Nilo vs CA

Facts:

These petitions are jointly heard to question the

effectivity of of RA 6839, which amended Sec 36
(1) of RA 3844 allowing a landowner to eject an
agricultural lessee or tenant on the ground that the
owner shall personally cultivate the land himself.

GR No L-34586: Respondent Almario

Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of
riceland at Barrio San Roque, San Rafael,
Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T76791 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the
agricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since
agricultural year 1964-65. On March 7, 1968,
Gatchalian flied an ejectment suit against
petitioner on the ground of personal
cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act
No. 3844. Nilo alleged by way of affirmative
defense that the ejectment suit was but an
act of reprisal and retaliation because he
elected the leasehold system, The RTC and
CA ruled in favor of private respondents.
Upon MOR to the CA, the petitioner "personal
cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an
agricultural lessee has been eliminated under
Republic Act No. 6389. The CA denied the
motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389
has no retroactive application.

GR No. L-36625: This is an appeal raised by

petitioner Fortunato Castro to the Court of Appeals
from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations
dismissing his complaint for the ejectment of his
tenant, respondent Juan Castro, on the ground of
personal cultivation. The landowner wants to
personally cultivate the land owned by him located
in Pulilan, Bulacan with an area of 6,941 square
meters. Petitioner Fortunato Castro questioned the
constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No.
6389 which amended Section 36(l) of Republic Act
No. 3844. After the enactment of Republic Act No.
6389 on September 10, 1971, the respondent
moved for the dismissal of petitioner's complaint
on the ground that the new law eliminated
personal cultivation by the landowmer as a ground
for the ejectment of an agricultural tenant. The
Court of Agrarian Reln dismissed the complaint.

Issue: W/N the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be

given retroactive effect to cover cases that were filed
during the effectivity of the repealed provision.
Ruling: NO

Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the

New Civil Code) provides that: "Laws shall not have
a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise
provided." According to this provision of law, in
order that a law may have retroactive effect it is
necessary that an express provision to this effect
be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be
understood which is not embodied in the law.

The general rule therefore, is that statutes have no

retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein
(Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v.
Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172).
The petitioner-tenant in G.R. No. L-34586 contends
that since Republic Act No. 6389 is a social
legislation and passed under the police power of
the State, it should be liberally interpreted in favor
of the tenants
We agree with the petitioner-tenant that the law in
question is social legislation. But social justice is
not for tenants alone. The disputed land in L-36625
is only 6,941 square meters. The area of the land in
L-34586 is slightly bigger, about two (2) hectares.
A person with only one or two hectares of land to
his name is equally deserving of social justice.
Precisely, the legislators, in providing "personal
cultivation" as a ground to eject tenants intended
to encourage and attract the landowners to go to
their respective provinces and till their own lands.
Unfortunately, the ground of "personal cultivation"
was abused and used as a pretext to eject the
tenant and this led to the amendatory law.
This unfortunate consequence should not work an
injustice upon those small landowners proven to
have the bona fide intention to personally cultivate
their lands.

Baltazar vs CA
Facts:

In 1969, private respondent bought two parcels of

riceland having an aggregate area of 3.2 hectares.
On the ground of converting the same into a
residential subdivision, she filed, that same year, a
complaint for ejectment of petitioner, the
agricultural lessee and share tenant of the
properties since 1912. Petitioner claimed that the
former landowner, in violation of sections 11 and
13 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. 3844
which took effect in 1963 until amended by R.A.
6839 in 1971) sold the properties without giving
him notice, and registered the sale without the
required Affidavit to the effect that the notice
requirement had been complied with. By way of
counter-claim, petitioner, in the exercise of his right
of redemption, tendered and deposited P5,000.00
with the Agrarian Court to cover the purchase price
of P4,608.32 paid by private respondent to the
former owner. In a decision dated August 20, 1970,
the Agrarian Court upheld petitioner's right of
redemption and ordered private respondent to
convey the properties to him. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, however, the complaint for
ejectment was dismissed based on the status
quo provision of Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and
316 which were both issued during the pendency
of the appeal. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner now seeks a review of CA decision

