Professional Documents
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No. 14-70025
In The
PetitionerAppellant,
v.
WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division,
RespondentAppellee.
______________________________
EDWARD L. MARSHALL
Chief, Criminal Appeals Division
CHARLES E. ROY
First Assistant Attorney General
TRAVIS G. BRAGG
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel of Record
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Counsel of Record
ii
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iii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS ......................................... i
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................ iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................... iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... vi
RESPONDENTAPPELLEES BRIEF .................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................. 2
Facts of the Crime ............................................................................ 2
Lopezs Trial ..................................................................................... 3
Postconviction Proceedings .............................................................. 6
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
iv
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
vi
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Statutes
18 U.S.C. 3599(f) ................................................................................... 28
28 U.S.C. 2254 ........................................................................................ 1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)................................................................................. 21
vii
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RESPONDENTAPPELLEES BRIEF
A Texas jury convicted PetitionerAppellee Daniel Lee Lopez and
sentenced him to death for the capital murder of Lieutenant Stuart
Alexander, an onduty police officer. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied Lopez relief on direct appeal, and he waived his state
habeas proceedings. While his direct appeal was pending in state court,
he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254, believing this
necessary to finalize his conviction and proceed with his sentence. For
over two years, Lopez sought to waive his federal habeas proceedings.
The lower court held a hearing during which Dr. Proctor, a forensic
psychologist, and Lopez testified. Based on the pleadings filed and
testimony elicited at the hearing, the district court found Lopez
competent, granted his waiver, dismissed his petition with prejudice, and
granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on the sole issue of
competency to waive. This Court should affirm the district courts finding
of Lopezs competency and the dismissal of his petition.
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Whether the district court erred in relying upon the reports of Drs.
Martinez
and
Proctor
and
denying
Lopezs
application
for
Given the focus of this appealLopezs competency to waive his federal habeas
proceedingsand in the interest of brevity, Respondent Stephens (the Director)
presents only a brief recitation of Lopezs crime. For a full presentation please see the
opinions cited from the lower court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
1
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CR refers to the Clerks Record of pleadings and documents filed in the state trial
court. This reference is preceded by the volume number and followed by the pertinent
page numbers.
3 RR refers to the Reporters Record from the trial. This is preceded by the volume
number and followed by the pertinent page numbers.
2
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A week before trial the state offered Lopez a deal of life without
parole in return for his guilty plea. 16 RR 7980. Lopez rejected that deal
and entered a plea of not guilty. Id. at 46, 7980. Prior to closing
argument during the guilt / innocence phase, trial counsel informed the
judge outside the presence of the jury that Lopez insisted on testifying
that he did in fact intentionally run over the officer, despite the fact that
he's told us in earlier discussions that this was not intentional and it was
accidental. 21 RR 99. When the court questioned Lopez, he stated
Whenever I tried to fire him, my counsel at the beginning
[when Lopez wanted to plead guilty], they said they are going
to do what I wanted, and we have to put in their defense and
so we did put in a defense. And now I want to go and testify,
but they are going to be against me.
Id. at 101. After the court admonished Lopez regarding his right to testify
and advised him to carefully consider his counsels guidance, Lopez opted
to not testify. Id. at 10103. The jury found Lopez guilty on all ten counts
including capital murder. 22 RR 48. Following the presentation of
evidence during the punishment phase, the jury returned answers to the
special issue questions requiring a sentence of death. 26 RR 12430; 2
CR 24448.
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Postconviction Proceedings
A.
After Lopez was sentenced, the judge informed him that direct
appeal was automatic by operation of law and the court would appoint
both appellate and state habeas counsel. 26 RR 13031. A week later on
March 10, 2010, at a posttrial hearing (discussed in greater detail below,
see infra Statement of the Case III(B)), the judge reaffirmed this: you've
[Lopez] already told me, on a number of occasions, that you wanted to
waive your appeal, and I have instructed you that that is not an option
to you. 27 RR 12. During this same hearing appellate counsel intimated,
And Mr. Lopez does not want a new trial, and hopes that my efforts on
the appeal will not win him a new trial . . . . Id. at 8.
