Global Dominance and Dependence, Post-Industrialism, and International Relations Theory

Global Dominance and Dependence, Post-Industrialism, and International Relations Theory: A
Review
Author(s): Harry R. Targ
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1976), pp. 461-482
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600095
Accessed: 24-05-2015 21:37 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Studies Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 201.234.181.53 on Sun, 24 May 2015 21:37:02 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Global Dominance
and Dependence,
Post-Industrialism,
and International
Relations Theory
A Review
HARRY R. TARG
ofPoliticalScience
Department
PurdueUniversity
This reviewanalyzes four premisesof state-centrictheoriesof internationalrelations

and contraststhem with two new global phenomena: dominance and dependency
The two phenomena,it is claimed,are leading international
and post-industrialism.
politicsin the directionof what some theoristscall a global dominancesystem.The
global future portrayed is wholistic, transnational,hierarchical, controlled via
technocraticmechanisms,and culturallyhomogeneous.Such a view is diametrically
opposed to state-centric,atomistic, decentralized, heterogeneousconceptions of
internationallife prevalentin the literatureof internationalrelations.The challenge
that new theory and data provide suggeststhe need for internationalrelations
premisesand to definetheirresearchin termsof the
scholarsto abandon state-centric
questionsraisedby the newertheoristsdiscussed.
Introduction
relationsscholarshave
An increasingnumberof international
begun to challenge the postulates central to contemporary
internationalrelations theory, particularlyits state-centric
perspective.This article elucidates assumptionsessential to
contemporarytheory, reviews selected literatureon global
AUTHOR'S NOTE: A differentversion of this paper was delivered at the
International Studies Association, New England meeting, April 11-12, 1975,
INTERNATIONAL
?1976 I.S.A.
STUDIES
QUARTERLY,
Vol. 20 No. 3, September 1976
[4611
[462] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
dominanceand dependencychallengingit, and discussesthe

convergenceof global dominance with the developmentof
post-industrial
societies.
Substantively,the portrayal of emergingglobal politics
treatedbelow givesparticularattentionto two complementary
processes:the increaseof dominanceand dependenceand the
transformationof dominant societies in the direction of
societies. Such an evolution entails the movepost-industrial
modes of dominamentfrominstitutionalto suprainstitutional
tion and dependencyand the creationof a global technocratic
political culture. In such a centralized,post-industrialized
internationalsystem,nation-statesexist primarilyforadministrativeconvenience.The relative explanatorypower of the
state-centric
model of international
realityversusa model based
on global relationsof dominanceand dependenceand governed
featuresbearsdirectlyon futuretheoryand
by post-industrial
researchin international
relations.
The Limitations of Contemporary
International Relations Theory
Historically,the most enduringexplanationof international

relationsis based upon a theoryof political realism.Further,
the best predictorof the frequencyand intensityof internationalconflictin a givenperiodof international
historyis the
success with which nations are able to maintaina balance of
power (Morgenthau,1960; Doughertyand Pfaltzgraff,
1971).
Theorists claim that the central unit of analysis is the
nation-state.Each nation-stateis motivatedby the desire to
maintain and/or enhance its power, and, tautologically,its
power is achieved by the skillfulutilizationof militaryand
civilian attributesof power. Given the universalquest for
Hartford,Connecticut.The author wishes to acknowledgea debt to the Department

of Political Science, Boston University
forprovidingintellectualand materialsupport
duringthe academic yearwhen the researchforthispaper was carriedout.
Targ /GLOBAL DOMINANCE [463]
power,statesin stable internationalordersaccede to a seriesof

"rules of the game" deemed legitimateto keep conflictwithin
limitssufficientto maintainsystemicstability.For diplomatic
historianssuch as Hinsley (1963) and Kissinger(1 969), the
golden age of the balance of power is that period of
international"calm" between 1815 to 1850 whenthe disparate
systemfor
leadersof Europe agreedto a commonmanagement
themaintenanceof "worldorder."
Premisescriticalto thisclassicalorientationto international
relationsare embedded in contemporarytheoryand research.
Four such assumptions will be examined to illustratethe
conflictbetweenprevailingtheoryand the "newer"theoriesof
dominanceand dependencein global politics,with the latter
beinganalyzedin detaillater.
relationstheoriesmaintainor
international
1. Contemporary
most
criticalactors in interimply that nation-statesare the
nationalpolitics.
It has been fashionablein recent years to organize international relationsliteratureaccordingto which variableeach
theoristdeems most criticalto explaininginternationalphenomena (Waltz, 1959; Singer,1961). Explanationsbased upon
the psyche of man, the structuresof nation-states,or the
balance of forces among nation-statesin the international
systemare used by varioustheoriststo understandconflictand
war. Whatseems clear about each "level of analysis"is thatthe
structurethat participatesin conflictis invariablythe nationstate. Each theoristthatWaltz and othersanalyzebeginswitha
system.
nation-state
More recently,Allison (1971) has posited threemodels to
thesame
explain the Cuban MissleCrisis,all of themreflecting
states
model"
actor
personifies
bias. The "rational
state-centric
as rational, goal-seekingactors. The "organizationalprocess
model" examines dynamicswithin national securitybureaucracies of nation-states.The "governmentalpolitics model"
conflict and bargainingbetween
analyzes interorganizational
bureaucracieswithinnation-states.
relationsliteraA thoroughexaminationof the international