dismissing the ejectment suit against a tenant filed
by a landowner who wanted to convert her land
into a residential subdivision, but denying to the
tenant the right of redemption, premised upon the
retroactive application of Presidential Decrees Nos.
27 and 316.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in according retroactive

application to Presidential Decrees Nos. 27 and 316.
Ruling: YES

It will thus be seen that the action was instituted

on 24 December 1969, long before Presidential
Decrees Nos. 27 and 316 took effect on 21 October
1972 and 22 October 1973, respectively. Decision
was rendered by the trial Court on 20 August 1970,
also prior to the effectivity of said decrees. The
case had been pending before the Court of Appeals
since 1970, again prior to the promulgation of said
Decrees, although its Decision was rendered after
their enactment.

There being no express nor clearly implied

authorization embodied in PD Nos. 27 and 316
allowing retrospective application, prospective
construction is called for.

But even if applied retroactively, PD Nos. 27 and

316 will find no application considering that
ejectment proceedings herein were not filed to
harass the tenant but to convert the land into a
subdivision, a reason perfectly valid under the laws
then in force.

It is Republic Act No. 3844, which took effect on 22

August 1963, prior to its amendment by Republic
Act No. 6839 on 10 September 1971, that should
govern the relationship between the contending
parties and which should determine whether or not
the trial Court's findings that petitioner had
properly exercised his right of redemption is
correct.

Private respondent herself failed to give the

required notice under section 36 (1) of the same
Code prior to the filing of ejectment proceedings.

Considering that petitioner could not exercise his

right of pre- emption for lack of notice and the sale
was consummated, he must be held to be entitled
to the lawful exercise of his right of redemption
allowed under Section 12 of the same Code.

Harmonizing the foregoing provision together with

section 36, supra, even if a landowner desires to
convert under section 14, a lessee possesses the
right to be secured in his tenure until a just cause
for his dispossession is proved and his ejectment is
authorized by the Court. The right of a lessee to
pre-empt or redeem a landholding cannot be
exercised if the owner bought or holds the land for
residential purposes. However, the limitation to the
lessee's right to pre-empt or redeem is conditioned
upon the fulfillment by the landowner of the
following requisites: (1) that the property is
suitably located; (2) that the conversion be in good
faith; and (3) that the conversion is substancially
carried out within one year from the date of
sale. 9 These conditions must concur, otherwise,
the land is subject to redemption by a tenant.

The trial Court found that the foregoing requisites

had not been fulfilled by private respondent. The
latter had not proven suitability. Petitioner was
admittedly the agricultural lessee of the lands from
which he was being sought to be ejected. Private
respondent had no approved plan of subdivision.
She did not have the approval of the proper
authorities to convert the properties into a
subdivision, nor had the construction been
readied. 10 The trial Court also found that there was

some measure of bad faith on the part of private

respondent in seeking the dispossession of
petitioner, and that no substantial conversion had
been undertaken by private respondents.
The Supreme Court held, that Presidential Decrees
Nos. 27 and 316 may not be applied retroactively,
so that petitioner, who is entitled to the right of
pre-emption and redemption under the provisions
of R.A. 3844, the law then in force, had validly
exercised his right to redeem, his right of
preemption not having been made available to him
due to lack of notice of the sale. Decision of the
Court of Appeals set aside and decision of the
Court of Agrarian Relations affirmed.

PNR vs Del Valle

Facts:

PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the

registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a
uniform width of 30. meters adjoining one another
longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad
right of way running from Manila to Legazpi.

Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of

the three strips of land aforementioned which are
on both sides of the track, not actually occupied by
the railroad track, after a competitive public
bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a
period of three (3) years and under conditions
hereinbefore set forth. Bingabing, however, failed
to take possession because respondent Pampilo
Doltz was occupying the land, had a house
thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant of previous
awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.

Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed

suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the
premises in the Court of First Instance of Albay.

Doltz' answer in that case averred inter alia that

the had been a tenant on the property for over
twenty years; that he had been placed thereon by
the deceased Pablo Gomba who leased the
property from the then Manila Railroad Company
(now PNR); that he became the tenant of Demetrio
de Vera, Gomba's successor; that he is the tenant
of Bingabing, having given the latter's share of 1/3
during the last two harvests; and that the case is
properly cognizable by the Court of Agrarian
Relations.

While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in

the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered
with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a
petition against Bingabing for security of tenure,
the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the
crops, and reliquidation of past harvests.

Petitioners opposed and maintained that CAR has

no jurisdiction over the case. CAR, nevertheless,
resolved in favor of Doltz. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the land here involved an agricultural land
within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
the Agricultural Land Reform Code?
Ruling: NO.

According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy

Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical
possession by a person of land devoted to

agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by,

another for the purpose of production through the
labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household, in consideration of
which the former agrees to share the harvest with
the latter, or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in
both."
It is obvious then that under the law, the land here
in controversy does not fit into the concept of
agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to
agriculture because by its own charter, Republic
Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture
Indeed, the land which adjoins the railroad track
on both sides is part of PNR's right of way. That
right of way is not limited to the particular space
occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also
includes the portions occupied by the telephone
and telegraph posts. It extends to a width of 30
meters which reasonably gives the train locomotive
engineer a clear commanding view of the track and
its switches ahead of him.
Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides
of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent
with agricultural activities.
Even on the assumption that the land is
agricultural, there is the circumstance that PNR
prohibits the sublease of the premises. PNR's
lessees cannot give what they are not allowed to
give.
This ushers us to a principle shaped out by
jurisprudence that the security of tenure
guaranteed by our tenancy law may be invoked
only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not
true and lawful tenants.

HIDALGO v HIDALGO
CMU vs. DARAB
G.R. No. 100091

Facts:
Petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural
education institution owned and run by the state
located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon
province. It started as a farm school at Marilang,
Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public
demand for and agricultural school in Mindanao.
In 1960s it was converted into a college
with campus in Musuan, and became known as
the CMU. Primarily an agricultural university, the
school was the answer to the need for training
people in order to develop the agricultural
potential of the island of Mindanao.

On January 16, 1958 the late president

Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 476,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and
reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a
site which would be the future campus of what is
now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3080
hectares was surveyed and registered and titled
in the name of the petitioner.
In the early 1960s student population of
the school was less than 3000. By 1988, the
student population had expanded to some 13000
students. To cope with the increase in its
enrollment, it has expanded and improved its
educational facilities partly from government
appropriation and partly by self-help measures.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No.
160, a livelihood program called Kilusang
Sariling Sikap Program under which the land
resources of the University were leased to its
faculty and employees. This arrangement was
covered by a written contract. Under this
program, the faculty and staff combine
themselves to groups of five members each, and
the CMU provided technical know-how, practical
training and all kinds of assistance, to enable
each group to cultivate 4-5 hectares of land for
the lowland rice project. The contract prohibits
participants and their hired workers to establish
houses or live in the project area and to use the
cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan.
It was expressly stipulated that no landlordtenant relationship existed between the
CMU and the faculty and/or employees.
Among the participants in this program
were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven
Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio
Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a
Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others
were employees in the lowland rice project. The
other complainants, who were not members of
the faculty or non-academic staff of the CMU,
were hired workers or laborers of the participants
in this program.
When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua
became President of the CMU in July 1986, he
discontinued the agri-business project for the
production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as
Agri-Business Management and Training Project,
due to losses incurred while carrying on the said
project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were
the complainants, were laid-off when this project