Approximately a month later, Lopez filed a motion to proceed with
his appeal pro se. 29 RR 4; 2 CR 25051. The judge explained competency
to waive appeal and competency to effectively represent ones self pro se
are scrutinized differently. 29 RR 68. The judge believed Lopez was
competent to waive his appeal if that were an option. Id. at 47. He
remarked, [A]ll along Mr. Lopez . . . wanted to be found guilty, [] he did
not want to go through a lengthy appeal, but wanted to move directly to
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. . . . the punishment that the jury had assessed. 56. However, the judge
denied Lopezs request. Id. at 11. This was not due to a mental defect; in
fact the judge noted the motion literally has laid out the appropriate
findings that I would have to make . . . . Id. at 45. Rather, the judge
based it on Lopezs age, education and lack of experience in dealing in
capital murder cases. Id. at 11. The judge also had questions as to
whether state law would even allow selfrepresentation on a capital
appeal. Id. at 1213.
After the appellate attorney filed his brief with the Court of
Criminal Appeals, Lopez sent a letter dated August 1, 2011, to that court.
In it Lopez stated,
I . . . choose not to fight my conviction or sentence. I accept
full responsibility for my actions and feel my sentence is fare
[sic]. I do not agree with the issues raised by [appellate
counsel] in my appeal. I dont feel the death penalty is
unconstitutional. I do not wish for a new trial. I do not agree
that Im not a future danger. I know Im a danger to others
given the chance.
SHCR EventID: 2474349.4 Months later Lopez sent a second letter to the
court seeking to hasten his appeal. Here he threatened,
SHCR refers to the State Habeas Clerks Record of pleadings and documents for
Lopezs state writ application. This is followed by the EventID number.
4
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Lopez v. State, No. AP-76,327, letter dated Dec. 20, 2011. On October 31,
2012, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief on direct appeal as to
all claims. Lopez v. State, 2012 WL 5358863, *10 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct.
31, 2012).
B.
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he wants to do. Id. at 10. He later said, And what it boils down [sic] is
the fact that he wants the death penalty. Hed like to be executed, maybe
next week, if they could get it done, and it is quite certain hes not gonna
change his mind. Id. at 9. After the judge gave him the admonitions and
instructions, he found Lopez competent to waive and requested that
waiver be reduced to writing. Id. at 1112. The following day, the court
held a second hearing at which Lopez knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently pled guilty to four more felonies. 28 RR 415. The judge then
accepted his written waiver of state habeas counsel. Id. at 1516; 2 CR
239 (Lopezs waiver), 240241 (court order). As the judge again
admonished Lopez, the following exchange took place:
The Court: And do you feel youre mentally competent?
[Lopez]:
Yes.
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Id. Finally, on May 4, 2012, Lopez wrote a letter to the court inquiring
about waiver of federal habeas proceedings; alternatively, he asked about
filing a petition [i]n order to expedite this process to end federal review
before the oneyear limitations period would expire. SHCR EventID:
2484835.
C.
Less than two weeks after sending the above letter to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, Lopez filed his federal habeas petition pro se with the
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lower court on May 17, 2012. ROA.1019. In his petition he asserted only
one ground for relief: The administration of the death penalty in Texas
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. ROA.15.5 Because Lopezs direct appeal was still pending
in the Court of Criminal Appeals, the district judge stayed and
administratively closed the case. ROA.32.
Less than a month after the Texas high court denied relief on direct
appeal, Lopez filed what would be his first of many motions to waive his
federal proceedings. ROA.33. After prompting from the district court,
Lopez filed a clear copy of the same motion on December 12, 2012.
