OPLAN EXODUS

Started way back in 2010 with Oplan Pitas

Numerous police operations were done after this but all of them
yielded negative results because the targets managed to escape.
In August 2014, they received new info that Marwan and Usman may
be in Brgy. Pedsandawan, Mamasapano, Maguindanao.
In November 2014, Napeas received a call from the already
suspended CPNP PDG Purisima, directing him to work with the PNP
Intelligence Group for the search and arrest of Marwan and Usman. This
was then called Oplan Terminator.
Oplan Terminator again failed because en route to the target, the local
boats used to transfer the SAF were capsized.
On the 2nd week of December 2014, they revived the operation with
Oplan Terminator 2 but again failed after a firefight erupted.
They again re-structured the mission and then called it Oplan Exodus.
This time, AFP Chief of Staff Catapang learned about the operation and
signified support to the mission. Catapang had expressed he has given
guidance to Guerrero (Area Commander of AFP Western Mindanao) and
Pangilinan (Division Commander of 6ID). They agreed to meet to
conceptualize a plan but this did not happen because Mendez (Acting
Director of the PNP Intelligence Group), who was supposed to present the
intelligence packet did not arrive [Meaning, there was no joint planning
between PNP and the AFP]
During this time, more planning ensued and the SAF units underwent
more training.
They then had a briefing in the Malacanang

This was attended by Napeas, Purisima, Mendez and the

President

The President reminded the officials to coordinate with the AFP

but they expressed concerns about this, saying the operation might be
compromised again. And so, they devised that the coordination with
the AFP will be "time-on-target" or TOT to avoid compromising the
operations. The President remained silent after this and then directed
the officers to increase the people to be deployed [I was just thinking,
yung silence ba dito ni Aquino, can it be interpreted as a consent to
the "TOT plan" re AFP? Cos instead of commanding them to coordinate
with the AFP, he told them to increase the number of men.]

After the briefing, Purisima told Napeas to not inform Roxas and
Espina. He (Purisima) also stated, "Ako na ang bahala kay Catapang"
which was interpreted by Napeas to be about the coordination with
the AFP.
ANALYSIS

A Chain of Command
May be bypassed only in urgent situations. In such cases, the intermediate
commanders should be notified of the context of the order ASAP.
May be bypassed if adherence becomes impractical and may cause
unacceptable delay

Oplan Exodus: should have been Espina (as OIC-PNP) -> Napeas (as Director
of SAF). Purisima could not have been legally part of this chain because he was
suspended.
President did not utilize the established chain of command through OIC-PNP
Espina. He exercised his prerogative to deal directly with Napeas instead of
Espina.
PURISIMA

He could not have acted with authority because of his suspension

His orders and directives did not produce any legal effect

Because Napeas took orders and followed him, he assumed full

responsibility and liability for the effects of carrying out the orders.

A Command Responsibility
Commander is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do
Could never be delegated otherwise it would constitute an abdication of his
role as a commander
He alone answers for the success or failure of his command in all
circumstances
Napeas - responsible for the tactical aspect of the operation

Had command responsibility with respect to Oplan Exodus

He texted Espina that there were unconfirmed deaths during the

firefight when in fact, he already knew during this time that the SAF were
outnumbered and losing.

His lack of urgency have prevented Espina to take urgent action (the
fact that he used texts, which indicated that he has enough time in his
hands.)
Purisima - even if suspended (on preventive suspension because of pending
cases in the Ombudsman), his actions indicate that he had been asserting and
exercising command responsibility in relation to Oplan Exodus

He kept relaying inaccurate and ambiguous information from unreliable

sources, which resulted in eventual erroneous decisions.

Failed to clarify regarding AFP's artillery support.

Provided inaccurate info to the President regarding the state of the

operation, probably making the President complacent

He didn't verify the reliability or veracity of his MILF source. If we

looked at the events, his info was false and inaccurate. This probably led
to Napeas' and all the other receivers' misappreciation of the situation.
President Aquino - as Commander-in-Chief

His knowledge regarding the operation was focused more on the

operational and tactical plan. But he updated regarding the details of the
operation

There was no clear or decisive instruction from him to take into

consideration the ongoing peace process with the MILF as well as the role
of the peace process mechanisms

He also did not follow up regarding the AFP's involvement after

Napeas expressed his doubts (he remained silent and merely instructed
them to increase the number of men).

