Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
ManilaEN BANC
DECISION
October 24, 1970
G.R. No. L-32096
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector
C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for petitioner. Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.
, J.:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law1 in this proceeding for certiorari
and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of
petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for
certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the
validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in
his answer, would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal questions
raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo who was quite
categorical in his assertion that both the challenged legislation and the administrative
order transgress the constitutional requirements of due process and non-delegation, is
not averse either to such a definitive ruling. Considering the great public interest
involved and the reliance by respondent Galo and the allegation that the repugnancy to
the fundamental law could be discerned on the face of the statute as enacted and the
executive order as promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in this
proceeding of the constitutional questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we
sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the
implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and
insubstantial.
As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of
other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police
power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970
with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that
respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of
the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be
nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a hearing on the plea for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both parties
were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970,
respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the
enforcement of such administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its
reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the meanwhile,
the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued, on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary

injunction upon the filing of the required bond. The answer before the lower court was
filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge
denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed with this court on June 18, 1970.
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G.
Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he restrained the
enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the
Solicitor General in seeking that the legal questions raised namely the constitutionality
of the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to
be in excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power be definitely decided. It was on until July
6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this petition
concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative Order
No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the Reflector Law, even assuming that
it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing
with Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It
was made clear during the course of such argumentation that the matter of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under consideration by this Court.
The case is thus ripe for decision.
We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector
Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the
oral argument, it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the affirmative. It is
to be noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather
convincing fashion that the challenged legislation does not suffer from the alleged
constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the respondent Galo. Since the special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a
declaration of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation the face thereof
of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow that
there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail. Moreover, any
further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited to a discussion of the
constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts having made. This is one case then
where the question of validity is ripe for determination. If we do so, further effort need
not be wasted and time is saved moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public,
both vitally concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the
definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest, as was
mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying
that respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action with respondent Judge
being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.
There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so before in
a suit, Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2 involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was
a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
then Judge Macadaeg. We there announced that we "have decided to pass upon the
question of the validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so
we would be putting an end to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has caused
considerable damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters
themselves."

There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly
passing upon the question of the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding
before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same felt
need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a
challenged enactment and thus serve public interest exists. What we have done in the
case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the executive, we can
very well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act.
Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of
showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to be as will now be shown too
much for respondent Galo.

It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and
unanimity were this Court to sustain respondent Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to
do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for disregarding the
due process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the
hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude
betrays lack of concern for public safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there
was no observance of due process equated as it has always been with that is
reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product
of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public
need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic appraisal.

2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed
at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that
are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.
Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or
other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back
which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not
provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be
registered."3 It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under
the police power to promote public safety.

Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the teaching of
many American State Court decisions referred to in the secondary source, American
Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been cautioned against
an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a
fundamental postulate in American public law, laissez faire.

Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force, Calalang
v. Williams,4 identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people." The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a preCommonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."6 In that
sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc7 with
the totality of legislative power.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to
quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of
powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs."
9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the
time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American
court decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo
speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution which would do
well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges must
obey." 12 For a long time legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered
on the rock that was the due process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract,
based on such a basic assumption.
The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and
economic forces at work changed matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater
receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential of
property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian,
could already discern a contrary drift. He did note the expending range of governmental
activity in the United States. 13 What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no
longer the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these rights
to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has withered at least as
to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer
integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls."
While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions
were deferred to when the Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said
that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then As early as
1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm
already had occasion to affirm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted
freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past.
The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible
demonstration of government activity. The Courts unfortunately have sometimes
seemed to trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive
march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under the due process
clause a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty
days after confinement could be cited to show that such a principle did have its day. It is
to be remembered though that our Supreme Court had no other choice as the
Philippines was then under the United States, and only recently the year before, the
American Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-

faire theory, did hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally
infirm.
What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it
that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our
government the responsibility of coping with social and economic
problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs.
Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare
through state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures
adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety is the
aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most
satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On
such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not because the
laissez-faire principle was such a new law before it adjourns for the 1998
elections.
7.2At the very least, whether or not Congress will be able to fasttrack the
enactment of a new oil deregulation law consistent with the Honorable
Court's ruling, would depend on many unforseeable and uncontrollable
factors. Already, several statements from legislators, senators and
congressmen alike, say that the new law can wait because of other
pending legislative matters, etc. Given the "realities" of politics, especially
with the 1998 presidential polls six months away, it is not far-fetched that
the general welfare could be sacrificed to gain political mileage, thus
further unduly delaying the enactment of a new oil deregulation law.
disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment
guarantees would call for vindication.
To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there
might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the
leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first
President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate
Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental
functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and
agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the
fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke
thus: "My answer is that this constitution has definite and well defined philosophy not
only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find
declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard
the interests and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have
come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards,
the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and
national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional
provision automatically imposes. 19
It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who likewise sat
in the Constitutional Convention and was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a
concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of Antamok Goldfields
Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with the
laissez-faire doctrine. In the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the
changes that have taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the government and

its undeniable power to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the doctrine in
People v. Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21
It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the
Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to legislation
covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum
wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the
issuance of
securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the Republic this
Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable tenancy laws, 29
nationalization of the retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of labor, 31 imposition of
price control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one month, 33 and social security
scheme. 34
Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of
Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our
Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as laissezfaire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to
paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it
would appear, is a vain quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune
from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the
constitutional test.
3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity
of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved
by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took
effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set
forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or
denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall
either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or
luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean
at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at
night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions
the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors - Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not
less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape - At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches
long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner."
36 Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted
or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there
shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle
parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the
body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial
glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor
vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all
be red. 39
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance
with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse
registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe
suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided],
However, that in the case of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8)
Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed.

40 It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector
Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and
regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. 41 It
is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its
provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor
not less than P50 could be imposed. 42
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of
the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To
determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature
does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully
been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation
of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the
law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be
regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and
practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel.
A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in
pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That is
sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." 43
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision
announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of
non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments." 44 He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice
by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that
what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the
statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in
People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of
laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless
the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that
is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the
law prescribes ... " 47
An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the
then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is
assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government,
said power may not be delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to
delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate
the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the
law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second
category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which
"sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be
known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs.
United States, 88 L. ed.
848) ... It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and
exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are,
among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a
rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2,
Rep. Act No. 265). These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the
delegated authority, the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law
and to place the grant said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative
powers ... " 48
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no
doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in
statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of
petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to
give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear.
There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack,
far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders
of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9, 1970 denying
reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to
dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo,
there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of
petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to
costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN
D. SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband.
The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had
no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner,
as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but
by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance
Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move
for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an
opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one
of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially
questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the
petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay
the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive
Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas
employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen
Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of
the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including
seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas

Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other
benefits" arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his
widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but
a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with
Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation
Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an
overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan
in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas
employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including
employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3
A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has worked overseas
under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" 4 or "any person working
overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign
employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he
died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the
petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute
implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death
in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas
employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the
contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas
Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and
welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private
respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas
contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does
indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the
Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees
of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are
not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it
necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and
approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas
workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL
cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments
coursed through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was
made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective
on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both
foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board
and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that

it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a
serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the circular,
which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on
board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract
effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment
contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the
provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with
Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative
of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had
been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which,
under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of
the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier
observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as
the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v.
Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It
is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or
better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be
the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate
and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is

enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of
the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because
of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally
certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become
more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the
delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen
Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard
guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable
in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public
interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16
"public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy
and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the

United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit
pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral
benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also
received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers.
These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against
the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment
for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master
electrician
c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.
2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be
separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which
the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ... 3. ...
c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners
shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding
P18,000.00 for burial expenses.
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued
by the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:
Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.
All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be
granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the
seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract
approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law
and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his
beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working
class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the
Constitution for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.
One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that
it has been denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum
Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of
administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the
quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate
implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply
such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its
own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and
Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and

the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the
Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective
administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of
modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the
cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations 21 are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are
resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the
Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy
and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is
to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a
subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane.
Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The
temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 159796. July 17, 2007.]
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and
ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN),
petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.),
STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG), and PANAY
ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J p:

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist

Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this original
action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge,
1 and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) 2 which seeks to implement the said
imposition, be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge
imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from
implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge. 3 The assailed provision of law
reads:
SECTION 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year from the
effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined, fixed and
approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users
for the following purposes:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts 4 in excess of the amount
assumed by the National Government and stranded
contract costs of NPC 5 and as well as qualified stranded
contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the
restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification; 6
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous
or renewable sources of energy vis--vis imported energy
fuels;

(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one

centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall
accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for
watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall
be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period
not exceeding three (3) years.
The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be
passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly basis by the
distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO
in any given month shall be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or before the
fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the
distribution utility. Any end-user or self-generating entity not connected to a
distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to the
TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a
Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for the purposes specified
herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount collected for the
universal charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a
reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.
The Facts
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. 7
On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities
Group 8 (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a
petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary
Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165. 9
On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No.
2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the
Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of
P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF)
managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group
(PSALM) 10 for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas. 11
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order 12 in ERC Case No. 2002-165
provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPCSPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the
same from its end-users on a monthly basis.
On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision 13 (for ERC Case No. 2002-165)
modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional
authority granted to petitioner National Power Corporation-Strategic Power
Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the Order dated December 20, 2002 is
hereby modified to the effect that an additional amount of P0.0205 per
kilowatt-hour should be added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour
provisionally authorized by the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly,
a total amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for
withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as its share

from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification (UC-ME) effective

on the following billing cycles:
(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission
Corporation (TRANSCO); and
(b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).
Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in
the amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and remit the same to PSALM on
or before the 15th day of the succeeding month.
In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30,
2004, a detailed report to include Audited Financial Statements and
physical status (percentage of completion) of the projects using the
prescribed format.
Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all
distribution utilities (Dus).
SO ORDERED.
On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC,
among others, 14 to set aside the above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in
its Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the "Motion for
Reconsideration" filed by petitioner National Power CorporationSmall Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is hereby modified
accordingly.
Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report
on the following:
1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;
2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;
5. Start of Operation; and
6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.
SO ORDERED. 15
Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the
NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation
Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the
Universal Charge. 16
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc.
(PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal
Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.
17
Hence, this original action.

Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to
implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of
the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The
power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such,
the delegation of said power to any executive or
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional,
giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision
clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be
determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence
leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative
authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where
the funds collected should be used.
3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation
without representation as the consumers were not given a
chance to be heard and represented. 18
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is
collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases 19 invoked by
the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein,
which is not so in the case at bench. In said cases, the respective funds 20 were
created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer
to counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other
variables which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus,
there was a need to delegate powers to administrative bodies. 21 Petitioners posit that
the Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar purpose.
On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for
public purposes, such as support of the government, administration of the law, or
payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific
regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power
industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power. On
this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to
the ERC since the latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the
execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA. 22
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax
because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of
the country's electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the
State's police power. Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not
possess the essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the
benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly
levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual
taxpayer's ability to pay. Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable

standards which would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly,
respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and
confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with
the requirements of due process. 23
On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the
amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund components
of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC
Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec.
46 24 of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions
or its IRR. 25
The Issues
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of
the EPIRA is a tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to
tax on the part of the ERC. 26
Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious procedural
lapse.
Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint
assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal Charge
and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus standi. They impugn
the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a
result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills.
However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this
"Complaint" directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in
order for the Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution 27 categorically provides that:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts
and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of
forum from which to seek such relief. 28 It has long been established that this Court
will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. 29
This circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action.
This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue
raised herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not
resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of
this litigation, and probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid
unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now.
The instant complaint is bereft of merit.
The First Issue
To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the State's power of taxation from
the police power.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be
found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency that is to pay it. 30 It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of
the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. 31 Thus,
the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without
taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and wellbeing of the people. 32
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. 33 It is the most pervasive, the
least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State.
The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare
of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your
property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty
which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its
regulatory powers. 34 We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to
protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and
foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. 35
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose
for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary
purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
36
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's
police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced
from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is
imposed 37 and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character. The EPIRA
resonates such regulatory purposes, thus:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the

policy of the State:
(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;
(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the
supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a
regime of free and fair competition and full public
accountability to achieve greater operational and
economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of
Philippine products in the global market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the
ownership base of the power generation, transmission and
distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and
private sector entities in the process of restructuring the
electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and
services of electric utilities and other providers of electric
power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy
sources and infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable
energy resources in power generation in order to reduce
dependence on imported energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the
assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation
(NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body
and system to ensure consumer protection and enhance
the competitive operation of the electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of
demand side management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal
Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public
welfare is surely promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power. 38 In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al. 39 and in
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 40 this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the
exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v. Orbos 41 with
respect to the OPSF. Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the instant case is different
from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF)
is also created under the administration of PSALM. 42 The STF has some notable
characteristics similar to the OPSF and the SSF, viz.:

1)In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall

conduct a review to determine whether there is underrecovery or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level of
the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an overrecovery, the ERC shall ensure that any excess amount
shall be remitted to the STF. A separate account shall be
created for these amounts which shall be held in trust for
any future claims of distribution utilities for stranded cost
recovery. At the end of the stranded cost recovery period,
any remaining amount in this account shall be used to
reduce the electricity rates to the end-users. 43
2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount
collected for the same is greater than the actual
availments against it, the PSALM shall retain the balance
within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall occurs.
44
3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the
STF shall be transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF
attached agencies as designated by the DOF Secretary.
45
The OSG is in point when it asseverates:
Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust
Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well
within the pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of
the government to secure the physical and economic survival and
well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign
authority we designate as the police power of the State. 46
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an
exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF
reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which
the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's electric
power industry.
The Second Issue
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim
potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated).
This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. 47
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle.
48 Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the
legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to

the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies
the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its
policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation
is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have
to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot. 49
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec.
34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sufficient standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that "within one (1) year from the
effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the
ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users," and therefore, does not state the
specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43 (b) (ii) of
the EPIRA provides:
SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote
competition, encourage market development, ensure customer
choice and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured
electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to
issue cease and desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards
this end, it shall be responsible for the following key functions in the
restructured industry:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate
and enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a
Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited to the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the
TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the
formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and
function of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further, That
such standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry
participants meet the minimum financial standards to protect the
public interest. Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and
public hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity
end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;

Moreover, contrary to the petitioners' contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude
of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51 (d) and (e) of the
EPIRA 50 clearly provides:
SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the
performance of its functions and for the attainment of its objective,
have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded
contract costs of NPC which shall form the basis for
ERC in the determination of the universal charge;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the
proceeds from sales and other property contributed to it,
including the proceeds from the universal charge.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative
power.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;" 51 "adequate and efficient instruction;" 52 "public
interest;" 53 "justice and equity;" 54 "public convenience and welfare;" 55 "simplicity,
economy and efficiency;" 56 "standardization and regulation of medical education;" 57
and "fair and equitable employment practices." 58 Provisions of the EPIRA such as,
among others, "to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability,
security and affordability of the supply of electric power" 59 and "watershed
rehabilitation and management" 60 meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they
provide the limitations on the ERC's power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were
challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, 61 the
Court had occasion to say:
In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the
provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather,
the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is passed as
a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its
meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part thereof but
from a general consideration of the statute as a whole. Considering
the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the
statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has expanded the
jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable
the latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by
the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction
of the ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers
already conferred upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view
that the ERC possesses only the powers and functions listed under
Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.
In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 62 in the same case, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation

to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power
as a vital public utility, to wit:
Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer
limited to the preservation of public health, safety and morals,
which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times. Police
power now requires the State to "assume an affirmative duty to
eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of
an unrestrained industrial economy." Police power is now exerted
"to further the public welfare a concept as vast as the good of
society itself." Hence, "police power is but another name for the
governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is the
basic end of all government." When police power is delegated to
administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should
be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader
dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State
must take a more active role in balancing the many conflicting
interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC,
acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. We
should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This
approach is more compelling in the field of rate-regulation of
electric power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a
traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few
but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging
investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may
come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is
impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of power
outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the
ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great
flexibility, when the need arises.
This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v.
Energy Regulatory Commission 63 where the Court held that the ERC, as regulator,
should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by multifarious
factors affecting public utilities.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC.
Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that
the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory,
and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed
waived or abandoned per Resolution 64 of August 3, 2004. 65 Moreover, the
determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an
issue which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from
reviewing the same. 66
As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA:
One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in
recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal
structure and regulatory framework for the electric power industry.

The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and
improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the
highly capital-intensive character of the industry itself have long
been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To
attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of the
industry had to be addressed. While the generation and
transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the
distribution side was fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly small
and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization
of existing generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive
power rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to
forgettable performance of the government power sector; high
system losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for
overcoming these shortcomings.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the
industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National
Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure,
and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies
and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry
into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission,
distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have
to privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized
thereafter. 67
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not
one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. 68 Indubitably, petitioners failed to
overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the
Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule
18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and Velasco,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
||| (Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007)

!
!
!
!

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 124360. December 3, 1997.]
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 127867. December 3, 1997.]

EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA,
WIGBERTO TAADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION,
HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, INC., FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION (FDC), SANLAKAS, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN
TORRES in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON.
FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the Secretary of Energy,
CALTEX Philippines, Inc., PETRON Corporation, and
PILIPINAS SHELL Corporation, respondents.

EASTERN PETROLEUM CORP., SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORP.,

SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC., TWA, INC., and DUBPHIL
GAS, movants-in-intervention.

Sanidad, Abaya, Cortez, Te, Madrid, Viterbo & Tan Law Firm for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz co-counsel for Caltex Phil., Inc.

SYNOPSIS
Motions for reconsideration and partial motions for reconsideration were filed by the
parties of the decision of the Supreme Court declaring R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional.
The choice and crafting of the standard to guide the exercise of delegated power is part
of the lawmaking process and lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. The
standard cannot be altered in any way by the Executive for the Executive cannot modify
the will of the Legislature.
The power of Congress to enact laws does not include the right to pass unconstitutional
laws. In fine, the Court did not usurp the power of Congress to enact laws but merely
discharged its bounden duty to check the constitutionality of laws when challenged in
appropriate cases. Our decision annulling R.A. 8180 is justified by the principle of check
and balance. We hold that power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the
constitutionality of laws cannot be defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries
serious economic implications. This Court has struck down laws abridging the political

and civil rights of our people even if it has to often the other more powerful branches of
government. There is no reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180 that
violates the economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big
business within reasonable bounds.
The Constitution gave this Court the authority to strike down all laws that violate the
Constitution. It did not exempt from the reach of this authority laws with economic
dimension.
A separability clause does not clothe the valid parts with immunity from the invalidating
effect the law gives to the inseparable blending of the bad with the good. The
separability clause cannot also be applied if it will produce an absurd result. In sum, if
the separation of the statute will defeat the intent of the legislature, separation will not
take place despite the inclusion of a separability clause in the law. In the case of
Republic Act No. 8180, the unconstitutionality of the provisions on tariff differential,
minimum inventory and predatory pricing cannot but result in the unconstitutionality of
the entire law despite its separability clause. These provisions cannot be struck down
alone for they were the ones intended to carry out the policy of the law embodied in
Section 2 thereof. The provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and
predatory pricing are anti-competition, and they are the key provisions of R.A. 8180.
Without these provisions in place, Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry.
The Motions for Reconsideration of the public respondents and of the intervenors as
well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Enrique Garcia: are denied
for lack of merit.

SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; DELEGATED POWER;
CRAFTING OF STANDARD LIES WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF
CONGRESS. The choice and crafting of the standard to guide the exercise of
delegated power is part of the lawmaking process and lies within the exclusive
jurisdiction of Congress. The standard cannot be altered in any way by the executive for
the Executive cannot modify the will of the Legislature.
2.ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8180 (OIL DEREGULATION LAW); 4 % 'TARIFF
DIFFERENTIAL GIVES A DECISIVE EDGE TO EXISTING OIL COMPANIES. This
4% tariff differential gives a decisive edge to the existing oil companies even as it
constitutes a substantial barrier to the entry of prospective players. We do not agree
with the public respondents that there is no empirical evidence to support this ruling. In
the recent hearing of the Senate Committee on Energy chaired by Senator Freddie
Webb, it was established that the 4% tariff differential on crude oil and refined petroleum
importation gives a 20-centavo per liter advantage to the three big oil companies over
the new players. It was also found that said tariff differential serves as a protective
shield for the big oil companies. Nor do we approve public respondents' submission that
the entry of new players after deregulation is proof that the 4% tariff differential is not a
heavy disincentive.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION BUT EXCLUDE FAIR AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION. Public

respondents try to justify the 4% tariff differential on the ground that there is a
substantial difference between a refiner and an importer just as there is a difference
between raw material and finished product. Obviously, the effort is made to demonstrate
that the unequal tariff does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The effort only proves that the public respondents are still looking at the issue of tariff
differential from the wrong end of the telescope. Our Decision did not hold that the 4%
tariff differential infringed the equal protection clause of the Constitution even as this
was contended by petitioner Tatad. Rather, we held that said tariff differential
substantially occluded the entry point of prospective players in the downstream oil
industry. We further held that its inevitable result is to exclude fair and effective
competition and to enhance the monopolists ability to tamper with the mechanism of a
free market. This consideration is basic in anti-trust suits and cannot be eroded by
belaboring the inapplicable principle in taxation that different things can be taxed
differently.
4.ID.; ID.; .ID.; MINIMUM INVENTORY REQUIREMENT; HIGH COST OF MEETING
REQUIREMENT HAS AN INHIBITING EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. The public
respondents tenaciously defend the validity of the minimum inventory requirement. They
aver that the requirement will not prejudice new players ". . . during their first year of
operation because they do not have yet annual sales from which the required minimum
inventory may be determined. Compliance with such requirement on their second and
succeeding years of operation will not be difficult because the putting up of storage
facilities in proportion to the volume of their business becomes an ordinary and
necessary business undertaking just as the case of importers of finished-products in
other industries." The contention cannot convince for as well articulated by petitioner
Garcia, "the prohibitive cost of the required minimum inventory will not be any less
burdensome on the second, third, fourth, etc. years of operations. Unlike most products
which can be imported and stored with facility, oil imports require ocean receiving,
storage facilities. Ocean receiving terminals are already very expensive, and to require
new players to put up more than they need is to compound and aggravate their costs,
and consequently their great disadvantage vis-a-vis the Big 3." Again, the argument on
whether the minimum inventory requirement seriously hurts the new players is best
settled by hearing the new players themselves In their motion for intervention, they
implicitly confirmed that the high cost of meeting the inventory requirement has an
inhibiting effect in their operation and hence, they support the ruling of this Court striking
it down as unconstitutional.
5.ID.; ID.; PREDATORY PRICING; DEFINITION TOO LOOSE TO BE DETERRENT.
As discussed, the provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential and minimum
inventory erected high barriers to the entry of prospective players even as they raised
their new rivals' costs, thus creating the clear danger that the deregulated market in the
downstream oil industry will not operate under an atmosphere of free and fair
competition. It is certain that lack of real competition will allow the present oil oligopolists
to dictate prices, and can entice them to engage in predatory pricing to eliminate rivals.
The fact that R.A. No. 8180 prohibits predatory pricing will not dissolve-this clear
danger. In truth, its definition of predatory pricing is too loose to be a real deterrent.
Following the more effective Areeda-Turner test, Congressman Tinga has proposed to
redefine predatory pricing, viz.: "Predatory pricing means selling or offering to sell any
oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of destroying
competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the
market." In light of its loose characterization in R.A. 8180 and the law's anti-competitive
provisions, we held that the provision on predatory pricing is constitutionally infirmed for

it can be wielded more successfully by the oil oligopolists. Its cumulative effect is to add
to the arsenal of power of the dominant oil companies.
6.REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DID NOT REVIEW THE WISDOM OF R.A.
NO. 8180 BUT MERELY DISCHARGED ITS BOUNDEN DUTY TO CHECK
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS. Public respondents insist on their thesis that the
cases at bar actually assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180 and that this Court should
refrain from examining the wisdom of legislations. They contend that R.A. No. 8180
involves an economic policy which this Court cannot review for lack of power and
competence. The Court is aware that the principle of separation of powers prohibits the
judiciary from interfering with the policy setting function of the legislature. For this
reason we italicized in our Decision that the Court did not review the wisdom of R.A. No.
8180 but its compatibility with the Constitution; the Court did not annul the economic
policy of deregulation but vitiated its aspects which offended the constitutional mandate
on fair competition. It is beyond debate that the power of Congress to enact laws does
not include the right to pass unconstitutional laws. In fine, the Court did not usurp the
power of Congress to enact laws but merely discharged its bounden duty to check the
constitutionality of laws when challenged in appropriate cases. Our Decision annulling
R.A. No. 8180 is justified by the principle of checks and balance.
7.ID., ID., POWER TO PASS UPON CONSTITUTIONALITY LAWS DID NOT EXEMPT
LAWS WITH ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS. We hold that the power and obligation of
this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of laws cannot be defeated by the fact that
the challenged law carries serious economic implications. This Court has struck down
laws abridging-the political and civil rights of our people even if it has to offend the other
more powerful branches of government. There is no reason why the Court cannot strike
down R.A. No. 8180 that violates the economic rights of our people even if it has to
bridle the liberty of big business within reasonable bounds. The Constitution gave this
Court the authority to strike down all laws that violate the Constitution. It did not exempt
from the reach of this authority laws with economic dimension.
8.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; R.A. NO. 8180; CHOICE OF
DATE OF FULL DEREGULATION, A JUDGMENT CALL OF CONGRESS WHICH
CANNOT BE IMPUGNED BY THIS COURT. Petitioner has no basis in condemning
as unconstitutional per se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning of the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Our Decision merely faulted the Executive
for factoring the depletion of OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation to
February 1997. Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is now a non-issue for the full
deregulation set by Congress itself at the end of March 1997 has already come to pass.
March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By that date the transition period has ended and it
was expected that the people would have adjusted to the role of market forces in
shaping the prices of petroleum and its products. The choice of March 1997 as the date
of full deregulation is a judgment of Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned
by this Court.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; SEPARABILITY CLAUSE; INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED AND SHOULD NOT CLOTHE VALID PARTS WITH IMMUNITY FROM
INVALIDATING EFFECT OF LAW. We cannot affirm the movants for to determine
whether or not a particular provision is separable, the courts should consider the intent
of the legislature. It is true that most of the time, such intent is expressed in a
separability clause stating that the invalidity or unconstitutionality of any provision or

section of the law will not affect the validity or constitutionality of the remainder.
Nonetheless, the separability clause only creates a presumption that the act is
severable. It is merely an aid in statutory construction. It is not an inexorable command.
A separability clause does not clothe the valid parts with immunity from the invalidating
effect the law gives to the inseparable blending of the bad with the good. The
separability clause cannot also be applied if it will produce an absurd result. In sum if
the separation of the statute will defeat the intent of the legislature separation will not
take place despite the inclusion of a separability clause in the law.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case of Republic Act No. 8180, the
unconstitutionality of the provisions on tariff differential, minimum inventory and
predatory pricing cannot but result in the unconstitutionality of the entire law despite its
separability clause. These provisions cannot be struck down alone for they were the
ones intended to carry out the policy of the law embodied in Section 2 thereof. They
actually set the stage for the regime of deregulation where government will no longer
intervene in fixing the price of oil and the operations of oil companies. It is conceded
that the success of deregulation lies in a truly competitive market and there can be no
competitive market without the easy entry and exit of competitors. We held in our
Decision that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and predatory
pricing are anti-competition, and they are the key provisions of R.A. No. 8180. Without
these provisions in place, Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil
industry. To decree the partial unconstitutionality of R.A. 8180 will bring about an
absurdity a fully deregulated downstream oil industry where government is impotent
to regulate run away prices, where the oil oligopolists can engage in cartelization
without competition, where prospective players cannot come in, and where new players
will close shop.
11.ID.; AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIVES THE LAWS IT HAS REPEALED. It
is sealed jurisprudence that the declaration of a law as unconstitutional revives the laws
that it has repealed. Stated otherwise, an unconstitutional law returns us to the status
quo ante and this return is beyond the power of the Court to stay. Under our scheme of
government, however, the remedy to prevent the revival of all unwanted status quo ante
lies with Congress. Congress can block the revival of the status quo ante or stop its
continuation by immediately enacting the necessary remedial legislation. We emphasize
that in the cases at bar, the Court did not condemn the economic policy of deregulation
as unconstitutional. It merely held that as crafted, the law runs counter to the
constitutional provision calling for fair competition. Thus, there is no impediment in reenacting R A. No. 8180 minus its provisions which are anti-competition. The Court
agrees that our return to the regime of regulation has pernicious consequences and it
specially sympathizes with the intervenors. Be that as it may, the Court is powerless to
prevent this return just as it is powerless to repeal the 10% tariff, differential of the Tariff
Code. It is Congress that can a give all these remedies.
12.ID.; SUPREME COURT, WITH NO PARTISAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY. When
the Court reviews the constitutionality of a law, it does not deal with the realities of
politics nor does it delve into the mysticism of politics. The Court has no partisan
political theology for as an institution it is at best apolitical, and at worse politically
agnostic.
13.ID.; ID.; WITH THE UNYIELDING DUTY TO UPHOLD THE SUPREMACY OF THE
CONSTITUTION. The Constitution mandates the regulation of monopolies and
interdicts unfair competition. Thus, the Constitution provides a shield to the economic
rights of our people, especially the poor. It is the unyielding duty of this Court to uphold

the supremacy of the Constitution not with a mere wishbone but with a backbone that
should neither bend nor break.
KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion:
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; LEGISLATIVE POWER;
STATUTES; SEPARABILITY CLAUSE; CONSTRUED. A separability clause states
that if for any reason, any section or provision of the statute is held to be
unconstitutional or (invalid), the other section(s) or provision(s) of the law shall not be
affected thereby. It is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision
shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act. Such a clause is not, however,
controlling and the courts may, in spite of it, invalidate the whole statute where what is
left, after the void part, is not complete and workable.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The three provisions declared void are
severable from the main statute and their removal therefrom would not affect the validity
and enforceability of the remaining provisions of the said law R.A. 8180, sans the
constitutionally infirmed portions, remains "complete in itself, sensible, capable of being
executed and wholly independent of (those) which (are) rejected. In other words,
despite the elimination of some of its parts; the law can still stand on its own.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J p:
For resolution are: (1) the motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondents;
and (2) the partial motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Enrique T. Garcia and
the intervenors. 1
In their Motion for Reconsideration, the public respondents contend:
I
"Executive Order No. 392 is not a misapplication of Republic Act
No. 8180;
II
Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of Republic Act No. 8180 do not
contravene section 19, Article XII of the Constitution; and
III
Sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of R.A. No. 8180 do not permeate the
essence of the said law; hence their nullity will not vitiate the other
parts thereof." llcd
In their Motion for Reconsideration, the intervenors argue:
"2.1.1The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 restores the
disproportionate advantage of the three big oil firms
Caltex, Shell and Petron over the small oil firms;

