HEIRS OF ROXAS vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118436 March 21, 1997
FACTS:
On July 2, 1990, Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for
Registration of two parcels of unregistered land. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the
purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad
de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26,
1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Authority or NALTDRA) to 3 parties on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de
Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of
the proceedings. Publication was made. After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the
land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among other things, that the subject
parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad
de Leon but no decision has been rendered thereon. Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted
Maguesun Corporation's application for registration.
Consequently, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case applied for by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon,
dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de
Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name.
Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court, to set aside the decree of
registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the
properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, and that her family had been in open,
continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty
years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold
the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale
and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents
to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally
omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the
Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As a result, an order of
general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for registration was granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petion for review of the registration may be granted.
HELD:
YES. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. Adjudication of land in
a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry
of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering
the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another
party. Absence, minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are

not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. It is further
required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry
of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an
innocent purchaser.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by
means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. 19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of
its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed
with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue
involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is
regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not
a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment
to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law in
this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required by
law. For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have
not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Persons who
were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a
decree of registration.
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration
sought to be reviewed by petitioner.
Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas
family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property.
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose
Ramirez. Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land was
unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation's
intentional concealment and representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant
constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the
Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, thus effectively depriving them of
their day in court.

TIONGCO vs. DE LA MERCED

G.R. No. L-24426 July 25, 1974
FACTS:
petitioner Tiongco and the other claimants of the lots in question were deprived of their rights without due process of law,
through the fraudulent machinations of deputy clerk of court Pascual Cando. There was in that case a pronouncement by
this Court, that even if a decree in a cadastral proceeding is infected with nullity in view of a clear denial of procedural due
process, still an innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title issued in pursuance thereof is protected. The best
that could be is to stress what was considered its obiter aspect. That does not suffice, for the reference to the rights
vested in an innocent purchaser for value is based on express statutory language, allowing the filing of a petition for
review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
ISSUE:
Whether under the circumstance of there being an innocent purchaser for value, there could still be a review of a decree
of registration?
HELD:
No. A decree of registration secured through fraud is valid, although annulable, upon petition filed within one (1) year after
entry of the decree, in the absence of an innocent purchaser for value, whereas a decision rendered without notice to the
parties of record is void for lack of due process .... Indeed, acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny
due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same
sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary not withstanding." Nonetheless, the next paragraph was explicit on the
point that the reopening on the ground of fraud was predicated on "no innocent purchaser for value [being] injured
thereby." Thus: "Now then, if a decree issued in pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be annulled within
(1) year from entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold that the same, if entered in compliance with a decision
suffering from a fatal infirmity, for want of due process, may be reviewed, set aside and cancelled upon petition filed within
the same period, provided that no innocent purchaser for value will be injured thereby.

ESCONDE vs.DELFIN
G.R. No. L-67583

July 31, 1987

FACTS:
Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in the "Application for Registration of Title". The application was
granted in a "Decision", and private respondent received copy thereof on the same date. Said parcel of land is now
covered by an OCT .On February 13, 1978 said private respondent Ramon filed his "Petition for Writ of Possession"
against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde.The petitions filed a motion to quash which was then denied.
On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second alias writ of possession in view of the failure of the
petitioner to turn over possession of the premises to private respondent and the same was granted in the Order of
November 21, 1983.
Petitioner then filed with Judge Avelino M. Constantino of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to
Hold in Abeyance Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have filed a civil action for
reconveyance.
ISSUE:
May the action for reconveryance prosper?
HELD:
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey
the land to him. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or
erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree,
for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration
proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the
questioned property is not the real owner thereof. An ordinary civil action for reconveyance does not seek to set aside the
decree but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land
from the registered owner to the rightful owner.
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that reconveyance is not the proper remedy. As earlier stated,
there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that
fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of one year within which intrinsic fraud could be
claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the Court ruled that the land should be adjudicated to the registered
owner.
Moreover, petitioner's action for reconveyance had already prescribed. An action for reconveyance of real property on the
ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title

MARQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998
FACTS:
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1)
Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen;
(10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio. Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of
161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No. 47572, 1wherein the constructed
their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of
Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572. Consequently, TCT No.
47572 was cancelled and TCT No. 33350 2 was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" covering the land
described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the house constructed thereon to three of this children, namely: (1) petitioner
Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners
herein. As a result of the donation, TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was issued in private respondents'
name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land. However, when petitioners learned about
the existence of TCT No. 47572, they immediately demanded that since they are also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr.,
they are entitled to their respective shares over the land in question. Unfortunately, efforts to settle the dispute proved
unavailing since private respondents ignored petitioners' demands.
In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for
"Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial court alleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and
"Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their
father in making him execute the said documents.
In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of limitations since
the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.
ISSUE:
Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed.
HELD:
It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate is governed by the present Civil
Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent
therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property
by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the sole surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F.
Marquez.
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the
only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under
his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established. Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to
prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence,
obtains or holds the legal, right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. Prescinding from

the foregoing discussion, did the action for reconveyance filed by the petitioners prescribe, as held by the Court of
Appeals?
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years
from the isuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to
run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance
was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.