was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this

agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty of
mishandling the CMU funds and was separated
from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17,
the re-organization law of the CMU.
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as
President, the CMU launched a self-help project
called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMUIEP) to develop unutilized land resources,
mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance,
provide socio-economic and technical training in
actual field project implementation and augment
the income of the faculty and the staff.
Under
the
terms
of
a
3-party
2
Memorandum of Agreement among the CMU,
the CMU-Integrated Development Foundation
(CMU-IDF) and groups of "seldas" of 5 CMU
employees, the CMU would provide the use of 4
to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1)
calendar year.
The participants agreed not to allow their
hired laborers or members of their family to
establish any house or live within the vicinity of
the project area and not to use the allocated lot
as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided
that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist
as a result of the Agreement.
Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was
extended only to workers and staff members who
were still employed with the CMU and was not
made available to former workers or employees.
In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impart of
the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar
cane project on the lives of its former workers,
the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMUIEP as special participants.
The one-year contracts expired on June
30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those
whose contracts were not renewed were served
with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the
discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can
project, the loss of jobs due to termination or
separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed
to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the
DARAB found that the private respondents were

not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries

under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB
ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of
suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the
CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for
distribution to qualified beneficiaries.

Issue:
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines
whether lands reserved for public use by presidential
proclamation is no longer actually, directly and
exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for
which they are reserved?

Held:
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best
position to resolve and answer the question of when
and what lands are found necessary for its use. The
Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of
exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs." The
Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for
the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively
exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out
its present educational program with its present
student population and academic faculty" overlooked
the very significant factor of growth of the university in
the years to come.

CASE DIGEST #6: ATLAS VS AGRA

Facts:
Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the
constitutionality of some portions of Republic Act No. 6657
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation, Philippine Federation of
Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention Archie's
Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They
assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as
well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained
in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by
public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform as unconstitutional.

Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL

violate the Constitution in the following manner:

1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend

agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural
lands.
2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture
lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated,
and differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial
lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the
constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and
burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other
industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of the
Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in
economic and employment opportunities.
4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its
government-induced investments in aquaculture even as
Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the
State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments and to
expansion and growth.
The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has
been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v.Secretary of
Agrarian Reform regarding the inclusion of land devoted to the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the
same above-mentioned provisions insofar as they include in its
coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry,
particularly fishponds and prawn farms.

HELD:
PETITIONERs contention
First argument: that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, this Court has already ruled impliedly that lands
devoted to fishing are not agriculture lands, for the use of land is only
incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and, hence,
should be excluded from R.A. 6657.

Second argument: that R.A. 6657, by including fishponds and prawn

ponds in the same classification as agriculture violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and is, therefore, void. the intent
of the consti framers is to exclude industrial lands, to which category
lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms
belong.Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform are, likewise, unconstitutional, as
held in Luz Farms, and are therefore void as they implement the
assailed provisions of CARL.
Further, that in fishponds and prawn farms, there are no farmers,
nor farm workers, who till lands, and no agrarian unrest, and therefore,
the constitutionally intended beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution do not exist in aquaculture.

COURTs decision
The question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions
has been rendered moot and academic because RA 7881, approved
by congress on February 20, 1995, expressly states that fishponds &
prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL.

Issue:

The court will not hesitate to declare law or an act void when
confronted with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the
Legislative & Executive branches of the government in correcting or
clarifying, by means of amendment said law or act.

Whether or not Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32

of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and
procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10
Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform are unconstitutional.