turewould show the extentto whichthe classicalstate-centric
view' permeatesscholarship.This literaturehas impairedthe
global conceptualizadevelopmentof potentiallymore fruitful
tions of critical variables. For example, transnationalphenomena such as internationalgovernmentaland nongovernmental organizations,dyadic relationshipsamong militaryindustrial complexes, activities of cross-nationalguerrilla
terrorists
and counter-cultures,
and, most critically,the operationsof an integrated
global economymaybe centrallyrelevant
to international
politicalbehavior.
2. Most internationalrelationstheoryimpliesthe existence
of boundaries between domestic politics and international
politics.Theoristsdo not posit any causal connectionsbetween
patternsof behavior at the global level and behaviorswithin
nation-states.
As a corollary to premiseone, this premisesuggeststhe
"impermeability"(Herz, 1961) of nation-states.Since each
nation-stateis a sovereignentityand is bounded territorially,
culturally,politically,and economically,the traditionalview
implies, the global system or particularglobal subsystems
impingeminimallyupon the domesticlife of thenationand its
foreignpolicy choices. Traditionaltheory,of course,recognizes
of the colonized by
colonialismas a formof interpenetration
the colonizer and furtheraccommodatesthe ways in which
small powers are constrainedby big powers. But the same
sees no structuredrelationtheory,because of its state-centrism,
ships between transnationalinstitutions,organizations,and
culturesand those withinnations. Some alternatives,
such as
theories of linkage politics, have introduced the notion of
nations are, to
penetration to suggest that contemrporary
varyingdegrees,infusedwithinfluencesfromthe international
1. D'Entreves (1967) suggeststhat the state has been conceptualized in three
ways: as the human communitythat claims the monopoly of the use of force
(political realists), as an organized system of laws that define the rights and
responsibilitiesof the governors and governed (legalists), and as the human
Targ / GLOBAL DOMINANCE [4651
However,mosttheoristsremaincommittedto the
environment.
politicsdistinction.
domesticpolitics/international
3. Internationalpoliticsis "anarchical"politics.Contraryto
the order, stability,and structureof domestic political life,
relationsis chaoticand unstructured.
international
Senghaas (1973) for example, suggeststhat conventional
wisdom and political theorydistinguishbetween the organic
nature, the stability,and the predictabilityof intrasocietal
behavior and the choas, disorder,and randomnessof international politics. The "high politics" of daily news on world
affairsreflectsthis chaos and disorder,but thisimagerymasks
of behaviorthat
and rigidities
the "substructure"of regularities
derive fromstructuredrelationshipsin internationalsociety.
and domesticinviolabilityhave led logicallyto
State-centrism
the presumptionthat the accumulationand use of power,the
to normsof
obeisanceto authority,and elite-masscommitment
law or custom may be concentratedin the "atoms" of state
structures.Each atom has a unique, independent,and unpredictablelifeof its own.
4. Manifestin most internationalrelationsthoughtis the
assumptionthat heterogeneityamong nations, peoples, ecoand socializationpatternsis
nomics, cultures,goal-structures,
life.
of
feature
global
theprevalent
This premiseis impliedby the others.The affairsof each
nation-stateare governedmoreby theuniquenessof geography
and cultureand the way the individualpeoples organizetheir
affairsthan by external pressuresfrom other nations,transnational forces such as trade and communication,or by
constellationsof status, hierarchy,and power in the internationalsystem.
These fourpremises,it is argued,haveset theparametersfor
mostinternationalrelationstheorizing.Of course,not all of the
internationalrelationsliteratureis constrainedby thesepremorganizationthat claims the ultimateloyaltyand sense of obligationof its members
(politicalphilosophers).Each of these "notions" of the statehave affectedthe way in
whichscholarshave theorizedabout internationalrelations.
ises. Recentchallengesfromtheoriesof linkagepolitics(Wilkenfeld, 1973), integration(InternationalOrganization,1970),

relations(InternationalOrganization,1971), and
transnational
world order (Falk, 1975) have moved in new directions.
However, the most fundamentalchallengeto the dominant
relationshas come from
state-centric
paradigm2of international
theoriesof dominanceand dependency.
Theories of Dominance and

Dependency and Global Politics
The new directionsdiscussedbelow come largelyfromthe

