Wesleyan University

History, Time, and Knowledge in Ancient India

Author(s): Roy W. Perrett
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Oct., 1999), pp. 307-321
Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University
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HISTORY, TIME, AND KNOWLEDGE IN ANCIENT INDIA

ROY W. PERRETT

ABSTRACT
The lack of interest in history in ancient India has often been noted and contrastedwith
the situationin China and the West. Notwithstandingthe vast body of Indianliteraturein
other fields, there is a remarkabledearth of historical writing in the period before the
Muslim conquest and an associated indifferenceto historiography.Variousexplanations
have been offered for this curious phenomenon, some of which appeal to the supposed
currency of certain Indian philosophical theories. This essay critically examines such
philosophical explanations."
I argue that it is not true that there was no history in ancient India, and it is not surprising thatthere was no developed historiographyor scientific history.It is both true and
surprisingthat there was no real importanceattachedto history in ancient India.An adequate philosophical explanation for this historical phenomenon, however, is not to be
found in appeals to the influence of indigenous metaphysicaltheories about time and the
self. A much more plausible philosophicalexplanationappeals instead to certainfeatures
of classical Indianepistemology.

The lack of interest in history in ancient India has often been noted and contrastedwith the situationin China and the West. Notwithstandingthe vast body
of Indianliteraturein other fields, there is a remarkabledearthof historicalwriting in the period before the Muslim conquest and an associated indifferenceto
historiography.Variousexplanationshave been offered for this curiousphenomenon, some of which appeal to the supposed currencyof certain Indian philosophical theories.This essay criticallyexamines such explanations,which I shall
call "philosophicalexplanations."
I take this task to be of particularinterestto threeoverlappingclasses of readers. First,those of us with a special interestin Indianphilosophy cannothelp but
be intriguedby the suggestion that the prestige of certainindigenous philosophical theories was sufficient to preempt the development of history in ancient
India. Second, those who are not specialists in Indian philosophy but who do
have a more general interest in ancient Indianculturewill also be concernedto
evaluate these philosophical explanations of the absence of history in India.
Third,even those who have no particularinterestin Indianphilosophy or culture
may nevertheless be intriguedby attemptsto explain the absence of history in

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ROY W. PERRETT

India,for such attemptsmay enableus to isolate certainnecessaryconditionsthat

must be presentif a cultureis to develop a concern with history.
The generallogical structureof my argumentis of a form long familiarto both
historians and philosophers: a historical phenomenon exists that needs to be
accounted for (what philosophers call the explanandum)and certain supposed
explanatoryfacts (what philosopherscall the explanans) are profferedin virtue
of which it is arguedthat the phenomenonto be explained is just what is to be
expected. As already mentioned, in this case not all the proffered explanans
appeal to the influence of indigenous philosophical theories. Variousother factors are often mentioned,including the relatively late usage of writtenlanguage;
the harshclimate, which made the preservationof manuscriptsdifficult;the lack
of a cultureof political freedom;and the brahmanicalhegemony over writtenliterature.But the explanationsI shall be concernedwith in this essay are those that
appealin some way or other to the presence of certainIndianphilosophicaltheories, without necessarily thereby being committed to the claim that only such
philosophical theories are of explanatoryrelevance. Before proceeding to the
evaluation of these philosophical explanations, however, we need to consider
first a logically prior question, "Is there really an explanandumhere in need of
explanation?"That is, is it really true that there was no history in ancientIndia?
II

It is certainly true that many have claimed that there was no history in ancient
India, and it is also truethatpeople have been saying this for quite some time. (It
is notable too that some of the most influentialof these persons are philosophers
convinced of the truthof some kind of philosophical explanation for the phenomenon.) One of the earliest written sources for the claim is the work of the
great Muslim travellerAlburuni(Muhammadal-Bfruni). Reportingon his visit
to Indiain about 1020 CE, he noted:"Unfortunatelythe Hindusdo not pay much
attentionto the historical order of things, they are very careless in relating the
chronologicalsuccession of their kings, and when they are pressed for information and are at a loss, not knowing what to say, they invariably take to taletelling."'
A much later,but far more influential,source is James Mill's The History of
BritishIndia. Unlike Alburuni,Mill never visited India;moreoverhe was entirely ignorantof any Indianlanguages. Indeed Mill boasts of both of these facts as
special qualificationsfor the task of writing a history of India, for his is a "critical history"and his total lack of Orientalistcredentialsis supposedto guarantee
his impartiality.Unhamperedby the "fond credulity"such firsthandknowledge
might otherwise have inspired, Mill argued for the gross inferiority of Indian
(particularlyHindu)civilization to thatof the West, hence justifying Britishrule.

