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The Iran Nuke Deal Could End Any Hope of

Israeli-Palestinian Peace

And six other reasons why theres a long,


long way to go before we can celebrate
what a new Tehran means for the
Middle East.

BY AARON DAVID MILLER, JASON BRODSKY-JULY 22,


2015

Whether youre for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), against it, or
somewhere in between, the Iran nuclear agreement will have profound consequences
for a Middle East already in the throes of turbulent change.
For 40 years, American policy toward Iran was based on the containment of Iran at
times even confrontation. That paradigm will now change. An agreement this complex
will require interaction between the United States and Iran at many levels. To what
extent that interaction, cooperation, and problem-solving (rather than problemcreating) will extend from the nuclear issue to regional issues is another matter.
And this uncertainty is why caution should be the order of the day. Indeed, as weve
seen with other events in this region notably the Arab Spring change is not
always positive, quickly apparent, or linear. History, like nature, knows no jumps,
Robert Penn Warren wrote. Except the jump backward, maybe.
Time will be the ultimate arbiter of how this agreement will shape regional trends. And
we should be careful not to make hard-and-fast predictions for a region that more
often than not confounds rather than confirms experts views. But assuming the
nuclear agreement reaches the implementation phase, heres a first cut at seven
regional trends that will likely be set into motion by one of the most portentous Middle
Eastern events in decades.
Iran rising
Forget the old Arab Spring that lies in ruins. Pay attention to the new Persian one. And
by spring, were not referring to dramatic political reform of the Islamic Republic. But
happy days are here again for Iran nonetheless. As the Arab world melts down as a
result of no governance (Syria, Libya, and Yemen) and bad governance (Iraq and
Egypt), a highly functional, newly empowered, legitimized, and cash-flushed Iran will
be rising. Indeed, the three most functional states in the region right now along with
Arab Saudi Arabia are the three non-Arabs: Turkey, Israel, and Iran. All are stable with
great economic potential and the capacity to project power. And at the moment, the
JCPOA and the financial resources, economic recovery, power, and legitimacy it will
bring suggest an Iranian moment.
More continuity than change for now
Nothing will happen quickly. In the period ahead, the agreement needs to be sold and
made normative (or not) in Washington and Tehran and at the United Nations. The
International Atomic Energy Agency needs to validate Irans disclosures of its possible
military dimensions by separate agreement and certify that Iran is complying with its
commitments within the JCPOA. And then theres sanctions relief, probably in early
2016.
How Iran seeks ultimately to use this opportunity is not yet entirely clear. The smart
money would bet on more continuity than change. After all, Supreme Leader Ali
Khameneis decision to approve the nuclear agreement wasnt to undermine the hardline, ideological, and revolutionary character of the regime or its support for its regional
allies, but to conserve, preserve, and strengthen it. And at home, the key to that is to

