on such petition until petitioner has given
satisfactory proof to this Court as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference to the child
who was born out of his relations with complainant Miss Purisima Barba." 1 Thereafter came this
resolution of February 26, 1969: "Hector S. Pedro having offered proof as to the action subsequently
pursued by him with reference to the child who was born out of his relations with complainant Purisima
Barba, in compliance with the resolution of January 15, 1969, [the Court resolved] to allow respondent
Hector S. Pedro to take the lawyer's oath." 2 Unfortunately, before he could do so in accordance with
the above resolution, there was a letter from the aforesaid complainant Purisima Barba objecting to his
taking his oath as a lawyer, premised on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as to her withdrawal
of her opposition to his membership in the bar did not represent her true feelings.
Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the effectivity of its previous resolution of February
26, 1969, which would have allowed him to take the lawyer's oath. Moreover, he was required to
comment. This he did in a pleading submitted on March 28, 1969. He denied the allegation of falsity

concerning the affidavit of complainant. This Court then, in another resolution of April 8, 1969, referred
the matter to its Legal Officer, Ricardo Paras Jr., for investigation and report. A report was submitted on
August 26, 1969. It stated that after a careful evaluation of the testimony given by the complainant and
the respondent, the conclusion is warranted that complainant "had all along thought that the document
Exhibit "A" was an affidavit of recognition of their daughter, Imelda, and definitely not an affidavit of
withdrawal of her opposition to Mr. Pedro's admission to the Philippine Bar." 3 The parties were heard
on the matter on January 19, 1970, with the complainant standing fast on her firm resolve to prevent
respondent from taking the lawyer's oath. That attitude she has maintained all this while. It remains her
deep conviction that respondent lacks good moral character, as proven by his failure to marry her "after
having carnal knowledge of her." As she pointed out in her last pleading dated July 5, 1972: "The
respondent was twenty seven years old when he committed the acts complained of and he was very
much qualified to marry the complainant herein, but he did not comply with his promise to march her to
the altar. Instead he married another woman." 4
It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired. He had committed a
transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral standard requisite for membership in the
bar. He had proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side. On
the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a
successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he has not been allowed to
take the lawyer's oath. It likewise appears, from the testimonials submitted, that he has behaved rather
well. At least, no other misdeed has been attributed to him. There is no affront to reason then in ruling
that the punishment, while deserved, has lasted long enough. He has sufficiently rehabilitated himself.
Retribution has been exacted, He has expiated for his offense. It is understandable that the bitterness
in the heart of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that should not prove decisive. Even the most
heinous of crimes prescribe after a certain period. 5 Moreover, as the transgression resulted from the
frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as "so powerful an appetite," an imperative of life
closely associated with the "recklessness and the caprice of desire," 6 this Court feels that all the years
he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer would satisfy the requirement that failure to live up
to the requisite moral standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also be said that in offenses of this
character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone. 7
It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that while his plea to take the lawyer's
oath is to be granted, it is indispensable, if he expects to be a member of the bar in good standing, that
he complies with the moral and legal obligation incumbent upon him as the father of the child born out
of wedlock as a result of his relationship with complainant Purisima Barba.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969, suspending a previous resolution of February 26, 1969,
is set aside and in accordance therewith, respondent Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take the lawyer's
oath as was provided in the February 26, 1969 resolution.

CANON 7

2.

TAN VS. SABANDAL

Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of pending
administrative complaints filed against him, he was not allowed to take the lawyers oath. He then filed a
Petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Rollo of Attorneys. The
complainants, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan, Benjamin Cabigon, Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes D. Agnis,
opposed the Petition on several grounds.
In a Resolution of this Court en banc promulgated on 29 November 1983, respondent's petition was
denied, the Court finding, inter alia, that:
... the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While respondent's infraction may
be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases Nos. 347 and 326 where they were
parties, it is clear from the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only after the
opposing counsel had objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" (Exhibit "A-l"). He called himself "attorney"
knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar. Oppositors evidence sufficiently shows that
respondent had held himself out as an "attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by
said oppositors. Respondent cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily
asked for rectification. ... Oppositors had also presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses
testified as to respondent's being their lawyer and their compensating him for his services (Exhibits "D8" and "D-9"). It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule
138, Rules of Court). If respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did,
however, was to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of Roxas,
complaining of harassment to "our clients." when he could not but have known that he could not yet
engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is "dependent or person under the
protection of another and not a person who engages in the profession" is puerile. (126 SCRA 60, at 67
& 68)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution was filed by respondent on 23 January 1984,
which was opposed by Complainants, who stated that the "span of time was so short to determine with
sufficient definiteness whether or not respondent has reformed;" that "the testimonials are self-serving
obviously prepared by respondent himself and had them signed by the signatories who could not refuse
him." In its Resolution of 8 May 1984 the Court denied reconsideration.
On 23 May 1985 respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration reiterating his prayer to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which was again opposed by Complainants, and which was denied
by the Court on 16 July 1985, with the Court stating that no other Motions of this kind would be
entertained.
Undaunted, on 2 December 1985, respondent filed another Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal for
Mercy and Forgiveness, which the Court simply NOTED in its Resolution of 7 January 1986.
In a letter dated 4 December 1986 respondent's children echoed his appeal to the Court to allow him to
take the lawyer's oath, which the Court noted without action on 7 July 1987.

On 28 June 1988, respondent filed a second Petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
Complainants were required to comment but they have not done so to date.
In a letter dated 23 November 1988 addressed to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of this Court,
respondent asks for forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if given a chance
to be a member of the Philippine Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyer's oath and conduct
himself in an upright manner.
Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the Court. An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character,
fit and proper to practice law.
In several cases wherein reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed, the following criteria were
considered: the person appreciates the insignificance of his dereliction and he has assured the Court
that he now possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be
restored to the practice of law (Magat vs. Santiago, L-43301-45665, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA 1); the time
that has elapsed between disbarment and the application for reinstatement, his good conduct and
honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement in civic, educational, and
religious organizations (In Re: Juan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 721 [1981]); the favorable indorsement of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local government officials and citizens of his community
(In Re: Quinciano D. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 1); the pleas of his
mother and wife for the sake and the future of his family (Andres vs. Cabrera, SBC-585, February 29,
1984, 127 SCRA 802).
The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to respondent's case. After the lapse of ten (10) years
from the time respondent took and passed the 1978 Bar Examination, he has shown contrition and
willingness to reform. He has also submitted several testimonials, including one from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath, with the
Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning
and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession.