HISTORY,TIME,AND KNOWLEDGEIN ANCIENTINDIA

309

As soon as reasonbegins to have considerableinfluencein the directionof humanaffairs,

no use of letters is deemed more importantthan that of preservingan accuraterecord of
those events and actions by which the interests of the nation have been promoted or
impaired.But the humanmind must have a certaindegree of culture,before such a memorial is perceived.... All rudenations,even those to whom the use of lettershas long been
familiar,neglect history,and are gratifiedwith the productionof the mythologists and the
poets.
It is allowed on all hands that no historicalcomposition existed in the literatureof the
Hindus; they had not reached that point of intellectual maturity,at which the value of a
recordof the past for the guidance of the futurebegins to be understood. .2

In this respect,Mill argues,even Mughalcivilization is higher up the "scale of

civilizations":
As all our knowledge is built upon experience,the recordationof the past for the guidance
of the futureis one of the effects in which the utility of the artof writingprincipallyconsists. Of this most importantbranchof literaturethe Hinduswere totally destitute.Among
the Mahomedansof Indiathe artof composing historyhas been carriedout to greaterperfection thanin any otherpartof Asia.3

Mill's History became the standard work on India and remained so for
decades.4It was used for many years as a textbook at the East India Company's
college at Haileyburyand thus served to shape the attitudestowardsIndiancivilization of generations of Indian civil servants. It was admired by Thomas
BabingtonMacaulay,the architectof the introductionof a system of English education in India from 1835. It also heavily influencedthe attitudestowardsIndia
of a numberof Europeanwriterswho otherwisehad no personalstake in justifying the existence of the British Raj. One of the more importantof these was
Hegel.
Hegel's interestin Indiawas partlya reactionto the Romanticexoticism about
Indian thought propoundedby Herder and the Schlegels, of whom he was
sharplycritical.5Hegel's own complicatedphilosophyof history implies that the
development of Western thought reveals the unfolding of the world spirit
(Weltgeist)throughthe world-historicalprocess. Comparedto Europe,the Orient
is "static,"lacking in the dynamics of progress that characterizesEuropeanhistory. Hegel claimed to find supportfor his thesis in the descriptive writings of
contemporaryOrientalists.Since Hegel was not himself an Indologist and he
read no Indian languages, he very much relied on British sources-including
James Mill-for his informationaboutIndia.Thus it is not too surprisingto find
him espousing opinions like the following in his Lectureson the Philosophy of
History (1831):
2. James Mill, The History of British India, abridgeded. [1817] (Chicago, 1975), 198-199.
3. Ibid., 329.
4. On Mill's influence and intentionssee Eric Stokes, The English Utilitariansand India (Oxford,
1959) and Javed Majid, UngovernedImaginings:James Mill's The History of British India (Oxford,

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ROYW.PERRETT

The Chinese possess a most minute history of their country.... The contraryis the case
in India. Though the recent discoveries of the treasuresof IndianLiterature,have shown
us what a reputationthe Hindoos have acquiredin Geometry,Astronomy,andAlgebrathat they have made great advances in Philosophy, and that among them Grammarhas
been so far cultivatedthat no language can be regardedas more fully developed than the
Sanscrit-we find the departmentof History altogetherneglected, or rathernon-existent.
For HistoryrequiresUnderstanding-the power of looking at an object in an independent
objective light, and comprehendingit in its rationalconnection with other objects. Those
peoples thereforeare alone capable of History, and of prose generally,who have arrived
at that period of development(and can make that their startingpoint) at which individuals comprehendtheir own existence as independent,i.e. possess self-consciousness....
This makes [the Hindoos] incapableof writing History.All that happensis dissipated
in their minds into confused dreams.What we call historicaltruthand veracity-intelligent, thoughtfulcomprehensionof events, and fidelity in representingthem-nothing of
this sort can be looked for among the Hindoos.6
The blatantly racist rhetoric of the nineteenth-century authors gradually ceases to be publicly acceptable in twentieth-century intellectual discourse, but the
influence of Mill and Hegel nevertheless lives on. An interesting fusion of the
these two influences is apparent in the work of Max Weber. In the writing of his
seminal The Religion of India Weber principally utilized British sources for his
information about India, but methodologically he was also the heir of the
German Geisteswissenschaften tradition that has its roots in Hegel. Unsurprisingly, then, we can hear echoes of both Mill and Hegel in some of Weber's
claims about the intellectual achievements of the ancient Indians:
The sense for the empirical,plain, and sober fact was stifled throughessentially rhetorical habituationto the search for significance in phantasybeyond the realm of facts. Yet,
Indian scientific literaturemade excellent contributionsin the fields of algebra,grammar
(including declamationand dramaand to a lesser extent metric and rhetoric).There are
noteworthycontributionsto anatomy,medicine, (excepting surgery,but including veterinary science) and music (tosolafa!). Historicalscience, however, . . . was altogetherlacking.7
Increasingly the theme of Indian ahistoricity, originally invoked in the service
of Western imperialism and cultural self-aggrandizement, becomes a commonplace of modern Indological studies, even when these are pursued by nonWesterners. Thus the noted Japanese scholar Hajime Nakamura, in his comparative study Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples, reaffirms the familiar sentiments:
All Indianbooks of history, of which there are very few, are tinged with a fantastic and
legendarycolor. They are not productsof historical science but ratherworks of art....
They ignore precise figures, the sequences of events, and other prosaic details relatingto
the time and place where the events took place.... [They] are far from reality, but are
ratherthe productsof fantasy.... In all the Indian documents of the past, little significance has been attachedto the books of history....8