He could have given strategic guidance on conducting a law

enforcement operation within MILF-controlled communities

He gave the go-signal and allowed the participation of Purisima.

A Execution
Support troops were only briefed on the concept of the operation and targets
a day before the start of the operation (January 24)
The mission planning failed to consider the analysis of the terrain and other
uncontrollable variables.
The absence of abort criteria forced the Seaborne to pursue their objective
regardless of the difficulties, limitations and hindrances.
The 55th SAC did not follow the SOP which states that when tactical troops
temporarily occupy an area, they should secure the perimeter, and look for
cover, vantage positions and observation posts. Failing to do this, they did not
notice that there was a defensible position approximately 100 meters behind
theirs. Resulting from this, they repelled waves of enemy attacks without any
cover. At around 1 PM, most of their members were dead.
A Command and Control
After the Rizal Park hostage taking incident, the Crisis Management Manual
was revised. The Core Manual, one of the two manuals formulated from the
original, laid down the principles of Command and Control. This system
supports the commander's ability to make decisions, delegate authority,
synchronize all actions and adjust plans for future operations while focusing on
the current crisis. It also mandates that the focus should be on roles, rather
than rank, providing for a clear structured mechanism for commanding large
scale incidents.
The TCP and ACP were the established command and control. And these were
plagued by failures since the start of the operation.
Poor communication due to erratic phone signals contributed to the delay of
the sending of information.
Units had no direct contact with each other. Information or instructions had to
pass through ACP before it could reach the other units. Because of this, they
were unaware of the situation of other units, reinforcement efforts and
decisions of commanders.
Battlefield visualizations were also distorted.
A Logistics
Military-grade communication equipment are necessary to withstand even
the toughest of situations

The SAF were using two brands of radios: the Harris and the Motorolas

Harris Radio is highly reliable under adverse condition; the Motorola,

not so much.

Since many of the radios were deemed useless after being soaked in
water, the troops had to use their cellphones as back-up communication.
These were unreliable because of erratic signal.

The communication problems had a major impact on the command

and control in the battlefield
Even if they were equipped with firepower, the shooters and ammunition
started decreasing quickly.
The budget was reported to be only over P100k. However, the BOI thinks this
is an unrealistic number considering the large number of personnel that were

utilized and transported. They weren't able to check the reliability of the
information due to time constraints.
A Efforts of the Peace Process Mechanisms
The Agreement for Cessation of Hostilities was signed in 1997.
This required prior coordination of a law enforcement operation. This will
facilitate arrest of criminal elements within the MILF base commands or
territories under MILF control.
This was not maximized in Oplan Exodus. They only utilized it around 5:30 AM
of January 25 to inform and coordinate with the MILF counterpart about the SAF
operation. But the operation was already ongoing during this time.
Because of the late coordination, the CCCH could no longer remedy the
situation.
Since a total ceasefire usually takes 5-6 hours to implement, the utilization of
the peace process mechanism was a failure from the start.
Based on the foregoing, the PNP was inadequate in a lot of aspects.
1. They failed to inform the MILF of their law operation. For failure to follow the
norm, the MILF, the BIFF and the other hostiles interpreted the firefight (the
earliest one when Marwan was killed) as an intruder attack. This had caused
the heavy firefight and the continuous attacks.
2. They failed to coordinate with the AFP. Because of the lack of coordination,
the AFP was lost as to what they should do. The unfamiliarity of the tactic
employed by the SAF had caused them to default back to what they know,
with little coordination and information from the one on the ground. Most of
their decisions were based on the followed procedure and the established
custom (like the taking into account of the peace process). Following the
usual procedure adnd the Rules of Engagement, Pangilinan could not be held
liable for the holding of artillery support since he is deciding under the notion
that the peace process must be honored. He was merely doing what has
been done in the past.
3. They failed to coordinate with the CCCH. This could have prevented the
death of the Commandos. But because they failed to inform the CCCH,
effectively breaking an established protocol, the opposing forces could not be
contained as quickly and as easily as they could have.
4. The lack of commonality of thinking had caused disastrous results. The AFP
and the SAF were following different protocols and tactics. This had caused
incoordination and confusion of the situation. Because of the new tactics
employed, the AFP, who was left in the dark at first, started to employ
methods and concepts familiar to them and had been used in the past.