CANON 7

3.

DIAO V. MARTINEZ

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application
for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due
course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which
contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he
claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high
school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate
(1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University
in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing
College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his
own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would
also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd
semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would
not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact
that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And
the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

CANON 7

4.

TAN SENG HOO V. DELA FUENTE

The appellants are Chinese citizens and occupants of positions (market stalls ) in the public markets in
the city of Manila, with a license issued in accordance with Republic Act No. 37 and by the Department
of Finance No. 32. They were given these positions because there was no Filipino applicants.
The May 26, 1949 , each received a notification under which they were I required that leave their
positions within a period of 24 hours, with the caveat that the city would be worth the police to throw in
there if not let these posts according to the order. On the same day the appellants filed a motion for
"prohibition " , Civil Case No. 8180 , in the Court of First Instance of Manila , requesting that the Mayor
and his agents were forbidden to throw them from their posts. On May 30 of that year issued your Court
, a motion duly made , an order of preliminary injunction .
On January 6, 1950 and after the corresponding view , the District Court issued a superseding
application for injunction decision , which were notified on January 23, 1950 . The next day the City
Treasurer , acting in accordance with the order of the Mayor, directed letters to the appellants, ordering
them to vacasen their jobs within five days . On January 24 the appellants attorney sent a letter to the
Mayor of the City, requesting that the order be suspended until the decision had become final .
On January 26 they appealed the decision. The 30th of the same month the record to the Court of
Appeals was transmitted , and the same day counsel for the appellants filed a motion in this court
requesting that the record be completed because the Supreme Court was only raise questions of law.
On January 31, the file was sent to this Court. The motion of the appellants in the Court of First
Instance , in which a preliminary injunction while the appeal is pedia was pending, was denied.
The January 31, 1950 , claiming that the lower court abuse its discretion , the appellants presented to
this Court an urgent motion for an order of preliminary injunction , which was denied on February 3 of
that year. In 21 of the same month filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on February 24 .
The " Annex B" of the request, dated January 6, 1949 , is a document which shows that Tan Ko Lok , a
resident of No. 502 Legarda Street , Sampaloc , paid to the City Treasurer the amount of P1 as
franchise tax (license fee ) to serve for one year from 1 . January to 31 December 1949 , the post 443
( Stall 443, 2nd class ) Sampaloc market . The appellants and others occupy their respective positions
have been obtained under the same conditions in which Tan Ko Lok occupies his. When dictated by the
Court of First Instance of Manila its decision on January 6, 1950 , the appellants had already
automatically lost his right to remain in their posts . However, this Court requested the issuance of a
preliminary injunction : it shows that they wanted to remain in their posts even knowing that his license
had expired . The appellants contend that , under the license issued in their favor ( similar to Annex "
B") , are entitled to remain in their respective positions as Filipinos can continue to occupy his. This
contention is untenable. After the expiration of one year, or Chinese, or Filipino can remain in office
unless his license has renevado . If , by the mere fact of having obtained his post , the occupant can
stay as long as you want, then it would be unnecessary to put in the license within one year. The fixing
of the term would be redundant .
The appellants contend that , under Law No. 37, the Philippine citizen has a preference for the post if
requested by a Filipino and a foreigner , but if there is no filipino applicant , the alien is entitled to the

position . The preference given abroad is only an act of grace or condescension , and his tenure is
precarious. This occupation is not of strict law , can be canceled at any time by the authorities of the
city. In the event that no Filipino applicant may provisionally granted to a foreign place to produce the
necessary income for the city . The election to a seat in a public market is reserved for nationals , is a
privilege granted by the Philippine constitutional provision . It is an inalienable right of every human
being , including the right to life , freedom from toil , etc. .
The State of New Jersey prohibits by law , foreign network use for fishing. ( 2 C. S. New Jersey, p. 252 ,
par. 92 . )
The State of New Jersey law prohibits a foreign devoted to hunting without a license. ( 2 C. S. New
Jersey, p. 2528, pars . 134, 138 . )
Is prohibited in the Philippines granting foreigners the public works contract , (Act No. 4239 ) and the
laws of the Commonwealth Nos. 108 and 421 punish evasion of nationalization laws of certain
franchise rights and privileges.
The laws of the states of Washington and Nebraska forbidding foreigners to practice the profession of
lawyer were declared legal in In re Yamashita (70 Pac . , 482) and Re Admission to Bar ( 84 NW, 611).
In the Philippines abroad are not allowed to practice the profession of lawyer, and the Court has denied
several requests by U.S. citizens.
In Gizzarelli v . Presbey (117 Atl. Rep., 359 ), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated that the
ordinance prohibits a foreign operating a "bus" of cargo and passengers on city streets is not
discriminatory , violates the 14th Amendment . to the Constitution.
In Morin against Nunan (103 Atl. Rep., 378 ) , was declared constitutional ordinance of the city of
Weehawken , New Jersey , which prohibits the operation of foreign motor vehicles for passage.
It was declared constitutional - that does not violate the 14th Amendment of the American Constitution the law of the State of Massachusetts , which restricts U.S. citizens for the issuance of license for the
occupation of peddler. ( V Commonwealth . Hana, 81 N. E. , 149. )
The Pennsylvania state law that prohibits foreigners kill birds or wildlife , except in self- defense and
property , was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in Patsone v .
Commonwealth ( 232 U.S. 138 , 58 L. ed , 539. ) .
The laws do not allow the issuance of licenses for the sale of foreign liquor were declared constitutional
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Trageser v . Gray ( 20 Atl Rep., 905. ) By the Supreme Court of
Ohio in Bloomfield v . State ( NE 99 , 309 ), and by the Supreme Court of Texas in De Grazier v .
Stephens ( S. W. 105 , 992 ) .
In People v . Lowndes (29 NE, 751 ), the Court of Appeals in New York declared that Article 441 of the
Penal Code , which punishes with imprisonment and a fine harvest or cultivation of oysters in the
waters of the State of New York by one nonresident thereof has been issued in order to protect
residents with exclusion of non-residents , and is, according to the Supreme Court of the United States,

CANON 7
McCready v . Virginia ( 94 U.S. 391 ) , " a legal exercise of the Legislature on the common property of
the citizens of the state. " Cralaw virtua1aw library

the purpose or use are to Which Such a market is dedicated and the authority under Which it
Operates , and not the fact of ownership or status . " cralaw virtua1aw library

Laws and decisions cited are measures were taken to protect national . Tariff barriers are other
measures to protect national resources , such as agriculture and industry. No weapons are bad law ,
remedies are used by nations when necessary. They should not suffer foreigners if their adoption in the
Philippines are affected.