ROA.38. He reaffirmed that he filed a federal habeas petition solely
because he thought it would be quicker instead of waiting for the 1 yr
statute of limitation to expire. Id. He further demonstrated a clear
understanding of what the court would require in order to waive: I am
assuming this court will want to make sure Im mentally competent
This lone claim itself supports Lopezs earlier inquiry as to how best to expedite
federal habeas proceedings. First, the law in this area is well settled and allows for a
swift and easy defeat of the claim. Second, he specifically stated in his August 1, 2011,
letter to the Court of Criminal Appeals that he dosent feel the death penalty is
unconstitutional. SHCR EventID: 2474349.
5
11
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(which I assure you I am which has been proven during my first waiver)
and am willing to undergo any evaluation yall have for me. Id.
In its following order, the district court reopened the case, provided
for the appointment of counsel, later named as Lopezs current counsel
on appeal, and ordered the parties to submit the suggestion of an expert
to evaluate Lopezs competency. ROA.4041.6 Opposing counsel filed
with the court its recommendation for an expert, Dr. Mosnik. ROA.51
53. However, Respondent recommended Dr. Allen. ROA.8082. Lopez
filed a pro se motion to accept the psychological evaluation completed
pretrial by Dr. Martinez. See supra Statement of the Case II; ROA.79.
Failing this, Lopez recommended Dr. Martinez serve as the expert. Id.
Again Lopez demonstrated, as he would throughout these proceedings,
both clarity of the issue at bar and acuity into a quick resolution: I
submit these documents as proof to inform the court that I am competent
enough to waive my federal appeals and also to save time and money
from this process. Id.
The district courts language is worth noting here because it makes apparent from
the outset the courts determination that it will only hear from one expert agreed
upon by both parties.
6
12
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On March 20, 2013, Lopez filed a pro se response with the court.
ROA.14142. Here Lopez first explained that any determination of
competency should be based on his present state of mind. Id. He further
explained his continuous attempts to waive all appeals. Id. He next
argued that the court should allow him to make the choice to both accept
responsibility for his crimes and own his punishment. Id. He ended with
a clear statement that he did not support his counsels attempts to prove
him incompetent. Id. Following a teleconference involving both parties
and the court, the district judge entered an order appointing Dr. Proctor
as the agreedupon expert to examine Lopez. ROA.14950. Lopez then
filed a pro se Motion to Expedite Mental Evaluation. ROA.151.
After Dr. Proctor issued his report answering the lower courts
questions in such a manner as to find Lopez competent, opposing counsel
filed a motion for further neuropsychological services, again seeking the
appointment of Dr. Mosnik. ROA.15762. In response, Lopez filed pro se
his first motion seeking to dismiss counsel citing their disagreement as
to how to proceed. ROA.164. I now have been proven competent twice by
Dr. Troy Martinez, and Dr. Timothy James Proctor, and would like to
exercise my right once again to proceed pro se. Id. Lopez also filed a
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***
I will point out neither did Dr. Martinez, who saw him in
2010, and I did not see evidence that that was, that there was
a depressive disorder that was contributing to him being
incompetent at this time.
Id.
When later questioned by opposing counsel about the possibility of
the execution serving as a de facto assisted suicide, Dr. Proctor explained,
I think its something I spent a lot of time considering. To me,
there is a distinction there between is this somebody who is
saying, Im going to use the court system I want to commit
suicide. Im going to use the court system as a way to commit
suicide. Or is this someone who is saying, This is the
situation before me. These are the choices I have. This is the
sentence that I believe I'm going to get at trial, or that I have
now. And given all the circumstances, I'm going to accept this
punishment and go along with it.
ROA.45354. He again came back to this explanation: But for a person
to think, Look, what I did I think meets the punishment Im being given,
whether we would all agree with it or not, thats a decision someone could
make without being irrational. ROA.459.7 Based on the above Dr.
Proctor concluded,
And ultimately it was my opinion, as you said, Your
Honor, that he is competent to waive his federal habeas
review. I believe he has the capacity to appreciate his position
7
16
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A:
Q:
A:
No, maam.
***
Q:
A:
17
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***
Q:
A:
I understand that.
Q:
A:
A:
The decision this whole time has been constant, and Ive
never changed it. So yes, I understand that.