CASE DIGEST #7

Held:

Luz Farms (petitioner) vs. Secretary of the Department of

Agrarian Reform (respondent) G.R. No. 86889. December 4,
1990

No, the contested provisions of R.A. 6657 and of A.O. Nos. 8

and 10 are not unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has
already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not
agricultural lands. In aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms,
the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor
in productivity and, hence, as held in "Luz Farms," they too
should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just as lands devoted to
livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same
reason.
When the case was pending, RA 7881 was approved by
Congress amending RA 6657. Provisions of R.A. No. 7881
expressly state that fishponds and prawn are excluded from
the coverage of CARL.
Thus, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

Ponente:
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order
and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the
Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for
acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions
of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the
Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit
Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to
herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation
of the constitutional rights of the petitioner. On June 10,1988,
the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its

coverage (Rollo, p. 80). On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of

Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in
Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80). On January
9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its
Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No.
6657. Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation
engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together
with others in the same business allegedly stands to be
adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section
11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657
promulgated on January 2,1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated
by the DAR on January 9,1989.
Issue:

Moreover, in his answer to Commissioner Regalado's

interpellation, Commissioner Tadeo clarified that the
term "farmworker" was used instead of "agricultural
worker" in order to exclude therein piggery, poultry and
livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986,
Vol. II, p. 621).

CASE DIGEST
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v CA
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was

Whether or not the Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.

6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) is
constitutional.

the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6

Held:

which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang community.

Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional

in so far as they include lands devoted to raising
livestock, swine and poultry within its coverage. The
use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor
or consideration of productivity in this industry.
The Supreme Court held that:
The transcripts of deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of
the government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural
land" as defined under Section 166 of RA 3844, as land
devoted to any growth, including but not limited to
crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned
land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The Supreme Court noted that the intention of the
Committee to limit the application of the word
"agriculture" is further shown by the proposal of
Commissioner Jamir to insert the word "arable" to
distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such
lands as commercial and industrial lands and
residential properties. The proposal, however, was not
considered because the Committee contemplated that
agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable
agricultural lands and therefore, do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record,
CONCOM, 7 August 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).

hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds,

Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the
property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in December
1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court
seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile.
By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of
private respondents.

After the filing of the ejectment cases,

respondents petitioned the Department of Agrarian Reform for the

compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP. The
landholding of SRRDC was placed under compulsory acquisition.
Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the property
contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural
purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and
above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were
not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against
the petitioner. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite
the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior
to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657
Held:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be
exempt from its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed
parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected
for watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations and the control of

flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that
needs to be answered now.

G.R. No. 122256 October 30, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
Private respondent Acil Corporation owned
several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista,
Davao del Norte, which the government took
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (R.A. No. 6657). Private respondent's
certificates of title were cancelled and new ones
were
issued
and
distributed
to
farmerbeneficiaries.
It appears, however, that in the Statement of
Agricultural Landholdings ("LISTASAKA") which
private respondent had earlier filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower
"Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated .
Private respondent rejected the government's
offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to
the same crops were valued at the higher price.
The matter was brought before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who,
sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP.
Private respondent filed a Petition for Just
Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of
Tagum, Court. Private respondent prayed that
DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare.
However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the
ground that private respondent should have
appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the
latter's Revised Rules of Procedure, before
recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition
the RTC found that, in violation of the DARAB's

rules of procedure the petition had been filed

more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the
decision of the PARAD.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but
its motion was denied Private respondent
therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for
just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 56-57
falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the
Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the case was
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
Issue:
whether in cases involving claims for just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal
from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to
the DARAB must first be made before a
landowner can resort to the RTC.
RULING:
The contention has no merit.
It is true that the DAR has primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform
matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over
"all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform," except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.
However, Special Agrarian Courts, which
are Regional Trial Courts, are given original
and exclusive jurisdiction over two
categories
of
cases,
to
wit:
(1)
"all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under
[R.A. No. 6657]."
The DAR is an
administrative agency which cannot be
granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent
domain (for such are takings under R.A.
No. 6657) and over criminal cases.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of
directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to
the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is
clear
from
57
that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to

determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to

transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and
to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57
and therefore would be void. What adjudicators
are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation
to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts
the ultimate power to decide this question.
Morta v. OccidentalGR No. 12341710 June
1999

pineapple plants. At any rate, whoever is

declared to be the rightfulowner of the land, the
case cannot be considered tenancy-related for it
still fails to comply with the other requirements.
Assuming arguendo that Josefina is the owner,
then the case is not between the landowner and
tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner,
Occidental cannot claim that there is consent to a
landowner-tenant relationship between him and
Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the
requisites, the issue involved isnot tenancyrelated cognizable by the DARAB.