And it is because Article 8 , Title XIII, so it has : jgc : chanrobles.com.ph

If the government , by necessity, had to give an alien a public works contract for not having any Filipino
who wants to take care of her, that's no reason to later reclamase abroad as of strict right , obtaining
other contracts.
Where no attorney or competent person , a court appoints a foreign lawyer to undertake the defense of
the accused , that is no reason to claim that the foreign lawyer after as of strict right , the privilege of
exercising the profession to Philippine courts . The appellants , who obtained license for a seat in a
public market in the absence of Filipino applicants must understand that courtesy was granted such
puseto and not because they are entitled to it; should not complain if they check the position because
he dealing in contravention of the constitutional prohibition .
The nationalization of the public markets has been definitively established upon approval of the
constitution.
In Chiong Co and Others v. Hon Michael Binder , Sr., and others ( . . . 46 Off Gaz, 4833 , 83 Phil , 242) ,
the Court said : jgc : chanrobles.com.ph
"Public markets are public services or utilities .... Under the Constitution , the operation of all public
services are reserved to Filipino Citizens and corporations or associations to sixty per centum of the
capital city of Which belongs to Filipino Citizens .
" Foodstuffs sold in public markets demand , at least, as much official monitoring and supervision as the
commodities sold and distributed in other public utilities . They Affect the life and health of the people,
the safeguarding of Which is one of the basic Obligations of a Constituted government. Official Control
and supervision can be more Effectively Exercised if public market stalls are occupied by Citizens
rather than by aliens. " cralaw virtua1aw library
In Case of Aranque Extension Chinese Market Vendors Association v. Hon Manuel de la Fuente, etc.
and others " That the Petitioners Alleged Aranque Extension Market is not a public market Within the
meaning of all laws , Ordinances , Regulations and orders governing government said public market
Because market stands on private property and its building was erected with private funds. This
contention is not well taken . a market is a ' public market ' when it is dedicated to the service of the
public generally and is operated under government supervision and monitoring as a public utility ,
Whether it be owned by the government or any instrumentality thereof or by any single private. It is
Settled doctrine that ' public market May be the object of single ownership or lease , subject to local
supervision and control. "( 43 CJ p. 394. ) THUS , if a market has-been permitted to operate under
government license for service to the public generally , it is a ' public market' That Whether the building
houses upon it or the land it is built Which be of private or public ownership . This is not different from
public vehicles or vehicles of public utility Whether Which They are so classified Individuals be owned
by private or by government instrumentalities . Determining The factors a ' public market' , Therefore ,

" No franchise shall be granted any , certificate or other form of authorization to operate a public service
, except to Filipino citizens or corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines,
sixty percent of whose capital is the ownership of Filipino citizens ; and such franchise , certificate, or
authorization will not have unique character and will be for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise
or right to any individual, business name or corporation except under the condition that such franchise
or right be granted shall be subject to amendment , modification or repeal by the National Assembly
when the public interest so requires . " cralaw virtua1aw library
It contends that a " stall " or a place in a public market can be occupied by an alien in the same manner
as this can take a ' taxicab . " There is no similarity in the two cases. That uses a " taxicab " is a
transport service buyer . The occupying a " stall " is not a buyer : It operates the business of selling in a
public market, which is precisely what is prohibited. The foreigner can buy effects of a " stall " such as a
passenger in a " taxicab " , but can not take the " stall " to engage in the business of selling, as can not ,
directly or indirectly, to operate the business of transporting passengers via a " taxicab . " An alien who
paid certain amount to Yellow Taxicab Co. , for example , that under the name of this and through a taxi
owned operating the business of transporting passengers, indirectly infringe the law.
If a " stall " may be occupied by a stranger, all the " stalls " may also be foreigners. So the
nationalization of markets would be a real public derision . Clearly, the administration of public markets
are not nationalized because already by municipal governments , nationalized what is the retail
business that is done in the " stalls . "
That business is rudimentary , is trading in its embryonic state , hardly a capital of twenty or Trienta
weights would employ ; crumb is compared to shops where there is free competition of foreign and
national . If instructed to Filipino citizens the exploitation of " stalls " in the public markets is because
they wanted to prevent transactions that are done hastily by exigencies of the moment is the cat serve
the public for a ride. No best and most zealous guardians of the health of the people who nationals
thereof. So they reasoned various supreme courts of the United States to sustain the constitutionality of
several protectionist laws were challenged to nil.

CANON 7

5.