2.1.2The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 "disarms" the

new entrants and seriously cripples their capacity to
compete and grow; and
2.1.3Ultimately the total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180
removes substantial, albeit imperfect, barriers to
monopolistic practices and unfair competition and trade
practices harmful not only to movant-intervenors but also
to the public in general."
In his Partial Motion for Reconsideration, 2 petitioner Garcia prays that only the
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on the 4% tariff differential, predatory pricing and minimum
inventory be declared unconstitutional. He cites the "pernicious effects" of a total
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180. He avers that "it is very
problematic . . . if Congress can fasttrack an entirely new law."
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration and partial motion for
reconsideration.
We shall first resolve public respondents' motion for reconsideration. They insist that
there was no misapplication of Republic Act No. 8180 when the Executive considered
the depletion of the OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry. They urge that the consideration of this factor did not violate the rule that the
exercise of delegated power must be done strictly in accord with the standard provided
in the law. They contend that the rule prohibits the Executive from subtracting but not
from adding to the standard set by Congress. This hair splitting is a sterile attempt to
make a distinction when there is no difference. The choice and crafting of the standard
to guide the exercise of delegated power is part of the lawmaking process and lies
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. The standard cannot be altered in any way
by the Executive for the Executive cannot modify the will of the Legislature. To be sure,
public respondents do not cite any authority to support its strange thesis for there is
none in our jurisprudence.
The public respondents next recycle their arguments that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) of
R.A. No. 8180 do not contravene section 19, Article XII of the Constitution. 3 They
reiterate that the 4% tariff differential would encourage the construction of new refineries
which will benefit the country for they use Filipino labor and goods. We have rejected
this submission for a reality check will reveal that this 4% tariff differential gives a
decisive edge to the existing oil companies even as it constitutes a substantial barrier to
the entry of prospective players. We do not agree with the public respondents that there
is no empirical evidence to support this ruling. In the recent hearing of the Senate
Committee on Energy chaired by Senator Freddie Webb, it was established that the 4%
tariff differential on crude oil and refined petroleum importation gives a 20-centavo per
liter advantage to the three big oil companies over the new players. It was also found
that said tariff differential serves as a protective shield for the big oil companies. 4 Nor
do we approve public respondents' submission that the entry of new players after
deregulation is proof that the 4% tariff differential is not a heavy disincentive. Acting as
the mouthpiece of the new players, public respondents even lament that "unfortunately,
the opportunity to get the answer right from the 'horses' mouth' eluded this Honorable
Court since none of the new players supposedly adversely affected by the assailed
provisions came forward to voice their position." 5 They need not continue their
lamentation. The new players represented by Eastern Petroleum, Seaoil Petroleum

Corporation, Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., TWA Inc., and DubPhil Gas have intervened in
the cases at bar and have spoken for themselves. In their motion for intervention, they
made it crystal clear that it is not their intention ". . . to seek the reversal of the Court's
nullification of the 4% differential in section 5(b) nor of the inventory requirement of
section 6, nor of the prohibition of predatory pricing in section 9(b)." 6 They stressed
that they only protest the restoration of the 10% oil tariff differential under the Tariff
Code. 7 The horse's mouth therefore authoritatively tells us that the new players
themselves consider the 4% tariff differential in R.A. No. 8180 as oppressive and should
be nullified.
To give their argument a new spin, public respondents try to justify the 4% tariff
differential on the ground that there is a substantial difference between a refiner and an
importer just as there is a difference between raw material and finished product.
Obviously, the effort is made to demonstrate that the unequal tariff does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. The effort only proves that the public
respondents are still looking at the issue of tariff differential from the wrong end of the
telescope. Our Decision did not hold that the 4% tariff differential infringed the equal
protection clause of the Constitution even as this was contended by petitioner Tatad. 8
Rather, we held that said tariff differential substantially occluded the entry point of
prospective players in the downstream oil industry. We further held that its inevitable
result is to exclude fair and effective competition and to enhance the monopolists' ability
to tamper with the mechanism of a free market. This consideration is basic in anti-trust
suits and cannot be eroded by belaboring the inapplicable principle in taxation that
different things can be taxed differently.
The public respondents tenaciously defend the validity of the minimum inventory
requirement. They aver that the requirement will not prejudice new players ". . . during
their first year of operation because they do not have yet annual sales from which the
required minimum inventory may be determined. Compliance with such requirement on
their second and succeeding years of operation will not be difficult because the putting
up of storage facilities in proportion to the volume of their business becomes an ordinary
and necessary business undertaking just as the case of importers of finished products
in other industries." 9 The contention is an old one although it is purveyed with a new
lipstick. The contention cannot convince for as well articulated by petitioner Garcia, "the
prohibitive cost of the required minimum inventory will not be any less burdensome on
the second, third, fourth, etc. years of operations. Unlike most products which can be
imported and stored with facility, oil imports require ocean receiving, storage facilities.
Ocean receiving terminals are already very expensive, and to require new players to put
up more than they need is to compound and aggravate their costs, and consequently
their great disadvantage vis-a-vis the Big 3." 10 Again, the argument on whether the
minimum inventory requirement seriously hurts the new players is best settled by
hearing the new players themselves. In their motion for intervention, they implicitly
confirmed that the high cost of meeting the inventory requirement has an inhibiting
effect in their operation and hence, they support the ruling of this Court striking it down
as unconstitutional.
Public respondents still maintain that the provision on predatory pricing does not offend
the Constitution. Again, their argument is not fresh though embellished with citations of
cases in the United States sustaining the validity of sales-below-costs statutes. 11 A
quick look at these American cases will show that they are inapplicable. R.A. No. 8180
has a different cast. As discussed, its provisions on tariff differential and minimum
inventory erected high barriers to the entry of prospective players even as they raised

their new rivals' costs, thus creating the clear danger that the deregulated market in the
downstream oil industry will not operate under an atmosphere of free and fair
competition. It is certain that lack of real competition will allow the present oil oligopolists
to dictate prices, 12 and can entice them to engage in predatory pricing to eliminate
rivals. The fact that R.A. No. 8180 prohibits predatory pricing will not dissolve this clear
danger. In truth, its definition of predatory pricing is too loose to be a real deterrent.
Thus, one of the law's principal authors, Congressman Dante O. Tinga filed H.B. No.
10057 where he acknowledged in its explanatory note that "the definition of predatory
pricing . . . needs to be tightened up particularly with respect to the definitive benchmark
price and the specific anti-competitive intent. The definition in the bill at hand which was
taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States on predatory pricing resolves the
questions." Following the more effective Areeda-Turner test, Congressman Tinga has
proposed to redefine predatory pricing, viz.: "Predatory pricing means selling or offering
to sell any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of
destroying competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from
entering the market." 13 In light of its loose characterization in R.A. 8180 and the law's
anti-competitive provisions, we held that the provision on predatory pricing is
constitutionally infirmed for it can be wielded more successfully by the oil oligopolists. Its
cumulative effect is to add to the arsenal of power of the dominant oil companies. For as
structured, it has no more than the strength of a spider web it can catch the weak but
cannot catch the strong; it can stop the small oil players but cannot stop the big oil
players from engaging in predatory pricing.
Public respondents insist on their thesis that the cases at bar actually assail the wisdom
of RA. No. 8180 and that this Court should refrain from examining the wisdom of
legislations. They contend that R.A. No. 8180 involves an economic policy which this
Court cannot review for lack of power and competence. To start with, no school of
scholars can claim any infallibility. Historians with undefiled learning have chronicled 14
over the years the disgrace of many economists and the fall of one economic dogma
after another. Be that as it may, the Court is aware that the principle of separation of
powers prohibits the judiciary from interfering with the policy setting function of the
legislature. 15 For this reason we italicized in our Decision that the Court did not review
the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180 but its compatibility with the Constitution; the Court did not
annul the economic policy of deregulation but vitiated its aspects which offended the
constitutional mandate on fair competition. It is beyond debate that the power of
Congress to enact laws does not include the right to pass unconstitutional laws. In fine,
the Court did not usurp the power of Congress to enact laws but merely discharged its
bounden duty to check the constitutionality of laws when challenged in appropriate
cases. Our Decision annulling R.A. No. 8180 is justified by the principle of check and
balance.
We hold that the power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality of
laws cannot be defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries serious economic
implications. This Court has struck down laws abridging the political and civil rights of
our people even if it has to offend the other more powerful branches of the government.
There is no reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180 that violates the
economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of big business within
reasonable bounds. In Alalayan vs. National Power Corporation 16 the Court, speaking
thru Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held:

"2.Nor is petitioner anymore successful in his plea for the

nullification of the challenged provision on the ground of his being
deprived of the liberty to contract without due process of law.
It is to be admitted of course that property rights find shelter in specific
constitutional provisions, one of which is the due process clause. It is
equally certain that our fundamental law framed at a time of "surging unrest
and dissatisfaction," when there was the fear expressed in many quarters
that a constitutional democracy, in view of its commitment to the claims of
property, would not be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty
and misery that unfortunately afflict so many of our people, is not
susceptible to the indictment that the government therein established is
impotent to take the necessary remedial measures. The framers saw to
that. The welfare state concept is not alien to the philosophy of our
Constitution. It is implicit in quite a few of its provisions. It suffices to
mention two.
There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the wellbeing and economic security of all the people, as well as the pledge of
protection to labor with the specific authority to regulate the relations
between landowners and tenants and between labor and capital. This
particularized reference to the rights of working men whether in industry
and agriculture certainly cannot preclude attention to and concern for the
rights of consumers, who are the objects of solicitude in the legislation now
complained of. The police power as an attribute to promote the common
weal would be diluted considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the
mere pleas that the liberty to contract would be restricted, the statute
complained of may be characterized as a denial of due process. The right
to property cannot be pressed to such an unreasonable extreme.
It is understandable though why business enterprises, not
unnaturally evincing lack of enthusiasm for police power legislation
that affect them adversely and restrict their profits could predicate
alleged violation of their rights on the due process clause, which as
interpreted by them is a bar to regulatory measures. Invariably, the
response from this Court, from the time the Constitution was
enacted, has been far from sympathetic. Thus, during the
Commonwealth, we sustained legislations providing for collective
bargaining, security of tenure, minimum wages, compulsory
arbitration, and tenancy regulation. Neither did the objections as to
the validity of measures regulating the issuance of securities and
public services prevail."
The Constitution gave this Court the authority to strike down all laws that violate the
Constitution. 17 It did not exempt from the reach of this authority laws with economic
dimension. A 20-20 vision will show that the grant by the Constitution to this Court of this
all important power of review is written without any fine print.
The next issue is whether the Court should only declare as unconstitutional the
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory and predatory
pricing.

Positing the affirmative view, petitioner Garcia proffered the following arguments:
"5.Begging the kind indulgence and benign patience of the Court,
we humbly submit that the unconstitutionality of the aforementioned
provisions of R.A. No. 8180 implies that the other provisions are
constitutional. Thus, said constitutional provisions of R.A. No. 8180
may and can very well be spared.
5.1With the striking down of 'ultimately full deregulation,' we will
simply go back to the transition period under R.A. 8180 which will
continue until Congress enacts an amendatory law for the start of full
oil deregulation in due time, when free market forces are already in
place. In turn, the monthly automatic price control mechanism based
on Singapore Posted Prices (SPP) will be revived. The Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB), which still exists, would re-acquire
jurisdiction and would easily compute the monthly price ceiling,
based on SPP, of each and every petroleum fuel product, effective
upon finality of this Court's favorable resolution on this motion for
partial reconsideration.
5.2Best of all, the oil deregulation can continue uninterrupted without
the three other assailed provisions, namely, the 4% tariff differential,
predatory pricing and minimum inventory.
6.We further humbly submit that a favorable resolution on this
motion for partial reconsideration would be consistent with public
interest.
6.1In consequence, new players that have already come in can
uninterruptedly continue their operations more competitively and
bullishly with an even playing field.
6.2Further, an even playing field will attract many more new players
to come in a much shorter time.
6.3Correspondingly, Congress does not anymore have to pass a
new deregulation law, thus it can immediately concentrate on just
amending R.A. No. 8180 to abolish the OPSF, on the government's
assumption that it is necessary to do so. Parenthetically, it is neither
correct nor fair for high government officials to criticize and blame
the Honorable Court on the OPSF, considering that said OPSF is
not inherent in nor necessary to the transition period and may be
removed at any time.
6.4In as much as R.A. No. 8180 would continue to be in place
(sans its unconstitutional provisions), only the Comprehensive Tax
Reform Package (CTRP) would be needed for the country to exit
from IMF by December 1997.
7.The Court, in declaring the entire R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional,
was evidently expecting that Congress "can fasttrack the writing of
a new law on oil deregulation in accord with the
Constitution" (Decision, p. 38). However, it is very problematic, to
say the least, if Congress can fasttrack an entirely new law.
7.1There is already limited time for Congress to pass

8.Furthermore, if the entire R.A. No. 8180 remains nullified as

unconstitutional, pernicious effects will happen:
8.1Until the new oil deregulation law is enacted, we would have to go back
to the old law. This means full regulation, i.e., higher tariff differential of
10%, higher petroleum product price ceilings based on transfer prices of
imported crude oil, and restrictions on the importation of refined petroleum
products that would be allowed only if there are shortages, etc.
8.2In consequence of the above, the existing new players, would have to
totally stop their operations.
8.3The existing new players would find themselves in a bind on how to
fulfill their contractual obligations, especially on their delivery commitments
of petroleum fuel products. They will be in some sort of "limbo" upon the
nullification of the entire R.A. No. 8180.
8.4The investments that existing new players have already made would
become idle and unproductive. All their planned additional investments
would be put on hold.
8.5Needless to say, all this would translate into tremendous losses for
them.
8.6And obviously, prospective new players cannot and will not come in.
8.7On top of everything, public interest will suffer. Firstly, the oil
deregulation program will be delayed. Secondly, the prices of petroleum
products will be higher because of price ceilings based on transfer
imported crude.
9.When it passed R.A. No. 8180, Congress provided a safeguard
against the possibility that any of its provisions could be declared
unconstitutional, thus the separability clause thereof, which the
Court noted (Decision, p. 29). We humbly submit that this is another
reason to grant the motion for partial reconsideration.
In his Supplement to Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner Garcia
amplified his contentions.
In a similar refrain, the public respondents contend that the "unmistakable intention of
Congress" is to make each and every provision of RA. No. 8180 "independent and
separable from one another." To bolster this proposition, they cite the separability clause
of the law and the pending bills in Congress proposing to repeal said offensive
provisions but not the entire law itself. They also recite the "inevitable consequences of
the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180" as follows:
"1.There will be bigger price adjustments in petroleum products due
to (a) the reimposition of the higher tariff rates for imported
crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
[10%-20%], (b) the uncertainty regarding R.A. 8184, or the
"Oil Tariff Law," which simplified tax administration by
lowering the tax rates for socially-sensitive products such
as LPG, diesel, fuel oil and kerosene, and increasing tax
rates of gasoline products which are used mostly by
consumers who belong to the upper income group, and (c)

the issue of wiping out the deficit of P2.6 billion and

creating a subsidy fund in the Oil Price Stabilization Fund;
2.Importers, traders, and industrial end-users like the National
Power Corporation will be constrained to source their oil
requirement only from existing oil companies because of
the higher tariff on imported refined petroleum products
and restrictions on such importation that would be allowed
only if there are shortages;
3.Government control and regulation of all the activities of the oil
industry will discourage prospective investors and drive
away the existing new players;
4.All expansion and investment programs of the oil companies and
new players will be shelved indefinitely;
5.Petitions for price adjustments should be filed and approved by
the ERB."
Joining the chorus, the intervenors contend that:
"2.1.1The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 restores the
disproportionate advantage of the three big oil firms Caltex, Shell
and Petron over the small oil firms;
2.1.2The total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180 "disarms" the
new entrants and seriously cripples their capacity to compete and
grow; and
2.1.3Ultimately, the total nullification of Republic Act No. 8180
removes substantial, albeit imperfect, barriers to monopolistic
practices and unfair competition and trade practices harmful not
only to movant-intervenors but also to the public in general."
The intervenors further aver that under a regime of regulation, (1) the big
oil firms can block oil importation by the small oil firms; (2) the big oil firms can
block the expansion and growth of the small oil firms. They likewise submit that the
provisions on tariff differential, minimum inventory, and predatory pricing are
separable from the body of R.A. No. 8180 because of its separability clause. They
also allege that their separability is further shown by the pending bills in Congress
which only seek the partial repeal of R.A. No. 8180.
We shall first resolve petitioner Garcia's linchpin contention that the full deregulation
decreed by R.A. No. 8180 to start at the end of March 1997 is unconstitutional. For
prescinding from this premise, petitioner suggests that "we simply go back to the
transition period under R.A. No. 8180. Under the transition period, price control will be
revived through the automatic pricing mechanism based on Singapore Posted Prices.
The Energy Regulatory Board . . . would play a limited and ministerial role of computing
the monthly price ceiling of each and every petroleum fuel product, using the automatic
pricing formula. While the OPSF would return, this coverage would be limited to monthly
price increases in excess of P0.50 per liter."
We are not impressed by petitioner Garcia's submission. Petitioner has no basis in
condemning as unconstitutional per se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning of

the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Our Decision merely faulted the
Executive for factoring the depletion of OPSF in advancing the date of full deregulation
to February 1997. Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is now a non-issue for the full
deregulation set by Congress itself at the end of March 1997 has already come to pass.
March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By that date, the transition period has ended and it
was expected that the people would have adjusted to the role of market forces in
shaping the prices of petroleum and its products. The choice of March 1997 as the date
of full deregulation is a judgment of Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned
by this Court.
We come to the submission that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum
inventory and predatory pricing are separable from the body of R.A. No. 8180, and
hence, should alone be declared as unconstitutional. In taking this position, the movants
rely heavily on the separability provision of R.A. No. 8180. We cannot affirm the
movants for to determine whether or not a particular provision is separable, the courts
should consider the intent of the legislature. It is true that most of the time, such intent is
expressed in a separability clause stating that the invalidity or unconstitutionality of any
provision or section of the law will not affect the validity or constitutionality of the
remainder. Nonetheless, the separability clause only creates a presumption that the act
is severable. It is merely an aid in statutory construction. It is not an inexorable
command. 18 A separability clause does not clothe the valid parts with immunity from
the invalidating effect the law gives to the inseparable blending of the bad with the good.
The separability clause cannot also be applied if it will produce an absurd result. 19 In
sum, if the separation of the statute will defeat the intent of the legislature, separation
will not take place despite the inclusion of a separability clause in the law. 20
In the case of Republic Act No. 8180, the unconstitutionality of the provisions on tariff
differential, minimum inventory and predatory pricing cannot but result in the
unconstitutionality of the entire law despite its separability clause. These provisions
cannot be struck down alone for they were the ones intended to carry out the policy of
the law embodied in section 2 thereof which reads:
Sec. 2.Declaration of Policy. It shall be the policy of the State to
deregulate the downstream oil industry to foster a truly competitive
market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair
prices and adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean
and high-quality petroleum products.
They actually set the stage for the regime of deregulation where government will no
longer intervene in fixing the price of oil and the operations of oil companies. It is
conceded that the success of deregulation lies in a truly competitive market and there
can be no competitive market without the easy entry and exit of competitors. No less
than President Fidel V. Ramos recognized this matrix when he declared that the need is
to ". . . recast our laws on trust, monopolies, oligopolies, cartels and combinations
injurious to public welfare to restore competition where it has disappeared and to
preserve it where it still exists. In a word, we need to perpetuate competition as a
system to regulate the economy and achieve global product quality." 21
We held in our Decision that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory
and predatory pricing are anti-competition, and they are the key provisions of R.A. No.
8180. Without these provisions in place, Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry. Consider the 4% tariff differential on crude oil and refined
petroleum. Before R.A. No. 8180, 22 there was a ten-point difference between the tariff

imposed on crude oil and that on refined petroleum. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180
lowered the difference to four by imposing a 3% tariff on crude oil and a 7% tariff on
refined petroleum. We ruled, however, that this reduced tariff differential is
unconstitutional for it still posed a substantial barrier to the entry of new players and
enhanced the monopolistic power of the three existing oil companies. The ruling that the
4% differential is unconstitutional will unfortunately revive the 10% tariff differential of
the Tariff and Customs Code. The high 10% tariff differential will certainly give a bigger
edge to the three existing oil companies, will form an insuperable barrier to prospective
players, and will drive out of business the new players. Thus, there can be no question
that Congress will not allow deregulation if the tariff is 10% on crude oil and 20% on
refined petroleum. To decree the partial unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 will bring
about an absurdity a fully deregulated downstream oil industry where government is
impotent to regulate run away prices, where the oil oligopolists can engage in
cartelization without competition, where prospective players cannot come in, and where
new players will close shop. LLjur
We also reject the argument that the bills pending in Congress merely seek to remedy
the partial defects of R.A. No. 8180, and that this is proof that R.A. No. 8180 can be
declared unconstitutional minus its offensive provisions. We referred to the pending bills
in Congress in our Decision only to show that Congress itself is aware of the various
defects of the law and not to prove the inseparability of the offending provisions from the
body of R.A. No. 8180. To be sure, movants even overlooked the fact that resolutions
have been filed in both Houses of Congress calling for a total review of R.A. No. 8180.
The movants warn that our Decision will throw us back to the undesirable regime of
regulation. They emphasize its pernicious consequences the revival of the 10% tariff
differential which will wipe out the new players, the return of the OPSF which is too
burdensome to government, the unsatisfactory scheme of price regulation by the ERB,
etc. To stress again, it is not the will of the Court to return even temporarily to the regime
of regulation. If we return to the regime of regulation, it is because it is the inevitable
consequence of the enactment by Congress of an unconstitutional law, R.A. No. 8180. It
is settled jurisprudence that the declaration of a law as unconstitutional revives the laws
that it has repealed. Stated otherwise, an unconstitutional law returns us to the status
quo ante and this return is beyond the power of the Court to stay. Under our scheme of
government, however, the remedy to prevent the revival of an unwanted status quo ante
lies with Congress. Congress can block the revival of the status quo ante or stop its
continuation by immediately enacting the necessary remedial legislation. We emphasize
that in the cases at bar, the Court did not condemn the economic policy of deregulation
as unconstitutional. It merely held that as crafted, the law runs counter to the
constitutional provision calling for fair competition. 23 Thus, there is no impediment in
re-enacting R.A. No. 8180 minus its provisions which are anti-competition. The Court
agrees that our return to the regime of regulation has pernicious consequences and it
specially sympathizes with the intervenors. Be that as it may, the Court is powerless to
prevent this return just as it is powerless to repeal the 10% tariff differential of the Tariff
Code. It is Congress that can give all these remedies. 24
Petitioner Garcia, however, injects a non-legal argument in his motion for partial
reconsideration. He avers that "given the 'realities' of politics, especially with the 1998
presidential polls six months away, it is not far-fetched that the general welfare could be
sacrificed to gain political mileage, thus further unduly delaying the enactment of a new
oil deregulation law." The short answer to petitioner Garcia's argument is that when the
Court reviews the constitutionality of a law, it does not deal with the realities of politics

nor does it delve into the mysticism of politics. The Court has no partisan political
theology for as an institution it is at best apolitical, and at worse, politically agnostic. In
any event, it should not take a long time for Congress to enact a new oil deregulation
law given its interest for the welfare of our people. Petitioner Garcia himself has been
quoted as saying that ". . . with the Court's decision, it would now be easy for Congress
to craft a new law, considering that lawmakers will be guided by the Court's points." 25
Even before our Decision, bills amending the offensive provisions of R.A. No. 8180
have already been filed in the Congress and under consideration by its committees.
Speaker Jose de Venecia has assured after a meeting of the Legislative-Executive
Advisory Council (LEDAC) that: "I suppose before Christmas, we should be able to pass
a new oil deregulation law." 26 The Chief Executive himself has urged the immediate
passage of a new and better oil deregulation law. 27
Finally, public respondents raise the scarecrow argument that our Decision will drive
away foreign investors. In response to this official repertoire, suffice to state that our
Decision precisely levels the playing field for foreign investors as against the three
dominant oil oligopolists. No less than the influential Philippine Chamber of Commerce
and Industry whose motive is beyond question, stated thru its Acting President Jaime
Ladao that ". . . this Decision, in fact tells us that we are for honest-to-goodness
competition." Our Decision should be a confidence booster to foreign investors for it
assures them of an effective judicial remedy against an unconstitutional law. There is
need to attract foreign investment but the policy has never been foreign investment at
any cost. We cannot trade-in the Constitution for foreign investment. It is not economic
heresy to hold that trade-in is not a fair exchange.
To recapitulate, our Decision declared R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional for three reasons:
(1) it gave more power to an already powerful oil oligopoly; (2) it blocked the entry of
effective competitors; and (3) it will sire an even more powerful oligopoly whose
unchecked power will prejudice the interest of the consumers and compromise the
general welfare.
A weak and developing country like the Philippines cannot risk a downstream oil
industry controlled by a foreign oligopoly that can run riot. Oil is our most socially
sensitive commodity and for it to be under the control of a foreign oligopoly without
effective competitors is a clear and present danger. A foreign oil oligopoly can
undermine the security of the nation; it can exploit the economy if greed becomes its
creed; it will have the power to drive the Filipino to a prayerful pose. Under a
deregulated regime, the people's only hope to check the overwhelming power of the
foreign oil oligopoly lies on a market where there is fair competition. With prescience,
the Constitution mandates the regulation of monopolies and interdicts unfair
competition. Thus, the Constitution provides a shield to the economic rights of our
people, especially the poor. It is the unyielding duty of this Court to uphold the
supremacy of the Constitution not with a mere wishbone but with a backbone that
should neither bend nor break.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Motions for Reconsideration of the public respondents and of
the intervenors as well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Enrique
Garcia are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

xxx xxx xxx

[G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.]

Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence

upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the
governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, respondents.

[G.R. No. 178628. July 16, 2008.]

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:
The Case
These consolidated petitions 1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007,
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the
legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. 2
The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts
for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City
and eight municipalities. 3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A.
6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054). 4 Although under the
Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao's first legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in
the plebiscite held in November 1989. SDECAI
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM's legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, 5 enacted
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and
Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and
constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is
hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
TESICD

The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of

Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the
province that they will choose or where they are residents:
Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces
becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall
have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant
position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional
Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have
been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided,
further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are
receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new
readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided,
furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
acSECT
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative
district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities 6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11.
Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao's first legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. ICDSca
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan's creation in a plebiscite held on
29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution
No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act
201. CHIEDS
In answer to Cotabato City's query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6
March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan
in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao". Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted
the recommendation of the COMELEC's Law Department under a Memorandum dated
27 February 2007, 7 provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law
by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part
of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied) aScIAC

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on
29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao's first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201. 8
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City)." 9
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City", prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in
Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution 10 and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 11 Thus, Sema asserted that
the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No.
7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanao's first legislative district despite
the COMELEC's earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as
the lone component of Maguindanao's reapportioned first legislative district. 12 Sema
further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress'
power to create or reapportion legislative districts. CHDAaS
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly
availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial,
power and (2) Sema's prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot
with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on
1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy
filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative
of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City". Respondent Dilangalen added that
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a
legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in
Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao's first legislative district. Respondent
Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanao's
first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to
reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that
Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city. 13
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents'
Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902. HAaScT
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No.
177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows:

(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in
Felwa v. Salas 14 stated that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which
cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment;" (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. 7160)
"affirms" the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province;
and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly
created provinces. aSDHCT
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier
stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes
with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is "selfexecuting". Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso
facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the
absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds:
(a) the "province" contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that
is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in R.A. 7160 on the
creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of R.A. 9054 withheld from the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which
encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of
Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM
Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM
in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces without
regard to the requirements in Section 461 of R.A. 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which
has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of
Representatives. TcaAID
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral
arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. 15
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No.
177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments. 16
On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, the parties
in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions: CITcSH
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is constitutional (a) as a
valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under
Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through
their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized by law
for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as an
amendment to Section 6 of R.A. 7160. 17 However, Sema concedes that, if taken
literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly
of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated" in R.A. 7160 in the
creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. 18 Thus,
Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional

Assembly from prescribing standards . . . that do not comply with the minimum criteria "
under R.A. 7160. 19
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not
among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in
Section 461 of R.A. 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and EHCcIT
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus
effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the
Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054
is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6, 20 Article X of
the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the
autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054
is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent
Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance
with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to
submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of R.A.
9054 is unconstitutional. CcTIDH
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral
arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the
Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R.
No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the
House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the
COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the "appropriate
law".
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and TIHDAa
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and cSIADa

(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R. No. 177597 and G.R. No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City]"), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of
such district (excluding Cotabato City). DCaSHI
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by "any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." 21 On the other
hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person to perform an act "which the law specifically enjoins as a duty." 22 True, the
COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasijudicial functions. 23 Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to
exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City". These, however, do not justify the outright
dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance
of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations. 24 2005jur
Respondent Dilangalen's Proclamation
Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen's proclamation as winner
in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City" mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent
Dilangalen's election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19,
Article VI of R.A. 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another,
determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City" will be included in the canvassing of
ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with
the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court's ruling in these petitions
affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding
elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

!
!

On the Main Issues

Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
EcSCAD
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of
a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and
municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, 25 subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the
Local Government Code, "only . . . an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or
municipalities. 26 EIaDHS
Under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the
power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers
granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. 27 In the present case, the
question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the
Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section
10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and
cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member . . . " ADaSEH

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000
or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to
create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than
250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city's
population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one
representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also
validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold
issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the
negative. HCaIDS
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past 28 Constitutions, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations. TEHIaA
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis
supplied) ECaAHS
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion
legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself
enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The
allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new

legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by
Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC 29 we held that the "power of redistricting . . . is
traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws", and thus is
vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion
legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of
legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a
law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or
reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior
legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership
of the superior legislative body. SaCDTA
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create
legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as
amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
ASaTHc
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for
the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region. DEcTCa
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous
regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts
for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of R.A. 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act,
provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power . . . except on
the following matters: . . . (k) National elections. . . . ." Since the ARMM Regional
Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot
create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.
Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is
always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law. 30 ADCTac

Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office,

and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. 31
It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its
regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds
and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent
limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can
only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national
office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of
the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction . . . ." SHEIDC
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the
exclusive nature of Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts by
abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA
Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing
legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof,
shall remain. (Emphasis supplied) aTIAES
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because
the Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one
representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a
legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis
supplied) aCTcDH
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member or such number of Members
as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The
number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created or where the city, whose population has
so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly
adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall
not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied) EASCDH

serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created
on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of
Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance,
petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that "when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment."
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (R.A.
4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and KalingaApayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces,
was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment
provided in the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative, thus: caHCSD
The Constitution ordains:
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have
at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall
have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the
same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National
Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the
present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall
comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory."
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come
into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province
for "each province shall have at least one member" in the
House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several
representative districts within a province. The requirements
concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the
territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of
representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the
creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not
only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also,
from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that
which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district,
comes into existence neither by authority of that statute
which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but
by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
cSaCDT
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of,
or other conditions under which a province may be created, except,
perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum

of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which

is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter
of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other
provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative
districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements.
32 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of R.A. 4695 because (1) it validly
created legislative districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress
creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in
breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935
Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly. SDECAI
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress' power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from
Congress' power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation
of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each province shall
have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. This does not
detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts
belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except
Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province
such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an
act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the
Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a
legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the
first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a
legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of
only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district
of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires
that "[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand . . ., shall have
at least one representative." EacHSA
Second. Sema's theory also undermines the composition and independence of the
House of Representatives. Under Section 19, 33 Article VI of R.A. 9054, the ARMM
Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without
regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of R.A. 7160, namely: minimum annual income
of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or
minimum population of 250,000. 34 The following scenarios thus become distinct
possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly
can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the
membership of a superior legislative body, the House of
Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the
Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); SHCaDA

(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives

based on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents
will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not
comply with the requirement in Section 461 (a) (ii) of R.A. 7160 that
every province created must have a population of at least 250,000;
and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the
majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM
Regional Assembly's continuous creation of provinces or cities
within the ARMM. IHEaAc
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597
highlights the absurdity of Sema's position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative
district[s] and pack Congress with their own
representatives [?] CIaHDc
Atty. Vistan II: 35
Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and
create . . . provinces . . . and, therefore, they can have
thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of
Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that
what you are saying? That can be done, under your
theory[?] cDAISC
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35)
new provinces, there may be . . . [only] one hundred
thousand (100,000) [population], . . ., and they will each
have one representative . . . to Congress without any
national law, is that what you are saying? ITSaHC
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we
are saying.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces,
sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the

House of Representatives without a national law[,]

that is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor. 36 (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on
regional autonomy, 37 nor Congress in enacting R.A. 9054, envisioned or intended
these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion
legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by
Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. ESTcIA
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not
the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states,
"[A]ny province that may hereafter be created . . . shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member", refers to a province created by Congress
itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the
actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress
can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219 38 district
representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since
party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there
should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list
candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district
representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there
is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House,
even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited "[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, . .
. ." The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (R.A. 9054) itself states that the ARMM
Government is established "within the framework of the Constitution". This follows
Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall be
created . . . within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines". TEaADS
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily
involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply
with the criteria established in Section 461 of R.A. 7160, as mandated in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays
does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue
to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes
the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,

Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the

Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating
a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that
MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. acCITS
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic
and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as
it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare
VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
ESTAIH
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED. TCEaDI

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.]
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM,
GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR.
petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY
TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
respondents.

