Sin vs.

Sin
GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in Janu
ary 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respect
ive documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed F
lorence s petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dat
ed November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did
not actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hear
ings, nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence
of the participation of the State in the proceedings.
HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaratio
n of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorne
y or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to pre
vent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabrica
ted or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No dec
ision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification b
riefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, t
o the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence that the State participat
ed in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

107 Phil 35
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot severa
l children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered
on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illici
t relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in
June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintif
f discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcal
as. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since t
hen they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in th
e act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intentio
n of filing a petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested confor
mity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingl
y, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of
judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:
Florenciano s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, i

n the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the c
onfession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is proh
ibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a plea
ding. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant s stat
ement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be grant
ed since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented
by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on de
fendant s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery
, which has not yet prescribed.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically a
fter nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously withou
t any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired propert
ies during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabite
d with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issua
nce of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the de
fendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership prof
its.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz
-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proc
eeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the tr
ial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evid
ence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly not
ified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal s
eparation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond th
e one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death o
f Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner s counsel moved to su
bstitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for
legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separat
ion, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not
come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are
merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the act

ion, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and the
re could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that au
tomatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by eit
her party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 coul
d be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appe
llee or by the heirs of the appellant.
Posted by hyper_jetsetter at 6:50:00 PM

Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitio
ner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a ci
vil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her h
usband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support
pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petition
er moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal sep
aration is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings rela
ted to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or ac
quittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the
resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A ci
vil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead o
f, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil
action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even
if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same of
fense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately
, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications fro
m inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or convic
tion is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an act

ion for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in ca
se, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too oner
ous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.

Bugayong vs. Ginez

GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on
August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marri
age, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality before he went
back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay with his s
isters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling
of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pa
ngasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to Dagupan to study in a l
ocal college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff s sist
er-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at the heari
ng, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He admitted that h
is wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these comm
unications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain
who asked him to consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met i
n the house of the defendant s godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, c
ousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as husband and wi
fe. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to verify w
ith Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, s
he merely packed up and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infi
delity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve a
s a ground for dismissal of the action.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for le
gal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the part
ies ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties liv
e in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohab

itation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of o
r consent to the adultery or concubinage.

Pacete vs Carriaga
Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Null
ity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de l
a Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting
and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married
to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequ
ently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she le
arned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pace
te was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within whi
ch to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderst
anding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer o
n the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare
the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court receive
d plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 19
80. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on Marc
h 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitione
r s motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in
default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal
separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pa
cete to Clarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated u
pon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appeara
nce of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the p
rosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys i
n case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marr
iages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contr
act.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandat
es that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provi
de the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or un
derscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal se
paration. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting atto
rney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and i
f there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that t
he evidence submitted is not fabricated.

Macadangdang vs CA
Macadangdang vs CA
GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981
FACTS:
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang wer
e married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children.
They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City. Throug
h hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandisin
g, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real
estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramar
ital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when
private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971,
she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided t
o take the initial action. In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal
separation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separa
tion has effect on the legal separation.
HELD:
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on
the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the sep
aration is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a hi
gher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have no
t yet been commenced nor terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on t
he conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformab
ly with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should
take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated
to the deceased spouse.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree.
Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the e
ffects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or aut
omatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal se
paration, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjuga
l assets.

Potenciano vs CA
Potenciano vs. CA
GR No. 139789, 139808, July 19, 2001
FACTS:
In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, pet
itioned for habeas corpus which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and
granted the petition to nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Erlind
a. This case before SC is Erlinda s motion to reconsider the decision made. A co
nference was set on September 2000 to determine the propriety and relevance of a
physical and medical examination of Potenciano and how it will be conducted. E
rlinda s motion to have Potenciano be medically examined by a team of medical expe
rts appointed by the Court was denied with finality in March 2001.
ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live
together and observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.
HELD:
Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in conso
rtium but clearly she wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause o
f her petition. What the law provides is that husband and wife are obliged to li
ve together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity . The sanction thereof is
the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mand
ate or court order to enforce consortium.
Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having se
parated from bed and board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared feel
ing between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual i
ntimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion . Marital union is a two-way proc
ess. It is for two loving adults who view the relationship with respect, sacrif
ice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sub

lime social institution.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, we
re married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Man
ila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent s
home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conju
gal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and l
ascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts a
nd demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goit
ia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting inju
ries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in fav
or of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree gran
ting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the c
onjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely
in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to su
pport the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension
or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given
by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or termin
ate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conju
gal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced
to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of
the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maint
enance even outside the conjugal home.

Ty vs CA
Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil c
eremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August
1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage
license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marri
age was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had thei
r church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August
1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage wi
th petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration o
f nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a subsequ
ent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions
of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doin
g so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to th
e wife who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint ca
using her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her m
arriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing
to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages wo
uld result to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal
or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Moreo
ver, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and
wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared vali
d and subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintain
ed as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age o
r otherwise legally entitled thereto.

Ilusorio vs Bildner
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board an

d President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herei
n petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-B
ildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from b
ed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila an
d at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On th
e other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potenciano s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 mo
nths in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this t
ime their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter s health to deteriora
te. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano due to the latter s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate
meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Clevel
and Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents
refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restr
aint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation
of Potenciano s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that th
e latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render hi
m mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. Wi
th his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subjec
t of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived
of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child bu
t the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuse
s to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat
or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter be
yond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in

Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in S
t. Paul s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she
taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 195
2 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in th
e House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marco
s when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a
voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in
San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won pres
idency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Man
ila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the Fi
rst District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commi
ssion on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requ
irement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote se
ven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "sin
ce childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 2
9, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or res
idence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she beca
me a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be el
igible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court a
re in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner s claim of legal residence or dom
icile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months res
idency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda s domicile of
origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of do
micile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishin
g a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and con
currence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband s domicile because the term resi
dence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda ma
rried late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired r
ight to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her res
idence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother s house,
an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthday
s and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence q
ualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First Dis
trict of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May

11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed
to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.