BACARRO VS. PINOTACAN

This is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by Carmen E. Bacarro charging Ruben M.
Pinatacan a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity, and lack of proper
character required of a member of the Bar.
In her Affidavit, complainant Bacarro averred that she and respondent fell in love and became engaged
while they were studying at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City; that when she became
pregnant as a result of their relationship, respondent abandoned her and never fulfilled his promise to
marry her; that on December 4, 1971, she gave birth to a baby girl; that because of respondent's
betrayal, complainant, her daughter and her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress and
anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member of the Bar. 1
Respondent Pinatacan in his Answer by way of a sworn Affidavit admitted that complainant had been
his sweetheart for several years prior to 1971 but denied that he was the father of complainant's child.
He claimed that his relationship with complainant started to cool down in January of 1971 when, over
her vigorous objection and opposition, he applied for a direct commission with the Philippine
Constabulary. He returned to Manila and stayed there for the greater part of March, 1971, for his
physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City, but in June of 1971, he left for his
hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and never again returned to Cagayan de Oro City. On the
other hand, as far as he knew, complainant was working from 1970-1971 in Cagayan de Oro City.
Respondent likewise denied that he ever promised marriage to complainant and that he ever cohabited
with her. 2
On June 10, 1976, this Court referred this case to the Judicial Investigator for investigation, report and
recommendation. 3 Subsequently, however, upon complainant's request prompted by financial
difficulties on her part, she was allowed on July 27, 1976 to present her evidence before the City Fiscal
of Cagayan de Oro City. 4 Respondent failed to attend the hearings conducted by the City Fiscal on
August 30 and September 27, 1976 during which complainant presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary. 5
In a nutshell, the evidence for the complainant tends to establish the following facts: After about a year
of courtship, she and respondent became sweethearts on March 17, 1967 while they were students at
the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. They had their first sexual intercourse on March 21,
1971, after respondent made promises of marriage, and they eloped to Cebu City where they stayed for
about a week. They returned to Cagayan de Oro and respondent left complainant allegedly to see his
parents in his hometown and make the necessary arrangements for their intended marriage.
Respondent came back in May, 1971, but only to inform complainant that they could not get married
because of his parents' objections. When complainant told respondent that she was pregnant, he told
her to have an abortion. Complainant refused and they had a quarrel Thereafter, she did not see or
hear from respondent until after the birth of their baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on
December 4, 1971. Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time that she had a
relationship with respondent. In July, 1973, she brought the child with her to see respondent in Cavite
City and the latter promised to support the child. However, respondent did not make good his promise
of support so complainant went to see him again, and once more respondent made several promises,

all of which were never fulfilled, until he finished his law course and married a singer by the name of
Annie Sarabillo. 6
Forming part of the records, aside from complainant's testimony, are the birth certificate of her child,
numerous letters written by respondent covering the period from March 6, 1967 to March 25, 1971
professing his everlasting love for complaint with assurances of his sincerity and loyalty, a letter dated
January 13, 1975 from a certain Margie whom complaint Identified as the sister of respondent, and
pictures of the child Maria Rochie with said Margie Pinatacan. 7
In a Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1977, 8 respondent argued that based on the evidence
adduced by complainant and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had been made out to
bar him from taking the lawyer's oath. The Court's Investigator, Atty. Victor Sevilla, agreed with
respondent in a Report dated February 24, 1977, stating that "the intimacy between the parties in this
case is neither so corrupt or so immoral as to warrant the respondent's permanent exclusion from the
Philippine Bar." Atty. Sevilla recommended that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. 9
On December 12, 1977, respondent submitted a Manifestation stating among others that he is to
recognize and give support or financial assistance to complaint 's child Maria Rochie although he
cannot make assurance that he could give such support or financial assistance immediately since he is
without a source of income. 10
Upon being required to comment on the foregoing Manifestation, complainant submitted a sworn
statement expressing her adamant stand that respondent "is unreliable, untrustworthy, and without a
word of honor, not only for what he has done to me, but on several occasion in the past he had made
the same promise to support our child ..., he did not even give something to the child to buy a candy
during our several meetings ... when I tried to see him every now and then for the fulfillment of his
promise." Moreover, according to complainant, respondent's insistence that the child be aborted proves
his "utter disregard of moral values and (C)hristian doctrines," making him unfit or unsuitable for the
legal profession. Complainant stressed that she was notmotivated by revenge, for she was aware that
whatever fortunes respondent may have in life would also benefit their child as an heir, but that after a
serious and profound consideration of the matter, she was of the opinion that "respondent would be
more of a liability than an asset to the legal profession." 11
By Resolution of October 11, 1979, this Court required respondent, "as proof of his sincerity and good
faith, to acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly notarized and registered in the local civil
registrar's office his paternity over the child Maria Rochie and send the original thereof to the
complainant and a duplicate copy to this Court within ten (10) days after notice hereof. 12 On October
19, 1979, respondent submitted proof of his compliance with the above Resolution. 13
From the foregoing narration of the background of this case, there clearly appears no question that the
complainant and respondent had been sweethearts for several years, that during the said period they
have been sexually intimate with each other, and that the child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan is the
result of such pre-marital relations. Respondent, however, maintains that even admitting the truth of
complainant's allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other do not justify his
disqualification from the practice of law.

CANON 7
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of
good moral character. 14 This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and
the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice
of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral
character.15 "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a leader of the community, looked up to as a
model citizen" 16 He sets an example to his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also
for his clean living. 17 Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and
passing the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to pass upon the
qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission to the Bar, that he has measured
up to that rigid and Ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation.
In the two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan 18 against successful 1971 Bar
examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of the requisite morality
for admission to the Bar"for violating the honor of two women. Tan had sexual relations with both
complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by complainant Bitangcor.
As in the Tan cases, We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to the high moral
standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically submitting
herself to him by promises of marriage. He even eloped with her and brought her to another place. He
got her pregnant and then told her to have an abortion When complainant refused, he deserted her.
Complainant had to track him down to ask him to help support their child born out of wedlock, and
during the few times that she was able to see him, respondent merely made promises which he
apparently did not intend to keep. On top of all these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to
deny before this Court in a sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by complaint.
These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent's character and are indicative of
his moral delinquency. All the years that he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were truly
well-deserved. Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment and retribution enough. Moreover,
considering that respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria
Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to the said
child, 19 We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn
over a new leaf. Likewise, We reiterate what had been stated in Barba vs. Pedro 20 that "in offenses of
this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone."
In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, he must be admonished that his admission to and
continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and
legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

CANON 7

6.