HISTORY,TIME, AND KNOWLEDGEIN ANCIENT INDIA

311

Indeed nowadays some version of the ahistoricitythesis has come to seem so

platitudinousto many contemporaryIndologists that in a 1980 publicationthe
AmericanscholarGeraldLarsonsimply assertsit withouteven a gesturetowards
supplying any evidence for its truth:
["History"is] a categorywhich has no demonstrableplace within any SouthAsian "indigenous conceptual system" (at least prior to the middle of the nineteenthcentury). Quite
apartfrom the merit or lack of merit of an historical interpretation,it appearsthat South
Asians themselves seldom if ever used such an explanation.... In a South Asian environment,historicalinterpretationis no interpretation.It is a zero category.9

But are these claims all true? The fact that the authorsoften seem to be just
quoting their predecessors, usually without acknowledgment, should perhaps
encourageus to take a closer look at the evidence. Moreover,in the quotations
above a numberof distinct ahistoricitytheses are in danger of being conflated,
including at least the following:
(TI) There was no history in ancient India.
(T2)There was no historiographyor scientific history in ancient India.
(T3)There was no significantvalue attachedto history in ancient India.
Now even if it is true, (T2)is hardlyan interestingthesis, since it offers us no
real historical contrast between India and the West that requires explaining.
Although the ancient Greeks and Romans wrote histories, our modem Western
conceptions of historiographyand scientific history only developed in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. That the ancient Indians, like the
ancientGreeks and Romans (and Chinese), lacked them is no surprise.The interesting ahistoricitytheses, then, are (TI) and (T3).
III

Is thesis (TI) true:that is, is it true that the ancient Indianshad no history?The
short answer is "No."1O
Of course, evaluating thesis (TI) is complicated by the
way it threatensto runtogethertwo ratherdifferentissues: (i) whetherthe ancient
Indianshad a sense of the past; and (ii) whetherthey had a sense of the past that
they wrote of in what we would call a historical manner. It would be wildly
implausibleto suggest the Indianshad no sense of the past, given the vast body
of Sanskritliteratureretailing stories of kings and heroes, gods and demons, all
linked by complex intergenerationaland sequentialconnections.However, it has
to be conceded that most of that literaturelacks anything like our modem distinction between real and mythical history. Was there anythingin ancient India
that we can recognize as correspondingto something like our literarygenre of
history?
9. Gerald James Larson, "Karma as a 'Sociology of Knowledge' or 'Social Psychology' of

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ROY W. PERRETT

Indeed there was. At the courts of the ancient Indian kings careful records
were kept of events importantto the realm, even if these are now lost to us. The
ancient texts also allude respectfully to a class of literaturecalled "itihdsa,"a
term with a ratherwider scope than "history"but neverthelessoverlappingwith
a hisit. In the twelfth centuryCE the poet Kalhanacomposed the RdjatarahganT,
tory of his native Kashmir.1IThe earliestpartsof the Mahivamsa, the Pali chronicle of Sri Lankawhich relates the history of Buddhismon the island, date from
the sixth centuryCE.12To be sure,these latterwritingsarenot fully works of critical history in the modernsense, but (as alreadynoted) this is unsurprisingsince
similar shortcomingsare to be found in the works of the Greek and Roman historians. Moreover, whatever the limits of his own historical work, Kalhana
explicitly requiresthat the historiancultivatepersonaldetachmentand consult at
first hand the relevant archival and epigraphicrecords. It is not strictly correct,
then, to assert that there was no history in ancient India, nor that the ancient
Hindus lacked all historical sense.
What is more surprising,however, is the relative paucity of historical literature, given the enormousness of Indian literatureon other subjects. As R. C.
Majumdarremindsus:
[F]or the longest period of Indianhistory,viz., from the earliest time down to the Muslim
conquest in the thirteenthcenturyAD, a period of about four thousandyears, we possess
no historicaltext of any kind, much less a detailed narrativeas we possess in the case of
Greece, Rome and China.... [This is notwithstandingthe fact that ancient] India has
bequeathedus a vast treasuryof texts which representthe intellectualand literaryactivities of more than two thousandyears and cover a wide field.13