Europeanpeace researchcommunity(Galtung,1971; Senghaas,
1973; Hveem, 1973), as well as from third world social
scientists(Dos Santos, 1971; Frank, 1971; Galeano, 1971),
tradition(Baran and
from theoristsof the Marxist-Leninist
Sweezy, 1971; Magdoff,1969), and fromrevisionisthistorians
(Williams,1972; Kolko, 1972). The dominance/dependency
model, which, despite substantialdisputes,3challengesmore
acceptedmodels of internationalrelations,viewsglobalpolitics
as more or less wholistic,incorporatingintranational,international,and transnationalforces.It seeks to explain patterns
of dominationand oppressionas well as those of conflictand
cooperation.Finally, it transcendsthe static conceptionof a
nation-statesystem that is presumedto be perpetual.Four
interrelatedpremises,generallyconflictingwith those above,
will be discussed to illustratemajor themes in theoriesof
dominanceand dependence.
1. The nation-statesystemis rapidlybeingtransformed
into
one global dominance system. This new global systemis
2. The case can be made that the four premises constitutea "paradigm" in
Kuhn's (1962) sense of the term.An analysisof the historyof internationlal
relations
theorymightusefullydraw upon Kuhn's provocativetheoryof the developmentof
science.
3. Fundamentalissues separate severalof these theorists:forexample, the claim
of the ultimate potential for global integrationas described below versus the
Targ / GLOBAL DOMINANCE [467]
developingfeaturesanalogousto thosecommonlyattributedto
domestic life, includingstructuresof power and authority,
socioeconomic classes, and norms governingbehavior within
and betweenclasses.
Senghaas, as suggested earlier, challenges the prevailing
view of internationalsociety as socially deficient,lackingin
a
regularstructuresand processesof interaction,and reflecting
of national
quality of randomnessand chaos uncharacteristic
of international
society,
behavior.Centralto an understanding
he suggests,is the factthat"the historyof international
society
is identical with the developmentof modern capitalismand
movementson a worldscale provoked
worldwideanti-capitalist
by the existenceof capitalism"(Senghaas,1973: 165). Further,
"inter-capitalist
relationpatterns"'are of an "interactiondensity" unequalled in the history of internationalrelations
(Senghaas,1973: 167).
These intercapitalist
relationpatterns,Hveem (1973) argues,
of internationalpolitics into a
facilitatethe transformation
"global dominance system" based upon specified"structural
elements, actors and processes." The culminationof this
movementfroma nation-statesystemto one global system
would entail the possible, if not inevitable,integrationof
capitalism and "anti-capitalist"movementsinto one global
structure
of dominationand subordination.
To Hveem,dominationinvolvescentralinstitutionalcontrol
of global political and social lifeand accumulationby these
institutions
of surplusvalue producedaround the globe. Direct
control and accumulationare "on the spot" exercisesbased
probabilitiesof internationalwar between capitalist metropoles as predicted by

Marxist-Leninists;
the claim by some that multinationalcorporationshave transcended theircommitmentsto and needs for theirown nation-statesversusthe claim
that multinationalsare still national corporationsoperatingabroad; and the debate
over the relativepotency of economic versustechnologicalvariablesfor explaining
the new global politics.The discussionbelow will relymoreon tendenciessuggested
by the European peace researchers.The author, however,is beginningresearchon
these issues and assumes that they representthe most vital questions for those
seekingto understandthe futureof global politics.
upon militaryoccupation,politicaland/oreconomicadministration (colonialism), or throughlocal "bridgehead"elites (neocolonialism). Indirect control and accumulationoccurs as a
resultof the global systemand is not "actor dependent."The
movement from direct to indirect forms of control and
accumulation,presumably,relatesto the movementof dominant societies from industrialismto the post-industrialism
discussedbelow.
The structureof the globaldominancesystemis analogousto
the hierarchyof the multinationalcorporation.It consistsof a
The
four-tiered
worldstructureof productionand distribution.
highestlevel, the "quanternarylevel," consistsof those small
decisionsabout
numbersof institutionsthatmakefundamental
control and accumulationfor the entire global system.The
second level, the "tertiarylevel," comprisesthose institutions
that make managementdecisionsabout specificeconomic and
politicaltasksat lowerlevels.Next,the "secondarylevel" is the
level of managementinvolvingthe processingof raw materials
and human labor for the productionof goods, essentiallythe
level of factory management.Finally, the "primarylevel"
consistsof the extractionof raw materials,agricultural
produc1973:
industrial
labor
323).
tion,and
(Hveem,
The actorsin theglobaldominancesystemare of threekinds:
eliteshavingthecapacitybothforcontrolof centralinstitutions
and for a highdegreeof accumulationof surplusvalue; agents
of the global systemhavinglittlecapacityforcontrolbut much
capacityforaccumulation;and objects of the systemthathave
no capacityforcontrolor accumulation.
The processes of control and accumulationin the global
raw
offixedvalue (territory,
systeminvolvethe transformation
materials)and consumable value (food, shelter,goods) into
social value (education,organization,
information,
technology),
ideological value (culture,ideas, creativity),and capital value
organ(money, capital goods). These values are hierarchically
ized in such a way as "to create a system of efficientand
centralizedcontrol and accumulationopportunities"(Hveem,
by everincreasingcontrol
1973: 323). This systemis furthered
over raw materialsand markets.The implicationsof these
relationstheoryare
international
argumentsfor contemporary
suggestedby the second, yet related,premiseof dominance/
dependencytheory.
2. Transnationalpolitics is replacingnation-statepolitics.
Indeed, nation-statesstill survive,but the dynamicsof global
politics are increasinglybecominga functionof an incipient
internationalhierarchyof control and accumulation with
progressivelyintegratedcenters and peripheries.Therefore,
distinctionsbetween "domestic politics" and "international
politics" mask the fact that the formermustbe understoodin
termsofinterestsand goals of theglobalsystemitself.
The major contributionthat Senghaas and othersmake to
internationalrelations theory involves the depiction of the
relationshipbetweencapitalistmetropolesand the thirdworld.
Third world nations and peoples have become part of an
internationaldivisionof labor providingprimaryagricultural
commoditiesor naturalresourcesto themetropolein exchange
forfinishedproducts.Economic penetrationof thethirdworld
and techis reinforcedby cultural,political,communications,
nological forms.To solidifydependentrelationshipsfurther,
local elites become "bridgeheads"or agents of the metropole
itself,servingto maintainthe stabilityof the superordinaterelationsubordinaterelationship.The metropole-dependency
ship is an international"structurewhich systematicallyencourages the flow of riches towards one pole (and thus a
speeded-upcapital accumulationprocess) and the relative,in
some cases even the absolute pauperizationof the dominated"
(Senghaas,1973: 172).
Galtung (1971) has influencedthe thinkingof peace researchersby makingexplicit the "structureof imperialism."
as Center(C) or Periphery
(P)
Galtungcategorizesnation-states
dependingupon the level of livingconditionexistentin each
kind of nation (and by implicationthe relativecapacityof C
and P nations for control and accumulation). Withineach
[4701 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
nation are center(c) elites and periphery(p) peoples as well.