DECISION

Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is

that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI,
Section 26 (1) of the Constitution, to wit:
"Sec. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the
subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to
the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.
Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of
the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5 (1)
and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:

BIDIN, J p:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein
petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos
signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on
April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of
the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By
virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of
three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
"As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its
own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in
the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The
remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/
Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan
with its first representative to be elected at the same election."

"Sec. 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of

not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations."
"Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in this section."
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted
in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners
contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And
finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city
with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains
compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
". . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5 (3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that

the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is
decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not
qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No.
7675 must be allowed to stand.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional

district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675. "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under
Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts

the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders
on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners
present further arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made
to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in
their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary
thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in
Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further
elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted
in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of
the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/
Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

"Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in

the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to
the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same
does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is
not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant
data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the
number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the
applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is
that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

SO ORDERED.

!
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118577. March 7, 1995.]
JUANITO MARIANO, JR., et al., petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF
M A K AT I , H O N . J E J O M A R B I N AY, T H E M U N I C I PA L
TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 118627. March 7, 1995.]
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR
BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
OF MAKATI, respondents.
Villamor Legarda & Associates for petitioner in G.R. No. 118627.
Acosta & Corvera Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 118577.
Emmanuel P.J . Tamase for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; DRAWING OF
TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES; REQUIRED; RATIONALE. The importance of
drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of
the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers
of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its
acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the
Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must
be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE THAT LAW MUST BE ENFORCED WHEN
ASCERTAINED, ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE STRICT
LETTER OF THE STATUTE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. Congress did not
intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions
similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such
description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the
very purpose which the Local Government seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the
Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at
the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No.
7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law
would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the
master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the
intendment of the law. Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts

will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of
the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051;
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government
which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes (Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520).
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAW, WHEN CHALLENGED;
REQUIREMENTS. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself. (Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Cruz, Constitutional Law,
1991 ed., p. 24)
4. ID.; REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT; RULE; APPLICATION IN
CASE AT BAR. In the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December
8, 1994, this Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution (Section
5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of
subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 (R.A. No. 7160);
REQUIREMENT THAT TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES BE IDENTIFIED BY METES AND
BOUNDS WITH TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT
BAR. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city,
municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set forth in
Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that
the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted should
be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions. The omission of
R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized
City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of the city
by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The
Constitution does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine
qua non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as

a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners'
reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing. Said section only applies to the
conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a
highly urbanized city.
2. ID.; R.A. No. 7854; INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE SEATS;
JUSTIFIED. Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the
City of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause
unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
That clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding
paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows: "Within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section." In short, the clause
refers to a general reapportionment law. The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a
permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.

reapportionment law to be passed by Congress

within three (3) years following the return of
every census; dctai
(b) the increase in legislative district, was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati
stands at only 450,000."
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner John H. Osmea as senator,
taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I

DECISION

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land area of the
proposed city of Makati, thus:

PUNO, J p:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It
was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero,
Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano,
Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land
area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three
consecutive term' limit for local elective officials, in violation of
Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati
only by special law (the Charter in violation of
the constitutional provision requiring a general

"SEC. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be

converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of
Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila
Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the
Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution
by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or
cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City
of Makati and the adjoining local government units." (Emphasis
supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates Sections
7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local
government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries
of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state,
any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts
in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in

requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions.

Government Code seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code

is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful
due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the
needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital
cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the
mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the
law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then
becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the
other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil
can be brought about by the description made in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the
established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, Section 2
stated that the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason
why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No.
7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over
Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a
co-equal department of government, the legislations felt that the dispute should be
left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a
legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if
they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also
refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present
an unsurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress form defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the
cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City
of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by
the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold
that Section 2 of R.A. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz:
"Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code,
it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz: 'the
territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be
described by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions' was
made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities
may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on
metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment
of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as
the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained,
i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the
legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities
must contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those
appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require
such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to
do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103
Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an
active instrument of government which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes (Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule
must indubitably apply to the case at bar."
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of Section
51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
"SEC. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective
officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials
of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions
until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected
officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices:
Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continue exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of
Makati."
They contend that this section collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
"SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more

than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected." cdll
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials,
including Members of the House of Representatives, have a term of three (3) years
and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They
argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence,
Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously serve by them. In particular,
petitioners point that Section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent
Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further
argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in
the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek
another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said
Section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of
respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51.
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will
run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue
in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality
of Section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
"SEC. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highlyurbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2)
legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No.
7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarias, and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of

Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second

district." (Emphasis supplied)
They contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment 6 cannot made by a special law; (2) the
addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill; 7 and (3)
Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.
8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9
clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred
fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing
a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. 10 That intolerable
situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible.
It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of
the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least
one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of
an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the
title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit. we reiterated the policy
of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as
not to impede legislation. To be sure, the Constitution does not command that the
title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details.
Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."
costs.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

Procedural Issues

[G.R. No. 189698. February 22, 2010.]

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR.,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, C.J p:
Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) motion for reconsideration, and the movantsintervenors' motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Court's December 1,
2009 Decision (Decision). 1
The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar
P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, 2 Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code 3 and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, 4
mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public
appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of
their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and
movants-intervenors submit the following arguments:
(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the
constitutional proscription against the participation of
public appointive officials and members of the military in
partisan political activity;
(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection
clause when they accord differential treatment to elective
and appointive officials, because such differential
treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions
and is germane to the purposes of the law; cDaEAS
(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of
overbreadth; and
(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as
public safety and interest demand such reversal.
We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.
I.

First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELEC's
motion for reconsideration which was filed on December 15, 2009, as well as the
propriety of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed after the
Court had rendered its December 1, 2009 Decision.
i. Timeliness of COMELEC's Motion for Reconsideration
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court, 5 in relation to Section 1,
Rule 52 of the same rules, 6 COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of
notice of the assailed Decision within which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC
received notice of the assailed Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until
December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.
The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December
14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally
submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 still
within the reglementary period.
ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:
A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be
entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor
shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or
interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. 7 SCIacA
Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within
which a motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion for intervention may
be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties. (italics supplied)
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the
period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not
been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the
trial court, 8 when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court, 9 and even where the assailed order has already
become final and executory. 10 In Lim v. Pacquing, 11 the motion for intervention filed
by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and
injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court 12 after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. 13 We
stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to
make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. 14 Its purpose is
not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. 15
We rule that, with the exception of the IBP-Cebu City Chapter, all the movantsintervenors may properly intervene in the case at bar.
First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or
interest in the case.
As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the
December 1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law; as a voter, he has a
right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; and as a public officer,
he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its
system of government.
On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are
candidates in the May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in view of
the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and are not
likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the assailed
Decision, unless it is reversed.
Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed if
this Court's Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the land.
With regard to the IBP-Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that
"this case involves the constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National
Elections," and that "there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene . . . so that the voice
of its members in the legal profession would also be heard before this Highest Tribunal
as it resolves issues of transcendental importance." 16 SDHacT
Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter
has failed to present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with
standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too
indistinguishable to justify its intervention.
We now turn to the substantive issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
The assailed Decision struck down Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, and Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:
(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because of the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices and those holding elective positions;
(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all
civil servants holding appointive posts: (a) without
distinction as to whether or not they occupy high/influential
positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil

servants' activity regardless of whether they be partisan or

nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the
national, municipal or barangay level; and
(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict
the fundamental right of these public appointive officials.
We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4 (a) of Resolution
8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse
our December 1, 2009 Decision.
III.
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law
Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of
the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:
Incumbent Appointive Official. Under Section 13 of RA 9369,
which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to
Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, 17 which repealed
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code 18 and rendered
ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an
elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign
period corresponding to the positions for which they are running, 19
an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run
for another position without forfeiting his seat. ADEHTS
These laws and regulations implement Section 2 (4), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in
any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaigns is unmistakable. The exchange between
Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission is instructive:
MS. QUESADA.
xxx xxx xxx
Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in
Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or employee
in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in
any partisan political activity." This is almost the same
provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the
government service have actually experienced how this

provision has been violated by the direct or indirect

partisan political activities of many government officials.
So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would
make this provision more strict, and which would deter its
violation?
MR. FOZ.
Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the
implementing rules on the matter are more than
exhaustive enough to really prevent officers and
employees in the public service from engaging in any form
of partisan political activity. But the problem really lies in
implementation because, if the head of a ministry, and
even the superior officers of offices and agencies of
government will themselves violate the constitutional
injunction against partisan political activity, then no string
of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft
will really implement the constitutional intent against
partisan political activity. . . . 20 (italics supplied)
To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and
employees is presently reflected and implemented by a number of statutes. Section 46
(b) (26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 respectively provide in relevant part:
Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political
activities by one holding a non-political office. TCacIE
xxx xxx xxx
Section 55. Political Activity. No officer or employee in the Civil
Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage
directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in
any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or
influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body.
Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer
or employee from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his
candidates for public office whom he supports: Provided, That
public officers and employees holding political offices may take part
in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to
solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any
of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.
Section 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further
makes intervention by civil service officers and employees in partisan political
activities an election offense, viz.:

SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of

an election offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or
employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices;
any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense
forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units
that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order,
if he is a peace officer.
The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation
of civil service officers and employees in partisan political activities is too plain to be
mistaken.
But Section 2 (4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes
apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the
constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that
"[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters." 21 This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office,
engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the
campaign period. 22 Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office,
elective positions included. 23
The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to
vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or mention the names of certain
candidates for public office whom they support. This is crystal clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz.:
MS. AQUINO:
Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2,
Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13,
between the words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase
ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete
the word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute the word
CAMPAIGN. AaITCS
May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas):
Commissioner Aquino may proceed.
MS. AQUINO:
The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase
"except to vote" which was adopted in both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not
intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a
qualification of the general prohibition against taking part
in elections.

Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided

for as an exception to this prohibition, it will amount to
disenfranchisement. We know that suffrage, although
plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other words, the
Legislature can always pass a statute which can withhold
from any class the right to vote in an election, if public
interest so required. I would only like to reinstate the
qualification by specifying the prohibited acts so that those
who may want to vote but who are likewise prohibited from
participating in partisan political campaigns or
electioneering may vote.
MR. FOZ:
There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand
that there was no intention on the part of the Committee to
disenfranchise any government official or employee. The
elimination of the last clause of this provision was
precisely intended to protect the members of the civil
service in the sense that they are not being deprived of the
freedom of expression in a political contest. The last
phrase or clause might have given the impression that a
government employee or worker has no right whatsoever
in an election campaign except to vote, which is not the
case. They are still free to express their views although
the intention is not really to allow them to take part actively
in a political campaign. 24
IV.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the
Equal Protection Clause
We now hold that Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. DcTSHa
i. Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling
In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned
provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. 25
In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to
Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the ground, among
others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed
Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the
Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned
from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast,
since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to be
operative they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section
14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions "apply equally" to

both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy
created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and
significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention
that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed
muster. We ruled:
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates
the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal
protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is
to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who
do not. ADTEaI
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office
by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in
the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any
partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to
vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or

employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed

to take part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging
under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed. 26
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our
assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare
decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents,"
mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. 27 This doctrine
is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial
decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The Nature of
the Judicial Process:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set
of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group of
cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same
decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on
opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday
when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if
I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement,
material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must
then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have
faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts. 28
CaHAcT
Our Farias ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned
provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an
adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered
as obiter dictum. 29 This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and
resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final
conclusion, and to any statement as to the matter on which the decision is predicated.
30 For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent
because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other
ground; or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did.
31 As we held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.: 32
. . . A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded
as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can

an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case

has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So,
also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of
which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court
actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative
precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can
be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should
not be denied authority merely because another point was more
dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding
other propositions dicta. 33 (italics supplied)
ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law
The Farias ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if
reexamined.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. 34 What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. 35 The test developed
by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 36 which has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 37
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions
satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the
dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected
officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain," viz.: SCEDaT
. . . For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the
Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the VicePresident who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in
the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take
charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both
head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them
differently when both file their [Certificates of Candidacy] for the
elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in
the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can still use the
resources of his office to support his campaign. 38
Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy
an injustice, the Legislature need not address every manifestation of the evil at once; it
may proceed "one step at a time." 39 In addressing a societal concern, it must
invariably draw lines and make choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those
included or excluded. 40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice"

are not exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment. 41 We may not
strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been more fully
achieved by expanding the class. 42 Stated differently, the fact that a legislative
classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render it unconstitutionally arbitrary or
invidious. 43 There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and
every class to which it might be applied; 44 that the Legislature must be held rigidly to
the choice of regulating all or none.
Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that
the law creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious." 45 He must
refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the
Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment, 46 such that the
constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the
classification is "fairly debatable." 47 In the case at bar, the petitioners failed and in
fact did not even attempt to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision was
likewise silent as a sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following thesis:
. . . [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that
the statute's distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the
best solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find
that there is no reasonably rational reason for the differing
treatment. 48
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding
elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned
provisions? I submit that there is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the
purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. 49 It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote. 50 Considering that elected officials are put in office
by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will.
In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. CaSHAc
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials
is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law
was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom
is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to
balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will. 51 (emphasis in the
original)
In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by invalidating
provisions of law that seek to restrain the evils from running riot. Under the pretext of
equal protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils are unconfined and vagrant,
existing at the behest of both appointive and elected officials, over another in which a
significant portion thereof is contained. The absurdity of that position is self-evident, to
say the least.

The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent,
that elected officials (vis--vis appointive officials) have greater political clout over the
electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring but not by this Court. Suffice it to say
that the remedy lies with the Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority,
under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make
policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the
Legislature's power to make the deemed-resigned provisions applicable to elected
officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such
frequency and magnitude as to tilt the balance in favor of expanding the class. This
Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on
the people the best state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.
iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled
Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed
Decision adverted to, and extensively cited, Mancuso v. Taft. 52 This was a decision of
the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals promulgated in March 1973,
which struck down as unconstitutional a similar statutory provision. Pathetically, our
assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:
(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two
fundamental freedoms freedom of expression and
association;
(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this
fundamental right must be subjected to strict equal
protection review; and
(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the
honesty and impartiality of its public work force, the
deemed-resigned provisions pursue their objective in a far
too heavy-handed manner as to render them
unconstitutional.
It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we
copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for
being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit." TCHcAE
Our assailed Decision's reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot blink
away the fact that the United States Supreme Court effectively overruled Mancuso
three months after its promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals. In United
States Civil Service Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers
AFL-CIO, et al. 53 and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al., 54 the United
States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions
prohibiting federal 55 and state 56 employees from taking an active part in political
management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial
invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in dismissal from employment and
possible criminal sanctions.
The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held
that (i) in regulating the speech of its employees, the state as employer has interests
that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech of the citizenry
in general; (ii) the courts must therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free
expression against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public
services; (iii) if the employees' expression interferes with the maintenance of efficient

and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech is not unconstitutional; and
(iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which
positions are to be covered by any statutory restrictions. 57 Therefore, insofar as
government employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an interestbalancing approach, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between
the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question. 58
Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:
Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the
country appears to have been that partisan political activities by
federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate
effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in
representative government, and employees themselves are to be
sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far
imposed on federal employees are not aimed at particular parties,
groups, or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan activities
of the type described. They discriminate against no racial, ethnic, or
religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions or
beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls.
But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education, 59 the
government has an interest in regulating the conduct and 'the
speech of its employees that differ(s) significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
(government), as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.' Although
Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so
chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by
the obviously important interests sought to be served by the
limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch
Act. HTSIEa
It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the
Executive Branch of the Government, or those working for any of its
agencies, should administer the law in accordance with the will of
Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a
political party. They are expected to enforce the law and execute
the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or
against any political party or group or the members thereof. A major
thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of Government
the impartial execution of the laws it is essential that federal
employees, for example, not take formal positions in political
parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan political
campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets.
Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and
effective government.
There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only
important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid

practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to

the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent.
Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities
by federal employees was perhaps the immediate occasion for
enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the conviction that
the rapidly expanding Government work force should not be
employed to build a powerful, invincible, and perhaps corrupt
political machine. The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns
convinced Congress that these dangers were sufficiently real that
substantial barriers should be raised against the party in power
or the party out of power, for that matter using the thousands or
hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public
expense, to man its political structure and political campaigns.
HIDCTA
A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was
to further serve the goal that employment and advancement in the
Government service not depend on political performance, and at
the same time to make sure that Government employees would be
free from pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a
certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with
their superiors rather than to act out their own beliefs. It may be
urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but
for many years the joint judgment of the Executive and Congress
has been that to protect the rights of federal employees with
respect to their jobs and their political acts and beliefs it is not
enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or
coerce another. For example, at the hearings in 1972 on proposed
legislation for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity, the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated that 'the
prohibitions against active participation in partisan political
management and partisan political campaigns constitute the most
significant safeguards against coercion . . ..' Perhaps Congress at
some time will come to a different view of the realities of political life
and Government service; but that is its current view of the matter,
and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view,
does the Constitution forbid it.
Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political
activities is absolute in any event. 60 . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to
construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport
with constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)
Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is
constitutionally permissible, viz.:

Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed

restrictions on the partisan political conduct of state employees.
Appellants freely concede that such restrictions serve valid and
important state interests, particularly with respect to attracting
greater numbers of qualified people by insuring their job security,
free from the vicissitudes of the elective process, and by protecting
them from 'political extortion.' Rather, appellants maintain that
however permissible, even commendable, the goals of s 818 may
be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and its prohibitions too
broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct that
may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. For these
and other reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh
paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto and cannot be enforced
against them or anyone else.
We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague.
61 We have little doubt that s 818 is similarly not so vague that
'men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning.' 62 Whatever other problems there are with s 818, it is all
but frivolous to suggest that the section fails to give adequate
warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out 'explicit
standards' for those who must apply it. In the plainest language, it
prohibits any state classified employee from being 'an officer or
member' of a 'partisan political club' or a candidate for 'any paid
public office.' It forbids solicitation of contributions 'for any political
organization, candidacy or other political purpose' and taking part
'in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political
campaign.' Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as
with the Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the meaning of such
terms in s 818 as 'partisan,' or 'take part in,' or 'affairs of' political
parties. But what was said in Letter Carriers, is applicable here:
'there are limitations in the English language with respect to being
both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that
although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding
fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person
exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and
comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.' . . . IAEcCT
xxx xxx xxx
[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and
purports to reach protected, as well as unprotected conduct, and
must therefore be struck down on its face and held to be incapable
of any constitutional application. We do not believe that the
overbreadth doctrine may appropriately be invoked in this manner
here.
xxx xxx xxx
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing
in the First Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute
thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting
construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the

seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected

expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner
is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has been employed by the Court
sparingly and only as a last resort. . . .
. . . But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial
over-breadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of
practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates
as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to
sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that
conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter
protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point
where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with confidence,
justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State
from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within
its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly
where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that
the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It
is our view that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that
whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-bycase analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions,
assertedly, may not be applied.
Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad
regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its terms, at political
expression which if engaged in by private persons would plainly be
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the
same time, s 818 is not a censorial statute, directed at particular
groups or viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political
activity in an even-handed and neutral manner. As indicted, such
statutes have in the past been subject to a less exacting
overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s 818
regulates a substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly
subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass.
This much was established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers.
Under the decision in Letter Carriers, there is no question that s
818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees from:
soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or
other partisan political purposes; becoming members of national,
state, or local committees of political parties, or officers or
committee members in partisan political clubs, or candidates for
any paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs of
any political party's partisan political campaign; serving as
delegates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political
parties; addressing or taking an active part in partisan political
rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters at the polls or
helping in a partisan effort to get voters to the polls; participating in

the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or

circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for
any political party or partisan political candidate. HAIaEc
. . . It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818
may be susceptible of some other improper applications. But, as
presently construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be
discarded in toto because some persons' arguably protected
conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute. Section
818 is not substantially overbroad and it not, therefore,
unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)
It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny
the principles enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He would hold,
nonetheless, that these cases cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso,
since they "pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set
of facts," viz.:
In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service
Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch
Act's prohibition against "active participation in political
management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired to
campaign for candidates for public office, to encourage and get
federal employees to run for state and local offices, to participate as
delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a political club.
In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague
and overbroad a provision in the (sic) Oklahoma's Merit System of
Personnel Administration Act restricting the political activities of the
State's classified civil servants, in much the same manner as the
Hatch Act proscribed partisan political activities of federal
employees. Prior to the commencement of the action, the
appellants actively participated in the 1970 reelection campaign of
their superior, and were administratively charged for asking other
Corporation Commission employees to do campaign work or to
give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for
soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving and distributing
campaign posters in bulk.
Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic
resignation provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full time police officer
and classified civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed
as a candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode
Island General Assembly. The Mayor of Cranston then began the
process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City Home
Rule Charter.
Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of
laws and were decided based on a different set of facts, Letter
Carriers and Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of
Mancuso. . . . (italics in the original)

We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary
to his claim, Letter Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all concerned the
constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:
(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a
candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode
Island General Assembly. He assailed the constitutionality
of 14.09 (c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which
prohibits "continuing in the classified service of the city
after becoming a candidate for nomination or election to
any public office."
(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil
Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to
enforce, the Hatch Act's prohibition against "active
participation in political management or political
campaigns" 63 with respect to certain defined activities in
which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to this
discussion are: THEcAS
(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which
alleged that its members were desirous of,
among others, running in local elections for
offices such as school board member, city council
member or mayor;
(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did
not, file as a candidate for the office of Borough
Councilman in his local community for fear that
his participation in a partisan election would
endanger his job; and
(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a
Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan
election for the mayor of West Lafayette, Indiana,
and that he would do so except for fear of losing
his job by reason of violation of the Hatch Act.
The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management
or political campaigns" by cross-referring to the rules
made by the Civil Service Commission. The rule pertinent
to our inquiry states:
30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a
nomination or for election to any National, State,
county, or municipal office is not permissible. The
prohibition against political activity extends not
merely to formal announcement of candidacy but
also to the preliminaries leading to such
announcement and to canvassing or soliciting
support or doing or permitting to be done any act
in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that
candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an
employee acquiesces in the efforts of friends in

furtherance of such candidacy such

acquiescence constitutes an infraction of the
prohibitions against political activity. (italics
supplied)
Section 9 (b) requires the immediate removal of violators and
forbids the use of appropriated funds thereafter to pay
compensation to these persons. 64
(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma
state employees seeking a declaration of
unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs of Section 818 of
Oklahoma's Merit System of Personnel Administration Act.
Section 818 (7), the paragraph relevant to this discussion,
states that "[n]o employee in the classified service shall be
. . . a candidate for nomination or election to any paid
public office . . ." Violation of Section 818 results in
dismissal from employment, possible criminal sanctions
and limited state employment ineligibility.
Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively
overruled Mancuso. By no stretch of the imagination could Mancuso still be held
operative, as Letter Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-torun laws, and (ii) were decided by a superior court, the United States Supreme Court. It
was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals the same court that
decided Mancuso to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v. Lynch 65
that Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly explained:
Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city
office in 1975. Pawtucket's "Little Hatch Act" prohibits city
employees from engaging in a broad range of political activities.
Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically proscribed,
66 the violation being punished by removal from office or immediate
dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials on
the ground that that the provision of the city charter was
unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of Letter
Carriers and Broadrick, took the position that Mancuso had
since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that
political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be
infringed upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not
available, was a position which was no longer viable, since the
Supreme Court (finding that the government's interest in
regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees
differed significantly from its interest in regulating those of the
citizenry in general) had given little weight to the argument
that prohibitions against the coercion of government
employees were a less drastic means to the same end,
deferring to the judgment of Congress, and applying a
"balancing" test to determine whether limits on political
activity by public employees substantially served government
interests which were "important" enough to outweigh the
employees' First Amendment rights. 67 aIcCTA

It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even
though the election in Magill was characterized as nonpartisan, as
it was reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances of
that case, that politically active bureaucrats might use their official
power to help political friends and hurt political foes. Ruled the
court:
The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter
provision, which bars a city employee's candidacy in even
a nonpartisan city election, is constitutional. The issue
compels us to extrapolate two recent Supreme Court
decisions, Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers and Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt with laws
barring civil servants from partisan political activity. Letter
Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act as to
federal employees. Broadrick sustained Oklahoma's "Little
Hatch Act" against constitutional attack, limiting its holding
to Oklahoma's construction that the Act barred only activity
in partisan politics. In Mancuso v. Taft, we assumed that
proscriptions of candidacy in nonpartisan elections would
not be constitutional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel
new analysis.
xxx xxx xxx
What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district
court recognized, is to apply the Court's interest balancing
approach to the kind of nonpartisan election revealed in
this record. We believe that the district court found more
residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than
remains after Letter Carriers. We have particular reference
to our view that political candidacy was a fundamental
interest which could be trenched upon only if less
restrictive alternatives were not available. While this
approach may still be viable for citizens who are not
government employees, the Court in Letter Carriers
recognized that the government's interest in regulating
both the conduct and speech of its employees differs
significantly from its interest in regulating those of the
citizenry in general. Not only was United Public Workers v.
Mitchell "unhesitatingly" reaffirmed, but the Court gave
little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the
coercion of government employees were a less drastic
means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of the
Congress. We cannot be more precise than the Third
Circuit in characterizing the Court's approach as "some
sort of 'balancing' process". 68 It appears that the
government may place limits on campaigning by public
employees if the limits substantially serve government
interests that are "important" enough to outweigh the
employees' First Amendment rights. . . . (italics supplied)

Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the

Magill court detailed the major governmental interests discussed in
Letter Carriers and applied them to the Pawtucket provision as
follows:
In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an
efficient government, faithful to the Congress rather than to party. The district
court discounted this interest, reasoning that candidates in a local election
would not likely be committed to a state or national platform. This
observation undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance to broad policy
positions is concerned. But a different kind of possible political intrusion into
efficient administration could be thought to threaten municipal government:
not into broad policy decisions, but into the particulars of administration
favoritism in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal
contracts and purchasing, hiring, zoning, licensing, and inspections. Just as
the Court in Letter Carriers identified a second governmental interest in the
avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy, so there is an
equivalent interest in avoiding the appearance of political preferment in
privileges, concessions, and benefits. The appearance (or reality) of
favoritism that the charter's authors evidently feared is not exorcised by the
nonpartisan character of the formal election process. Where, as here, party
support is a key to successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the norm, the
city might reasonably fear that politically active bureaucrats would use their
official power to help political friends and hurt political foes. This is not to say
that the city's interest in visibly fair and effective administration necessarily
justifies a blanket prohibition of all employee campaigning; if parties are not
heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of favoritism is less, for neither
friend nor foe is as easily identified. CScaDH
A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was
avoiding the danger of a powerful political machine. The Court had in mind
the large and growing federal bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The
district court felt this was only a minor threat since parties had no control
over nominations. But in fact candidates sought party endorsements, and
party endorsements proved to be highly effective both in determining who
would emerge from the primary election and who would be elected in the
final election. Under the prevailing customs, known party affiliation and
support were highly significant factors in Pawtucket elections. The charter's
authors might reasonably have feared that a politically active public work
force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent workers, an
unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In municipal elections especially,
the small size of the electorate and the limited powers of local government
may inhibit the growth of interest groups powerful enough to outbalance the
weight of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan issues and
candidacies are at stake, isolated government employees may seek to
influence voters or their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is
that a central party structure will mass the scattered powers of government
workers behind a single party platform or slate. Occasional misuse of the
public trust to pursue private political ends is tolerable, especially because
the political views of individual employees may balance each other out. But
party discipline eliminates this diversity and tends to make abuse systematic.
Instead of a handful of employees pressured into advancing their immediate

superior's political ambitions, the entire government work force may be

expected to turn out for many candidates in every election. In Pawtucket,
where parties are a continuing presence in political campaigns, a carefully
orchestrated use of city employees in support of the incumbent party's
candidates is possible. The danger is scarcely lessened by the openness of
Pawtucket's nominating procedure or the lack of party labels on its ballots.
The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was
ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they
be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity.
The district court did not address this factor, but looked only to the possibility
of a civil servant using his position to influence voters, and held this to be no
more of a threat than in the most nonpartisan of elections. But we think that
the possibility of coercion of employees by superiors remains as strong a
factor in municipal elections as it was in Letter Carriers. Once again, it is the
systematic and coordinated exploitation of public servants for political ends
that a legislature is most likely to see as the primary threat of employees'
rights. Political oppression of public employees will be rare in an entirely
nonpartisan system. Some superiors may be inclined to ride herd on the
politics of their employees even in a nonpartisan context, but without party
officials looking over their shoulders most supervisors will prefer to let
employees go their own ways.
In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees'
participation in nominally nonpartisan elections if political parties play a large
role in the campaigns. In the absence of substantial party involvement, on
the other hand, the interests identified by the Letter Carriers Court lose much
of their force. While the employees' First Amendment rights would normally
outbalance these diminished interests, we do not suggest that they would
always do so. Even when parties are absent, many employee campaigns
might be thought to endanger at least one strong public interest, an interest
that looms larger in the context of municipal elections than it does in the
national elections considered in Letter Carriers. The city could reasonably
fear the prospect of a subordinate running directly against his superior or
running for a position that confers great power over his superior. An
employee of a federal agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses less of
a direct challenge to the command and discipline of his agency than a
fireman or policeman who runs for mayor or city council. The possibilities of
internal discussion, cliques, and political bargaining, should an employee
gather substantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted)
TEaADS
The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings in respect of the petitioners' overbreadth
charge. Noting that invalidating a statute for being overbroad is "not
to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark," the court
held:
The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of
"substantial" overbreadth in a closely analogous case. Under Broadrick,
when one who challenges a law has engaged in constitutionally
unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and when the
challenged law is aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a

statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Two major uncertainties attend the
doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to define
"substantial" overbreadth. We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick
itself. The plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a candidate, and
they were subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of
activities, including soliciting contributions for political candidates and
becoming a candidate. The Court found that this combination required a
substantial overbreadth approach. The facts of this case are so similar
that we may reach the same result without worrying unduly about the
sometimes opaque distinction between speech and conduct.
The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no
substantial overbreadth in a statute restricting partisan campaigning.
Pawtucket has gone further, banning participation in nonpartisan
campaigns as well. Measuring the substantiality of a statute's
overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the
number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially
invalid applications. Some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid
application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one
that is probable. The question is a matter of degree; it will never be
possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes
a law substantially overbroad. Still, an overbreadth challenger has a duty
to provide the court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid
applications the statute permits. Often, simply reading the statute in the
light of common experience or litigated cases will suggest a number of
probable invalid applications. But this case is different. Whether the
statute is overbroad depends in large part on the number of elections that
are insulated from party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket employees. For
all the record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in
Pawtucket is actively contested by political parties. Certainly the record
suggests that parties play a major role even in campaigns that often are
entirely nonpartisan in other cities. School committee candidates, for
example, are endorsed by the local Democratic committee.
The state of the record does not permit us to find
overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to be taken lightly,
much less to be taken in the dark. On the other hand, the
entire focus below, in the short period before the election
was held, was on the constitutionality of the statute as
applied. Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are
not justified, but they should be afforded the opportunity to
demonstrate that the charter forecloses access to a
significant number of offices, the candidacy for which by
municipal employees would not pose the possible threats
to government efficiency and integrity which Letter
Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant.
Accordingly, we remand for consideration of plaintiffs'
overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate
beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft, heavily relied upon by the

ponencia, has effectively been overruled. 69 As it is no longer

good law, the ponencia's exhortation that "[since] the Americans,
from whom we copied the provision in question, had already
stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is
high-time that we, too, should follow suit" is misplaced and
unwarranted. 70
Accordingly, our assailed Decision's submission that the right to run for public office is
"inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms those of expression and
association lies on barren ground. American case law has in fact never recognized
a fundamental right to express one's political views through candidacy, 71 as to
invoke a rigorous standard of review. 72 Bart v. Telford 73 pointedly stated that
"[t]he First Amendment does not in terms confer a right to run for public office, and this
court has held that it does not do so by implication either." Thus, one's interest in
seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection. 74 Moreover, one
cannot bring one's action under the rubric of freedom of association, absent any
allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is advancing the political ideas of
a particular set of voters. 75 HTSAEa
Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the
case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection clause. The deemed-resigned
provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service
faithful to the government and the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the
appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful
political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their
merits and that they be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political
activity). These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the nonfundamental right of appointive officials and employees to seek elective office.
En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v. Fashing
76 and Morial, et al. v. Judiciary Commission of the State of Louisiana, et al. 77 to
buttress his dissent. Maintaining that resign-to-run provisions are valid only when made
applicable to specified officials, he explains:
. . . U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality
of resign-to-run provisions when applied to specified or particular
officials, as distinguished from all others, 78 under a
classification that is germane to the purposes of the law. These
resign-to-run legislations were not expressed in a general and
sweeping provision, and thus did not violate the test of being
germane to the purpose of the law, the second requisite for a
valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials,
they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. (emphasis
in the original)
This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-torun provisions in these cases were upheld not because they referred to specified or
particular officials (vis--vis a general class); the questioned provisions were found valid
precisely because the Court deferred to legislative judgment and found that a
regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be
incomplete. In fact, the equal protection challenge in Clements revolved around the
claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why some public officials are subject to

the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States Supreme
Court:
Article XVI, 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of
certain offices automatically resign their positions if they become
candidates for any other elected office, unless the unexpired portion of the
current term is one year or less. The burdens that 65 imposes on
candidacy are even less substantial than those imposed by 19. The two
provisions, of course, serve essentially the same state interests. The
District Court found 65 deficient, however, not because of the nature or
extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the
manner in which the offices are classified. According to the District Court,
the classification system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny, because
Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are
subject to 65 and why others are not. As with the case of 19, we
conclude that 65 survives a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause
unless appellees can show that there is no rational predicate to the
classification scheme. TcSICH
The history behind 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the
"one step at a time" approach that this Court has undertaken with regard to
state regulation not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned
by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954 as a
transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65
extended the terms of those offices enumerated in the provision from two to
four years. The provision also staggered the terms of other offices so that at
least some county and local offices would be contested at each election.
The automatic resignation proviso to 65 was not added until 1958. In that
year, a similar automatic resignation provision was added in Art. XI, 11,
which applies to officeholders in home rule cities who serve terms longer
than two years. Section 11 allows home rule cities the option of extending
the terms of municipal offices from two to up to four years.
Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the
State's electoral reforms of 1958. That the State did not go further in
applying the automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose
terms were not extended by 11 or 65, absent an invidious purpose, is
not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by
the Equal Protection Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a rational
predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. The Equal
Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one elected
officeholder's candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places
similar restrictions on other officeholders. The provision's language and its
history belie any notion that 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying
access to the political process to identifiable classes of potential
candidates. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is no
blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates
for public office" out of context. A correct reading of that line readily shows that the Court
only meant to confine its ruling to the facts of that case, as each equal protection
challenge would necessarily have to involve weighing governmental interests vis--vis
the specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:

The interests of public employees in free expression and political

association are unquestionably entitled to the protection of the first and
fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's decision should be taken to
imply that public employees may be prohibited from expressing their private
views on controversial topics in a manner that does not interfere with the
proper performance of their public duties. In today's decision, there is no
blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become
candidates for public office. Nor do we approve any general restrictions on
the political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is necessarily
narrowed by the methodology employed to reach it. A requirement that a
state judge resign his office prior to becoming a candidate for non-judicial
office bears a reasonably necessary relation to the achievement of the
state's interest in preventing the actuality or appearance of judicial
impropriety. Such a requirement offends neither the first amendment's
guarantees of free expression and association nor the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. (italics supplied)
cTCEIS
Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:
In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of
its employment positions require restrictions on partisan political activities
and which may be left unregulated. And a State can hardly be faulted for
attempting to limit the positions upon which such restrictions are placed.
(citations omitted)
V.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369,
and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth
Apart from nullifying Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code on equal protection ground, our assailed
Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:
(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants
holding appointive posts without due regard for the type of
position being held by the employee seeking an elective
post and the degree of influence that may be attendant
thereto; 79 and
(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil
servants holding appointive positions without due regard
for the type of office being sought, whether it be partisan
or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or
barangay level.
Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.
i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of
Incumbent Appointive Official's Position, Valid
According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad
because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive posts, without

due regard for the type of position being held by the employee running for elective office
and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.
Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant
only when the incumbent appointive official running for elective office holds an influential
post.
Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat
to the government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy:
the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has
amassed "the scattered powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its
incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power." 80 As elucidated in
our prior exposition: 81 EHTSCD
Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to
make use of their respective positions (apparently) to promote their own
candidacy may seem tolerable even innocuous particularly when
viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by other government
employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if
not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly
disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on the
part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda
through a "carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective]
officials" coming from various levels of the bureaucracy.
. . . [T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which
could give an emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the
reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the
candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to
the type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of
influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations omitted)
ii. Limitation on Candidacy
Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid
The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad
because they are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil servants holding appointive
offices, without due regard for the type of elective office being sought, whether it be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.
This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly
partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently different from those involved
in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment,"
82 so that restrictions on candidacy akin to those imposed by the challenged provisions
can validly apply only to situations in which the elective office sought is partisan in
character. To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions are said to preclude even
candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged restrictions are to be
considered as overbroad.
Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will
show that the alleged overbreadth is more apparent than real. Our exposition on this
issue has not been repudiated, viz.:
A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and
guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy

and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in

connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. 83
Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section
4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes of the May
10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are
decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in
Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive
officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against
Section 4 (a) is clearly unsustainable. aIcDCH
Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction with other related laws on the
matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not intended to apply
to elections for nonpartisan public offices.
The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the
elections for barangay offices, since these are the only elections in this
country which involve nonpartisan public offices. 84
In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of
the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has intended that these
nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a
separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Said provision states:
Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. No person shall be elected
punong barangay or kagawad ng sangguniang barangay unless he
files a sworn certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day from the
commencement of the election period but not later than the day
before the beginning of the campaign period in a form to be
prescribed by the Commission. The candidate shall state the
barangay office for which he is a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national
official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including
those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation
rule, under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply
the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any
election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth
challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. 85
In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding provision in Section 13 of RA 9369
are general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the
overbreadth challenge would still be futile. Again, we explained:

In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan
behavior has not received judicial imprimatur, because the general
proposition of the relevant US cases on the matter is simply that the
government has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its
employees that differs significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. 86
Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its
face for being overly broad, particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and
not "pure speech" is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.
87 DaTEIc
In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth
would entail, among other things, a rough balancing of the number of valid
applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. 88 In
this regard, some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is
far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. 89 The
question is a matter of degree. 90 Thus, assuming for the sake of argument
that the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a
statute which fails to make this distinction is susceptible to an overbreadth
attack, the overbreadth challenge presently mounted must demonstrate or
provide this Court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid elections
(i.e., the number of elections that were insulated from party rivalry but were
nevertheless closed to appointive employees) that may in all probability result
from the enforcement of the statute. 91
The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth.
Borrowing from the words of Magill v. Lynch, indeed, such a step is not to be
taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark, 92 especially since an
overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit the State from
'enforcing an otherwise valid measure against conduct that is admittedly
within its power to proscribe.' 93
This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to
the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis of statutes that purportedly
attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, for such
approach is manifestly strong medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a last
resort. 94 EcIaTA
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in
the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted
and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected
speech or conduct to go unpunished. 95 Facial overbreadth has likewise not been
invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the challenged statute, and
where there are readily apparent constructions that would cure, or at least substantially
reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute. 96
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive
officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs
the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible
inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.

In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes

which are, at best, bold predictions cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto
and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more
than 100 years been, unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe. 97
Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably
impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through a total
invalidation of the statute itself. 98
Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that a number of high-ranking
Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without relinquishing
their posts. 99 Several COMELEC election officers had likewise filed their Certificates of
Candidacy in their respective provinces. 100 Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her
certificate of substitution for representative of the first district of Quezon province last
December 14, 2009 101 even as her position as Justice Secretary includes
supervision over the City and Provincial Prosecutors, 102 who, in turn, act as ViceChairmen of the respective Boards of Canvassers. 103 The Judiciary has not been
spared, for a Regional Trial Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political
arena. We cannot allow the tilting of our electoral playing field in their favor.
For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4 (a) of Resolution 8678 and
Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent's and the
intervenors' Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court's
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring
as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2)
the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and
(3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. IDCHTE
SO ORDERED.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

EN BANC

2nd District

[G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.]

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR
JESSE ROBREDO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and
its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS
R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, respondents.

3rd District

DECISION

4th District

PEREZ, J p:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the
respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and
from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October
2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper
of general circulation. 1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.

Municipalities/Cities

1st District

Del Gallego

Libmanan

Ragay

Minalabac

Lupi

Pamplona

Sipocot

Pasacao

Cabusao

San Fernando

Canaman

Milaor

Camaligan

Naga

Magarao

Pili

Bombon

Ocampo

Calabanga

Caramoan

Sangay

Garchitorena

San Jose

Goa

Tigaon

Lagonoy

Tinamba

Presentacion

Siruma

Iriga

Buhi

Baao

Bula

Balatan

Nabua

474,899

372,548

429,070

Bato
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for
the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table 3
illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716: AIaSTE
District

Municipalities/Cities

Population

1st District

Del Gallego

176,383

Ragay

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821, 2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District

Gainza

Lupi
Sipocot

Population

Cabusao

417,304
2nd District

Libmanan

San Fernando

Minalabac

Gainza

Pamplona

Milaor

Pasacao

276,777

3rd District

Naga

Camaligan

(formerly 2nd

Pili

Magarao

District)

Ocampo

Bombon

Canaman

Calabanga

4th District

Caramoan

Sangay

(formerly 3rd

Garchitorena

San Jose

District)

Goa

Tigaon

Lagonoy

Tinamba

Presentacion

Siruma

5th District

Iriga

Buhi

(formerly 4th

Baao

Bula

District)

Balatan

Nabua

439,043

(4). . . (Emphasis supplied).

372,548

429,070

Bato
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of
the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No.
4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2)
against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the
sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new
congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before
us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least
250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district. 4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill
by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part
of the former second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were
taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined the two;
neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard. 6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5.(1) . . .
(2). . .

(3)Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,

contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. DIcSHE
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is
the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The
petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative
district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid. 8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be
reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will
represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment
would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than
250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the
creation of additional legislative seats. 9 The petitioners argue that when the
Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of
Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national
population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986. 10 According to the
petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to
roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative. 11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in
distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently
from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population
threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1.Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly
apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet
the population requirement for the creation of the
legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI,
Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2.Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional
representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5
paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution. 12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5.(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan

Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective

inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations. EaHcDS
(2). . .
(3)Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4)Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek
the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2)
fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction
between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue
that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has
no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. 13 Rather,
the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only
creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be
sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of
Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The
respondents cite the following reasons: EHITaS
1.The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the
respondents had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion.
2.The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against
a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.
Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act
No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasijudicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance
of a ministerial act.

3.The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain,

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition
is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
9716, the same could have been ventilated through a
petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme
Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the
petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with
issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments
on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules, 14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever
confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society. 15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) 16
and Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the
principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues
of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates: CAaSED
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly
treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that
we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary, 19 Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority 20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 21 just to name
a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may
be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In
Lim v. Executive Secretary, 22 this Court held that in cases of transcendental
importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent
decision on Chavez v. Gonzales. 23

Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must
apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or
not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality. 24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by
this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental
law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific
provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the
presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain. 25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district. TaCDIc
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of
the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each
legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides:
"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province"
point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required
for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in
turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC. 27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854,
which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City.
As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for
Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that
the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less
than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly
created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit: DTEScI

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative

district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to
at least one congressional representative. 28 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if
an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an
additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an
initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of
a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has
an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i)a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or DTAcIa
(ii)a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is
merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.

The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred
fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission
which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an
ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such
records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and
Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was used to determine how many
districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is
the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one
legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the
precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the
sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal, 29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the
entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original
number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional
Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73)
provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000; 30 second, the
remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio." 31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member
and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for the
Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of
legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces
and cities with a population of at least 250,000 and the Metropolitan
Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is
based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as
the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population
is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that
each city with at least 250,000 inhabitants and each province
shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat
for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a
population of at least 250,000, which are the Cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de
Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed]
to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
(Emphasis supplied). cEAIHa
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from
this, the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests
and complaints formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants
other than population as already mentioned.

Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in
the northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town
of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brooke's Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos.
He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second
District. He then queried whether population was the only factor
considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into
account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the
Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be
apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be
compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when
Puerto Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then
inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San
Vicente.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a
population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion
with the northern towns would result in a combined population of
265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo
and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan
and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to
Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential
candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and
the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be
less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not
interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be
included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the
period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff
study said proposal. 33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was
explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population
of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second
District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however,
that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to
satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering
that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second
District. DEIHAa
In reply to Mr. Monsod's query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the
proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District,

the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while
the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no
substantial changes.

On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body

approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of the
apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.

Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo's proposal to insert Puerto

Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.

Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the

amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members
voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by
the Body.

There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was
approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF
PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there
being no objection, the apportionment and districting for the
province of Palawan was approved by the Body. 34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by
the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado
made a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening
of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee,
Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he
was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for
Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba
could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have
its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second
District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that
the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may
be lower during certain times of the year, but the transient
population would increase the population substantially and,
therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it
is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than
qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions
and offices that are also there. cSTCDA
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima's statement that unless
Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest
of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through
Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter
to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment,
Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter
and that the considerations he had given are not on the
demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the
summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices
and functions.

Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment,

Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall
comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun,
Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad,
Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of
Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment
and districting of Region I. 35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts
based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district
"supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice
growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the
standard of compactness." 36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters
discussed were "political stability and common interest among the people in the area"
and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political,
traditional and sectoral leaders." 37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in
the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu,
Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and
population." 38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we
stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC 39 that: TcSHaD
. . . Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population
sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard
in gauging equality of representation. . . . . To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and ease of
access by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district should
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of
petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a
250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the
petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the
provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of
250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative

district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986
numbers.

Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

Translated in the terms of the present case:

SO ORDERED.

1.The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of

1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number
of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given
in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino
concedes this point. 40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as
clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for
the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9786;
2.Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance
on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the
population standard, and more importantly based on the final
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in
the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the
population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as
insisted upon by the petitioners. EcIaTA
3.The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No.
4264, were:
(a)the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b)the size of the original groupings compared to that of
the regrouped municipalities;
(c)the natural division separating the municipality subject
of the discussion from the reconfigured District
One; and
(d)the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting
from the redistricting of Districts One and Two. 41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the
increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence
of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that would warrant the
invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first
and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the
resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not
the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional
district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit
of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue
presented by this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010.]
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO
G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No.
9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for
violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city.
Antecedents
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four
legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos 1 and
the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May
2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos' City Charter, 2 by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were
filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill
No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The
population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that
House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected population of the Municipality of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78
between 1995 to 2000." 3
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition
contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
Congress' use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on
the "wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a
constitutional requirement]." 4 DECSIT
The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section
5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must
have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." 5 The only issue here is
whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or
projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time
for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the
City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N.
Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the
population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." The Certification
states that the population of "Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The
Certification further states that it was "issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A.
Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City
as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan." 6
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic
projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and
no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because
based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be
made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to
250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately following
election" 7 after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections
are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).
Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the
NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population
projections must be as of the middle of every year.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135 8 dated 6 November 1993 issued by President
Fidel V. Ramos provides:
SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of
Population sizes Pursuant to Section 7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and
461 of the New Local Government Code. HEcaIC
(a) The National Statistics Office shall issue certification on data
that it has collected and processed as well as on statistics that it
has estimated.
(b) For census years, certification on population size will be based
on actual population census counts; while for the intercensal
years, the certification will be made on the basis of a set of
demographic projections or estimates declared official by the
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB).
(c) Certification of population census counts will be made as of the
census reference date, such as May 1, 1990, while those of
intercensal population estimates will be as of middle of every
year.

(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify

the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The
range will correspond to the official low and high population
projections.

projection issued by the authority of the NSO Administrator is

recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on
the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which
states:

(e) The smallest geographic area for which a certification on

population size may be issued will be the barangay for census
population counts, and the city or municipality for intercensal
estimates. If an LGU wants to conduct its own population census,
during off-census years, approval must be sought from the NSCB
and the conduct must be under the technical supervision of NSO
from planning to data processing.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) Certifications of population size based on published census

results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the
Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or
estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or
his designated certifying officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic
projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this
case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on
demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states
that the population of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the
requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every
year." In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been
designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections
in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the
NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.
Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of
May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of
Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78%
per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.
DcICEa
Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August
2007. 9 Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only
248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the
population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as
of 1 August 2010. 10
All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos "will be
254,030 by the year 2010." Based on the Certification's own growth rate assumption,
the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections for individual
municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces. 11
Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing
respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment,
thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, "the population of the
Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000." This

(d) Certification of population size based on projections

may specify the range within which the true count is
deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond to the
official low and high population projections.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Certifications of population size based on published
census results shall be issued by the Provincial Census
Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications
based on projections or estimates, however, will be issued
by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district
must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited
Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable
or speculative.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of members as it may be
entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of
Article VI of the Constitution. . . . . (Emphasis supplied) ITCHSa
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district
only in the "immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the
250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city
shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that
the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether
actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be
at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the
immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus,
the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5
(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution.
On the OSG's contention that Congress' choice of means to comply with the population
requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that
questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards
by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of
such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of

the Government. 13

population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,

shall have at least one representative.

Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming
weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the
courts." 14 Compliance with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative
districts is important because the "aim of legislative apportionment is 'to equalize
population and voting power among districts.'" 15

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591

UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

For a city to merit one representative it should have a population of at least 250,000. A
province, however, is entitled to one representative no matter what its population size.
In this case, the basis of House Bill 3696 is the certification of the NSO that the
projected population of the City of Malolos by 2010, the coming election year, will be
254,030. Thus, said the NSO:
National Statistics Office
Region III
CERTIFICATION

Separate Opinions
ABAD, J., dissenting:
This case is about a law that establishes a new legislative district based on a projected
population of the National Statistics Office (NSO) to meet the population requirement of
the Constitution in the reapportionment of legislative districts.
The Facts and the Case
The City of Malolos and the Municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and
Paombong comprise the current first district of the province of Bulacan. In 2007 the
population of Malolos City was 223,069. The NSO projected that, using the established
population growth rate of 3.78 percent between 1995 and 2000, its population in 2010
will be 254,030.
On May 1, 2009 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 9591, to amend Section 57 of
R.A. 8754, the charter of the City of Malolos, making the city a separate district from the
existing first legislative district of Bulacan.
The Challenge
On June 16, 2009 petitioners Victorino Aldaba, Carlo Jolette S. Fajardo, Julio G.
Morada, and Minerva Aldaba Morada, all claiming to be taxpayers from Malolos City,
filed the present action, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9591. They point out a)
that the law failed to comply with the requirement of Section 5 (4), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that a city must have a population of at least 250,000; (2) that the creation
of a separate district amounts to a conversion and requires the conduct of a plebiscite;
and (3) that the law violates Section 5 (3), Article VI which provides that each district
shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
The Dissenting View
First. Section 5, paragraphs (3) and (4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a

To whom it may concern:

This is to certify that based on the 2000 census of population in
housing census 2000 conducted by the National Statistics Office,
the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291.
This is to certify that the results of the census 2000 were
proclaimed and declared official by the President of the Philippines
under Proclamation No. 28, dated April 18, 2001.
It is further certified that the projected population of the Municipality
of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. Please note that the
computation was just based on the conventional method and not
taking into account other factors that may affect the base
population. Hence, the projected population may reach more than
250,000 in consideration of the other factors like future or past
fertility, mortality, and migration within the locality for the year 2010.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A.
Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed
creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the
Province of Bulacan.
By authority of the
Administrator
(Sgd.) ALBERTO N.
MIRANDA
Regional Director 1
I cannot agree with petitioners' claim that the Congress gravely abused its discretion in
relying on the 2010 projected population of Malolos City as basis for its reapportionment
law. The Court has always been reluctant to act like a third chamber of Congress and
second guess its work. Only when the lawmakers commit grave abuse of discretion in
their passage of the law can the Court step in. But the lawmakers must not only abuse
this discretion, they must do so with grave consequences. 2

Here, nothing in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the use of estimates or
population projections in the creation of legislative districts. As argued by the Solicitor
General, the standard to be adopted in determining compliance with the population
requirement involves a political question. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or
patent violation of established legal parameters, the Court cannot intrude into the
wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature. ESHAcI
In fact, in Macias v. Commission on Elections, 3 the Court upheld the validity of a
reapportionment law based on the NSO's "preliminary count of population" which may
be subject to revision. The Court held there that "although not final, and still subject to
correction, a census enumeration may be considered official, in the sense that
Governmental action may be based thereon even in matters of apportionment of
legislative districts."
Majority opinion ably written by Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out, however, that "no
legal effect" can be accorded to the certification of demographic projection for Malolos
City issued by the NSO Region III Director because it violates the provisions of
Executive Order 135 dated November 6, 1993 of President Fidel V. Ramos, which
requires that such demographic projection be declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board and that the certification be issued by the NSO administrator or a
designated officer. In addition, the intercensal population estimates must, according to
the Executive Order, "be as of middle of every year."
But Executive Order 135 cannot apply to this case for the following reasons:
a. The President issued Executive Order 135 specifically to provide guidelines on the
issuance of Certification of Population sizes pursuant to the following provisions of the
Local Government Code: Section 7 (the creation and conversion of local government
units); Section 386 (the creation of a barangay), Section 442 (the creation of a
municipality); Section 450 (the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangay into
a component city); Section 452 (the creation of highly urbanized cities); and Section 461
(the creation of urbanized cities).
Since R.A. 9591 is not concerned with the creation or conversion of a local government
unit but with the establishment of a new legislative district, which is by no means a local
government unit, the same is not governed by the requirements of Executive Order 135.
b. R.A. 9591 is based on a "legislative" finding of fact that Malolos will have a population
of over 250,000 by the year 2010. The rules of legislative inquiry or investigation are
unique to each house of Congress. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Executive
Department can dictate on Congress the kind of evidence that will satisfy its law-making
requirement. It would be foolhardy for the Court to suggest that the legislature consider
only evidence admissible in a court of law or under the rules passed by the Office of the
President. Obviously, the Judicial Department will resist a mandate from Congress on
what evidence its courts may receive to support its decisions.
c. At any rate, the certification issued by the NSO Region III Director, whose office has
jurisdiction over Malolos City, partakes of official information based on official data. That
Malolos had a population of 175,291 as of May 1, 2000 is, as the certification states,
based on the 2000 census of population conducted by the NSO. The President of the
Philippines proclaimed and declared that census official under Proclamation 28 dated
April 18, 2001. On the other hand, the population growth rate of 3.78% used in the 2010
population projection for Malolos derived from the difference between the results of the
official population census taken in 1995 and that taken in 2000. The Regional Director

did not make the projection by counting the trees from the mountaintops. The data are
based on evidence that is admissible even in a court of law. EDATSI
The majority opinion claims that the NSO Regional Director's projection of the
population of Malolos by 2010 is erroneous. Given that the total population of Malolos
as of May 1, 2000 was 175,291 and its growth rate was 3.78% per year, its population
will grow, according to the dissenting opinion, to only 241,550 in 2010.
But the majority opinion uses the following formula: 175,291 x 37.80% (arrived at by
multiplying the 3.78 annual growth rate by 10 for the 10 years between 2000 and 2010)
= 241,550. It uses a growth rate of 37.80% per 10 years to substitute for the stated
official growth rate of 3.78% per year. It ignores logic and the natural cumulative growth
of population.
In contrast, the NSO Regional Director's computation applies the growth rate of 3.78%
per year, which is more logical in that the base is adjusted annually to reflect the year to
year growth. Thus:
Base Rate Growth Year
175,291 x 3.78% = 181,917 2001
181,917 x 3.78% = 188,793 2002
188,793 x 3.78% = 195,929 2003
195,929 x 3.78% = 203,335 2004
203,335 x 3.78% = 211,021 2005
211,021 x 3.78% = 218,998 2006
218,998 x 3.78% = 227,276 2007
227,276 x 3.78% = 235,867 2008
235,867 x 3.78% = 244,783 2009
244,783 x 3.78% = 254,036 2010
Second. The constitutional check against "gerrymandering," which means the creation
of representative districts out of separate points of territory in order to favor a candidate,
4 is found in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution. It states that "each legislative
district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory."
It should be noted, however, that this rule is qualified by the phrase "as far as
practicable." Hence, the fact that the creation of a legislative district for Malolos would
separate the town of Bulacan from the rest of the towns comprising the first district,
would not militate against the constitutionality of R.A. 9716. This is so because there is
no showing that Congress enacted R.A. 9591 to favor the interest of any candidate. A
city can aspire to have one representative who will represent its interest in Congress.
Third. Contrary to petitioners' claim, R.A. 9591 is a reapportionment bill. It does not
require the conduct of a plebiscite for its validity. As the Court held in Bagabuyo v.
Commission on Elections, 5 the holding of a plebiscite is not a requirement in legislative
apportionment or reapportionment. A plebiscite is necessary only in the creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units, which is
not the case here.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

||| (Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010)
. . . [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others
may make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we
may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However,
choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right
to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value
protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of,
and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet
herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will
allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least,
civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang
Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
November 11, 2009 2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the
Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed
Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad
as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act. 4 CDAHaE
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves
as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in
2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition 5
for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized
and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court inAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on

Elections. 6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. 7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
. . . This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines
the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
Community, thus:
. . . a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
. . . refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional,
affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and
sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of
the same gender, or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In
Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for
even their women did change the natural use into that
which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving
the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one
toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of
their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women
"ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond
bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower
(of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who
indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord!
Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment
dated October 2, 2008: CcADHI
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual
immorality as indicated in the Petition's par. 6F:
'Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and
lesbians who are already of age'. It is further indicated in
par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines
were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of
Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit,
license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code

are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with

for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code
which defines nuisance as 'Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which . . . (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency
or morality . . .
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: 'The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. Art. 1409 of
the Civil Code provides that 'Contracts whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy' are inexistent and
void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes 'Immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows' as
follows:

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for

advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful
when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be
exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and
writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing
homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the
government, ours too is the State's avowed duty under Section 13,
Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and
spiritual degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, 9 three commissioners voted to overturn the
First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento,
and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad's Motion
for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias
R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in
his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I.The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and

exhibitions, and indecent shows. The penalty of prision
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall
be imposed upon:

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the partylist system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its underrepresentation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad's
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a
whole.

1.Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines

openly contrary to public morals;

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose

of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives is
to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.

2.(a) The authors of obscene literature, published with

their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such
literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment
selling the same;
(b)Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any
other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes,
acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene
literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or
shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by
virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify
criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose
but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography;
(3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in
and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law,
public order, morals, good customs, established policies,
lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3.Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints,
engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to
morals. THADEI

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of
an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the
party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law.
The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are
also the nation's only that their interests have not been brought
to the attention of the nation because of their under representation.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under
the party-list system will remain just that.