Of course, it is possible that there once existed a large body of Indianhistorical literature,now lost to us. But the very few referencesto lost historicalworks
that we do find in the enormous ancient Indianliteraturethat still survives give
us little reason to suppose that there was ever a relatively large numberof historical writings.
An obvious and plausible explanationfor this apparentpaucity of historical
writingsis not thatthe ancientIndianslacked a sense of history,for we have seen
that this is false, but that they did not particularlyvalue history:in other words,
thatthesis (T3)is true.(An interestingpiece of corroboratoryevidence here is the
fact that classical Indianphilosophy did not recognize either history or memory
as independentsources of knowledge.)
Of course, this in turnraises the question of why the Indiansdid not value history, thus locating at last a genuine explanandumfor which various features of
Indianphilosophy might be supposed to provide the explanans. For one set of
11. On Kalhana'scontributionto Indian history see A. Berriedale Keith, A History of Sanskrit
Literature(London, 1920), 158-172; A. L. Basham, "The KashmirChronicle"in Philips, ed., 57-65.
12. L. S. Perera,"ThePali Chronicleof Ceylon," in Philips, ed., 29-56.
13. R. C. Majumdar,"IndianHistory,Its Nature,Scope and Method,"in The VedicAge, ed. R. C.

HISTORY,TIME,AND KNOWLEDGEIN ANCIENTINDIA

313

answersto the question of why the ancientIndiansdid not value history seeks to
locate the explanationin the influence of variousindigenousphilosophicaltheories. Precisely which philosophical theories are supposed to be responsible is
controversial,but candidatesfor the job include particularlytheories about time
and the self. I shall call these general sorts of explanations "philosophical
explanans" and I now intend to examine more closely a few of the proffered
examples.
Before proceedingto this task, however, it might be as well to make explicit
and distinguishtwo methodologicalprinciples:
(P1)Any plausiblephilosophicalexplanansmust be compatiblewith the
majorIndianphilosophicaltexts.
(P2) Any plausible philosophical explanans must be supported by the
majorIndianphilosophicaltexts.
Two quick comments on these principles. First, what I mean by "the major
Indian philosophical texts" here is predictableenough. Following well-established precedent,I include within the intendedscope of this phrasethe principal
texts of the "six schools" of Hindu philosophy (the sad darsana)-SmrkhyaYoga, Nyaya-Vaisesika,Mimdmsa,Veddnta-plus the majorBuddhist and Jaina
philosophicaltexts.14
Second, the second principle is obviously stronger than the first. (P1) only
requires that the explanans should not be inconsistent with the major Indian
philosophicaltexts, whereas (P2)goes further,ruling out argumentsfrom historical silence. Although perhaps an ideal philosophical explanans should satisfy
both of these principles, it is worth noting that most of my criticisms of candidate philosophicalexplanans only requirethe truthof the weaker principle(P1).
IV

One populartype of philosophicalexplanansfor the fact that the ancientIndians

did not attachmuch importanceto history appeals to their very different ideas
aboutthe philosophy of time. Consider,for example, this instanceof the general
explanationtype:
This is why the concepts of meayaand cyclical time are so importantin understandingthe
Indian attitudetowardshistory.... Contraryto the Islamic and Judaeo-Christiantraditions, historyhas no metaphysicalsignificancefor either Hinduismor Buddhism.... The
highest humanideal is theftvanmukta-one who is liberatedfrom Time.... The durability of the cyclical-time concept at the most advanced levels of Hindu metaphysical
thoughtmakes this indifferenceto what we would call history one of the distinguishing
marksof the Indianculturaltradition.... There is no room in this scheme for the modern
idea that man is the subject and agent of history....15
14. For fuller glosses of the Sanskritphilosophicalterms used here and below see John Grimes,A