ROYONG VS. OBLENA

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged
the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her
person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his
answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February
3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for
her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their
relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he
wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960).
xxx

xxx

xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT


On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that
the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her
alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a
newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand
dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not
shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on
the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows
on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to
report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She
resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother
on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth
to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did
not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still
frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands
for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when
respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia
Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal,
and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957
to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents,
but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing
her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual
intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May
18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual
intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the
opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant
claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned
are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent.
From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart
than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend
respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long
after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because
of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous
relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he
seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means
of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who
forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral
influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata'
(uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she
was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22,
1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court
permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any
time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the
present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive,
knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact
permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme
Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or
to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the
Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same
misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double
standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the
office of a lawyer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

CANON 7
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J.
Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging
in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant
Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and
unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering
"the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his
name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does
not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the
original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in
Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional
evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On
September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on
October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been
proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or
fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to
the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles,
who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941
at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by
the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and
Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n.
24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25).
She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n.
26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n.
26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living
together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were
living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat,
but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual

relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because
respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga
(t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife,
named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and
lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact,
she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp.
5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was
also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter
was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958,
when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia
Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate'
her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October
16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia
alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other
evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as
common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she
confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he
could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to
join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from
him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations,
Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again,
telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told
him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already
living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed
his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from
this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not
state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that
the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral
character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did
not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did,
that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent
committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a
lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his
petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the
respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

CANON 7
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of
record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file
his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was
duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant
several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise
continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the
open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the
respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with
the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been
convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment
proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court
for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive
and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it
is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special
statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be
exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be
heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a
well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may
provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and
rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not
restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be
removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of
legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who
has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred
may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The
tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is
so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension
that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse
with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely
to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with
his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle.
As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From
childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly

because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old
then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not
resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the
respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be
done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral
integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where
this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in
the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between
court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require
that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a
license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during
the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession,
has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give
sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a
double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from
the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous
seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of
lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission
to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration
of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed
fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of
decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble
profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous
relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his
"sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the
bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he
employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by
courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting.
An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to
have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous
relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit
and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification

CANON 7
for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess
such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present
complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different
from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the
Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report
to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be
exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds
sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the
respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with
direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor
General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by
the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case
against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954
since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good
moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a
gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to
objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be
applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to
escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D.,
Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82
N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who
knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral
character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to
remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena,
from the roll of attorneys.

CANON 7

7.

IN RE ARGOSINO

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing"
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered
into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a
judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional
Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993
Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14
August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath
of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last
for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation
dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer:

negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient ofunbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight
and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For
these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen , as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants
by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to
enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7

xxx xxx xxx


This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should
have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a
man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights
and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to
clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral

CANON 7
character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the
due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have
not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be
permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance
so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession
of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may
be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace
instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission
to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court
cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts
which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the
acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal
the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as
we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction
of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan,

certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a
"neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all
of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog.
Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
considerde novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and
to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that
he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at
large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of
the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to
the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

CANON 7

8.

IN RE CUEVAS

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. [1] His oath-taking was held
in abeyance in view of the Courts resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar
Examinations subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take
the lawyers oath pending approval of the Court x x x due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioners participation in the
initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW,
sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal
violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 16,
1995, he was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated.
In this petition , received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that he be allowed to take his
lawyers oath at the Courts most convenient time [2] attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications
attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the
Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang
Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter;
(e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique, and (f) the
President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the
Court, before acting on petitioners application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of
the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the Courts
directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:
1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to the
pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyers oath, and hereby expresses his genuine
gratitude to such gesture.
2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19, 1997
in Bar Matter No.712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death
of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus,
indicating serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with
his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his codefendants that they are liable not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage
of the neophytes helpless and defenseless condition when they were beaten and kicked to death like
a useless stray dog, suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).
3 He, however, has consented to the accused-students plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a
pregnant wife of the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying
and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in
1992, during which they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon
learning of his sons involvement in the case.
4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal case for the
death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has a high hope to become a good

lawyer to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of taking his life. This he cannot forget.
5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become morally fit for
admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious
discretion of the Hon. Court. [3]
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the
untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that [h]e is not, right now, in
a position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit x x x and submits petitioners
plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing petitioners
admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a
helpless neophyte which resulted to the latters untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who
possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent
the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have
become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in
the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioners co-accused below, to take
the lawyers oath.[4]
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant
conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented
character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character
and atone for the unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit
of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.[5] Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyers oath is not a mere formality
recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses.
Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Padillas comment in
the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyers Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March
19, 1997, [t]he Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Cuevas, Jr., will continue with the assistance he has
been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.[6]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to take the
lawyers oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment
of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioners personal records in the Office of the
Bar Confidant.

CANON 7

9.

LIM V. ANTONIO

In a verified letter dated October 20, 1968 addressed to this Court complainant Vicente L. Lim prayed
for the disbarment of the respondent, Francisco G. Antonio, on the ground that he is a Chinese citizen
and therefore disqualified to be a member of the Bar.
In his answer to the complaint respondent denied the material averments thereof and alleged
specifically that he and his parents were Filipino citizens, and that the complaint filed by complainant
was motivated by personal revenge, he (the respondent) having been instrumental in the filing against
said c848_09_71omplainant of a number of criminal and civil actions at that time still pending in court.
Issues having been joined, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General and thereafter
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra was commissioned to conduct the investigation. In the
course of the hearings held, both parties presented their respective evidence, and on the basis thereof
the Office of the Solicitor General filed, under date of August 12, 1971, the corresponding report
recommending "that the herein complaint of Vicente L. Lim to disqualify the respondent, Atty. Francisco
G. Antonio, from the practice of law be dismissed."
Discussing the evidences submitted by the parties, the pertinent portion of the report of the Solicitor
General says the following:
One of the qualifications of an applicant for admission to the Philippine Bar is that he must be a citizen
of the Philippines (Section 2, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court).
Of the above evidence introduced by the complainant to support his theory that respondent is not a
Filipino citizen but a Chinese national, the following may be considered:
(a) The statements in the marriage certificate (Exhibit "A") that respondent's father (Jose Antonio), his
(respondent's) paternal grandfather (Efren Antonio),his paternal grandmother (Ong Pun and his
maternal grandfather (Santiago Tan Garcia) are Chinese;
(b) The testimony of Lorenzo Reyes that according to Efren Antonio or Lim Samson, the latter has three
brothers named Hesing Lim, Hoc Kim Lim, and Cicero Lim and that said brothers came from China and
that Lim Samson had a wife who bore him children one of whom is Jose Lim Antonio, the father of
respondent;
(c) The testimony of Gelerina Ramirez that Samson Lim is a Chinese;
(d) Certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Mobo, Masbate (Exhibit "A-Deposition") that according to
the record of his office, Lim Sing Kim (alias Cicero) is a duly registered alien (Chinese) per ACR No. A127777 dated January 13, 1951 and ACR No. C-024963 dated March 1, 1963.
Regarding Exhibit "A," the marriage certificate, as distinguished from a marriage contract, it is not of
itself the primary evidence of the celebration of the marriage but the marriage contract from which the
entries contained in the marriage certificate are taken. The civil marriage contract executed on May 7,
1933 in Masbate, Masbate, which was supposed to be the origin of Exhibit "A," is not available in the