get out from under the kind of financial and economic pressures (in this case, crushing
sanctions and isolation) that can make publics restless, alienated, and even
revolutionary. Abroad, four decades of foreign policy based on resisting the United
States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia isnt going to change quickly, easily, or maybe at all.
Remember that Irans founding ideology is one of countering Westoxication, with the
constant suspicion of the imperialist powers that follows. Consider what the supreme
leader said back in 2000:
An all-encompassing American plan has been arranged to collapse the Islamic
Republican system, and all its aspects have been weighed. This plan is reconstructed
from the collapse of the Soviet Union. They have, in their own imaginings, revived
the plan for the collapse of the Soviets in accordance with the conditions in Iran.
These bogeymen will help the regime marshal and mobilize its supporters and also
continue to check reformists and pragmatists, like President Hassan Rouhani, who
may get too strong. Speaking after the end of Ramadan, while praising his nuclear
negotiating teams efforts, the supreme leader made clear that any dreams that Iran
and the United States would cooperate on other matters wouldnt become
reality, casting the United States actions in the region as 180 degrees different from
the Islamic Republics agenda. And the crowd responded with the usual cries: Death
to America and Death to Israel.
The Iranians see the essence of the nuclear deal as merely transactional, not
transformational it buys time, resources, and a nuclear option for the mullahcracy.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: counterbalance?
In a dysfunctional Arab world, the only real regional counter to a rising Iran and that
isnt saying all that much is Saudi Arabia with a few Persian Gulf Arab states in tow.
The Gulf states have different agendas vis--vis Tehran. Think Oman the only Arab
kingdom not to participate in the Saudi-led offensive against the Houthis in Yemen.
And Oman, and even the United Arab Emirates, may well see benefits in testing the
possibility of closer cooperation with Iran, particularly on the economic side. As
evidenced by its tough (and so far unsuccessful) campaign in Yemen against the
Houthis, Riyadh sees Tehrans hand everywhere and fears that the nuclear agreement
will only empower Iran further. Its checkbook diplomacy will continue to be used as a
hedge against Iran.
Indeed, even before the accord, the Saudis had forged a reasonably common front
with Turkey and Qatar to support Islamist fighters against President Bashar al-Assad
in Syria. That coalition is likely to become more active.
Moreover, Saudi King Salmans meeting with Hamas leaders last week would have
been unthinkable a year ago and reflects the reality that Riyadh may be more open to
aligning with Muslim Brotherhood types to counter Iran and its Shiite allies. Saudi
Arabia is demonstrating new assertiveness and in the process a new independence
from the United States too. Much of the tension in the U.S.-Saudi relationship flows
from Riyadhs conviction much like Israels that U.S. President Barack Obamas

administration is naive about Iran and not nearly forceful enough in countering Irans
allies, such as Assad. The United States may try to reassure the Saudis with arms
sales, intelligence sharing, and closer cooperation. But until the Saudis believe that
Washington understands the Iranian challenge and is prepared to do something about
it, the strain will remain.
Syria, Iraq, and Yemen: proxies, not progress
And that strain is driven primarily by Irans behavior (or misbehavior) in the region. Or
what Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed al-Jubeir calls Irans adventures. The
problem of course is that Tehran even though its allies (Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite
militias, and Assad) are overextended and comprise pretty weak tea has managed
to hold its own and become the dominant regional power in Iraq and Syria. In Yemen,
by providing relatively low-cost support to the Houthis, Iran has managed to bog the
Saudis down in an unwinnable air campaign and blacken their image as their airstrikes
claim civilian lives. And an infusion of even 10 to 20 percent of the $100 billion in
expected unfrozen oil revenue next year would be useful in bucking up Irans allies.
Financial and economic support for whats left of the Syrian regime is critically
important to Assads survival, as are the Shiite Iraqi militias, Hezbollah, and Iranian
Revolutionary Guards, which are in Syria shoring up the regime. Its no coincidence
that Assad welcomed the nuclear accord, which he sees as producing a cash windfall
some of which may be coming his way.
Theres little doubt that Iran and the United States and the Saudis too have a
common stake in checking the Islamic States further gains in Iraq and even in Syria.
And since tacit cooperation was established before the nuclear agreement, its likely to
continue on that front. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi welcomed the nuclear
accord because he sees the easing of U.S.-Iranian tensions as creating a better front
against the Islamic State. Other Sunni leaders arent so sure and worry that Irans
newfound power would mean stronger Shiite militias at their expense. And there is a
view that the threat of the Islamic State does make Iraqi Shiites more dependent on
and beholden to Tehran. Bottom line: If theres one area that seems hopeful in terms of
U.S.-Iranian cooperation, its the fight against Sunni jihadis.
The key question of course is Syria and under what circumstances would Iran
consider changing course and cooperating with the United States to bring about a new
reality there. We wonder whether this is even a relevant question now? Syria and Iran
have been allies now for four decades, and while Assad has been an increasing drain
on Tehran, Iran needs an Alawite stronghold in Syria to avoid encirclement by Sunnis
both Saudis and the Islamic State and to preserve the connection to Lebanon
and Hezbollah. And the last thing the supreme leader can afford now on the heels of a
U.S.-Iranian agreement is to signal that Iran is abandoning its allies and cooperating
with the arrogant Americans. In fact, just this month in the midst of the nuclear talks,
Syria ratified a $1 billion line of credit from the Islamic Republic to buck up its fledgling
economy. Iran is likely to try to keep an Alawite enclave in Syria viable as long as
possible until a new balance of forces on the ground either undermines Irans position
in Syria or secures it. And eager to sell billions of dollars in arms to Iran and to prevent

