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K.Sri Ram
K.Sri Ram
K.Sri Ram
causal theories fall in to the realm of metaphysics as scientific knowledge is not the
knowledge of ultimate origins (75,78,79). The paradox with positivism is that only through
metaphysical concepts; positivism can make sense of itself (80). Habermas critique of
positivism is that its theories can be falsified as demonstrated by applying the theory to itself,
which fails in the case of positivism while seeking to copy reality (79, 87).
Following Comte, Mach looks at the subject as an object and rejects
the Hegelian notion of the self and the other where the world is conceived to be an infinite
proposition which can be tested by theory.5According to Mach, the objectivity of knowledge
cannot be understood from the perspective of the knowing subject but can only be derived
from the object domain (86). Habermas calls Machs project to be a copying process where
knowledge is produced through the synthesis between the perceiving objects and perceived
objects (87). Mach could not properly justify his theory concerning reflection that goes
beyond the realm of science, including itself (87). Mach says, Reflection can abolish itself
[] only by granting science a legitimate object domain (88). He suggests that a prior
knowledge is required for man to perceive science and in turn science is engaged in the
empirical study of man.
Peirces logic of inquiry is founded on the belief that by having enough
information and exerting adequate thought, one can arrive at a definite conclusion like any
other would under favourable conditions. He combines realism with transcendental
philosophy and turns it in to the inquiry of logic (111). Peirce says [] every question [has]
a true answer, a final conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly gravitating
(93). The conundrum in Peirce lies in his proposition that knowledge is grounded in the way
of life. As opposed to Positivism, Pierces logic of inquiry falls between formal and
transcendental logic while trying to extend the structure of logic to knowledge under
empirical conditions (94). This implies that knowledge as a description of reality cannot be
detached from the knowing subject. Reality itself becomes a transcendental concept where it
can exist independent of actual knowing (95). He employs three types of logical inferences
namely induction, deduction and abduction as types of logical inquiry and states that the
beginning and ending of the chain of reasoning cannot be clearly perceived. He says, There
are neither fundamental propositions that qualify as principles once and for all, without being
justified by other propositions that are immediately certain and unaffected by our
5 Dr.Michael Dusche, Lectures on Habermas.
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K.Sri Ram
interpretations (97). This is the conundrum in Pierce where no matter how far one retraces
ones inferences, one remains caught in the compass of interpretations (98). Similarly the
conundrum in Konrad Lorenzs evolutionary epistemology can be spotted, where man
perceives nature through evolution and nature manifests itself in the site of man where man
becomes the transcendental subject.
In Diltheys theory of understanding expression, he classifies
hermeneutic understanding in to three classes of life expressions among which linguistic
expression can be totally detached from real life context (163). The vicious empirico
transcendental circle in Dilthey can be recognised when he says that the dilemma of cultural
sciences is due to the hermeneutic circle that designates cultural sciences (171). The analysis
between symbols and objects uses metalinguistic statements to describe an object language.
But these linguistic objects can also be viewed as experiential data which gives the objects
held by cultural sciences a double status (171). The circular development while combining
linguistic analysis with experience, the interpretive process involved would be caught in a
vicious circle (171). Man gets caught between the disciplines of culture sciences and natural
sciences in a hermeneutic circle while trying to arrive at an understanding or consensus.6
Bibliography:
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. Routledge, 2005.
Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
Dusche, Michael. Lecture notes. 2014.
6 Ibid.
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