ROA.48283.
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Two weeks after the hearing, Lopez filed a letter with the court
covering some topics that arose during testimony. ROA.19394. He
continued to assert that he was merely wanting to accept his punishment
and was not suicidal as suggested by opposing counsel. Id. He also
stressed to the court that the purpose of the hearing was simply to
determine competency; it was not a platform for his counsel to press
potential claims for relief. Id. Yet again he displayed a clear awareness
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contrary, there was ample evidence to show Lopez did not suffer from any
mental disease or defect, he had a thorough understanding of his legal
position and the available options, and he was rational in his choice to
waive. Any argument to the contrary is without foundation.
Counsel also alleges the district court erred in relying upon the
reports of Drs. Martinez and Proctor and denying Lopezs application for
neuropsychologist and investigatory services. The first issue informs the
district courts valid denial of counsels motions for further funding and
testing. The weight of evidence in favor of granting Lopezs request for
waiver did not require further investigation. Further, such requests are
not a matter of right but rather are at the courts discretion. Finally, the
court was correct to rely upon the expert agreed upon by both parties. For
these reasons this Court should affirm the lower courts decision.
ARGUMENT
The Lower Courts Grant of Waiver was well Informed and Proper.
Upon review by this Court, a district courts determination of an
inmates competency to waive his federal habeas proceeding is thus
protected by the shield and buckler of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), and must be
accepted unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at
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399 (citing Floyd v. United States, 427 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1970)). A finding
is clearly erroneous only if it is implausible in the light of the record
considered as a whole. Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361 (5th
Cir. 2007). Opposing counsel first claims the district court erred in
accepting Lopezs waiver of his federal habeas proceedings. Appellants
Br. 1521 (Br.). Generally, a criminal defendant has the right to make
his defense because it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense
fails. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 81920 (1975). He is the
master of his own defense. Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 606 (5th
Cir. 1999). Specifically, an inmate under a sentence of death may waive
his federal habeas proceeding if he is competent to make such a decision.
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 16566 (1990); Rees, 384 U.S. at
314.
[A] habeas court must conduct an inquiry into the defendants
mental capacity, either sua sponte or in response to a motion by
petitioners counsel, if the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to his
competency. Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 330 (5th Cir. 2000). The
wellestablished standard for competency to abandon federal habeas
review asks whether he has capacity to appreciate his position and make
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The lower court noted that at times this test has been collapsed into two questions.
ROA.357; see Wilcher v. Anderson, 188 F. Appx 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2006); Mata, 210
F.3d at 328.
9
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Id. This Court has further held that adequate due process in these
circumstances may require,
ordering and reviewing a current examination by a qualified
medical or mental health expert, allowing the parties to
present any other evidence relevant to the question of
competency and, on the record and in open court, questioning
the petitioner concerning the knowing and voluntary nature
of his decision to waive further proceedings.
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Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 1995). This must be weighed in
conjunction with all other evidence presented with respect to a
defendants mental stability and competence. Mata, 210 F.3d at 330.
This Court spoke squarely on the topic:
The idea that the deliberate decision of one under sentence of
death to abandon possible additional legal avenues of attack
on that sentence cannot be a rational decision, regardless of
its motive, suggests that the preservation of ones own life at
whatever cost is the summum bonum, a proposition with
respect to which the greatest philosophers and theologians
have not agreed and with respect to which the United States
Constitution by its terms does not speak.
Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Lenhard
v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1313 (1979) (Rhenquist, J., in chambers)). Indeed,
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Dr. Proctor testified at the hearing that Lopezs attempt to waive his
proceedings is born out of a desire to accept his punishment. ROA.453
54. Lopez has continued to say these words in various written pleading
and at the federal evidentiary hearing. See supra Statement of the Case
II & III. Based on all the pleadings and hearing testimony, the court
properly found that there was no evidence of mental disease or defect.
The court could have ended the inquiry here; but it properly decided to
examine all three parts of the test.