FACTS:
Jaime Morta and Purificacion Padilla filed a suit
against Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda,
and Daniel Corral, for allegedly gathering pili
nuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their
respective land, delivered the produce to Atty.
Mariano Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana
and pineapple plants. The court considered the
cases covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Occidental, etal. appealed, contending
that the case was cognizable by the DAR
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). Occidental claimed
that he was a tenant of the actual owner of the
land ,Josefina Baraclan, and that Morta and
Padilla were notactually the owners of the land
inquestion.The trial court ruled in favor of Morta
and Padilla.
Thus, the RTC reversed the lower court and ruled
in favor of Occidental, stating that the case is a
tenancy-related problem which falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA affirmed
the RTC.regarding the ownership of theland are
not conclusive to settlethe matter.
ISSUE: W/N the cases are properly cognizable by
the DARAB.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS

IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989

Facts:
The petitioners in this case invoke the right
of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners
of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares as long as they are cultivating or
intend to cultivate the same. Their respective
lands do not exceed the statutory limit but
are occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating such lands.

RULING:

According to P.D. No. 316, which was

promulgated in implementation of P.D. No.
27:

NO. Since there is a dispute as to who is the

rightful owner of the land, the issue is clearly
outside DARABs jurisdiction. Whatever findings
made by the DARABFor DARAB to have
jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a
tenancy relationship between the parties. In order
for a tenancy agreement to take hold over
anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their
respective land anddestroying their banana and

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands

primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be
ejected or removed from his farmholding
until such time as the respective rights of the
tenant- farmers and the landowner shall
have been determined in accordance with
the rules and regulations implementing P.D.
No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their

tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the
above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent to issue the said rules.
The public respondent argues that P.D. No.
27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing
any right of retention from persons who own
other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate
income for their family. And even assuming
that the petitioners do not fall under its
terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No.
27 have already been issued, to wit, the
Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim
Guidelines on Retention by Small
Landowners, with an accompanying
Retention Guide Table), Memorandum
Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474),
Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated
December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines
on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by
Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a
Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for
Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of
their Landholdings under Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure
to file the corresponding applications for
retention under these measures, the
petitioners are now barred from invoking this
right.
The petitioners insist that the above-cited
measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven
hectares of agricultural land.
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be
outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments,
it also adopted one whole and separate

Article XIII on Social Justice and Human

Rights, containing grandiose but
undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift
of the common people. These include a call
in the following words for the adoption by the
State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share
of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject
to such priorities and reasonable retention
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The
State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.
Issue:
Whether or not all rights acquired by the
tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as
recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained
by him even under R.A. No. 6657.
Held:
P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the
emancipation of tenant-farmer as October
21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be
deemed the owner" of a portion of land
consisting of a family-sized farm except that
"no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he
had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers' cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of
the just compensation also had to be made
first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its

Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now
deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972
of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or
the deposit by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership
is contemplated either.
This should counter-balance the express
provision in Section 6 of the said law that
"the landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall
be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, that
original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this
Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead."
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits
now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is
one of its most controversial provisions.
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or

retain, directly or indirectly, any public or

private agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-sized farm, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil
fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by
the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.
Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the
following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is
actually tilling the land or directly managing
the farm; Provided, That landowners whose
lands have been covered by Presidential
Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the
area originally retained by them thereunder,
further, That original homestead grantees or
direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead.
All rights previously acquired by the tenantfarmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized. Landowners who were unable to
exercise their rights of retention under P.D.
No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights
granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the
conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the
above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
costs.