II.No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades
Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays,
homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of
individuals. . . . Significantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right,
and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable
intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of
homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.
EcHTCD
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of
LGBT's is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad
constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain
either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that
applies to all citizens alike.
xxx xxx xxx
IV.Public Morals
. . . There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or
Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any
particular religious group's moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are
being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a
society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years
of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral
precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into
society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V.Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the
law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes
"immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and
indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petition's paragraph 6F:
"Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000.
Moreoever, * Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any
act, omission . . . or anything else . . . which shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality . . . ." These are all unlawful. 10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the
Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad's application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory

injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its
Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11
Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting
that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. 12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG
later filed a Comment in support of petitioner's application. 13 Thus, in order to give
COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own
comment. 14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on
February 2, 2010. 15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining
order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders
from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the
Assailed Resolutions. 16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to
Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.
17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition on moral grounds violated
the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR's motion to intervene. DcaECT
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which
motion was granted on February 2, 2010. 19
The Parties' Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment
of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines' international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in
denying petitioner's application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC's
allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and
concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner's freedom of
speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had
been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is
not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary
to actual verification reports by COMELEC's field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of

the Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that the
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated
with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 20 "the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when
it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate
organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was
shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in
almost all provinces in the country." 21 EaISTD
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner
was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner's
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner's alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed
Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a
change in respondent's theory, and a serious violation of petitioner's right to procedural
due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of
Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the
Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. 22
Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB)-Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City-Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion-Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Can't Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC)-Metro Manila

Cebu Pride-Cebu City

Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association-Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality
(GALANG)-Metro Manila
Gay Men's Support Group (GMSG)-Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS)-Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association-Iloilo City
Kabulig Writer's Group-Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA-Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association-Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC)-Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association-Naga City
ONE BACARDI AaITCS
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe)-Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc.-Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association-Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family-Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)-Metro
Manila
Soul Jive-Antipolo, Rizal
The Link-Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association-Quezon
Women's Bisexual Network-Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association-Zamboanga City 23
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD
LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these
regions. In fact, if COMELEC's findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even
exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad's principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in
the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to

register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the
guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad's morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to
Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." 24
Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality." 25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause
for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government
must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we
held in Estrada v. Escritor: 26
. . . The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence
the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only
on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a
"compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom
for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs
are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must
have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this
conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral
judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on
those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they
might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the
human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual

institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with

heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or
Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an
articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass
scrutiny of the religion clauses. . . . Recognizing the religious nature
of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society,
however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not
a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes
that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at
the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the
morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny
Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and
homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally
accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues: aIcCTA
Petitioner's accreditation was denied not necessarily because their
group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the
people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad
example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our
civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in
danger of losing its own existence. 28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult
to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the
preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law. 29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the
COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are committing immoral acts."
30 The OSG argues:
. . . A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same
gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere
attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full
of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays."
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended
to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not
suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality,
sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should
continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality
on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of
legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value.
Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of
laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability. SDIaCT
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable
conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not
because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted
the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle,
"consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances. 34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end. 35 In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction,
the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges . . . have followed the 'rational
basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution." 37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient

reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were
to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate
state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection
clause. The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad
cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers
no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any
other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG's position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.
38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special
or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it
is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and
Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt
to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It
is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be
distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral
ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every
opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people
deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of
opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief,
and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining
which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the
people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle
in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on
moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of
adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies

including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority,

however small not only for a majority, however large but for
each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying
ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride
roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view.
However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious
or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of
other members of the community.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also
to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is
not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. aAcDSC

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights
litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy
between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral
sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal,
reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither
attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not
illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality
and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are
protected as well.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming
public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify
criminalizing same-sex conduct. 41 European and United Nations judicial decisions
have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing
general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts. 42 To
the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the
issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign
authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
persuasive influence on the Court's analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In
order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions
must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint." 43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in
Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the
law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization
is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking
or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 45 Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view.
On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any

assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to
review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise
of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III
of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
A denial of the petition for registration . . . does not deprive the
members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of
elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In
fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which
cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner
contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition has the clear and
immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of
its members to fully and equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right
but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. . . . 47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC's action, from
publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in
the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there
has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International
Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to

bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling
with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms
are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems
so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of nondiscrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR. SIaHDA
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation." 48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements. 49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1)Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of
the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
(a)To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives;
(b)To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c)To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in
his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral
participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No.
25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1.Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of

every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to
vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the
Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an
effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at
the core of democratic government based on the consent of the
people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxx xxx xxx
15.The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to
stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a
free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for
election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and
reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for
election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory
requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by
reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination
or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy.
States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions
which exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office. 50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility
of giving effect to the Philippines' international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner's
invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights
Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), 51 which petitioner declares
to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain
norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations
outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international
law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 52 Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status. ATDHSC
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society
wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human
intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much
of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies
many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges
states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights,
and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they
are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege
ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much
of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony,

and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. 53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case
are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious
communities are divided in opinion. This Court's role is not to impose its own view of
acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is
resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL)
are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner's
application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

EN BANC

Juan Carlos T. Cuna for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.

Buag Kapunan Migallos & Perez for Aksyon Democratiko.

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]

Tonisito M.C. Umali for Liberal Party.

Antonio Dollete & Associates for Partido ng Masang Pilipino.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the

acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general,
MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA
DROGA; GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS
LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE
LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE,
ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL
ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH
ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG
OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under "Organizations/Coalitions"
of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S
COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO;
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG;
and others under "Political Parties" of Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785, respondents.

Yulo and Bello Law Offices for LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP.

Ceferino Padua Law Office, Gerardo A. Del Mundo Law Office and Antonio R. Bautista
& Partners for Bagong Bayani Org.
The Solicitor General for Commission on Elections.

SYNOPSIS
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed the present
petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
37851 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This
Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented.

Cruz Cruz & Navarro for Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga.

The Supreme Court found the petition partly meritorious. The Court remanded the case
to the Comelec and directed the Commission to conduct summary evidentiary hearings
on the qualifications of the party-list participants. The Court rejected the submissions of
the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any
qualification, open to all. According to the Court, such position does not only weaken the
electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It
would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would
create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization. The Court stressed that the very reason for the
establishment of the party-list system is the fundamental social justice principle that
those who have less in life should have more in law. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give
them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling
and desecrating this social justice vehicle. The Court also laid down some guidelines to
assist the Comelec in its work of conducting summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants.

Brillantes Navarro Jumamil Arcilla Escolin & Martinez Law Offices for The True Marcos
Loyalist Association of the Philippines.

SYLLABUS

[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001.]

BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.

Neri Javier Colmenares for Bayan Muna.

Chan Robles & Associates for Citizens Drug Watch Foundation, Inc.

Francis A. Ver for Phil. Local Autonomy Movement.

Yap Crisanto Salvador & Calderon and Fonacier & Fonacier Law Office for Chamber of
Real Estate Builders Asso.
Mcaskell Equila & Associates for Ang Lakas ng Overseas Contract Workers (OCW).

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; VALIDITY OF

COMELEC OMNIBUS RESOLUTION 3785 IN CASE AT BAR MAY BE BROUGHT
BEFORE THIS COURT IN A VERIFIED PETITION THEREFOR UNDER RULE 65 OF

RULES OF COURT. Petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution

3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in
a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILABLE. These cases present an exception to the rule that
certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved,
and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public
interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20
percent of the House of Representatives.

win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose
and objectives of the party-list system."
8. ID.; ID.; POLITICAL PARTY; DEFINED. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also
provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the
law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS MAY BE GLOSSED OVER

TO PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. Procedural requirements "may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of
social justice . . . when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need
for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available."

9. ID.; ID.; RA 7941; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, CONSTRUED.

"Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not refer to the number of
people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers
to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."

4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE;

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PROHIBITED UNDER SECTION 1(D), RULE 13
THEREOF. The assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF WELL-DEFINED CONSTITUENCY, EXPLAINED. "Lack of

well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it
points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DUTY; TO FORMULATE GUIDING

AND CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, PRECEPTS, DOCTRINES OR
RULES. These cases raise transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." acCTIS
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; POLITICAL PARTIES; MAY PARTICIPATE IN PARTYLIST ELECTIONS AND MAY BE REGISTERED UNDER PARTY-LIST SYSTEM.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of Representatives
may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political
parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below: . . . Indubitably,
therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate in the party-list
elections.
7. ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the partylist provision was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that
consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their
votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third
or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this
way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not

11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES; WHERE

LANGUAGE OF LAW IS CLEAR, IT MUST BE APPLIED ACCORDING TO ITS
EXPRESS TERMS. The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to
the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by
enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent,
the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, . . ., to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the
language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.
12. ID.; ID.; MEANING OF A TERM IN A STATUTE MAY BE LIMITED, QUALIFIED OR
SPECIALIZED BY THOSE IN IMMEDIATE ASSOCIATION. While the enumeration of
marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear
intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is
a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the
words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of
a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association.
13. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; PRIMARY SOURCE FROM WHICH TO
ASCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT OR PURPOSE IS LANGUAGE OF
PROVISION ITSELF. The fundamental principle in constitutional construction,
however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or
purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in

which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words
used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of construction
and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed.
14. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION; WHEN A LOWER COURT OR A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY VIOLATES
OR IGNORES THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW, ITS ACTION CAN BE STRUCK
DOWN BY THIS COURT ON THE GROUND THEREOF. When a lower court, or a
quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial
instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
15. ID.; SUPREME COURT; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT NOT A TRIER OF
FACTS. Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan
Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources
and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); POLITICAL
PARTY, SECTOR, ORGANIZATION OR COALITION MUST REPRESENT
MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN SECTION 5
THEREOF. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent
the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words, it must show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws,
history, platform of government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES MUST SHOW THAT THEY
REPRESENT INTERESTS OF THE MARGINALIZED AND UNDERREPRESENTED.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized
and underrepresented. DAHaTc
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECTOR MAY NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARTY-LIST
SYSTEM. In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system.
19. ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS AND SECTS
SHALL NOT BE REGISTERED AS POLITICAL PARTIES. Furthermore, the
Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."
The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this
wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I

do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not
prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party."
20. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941); A PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST
NOT BE DISQUALIFIED UNDER SECTION 6 THEREOF. Fourth, a party or an
organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or
unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving
support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It
has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY OR ORGANIZATION MUST NOT BE AN ADJUNCT OF, OR A
PROJECT ORGANIZED OR AN ENTITY FUNDED OR ASSISTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by the government. By the very nature
of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized
by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The
participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not
only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to
enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of Representatives.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEES MUST REPRESENT MARGINALIZED AND
UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS. Not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.
To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can
those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to
betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOMINEE MUST BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO FORMULATION
AND ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION THAT WILL BENEFIT THE
NATION AS A WHOLE. As previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose
Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a
party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . . ."
VITUG, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM;
SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND
SECTORAL REPRESENTATION, EXPLAINED. Perhaps the present controversy
stems from a confusion of the actual character of the party-list system. At first glance, it
gives the impression of being a combination of proportional representation for non-

traditional parties and sectoral representation. The first, proportional representation, on

one end, is intended for no other reason than to open up the electoral process for
broader participation and representation. Sectoral representation on the other,
presupposes that every underrepresented sector be represented in Congress. This
impression of sectoral-based representation stems from the provisions of Article 6,
Section 5(2), of the Constitution, as well as R.A. 7941, in enumerating specific sectors
to be represented.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUR GROUPS BELONGING THERETO, NAMELY: 1) POLITICAL
PARTIES, 2) SECTORAL PARTIES, 3) SECTORAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND 4)
COALITIONS, CONSTRUED. The party-list system is limited to four groups 1)
political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A
political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform,
principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominate and supports certain of
its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized
group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article
6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the
fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A
sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly
registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE. A party-list nominee is
subject to basically the same qualifications applicable to legislative districts candidates,
with the exception of the additional requirement that he be nominated in one list only,
and provided, further, that he is not a candidate for any elective office or has lost his bid
for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. A nominee must actually
belong to the sector which they purport to represent, otherwise, there can be no true
representation. A nominee of the youth sector is further required to be at least 25 but not
more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. Should he, however, attain the
age of 30 during his term, he is allowed to continue until the expiration thereof. Once
elected, party-list representatives also enjoy the same term, rights and privileges as do
district representatives, except that they are not entitled to the Country-wide
Development Fund (CDF).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FEATURE THEREOF IS THAT POLITICAL PARTIES, SECTORAL
GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS, COALITIONS AND AGGRUPATION ACQUIRE
STATUS OF "CANDIDATES" AND THEIR NOMINEES RELEGATED TO MERE
AGENTS. A feature of the party-list system is that political parties, sectoral groups
and organizations, coalitions and aggrupation acquire the status of "candidates" and
their nominees relegated to mere agents. Thus, if a party-list representative dies,
becomes physically incapacitated, removed from office by the party or the organization
he represents, resigns, or is disqualified during his term, his party can send another
person to take his place for the remaining period, provided the replacement is next in
succession in the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC upon registration.
Furthermore, a party-list representative who switches party affiliations during his term
forfeits his seat. So, also, if a person changes his sectoral affiliation within 6 months
before the election, he will not be eligible for nomination in party-list representative
under his new party or organization. EcTDCI

5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT

MUST BE GIVEN TO INTENT OF FRAMERS OF ORGANIC LAW AND OF PEOPLE
ADOPTING IT. The polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains
"effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it." The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for
construction. Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the
application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have
been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as
compensated by countervailing advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does,
may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous
waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment.
While, the lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this
Court but with the people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when
better counsel prevails.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION; MOST
IMPORTANT SINGLE FACTOR IN DETERMINING INTENTION OF PEOPLE FROM
WHOM CONSTITUTION EMANATED IS LANGUAGE IN WHICH IT IS EXPRESSED.
"The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from
whom the Constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed." The text of
Art. VI, 5(1)(2) is quite clear. It provides for a party-list system of "registered, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations," not for sectoral representation. Only for three
consecutive terms following the ratification of the Constitution and only with respect to
one-half of the seats allotted to party-list representatives does it allow sectoral
representation. Textually, Art. VI, 5(1)(2) provides no basis for petitioners' contention
that whether it is sectoral representation or party-list system the purpose is to provide
exclusive representation for "marginalized sectors," by which term petitioners mean the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.
2. ID.; ID.; RESORT TO DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION MAY BE HAD ONLY WHEN OTHER GUIDES FAIL AS SAID
PROCEEDINGS ARE POWERLESS TO VARY TERMS OF CONSTITUTION WHEN
MEANING IS CLEAR. The polestar of constitutional interpretation has been stated by
this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, as follows: While it is
permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than in the framers' understanding thereof.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; SYSTEMS OF
REPRESENTATION; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL SINGLE-SEAT
DISTRICT SYSTEM, DISTINGUISHED. The two systems of representation are not
identical. Party-list representation is a type of proportional representation designed to
give those who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district

elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide basis. (In this
sense, these groups are considered "marginalized and underrepresented.") Under the
party-list system, representatives are elected from multi-seat districts in proportion to
the number of votes received in contrast to the "winner-take-all" single-seat district in
which, even if a candidate garners 49.9% of the votes, he gets no seat. Thus, under the
party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first in order to win seats in the
legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all" single-seat district, the votes cast
for a losing candidate are wasted as only those who vote for the winner are
represented. To the extent then that it assures parties or candidates a percentage of
seats in the legislature that reflects their public support, the party-list system enables
marginalized and underrepresented sectors (such as, but not limited to, the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors) to
obtain seats in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, the party-list system does not
guarantee to these sectors seats in the legislature.
4. ID.; ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM; A TYPE OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
INTENDED TO GIVE VOICE TO THOSE WHO MAY NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY
NUMBER TO WIN A SEAT IN A DISTRICT BUT ARE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS TO
GIVE THEM A SEAT NATIONWIDE. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission show that the party-list system is not limited to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors referred to by petitioners, i.e., labor, peasants, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and the youth, but that it is a type of
proportional representation intended to give voice to those who may not have the
necessary number to win a seat in a district but are sufficiently numerous to give them a
seat nationwide. It, therefore, misreads the debates on Art. VI, 5(1)(2) to say that
"Although Commissioners Villacorta and Monsod differed in their proposals as to the
details of the party-list system, both proponents worked within the framework that the
party-list system is for the 'marginalized' as termed by Comm. Villacorta and the
'underrepresented' as termed by Comm. Monsod, which he defined as those which are
'always third or fourth place in each of the districts.'"
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT CANNOT HOLD THAT PARTY-LIST SYSTEM IS
RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LABOR, PEASANTS, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN AND YOUTH. A problem was placed before
the Constitutional Commission that the existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district
system of election leaves blocks of voters underrepresented. To this problem of under
representation two solutions were proposed: sectoral representation and party-list
system or proportional representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the partylist system. This Court cannot hold that the party-list system is reserved for the labor,
peasants, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth as
petitioners contend without changing entirely the meaning of the Constitution which in
fact mandates exactly the opposite of the reserved seats system when it provides in Art.
IX, C, 6 that "A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the
free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article."
6. ID.; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM ACT (R.A. No. 7941); SECTION 2 THEREOF,
CONSTRUED. What Section 2 of RA No. 7941 simply states is that the purpose of
the party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives" shall be guaranteed.
Contrary to what the majority claims, 2 does not say that the party-list system is

intended "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented

sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to
win seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is
"to promote proportional representation through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win
seats in the House. For while the representation of "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As
already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable those who cannot
win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not
necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in 5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include
other sectors. DHITcS

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J p:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the
great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the
underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but active
participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all
individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have
the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty
objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for
traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26,
2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political
parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the

Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as]
heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which
were promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in
the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered
parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154
parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26,
2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that
this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage
multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or
sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this
electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a
'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must
recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of
sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a
manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply
with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency
of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified
List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be
accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification
cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on

April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing,
however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution
dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition
within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12
docketed as G.R. No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered the consolidation of the
two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their
respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an
Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the
counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on
May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in
open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the
following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the
premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list
elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized
and underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec
which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements
of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision. ASCTac
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper
because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have filed
before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration,

pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated
November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution
3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this
Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a
prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for
there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the
urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the
Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, thesse cases present an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only
in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been held
that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, "where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House
of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system,
which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of
justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice . . . when the decision
sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No.
7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the
party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are

political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the
House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the partylist system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters'
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod
pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a regional party, a
sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime
Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO.
Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng
UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE.
Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or
fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress. 34 He explained:
"The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there
were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about
1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the
districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or
six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative
districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the partylist system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ."
Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political
parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"xxx xxx xxx

"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list
system.
"xxx xxx xxx"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate in the
party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party or any organization or group for that matter may do so. The
requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose
of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Italics supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the
Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to
give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision was
discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall,
hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our
people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law";
it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution.
Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized

and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who

lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented
to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular
district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to
numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The partylist organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36 Concurrently, the persons
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the partylist system, Filipino-style.

The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by
giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, . . . , to become
members of the House of Representatives." Where the language of the law is clear, it
must be applied according to its express terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list
system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."

two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly
defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna
Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers,
industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of
their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority,
they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their
economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's
constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of
one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the
majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list
system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give
them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their
constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized
and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor,
even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it

demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under
the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words
employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is
ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated
or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association. 38

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested
groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the
party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent
of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list elections.

The Party-List System Desecrated

by the OSG Contentions

As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, 44 in
order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain
representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible.
45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a
foothold within it those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who
therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical
to open the system to those who have long been within it those privileged sectors
that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General
submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In fact, it contends that any
party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in
the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in
the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino
citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The
assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich
and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these

The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows outsiders to
enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special
privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized
or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats
under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the
marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it.
The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not

have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
HDAaIc
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by
those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of
hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the
Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the
Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary
source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 46 In other words, verba legis
still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should
resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on
and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution . . . only when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting
it than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in
clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto,
Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its
provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words.
Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing
congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole . . ." The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus,
there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings
of Congress. In any event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual
opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.

Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is

not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly
and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it
seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as
its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and
overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this
Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial
and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or
second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC,
LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have
been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May
14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting
official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers . . . ."
We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but,
inter alia, to the election of district representatives for the purpose of determining which
parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of
whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved
groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa
Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government resources and
privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive
evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision,
before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the
party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening
Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter
to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in
its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must
show through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of
government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized
and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated
political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote
shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the
political party must claim to represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN:
Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes." 52
Third, in view of the objections 53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. . . .
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even
international networks of members and supporters, in
order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its
own political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and
philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that
also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD.
If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the
prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through
the legal fiction." 54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA.
When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS
GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams

or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous

community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS.
Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia
ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et
cetera." 55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not
be registered." 56 The prohibition was explained by a member 57 of the Constitutional
Commission in this wise: "[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering
as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a
candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a
political party." 58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,
which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of
or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of
RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties . . .
to become members of the House of Representatives." A party or an organization,
therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system,
the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and
operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the
government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal 60 and
unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens

belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be

elected to the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees
must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall
be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA
7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth
cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the
working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party,
national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . ." 61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those
who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool
intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our people
genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced,
and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for
them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the
other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all.
Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and

underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list
system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the
marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of
noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this
could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of
RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list
participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the
extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec
is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives.
The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within
30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain from
proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after
the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

||| (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, 147613, June 26, 2001)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA,
SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN,
AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS
CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN,
ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY
PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and
Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG
TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,

PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,

BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.

Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must
be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is
mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to
contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.

[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]

Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement
election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.

ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION

OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON
FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR
CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA,
OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG
LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION

In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of

parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by
unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions,
which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations
which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution1[1] of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;2[2]
and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution3[3] of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said
disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38)
additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941.

PANGANIBAN, J.:*

Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

The Facts and the Antecedents

Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of
government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national,
regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections
may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and
proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members.4[4] In
effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and
another for a party-list representative.5[5]

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the

Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of
party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this
statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible. (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this
law (RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall
be observed:

additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No.
2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously
with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties,
organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast
for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes
cast in their favor were as follows:6[6]

Party/Organization/
Number of
Coalition
Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC
503,487
5.5%
Eballe
2. ABA
321,646
3. ALAGAD
312,500
4. VETERANS
304,802
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI
255,184
6. AKO
239,042
7. NCSCFO
238,303
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548
9. AKBAYAN
232,376
10. BUTIL
215,643
11. SANLAKAS 194,617
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802

Percentage of
Rene M. Silos

Nominees
Melvyn D.

3.51%
3.41%
3.33%

Leonardo Q. Montemayor
Diogenes S. Osabel
Eduardo P. Pilapil

2.79%
2.61%
2.60%

Joy A.G. Young

Ariel A. Zartiga
Gorgonio P. Unde
Patricia M. Sarenas
Loreta Ann P. Rosales
Benjamin A. Cruz
Renato B. Magtubo
Cresente C. Paez

2.54%
2.36%
2.13%

2.57%

2.07%

After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998,
the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters
Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes,
which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as
the 14th party-list representative.7[7]

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of

the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of
the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8[8] filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations
were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power,
Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU,
PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional9[9] seats
must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%)
percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it
identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine
"how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the
marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of
Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the
Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in
the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold
requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x
x should have at least one representative. It thus disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus

Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the
Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and
motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on
the list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are
PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN

11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS

to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as

provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its
Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously
promulgated a set of Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System. Under these Rules and Regulations,
one additional seat shall be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula the
Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method when it
proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12
other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said
unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three elements, the Group of 38
private respondents.10[10]

x. Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the
constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the
House of Representatives.
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin
majority -- with three commissioners concurring11[11] and two members12[12]
dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in
abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the
resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors.

Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement
imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application,
holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold.

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners
on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list
system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties,
organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list
system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats,
not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as
provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up, the
Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of
the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled
seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had
each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein
private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled
the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations
representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor,
veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does
not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop
and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers
for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were
filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two
per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.13[13] In the suits, made
respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and
coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of
additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had
obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to
CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13
January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15
October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this
Court.
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U.
Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for
petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No.
136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private
respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena
for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez
appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective
Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.14[14]

The Issues

This formulation16[16] means that any increase in the number of district

representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding
increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208
district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of
party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the
winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following
issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?
2.
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3.
If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of
a qualified party be determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed
Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional
seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision15[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of
Representatives reads as follows:

Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in
arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise
"twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80
representatives

208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated
seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list.
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be
filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature
enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition
participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together
with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties,
organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and
thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such
allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the
"incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise
of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that
the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict
application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list
complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys
the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define
and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said
earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in
the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit

them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions

participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats
in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law
provides:
(b)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether
to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17[17] Our task now,
as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through
highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical
formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual
election process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless
declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper
tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and
obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from
the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate
discussion:

SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point

that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must
have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to
qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes
cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will
actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by
the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will
be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list
system, Mr. President."18[18]

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at,
arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats
among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned
after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the
Bundestag of Germany.19[19]

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote

requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine.
Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of
votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a
seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-ahalf percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000
votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent,
we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we
are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be
able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over
10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are trying
to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job
to open up the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat.
We think that people should organize, should work hard, and should earn their seats
within that system.20[20]

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,

but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.21[21] But to have meaningful

representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be
the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"22[22] to ensure
meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise
and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.23[23]

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic
society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of
mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious
shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it
up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the
fifty. x x x.24[24]

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the

seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified"
means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the
entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no
matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire
House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and
having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat
limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many
party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The
very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to
the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that
garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed
seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two
percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally,"
bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion
of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first
seat.25[25] Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes
cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to
two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal
has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however,
when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20
percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the
method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and
Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will
each uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party
garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the
same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect,
proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this
suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.

The Niemeyer Formula

Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of
distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying
the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by
that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the

qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of
additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:

statutory difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the

Philippines.

No. of remaining seats

to be allocated
--------------------------- x
Total no. of votes of
qualified parties

Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in
the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer
formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances between the two
party-list models.

No. of additional
No. of votes of
= seats of party
party concerned concerned
(Integer.decimal)

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998
election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be
as follows:
Party

Number of
Guaranteed
Votes Seats
1. APEC
503,487
1
2. ABA
321,646
1
3. ALAGAD
312,500
1
4. VETERANS
304,802
1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI
255,184
1
6. AKO 239,042
1
2.72
7. NCSCFO
238,303
1
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548
4
9. AKBAYAN
232,376
1
10. BUTIL
215,643
1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617
1
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802
3
13. COCOFED
186,388
1
Total
3,429,338

Additional
Seats
5.73
3.66
3.55
3.47

Extra
Seats
1
1

2.90

2.71
1

1
2.68

2.64
2.45
2.21
1

2.16

2.12
13

32

Total
7
5
4
4
4
1

4
4
4
3
3

3
52

However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party,
those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our
present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer
formula would violate the principle of "proportional representation," a basic tenet of our
party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of
the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have
threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There are marked
differences between the two models, however. As ably pointed out by private
respondents,26[26] one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members.
More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a
three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major

The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines

It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which
demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution
to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need
to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat
in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional
representation into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or
amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One.
There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the
participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed
by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.
All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each.
Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two.
The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution
is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its
obtaining the most number of votes.

For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to
two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be
entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes
won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first
party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should
be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first
party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be
less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because
there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result
in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration
of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the
number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end
up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales27[27] that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in
effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can
claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this
Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of
facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18
or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such
scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the
maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is
entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number
of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the
same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For
example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According
to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of
votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party
would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting
only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one
obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total
of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to
those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is
encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party-list system
No. of additional
= ----------------------x seats allocated to
No. of votes of
the first party
first party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party list system

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only
basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes
shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the
number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of
seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the
first party is entitled is as follows:

Additional seats
for concerned
party

Number of votes
of first party
-------------------- =
Total votes for
party-list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first
party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but
less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to
the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of

Additional seats
for concerned
party

No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of additional
------------------ x seats allocated to
No. of votes of the first party
first party

Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is
computed as follows:
No. of votes of

Additional seats
for concerned
=
party (ABA)

ABA
No. of additional
-------------------- x seats allocated to
No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)

repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that
provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is
restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An
increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled
to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set
the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant
parameter.

Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:

Additional seats 321,646
for concerned = ----------- x 1 =
party (ABA)
503,487

.64 or 0 additional seat, since

rounding off is not to be applied

Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as
follows:
Organization

Votes

1. APEC
2. ABA
3. ALAGAD
4. VETERANS
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI
6. AKO
7. NCSFO
1
8. ABANSE!
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN!
10. BUTIL
1
11. SANLAKAS
12. COOP1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED

503,487
321,646
312,500
304,802

%age of Initial No.

Additional
Total
Garnered Total Votes
of Seats Seats
5.50% 1
1
3.51% 1
321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64
3.41% 1
312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62
3.33% 1
304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61

2
1
1
1

255,184 2.79% 1
255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51
1
239,042 2.61% 1
239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47
1
238,303 2.60% 1
238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47
235,548 2.57%

321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47

232,376 2.54% 1
232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46
1
215,643 2.36% 1
215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43
194,617 2.13% 1
194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39
1
189,802 2.07% 1
189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38

The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily
coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC)
and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the
incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and
methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say,
however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a
mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify
RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will also be modified to reflect the
changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirtyeight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a
party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two
percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec
effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the
legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of
the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear
transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.28[28]

186,388 2.04%

186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end
result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number
of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an
exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions
are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and
respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their
discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.29[29]

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related

laws,30[30] cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of
its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its
approval and enactment by the legislature.

Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its

provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or
any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing
that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.31[31]

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a
total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the
proportional representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be
interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of
representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements
imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it
remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in parliamentary
democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time
to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of
republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives
should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them
to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's
lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in
adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties,
we are confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed
with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will
fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the partylist system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14)
sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve
(12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

!!
!!
!!
!!
!
!

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

EN BANC

DECISION

[G.R. No. 177271. May 4, 2007.]

GARCIA, J p:
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR.
AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR
LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P.
PORCARE, Secretary-General, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, KAPATIRAN NG MGA
NAKAKULONG NA WALANG SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY
ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), AHON PINOY, AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP),
PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA NG MGA
GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA
MAMAMAYAN, INC. (AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN
(BABAE KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA
BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT REPORMANG
KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC.
(AGBIAG!), ABANTE ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO),
AANGAT TAYO (AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK),
BAGO NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE PHILIPPINES
(BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN PILIPINO MOVEMENT
(AANGAT KA PILIPINO), ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONAL (ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA
NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG), SULONG
BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO PRODUCERS CONSUMER
EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED
MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD), PARENTS
E N A B L I N G PA R E N T S ( P E P ) , A L L I A N C E O F N E O CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE
AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT (FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY
MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1UNTAK), ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC),
BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC.,
(APOI), ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI
SECTORAL PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO)
AND ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS, PROFESSIONALS
AND SENIORS (AAPS), respondents.

[G.R. No. 177314. May 4, 2007.]

REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION,
BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to
nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
respecting party-list groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the
party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BARA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the
various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to
participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List
System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to
represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P.
Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release
or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating
party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales' previous letter-request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, 1 the
petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33
private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the
party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply
with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec 2 ]"
and, 2) correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the May 2007 elections. aTEHCc
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the Court en banc required the public
and private respondents to file their respective comments on the petitions within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven
(7) private respondents 3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-list group 4 mentioned in
G.R. No. 177314 submitted their separate comments. In the main, the separate
comments of the private respondents focused on the untenability and prematurity of the
plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as party-list
groups and thus disqualify them and their respective nominees from participating in the
May 14, 2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of
names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the
May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the
necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by
the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1)
BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6)
AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG

KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to
be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the
Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. EACIcH
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the
aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor
and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter 5
dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelec's Law Department
requesting a list of that groups' nominees. Another letter 6 of the same tenor dated
March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the
particular urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner
Rosales' requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the
front-page banner headline "COMELEC WON'T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", 7
with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their
own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter 8 to the
Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales' earlier plea for
information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the
same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for
the Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming
or denying . . . the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin
Abalos, Sr. . . ." Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of
Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 9 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the
nominees' names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales' basic
disclosure request. In its relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will disclose/
publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection with the
May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day.
DaACIH
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and reply to all
letters addressed to the Commission inquiring on the party-list
nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain a copy of the April 3, 2007
Resolution only on April 21, 2007. She would later state the observation that the last
part of the "Order empowering the Law Department to 'implement this resolution and
reply to all letters . . . inquiring on the party-list nominees' is apparently a fool-proof
bureaucratic way to distort and mangle the truth and give the impression that the
antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 . . . is the final answer to the two formal
requests . . . of Petitioners". 10
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the foregoing factual setting, albeit
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed their
petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007 Comelec Resolution 07-0724.

To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the
accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in
their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not
appear to be qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR, Comelec
. . . committed grave abuse of discretion . . . when it granted the
assailed accreditations even without simultaneously determining
whether the nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or
not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent
in Congress, in accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines
prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani
11 case which states that, "not only the candidate party or
organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees." In the case of private
respondents, public respondent Comelec granted accreditations
without the required simultaneous determination of the qualification
of the nominees as part of the accreditation process of the party-list
organization itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the
original) 12 DEScaT
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such
course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral
groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent
marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a
factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of
special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to
decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record.
13 The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal's evaluation of
the evidence. 14
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before the Comelec of SPA Case No.
07-026 in which petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to disqualify the
nominees of the respondent party-list groups named in their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941's and UP-LR's posture that the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously
determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No.
7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined
simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by
private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941
requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to be filed with the Comelec
"not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the succeeding Section 8
requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the election" of the list
of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The petition in G.R. No. 177314
formulates and captures the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these
consolidated cases and they may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names

of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has
violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to
disclose to the public the names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its refusal to disclose the names of
the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision,
while commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of
party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or
include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC
shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a
certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations
or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their
desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute
copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on
election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list. (Emphasis added.) aEDCSI
And doubtless part of Comelec's reason for keeping the names of the party list
nominees away from the public is deducible from the following excerpts of the news
report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up yesterday its
decision not to release the names of nominees of sectoral parties,
organizations, or coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list
election which will be held simultaneously with the May 14 mid-term
polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. . . . said he and [the
other five COMELEC] Commissioners believe that the party list
elections must not be personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 . . ., the people are to vote for
sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their
nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to
disclose the names of nominees. . . . (Words in brackets and
emphasis added) HEDSCc
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale
therefor is the right to information enshrined in the self-executory 15 Section 7, Article III
of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for

policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such

limitations as may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another
constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in
Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public,
or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as
fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and
protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. 16
Without a government's acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order
to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties
exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the
exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. 17 And
since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be
informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing. 18
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion
right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the
people's right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is
confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of
confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets
or those affecting national security. 19
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But
both terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the
day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is
of interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons
employed as sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles,
surely the identity of candidates for a lofty elective public office should be a matter of
highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of
the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends

only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling
places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to
read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing
in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees. The
Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an
absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus
given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence
of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelec's reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is
valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance
which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does,
on a fundamental right to information. 20 While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a
vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports detailing the purported reasons
behind the Comelec's disinclination to release the names of party-list nominees. It is to
be stressed, however, that the Court is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis
of hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws. And lest it be overlooked, the
Court always assumes, at the first instance, the presumptive validity and regularity of
official acts of government officials and offices.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect
their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to
be informed about matters that have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be
achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in the assailed resolution of
the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo, 21 has
consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22
So it must be here for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the
herein petitions. cIECaS
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to
nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks
to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list
groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections,
the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in
the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to
the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to costs. HcaATE
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cinco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, 177314, May 04, 2007)

!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179271. April 21, 2009.]
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers),
respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, intervenor.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens
in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, 3
assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60 4 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made
a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two
percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced
that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans
Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

AANGAT TAYO, intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), intervenor.

[G.R. No. 179295. April 21, 2009.]

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY
TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, 1 assails the
Resolution 2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot.
BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. 6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before
the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is
duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats". 7 There were no intervenors in
BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
aTEACS
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens'
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela), Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We
quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as
National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for PartyList, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and
public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty
three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under
the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the
National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation
Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than
sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots
have been completely canvassed;

i.

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have

thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand
four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

Total party-list votes already canvassed/

15,283,659

tabulated
RANK
ii.

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/

VOTES

COALITION

RECEIVED

BUHAY

1,163,218

BAYAN MUNA

972,730

CIBAC

760,260

GABRIELA

610,451

APEC

538,971

A TEACHER

476,036

AKBAYAN

470,872

ALAGAD

423,076

BUTIL

405,052

10

COOP-NATCO

390,029

11

BATAS

386,361

12

ANAK PAWIS

376,036

13

ARC

338,194

14

ABONO

337,046

To t a l p a r t y - l i s t v o t e s r e m a i n i n g 1,337,032
uncanvassed/
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

iii.

Maximum party-list votes (based on 100%

102,430

outcome) from areas not yet submitted for

canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar,
Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan,
Maguindanao)

Maximum Total Party-List Votes

16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System

Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected
total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold
can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four
hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen's Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in
Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula
for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition
receiving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng

Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION
AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer
for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties,
organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are
therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of
representation in the meantime. SATDHE

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the

Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144,
Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the
Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM,
subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties,
organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List
System:

Buhay Hayaan Yumabong

BUHAY

Bayan Muna

BAYAN MUNA

Citizens Battle Against Corruption

CIBAC

Gabriela Women's Party

GABRIELA

Association of Philippine Electric

APEC

Cooperatives
6

Advocacy for Teacher

A TEACHER

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or

coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party
versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the
party-list results.
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng
Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the
proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be
held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution,
furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 8 (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC's interpretation of the Veterans
formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting
en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen
(13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the
projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121,
and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.
7

Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party

AKBAYAN

Alagad

ALAGAD

Luzon Farmers Party

BUTIL

10

Cooperative-Natco Network Party

COOP-NATCCO

11

Anak Pawis

ANAKPAWIS

12

Alliance of Rural Concerns

ARC

13

Abono

ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,

organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to
have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes
cast under the Party-List System.

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory

Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected
maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the
votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in
Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum
votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that
the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified
parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List

Projected total number of votes

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

977,476

CIBAC

755,964

GABRIELA

621,718

APEC

622,489

Proportion of votes received

A TEACHER

492,369

by the first party

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD

423,190

Equal to or at least 6%

Two (2) additional seats

BUTIL

409,298

Equal to or greater than 4% but lessthan 6%

One (1) additional seat

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

Less than 4%

No additional seat

11

ANAKPAWIS

370,165

12

ARC

375,846

13

ABONO

340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong

(Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen
(13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the
"first party" in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) versus COMELEC; acITSD
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions
participating under the party-list system of representation that have
obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional
seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party",
the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party

Total votes for party-list system

Additional seats

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the

following percentage:

1,178,747

0.07248 or 7.2%

16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula
as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

Proportion of votes of first

No. of votes of

party relative to total votes for

concerned party

party-list system

Additional seats for

a concerned party

No. of votes of

No. of additional
x

seats allocated to
first party

first party
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without
rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List

Percentage

Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA

1.65

CIBAC

1.28

GABRIELA

1.05

APEC

1.05

A TEACHER

0.83

AKBAYAN

0.78

ALAGAD

0.71

BUTIL

0.69

COOP-NATCO

0.69

ANAKPAWIS

0.62

ARC

0.63

ABONO

0.57

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the

Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144,
Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the
Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled
to additional seats, to wit:

GABRIELA

APEC

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,

organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to
have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast
under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed
seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to
one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be
held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this
Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 9
Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3
August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal
Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation
thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

Party List

Additional Seats

1.That the full number twenty percent (20%) of

Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed. CaDEAT

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

2.Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes

the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section
12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable

only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted

on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3.The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied;
and
4.Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of
seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they
received and the additional seats shall be allocated in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in
proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats
under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure
prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS,
ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25
June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining
how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list
groups are entitled to representative seats and how many
of their nominees shall seat [sic].

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and
of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. 11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to
one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), 12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN), 13 and An Waray. 14 Per the
certification 15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been
proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List

No. of Seat(s)

1.1

Buhay

1.2

Bayan Muna

1.3

CIBAC

1.4

Gabriela

RECOMMENDATION:

1.5

APEC

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

1.6

A Teacher

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60

promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass
of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties,
Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the
Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections" resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or
coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results".

1.7

Akbayan

1.8

Alagad

1.9

Butil

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic]

1.11

Anak Pawis

1.12

ARC

1.13

Abono

1.14

AGAP

1.15

AMIN

5.In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section

11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in
allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by
Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of

Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and
adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC
Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot
and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED. 10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing

Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal
of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the

Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred
pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250. SaHIEA
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1.Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2.Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3.Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by
the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4.How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in
their petition:
I.Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board
of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the
First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified partylist organizations as said rule:
A.Violates the constitutional principle of proportional
representation.
B.Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1.The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule
in allocating additional seats for the
"First Party" violates the principle of
proportional representation under RA
7941.
2.The use of two formulas in the allocation of
additional seats, one for the "First Party"
and another for the qualifying parties,
violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3.The proportional relationships under the First
Party Rule are different from those
required under RA 7941;
C.Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the
Philippine party-list system as provided for under
the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et
al. v. COMELEC.

II.Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the
same being merely in consonance with the ruling in
Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the
instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved
herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct
interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of
transcendental importance to our nation. 17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22
April 2008:
1.Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or
merely a ceiling?
2.Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3.Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4.How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5.Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections? 18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election
has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference,
these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their
total number of votes". 19 ITSacC

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical

interpretation of the term "proportional representation", this Court is compelled to
revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5.(1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available
for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since
the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.

220

x .20

55

.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number
of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available
to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11.Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law". The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to
modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of partylist representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of
seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On
this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved
under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed
seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes.
However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the
allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the
First Party Rule, 20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's dissent in Veterans presented
Germany's Niemeyer formula 21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats
for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b)
of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11.Number of Party-List Representatives. . . .
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 22 the
following procedure shall be observed:

Number of seats available to

legislative districts

Number of seats available to

x .20

party-list representatives

(a)The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from

the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be

entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more

than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes:
Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12.Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank
them according to the number of votes received and allocate partylist representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against
the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis
supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11 (b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as
follows: ASEIDH
(a)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent
(20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives
including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and
Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are
220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55
Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b)All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for
every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they
obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than
three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c)The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by
the party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph
and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to
those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to
all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three
(3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section
12 of RA 7941. 23

organization or coalition as against the total nationwide

votes cast for the party-list system. 24
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a party-list with
a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats".
25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's second
interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the
party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the
total number of seats allotted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and
A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the
qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified
party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a
qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the
second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the
whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned
party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat
allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are
ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are
allocated until all the seats are filled up. 26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the elections.
27

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement
is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by
following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

BUHAY

1,169,234

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

CIBAC

755,686

(b)rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

GABRIELA

621,171

(c)allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to

the percentage of votes obtained by each party,

APEC

619,657

(a)shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions
on a nationwide basis;

A TEACHER

490,379

34

1-UTAK

164,980

AKBAYAN

466,112

35

TUCP

162,647

ALAGAD

423,149

36

COCOFED

155,920

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

37

AGHAM

146,032

10

BUTIL

409,160

38

ANAK

141,817

11

BATAS

385,810

39

ABANSE! PINAY

130,356

12

ARC

374,288

40

PM

119,054

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

41

AVE

110,769

14

ABONO

339,990

42

SUARA

110,732

15

AMIN

338,185

43

ASSALAM

110,440

16

AGAP

328,724

44

DIWA

107,021

17

AN WARAY

321,503

45

ANC

99,636

18

YACAP

310,889

46

SANLAKAS

97,375

19

FPJPM

300,923

47

ABC

90,058

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

48

KALAHI

88,868

21

ABS

235,086

49

APOI

79,386

22

KAKUSA

228,999

50

BP

78,541

23

KABATAAN

228,637

51

AHONBAYAN

78,424

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

52

BIGKIS

77,327

25

ALIF

217,822

53

PMAP

75,200

26

SENIOR CITIZENS

213,058

54

AKAPIN

74,686

27

AT

197,872

55

PBA

71,544

28

VFP

196,266

56

GRECON

62,220

29

ANAD

188,521

57

BTM

60,993

30

BANAT

177,028

58

A SMILE

58,717

31

ANG KASANGGA

170,531

59

NELFFI

57,872

32

BANTAY

169,801

60

AKSA

57,012

33

ABAKADA

166,747

61

BAGO

55,846

62

BANDILA

54,751

90

BUKLOD FILIPINA

8,915

63

AHON

54,522

91

LYPAD

8,471

64

ASAHAN MO

51,722

92

AA-KASOSYO

8,406

65

AGBIAG!

50,837

93

KASAPI

6,221

66

SPI

50,478

67

BAHANDI

46,612

68

ADD

45,624

69

AMANG SCIAaT

43,062

70

ABAY PARAK

42,282

71

BABAE KA

36,512

72

SB

34,835

73

ASAP

34,098

74

PEP

33,938

75

ABA ILONGGO

33,903

76

VENDORS

33,691

77

ADD-TRIBAL

32,896

78

ALMANA

32,255

79

AANGAT KA PILIPINO

29,130

80

AAPS

26,271

81

HAPI

25,781

Total Votes

82

AAWAS

22,946

for Party-List,

83

SM

20,744

in %

84

AG

16,916

85

AGING PINOY

16,729

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

86

APO

16,421

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

87

BIYAYANG BUKID

16,241

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

88

ATS

14,161

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

89

UMDJ

9,445

APEC

619,657

3.88%

TOTAL

15,950,900
=========

The first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations,
and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each". This clause guarantees a seat to the twopercenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration
purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for all party-list candidates.
Table 2.The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective
percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.
28

Rank

Party

Votes

Votes

Guaranteed

Garnered

Garnered over

Seat

A TEACHER

490,379

3.07%

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

COOP-NATCCO

409,883

2.57%

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

11

BATAS 29

385,810

2.42%

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes
cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the
votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability
of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get
two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
present.

17

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives". 30

===

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of

R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

Total

second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from
the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list
candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one
seat each", or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed
17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes". This is where petitioners' and intervenors'
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion
to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941. IATHaS
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the

1.The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from

the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2.The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3.Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4.Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats
are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding
off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes

garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the
remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the threeseat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Thus:

A Teacher

490,379

3.07%

1.17

N.A.

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1.11

N.A.

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1.01

N.A.

9 31

C O O P - 409,883
NATCCO

2.57%

N.A.

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

N.A.

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

N.A.

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

N.A.

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

N.A.

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

N.A.

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

N.A.

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

N.A.

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

N.A.

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

N.A.

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

N.A.

Vo t e s
for

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

N.A.

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

N.A.

Party
List,

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

N.A.

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%

N.A.

24

ABA-AKO

218,818

1.37%

N.A.

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

N.A.

26

S E N I O R 213,058
CITIZENS

1.34%

N.A.

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

N.A.

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

N.A.

Table 3.Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank

Party

Votes

Votes

Guaran Additio ( B
teed
nal
plus

G a r n e r G a r n e r Seat
ed
ed

Seats

) Applyi
ng

(C), in

t h e
three

over

whole

seat

Total

integer cap
s

in %
(First
Round)

Round)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

1,169,2 7.33%
34

2.79

N.A.

(A)
1

BUHAY

(Secon
d

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

2.33

N.A.

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

N.A.

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1.80

N.A.

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

N.A.

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1.48

N.A.

31

1.07%

N.A.

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1.48

N.A.

A
N
G 170,531
KASANGGA

32

BANTAY

1.06%

N.A.

169,801

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

N.A.

34

1-UTAK

164,980

1.03%

N.A.

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

N.A.

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

N.A.

Total

17

55

====

====

In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner

mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as
for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can
also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30
percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are
allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates
and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55
party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available
party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient
number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each
party, are shown in column (D). IcADSE
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty
system. . . . We are for opening up the system, and we
would like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to
classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the
party list concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.

May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list

system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether
he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if
they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political
parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and
that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.

Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang

political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political
parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang "reserve". Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. DAETHc
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE.
. . . In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political
parties and mass organizations to seek common ground.
For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I
see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of
the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no
question that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their participation, the policies of
such parties can be radically transformed because this
amendment will create conditions that will challenge both
the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available,
although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that
the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the

names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated

with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute
themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very
presence there has a transforming effect upon the
philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFLCIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the
Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all
why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other
so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution
for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more
lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I
support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty
of being elected representatives later on through a party
list system; and even beyond that, to become actual
political parties capable of contesting political power in the
wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
xxx xxx xxx 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided
the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system.
(b)A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c)A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region. cDaEAS

(d)A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens

belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector,

the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue
until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 34 as there is
no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, 35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a
senior citizen.

(e)A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition

of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f)A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down,
19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist system to the sectoral groups. 33 In defining a "party" that participates in party-list
elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party", R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding
the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage
in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political
parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang
Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate,
the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang
Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the
members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, . . . ." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in
the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for partylist representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the partylist elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the
formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this
ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution
dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional
seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in partylist elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. ECISAD
Carpio Morales, Tinga, Nachura, Brion, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, J., certify that J. Quisumbing joined the Chief Justice's Opinion.-RSP
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Leonardode Castro, JJ., join the Chief Justice in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

!!

||| (BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, 179295, April 21, 2009)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 203976. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.]

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan
Igot, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION,

INC. (ARARO), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.

[G.R. No. 203981. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. Nos. 203818-19. April 2, 2013.]
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 203922. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
(APEC), represented by its President Congressman Ponciano
D. Payuyo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.

ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON

LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms.
Lourdes L. Agustin, the party's Secretary General, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204002. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204094. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 203936. April 2, 2013.]
A K S Y O N M A G S A S A K A - PA R T I D O T I N I G N G M A S A ,
represented by its President Michael Abas Kida, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 203958. April 2, 2013.]

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC.
(KAKUSA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.

[G.R. No. 203960. April 2, 2013.]

1ST CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1CARE), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
respondent.

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD),

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204100. April 2, 2013.]

1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC.,
(1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204122. April 2, 2013.]

1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/
GUARDIANS), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, Commissioner, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Commissioner, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner, ELIAS
R. YUSOPH, Commissioner, and CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM,
Commissioner, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204125. April 2, 2013.]

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC.
(A-IPRA), represented by its Secretary General, Ronald D.
Macaraig, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204126. April 2, 2013.]

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG
MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG
NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by
its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND

ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 204174. April 2, 2013.]

AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its
President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204216. April 2, 2013.]

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204139. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204220. April 2, 2013.]
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty.
Berteni Catalua Causing, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204141. April 2, 2013.]

BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F.
Palparan, President, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204153. April 2, 2013.]

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY represented by its
President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204236. April 2, 2013.]

FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204238. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204239. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204158. April 2, 2013.]
ABROAD PARTY LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM,

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND

DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE), petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204240. April 2, 2013.]

AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG

PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary
General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204263. April 2, 2013.]

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSED FEDERATION OF
FARMERS AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204318. April 2, 2013.]

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION
(UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204356. April 2, 2013.]

BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204358. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MINING ADVANCEMENT FOR
NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204359. April 2, 2013.]

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVE REFORM AND
TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman,
Carlito B. Cubelo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204321. April 2, 2013.]

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by
its Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204323. April 2, 2013.]

BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented by Homer Bueno, Fitrylin
Dalhani, Israel de Castro, Dante Navarro and Guiling
Mamondiong, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM,
and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204364. April 2, 2013.]

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA
LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO
BUHAY), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO
M. PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners thereof,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 204367. April 2, 2013.]

AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION (AKIN), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204341. April 2, 2013.]

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES (ALIM) PARTYLIST, represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204370. April 2, 2013.]

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by its Secretary General,
Rodolfo T. Tuazon, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204374. April 2, 2013.]

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA
MAGSASAKA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, respondent.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented
herein by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol,
Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204425. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204379. April 2, 2013.]
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye
Maybelle Lorenz, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.

[G.R. No. 204394. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER,
DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204402. April 2, 2013.]

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President,
Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q.
Quimpo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, respondent.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE

PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS,
ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR
AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204426. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND
HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V.
SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA.
GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as
COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204428. April 2, 2013.]

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary
General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204408. April 2, 2013.]

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH
ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204435. April 2, 2013.]

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP),
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
respondent.

[G.R. No. 204410. April 2, 2013.]

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204421. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204436. April 2, 2013.]

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented by its Party
President, Rolex T. Suplico, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204455. April 2, 2013.]

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
respondent.

[G.R. No. 204484. April 2, 2013.]

PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its
Secretary General, Roger M. Federazo, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204485. April 2, 2013.]

A L L I A N C E O F O R G A N I Z AT I O N S , N E T W O R K S A N D
ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from

participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13
November 2012, 2 20 November 2012, 3 27 November 2012, 4 4 December 2012, 5 11
December 2012, 6 and 19 February 2013. 7
The Facts
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G . R . S P P
Group
No.
No.

Grounds for Denial

A.Via the COMELEC En Banc's automatic review of the COMELEC Division's

resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 2012 8
1

204379

[G.R. No. 204486. April 2, 2013.]

12-099

Alagad ng

(PLM)

Sining (ASIN)

1ST KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN

(1ST KABAGIS), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.

marginalized
underrepresented;

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition 1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions

and

Failure to prove track record;

and

Failure of the nominees to

qualify

[G.R. No. 204490. April 2, 2013.]

PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

The "artists" sector is not

considered

under RA 7941 and Ang Bagong

Bayani.
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 9

204455

12-041

Manila Teachers

A non-stock savings and loan

(PLM)

Savings and Loan

association cannot be
considered

Association, Inc.

marginalized
underrepresented;

(Manila Teachers)

and

and

204426

12-011

Association of

(PLM)

Local Athletics

The first and second nominees

are

(PP)

(AAB)

sector of society, despite the

not teachers by profession.

formation of a sectoral wing for

the

Failure to show that its members

benefit of farmers of Region 8;

belong to the marginalized; and

Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists,

representatives;
-

Failure of the nominees to

qualify.

Inc. (ALA-EH)

204435

Failure of the nominees to

qualify:

12-057

1 Alliance

(PLM)

Advocating

although registering as a
regional

Autonomy Party

p o l i t i c a l p a r t y, t w o o f t h e
nominees

(1AAAP)

are not residents of the region;

and

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 13

204436

12-009

Abyan Ilonggo

(PP),

Party (AI)

12-165

underrepresented sector, as the

(PLM)

Province of Iloilo has district

representatives;

underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 2012 11

Failure of the group to show that

its

12-104

Akbay

(PL)

Kalusugan

nominees belong to the urban

poor

(AKIN), Inc.

sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 2012 12

204370

12-011

Ako An Bisaya

Untruthful statements in the

memorandum; and

Failure to show that the party

represents a marginalized and

belong to the marginalized and

204367

Nominees are neither farmers

nor
peasants.

four of the five nominees do not

Lack of track record in

representing
peasants and farmers; and

Resolution dated 27 November 2012 10

4

Constituency has district

Failure to represent a
marginalized

Withdrawal of three of its five

nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 14

204485

12-175

Alliance of

(PL)

Organizations,

Failure to establish that the

group can
represent 14 Networks and
sectors;

Associations of
the Philippines,

The sectors of homeowners'

Inc. (ALONA)

associations, entrepreneurs and

and underrepresented;

cooperatives are not

marginalized

its members belong to the

and underrepresented; and

-

marginalized
underrepresented;

The nominees do not belong to

the
marginalized
underrepresented.

There is no proof that majority of

and

and

The group represents sectors

with
conflicting interests; and

B.Via the COMELEC En Banc's review on motion for reconsideration of the

COMELEC Division's resolutions denying registration of groups and
organizations

The nominees do not belong to

the
sector which the group claims to

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 15

represent.
9

204139

12-127

Alab ng

(PL)

Mamamahayag

Failure to prove track record as

an
organization;

Resolution dated 14 November 2012 17

11

204394

12-145

Association of

(PL)

Guard, Utility

(ALAM)
-

Failure to show that the group

and track record;

Helper, Aider,

actually represents the

marginalized

Failure to prove membership

base

Rider, Driver/

Failure to present activities that

and underrepresented; and

Domestic

sufficiently benefited its intended

Failure to establish that the

group

Helper,

constituency; and

can represent all sectors it seeks

to

Janitor, Agent

represent.

and Nanny of the

of the sectors which the group

seeks

Philippines, Inc.

to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 16

The nominees do not belong to

any

(GUARDJAN)
10

204402

The group reflects an advocacy

for

12-061

Kalikasan Party-

(PP)

List

the environment, and is not

(KALIKASAN)

representative of the
marginalized

Resolution dated 5 December 2012 18

12

204490

12-073

Pilipinas Para sa

(PLM)

Pinoy (PPP)

Failure to show that the group

represents a marginalized and

underrepresented sector, as
Region

(PLM)

elections
-

12 has district representatives;

and
-

and underrepresented sector;

Failure to show a track record of

undertaking programs for the

welfare

represent.

Resolution dated 11 October 2012 25

203766

12-161

Atong Paglaum,

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Inc. (Atong

accreditation

Paglaum)

12-154

AKO Bicol

Retained registration and

accreditation

19

(PLM)

Political Party

as a political party, but denied

12-177

(AKB)

participation in the May 2013

party-list

The party failed to file its

Statement
of Contributions and
Expenditures
for the 2010 Elections.

203818-

The nominees do not belong to

the

and

Grounds for Denial

Resolution dated 10 October 2012 24

sectors which the party

represents;

Pursuant to paragraph 2 22 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled

summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that
filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified
the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections:
S P P
Group
No.

The nominees are not

marginalized
and underrepresented.

These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory
injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No.
9604, 21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

G.R. No.

The Bicol region already has

representatives in Congress;
and

of the sector the group seeks to

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, 19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the

COMELEC Second Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB)
registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region.
However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because
PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to
apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as
an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
20 SDHCac

Failure to represent any

marginalized

203981

12-187

Association for

(PLM)

Righteousness

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
-

Advocacy on

Failure to comply, and for

violation
of election laws;

Leadership
(ARAL)

The nominees do not represent

the

sectors which the party

represents;

204100

and
-

204002

Guardians

organized for religious

purposes.

Inc. (1 BRO-

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Rural Concerns

accreditation

PGBI)

204122

Failure of the party to prove that

12-220

United

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Movement

accreditation

Against Drugs

The sectors of drug counsellors

and

Foundation

lecturers, veterans and the

youth,

(UNIMAD)

are not marginalized and

underrepresented;

Resolution dated 16 October 2012 26

Failure to define the sector it

seeks to
represent; and

The nominees do not belong to

a
and

sector.
12-223

1 Guardians

(PLM)

Nationalist

Cancelled registration
-

The party is a military fraternity;

The sector of community

volunteer

Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/

the sectors it seeks to

represent.
204318

marginalized
underrepresented

majority of its members belong

to

Cancelled registration

Failure of the nominees to

qualify;
and

(PLM)

Brotherhood,

Alliance for

1-Bro Philippine

There is doubt that the party is

12-188

(ARC)

12-196

GUARDIANS)

workers is too broad to allow for

meaningful representation; and
-

The nominees do not appear to

belong to the sector of
community
volunteer workers.

204263

12-257

Blessed

(PLM)

Federation of

Cancelled registration
Three of the seven and
nominees do

Failure to establish track record;

and

Failure of the nominees to

qualify

Farmers and

not belong to the sector of

farmers

as representatives of the youth

and

Fishermen

and fishermen, the sector

sought

young urban professionals.

International,

to be represented; and

Inc. (A

BLESSED

Party-List)

None of the nominees are

registered
voters of Region XI, the region
sought to be represented.

Resolution dated 16 October 2012 27

203960

12-260

1st Consumers

(PLM)

Alliance for

represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 2012 29

11

204174

12-232

Aangat Tayo

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Party-List Party

accreditation

(AT)

Cancelled registration
-

Congress failed to author or

The sector of rural energy

consumers

sponsor bills that are beneficial

to

is not marginalized and

Inc. (1-CARE)

underrepresented;

the sectors that the party

represents

The party's track record is

related

(women, elderly, youth, urban

poor);

to electric cooperatives and not

rural

and
-

energy consumers; and

-

marginalized sectors that the

party

sector of rural energy

consumers.

seeks to represent.

12-201

Association of

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Philippine

accreditation

Electric

Failure to represent a
marginalized

and underrepresented sector;

and

Cooperatives
(APEC)

Resolution dated 23 October 2012 30

12

203976

12-288

Alliance for

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Rural and

accreditation

Agrarian

The nominees do not belong to

the
sector that the party claims to

The interests of the peasant and

Reconstruction,

urban poor sectors that the

party

Inc. (ARARO)

represents differ;
-

The nominees do not belong to

the

The nominees do not belong to

the

Resolution dated 16 October 2012 28

203922

The incumbent representative in

Rural Energy,

10

The nominees do not belong to

the
sectors that the party seeks to
represent;

Failure to show that three of the

nominees are bona fide party

nominees actually belong to the

members; and
-

Failure to prove that four of its

nine

farmers sector; and

Lack of a Board resolution to

-

participate in the party-list

elections.

Failure to show that five of its

nine
nominees work on uplifting the
lives

Resolution dated 24 October 2012 31

of the members of the sector.

13

204240

12-279

Agri-Agra na

(PLM)

Reporma Para sa

Cancelled registration
-

15

204126

The party ceased to exist for

more

12-263

Kaagapay ng

(PLM)

Nagkakaisang

Cancelled registration
-

Magsasaka ng

than a year immediately after

the

Agilang

Certificate of Nomination were

not

Pilipinas

May 2010 elections;

Pilipinong

signed by an appropriate officer

of

Magsasaka

the party;

Movement
(AGRI)

The nominees do not belong to

the

(KAP)
-

sector of peasants and farmers

that

Only four nominees were

submitted

203936

12-248

Aksyon

(PLM)

Magsasaka-

Cancelled registration
-

Failure to show that majority of

its

Partido Tinig ng

members are marginalized and

Masa (AKMA-

underrepresented;

PTM)

that they have undertaken

meaningful

Failure to show meaningful

activities
for its constituency.

Failure to show that nominees

actually belong to the sector, or

to the COMELEC; and

-

Failure to show track record for

the
farmers and peasants sector;
and

the party seeks to represent;

14

The Manifestation of Intent and

activities for the sector.

16

204364

12-180

Adhikain at

(PLM)

Kilusan ng

Cancelled registration
-

Failure to show that nominees

Ordinaryong

actually belong to the sector, or

Tao Para sa

that they have undertaken

meaningful

Lupa, Pabahay,

activities for the sector.

Hanapbuhay at

(PLM)

Nationwide

Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)
17

204141

12-229

The True

(PLM)

Marcos Loyalist

Cancelled registration
-

its members are marginalized

Country and

and underrepresented; and

18

204408

MASDA)

interests; and
-

20
-

operators, who may have

conflicting

Failure to prove that two of its

203958

12-015

Kapatiran ng

(PLM)

mga Nakulong

Cancelled registration
-

nominees actually belong to the

na Walang Sala,

its officers and members belong

to the

Inc. (BANTAY)

marginalized
underrepresented.

Inc. (KAKUSA)

marginalized
underrepresented;

12-217

Pilipino

Cancelled registration

(PLM)

Association for

and

Change of sector (from urban

poor

Country Urban

youth to urban poor)

necessitates

Poor Youth

a new application;

and Welfare

(PACYAW)

that the party represents

(persons

Failure to show track record for

imprisoned without proof of guilt

the marginalized and

beyond reasonable doubt);

-

Failure to prove that majority of

its

Pasang Masda

Cancelled registration

and

and
-

The nominees are not members

of the
urban poor sector.

Failure to show track record for

the
marginalized
underrepresented;

urban poor sector; and

12-277

The incumbent representative in

bills that are beneficial to the

sector

members and officers are from

the

and

Congress failed to author or

sponsor

underrepresented;

204153

Failure to prove that majority of

the Philippines,

Advancement

19

Nominees are either operators

or
former operators.

People)
Association of

Party (PASANG

Failure to show that majority of

(for God,

The party represents drivers

and

The nominees did not appear to

be
marginalized
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 30 October 2012 32

and

21

204428

12-256

Ang Galing

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Pinoy (AG)

accreditation
-

Contribution and Expenditures

for

Failure to attend the summary

hearing;

Failure to show track record for

the
marginalized
underrepresented;

the 2007 Elections.