Imperialismexists when centerelites in Centerand Periphery
nationshave commoninterestsand when thoseinterestsare in
fundamentalconflict with peripherypeoples in Periphery
nations.
Centerand
Galtungsees two vital "mechanisms"reinforcing
Peripheryrelations.Verticalinteractionrelationsare such that
Center nations gain economically,politically,militarily,and
culturallyfromtheirinteractionwithPeripherynations,while
the latter lose in each of these dimensions.The feudal
interactionstructureis one in which P nations and peoples
relate to theirexternalenvironment
only throughC. P nations
interactextensivelywith theirCs; interactionwithotherCs is
missing,and interactionwithfellowPs is missing.
More recently,Chase-Dunn(1975) has summarizedwhat he
conceives to be the three major dimensionsof dependency
theory:"exploitationof the peripheryby the core, structural
distortionof the peripheryeconomy,"and "the suppressionof
autonomous policies in the periphery."Exploitationinvolves
the process of drainingsurplusvalue fromperipheryto core
areas (or Centernations) throughforeigninvestmentor trade
(Emmanuel, 1972). This leads to greaterwealth for the core
areas and greaterpovertyfor the peripheryareas. Structural
distortionof peripheraleconomies takes several forms.The
basic featureof thisviolationof the domesticpoliticaleconomy
is the organizationof peripheryproduction as part of the
internationaldivision of labor at the expense of national
development.Peripherynationsdepend on the exportof single
raw materials;the economic infrastructure
of transportand
communicationsis structuredprimarilyfor export purposes;
and any industrialproduction in the peripheryis capital
intensive,leavingthe levelsof unemployment
unaffected.
Third
world economics are structuredby and organized for the
interestsof capitalistmetropoles.Finally,the suppressionof
politicaland economic autonomyin the peripheryis furthered
by the linkagesbetweenthirdworldelites,thebridgeheads,
and
Targ/GLOBAL DOMINANCE [471]
is stifledby
elitesin centernations.Nationalself-determination
a stratumof peripheryelites who are instrumentsof and
dependenton centernations.
Hveem (1973) develops the transnationaland dependency
themes furtherby suggestingthat the internationalsystemis
withtop-down
progressing
towarda centralizedpowerstructure
controlutilizingthe latestadvancesin technologyand manageare closestto
mentforcontrolpurposes.Those in the periphery
fixed value and direct consumption. They representthe
peasantryand industriallaborersof the world-indeed,thebulk
of humanity. Those at the top, as in the structureof a
corporation,representthe key decisionmakersand institutions
in the metropolitancentersof controlin westernnations,the
a high
Soviet Union, China, and Japan. Those representing'
degreeof accumulationand low controlare partof the "upper
class" of the globe in a socioeconomicsense even if theyonly
serve as middle-management
in westernsocieties or "bridgeheads" in thirdworldsocieties.They are the factorymanagers,
and civilservantswho have controlof
labor leaders,merchants,
thosebelow themand are dominatedfromabove.
3. Among the new forcesdramaticallyaffectingthe transformationfrominternationalpolitics to a global dominance
system are the developmentand application of technology.
the
Among the new personsof power,perhapsovershadowing
are the
specialistson violenceand the specialistson bargaining,
men's mindsand the specialistson
specialistson transforming
and disseminating
codifying
specializedknowledge.
This premisefollows from the logic of global integration
posited by theoristsof dominanceand dependency.Most of
them see an evolution from traditionalformsof control of
peripheriesbased upon force to newer forms based upon
structurallinkages (bridgehead elites) and mechanismsof
manipulation.These manipulativestrategiesincludemonopoly
and selectiveapplicationsof technologicalexpertise,an expertise only available in Center nations. Such knowledgeaffects
processesof production,the characterand styleof communica-
tion of informationand knowledge,and, most critically,the

manipulationof peoples via the creation of "false" needs
definedin the centers.
For example, Hveem (1973) most clearly develops this
position by suggestingthat technologyhas become a preeminentvalue soughtand utilizedat thetop of the globalhierarchy
to advance control and accumulation.In the West, "technocapital" is the integrationof technology,information,and
capital. The concentrationand growthin the accumulationof
surplus value in the capitalist metropolesmeans enhanced
development,utilization,and control of technocapital.The
centersof dominationcarryon the bulkof the world'sresearch
and development,dominate the use and sale of patentsand
licenses, and are in close relationshipwith specialists on
information,
management,
and marketing.
Because of the structureand dynamicsof the global system
explicit in the firstthree premises,knowledgeand technical
expertiseare becomingcriticalsourcesof power.As longas this
futureevolvesunchecked,technocapitalprobablywill replace
militaryforce and diplomatic skill as primaryattributesof
power in global life. The full embodimentof the salience of
technocapitalis suggestedby the finalpremiseto be discussed.
4. With the emergenceof a global system-of centralized
control through the application of technologyand of the
concomitantwitheringaway of the nation-stateand local
peoples-comes an end to the heterogeneityof people and
culturesas a forcein worldpolitics.Homogeneityin lifestyles,
values,and desiresreplacesthe culturalpluralismof thepast.
Again, among the dependencytheoristsHveem (1973) has
developedthis thememost fully.The authorexaminesold and
new formsof dominationand distinguishes
betweenenforcement (colonialism), assimilation (neocolonialism), and the
demonstration
effect.The latterformof dominationinvolves
the disseminationof informationabout the desirabilityof
productsand technologiesdeveloped in the metropoles.The
imagerypasses from Center to Peripherynations ("trickles
down"), where peripheryelites and ultimatelyall periphery

peoples develop new consumerdemands and lifestyles.This
demonstration
effectlegitimizesthe systemof dominationby
inducingperipherypeoples to believein those thingsthatthey
mightget if they work hard and accede to systemnorms.If
resistanceto global integrationoccurs, traditionalmethodsof
dominationcan be utilized,but the "perfect"globaldominance
systemis one in which controlis maintainednot by forceor
briberybut by desire.
A global dominance system based upon hierarchyand
top-downcontrol,a disintegration
of nation-states,
the rise of
technocapital,and the demonstration
effectpresagesthe emergence of a global culture. This new global culture would
manifest patterns of consumption much like middle-class
patternswithinCenter nations today. It would endorse and
sustainthe commitment
to scientismand rationalism,
and, most
importantly,
it would accept the legitimacyof technocratsas
men of power and authority.All of these would destroythe
salienceof heterogeneouselementsof worldcultures.
These four premisesillustratethe challengethat theoriesof
framedominanceand dependencyhave offeredto state-centric
worksforthe analysisof international
politics.These challenges
suggestan emergingglobal systemthatis wholistic,centralized,
stratified,
systemdependent(not actor dependent),culturally
homogeneous,and technocratic.The substanceof traditional
descriptionsof internationalpolitics has been atomistic,deactordependent,culturallypluralistic,
centralized,symmetrical,
and politicalor ideological.
The DevelopmentofPost-Industrial
Societies
The concept of post-industrial
society has come from an
analysisof apparentchangesin the economy,polity,culture,
and knowledgebase of the nations of the West, Japan,the
the UnitedStates.Some
Soviet Union,and, most prominently,
and
theoristsare more or less celebrantsof post-industrialism,
as an exacerbatingsource of
others see post-industrialism
dehumanization.Both views, however, provide useful and
provocativedescriptionsof the directionsof change within
societiesthat paralleland convergewiththeimageof theglobal
dominancesystem(Bookchin,1971; Ellul, 1967; Ferkiss,1969;
1965; Mumford,1963).
Harrington,
Bell (1973) has been instrumentalin raisingthe issue of
societies,he says, have five
Post-industrial
post-industrialism.
centralcharacteristics:(1) an economic sector based upon a
serviceeconomy ratherthangoods production,(2) an occupabased upon a professionaland
tionaldistribution
preeminently
technical class, (3) an axial principle that highlightsthe
of theoreticalknowledgeas the source of innovation
centrality
mndof policy formulationfor the society, (4) a future
orientationemphasizingtechnologyand technologicalassessbased upon the creationof a new
ment,and (5) decision-making
"intellectualtechnology"(Bell, 1973: 14).
Each of these characteristicsof post-industrialsociety is
interrelated.The fundamentalprincipleof post-industrialism
(number three) is the use of theoretical knowledge for
innovation,control,and policy. Theoreticalknowledgeleads to
an orientationtoward planning and predictionsabout the
consequencesof policy choices.The knowledge-planning-policy
nexus suggeststhe new power, or at least the impact,of the
the new powerful
expert.The new modes of decision-making,
and
the
foundations
for political
new
epistemological
actors,
choices convergewith or stimulatethe change froma goodsproducingor industrialeconomy to a serviceeconomy. The
industrialworkerdisappears,and the knowledgeworkerbecomesmoreprevalent.Finally,whereastheindustrialrevolution
presagedthe corporationand the trade union, the post-industrial revolutionhas maximizedthe role of the universityand
researchinstitute.
Lasch (1972) findsthe post-industrial
conceptusefulbut,in
to Bell, views the characteristicsof postcontradistinction
Targ/ GLOBAL DOMINANCE [475]
industrialism
as unique to the lateststagein the developmentof
capitalism. Such societies are still capitalist because "the
industrialsystemproducescommoditiesratherthanobjectsfor
use and that the importantdecisions concerningproduction
remainin privatehands ratherthanbeingsociallydetermined"
(Lasch, 1972: 36).
Lasch contends that a new ruling class of owners and
societies.
managersof the economy dominate post-industrial
More specifically,the rulingclass is "an amalgamof the haute
bourgeosieand the new managerialelite,thatcontrolsthegreat
corporations,most of the land, and the higherreaches of
government
(especiallythe military).In both its functionsand
ideology,the rulingclass is predominantly
managerial"(Lasch,
1972: 38). The ideology of the ruling class is "corporate
liberalism,"an acceptanceof a managedeconomy,the welfare
state, trade unions, and imperialism,all in the name of "free
enterprise."This ideology is disseminatedthroughthe class
structureof white-collarand serviceworkersand is broadly
acceptedby thepopulace.
Further,the politicaleconomyof post-industrialism
requires
and
and
"the
creation
therefore
continualeconomic growth
satisfactionof falseneeds" (Lasch, 1972: 41). Marketresearch,
public relations, defense, and other governmentsubsidized
programsare furtherexamples of "subsidizedwaste." "In the
and the greatcorporations,
betweenthegovernment
partnership
the formerperformsall the functionsindispensibleto the
survivalof the latter,whilethe latterretainthe profits"(Lasch,
1972: 41-42). The demands for investment,
production,and
waste make acceleratingdefensebudgetsand overseasimperialisminevitableas well.
Although Lasch's post-industrialsociety is inherentlyless
stable than the one envisionedby Bell, his conceptionincludes
the increase in government-corporate
integration,the rise of
expertise,the recognitionof technicalknowledgeas an essential
mechanism(as opposed to Bell's implicationthat
intervening
and theincreasing
knowledgeis power) in systemmanagement,
capacityof the rulingclassto controlthe population.As to this

last factor, Lasch states that "the tendency of political
grievancesto present themselvesas personal grievances,the
tendency for repressiveauthorityto assume the guise of
benevolence,the substitutionof psychologyfor politics,and
the pervasivenessof the managerialmode of thought help
preventconflictsfromcomingto the surfaceand contributeto
the illusionthat ideology has exhausteditself" (Lasch, 1972:
46).
Roszak (1969) is a critic of post-industrialsociety but,
contraryto Lasch,analyzesthe phenomenonusingcategoriesof
science,rationalism,and bureaucratization
(ratherthancapitalist economic development). To Roszak, the characteristic
feature of modern society is that it is a technocracy,an
organizationbased upon the confluenceof science, bureaucracy,and centralizedpower. The potencyof thistechnocracy
is measuredmore by its powerto manipulatethanby itspower
to coerce. Marcuse's notion of "repressivedesublimation"is
cited as illustrationof the scope and intensityof technocratic
infiltration
into thepublicpsyche.Large-scaleconsumptionand
the imageryof ready sexual gratification
lead the populace to
believethatit is "liberated"whenin factitsinstinctsand needs
are beingmanipulated.
In a laterwriting,Roszak (1972) arguesthat the progressive
commitmentof man to science (and its dehumanizingand
effectson the world and its people), the rising
denaturalizing
legitimacyof the man of knowledgeas the man of power,and
the seeming acceptance of repressivedesublimationas the
motivepatternfor mass behaviorare contagious.All societies
are movingin the directionof technocracies.The developed
Westcan be characterized
as beingsuave technocracies-mature,
managed, manipulative,and dominated by massive corporations. The Soviet Union is a vulgar technocracy-clumsy,
coercive, still featured by sweat, toil, and an oppressive
ideology. Perverseformsthat integrateracial and nationalist
theorieswithtechnocraticformslike Nazi Germanyand South
Africaare labeled teratoidtechnocracies.Below the mad leader

like Adolf Hitlerare the cool expertssuch as AlbertSpeer and
Adolf Eichmann. Lastly, even thirdworld societies are now
comic opera technocraciesrelyingon foreigntechnicians,new
skilled militaryelites, huge modern national capitals, large
developmentprojects,and "pretentious"bureaucracies.In sum:
stylesare very
The differences
betweentheseveraltechnocratic
enterprises
of the
likelyto diminish,
especially
as thegiant-sized
andspheres
societies
workouttheir
mergers
developed
advantageous
oftheColdWarmaycontinue
ofinfluence.
Theideological
rhetoric
forsometime,butthemaincourseofworldaffairs
willflowtoward
a grandurban-industrial
outward
fromfive
homogeneity,
spreading
or six increasingly
power.[Roszak,
suavecenters
of technocratic
1972:49]
theorists
Despite fundamentaldisputes,these representative
of post-industrial
societypointto severaldiscerniblefeaturesof
selected societies,particularlycapitalistones. First,the social
of post-industrial
structure
societiesis changing.Servicereplaces
industrialproduction as the primaryeconomic activityand
occupational mode (Lasch contends that industriallabor is
increasingly
being transferred
to the thirdworld). Thereforea
class of highlyskilled white-collarworkersis beingtrainedto
serve corporationsand the public bureaucraciesin tertiary
capacities.Above themare menof technicalexpertisetrainedin
science,management,
and communications.
Second, these men play an increasingrole in managingthe
polity and economy.Roszak and Bell assume thatthe technocrats are the new men of power. Bell suggeststhat the very
principleof the new societyis theoreticalknowledge.Lasch,
of knowledgeand capitalsuchthat
however,sees an integration
of capital.In eithercase (expertsas
knowledgeis an instrument
of the rulingclass),power
the new rulingclass or as instruments
is veiled, key actors in the society are less visible,and the
of manipulationmoreeffective.
instruments
Third, Lasch and Roszak suggestthat affluence,as a more
pervasivefeature of post-industriallife, itself becomes an
instrument
of control."False needs" are createdand "repressive
desublimation"is encouraged.Individualconformanceto system needs becomes a functionof the manipulationof pleasure
ratherthan the applicationof pain. Ultimately,
a new hedonism
borne of post-industrial
society will lead to a homogeneityof
values,lifestyles,and beliefs.
Last, post-industrialism
is a dynamicprocess.Roszak, most
concretely,predictsthe emergenceof technocraciesthroughout
the world. Bell's analysis implies an historic process of
developmentleadingsocietiesfrompre-industrial,
to industrial,
to post-industrial
phases.The future-oriented,
social engineering
quality of post-industrial
societies makes their potencies as
models and agents of change in pre-industrial
and industrial
societiesinevitable.Even thoughRoszak and Lasch see inherent
contradictionsin post-industrial
societies,the viabilityof such
formsfor the near futureseems assured.Of importanceis the
clear dynamicquality to post-industrial
developmentand the
consequencesof such developmentfor the expectationsconcerningan emerging
globaldominancesystem.
Dominance, Dependence, and Post-Industrialism:

The Future of Global Politics
An examinationof theliteratureon dominance,dependency,

tendand post-industrialism
suggeststhat thereare converging
enciesbetweenglobal politicsand social changeswithinCenter
nations.First,a global dominancesystemis one withspecified
structuresand regularitiesof behavior.Some theoristssee the
globalsystemprimarily
in termsof a networkof relationsamong
capitalistnations and theirdependencies.Otherscontendthat
the convergencebetween capitalist and socialist worlds is
movingto completion.Hveem,forexample,sees the emergence
of centersof controland accumulationat the global level as
a finalverticalintegrationof all elementsof power.
prefiguring
Centers of power make the critical decisions involvingthe
of raw materialsacquired in the peripheryto
transformation
goods, services,culture,and furtherdominancevia scientific

and technologicaladvances.
The furtherintegrationof the global systeminto a unified
hierarchyof controland accumulationis facilitatedby thenew
societies.
technologicalexpertise generatedin post-industrial
The movementof centernationsfromindustrialto post-industrialeconomiessuggestsa new global divisionof laborwhereby
"pre-industrial"
and "industrial"societiesextractraw materials
and transformthem into finishedproducts, while those in
positions of power in post-industrialsocieties make critical
decisionsabout materialextraction,production,and theallocation of productionoutputs. Because developmentand utilization of scientificand technologicaladvances are within the
purview of the ruling classes (owners and managers) who
manage the post-industrial
centers,contemporarypost-industrial societies are being transformed
into the new centersof
controland accumulationenvisionedby Hveem.
Second, a global dominancesystemsuggestsa diminutionof
betweendomesticand international
distinctions
politics.Center
nations increasinglypenetrate Peripherynations and hence
exploit the latter,distorttheireconomies,and suppresstheir
drivesfor national self-determination.
These policies are made
more effectiveby the use of skillsgeneratedin post-industrial
societies-skillsevolvingfromthe greatercapacitiesof technocrats to control not only the physical environmentand the
world economy,but also the mindsof men. Some theoristsof
post-industrialism,
such as Roszak, see an underlyingobsessive
dynamic for ever expanding control built into technocratic
organization.The whole world, he predicts,will some day
finallybe a grandurban-industrial
complex.
Anotherdimensionof thediminishing
domestic/international
distinction is the horizontal integrationof post-industrial
centersthemselves.These centersendorsethe axial principleof
theoreticalknowledge,a futureorientationto public policy,
and social engineeringas a guide to public policy. Their
commitmentto theoreticalknowledgeand its byproductsleads
to a penchantforgreaterrationalization
of globallifeand hence
to the quest for perfectcontrolof the majorelementsof the
global system.Common social structures,
interests,and belief
systems stimulate an ever broadening integrationof once
distinctCenternations.
Finally, the logic of claims about a new global dominance
systemleads to the presuppositionof a new global homogeneity. The global structure,the principlesof rationalism,the
creationof false needs and consumptionpatternsthroughout
the global stratificationsystem,and the global networkof
communicationsall lead to the evolutionof a global culture.
The post-industrial
society molds and shapes mass attitudes,
desublimation.
values,and behaviorpatternsthroughrepressive
Perfect control within such societies, as with the global
dominancesystem,is based upon the manipulationof desire
and pleasureratherthanbriberyor force.
Conclusion
This paper develops a critique of state-centricmodels of