Office of the Civil Registrar of that town due to its destruction during the Japanese occupation (Exhibit
"A-3"); neither does any information about such marriage contract existent in the Bureau of Records
Management (Exhibit "A-4").
On the other hand, the church marriage contract which was subsequently performed on May 9, 1936,
also between the parents of the respondent (Exhibit "5"), states that the nationality of said parents, as
well as that of his paternal grandfather, is Filipino. Likewise, his birth certificate shows that his parents
are citizens of the Philippines (Exhibits "1," "1-A-1" and "1-A-2").The testimonies of the respondent
himself and of former Civil Registrar of Masbate, Masbate Andres Teodoro, affirm that the parents of the
respondent are Filipinos (Exhibit "1-B"). There is no evidence of record that the respondent, his parents,
his paternal grandfather, and his brother and sisters are or have been registered as aliens. All these
and the circumstances taken together that the respondent and the parents are voters without their
citizenship being questioned; that respondent is a Certified Public Accountant to which profession only
Filipinos are qualified and his Filipino citizenship has never been objected to by the authorities; that his
father was admitted into the Philippines in April, 1923 as "Son of P.I. cit."; that his brother and two
sisters are professionals, are supportive of respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship, despite the
rules in this jurisdiction that: .
While baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered documents, they are evidence only to
prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified which in this case were the
baptism and marriage, respectively, of Leoncio Chan but not the veracity of the statements or
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship. (Paa vs. Chan, L-25949, Oct.
31, 1967) and that:
The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted only to Filipino citizens is not
conclusive proof that he or she is a Filipino citizen. (Id.)
It may be mentioned that the evidence for the respondent already enumerated does not depend solely
upon the entries in the church marriage contract or in the birth certificate.
With respect to the testimony of Lorenzo Reyes that Efren Antonio or Lim Samson, as well as the
latter's alleged three brothers (Hesing, Lim, Hoc King Lim and Cicero Lim) is hearsay, the same having
been supposedly mentioned to him only by Lim Samson who should have been but was not placed on
the stand to testify.
Regarding the testimony of Celerina Ramirez to the effect that Lim Samson is a Chinese, it is a mere
conclusion. No authentic basis has been established therefor.
With reference to Exhibit "A-Deposition," the mere fact that Lim Sing Kim alias Cicero has registered
himself as a Chinese national is not competent evidence, much less a conclusive one, of the citizenship
of Efren Antonio, supposing that the two are brothers, for Cicero, through ignorance or error, might have
caused his registration as an alien, while Efren Antonio might have correctly abstained from registering
as a Chinese. The act or declaration of a person does not bind another. Besides, there is the testimony
of the respondent himself that Cicero is not related to him, meaning that the imputed relationship of
brothers between Cicero and Efren Antonio (respondent's paternal grandfather) is not true, which
relationship should have been established in the first place by more weighty evidence.
xxx xxx xxx

CANON 7
The assertion that Exhibit "5" is not reliable it being contradicted by the certificate of marriage (Annex
"A" of complainant's memorandum) is unsound. In the first place, it cannot legally be considered for the
complainant because it has not been properly offered during the trial (Sec. 35, Rule 132, Revised Rules
of Court; De Castro vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 75 Phil. 824). Secondly, the statement of complainant
that Exhibit "5" is contradicted by Annex "A" is inaccurate. Annex "A" reads in part: .
CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE
This is to certify that:
JOSE ANTONIO LIM and ANGELITA TAN CLEMENTE
Age (not stated) (not stated)
Native of Mobo, Masbate Mobo, Masbate
Father Efren Antonio Lim Santiago Tan Clemente
Mother Ong Tuan Margarita Garcia
were united in
HOLY MATRIMONY
according to the Rites of the Holy Roman Catholic Church and the laws of the country on the 9th day
of May, 1936 by the Rev. Fr. Felix Ragos being the sponsors of the ceremony: Jose
Caragan andEngracia de Caragan as appears in the Register of Marriages of this Parish Book
No. 2 (old) Page150 Line 2.
This certificate which was made by filling out a printed form does not contain an item for the citizenship
of the contracting parties and their parents. Hence, it does not and cannot contradict Exhibit "5." The
church marriage contract itself should have been presented since the form for a marriage contract
contains the required statement of citizenship. Thirdly, if anything, Annex "A" only confirms and
corroborates the celebration of the church marriage between the parents of respondent.
Lastly, complainant invokes two opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely, the 2nd Indorsement
dated September 10, 1956, and the 2nd Indorsement dated December 29, 1956, wherein it was held
that a landing certificate of residence is not competent proof of citizenship. It is respectfully submitted
that those opinions are not applicable or controlling in this case for the reasons that: First, the persons
involved in the cases cited were registered as aliens at the time the opinions were sought. In the instant
case, the respondent is not and was never a registered alien. Second, in the two cases mentioned, the
claim for Philippine citizenship was based chiefly on their landing certificates of residence, wherein
each is described as "son of P.I. citizen" or "son of Doroteo Roselba, P.I. citizen," as the case may be.
In the present case, respondent does not rely only on his landing certificate because he has none,
being native born, although his father's entry into the Philippines is evidenced by a landing certificate
dated April, 1923 (Exhibit "6") as "son of P.I. citizen." Respondent avers that he is a natural born Filipino
saying that his father and mother as well as his paternal grandfather are Filipinos. Like him, the latter
three persons have not been proved by the complainant to have been registered as aliens at any time
before and now. It is logical to assume, therefore, that Efren Antonio, respondent's paternal grandfather,
although he might be of Chinese descent, might have been a citizen of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of its Constitution on May 14, 1935. There is no evidence against this. If this be so, then his
son, Jose Antonio, was born a Filipino, and the latter's son, the respondent, also natural born Filipino.