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ROY W. PERRETT

Once again, several distincttheses are unhelpfullyconflatedhere. Is the explanationfor Indianahistoricitysupposedto be the Indianbelief in cyclical time, or
their belief that time is illusory (mny:), or their belief that the ideal human type
is outside of time? Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn.16
We cannot successfully explain Indianahistoricityby referenceto a generally
acceptedindigenous theory of cyclic time.17 First, the Indiansdid not believe in
"cyclic time," if by that is meant an endless and beginningless recurrenceof
events. It is true that the narrativesrecountedin the Puranasallude to vast cosmic cycles of repeatedcreationand dissolution (the kalpas), but these are cycles
of change within linear time. Moreover, this notion of cosmic cycles did not
directly shape the details of the different theories of time propoundedby the
majorphilosophicalschools.
Second, even if it were true that the Indian philosophersbelieved in cyclic
time, it is unclearhow that would explain Indianahistoricity.After all, many of
the Greekphilosophersbelieved in cyclic time and yet the Greeksdevelopedhistory.18 Moreover the whole subsequent history of Western attitudes to time
exhibits a vacillation between the metaphorsof the arrow and the cycle which
proved entirely compatiblewith the developmentof history.19
Nor will it do to appeal to the notion that the Indiansbelieved time to be illusory (mgya).In fact only the philosophicalschool of AdvaitaVeddntaheld timetogether with the rest of the empirical order-to be (ultimately) unreal; most
Indian philosophers denied that time was unreal.20Anyway, the case of early
Christianityshows us that a belief in the unrealityof time is compatiblewith an
intense concernwith history,for Augustineand othertheologiansunderthe influence of neo-Platonismtypically both excluded time from the highest level of
Being and accepted the soteriological significance of time as a psychological
reality.
A different but not unrelatedsuggestion is that Indian ahistoricity is better
explained by certain philosophical conceptions of the timeless authorityof the
Vedic revelation.21According to the Mlmarnsaphilosophers,the authorityof the
Vedas requiresthat these texts must be both authorlessand timeless. They are
authorlessbecause otherwise they might be fallible, like other authoredtexts
16. For some of the critical points that follow I am indebtedto the terse but trenchantremarksin
JitendraNath Mohanty,-"Between Indology and Indian Philosophy,"in Beyond Orientalism,ed. Eli
Francoand KarinPreisendanz(Amsterdam,1997), 166-168.
17. On the misrepresentationof the Indian view of time as "cyclic" see AninditaNiyogi Balslev,
A Study of Timein Indian Philosophy (Wiesbaden, 1983) and "Time and the Hindu Experience,"in
Religion and Time,ed. AninditaNiyogi Balslev and J. N. Mohanty (Leiden, 1993), 163-181. On the
historiographicalsignificanceof this misrepresentationsee RomilaThapar,"LinearTime in Historical
Texts of Early India,"in India and Beyond, ed. Dick van der Meij (London, 1997), 562-573.
18. For an importantcorrectiveto the common view that the Greekhistoriansespoused a cyclical
view of time see ArnaldoMomigliano,"Timein Ancient Historiography,"Historyand Theory,Beiheft
6 (1966), 1-23.

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TIME,ANDKNOWLEDGE
INANCIENTINDIA

315

familiarto us. They are timeless because they have no origin and do not refer to
historicalpersons. Sheldon Pollock proposes that the conjunctionof this philosophical conception of the timelessness of the Vedas with the general orthodox
brahmanicalcommitment to Vedic authoritydisplaced any branch of learning
thatcould not claim for its texts a "quasi-vedic"status.The "history"of the great
epics is counted as itihasa, the authorityof which is derived from the Vedas,but
secularhistory has no such authorityand hence gets displaced from the cultural
agenda.
The theory is unconvincing. First, it fails to explain why the Buddhists and
Jainas,who denied the authorityof the Vedas, also attachedno great importance
to history.Second, it exaggeratesthe influenceof the Mlmdmsaaccount of revelation, which is but one of several orthodoxHindu views of the matter.22Nyaya,
for example, holds that the Vedas were authoredby an omniscient and trustworthy God: thatis what guaranteestheirreliability.MoreoverNyayaclaims thatthe
Veda is not eternal, for God recreates it anew in each world cycle. Yoga also
attributesthe authorshipof the Vedas to God. Samkhya holds the Vedas to be
unauthoredbut thereby,like other naturalproducts,non-eternal.The Vedantins
believe that the Veda is unauthoredbut not ultimatelyreal and eternal,for only
Brahman is that. There was, then, no general consensus among the Hindu
philosophersthat the Veda is beginningless, eternal,and timeless.
What aboutthe appealto the Indianbelief thatthe ideal humantype is outside
of time? The contemporaryIndian philosopherJitendraNath Mohanty offers a
particularlylucid version of this kind of philosophicalexplanans:
What is needed for a sense of history is a recognitionof the historicityof consciousness.
Now, in general,for Hinduthought,consciousness is above change.... [Accepting]a theory of [the temporalityof] consciousness would also entail a rejectionof that conception
of self or atman which is almost a pervasive feature of Hindu thought.... An essential
temporalityof atman is a necessarypresuppositionof a serious philosophicalconcern for
history.23

ElsewhereMohantyelaborateson this notion of temporalconsciousness thus:

"The consciousness which is temporaland so historical is the intentionalconsciousness. In fact, its temporalityand its intentionalityarebut two aspects of the
same phenomenon.The consciousness which is supra-historicalis the transparent, self-illuminatingconsciousness."24
The idea that liberation(moksa) in some sense involves the recovery of one's
true self ordtman is common to all the Hindu philosophical schools, whatever
their differences about the natureof that self. Moreover,many-though by no
means all-Hindu philosophers associate the dtman with pure, nonintentional
consciousness, a consciousness without a content. (One notable exception is
22. For a review of Hindu treatmentsof revelation,with special referenceto AdvaitaVedanta,see
K. SatchitanandaMurty,Revelationand Reason in Advaita Vedinta(Delhi, 1974).