a jihadi takeover in Syria, Russia will back up Irans support of Assad. Bottom line:
Dont look for much Iranian help on Syria anytime soon.
A frustrated Israel
Some Israelis have made the case that the nuclear deal carries one large advantage
for Israel: the key decision point at which Iran would get the bomb and Israel would
have to bomb has been put off, perhaps by a decade. But the majority of those in the
political elite, particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have reacted
vociferously against the agreement. The argument is that the agreement will not stop
Irans nuclear weapons clock and that lifting sanctions will only fuel Irans regional
misbehavior.
And for Netanyahu, the issue is deeply personal. He has been focused on Iran for
decades. Not being able to prevent the accord, given the risks he took, is something of
a political defeat. But more than that he now has a continuing mission to keep on
opposing the deal. But he has very limited options. Israel will have no more success
lobbying Congress this time around than it did in January. Theres no possibility of a
military strike against Irans nuclear sites in the wake of an agreement if
successfully implemented. Nor will the United States support Israeli cyberattacks and
assassinating Iranian scientists if the Iranians are holding up their end of the bargain.
Nor do the Israelis have many good options against Irans allies. Indeed, with
Hezbollah bogged down in Syria, the chances of a serious Israeli-Hezbollah clash are
reduced.
More than likely, unless Iran violates the agreement in some major way, Israel will
have no choice but to work closely with the United States on intelligence sharing to
monitor the accord and to see what the Americans are prepared to offer Israel in the
security field in return. But none of that is going to substantially improve the U.S.
presidents relationship with the Israeli prime minister. The Obama-Netanyahu
relationship is already a dysfunctional one. And the upset over how the Iran nuclear
deal played out is only going to make matters worse. Bottom line: The next 15 months
will be as rocky as the previous period and could even reach a new low.
Peace process: one more nail
One issue that could help drag the U.S.-Israel relationship down is the peace process
or, more accurately, the absence of one. There are enough nails in this coffin already:
big gaps on the core issues between Israel and the Palestinians and between the
United States and Israel, the Palestinian decision to take Israel to the International
Criminal Court, splits between Hamas and Fatah, and an Israeli government that has
neither the will nor the capacity to take this issue on.
But fearing violence on the ground and looking for some idea that will stabilize the
situation for the remainder of its term and also leave a legacy, the Obama
administration has been considering some kind of framework on Palestinian
statehood. This could take the shape of either a U.N. Security Council resolution
already a favorite project of the French (complete with a draft) or a U.S.-initiated set

of parameters that would be designed to reaffirm the feasibility and desirability of a


two-state solution, including the key elements necessary to make it work. Neither
could actually trigger a serious negotiation under the current circumstances, let alone
produce an agreement, and its by no means certain that the Palestinians would sign
on. One thing is certain: Such an exercise is bound to increase tensions between the
United States and Israel. More than likely for the remainder of Obamas term, the
peace process will be shaped by a two-state solution thats too hard to implement but
too important to abandon.
U.S. policy
So how will the Obama administration choose to spend its last 18 months in the
Middle East? Will it choose to test the possibility of cooperating with Iran in Syria,
Yemen, and Iraq? Will we see Secretary of State John Kerry in Tehran within a year,
particularly if Iran frees the Americans its holding and provides information on the one
it claims it doesnt have? Or will the U.S. president take the advice of some of Irans
critics and signal to Iran that the United States is going to push back against Irans
regional misbehavior and work aggressively to weaken Assad and push for a political
solution? Our bet is neither one. Faced with tremendous uncertainty in a region thats
out of control, the president will likely try to secure the single accomplishment he has:
making sure the Iran nuclear agreement is implemented. That will be tough enough.
As for keeping busy until 2017, we kind of figure an unpredictable Middle East will take
care of that.
Behrouz Mehri/AFP/Getty Images
Posted by Thavam

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