There is no question based on this record that Lopez understands
his legal position and his options. From the time that Lopez first
attempted to plead guilty, he has maintained that he killed Lieutenant
Alexander. Immediately after the jury imposed the sentence of death,
Lopez began strategically planning how to best expedite his appeals. He
attempted to represent himself pro se on direct appeal, he waived his
right to state habeas counsel, and he waived his federal habeas
proceeding. In fact, he only filed his federal habeas petition because he
believed it would expedite the carrying out of his sentence. Had he known
that there was no legal impediment to setting an execution date once his
direct appeal was denied, he may very well have never filed. Even at the
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Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 28889 (5th Cir. 2005). Funding may be denied
where it would only provide evidence on a procedurally defaulted claim,
on a claim that is meritless, or where the assistance would merely
supplement prior evidence. Riley v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 302, 30708 (5th
Cir. 2004); Barraza v. Cockrell, 330 F.3d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2003); Hill v.
Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 48687 (5th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, opposing
counsel believes further funding was needed for a second expert opinion.
Although they agreed to the appointment of Dr. Proctor, they argue his
evaluation did not meet the standard laid out in Mata because his opinion
was illinformed.
As discussed above, Dr. Proctor reviewed 9,500 pages of records,
including a report by Dr. Martinez, and took those records into
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consideration when forming his opinion. See supra Statement of the Case
III(D). Dr. Proctor gave a full evaluation both in his report and at the
federal evidentiary hearing. Based on this testimony, Lopezs testimony,
and the pleadings in the case, the district court made a correct
determination in granting the waiver. See supra Argument I. Thus, any
evidence resulting from the funding would have at best supplemented the
record.
There is no evidence that Dr. Proctors assessment was inadequate.
Rather, its fair to assume opposing counsels argument simply indicates
displeasure with Dr. Proctors conclusions and the courts reliance on
them. But a defendant does not have a right to the appointment of [an
expert] who will reach biased or only favorable conclusions. Granviel v.
Lynaugh, 881 F.2d 185, 192 (5th Cir. 1989). Nor is a defendant entitled
to choose [an expert] of his personal liking. Woodward v. Epps, 580 F.3d
318, 331 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985)).
Because the Court appointed a neutral expert agreed upon by all parties,
it was unnecessary for the Court to permit Lopezs counsel to shop for
another. Thus, the district court correctly denied further funding.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons the Director respectfully requests this Court
affirm the lower courts decision to grant Lopezs waiver of his federal
habeas proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
CHARLES E. ROY
First Assistant Attorney General
ADRIENNE McFARLAND
Deputy Attorney General
for Criminal Justice
EDWARD L. MARSHALL
Chief, Criminal Appeals Division
s/ Travis G. Bragg
TRAVIS G. BRAGG
Assistant Attorney General
State Bar No. 24076286
Counsel of Record
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 21, 2014, I electronically filed the
foregoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit using the electronic casefiling system of
the Court. The electronic casefiling system sent a Notice of Electronic
Filing to the following attorney of record, who consented in writing to
accept this notice as service of this document by electronic means:
James Gregory Ryttng
Hilder & Associates, P.C.
819 Lovett Blvd.
Houston, TX 77006
David R. Dow
University of Houston Law Center
100 Law Center
Houston, TX 77204
s/ Travis G. Bragg
TRAVIS G. BRAGG
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with Rule 32(a)(7)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. It contains 6,505 words, Microsoft Word 2010,
Century, 14 points.
s/ Travis G. Bragg
TRAVIS G. BRAGG
Assistant Attorney General
ELECTRONIC CASE FILING CERTIFICATIONS
I hereby certify that: (1) all required privacy redactions have been
made; (2) this electronic submission is an exact copy of the paper
document; and (3) this document has been scanned using the most recent
version of a commercial virus scanning program and is free of viruses.
s/ Travis G. Bragg
TRAVIS G. BRAGG
Assistant Attorney General
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TEL. 504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTRI PLACE
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
By: _________________________
Monica R. Washington, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7705
cc: