Southern Political Science Association

Defining the National Interest of the United States

Author(s): John L. Chase
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Nov., 1956), pp. 720-724
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association
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VIEWS AND OPINIONS

DEFINING

THE

NATIONAL

INTEREST

OF THE

UNITED

STATES

In a recent issue of THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS,' Robert L. Humphrey calls our attention to the need, in any valid theory of international politics, for an understanding of the "basic value" which
is, as a matter of objective fact, pursued by all governments regardless of their democratic or authoritarian ideologies, and of cultural
or other specific peculiarities. Mr. Humphrey rightly, I believe,
maintains that this basic value is survival or human life, and that
this has both a specific or individual and a group or "species" connotation and significance.
The importance of such a value to the theory of international
politics seems evident, and is not disputed here. Agreement upon
it, however, simply points up the additional importance, in understanding the policies of individual nations, of making clear just what
it is that nations not only have in common, but also what it is that
differentiates their own unique policies. In other words, what is it
that explains the characteristic distinguishing features of the policies of different nations? Recently there seems to have been fairly
general agreement that this is the "national interest." Unfortunately
there has been little agreement as to how this term may be defined,
particularly as it applies to the United States. And as a teacher the
author has found that students have great difficulty with the concept, and seem to find it devoid of any specific content. The author's hope is that in the present article a more specific meaning
can be suggested, which will not only be sound theoretically and
from a scholarly point of view, but which will be a useful teaching
device intelligible and helpful to students. The attempt will therefore be made to ascertain, on the basis of the actual historical record, what have been the most important aspects of the American
national interest which have actually guided and motivated the
development of our foreign policy.
'Robert L. Humphrey, "The Theory of International Relations," THaEJOURVol. 17, No. 4 (Nov., 1955), pp. 664-669.

NAL OF POLITICS,

[ 720 ]

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1956 ]

VIEWS AND OPINIONS

721

In line with Mr. Humphrey's assertion about the importance of

survival, it should not be surprisingto find early American statesmen
formulating one aspect of the national interest in almost the identical
terms. Readers will recall Hamilton's statement (in Federalist No.
8) to the effect that "safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct."
As a general proposition, probably few would question the validity of Hamilton's statement. The main difficulty with it, especially
from the teacher's point of view, is that it is a statement of values
which seems equally applicable to many other nations. Would it
not, for example, be equally true of Germany, Russia, or any other
nation? What we need here, evidently, is a statement of the specific
American security goal, so defined and so limited as to enable us
to differentiate it from the security goals of other countries. Can
we formulate such a specific goal?
Looking back over the whole range of Americanhistory, it should
be possible to recognize a common element and guiding principle in
such varied phenomena as our continental expansion westward, the
acquisition of Alaska and the Philippines, the involvement of the
United States in two world wars, and the extension of American
political and economic commitments to Europe and Asia. One could
perhaps define the underlying common principle by saying that an
important aspect of the national interest has been to deprive potentian aggressors of bases from which successful attacks against the
American homeland might be launched. This has been the specifically American security interest, so defined and so limited as to
mark it off from the security interest of other states.
A typical student question at this point would probably be: why
is it that the area of the world in which the United States has a
security interest has expanded so tremendously? It is, of course,
true that in 1776, say, our interests did not extend to Oregon,
Alaska, or the Philippines, whereas they do (and much further)
today. The answer is that the specific extent of our security interest
is directly affected by and related to the balance of power in the
external world, and to developments in the technology of weapons
and communications. In the days of sailing ships and infantry warfare, our primary concern was with our immediate land frontiers
and the surrounding seas. But in the day of atomic bombs and
rocket weapons, of long-distance airplanes and submarines, and in
an essentially unbalanced world, farther and farther reaches of the

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722

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

[Vol. 18

world's surface have come within the ambit of our security interests. Under conditions of modern technology, attacks against us
might be launched from more and ever more distant shores. Hence
the recent expansion of our interests to the Arctic, to Germany and
Japan, and to the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Security is still
the primary director of national conduct, but the specific conditions
under which it may be attained have changed.
A second major aspect of the national interest has been the
ideological one, or our support for the cause of self-government and
democracy abroad. The Monroe Doctrine itself was a prominent
example of this, since the whole basis of the Doctrine was the distinction between the two "spheres"-the European, which was declared to be the home of despotism, and the American, the home of
democracy. Many of our interventions in Central America were motivated, at least in part, by this concern, as was, most apparently,
our grant of independence to the Philippines. President Wilson's
policy of self-determination was essentially an affirmation of this
interest, and so were the later Atlantic Charter promises of restoring
self-government to conquered peoples, the denial of territorial ambitions, and the declaration that territorial changes were not to be
made without the consent of the peoples concerned. Our opposition
to Soviet aggrandizementhas in part been similarly motivated. The
taproot of this interest is of course the belief that, as the Declaration of Independence has it, governments derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed. This is not, and never has been,
"mere" idealism (as some writers treat it) as distinct from a selfish
interest. On the contrary, it is a permanent and inseparable part
of the American national interest in foreign affairs, and can no more
be separated from it than our quest for national security.
A third major aspect of the national interest has had to do with
economic affairs, both domestic and foreign. Some writers have
treated this primarily in terms of foreign trade and shipping, together with all matters such as customs and tariffs, relating to them.
Thus the freedom of the seas and the removal of restrictions on
freedom of trade were major concerns of the United States from
the Embargo Act of 1807-09 and the War of 1812 through the first
and second World Wars.
But there is a breadth to this interest not ordinarily understood
in terms of shipping and trade, or even or freedom of the seas. In a
famous American controversy with Great Britain over the Vene-

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1956 ]

VIEWS

AND

OPINIONS

723

zuela-British Guinea frontier in 1895, it was Secretary of State

Olney who pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine was a protection
for our domestic economy and society, as well as for our security
interest. For, as Olney said, because of our unique position in the
Western Hemisphere, we had not found it necessary to maintain a
large military establishment, or to divert to war-like purposes a
major part of the products of our civilian economy. The establishment of major European powers in our vicinity would change all
this, and might undermineand destroy the essentially civilian nature
of our society.2 Our interest in the peaceful expansion of world
trade is not, therefore, derived solely from the rights and property
of citizens engaged in foreign commerce narrowly defined, but is
also the legitimate outgrowth of our concern to preserve our civilian
economy and social structure. It merges into the broader interest of
promoting the free circulation of ideas and persons, as well as goods.
It is part and parcel of our concern to broaden our "way of life."
Certainly the most notable expression of this interest in recent years,
the Reciprocal Trade program, is to be viewed in this light.
A final important aspect of the national interest has been our
concern to preserve a favorable world balance of power. One of the
fundamntal axioms of statesmanship is that no statesman worthy of
the name can afford to let his counry be put in a position where its
welfare and security depend solely upon the friendliness of some
foreign government. It follows that no statesman can be indifferent
to the alignment of powers in the world, or can disregard important
trends in the world balance of power. The more far-sighted the
statesman, the more he will take measures far in advance to prevent
the development of a situation in which his own nation's bargaining
power may be severely diminished. Thus in the late thirties there
was little indication that Hitler had any immediate aggressive designs upon the United States. But the essence of President Roosevelt's leadership lay in the fact that he recognized, far in advance,
that a world dominated by Germany and Japan would leave the
United States at their mercy. Therefore he took measures to counteract their influence, before many Americans realized what was at
stake. Similar reasons lie behind much of our recent opposition to
Soviet policy. It can be doubted, for example, whether the United
States has any immediate pressing need for the oil of the Middle
2For the text of Olney's note, see Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of
AmericanDiplomacy (New York: Knopf, 1948), pp. 341-345.

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[Vol. 18

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

East. But if the Soviet Union were ever to gain uninhibited access
to that oil, the result might well be such an accretion of power for
the Soviets as to tip the whole balance of world power against us and the impact might be felt in Europe, Asia, and/or the Middle
East itself. The preservation of a favorable world balance of power
is therefore clearly a legitimate aspect of the national interest which
we can neglect only at our peril.
Such are then, in brief, the major aspects of the American national interest in foreign policy. It is submitted that such a definition provides some concrete substantive content to a term which is
otherwise so elastic and amorphous as to be almost unintelligible;
that it is sound historically; and that students will find it helpful
in their study of both past and present policies. One final advantage
may be mentioned. Defining the national interest simply in terms
of "power" seems to imply that the United States must always pursue its interests at the expense of other nations, and that this in
turn implies that the present organization of national states is inflexible and permanent. Many people feel, however, that progress
in international politics must lie in the direction of creating everlarger, supra-national organizations. Whether either of these conclusions is correct, will not be argued here. But the definition of
the national interest offered here does not seem to have the former
drawback. Assuming that our security would actually be enhanced,
that the cause of self-government would be furthered, that the area
of free exchanges would be broadened, and that the world balance
of power would be further stabilized - or in other words, that the
national interest would be promoted- then the United States might,
at some future date, join some larger organization which might
actually modify the existing form of the national state.
JOHN

Louisiana State University

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L.

CHASE