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ROY W. PERRETT

Ramanuja,who vigorously insists upon the irreducible intentionality of consciousness.25)Thus, broadly speaking, it is true that many Hindu philosophers
deny both the essential intentionalityof consciousness and the temporalityof the
self. But thereremaina couple of majordifficulties with this theory as a general
explanationfor ancient Indianahistoricity.
In the first place it does not seem to fit Indian Buddhism, which famously
denies the existence of the atman but which is also just as ahistorical as
Hinduism. Unsurprisingly,Mohanty anticipates this objection and attempts a
reply:
Where, as in Buddhism,the concept of process is extended to consciousness, this process
is conceived as a series of instantaneousmoments;with Nirvana this flow is arrestedand
transcended.Nirvanais beyond historyjust as much as moksa is, andcannotbe conceived
of as an achievementof history within history.26

This transcendentalistinterpretationof the Buddhistnirvana,however, seems

exegetically dubious, at least for the Mahayana.Certainlyit is difficult to square
with Nagarjuna'sfamous identificationof nirvana and samsdra:"The limits of
nirvanaare the limits of samsira. Between the two there is not the slightest difference whatsoever" (Milamadhyamakakiriki, 25:20). Moreover, the Indian
Buddhist philosophers arguablydid not admit the existence of nonintentional
consciousness, that is, pure, contentless mental events.27Hence, on Mohanty's
theory, the Buddhists-unlike the Hindu philosophers-had no reason not to
develop "a serious philosophical concern with history,"but inexplicably they
failed to do so.
Second, Mohanty'sexplanans does not do full justice to the ethical importof
the Hindu theory of the cycles of cosmic history.28According to this theory the
vast cycles of the world historicalprocess are divided into four recurringages or
yugas. In the first age (the krta-yuga)virtue (dharma)reigns. In the succeeding
ages (the treti- and dvapara-yugas)it progressively declines until in the fourth
age (the kali-yuga) it disappears.Then the world is destroyed and the cosmic
cycle begins again. (The Buddhistsaccept a similarfour-agescosmology and the
Jainas accept a reduced two-ages version.) This cyclical succession of world
ages, however, is not purely mechanical;it also has an ethical significance. It
reflects the rise and fall of the moral order(dharma)due to the actions of human
agents. The precise durationof the ages depends upon the actions and character
of the people, on how well they performtheir dharma.
Save for the short-lived school of Carvakamaterialists,the classical Indian
philosophersall agreedliberation(moksa)to be the supremevalue. But the ortho25. Srfbhdsya,1.1.1.
26. Mohanty,Reason and Tradition,191.
27. Though Yogacaradid admit the existence of nondualistic consciousness, i.e. consciousness
without any structural opposition between subject and object: see Paul J. Griffiths, "Pure

HISTORY,TIME,AND KNOWLEDGEIN ANCIENTINDIA

317

dox Hindu philosopherswere also all committedto the recognitionof the value
of dharma.However, since dharmawith its concernwith right action is so obviously a temporalvalue and moksais apparentlyan atemporalideal, there seems
at least a prima facie tension between them. In fact the Hindu philosophers
espouse a variety of positions on this issue of the relationof dharmato moksa.29
The oldest tradition(presentin the Dharmasastraand the Epics) claims an essential continuitybetween dharma and moksa:selfless performanceof one's dharma leads ineluctablyto moksa.A differenttradition(particularlyassociatedwith
Samkaraand otherVeddntins)insists on a sharpoppositionbetween dharmaand
moksa.But even then the cultivationof dharma is considered a prerequisitefor
the moraldevelopmentof the adhikarin,the qualifiedaspirantto moksa.Thus the
timeless ideal of moksacannot be so easily separatedfrom the temporalideal of
dharma,and the latterconcept is very much part of the Hindu theory of cosmic
cycles. In this sense the Hindu philosophers,throughtheir commitmentto this
backgroundtheory of cosmic history, effectively do temporalizeconsciousness
rathermore than Mohantyadmits. Thus it is unclear that the contrasthis philosophical explanansrequiresreally exists.
It seems, then, that an adequate philosophical explanans of the ahistoricity
phenomenonis not to be found in indigenous philosophicaltheories of time or
the timeless self. My own positive suggestion is that such a philosophical
explanans is instead better located in the details of classical Indianepistemology, ratherthan Indianmetaphysics.In other words, it is the Indianphilosophers'
ratherdifferentconceptionof knowledgethatleads them to attachno importance
to history,to deny history andmemorythe statusof knowledge.To see this, however, we need to understandsomething of the backgroundof Indianphilosophical thinkingabout the natureof knowledge, that is, that partof their philosophical traditionthe Indianscall pramanavdda.
V