On the basis of the above, the Office of the Solicitor General drew the conclusion that the complainant
had failed to prove clearly and convincingly that the respondent is not a Filipino citizen, and therefore
made the corresponding recommendation mentioned heretofore.
In the light of the evidence of record, We are constrained to agree with the finding and recommendation
just mentioned. Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554). More so in the instant case where it
has been clearly established that complainant's motives are not beyond suspicion. The evidence of
record shows that the respondent was instrumental in the filing of Criminal Cases Nos. 3681 and
91293, the first for perjury filed in the Municipal Court of Masbate, Masbate and the second for
falsification of a public and/or official document filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, against said
complainant.
WHEREFORE, the complaint filed against respondent is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to any
action that the State may deem justified to take in connection with the questioned citizenship of said
respondent.

CANON 7

10. REYES V. WONG


Felipe C. Wong, duly admitted in 1962 to the Bar, is sought to be disbarred for grave immorality by
Emerenciana V. Reyes, who filed her sworn complaint on October 26, 1962 (pp. 1-4, rec.).
In his answer filed on December 17, 1962, respondent completely denied the charge, claiming that he
and petitioner were merely friends (pp. 5-7, rec.)..
On January 21, 1963, petitioner filed her reply to the answer of respondent, attaching thereto xerox
copies of two letters written by respondent to her dated October 20, 1960 and December 14, 1960 (pp.
30-34, rec.) for comparison with the penmanship of the respondent in his answer sheets to the Bar
questions in 1961 to disprove respondent's claim that he never wrote letters to petitioner. The aforesaid
reply was forwarded to the Solicitor General, to whom the case was referred on December 28, 1962 for
investigation, report and recommendation (pp. 10, 15, rec.).
After the submission of petitioner's evidence, respondent filed a motion to dismiss dated July 31, 1963,
contending that in the light of the ruling of this Court in Soberano vs. Villanueva (Dec. 29, 1962, 6
SCRA 891-896), the evidence presented by the petitioner does not make out a case against him (pp.
67-70, 85-90, rec.). Respondent likewise filed on August 1, 1963 a motion for the cancellation of all
scheduled hearings of the case until after the Court has resolved the said motion to dismiss (p. 85,
rec.).
Petitioner in turn filed an opposition dated August 17, 1963 to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the
Soberano ruling does not apply to her situation, because, unlike the complainant in said case petitioner
never doubted her marriage with respondent; and that respondent in fact wrote her numerous letters
and sent her telegrams, all addressing her either as "E.R. Wong" or "Emerenciana R. Wong" (pp. 9195, rec.)..
To this opposition, respondent filed a reply dated August 28, 1963, substantially reiterating the same
arguments contained in his motion to dismiss (pp. 96-100, rec.).
On June 9, 1972, then Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin, now CFI Judge, issued an order
resetting the case for hearing on June 20, 1972 (p. 58, rec.). The June 20, 1972 hearing was however
postponed, and it was only on September 6, 1972 that the hearing of the case was continued but was
again reset to October 18, 1972, upon motion of respondent so as to give him time to file a motion
with this Court in connection with his 1963 motion to dismiss (pp. 61, 66-74, 82, rec.).

On September 13, 1972, respondent thus filed with this Court a motion reiterating his still unresolved
1963 motion to dismiss the case, adding that the Solicitor General had already reset the case for
hearing; that subsequent to the filing of the present administrative case, petitioner herein filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action against herein respondent, entitled
"Emerenciana V. Reyes, plaintiff, versus Felipe C. Wong, defendant," Civil Case No. E-00454, For
Recognition of Natural Children and Support; and that in the compromise agreement dated October 28,
1966 submitted in said case, respondent acknowledged that he is the father of the two daughters of
petitioner and that he agreed to support these children, while petitioner in turn agreed to withdraw this
administrative case against respondent, which compromise agreement was approved by the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court on November 14, 1966 (pp. 105-108, rec.; p. 4, Report and
Recommendation of the Solicitor General, p. 118, rec.).
On September 18, 1972, petitioner filed another pleading reiterating her opposition to the motion to
dismiss of respondent (p. 109, rec.) .
The aforesaid pleadings were referred to the Solicitor General (p. 110, rec.) .
Before the Solicitor General could resolve the motion to dismiss, petitioner Emerenciana V. Reyes filed
on November 21, 1972 an affidavit of desistance, requesting permission to withdraw the administrative
complaint against respondent. Her affidavit, which was subscribed and sworn to before City Fiscal
Manuel R. Maza of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, stated that it would be for the good of her children that
the administrative case against respondent be dismissed and terminated (p. 114, rec.; pp. 4-5, Report
and Recommendation of the Solicitor General; p. 118, rec.).
Since withdrawal by a complainant in an administrative case does not ipso facto exonerate a
respondent (Co vs. Candoy, 21 SCRA 438, 442 [1967]; Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586; Bolivar vs.
Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, 628 [1966]) -especially so in this instant case where the withdrawal of the
complainant came after she had rested her case - the Solicitor General did not act upon petitioner's
motion to withdraw; but instead proceeded to take up respondent's motion to dismiss.
With petitioner's desistance at this stage of the proceeding, and considering respondent's motion to
dismiss, the question left for resolution is whether in the light of the evidence presented by petitioner,
there is a prima faciecase against respondent to warrant requiring respondent to present his evidence.
In his report and recommendation, the Solicitor General recommended that the present administrative
case be dismissed in the light of the Soberano case (p. 118, rec.).
We sustain the said recommendation of the Solicitor General, on the force of the Soberano ruling and
on the fact that the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to disclose a case against respondent
warranting disciplinary action.
As contained in the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General (pp. 1-3, 118, rec.), the
evidence adduced by petitioner reveals that:
Petitioner is a holder of the degree of Bachelor of Laws, graduating from the MLQ University in 1960
(pp. 21-22, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); in 1958 petitioner and respondent were classmates at the same
university (p. 2, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); respondent began courting petitioner and finally won her love (p.