international
behaviorby reviewing
selectedliterature
on global
These
dominance and dependence and post-industrialism.
bodies of literatureare growingrapidlyand raise fundamental
challengesto prevailingstate-centric
paradigms.Consequently,
theinternational
relationscommunityshouldseriouslyconfront
thechallengesraisedabove so thatinternational
relationstheory
and researchcan move in the directionof furthercomprerealities.
hendingchangesin international
Targ / GLOBAL DOMINANCE [4811
REFERENCES
ALLISON, G. T. (1971) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban MissileCrisis.
Boston: Little,Brown.
BARAN, P. A. and P. M. SWEEZY (1971) "Notes on the theoryof imperialism,"pp.
69-85 in K. T. Fann and D. C. Hodges (eds.) Readings in U.S. Imperialism.
Boston: PorterSargent.
Society. New York: Basic Books.
BELL, D. (1973) The Comingof Post-Industrial
BOOKCHIN, M. (1971) Post-ScarcityAnarchism.Berkeley:Ramparts.
CHASE-DUNN, C. (1975) "The effectsof internationaleconomic dependence on
development and inequality: a cross-nationalstudy," in Amer. Soc. Rev.
(December): 7 20-739.
D'ENTREVES, A. P. (1967) The Notion of the State. London: Oxford Univ.Press.
DOS SANTOS, T. (1971) "The structureof dependence,"pp. 225-237 in K. T. Fann
and D. C. Hodges (eds.) Readingsin U.S. Imperialism.Boston: PorterSargent.
DOUGHERTY, J. E. and R. L. PFALTZGRAFF (1971) ContendingTheories of
InternationalRelations.Philadelphia:Lippincott.
ELLUL, J. (1967) The TechnologicalSociety. New York: Vintage.
EMMANUEL, A. (1972) Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialismof Trade.
New York: MonthlyReview.
FALK, R. A. (1975) A Study of FutureWorlds.New York: Free Press.
FERKISS, V. C. (1969) TechnologicalMan. New York: New AmericanLibrary.
FRANK, A. G. (1971) "On the mechanismsof imperialism:the case of Brazil," pp.
237-249 in K. T. Fann and D. C. Hodges (eds.) Readings in U.S. Imperialism.
Boston: PorterSargent.
GALEANO, E. (1971) "Latin America and the theoryof imperialism,"pp. 205-225
in K. T. Fann and D. C. Hodges (eds.) Readings in U.S. Imperialism.Boston:
PorterSargent.
GALTUNG, J. (1971) "A structuraltheoryof imperialism."J. of Peace Research2:
81-119.
HARRINGTON, M. (1965) The AccidentalCentury.Baltimore:Penguin.
HERZ, J. H. (1961) "The rise and demise of the territorialstate," pp. 80-87 in J.
Rosenau (ed.) InternationalPoliticsand ForeignPolicy. New York: Free Press.
HINSLEY, F. H. (1963) Power and the Pursuitof Peace. London: CambridgeUniv.
Press.
HVEEM, H. (1973) "Global dominancesystem."J. of Peace Research4: 319-340.
InternationalOrganization(1971) Summer.
--- (1970) Autumn.
KISSINGER, H. (1969) AmericanForeignPolicy. New York: Oxford Univ.Press.
KOLKO, G. (1972) The Limitsof Power. New York: Vintage.
KUHN, T. S. (1962) The Structureof ScientificRevolutions.Chicago: Universityof
Chicago.
society," pp. 36-51 in M. D.
LASCH, C. (1972) "Toward a theoryof post-industrial
Hancock and G. Sjoberg (eds.) Politics in the Post-WelfareState. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press.
MAGDOFF, H. (1969) The Age of Imperialism.New York: MonthlyReview.
MORGENTHAU, H. J. (1960) PoliticsAmongNations.New York: Knopf.
[4R21 INTERNATIONAL
STTI)TES
OTTARTERTY
MUMFORD, L. (1963) Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt,Brace &

World.
ROSZAK, T. (1972) WheretheWastelandEnds. GardenCity,N.Y.: Doubleday.
The Makingof a CounterCulture.GardenCity,N.Y.: Anchor.
---(1969)
SENGHAAS, D. (1973) "Conflict formations in contemporary international
society."J. of Peace Research3: 163-184.
SINGER, J. D. (1961) "The level-of-analysis
problemin internationalrelations,"pp.
77-93 in K. Knorr and S. Verba (eds.) The InternationalSystem.Princeton,N.J.:
PrincetonUniv.Press.
WALTZ, K. N. (1959) Man, the State and War.New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
WILKENFELD, J. (1973) ConflictBehaviorand Linkage Politics.New York: McKay.
WILLIAMS, W. A. (1972) The Tragedyof AmericanDiplomacy. New York: Dell.

Global Dominance and Dependence, Post-Industrialism, and International Relations Theory

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Global Dominance and Dependence, Post-Industrialism, and International Relations Theory

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Global Dominance and Dependence, Post-Industrialism, and International Relations Theory: A

This reviewanalyzes four premisesof state-centrictheoriesof internationalrelations

Vol. 20 No. 3, September 1976

[462] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

dominanceand dependencychallengingit, and discussesthe

Historically,the most enduringexplanationof international

Hartford,Connecticut.The author wishes to acknowledgea debt to the Department

Targ /GLOBAL DOMINANCE [463]

power,statesin stable internationalordersaccede to a seriesof

[464] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

relationsliteraA thoroughexaminationof the international

Targ / GLOBAL DOMINANCE [4651

[466] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

ises. Recentchallengesfromtheoriesof linkagepolitics(Wilkenfeld, 1973), integration(InternationalOrganization,1970),

Theories of Dominance and

The new directionsdiscussedbelow come largelyfromthe

Targ / GLOBAL DOMINANCE [467]

probabilitiesof internationalwar between capitalist metropoles as predicted by

[468] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Targ /GLOBAL DOMINANCE [469]

[4701 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

nation are center(c) elites and periphery(p) peoples as well.

Targ/GLOBAL DOMINANCE [471]

[472] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

tion of informationand knowledge,and, most critically,the

Targ /GLOBAL DOMINANCE [473]

down"), where peripheryelites and ultimatelyall periphery

[474] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Targ/ GLOBAL DOMINANCE [475]

[476] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

capacityof the rulingclassto controlthe population.As to this

Targ / GLOBAL DOMINANCE [477]

Africaare labeled teratoidtechnocracies.Below the mad leader

[478] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

Dominance, Dependence, and Post-Industrialism:

An examinationof theliteratureon dominance,dependency,

Targ / GLOBAL DOMINANCE [479]

goods, services,culture,and furtherdominancevia scientific

[480] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY

This paper develops a critique of state-centricmodels of

Targ / GLOBAL DOMINANCE [4811

MUMFORD, L. (1963) Technics and Civilization. New York: Harcourt,Brace &

You might also like