Classical Indian philosophical theory of knowledge was centered around

pramnnatheory.In Indianepistemology the pramanas are the means of knowledge, providingknowledge throughmodes like perception,inference, and testimony.30The prameyas are the knowables, cognizable entities which constitute
the world.Apramd is a knowledge-episodeand the relationbetween such a cognitive episode and its object (prameya)is structuredby thepramanas.Apramdna
providesboth an authoritativesource for makinga knowledge claim and a means
for (or way of) knowledge. In other words, a pramanahas a dual character:both
evidential and causal. It provides evidence or justificationfor regardinga cognitive episode as a knowledge-episode.But it is also supposedto be the most effective causal route to such an episode. Thus the theory of pramanasbecomes both

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a theory of epistemic justification and a metaphysical theory of the causal

requirementsnecessary for the validity of such justification.The pramanas are
not simplyjustificationprocedures,but also those methodsthat matchthe causal
chains with the justificationchains so as to validate knowledge claims.
All schools of Indianphilosophy agreed that truthis a differentiatingcharacteristic of knowledge-episodes (pram7). Some schools add extra conditions,
including novelty. Save for the Carvaka,everyone admittedat least perception
and inferenceas pramunas.Almost all the Hinduphilosophers(save for the early
Vaisesikas)were willing to add testimony to the list. But no one was willing to
admitmemoryas a means of knowing. Since this omission is plausiblyrelatedto
theirattitudeto history,it is worth consideringthe argumentsthe Indianphilosophers used to justify their standon the matter.
Basically memory (smrti)is ruled out as a pramuniafor three reasons (though
not everyone accepted all three of these arguments).31First, memory does not
give us new knowledge, but only revives old knowledge. Genuine knowledge
has to be both true (pram&)and novel (anadhigata). Second, a genuine knowledge-episode is true in virtue of correspondingto its object, but the objects of
memory no longer exist. The object as rememberedis not the object as originally presented,but a representationof what was once presented.Third,a pramcna
must be capableof makingits objects known independently,but memoryreveals
its objects only throughthe traces of past experience. These three conditions of
novelty, correspondence,and independence, it is argued,jointly and severally
preclude memory being a means of knowledge. All three conditions appeal in
variousways to those featuresof memorywhich entail thata memoryexperience
is not a presentative(anubhava)cognition. Genuineknowledge, it is assumed,is
presentative,not representative.
But even if the Hindu philosophersdenied memory the status of a pramana,
most of them admittedtestimony (sabda) as one. Why was this concession not
thoughtto validate historicalknowledge? Briefly, because the scope of testimony was so restrictedby the novelty, immediacy,and independenceconditions on
knowledge thathistoricalknowledge was largely unacceptableas a genuine form
of testimony.
For the orthodoxHinduphilosopherstestimonyor sabda-pramnnahad special
connotationsbecause it was taken to be the means for justifying the scriptural
authorityof the Vedas.Indeedfor some philosophicalschools (like Mimdmsaand
Advaita Veddnta)testimony primarilymeans scripturalauthority.But for those
schools sabda's sphere of authorityis then taken to be confined to nonempirical
(alaukika)matters.Hence scripturalauthoritycannotcontradictcommon experience in ordinarymattersand such testimony,providedit is internallyconsistent,
easily meets one necessary conditionon knowledge: it is free from contradiction
(abadhita). It is also obvious that testimony so understoodreadily satisfies both

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the novelty and independenceconditions on knowledge. It is even more obvious

that history could not qualify as testimony on such a conception of s'abda.
This is not, however, the only Hindu view of testimony.Nyaya acceptedtestimony as a means of knowledge, but argued that it merely means the verbal
knowledge one gets from a trustworthyexpert (apta). Testimonyis of two kinds:
thatdealing with perceptibleobjects and thatdealing with imperceptibleobjects.
The Vedas are concernedonly with the second sort of objects and their authority derives from their being authoredby a trustworthyexpert: a sage, or in the
developed Nyaya tradition,God (Isvara). Ordinarytestimony,however, can be
authoritativewithin its own sphere of perceptible objects if it is the word of a
trustworthyhuman expert. Indeed old Nyaya is very permissive about this:
Vatsyayanasays such an authorityneed not be a sage, and could even be a barbarian (mleccha)!32