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6, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); sometime in the first week of February, 1960, petitioner was requested to fill up
and sign an application for marriage license (p. 4, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); later on, upon the request of
respondent, petitioner also filled up and signed a marriage contract (pp. 4-5, t.s.n., May 28, 1963; pp.
38-39, t.s.n., May 31, 1963); thereafter, petitioner was shown by respondent the marriage contract,
dated February 15, 1960, now allegedly signed by witnesses and the Honorable Arsenio Dizon as the
solemnizing minister (pp. 4-5, t.s.n., May 28, 1963; p. 46, t.s.n., May 31, 1963); believing that petitioner
was married to respondent, she went with him in hotels and had carnal knowledge with him (pp. 5-6,
t.s.n., May 28, 1963); they lived together in an apartment at 1236 Isaac Peral, Manila, but moved out
after some 4 months when respondent went to Zamboanga City to work at the Bank of P.I. (pp. 6-7,
t.s.n., May 28, 1963); while respondent was in Zamboanga City, petitioner gave birth to her first child on
November 28, 1960 (p. 7, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); in July 1961, respondent was in Manila reviewing for
the Bar Examinations which was to be held in August of that year (pp. 11-12, t.s.n., May 28, 1963);
petitioner who was then in Munoz, Nueva Ecija, was called by respondent to Manila (p. 11, t.s.n., May
28, 1963); petitioner stayed at her sister's house in Pandacan where respondent used to visit her (pp.
11-13, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); after respondent took the Bar examinations, he left for Mindoro to help
candidate Cesar Climaco in his senatorial campaign (pp. 13-14, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); on May 25, 1962,
petitioner gave birth to her second child (p. 14, t.s.n., May 28, 1963); petitioner thereafter received
news from her cousin in Zamboanga City that respondent had married someone else (p. 20, t.s.n., May
28, 1963); petitioner found out from the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Bacoor, Cavite, that their
alleged marriage was not registered (pp. 18-20. t.s.n., May 28, 1963).
Quite clearly petitioner's evidence disclosed that petitioner voluntarily yielded to the carnal desire of
respondent, with whom thereafter she freely lived as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
an illegitimate cohabitation that stemmed from love and mutual desire. In fact, in his letters to
Petitioner (Exhibits A, C, G, H, I, J, K, M, O, Q, R, T, U, V, W and AA), respondent manifested much
concern for the health and well-being of petitioner and their Baby Sheila (p. 8, Report and
Recommendation of the Solicitor General; p. 118, rec.). And in the compromise agreement embodied in
the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in C.C. No. E-00454, respondent
acknowledged that he is the father of the two natural children, Sheila Reyes Wong and Florinda
(Thelma) Reyes Wong, and agreed to support them (p. 8, Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General; p. 118, rec.). It was indeed a relationship that was devoid of deceit on the part of the
respondent and a happy one until his sudden turnabout and marriage to another woman that compelled
him to abandon petitioner and their children.
Petitioner's claim that she consented to live with respondent as husband and wife because she was
made to believe by respondent that she was legally married to him as she was made to sign by
respondent an application for a marriage license and afterwards a marriage contract which later was
shown to her complete with the alleged signatures of supposed witnesses and of a solemnizing officer
allegedly in the person of no less than a member of the Supreme Court is belied by the contents of
her letter dated December 18, 1961 (Exhibit 2-H) to respondent, from which letter We can readily infer
that she had knowledge of the legal infirmities of the said marriage contract. Said letter reads:
Another thing that worry me so much is about our relationship at present. My family is in good faith
about the legality of our marriage. If they'll discover the truth I don't know if what shall happen to both of
us. I'm sure that they'll take some drastic action against you and I don't want this thing to happen.

As I observed you even doubt the paternity of our children. I swear before God and before all that this
children are yours. But if you don't like to recognize them as yours, nobody else can force you.
In this situation of ours now, nobody can be blamed for it except the two of us.
How can you expect me not to worry when in spite of our present situation we'll have another child?
Have we not gone to the extent of committing this mistake, both of us will be happy. But now, its too late
for us to repent.
In spite of everything we can still remedy our situation if you'll only grant my request. All I want you to
do is to come here or on before January in order to settle down everything smoothly." (Pp. 6-7, Report
and Recommendation of the Solicitor-General; p. 118, rec.).
The above-quoted portions of petitioner's letter to respondent show that petitioner was aware all the
time of the nature of her relationship with respondent, foreclosing all doubts that the petitioner
knowingly and freely lived with respondent without the benefit of marriage (Soberano vs. Villanueva, 6
SCRA 893-894).
Furthermore, complainant was then in the fourth year in the School of Law, MLQ University. In the first
year of the law course, she already knew the requisites and formalities of a valid marriage, which she
took up again in Civil Law review in her senior year. Complainant could not have been so naive as to be
easily deceived to believe that she was legally married to respondent, knowing fully well that no
marriage ceremony was performed publicly, in the presence of witnesses and solemnizing minister,
before whom the parties to the marriage are to declare that they take each other as husband and wife
(Articles 55 & 57, New Civil Code). Petitioner should have realized that an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court would not have consented to taking part in the execution of a simulated or fictitious
marriage contract. This circumstance alone should have put her on her guard and should have
provoked her into further inquiry before submitting herself to the sexual passions of respondent, if she
valued her honor and virtue as she now pretends.
Undoubtedly, the cohabitation of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack of a valid marriage. But
to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must not merely be immoral; it must be "grossly immoral"
"it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" (Section 27, Rule 138. New Rules of Court; Soberano vs. Villanueva, 6
SCRA 893, 895; Mortel vs. Aspiras, December 28, 1956, 100 Phil. 587, 591-593; Royong vs. Oblena,
April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 869-870; Bolivar vs. Simbol, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 623, 630; and Quingwa
vs. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-440, 444-445). And the same must be established by clear
and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court
of its disciplinary power (Co vs. Candoy, October 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439, 442). Likewise, the dubious
character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated (Co vs.
Candoy, supra). The evidence adduced by petitioner lacks the quantity and quality required by the
foregoing criteria.
All told, because of petitioner's active and voluntary participation in her illicit relationship with
respondent, the latter's acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible. For as We have declared
in Soberano:

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Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, ... is neither so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against the man as a
member of the Bar. ." (p. 895)

It should be added that the decision of the Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
embodied the compromise agreement between the parties herein under which respondent expressly
acknowledged their two children and committed himself to support them.

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