All five legally recognised nuclear weapon states the United States, the United

Kingdom, France, Russia and China still have large stockpiles of long-range ballistic
missile. These countries have been deploying both intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and submarined launched ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, while the US and the Russia have eliminated all of their intermediate and
medium-range missiles and significantly reduced their arsenals of long-range ballistic
missiles, the threat of missile strikes from regional powers remains intact. The US
prompt global strike programme has showed that missiles will cause heavy damage even
if they are used as a limited conventional warfare tactic in the years to come.
The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed an ongoing proliferation race in
which India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and North Korea are major participants. The expert
community is now focusing on the ballistic missile threat emanating from hostile WMDarmed nations. What makes these missiles a highly destabilising force is their long range
and ability to strike targets across the globe on short notice.
Ballistic missiles follow a ballistic trajectory over most of their flight paths and are
generally categorised, according to their range, into four classes: Short-range (SRBM),
with range of less than 1000 km; Medium-range (MRBM), which have a operational
range of 1000 km-3000 km; Intermediate-range (IRBM) have operational ranges of 3,000
km-5500 km, and Intercontinental-range (ICBM) can travel more than 5500 km. Shortand medium-range ballistic missiles are commonly known as theatre ballistic missiles,
whereas IRBMs and ICBMs are referred to as strategic ballistic missiles.
Ballistic missiles are also classified by fuel-type and are described as solid or liquid
propellants. Missiles with solid propulsion systems are considered more reliable because
they require less preparation. On the other hand, liquid-propellant rocket have to keep
oxidizer and fuel separate before deployment. Despite this difficulty, some Third World
countries still rely on liquid-propellant technology because of greater access to it.
North Korea, a nuclear-armed rogue state, has a formidable missile capability. According
to many nuclear experts, North Korean ballistic missiles are capable of reaching Tokyo
and Seoul and have the ability to deliver biological and chemical weapons.
In the Middle East, Israel has a well-developed ballistic missile programme since the late
1970s, serving to aggravate certain existing threats to regional peace and security. The
Jericho III is a very advanced Israeli Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with the
ability to launch nuclear warheads into almost any location on the Earths surface. The
2006 Israel-Hezbollah war made it evident that some non-state actors have also acquired
missile capability but this development largely went unnoticed.
During the ongoing civil war in Syria, the Syrian military has launched ballistic missile
strikes on rebel-controlled areas. This shows the increasing role of ballistic missiles in
civil conflicts but no concrete steps by the international community have been taken to
prevent the proliferation of missiles and related technologies in the region.

In South Asia, another highly volatile region, India and Pakistan maintain relatively large
stockpiles of ballistic missiles. More alarmingly, Indias military establishment has also
been working on its ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme, triggering fresh
tensions in the region.
In India, over the past decade, support for ballistic missile defence (BMD) has broadened
because the public is unaware of new security threats to regional peace due to Indias
aggressive approach. Even many well-known Indian journalists have no idea that the
success rate of a deployed BMD system is very low.
The Indian BMD does not even provide reliable defence against Pakistani stealth cruise
missiles like the Hatf-VII and would surely be unable to provide Indias two cities New
Delhi and Mumbai a shield against Chinese Dongfeng-41 missile with multiple subwarheads with separate trajectories.
The unfortunate fact is that India, Iran, North Korea and some other countries have
successfully advanced their missile programmes with foreign assistance. Many countries
have even remained involved in selling sensitive missile technology to other members.
Yet, because of their voluntary nature, the missile technology control regimes cannot
mandate any forceful action against member countries violating its guidelines.
Curbing the spread of missile technology is particularly difficult because of lack of
recognition of the threat it poses. The MTCR urgently needs to address all these concerns
related to WMD delivery systems if it wants to avoid the fate of becoming totally
incapable of mitigating the dangers associated with the global nuclear trade.
Email: rizwanasghar5@unm.edu