But this general Nyaya position increasingly comes under attack from other
Hindu philosopherswho feel that it fails to guaranteeproperlythe authorityof
the Vedas. On the one hand, the Naiyayikasare hardpressed by the Advaitins to
define in a noncircularfashion precisely what an apta is such that his or her testimony is a source of knowledge. On the otherhand,they are constrainedby their
acceptance of at least the independence and immediacy conditions on knowledge. The later Naiyayikasrespondby distinguishingbetween two kinds of verbal statements:Vedic (vaidika) and secular (laukika).33Vedic statementsare all
authoritativebecause they are made by God. Secularstatementsare only authoritative if they are made by a trustworthyperson (an apta). This distinction
enables Nyaya to guaranteethe authorityof the Vedanoncircularlyprovidedthat
they can independentlyprove the existence of God-which they endeavorto do
with a batteryof causal and cosmological arguments.But having admittedthat
not all secular statementsare authoritative,we now need a criterionfor distinguishing trustworthyfrom nontrustworthyspeakers.This is not at all easy to do
in a fashion that both satisfies the correspondenceand independenceconditions
for knowledge and does not just reduce seculartestimony to the supposedlydistinctpraminas of perceptionor inference. Certainlyit is almost impossible if we
know nothing about the speaker, for how can the testimony of an unknown
speaker by itself have the justificatory authorityof a pramana. Thus it is that
Nyayarejectsthe proposalthattradition(aitihiya), definedas "a statementwhose
But this
originalspeakeris not known,"should count as a distinctivepram&na.34
rejection is tantamountto the rejection of history as an independentmode of
knowledge.
Underpinningall this argumentationis a fundamentalIndianassumptionabout
the natureof knowledge: that it is presentative(anubhava),not representative.
Note that the Sanskritterm I am translatinghere as "knowledge"is pram&.A
pram&, however, is really a knowledge-episode, a "knowing."35Although

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episodic notions of knowledge are not wholly unfamiliarto Westernepistemologists, they have tended to favor instead a dispositional theory of knowledge
accordingto which knowledge is a capacity,ratherthanan episode or occurrence
of that capacity.In Indianepistemology not only are perceptionsand inferences
episodic in character,but a knowing episode is an awarenessor experience that
is the culminationor end-productof a perceptualor inferentialprocess. Moreover, not every cognitive episode amounts to a knowledge-episode; only such
cognitive episodes as yield truthare knowledge-episodes.For the Indianepistemologists, then,knowledge is a special kind of momentarymentalepisode: a true
cognition revealingthe natureof reality as it is, via a reliablecausal route. Given
this conception of knowledge, we can easily see one reason why both memory
and history are excluded as sources of knowledge:they do not have the requisite
episodic immediacy.
Understandingthe Indianconceptionof knowledge, then, enables us to offer a
more plausible philosophical explanans for the phenomenon of ancient Indian
ahistoricity:namely that the particulartheory of knowledge articulatedin classical Indianepistemology implies history is not a genuine kind of knowledge, and
the influence of this philosophical theory explains the lack of importancethe
Indiansattachedto history.
But even if this proposedexplanationis true,it obviously leaves us with a further question. Suppose Indianahistoricitywas due to the influence of this philosophical conception of knowledge, a conception which excludes history as
knowledge. Why, however, were the Indians so impressed by the theory?Why
did they not just redefine"knowledge"to include history?I can only conjecture
a reply to this question. This reply seems to me ratherplausible, but I do not
claim thatit is an explanationthat satisfies both of the methodologicalprinciples
I invoked earlier as constraintson an ideally adequatephilosophical explanans.
More specifically, although my conjectureis compatible with the major philosophical texts, I cannotpoint to any texts that explicitly supportit.
My conjectureappealsto the enormouslyimportantIndianbackgroundbelief
thatliberation(mokya)is the supremevalue. All the Indianphilosophicalschools
startfrom the assumptionthatworldly life is radicallyunsatisfactoryand thatliberation from suffering is both desired and possible. The possibility of such
release is guaranteedby the fact thatthe presence of ignorance(avidyd)is a necessary factorin the causal chain which leads to bondage. Hence knowledge (the
absenceof ignorance)can effect liberationfrom our bondage.Whatevertheirdifferences aboutthe details, almost all Indianphilosophersagreedon at least this.
But these assumptions in turn imply a certain conception of knowledge: the
knowledge that effects liberationmust be presentational,ratherthan representational, for otherwise we would already know and hence already be liberated.
(Even those schools like Sanikhya and Advaita that claim we are, in a sense,

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cal knowledge) is just not importantenough to count as genuine knowledge

because it does not promotethe supremevalue of moksain the way real knowledge should. This, I submit,is why the Indianphilosopherswere so wedded to a
conception of knowledge that implies history is too unimportantto count as a
mode of knowledge.
VI

It is not truethattherewas no historyin ancientIndia,and it is not surprisingthat

there was no developed historiographyor scientific history. It is both true and
surprisingthat there was no real importanceattachedto history in ancient India.
An adequatephilosophicalexplanationfor this historicalphenomenon,however,
is not to be found in appealsto the influenceof indigenousmetaphysicaltheories
about time and the self. A much more plausible philosophical explanation
appealsinstead to certainfeaturesof classical Indianepistemology.36
Massey University
New Zealand