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 34

23

204239

and

12-060

Green Force for

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

the Environment

accreditation

Sons and

and
-

The nominees did not appear to

be
marginalized
underrepresented.

and

204094

Alliance for

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Nationalism and

accreditation

Democracy

Daughters of

does not represent the

marginalized

Mother Earth

and underrepresented;

12-185

(ANAD)

and

sector;
-

24

204236

12-254

Firm 24-K

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Association, Inc.

accreditation

(FIRM 24-K)

Only three nominees were

submitted

and

represent (urban poor and

peasants
of the National Capital Region);
-

Failure to submit its Statement

of

Only two of its nominees reside

in
the National Capital Region;
and

and
-

The nominees do not belong to

the
sector that the party seeks to

The nominees do not belong to

the
marginalized
underrepresented;

The nominees are not

marginalized
citizens.

to the COMELEC;
-

Failure to comply with the track

record requirement; and

Failure to represent an
identifiable
marginalized
underrepresented

The party is an advocacy group

and

(GREENFORCE)

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 33

22

Failure to comply with the track

record requirement.

25

204341

12-269

Action League

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

of Indigenous

accreditation

Masses (ALIM)

(PLM)

Failure to establish that its

nominees
are members of the indigenous
people

Movement for

Active Reform

representing the sectors that

and Transparency

the party represents;

(SMART)
-

in the Mindanao and Cordilleras

represent;

of its members are marginalized

and

reside in the Mindanao and

underrepresented.

Three of the nominees do not

appear
to belong to the marginalized.

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 37

28

204238

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 35

26

204358

12-204

Alliance of

(PLM)

Advocates in

12-173

Alliance of

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Bicolnon Party

accreditation

(ABP)

specifically defined group which

Advancement

may not be allowed registration

for National

under the party-list system; and

Failure to represent any sector;

and

Failure to establish that the

nominees

industry, the sector it claims to

Failure to establish that the

nominees
actually belong to the sector.

are employed in the

construction

Progress
-

Defective registration and

accreditation dating back to
2010;

The sector it represents is a

Mining

(AAMA)

Cancelled registration
-

There is doubt as to whether

majority

Only two of the party's

nominees

Cordilleras; and
-

Failure to comply with the track

record requirement; and

sector that the party seeks to

The nominees are disqualified

from

represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 38

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 36

29
27

204359

12-272

Social

Cancelled registration

204323

12-210

Bayani Party

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

List (BAYANI)

accreditation

Failure to prove a track record

of
trying to uplift the marginalized
and

Alliance, Inc.

are members of the indigenous

(A-IPRA)

people sector;
-

underrepresented sector of

actively participated in the

professionals; and
-

undertakings of the party; and

One nominee was declared

-

unqualified to represent the

sector
of professionals.

204321

12-252

Ang Agrikultura

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Natin Isulong

accreditation

(AANI)

are bona fide members.

32

204216

12-202

Philippine

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Coconut

accreditation

Producers

Failure to establish a track

record
of enhancing the lives of the
marginalized
underrepresented

and

and government agencies and

is

(COCOFED)

not marginalized;
-

The nominees are not members

of

nominees do not belong to the

the marginalized sector of

coconut

farmers sector.

farmers and producers.

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 42

12-292

Agapay ng

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Indigenous

accreditation

Peoples Rights

More than a majority of the

party's

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 40

204125

The party is assisted by the

government in various projects;
and

and

31

The party is affiliated with

private

Federation, Inc.

farmers which it claims to

represent;

Failure to prove that its five

nominees

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 41

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 39

30

Failure to prove that its five

nominees

Failure to prove that its five

nominees

33

204220

12-238

Abang Lingkod

(PLM)

Party-List
(ABANG

Cancelled registration
-

Failure to establish a track

record of
continuously representing the

LINGKOD)

peasant farmers sector;

-

Failure to show that its

members

35

204374

actually belong to the peasant

farmers

12-228

Binhi-Partido ng

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

mga Magsasaka

accreditation

Para sa mga

sector; and
-

Failure to show that its

nominees are
marginalized
underrepresented,

Magsasaka

the government through the

(BINHI)

Department of Agriculture; and

and

adhere to its advocacies.

36

204356

12-136

Butil Farmers

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Party (BUTIL)

accreditation
-

204158

and

Resolution dated 28 November 2012 45

Resolution dated 14 November 2012 43

34

Failure to prove that the group

is
marginalized
underrepresented.

have actively participated in

programs
for the advancement of farmers,
and

The party receives assistance

from

Failure to establish that the

12-158

Action

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Brotherhood for

accreditation

agriculture and cooperative

sectors

Failure to show that the party is

are marginalized and

Dreamers, Inc.

actually able to represent all of

underrepresented; and

(ABROAD)

the sectors it claims to

represent;

Active

The party's nominees neither

appear

Failure to show a complete

track

to belong to the sectors they

seek to

record of its activities since its

represent, nor to have actively

registration; and

participated in the undertakings

of

The nominees are not part of

any of
the sectors which the party
seeks to
represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 2012 44

the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 2012 46

37

204486

12-194

1st Kabalikat ng

Cancelled registration and

(PLM)

Bayan
Ginhawang

accreditation

(SENIOR

Declaration of untruthful
statements;

CITIZENS)

Sangkatauhan
(1st KABAGIS)

Failure to exist for at least one

year;
and

None of its nominees belong to

the
labor, fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural communities
sectors which it seeks to
represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 47

38

204410

12-198

1-United

(PLM)

Transport

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG,
ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, AIPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK,
SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court,
directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of
the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. CSAaDE
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This
Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo
Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No.

The party represents drivers

and

Koalisyon (1-

operators, who may have

conflicting

UTAK)

interests; and
-

The party's nominees do not

belong

12-154 (PLM)

203981

12-187 (PLM)

Association for Righteousness Advocacy

on Leadership (ARAL)

204002

12-188 (PLM)

Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

203922

12-201 (PLM)

Association of Philippine Electric

Cooperatives (APEC)

203960

12-260 (PLM)

1st Consumers Alliance for Rural

Energy, Inc. (1-CARE)

203936

12-248 (PLM)

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng

Masa (AKMA-PTM)

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 48

203958
39

AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

12-177 (PLM)

to any marginalized and

underrepresented sector.

Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19

Cancelled accreditation

SPP No.

12-015 (PLM)

Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA)

204421,

12-157

Coalition of

Cancelled registration

204425

(PLM),

Senior Citizens

12-191

in the

because its nominees had a

term-

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

(PLM)

Philippines, Inc.

sharing agreement.

204094

The party violated election laws

Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang

203976

12-288 (PLM)

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian

Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO)

12-185 (PLM)

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(ANAD)
204125

204100

12-292 (PLM)

12-196 (PLM)

204364

12-180 (PLM)

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights

Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at

Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)

Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY)

1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,

204139

12-127 (PL)

Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)

204220

12-238 (PLM)

Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141

204240

12-229 (PLM)

12-279 (PLM)

LINGKOD)
The True Marcos Loyalist (for God,

204236

12-254 (PLM)

Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

Country and People) Association of the

204238

12-173 (PLM)

Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY)

204239

12-060 (PLM)

Green Force for the Environment Sons

Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa

Magsasaka
ng Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216

12-202 (PLM)

Philippine Coconut Producers

Federation,
Inc. (COCOFED)

204158

12-158 (PLM)

and Daughters of Mother Earth

(GREENFORCE)
204321

12-252 (PLM)

Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

204323

12-210 (PLM)

Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

204341

12-269 (PLM)

Action League of Indigenous Masses

(ALIM)

Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer,

Inc. (ABROAD)

204358

12-204 (PLM)

12-223 (PLM)

Alliance of Advocates in Mining

Advancement for National Progress

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122

Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao

(AAMA)

1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

204359

12-272 (PLM)

Social Movement for Active Reform

and Transparency (SMART)

203766

12-161 (PLM)

Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

204318

12-220 (PLM)

United Movement Against Drugs

204356

Foundation (UNIMAD)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

Blessed Federation of Farmers and

204402

12-061 (PL)

Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

Fishermen International, Inc.

204394

12-145 (PL)

Association of Guard, Utility Helper,

204263

12-257 (PLM)

12-136 (PLM)

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

(A BLESSED Party-List)

Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper,

204174

12-232 (PLM)

Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the

204126

12-263 (PLM)

Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang

Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN)

Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP)

204408

12-217 (PLM)

Pilipino Association for Country

Urban Poor Youth Advancement

204153

12-277 (PLM)

and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428

12-256 (PLM)

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

204490

12-073 (PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

204379

12-099 (PLM)

Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

204367

12-104 (PL)

Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426

12-011 (PLM)

Association of Local Athletics

Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc.
(ALA-EH)

204455

12-041 (PLM)

Manila Teachers Savings and Loan

Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374

12-228 (PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para

sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435

12-057 (PLM)

1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy

Party (1AAAP)

204486

12-194 (PLM)

1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

Pasang Masda Nationwide Party

(PASANG MASDA)

The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether the
criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections 49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections.
The Court's Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this
Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties
under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by
the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the
new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation.
Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in
the House of Representatives. 50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of
Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her partylist group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides: cCTESa

204410

12-198 (PLM)

1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

204421,

12-157 (PLM)

Coalition of Senior Citizens in the

Section 5, Article VI

204425

12-191 (PLM)

Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)

204436

12-009 (PP),

Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

(1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more

than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

12-165 (PLM)
204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance of Organizations, Networks

and Associations of the Philippines, Inc.
(ALONA)

204484

11-002

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum

of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be

provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
Sec. 7.No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the partylist system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8.Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered
under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters'
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of
canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed
that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation." 51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be
read in light of the following discussion among its framers: SEDaAH
MR. MONSOD:
....
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the
proposal for the party list system is not synonymous
with that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the
party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of
sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In
making the proposal on the party list system, we were
made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved
seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly
would mean that certain sectors would have reserved
seats; that they will choose among themselves who would
sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem
of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation
No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen,
workers, students, professionals, business, military,
academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are
the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission.
The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral
representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at
these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went
through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be
included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know,
the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the
law become because when we make an enumeration we
exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second,
we had the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us
just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there
are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A
doctor may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer.

And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am

a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system
of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in
effect, giving some people two votes and other people one
vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a
party list system. Under the party list system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and
farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates
of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially,
under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so
there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the
representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In
that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or
organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in
the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the
parties, organizations or coalitions that have been
registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in
that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a
national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in
Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants
the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been
garnered by each party or each organization one does
not have to be a political party and register in order to
participate as a party and count the votes and from
there derive the percentage of the votes that had been
cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition. ScCIaA
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming
that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list system.
So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that
the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats
is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of
15 names. They have to submit these names because
these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications
of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the
day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the
percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15
percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women's party
gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are
apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2
1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a
constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the
National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When
we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any

district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no

reason why a group that has a national constituency, even
if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have
a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us
say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register
as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one
percent or five of them get one percent, they are not
entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think
that if they really have a common interest, they should
band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the
vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly.
Those are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making sure that
those who really have a national constituency or sectoral
constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may
not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative
district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a
district basis but surely, they will have votes on a
nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we
found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if
we count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice
in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system. EcHaAC
BISHOP BACANI:
Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak
now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we
would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors
and party list?
MR. MONSOD:
As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do
not even have to mention sectors because the sectors
would be included in the party list system. They can be
sectoral parties within the party list system.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty

system. . . . We are for opening up the system, and we

would like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. . . . . CcAHEI
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not
limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we
going to classify for example Christian Democrats and
Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run
under the party list concept or must they be under the
district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the
Senate as well as for the House of Representatives.
Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for
the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of
the seats that we are allocating under the party list
system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party
list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
EaSCAH
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether
he is a farmer or not?

Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi

talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa,
abogado ito.
MR. TADEO:

MR. TADEO.

Iyong mechanics.

Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political

parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if
they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD:

MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political
parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and
that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political
parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD.
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system? CDHaET
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that
answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. IcESaA
MR. MONSOD:

Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent

problem of sectoral representation. My question is:
Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO:
The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a
political party is really organized along a specific
sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the
political party may submit a list of individuals who are
actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations
belonging to such sector the chance to present
evidence contradicting claims of membership in the
said sector or to question the claims of the existence
of such sectoral organizations or parties. This
proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and
shall be summary in character. In other words,
COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and
unappealable. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to
include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the
sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in
the party-list system "[F]or as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution." 53
DTAaCE
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to
sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list
system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in
his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5,
subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch
positions the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress
to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be reserved
to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
The proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod
expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed
representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their
development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral

machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be

represented. The Villacorta group, on the other hand, was
apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed
sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes
in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established
political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized
this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on
the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
from participating in the party-list system for the first party-list
elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with
the 2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral
representatives made an effort towards a compromise that the
party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by
allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to
candidates from the sectors which would garner the required
number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the
proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was
voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to
muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for
three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and
solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups. 54
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was
outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed
for the first three consecutive terms. 55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list
system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list
system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot
expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections,
at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative
district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the
House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete
in legislative district elections. TaDSHC
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list
system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5 (1), Article
VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5.(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of
not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a

party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral

parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
The commas after the words "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate national and
regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated
"national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never
their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5 (1), could not be
any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral
parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5 (1) leaves no
room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral
parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties
or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the
first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
"one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. ASETHC
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea
that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the partylist seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the
end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will
be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in
Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the
party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements
the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3.Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate

independently provided the coalition of which they form part does

not participate in the party-list system.
(b)A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c)A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d)A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.
(e)A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition
of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. DCIEac
(f)A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party
refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other hand,
Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector."
R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national
and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and causeoriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and causeoriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the
electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from
the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving
as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. aHcACT

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly

different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party
and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941
that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who
advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." 56 The sectors mentioned in
Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure,
"professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the
elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves
into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective
sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law
does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of
parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. TcEaAS
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No.
7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. 57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of
Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly
refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the
specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the
sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the
contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized
and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No.
7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions
of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors
in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the
sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or
infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More
specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in
the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58
TAaCED
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
"well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House
of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give
rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in
economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own
members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the partylist system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even
as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they
neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and

underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the partylist system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This
automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to
those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to
have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political
parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
'Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be
elected to the House of Representatives.'" However, the requirement in Ang Bagong
Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party . . . must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong
Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC's refusal to register sectoral wings
officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the
party-list system, even through their sectoral wings. STECDc
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. 59 Thus,
major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the
prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However,
major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral
wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority
of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as
members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack welldefined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack welldefined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate
in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws,
platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must
belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed
by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This
provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall

be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of
the election. aSTAcH
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide
party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have
a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those
who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. . . .
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by
RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system,
they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Third, . . . the religious sector may not be represented in the partylist system. . . . . cSCADE
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under
Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
"(1)It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation,

organization, whether directly or through any of

its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules
or regulations relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the
law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads
as follows: TCcIaA
"SEC. 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.
No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least
be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees. . . . .

Eighth, . . . the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the

formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from
participating in party-list elections, 60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong
Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 that major political parties
can participate in party-list elections. TEacSA
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in
the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that
"[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law." 61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted
in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not
have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually
envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT,
this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the
COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong
Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule 62 that a party may appeal
to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1.Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2.National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3.Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only

through its sectoral wing that can separately register under

the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition. cdtai
4.Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5.A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector
they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "welldefined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6.National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified. THESAD
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2)
all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do
not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may
have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral
parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover,
a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to
qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed
above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances
is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and
desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what

the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the
Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not
because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this
Court.

I believe that the ponencia may have further marginalized the already marginalized and
underrepresented of this country. In the guise of political plurality, it allows national and
regional parties or organizations to invade what is and should be constitutionally and
statutorily protected space. What the ponencia fails to appreciate is that the party-list
system under the 1987 Constitution and the party-list law or RA 7941 is not about mere
political plurality, but plurality with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged. DSEaHT

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have
been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the
names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on
Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the
party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been
granted mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of
ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The
Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose.
This Decision is immediately executory.

The creation of a party-list system under the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 was not
done in a vacuum. It comprehends the reality of a Filipino nation that has been and still
is struggling to come to terms with much social injustice that has been perpetrated over
centuries against a majority of its people by foreign invaders and even by its own
governments.

SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I dissent; Ang Bagong Bayani should be upheld, not reversed. See
concurring and dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relative's participation in party list election.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., I concur and also with the additional grounds cited in Justice
Brion's concurring opinion for revisiting the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and his erudite
analysis of the aim of the party-list system under the Constitution and law and its
implications on political parties, party-list registrants and nominees.
Brion, J., see: separate opinion.
Peralta, J., I join separate opinion of J. Brion.
Abad, J., I join J. A.D. Brion in his separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur to remand but these was a grave abuse of discretion but only with
respect to the disqualification of nominees separate from the party organization.
Reyes, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions

This injustice is the fertile ground for the seeds which, watered by the blood spilled
during the Martial Law years, ripened to the revolution of 1986. It is from this ferment
that the 1987 Constitution was born. Thus, any reading of the 1987 Constitution must be
appropriately sensitive to the context from which it arose. As stated in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear
in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light
of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers
of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe
the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. 1 (Emphasis supplied)
The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on Social Justice. This is appropos
since it is a document that not only recognizes but tries to heal the wounds of history. To
harken to the words of Cecilia Muoz-Palma, n President of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
THE PRESIDENT:My distinguished colleagues in this Assembly:
xxx xxx xxx
My colleagues, in all humility, but with profound pride, I vote in
favor of the Constitution drafted by this Constitutional
Commission because I believe that the document is a worthy and
inspiring legacy we can hand down to the Filipino people of
today, tomorrow, and for posterity.

SERENO, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

The reasons I will give have been given by most of the Members
of this Constitutional Commission this evening. But permit me to
restate them just to stress the reasons why I am voting in favor.
EDSAac

The party-list system is primarily a

tool for social justice.

For the first time in the history of constitution-making in our

country, we set forth in clear and positive terms in the

Preamble which is the beacon light of the new Charter, the

noble goal to establish a just and humane society. This must
be so because at present we have to admit that there are so few
with so much and so many with so little. We uphold the Rule of
Law where no man is above the law, and we adhere to the
principles of truth, justice, freedom, equality, love and peace. Yes,
for the first time and possibly this is the first Constitution where
"love" is enshrined. This is most significant at this period in our
national life when the nation is bleeding under the forces of
hatred and violence, brothers fighting against brothers, Filipinos
torturing and killing their own countrymen. Without love, there
can be no peace.
The new Charter establishes a republican democratic form of
government with three branches each independent and coequal
of each other affording a check and balance of powers.
Sovereignty resides in the people.
xxx xxx xxx
For the first time, and possibly this is the first and only
Constitution which provides for the creation of a Commission on
Human Rights entrusted with the grave responsibility of
investigating violations of civil and political rights by any party or
groups and recommending remedies therefor. The new Charter
also sets forth quite lengthily provisions on economic, social and
cultural rights spread out in separate articles such as the Articles
on Social Justice, Education and Declaration of Principles. It is
a document which in clear and in unmistakable terms
reaches out to the underprivileged, the paupers, the sick, the
elderly, disabled, veterans and other sectors of society. It is
a document which opens an expanded improved way of life
for the farmers, the workers, fishermen, the rank and file of
those in service in the government. And that is why I say
that the Article on Social Justice is the heart of the new
Charter. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
That is why Section 1, Article XIII, provides that: "The Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good." 3 As explained by this Court: cSHIaA
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the
use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and
action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality"
as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in
Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear
commands to the State to take affirmative action in the
direction of greater equality. . . . [T]here is thus in the

Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a

more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable
measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital
social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class
on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life
should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to
labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws
and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. 4 (Emphasis
supplied)
That is also why the 1987 Constitution is replete with other social justice provisions,
including Sections 9, 10, 13, 14, 18 and 22 of Article II, Section 2 of Article V, Section 5
(1) (2) of Article VI, Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 of Article XII, and Article XIII. As
aptly pointed out by Commissioner Guingona in his sponsorship speech for the approval
of the entire draft of the 1987 Constitution, social justice was the underlying philosophy
of the drafters when crafting the provisions of the fundamental law. Thus:
MR. GUINGONA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
This sponsorship speech is for the entire draft of the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Today, we have completed the task of drafting a Constitution
which is reflective of the spirit of our time -a spirit of nationalism,
a spirit of liberation, a spirit of rising expectations. DSETcC
On June 2, forty-eight men and women met in this hall-men and
women from different walks of life with diverse backgrounds and
orientations, even with conflicting convictions, but all sharing the
same earnest desire to serve the people and to help draft a
Constitution which will establish a government that the people
can trust and enthusiastically support, a Constitution that
guarantees individual rights and serves as a barrier against
excesses of those in authority.
xxx xxx xxx
A Constitution of the people and for the people derives its
authenticity and authority from the sovereign will; the power of
the people precedes it. As such, it should reflect the norms, the
values, the modes of thought of our society, preserve its heritage,
promote its orderliness and security, protect its cherished liberties
and guard against the encroachments of would-be dictators.
These objectives have served as the framework in the work of
drafting the 1986 Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx

A significant innovation, as far as the legislative department is

concerned, refers to the composition of the members of the
House of Representatives. Representation in the Lower House
has been broadened to embrace various sectors of society; in
effect, enlarging the democratic base. It will be constituted by
members who shall be elected in the traditional manner,
representing political districts, as well as by members who shall
be elected through the party list system.
xxx xxx xxx
The institutions through which the sovereign people rule
themselves are essential for the effective operation of
government. But these are not enough in order that the body
politic may evolve and progress. There is need for an
underlying socio-economic philosophy which would direct
these political structures and serve as the mainspring for
development. So it is that the draft Constitution contains
separate Articles on Social Justice and National Economy
and Patrimony.
Talk of people's freedom and legal equality would be empty
rhetoric as long as they continue to live in destitution and misery,
without land, without employment, without hope. But in helping to
bring about transformation, in helping the common man break
away from the bondage of traditional society, in helping restore to
him his dignity and worth, the right to individual initiative and to
property shall be respected.
The Social Justice Article, to which our Commission
President, the Honorable Cecilia Muoz Palma, refers to as
the "heart of the Constitution," provides that Congress shall
give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
would reduce social, economic and political inequalities. The
same article addresses the problems of (1) labor local and
overseas, organized and unorganized recognizing the rights of
all workers in the private as well as in the public sector, the rank
and file and the supervisory, to self-organization, collective
bargaining and peaceful and concerted activities including the
right to strike in accordance with law; (2) the farmers, the farm
workers, the subsistence fishermen and the fishworkers, through
agrarian and natural resources reform; (3) the underprivileged
and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas,
through urban land reform and housing; (4) the health of the
people, through an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development; (5) the women, by ensuring the fundamental
equality of women and men before the law, and (6) people's
organizations, by facilitating the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms. caIEAD
xxx xxx xxx
These are some of the provisions which we have
constitutionalized. These are some of the innovations that we

have introduced. These are the ideas, values and institutions

which we have drawn and which we trust would serve as the
foundation of our society, the keystone of our national
transformation and development, the driving force for what we
pray would be our irreversible march to progress. In brief, this is
what the men and women of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
have drafted under the able, firm and dedicated leadership of our
President, the Honorable Cecilia Muoz Palma.
The Constitution that we have drafted is a practical instrument
suited to the circumstances of our time. It is also a Constitution
that does not limit its usefulness to present needs; one which, in
the words of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall,
and I quote, "is intended to endure for ages to come and
consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs."
As we present the proposed fundamental law, we pray that our
efforts would pave the way towards the establishment of a
renewed constitutional government which we were deprived of
since 1972, that these efforts would ensure that the triumph at
EDSA so deservingly won by the people shall continue to be
enjoyed by us and our posterity for all time, that these efforts
would result in the drafting of a democratic Constitution a
Constitution which is the repository of the people's inalienable
rights; a Constitution that enshrines people's power and the rule
of law; a Constitution which would seek to establish in this fair
land a community characterized by moral regeneration, social
progress, political stability, economic prosperity, peace, love and
concern for one another; a Constitution that embodies vital living
principles that seek to secure for the people a better life founded
on liberty and welfare for all. TAIaHE
Mr. Presiding Officer, on behalf of this Commission's Sponsorship
Committee, I have the honor to move for the approval of the draft
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines on Second
Reading. 5
It is within this historical and textual milieu that the party-list provisions in the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted. Every provision should be read in the context of all
the other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy is made clear. 6
The place of the party-list system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided for
the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political arena. 7
The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald:
First, an idea that has received much attention among democratic
theorists is that representatives should be selected to 'mirror' the
characteristics of those being represented in terms of gender,
ethnicity, and other such characteristics judged to be socially
relevant. This idea has been advocated most notably in some
recent democratic debates focused on the need for special
representation of disadvantaged and under-represented social

groups within democratic assemblies. The applicability of this

idea of 'mirror' representation is not confined to debates about
representing marginalized minorities within nation-states; Iris Young
further applies this model of representation to global politics,
arguing that global representation should be based on
representation of the various 'peoples' of the world, each of which
embodies its own distinctive identity and 'perspective'. In practice,
special representation for certain social groups within a 'mirror'
framework can be combined with election mechanisms in various
ways such as by according quotas of elected
representatives to designated social groups. But since the
selection of these 'social groups' for special representation
would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the process of
selecting legitimate representatives, occurring prior to the
electoral process, such 'mirror' representation is still
recognizable as a distinct mechanism for selecting
representative agents. 8 (Emphasis supplied) AEcIaH
Two months after their initial debates on the form and structure of government that
would best promote equality, the Commission broke ground on the promotion of political
equality and provided for sectoral representation in the party-list system of the
legislature. Commissioner Villacorta opened the debates on the party-list system. 9
MR. VILLACORTA:. . . On this first day of August 1986, we shall,
hopefully, usher in a new chapter in our national history by giving
genuine power to our people in the legislature . . .
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo explained the circumstances the party-list system sought to
address: 10
MR. TADEO:. . . Ang Cory government ay iniakyat ng people's
power. Kaya kami naririto sa Con-Com ay dahil sa people's
power nasa amin ang people, wala sa amin ang power. Ganito
ito kahalaga.
xxx xxx xxx
The Legislature is supposed to implement or give flesh to the
needs and aspirations of the Filipino people. SDTIaE
Ganoon kahalaga ang National Assembly kaya't napakahalaga
noong Section 5 and Section 31 ng ating Constitution. Our
experience, however, has shown that legislation has tended to
benefit more the propertied class who constitutioes a small
minority in our society than the impoverished majority, 70 percent
of whom live below the poverty line. This has come about
because the rich have managed to dominate and control the
legislature, while the basic sectors have been left out of it. So,
the critical question is, how do we ensure ample representation
of basic sectors in the legislature so that laws reflect their needs
and aspirations?
RA 7941 was enacted pursuant to the party-list provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Not
only is it a "social justice tool", as held in Ang Bagong Bayani, 11 but it is primarily so.

This is not mere semantics but a matter of legal and historical accuracy with material
consequences in the realm of statutory interpretation.
The ponencia gives six (6) parameters that the COMELEC should adhere to in
determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections. I shall discuss below my position in relation to the second, fourth and sixth
parameter enunciated in the ponencia.
"Marginalized and underrepresented"
under Section 2 of RA 7941 qualifies
national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Under the second parameter, "[n]ational parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector." In a nutshell, the ponencia interprets
"marginalized and underrepresented" in Section 2 of RA 7941 to qualify only sectoral
parties or organizations, and not national and regional parties or organizations.
I dissent for the following reasons.
First, since the party-list system is primarily a tool for social justice, the standard of
"marginalized and underrepresented" under Section 2 must be deemed to qualify
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. To argue otherwise is to
divorce national and regional parties or organizations from the primary objective of
attaining social justice, which objective surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies
the entirety of both the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941. TcDIEH
Second, Section 2 of RA 7941 states that the party-list system seeks to "enable Filipino
citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties . . . to become members of the House of Representatives." On its face, it is
apparent that "marginalized and underrepresented" qualifies "sectors", "organizations"
and "parties".
Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in terms of statutory construction, the
import of "social justice" that has developed in various decisions is that when the law is
clear and valid, it simply must be applied; but when the law can be interpreted in more
ways than one, an interpretation that favors the underprivileged must be favored. 12
Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show that the party-list system is
a countervailing means for the weaker segments of our society to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well-established political parties.
To quote:
MR. OPLE:
So, Commissioner Monsod grants that the basic principle for a
party list system is that it is a countervailing means
for the weaker segments of our society, if they want to
seek seats in the legislature, to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and
well-established political parties, but he is concerned
that the mechanics might be inadequate at this time.
MR. MONSOD:

Not only that; talking about labor, for example I think

Commissioner Tadeo said there are 10 to 12 million
laborers and I understand that organized labor is about 4.8
million or 4.5 million if the laborers get together, they
can have seats. With 4 million votes, they would have 10
seats under the party list system.
MR. OPLE:
So, the Commissioner would favor a party list system that is open
to all and would not agree to a party list system which
seeks to accommodate, in particular, the so-called sectoral
groups that are predominantly workers and peasants?
prcd
MR. MONSOD:
If one puts a ceiling on the number that each party can put within
the 50, and I am assuming that maybe there are just two
major parties or three at the most, then it is already a form
of opening it up for other groups to come in. All we are
asking is that they produce 400,000 votes nationwide. The
whole purpose of the system is precisely to give room
for those who have a national constituency who may
never be able to win a seat on a legislative district
basis. But they must have a constituency of at least
400,000 in order to claim a voice in the National Assembly.
13 [emphasis supplied]
However, the second parameter would allow the more entrenched and well-established
political parties and organizations to compete with the weaker segments of society,
which is the very evil sought to be guarded against.
The ponencia's second parameter is premised on the following grounds, among others.
First, the ponencia explains that the text of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941, and the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission evince an indisputable intent to allow
national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations to participate in the party-list
system. To require national and regional parties and organizations to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented makes them effectively sectoral parties and
organizations and violates this intent.
The error here is to conclude that if the law treats national, regional and sectoral parties
and organizations the same by requiring that they represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented," they become the same. By analogy, people can be treated similarly
but that does not make them identical.
Second, the ponencia rules that since under the Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, only 50% of the seats are allocated during the first three consecutive terms
of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution to representatives from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, etc., it necessarily follows that the other 50% would be
allocated to representatives from sectors which are non-marginalized and
underrepresented. DTcACa
The error here is to conclude that the latter statement necessarily follows if the former is
true. This is not so since the latter 50% can very well include representatives from other

non-enumerated sectors, or even national or regional parties and organizations, all of

which can be "marginalized and underrepresented."
Third, the ponencia adds that it would prevent ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, from participating in the party-list
system.
The error here is to conclude that such ideology-based or cause-oriented parties are
necessarily non-marginalized or underrepresented, which would in turn depend on how
"marginalization and underrepresentation" is defined. The ponencia appears to be
operating under a preconceived notion that "marginalized and underrepresented" refers
only to those "economically" marginalized.
However, there is no need for this Court to define the phrase "marginalized and
underrepresented," primarily because it already constitutes sufficient legislative
standard to guide the COMELEC as an administrative agency in the exercise of its
discretion to determine the qualification of a party-list group.
As long as such discretion is not gravely abused, the determination of the COMELEC
must be upheld. This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that,
"the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are 'marginalized
and underrepresented' become members of the Congress under the party-list system."
For as long as the agency concerned will be able to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, and that these regulations are
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law, then the standard may be deemed
sufficient. 14 TAaIDH
We should also note that there is a time element to be considered here, for those who
are marginalized and underrepresented today may no longer be one later on.
Marginalization and underrepresentation is an ever evolving concept, created to
address social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of our
Constitution. 15 Confining its definition to the present context may unduly restrict the
COMELEC of its quasi-legislative powers which enables it to issue rules and regulations
to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress. 16
Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability of our Constitution,
because the legislature is certain to find it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying laws into effect. 17 The growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not only
execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest. 18 This is the principle of subordinate legislation discussed in
People v. Rosenthal 19 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service
Commission. 20
This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani that, "the role of the
COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos that are 'marginalized and
underrepresented' become members of the Congress under the party-list system."

Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and regional parties to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented is not a ground for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the COMELEC may refuse or cancel if the
party "violates or fails to comply with laws." Thus, before the premise can be correct, it
must be first established that "marginalization and underrepresentation" is not a
requirement of the law, which is exactly what is at issue here.
Fifth, the ponencia makes too much of the fact that the requirement of "marginalization
and underrepresentation" appears only once in RA 7941.
The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to appear more than once to carry
sufficient legal significance. "Marginalization and underrepresentation" is in the nature of
a legislative standard to guide the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative
powers. This Court has held that to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters
of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard
does not even have to be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act considered as a whole. 21 Consequently, we have held that "public welfare" 22
and "public interest" 23 are examples of such sufficient standards. Therefore, that it
appears only once in RA 7941 is more than sufficient, since a standard could even be
an implied one. TaCIDS
National, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations must both
represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and lack "well-
defined political constituencies".
The fourth parameter in the ponencia states:
4.Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communites,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
I dissent for the following reasons.
First, Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the "lack of a well-defined political
constituency" as a requirement along with "marginalization and underrepresentation."
They are cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus, sectoral parties and
organizations intending to run in the party-list elections must meet both.
Second, the ponencia appears to be operating under preconceived notions of what it
means to be "marginalized and underrepresented" and to "lack a well-defined political
constituency." For reasons discussed above, the exact content of these legislative
standards should be left to the COMELEC. They are ever evolving concepts, created to

address social disparities, to be able to give life to the "social justice" policy of our
Constitution. IDSaTE
The disqualification of a nominee
should not disqualify the party-list
group provided that: (1) it meets
Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong
Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the
new parameters set in the ponencia,
that they validly qualify as national,
regional or sectoral party-list group);
and (2) one of its top three (3)
nominees remains qualified.
I concur with the ponencia that an advocate may qualify as a nominee. However, I
would like to explain my position with regard to the sixth parameter set forth in the
ponencia with respect to nominees.
To recall, the sixth parameter in the ponencia provides:
6.National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remain qualified.
I propose the view that the disqualification of a party-list group due to the disqualification
of its nominee is only reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the
nominee's qualifications. Otherwise, the disqualification of a nominee should not
disqualify the party-list group provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos. 1-5 of
Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set in the
ponencia, that they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral party-list
group); and (2) one of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for reasons
explained below. IaESCH
The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. Consistent
therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free
and open party-list system that would achieve proportional representation in the House
of Representatives by enhancing party-list groups' "chances to compete for and win
seats in the legislature." 24 Because of this policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot
interpret Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely administrative, quasilegislative or quasi-judicial power to ipso facto disqualify party-list groups based on the
disqualification of a single nominee.
It should also be pointed out that the law itself considers a violation of election laws as a
disqualifying circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be considered a violation
of election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or
public policy. The standard cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued by the
COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a party-list group based on the disqualification
of its nominee must be based on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee's
qualifications. This also finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which considers
declaring "untruthful statements in its petition" as a ground for disqualification.
As regards the second qualification mentioned above, party-list groups should have at
least one qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed to
participate in the elections. This is because if all of its top three nominees are

disqualified, even if its registration is not cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in
the elections, and should it obtain the required number of votes to win a seat, it would
still have no one to represent it, because the law does not allow the group to replace its
disqualified nominee through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying
Sections 13 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Section 13 provides that party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the
COMELEC based on "the list of names submitted by the respective parties . . .
according to their ranking in the said list." The ranking of a party-list group's nominees is
determined by the applicability or the inapplicability of Section 8, the last paragraph of
which reads: cHDAIS

were cast for the party-list system; and (3) there are 50 seats in Congress reserved for
the party-list representatives.
The succeeding paragraphs will explain how the BANAT method will operate to
distribute the 50 seats reserved in the House of Representatives given the foregoing
facts and the number of votes obtained by each of the 35 party-list groups.
Ran
Party-list
k

Votes

1st Round

2 n
Round

Total #

(guarantee (additional
of seats
d seats)
seats)

group

Garnered

AAA

1,466,000

7.33%

BBB

1,228,000

6.14%

CCC

1,040,000

4.74%

Thus, only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a party-list
group to change the ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted. The ranking
of the nominees is changed through substitution, which according to Section 8 is done
by placing the name of the substitute at the end of the list. In this case, all the names
that come after the now vacant slot will move up the list. After substitution takes effect,
the new list with the new ranking will be used by COMELEC to determine who among
the nominees of the party-list group shall be proclaimed, from the first to the last, in
accordance with Section 13.

DDD

1,020,000

3.89%

EEE

998,000

3.88%

FFF

960,000

3.07%

GGG

942,000

2.92%

HHH

926,000

2.65%

If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no substitution will be allowed. Thus,

their ranking remains the same and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in
determining the one/s that will represent the winning party-list group in Congress. This
means that if the first nominee is disqualified, and the party-list group is able to join the
elections and becomes entitled to one representative, the second cannot take the first
nominee's place and represent the party-list group. If, however, the party-list group gets
enough votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can represent it.

III

910,000

2.57%

10

JJJ

796,000

2.57%

11

KKK

750,000

2.42%

12

LLL

738,000

2.35%

Allowing a party-list group, which has successfully passed Guideline Nos. 1-5 of Ang
Bagong Bayani 25 (alternately, pursuant to the present holding of the ponencia, that it
qualifies as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization) and has established
the qualification of at least one (1) of its top three (3) nominees, to participate in the
elections is a better interpretation of the law. It is fully consistent with the policy of
developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list system that would achieve
proportional representation in the House of Representatives by enhancing party-list
groups' "chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature" 26 while providing
sufficient disincentives for party-list groups to flood the COMELEC with nominees as
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 only requires that they submit not less than five (5). cEaCTS

13

MMM

718,000

2.32%

14

NNN

698,000

2.13%

15

OOO

678,000

2.12%

16

PPP

658,000

2.06%

17

QQQ

598,000

2.02%

18

RRR

482,000

1.95%

It must be noted that this method, together with the seat-allocation system introduced in
BANAT v. COMELEC, 27 will allow more party-list groups to be represented in
Congress.

19

SSS

378,000

1.89%

20

TTT

318,000

1.54%

Let us use a hypothetical scenario to illustrate.

21

UUU

294,000

1.47%

The table below uses the seat-allocation system introduced in BANAT. It assumes the
following facts: (1) 35 party-list groups participated in the elections; (2) 20 million votes

22

VVV

292,000

1.44%

. . . No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees

shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in
which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list.

23

WWW

290,000

1.43%

the 2nd and 3rd nominees of both AAA and BBB are qualified, then only 29 will be left
for distribution. TAIDHa

24

XXX

280,000

1.37%

25

YYY

274,000

1.37%

26

ZZZ

268,000

1.34%

27

1-A

256,000

1.24%

28

1-B

248,000

1.23%

In distributing the remaining 29 seats, it must be kept in mind that the number of votes
cast in favor of the remaining party-list groups becomes irrelevant. At this stage, the
only thing that matters is the group's ranking. The party-list group that comes after BBB
will be given 1 additional seat and the distribution of one seat per party-list group, per
rank, continues until all 50 seats are accounted for; the second round of seat allocation
stops at this point. In the table above, the 50th seat was awarded to I-E the party-list
group that ranked 31st in the election.

29

1-C

238,000

1.18%

30

1-D

222,000

1.11%

31

1-E

214,000

1.07%

32

1-F

212,000

1.06%

33

1-G

210,000

1.05%

34

1-H

206,000

1.03%

35

1-I

194,000

1.02%

20,000,000

17

33

50

=========

====

====

===

We explained in BANAT that the first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. 7941 guarantees a
seat to the party-list groups "receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system." In our hypothetical scenario, the party-list groups ranked 1st to
17th received at least 2% of the 20 million votes cast for the party-list system. In effect,
all 17 of them were given guaranteed seats. The distribution of these so-called
guaranteed seats to the "two percenters" is what BANAT calls the "first round of seat
allocation."
From the first round of seat allocation, the total number of guaranteed seats allocated to
the two percenters will be subtracted from "20% of the members of the House of
Representatives" reserved by the Constitution for party-list representatives, which in this
hypothetical scenario is 50 seats. Assuming all 17 of the two percenters were able to
establish the qualification of their first nominee, the remaining 33 will be distributed in
what BANAT termed as the "second round of seat allocation."
These remaining 33 seats are called "additional seats." The rules followed in the
distribution/allocation of these seats are fairly simple. If a party-list group's percentage is
multiplied by the total number of additional seats and the product is no less than 2, then
that party-list will be entitled to 2 additional seats. This is to keep in line with the 3-seat
limit rule. In our hypothetical scenario as shown by the table above, only the top two
party-list groups, AAA and BBB are entitled to 2 additional seats. Assuming, again, that

In the foregoing discussion, all the nominees of the party-list groups are qualified. What
happens if one or some of the nominees are disqualified? Following the proposed
method, if one or two of the party-list groups with guaranteed seats have a disqualified
first nominee, their second nominee, if qualified, can still represent them in Congress
based on the second round of seat allocation.
In the event that some of the nominees of party-list groups whether or not entitled to
guaranteed seats are disqualified, then those party-list groups, which without the
disqualification of these nominees would not be entitled to a seat, would now have a
higher chance to have a representative elected in Congress.
If, for example, the first nominee of BBB is disqualified, then it forfeits its guaranteed
seat and the additional seats for distribution in the second round will be increased by 1.
With 34 seats to be allocated, I-E will now qualify to obtain a seat in its favor, assuming
that its first nominee is qualified. If I-E's first nominee is disqualified, then we will
proceed to the party-list next-in-rank, which is I-G. This method is followed down the line
until all 50 seats are allocated. TSHcIa
If we follow the proposed method, this would yield a higher number of party-list groups
represented in Congress, but with fewer representatives per group.
This proposed method can be further illustrated through another example, this time
using a "non-two percenter" party-list group. In the table above, RRR failed to garner at
least 2% of the total votes. However, in the second round of seat allocation, it was
granted 1 seat. To be able to send a representative in Congress, RRR's first nominee
should be qualified to sit. Assuming that its first nominee was disqualified, its second or
third nominee cannot occupy said seat; instead, it will forfeit the seat and such seat will
now go to I-E. Again, this method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are
allocated.
In conclusion, I submit that a party-list group should be allowed to participate in the
elections despite the disqualification of some of its nominees, provided that there
remains a qualified nominee out of the top three initially submitted. Not only is this the
better policy, but this is also the interpretation supported by law.
Only nine of the petitions should be
remanded.
Given the circumstances above-mentioned, I respectfully dissent on the remand of all
petitions to the COMELEC for reasons to be discussed below.
The ponencia justifies the remand of all petitions in this wise, viz.:
. . . Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may

now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this
Court. (Emphasis supplied) ATaDHC
The "new parameters" set forth in the ponencia's guidelines focus mainly on two (2)
grounds used by the COMELEC to cancel registration: (1) the standard of marginalized
and underrepresented as applied to national, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations; and (2) the qualification of nominees. From such examination, we can
conclude that, in relation to the other grounds used by COMELEC to cancel registration
(other than those two grounds mentioned above), the doctrines remain unchanged.
Thus, a remand of those petitions is unnecessary, considering that the acts of the
COMELEC pertaining to their petitions are upheld. The ponencia even admits that
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners.
Consequently, the remand should only pertain to those party-list groups whose
registration was cancelled on the basis of applying the standard of "marginalized and
underrepresented" and the qualification of nominees wherein the "new parameters"
apply. If other grounds were used by COMELEC other than those with "new
parameters," say, for example, failure to prove track record, a remand would be
uncalled for because the doctrine pertaining to the other grounds remain unchanged.
Despite the new doctrine set forth in the ponencia, at the very least, only nine (9)
petitions should be ordered remanded to the COMELEC. In these nine (9) petitions, the
COMELEC cancelled the registration of the party-list groups solely on the ground that
their nominees are disqualified. In making such a pronouncement, the COMELEC
merely used as yardstick whether the nominees actually belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented, and not whether they could qualify as advocates, and for this reason,
I recommend that the following cases be REMANDED to the COMELEC. These are:
1.Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
2.Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
3.Aangat Tayo (AT)
4.A Blessed Party-List (a.k.a. Blessed Federation of Farmers and
Fishermen International, Inc.) [A BLESSED]
5.Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
6.Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
7.Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO BAHAY)
8.Akbay Kalusugan, Inc. (AKIN)
9.1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK)
Assuming for the sake of argument that we agree with the ponencia's take that the
phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" qualifies only sectoral parties, still, a
remand of all the petitions remain uncalled for. Out of the 52 petitions, there are only 11
party-list groups which are classified as national or regional parties. 28 Thus, if we were
to strictly apply the ponencia's guidelines, only 20 petitions ought to be remanded.
TcEaAS

The COMELEC did not violate

Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
It bears stressing that COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 does not violate Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires a prior motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC can decide election cases en banc. To recall, the Resolution allows the
COMELEC en banc, without a motion for reconsideration, to conduct (1) an automatic
review of a decision of a COMELEC division granting a petition for registration of a
party-list group or organization; and (2) a summary evidentiary hearing for those already
accredited and which have manifested their intent to participate in the 2013 national and
local elections for the purpose of determining their continuing compliance with the
requirements of RA No. 7941 and the Ang Bagong Bayani 29 guidelines.
Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers which
can be found in Section 2 (2) of the same article. However, since the conduct of
automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing is an exercise of COMELEC's
administrative powers under Section 2 (5), the prior motion for reconsideration in
Section 3 is not required.
It is in this light that I would like to further elucidate why the power under Section 2 (5) is
not quasi-judicial but administrative in nature in order to help clarify the true distinction
between the two. In a number of cases, this Court has had the opportunity to distinguish
quasi-judicial from administrative power. Thus, in Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 30 we
held that: EDaHAT
The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to "administration,
especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing
or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of
persons or things." It does not entail an opportunity to be
heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon. This is to be distinguished from
"quasi-judicial function", a term which applies, among others, to
the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies,
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. [emphasis supplied]
However, there are administrative proceedings, such as a preliminary investigation
before the public prosecutor, that also entail the "opportunity to be heard, the production
and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon," but are not considered
quasi-judicial in the proper sense of the term. As held in Bautista v. CA: 31
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary
investigation performs a quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco
v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of
Surigao del Norte and Crespo v. Mogul. In these cases this
Court held that the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement
holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies,
the prosecutor is an office in the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the
similarity ends.

A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is

very different from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasijudicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other
than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights
of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making."

(2)Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests

relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal of officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 34

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rulemaking functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It
is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on
the accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body;
necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal
complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with
finality only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not
exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the
only remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of the case.
(emphasis supplied) aDHScI
While the exercise of quasi-judicial and administrative power may both involve an
opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or
resolution thereon, the distinction I believe is that the exercise of the former has for its
purpose the adjudication of rights with finality. 32 This makes it akin to judicial power
which has for its purpose, among others, the settlement of actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. 33
Another way to dispose of the issue of the necessity of a prior motion for
reconsideration is to look at it through the lens of an election case. The phrase "all such
election cases" in Section 3 has been read in relation to Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C,
viz.:
What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be
seen in Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution which
states:
Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx

As to the nature of "contests," the Court has already defined it under the penumbra of
election as follows: SDHAEC
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to
a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office.
xxx xxx xxx
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would
not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vicepresidency before the elections are held. (Emphasis supplied) 35
In Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, 36 it was also held that the primary purpose of
an election case is the ascertainment of the real candidate elected by the electorate.
Thus, there must first be an election before there can be an election case. Since the
national and local elections are still to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of
automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing under the Resolution No. 9513
cannot be an election case. For this reason, a prior motion for reconsideration under
Section 3 is not required.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the following cases: ARARO, A-IPRA,
AT, A BLESSED, ALIM, BUTIL, AKO BAHAY, AKIN, and 1-UTAK. The Petitions of all the
other Petitioners should be dismissed.
BRION, J., concurring:
I submit this SEPARATE OPINION to reflect my views on the various questions
submitted to the Court through consolidated petitions before us.

For ease of presentation and understanding, this Separate Opinion is laid out under the
following structure: IHaSED
I.The Case and the Issues
II.Summary of Positions: Substantive Aspect of the Petitions
A.On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its Guidelines.
1.Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong Bayani
2.Effects on the Components of the Party-list System
B.Nominees
C.On the observation of the Chief Justice
D.Grave abuse of discretion and Conclusion
III.Preliminary Matters
A.The suspension of Rule 64; the existence of jurisdictional error
that warrants reviewing COMELEC's action
B.COMELEC's power to register and to cancel registration of a
party-list group is an exercise of its administrative powers
IV.Discussion: Merits of the Consolidated Petitions
A.The Constitutional Provisions on the Party-list System
a.The Constitutional Text
b.Constitutional text summarized
c.Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation aDcHIS
B.RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act
C.Jurisprudential Developments
a.Ang Bagong Bayani
b.Banat
D.The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and RA
7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and its errors
a.The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System
a.1.From the Constitutional Perspective
a.2.From the statutory perspective
b.Party participation under the party-list system
b.1.Impact on political parties
c.The parties and their nominees
c.1.Refusal or cancellation of registration due to
nominee problems
c.2.party nominee relationship
E.Chief Justice Sereno's Reflections

F.The Eleven-Point Parameters for COMELEC Action

I.A The Cases
The Court resolves fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions for certiorari/prohibition filed
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court by various party-list groups and organizations. They
commonly assail the COMELEC's resolutions, either cancelling their existing
registrations and accreditations, or denying their new petitions for party-list registration.
AcIaST
Of the 53 petitions, thirteen (13) were instituted by new party-list applicants under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 (dated February 21,
2012). These petitions were denied by the COMELEC En Banc upon its review of the
COMELEC Division's resolutions.
The other forty (40) petitions were similarly brought by previously registered and
accredited party-list organizations whose registrations/accreditations have been
cancelled. These petitioners participated in previous elections and cannot participate in
the May 2013 election if the cancellation of their registration/accreditation would stand.
The consolidated petitions, uniformly citing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC and the disregard of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and
RA No. 7941, variously questioned
a.the COMELEC En Banc's authority under COMELEC Resolution
No. 9513 to conduct an automatic review of its Division's
rulings despite the absence of motions for reconsideration,
in disregard of Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure;
b.with respect to the cancellation of previous registration/
accreditation of party-list groups or organizations, the
denial of due process and the violation of the principle of
res adjudicata; further, the COMELEC's cancellation of
their existing registration/accreditation is claimed to be an
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers that the COMELEC
Division, not the COMELEC En Banc, can exercise at the
first instance;
c.the COMELEC En Banc's appreciation of facts and its application
of the guidelines of Ang Bagong Bayani, which either
addressed defects or deficiencies on the part of the parties
or of their nominees and which resulted in the refusal or
cancellation of registration/accreditation. cEaDTA
I.B. The Issues
Based on these cited grounds, the issues for the Court's consideration may be
condensed as follows:
1.Whether the COMELEC En Banc may automatically review the
decision of the COMELEC Division without the requisite
filing of a motion for reconsideration under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure; and
2.Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying
or cancelling the registration/accreditation of the

petitioners, mainly relying on the eight point guidelines laid

down by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections.
II. SUMMARY OF POSITIONS
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT OF THE PETITIONS
II.A.On reliance on Ang Bagong
Bayani and its Guidelines.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC's 1 intrinsically flawed
interpretation of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions is the main source
of the present controversy. Its constricted interpretation of the statutory phrase
"marginalized and underrepresented" has invited more questions than answers that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in fact sought to avoid.
II.A.1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong
Bayani.
I take the position that it is time to re-visit this oft-cited ruling before the party-list
system is further led astray.
First, the party-list system came into being, principally driven by the constitutional
framers' intent to reform the then prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and
underrepresented parties (i.e., those who cannot win in the legislative district elections
and in this sense are marginalized and may lack the constituency to elect themselves
there, but who nationally may generate votes equivalent to what a winner in the
legislative district election would garner) the chance to participate in the electoral
exercise and to elect themselves to the House of Representatives through a system
other than the legislative district elections. HTScEI
Ang Bagong Bayani glossed over the constitutional text and made a slanted reading
of the intent of the framers of the Constitution. By these means, it erroneously
concluded that the party-list system is primarily intended as a social justice tool, and
was not principally driven by intent to reform electoral system. Thus, under its First
Guideline, Ang Bagong Bayani solely viewed the party-list system from the prism
of social justice, and not from the prism of electoral reform as the framers of the
Constitution originally intended.
Second. In the constitutional deliberations, the proponents of the electoral reform
concept were opposed by those who wanted a party-list system open only to sectoral
representation, particularly to sectoral groups with social justice orientation.
The oppositors were defeated, but the proponents nevertheless opened the system to
sectoral representation and in fact gave the social justice groups a head-start by
providing for their representation through selection in the first three elections.
In the resulting approved wording, the Constitution made a textual commitment to open
the party-list system to registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations. The Article on the Commission on Election also pointedly provided that
there shall be a "free and open party system," and votes for parties, organizations
or coalitions shall only be recognized in the party-list system.
II.A.2. Effects on the Components of the Party-list
System

Ang Bagong Bayani admits that even political parties may run in the party-list elections
but maintains under its Second Guideline that they must qualify as marginal and
underrepresented as this phrase is understood in the social justice context. This
is totally incorrect.
Based on the reasons discussed above and further expounded below, even major
political parties can participate in party-list elections because the party-list system is
open to all registered political, national, regional, sectoral organizations and parties,
subject only to the limitations imposed by the Constitution and by law. Further, both
political and sectoral parties have equal roles and participation in the party-list system;
again, they are subject to the same limitations imposed by law (the Constitution and RA
No. 7941) and are separately burdened only by the limitations intrinsic to their
respective natures. To summarize: TaIHEA
a)For political parties (whether national or regional): to be
classified as political parties, they must advocate an
ideology or platform, principles and policies, for the
general conduct of government. The application of the
further requirement under RA No. 7941 (that as the most
immediate means of securing the adoption of their
principles of governance, they must regularly nominate
and support their leaders and members as candidates for
public office) shall depend on the particular circumstances
of the party.
The marginal and under-representation in the electoral sense (i.e.,
in the legislative district elections) and lack of constituency
requirements fully apply, but there is no reason not to
presume compliance with these requirements if political
parties are not participants in any legislative district
elections.
Major political parties, if they participate in the legislative district
elections, cannot participate in the party-list elections, nor
can they form a coalition with party-list parties and run as
a coalition in the party-list elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what
the party-list system forbids directly (i.e., participation in
both electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do
indirectly through a coalition. No prohibition, however,
exists against informal alliances that they can form with
party-list parties, organizations or groups running for the
party-list elections. The party-list component of these
informal alliances is not prohibited from running in the
party-list elections.
b)For sectoral parties and organizations, they must belong to the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly
based on social justice characteristics; or must have
interests, concerns or characteristics specific to their
sectors although they do not require or need to identify
with any social justice characteristic. In either case, they

are subject to the "marginalized and under-represented"

and the "constituency" requirements of the law through a
showing, supported by evidence, that they belong to a
sector that is actually characterized as marginal and
under-represented.
These parties and organizations are additionally subject to the
general overriding requirement of electoral
marginalization and under-representation and the
constituency requirements of the law, but there is no
reason why compliance with these requirements cannot
be presumed if they are not participants in any legislative
district elections. ACETIa
c)Compliance with COMELEC Rules. To justify their existence, all
party-list groups must comply with the requirements of law,
their own internal rules on membership, and with the
COMELEC's Rules of Procedure. They must submit to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) their constitution,
by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require. 2

In both political or sectoral party or group, party membership is the most tangible link
of the nominees to their respective parties and to the party-list system.
Subject to the above, the disqualification of the nominee does not necessarily mean
the disqualification of the party since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of
registration pertain to the party itself.
I make the qualification that the law's 3 requirement of the submission of a list
containing at least five (qualified) nominees is mandatory, and a party's inexcusable
failure to comply with this requirement warrants the refusal or cancellation of its
registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
C.On the Observations of
the Chief Justice
As my fourth and final point, the "textualist" approach that the Chief Justice objects to,
has been driven, and is fully justified, by the above reading of the Constitution and the
law.

To sum up these Ang Bagong Bayani objections, the party-list system as principally
espoused by Commissioner Christian Monsod and duly approved by the
Commission's vote maintained its electoral reform objectives while significantly
contributing to the social justice thrust of the Constitution.

As a basic constitutional point, the business and principal function of this Court (and
of the whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to supplant what the Constitution and
the law expressly provide. The framers of the Constitution and Congress (through RA
No. 7941 in this case) provided the policy expressed through the words of the
Constitution and the law, and through the intents the framers; both were considered and
cited to ensure that the constitutional policy is properly read and understood. The whole
Judiciary, including this Court, can only apply these policies in the course of their
assigned task of adjudication without adding anything of our own; we can interpret the
words only in case of ambiguity. HSEcTC

It is not correct to say, as the Chief Justice did in her Reflections, that this
Separate Opinion is not "appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the 1987
Constitution] arose." I recognize the social justice content of the party-list provisions in
the Constitution and the law; I simply cannot give these provisions the primacy that
both the framers of the Constitution and Congress did not see fit to accord.

This Court and its Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for social
justice or for any ideology for that matter, as advocacy is not the task assigned to
us by the Constitution. To play the role of advocates, or to formulate policies that fall
within the role of the Legislative Branch of government, would be a violation of our
sworn duty.

B.On Nominees
Third. Considering the Constitution's solicitous concern for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors as understood in the social justice context, and RA 7941's
requirement of mere bona fide membership of a nominee in the party-list group, a
nominee who does not actually possess the marginalized and underrepresented
status represented by the party-list group but proves to be a genuine advocate of
the interest and concern of the marginalized and underrepresented sector
represented is still qualified to be a nominee.
This classification of nominees, however, is relevant only to sectoral parties and
organizations which are marginalized and underrepresented in the social justice sense
or in terms of their special interests, concerns or characteristics. To be consistent with
the sectoral representation envisioned by the framers, a majority of the members of
the party must actually belong to the sector represented, while nominees must be a
member of the sectoral party or organization. ETDHSa
Since political parties are identified by their ideology or platform of government, bona
fide membership, in accordance with the political party's constitution and by-laws,
would suffice.

D.Grave Abuse of Discretion and Conclusion

As agreed upon by the Majority during the deliberations of this case, the Court
suspended the Rules of Court in considering the Rule 64 petitions before us in light of
the clear and patent violation of the Constitution that the Majority unanimously found.
Thus, without an explicit ruling on the grave abuse of discretion in this case, I vote to
VACATE the ruling of the COMELEC pursuant to the suspended rules in light of our
finding of patent violation of the Constitution after revisiting and overturning the Ang
Bagong Bayani ruling.
Having said these, however, I reflect for the record my view that a grave abuse of
discretion exists.
Undeniably, all the parties to these consolidated cases namely, the petitioners and
the COMELEC relied upon and were all guided by the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling.
However, my re-examination of Ang Bagong Bayani and its standards, in light of what
the text and intents of the Constitution and RA No. 7491 provide, yield a result different
from what Ang Bagong Bayani reached. HIEASa
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, wrong considerations were
used in ruling on the consolidated petitions, resulting in gross misinterpretation and

misapplication of the Constitution. This is grave abuse of discretion that taints a

decision maker's action, 4 infinitely made worse in this case because the Constitution
itself is involved.
An added basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion pertains specifically to the
COMELEC's refusal or cancellation of registration of the party-list group based, solely or
partly, on the disqualification of the nominee. As discussed below, this action and any
refusal or cancellation of registration is completely devoid of basis in fact and in
law and in this sense constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In these lights, I vote for the REMAND of ALL the petitions to the COMELEC in
accordance with the terms of this Separate Opinion. AcHaTE
III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A.The existence of jurisdictional
error that warrants reviewing
COMELEC's action
Whether acting in the exercise of its purely administrative power, on one hand, or quasijudicial powers, on the other hand, the judicial remedy available to an aggrieved party is
the remedy of certiorari under Rule 64, in relation with Rule 65. Court action under this
rule is rendered necessary by the reality that, by law, the COMELEC en banc decision is
final and executory and should stand unless nullified by this Court through a writ of
certiorari.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court expressly require that the tribunal
must have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The requisite grave abuse of discretion is in
keeping with the office of the writ of certiorari; its function is to keep the tribunal within
the bounds of its jurisdiction under the Constitution and law.
The term grave abuse of discretion, while it defies exact definition, generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. 5
Arguably under the above standards, it may be claimed that since the COMELEC
merely complied with the prevailing jurisprudence (in particular. with the Court's
pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC and Banat v. COMELEC), then it
could not have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, much less with grave abuse
of discretion. Besides, the writ of certiorari only lies when the respondent is exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, which is not so in the present case. CITDES
This rationalization, however, is only superficially sound as the gross misinterpretation
and misapplication of the Constitution cannot be allowed by this Court in its role and
duty as guardian of the Constitution. Where a misinterpretation or misapplication of the
Constitution occurs, the result is a constitutional violation that this Court cannot be
prevented from addressing through the exercise of its powers through the available
medium of review under the Rules of Court. To hold otherwise is to countenance a
violation of the Constitution a lapse that cannot and should not happen under our
legal system.

Otherwise stated, if the Court were to sustain the view that the mere application of a
prevailing rule or doctrine negates a finding of grave abuse of discretion, in spite of a
glaring error in the doctrine's interpretation of the Constitution, then the Court
would have no chance to correct the error, except by laying down a new doctrine that
would operate prospectively but at the same time dismissing the petition for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion. To be sure, this is a course of action the Court cannot
take if it were to faithfully discharge its solemn duty to hold the Constitution inviolate.
For the Court, action under these circumstances is a must; no ifs or buts can be allowed
to be heard about its right and duty to act.
It should be considered, too, that in the adjudication of a case with constitutional
dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit of the Constitution itself that reign supreme. The
Court's previous ruling on a matter serves as a guide in the resolution of a similar matter
in the future, but this prior ruling cannot inflexibly bind the Court in its future actions. As
the highest Court in our judicial hierarchy, the Court cannot tie its hands through its past
actions, particularly when the Constitution is involved; it is invested with the innate
authority to rule according to what it sees best in its role as guardian of the Constitution.
6 cDIaAS
Additionally, be it remembered that the rulings of this Court are not written in stone and
do not remain un-erased and applicable for all times under all circumstances. The
Supreme Court's review of its rulings is in a sense a continuing one as these are made
and refined in the cases before the Court, taking into account what it has said on the
similar points in the past. This is the principle of stare decisis that fosters the stability of
rulings and decisions. This principle, however, is not an absolute one that applies even
if an incisive examination shows that a past ruling is inaccurate and is far from a faithful
interpretation of the Constitution, or in fact involves a constitutional violation. In this
excluded circumstance, both the rule of reason and the commands of the Constitution
itself require that the past ruling be modified and, if need be, overturned. 7 Indeed, if the
act done is contrary to the Constitution, then the existence of grave abuse of discretion
cannot be doubted. 8
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate Opinion, the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
does not rest on firm constitutional and legal grounds; its slanted reading of the text of
the constitution and its myopic view of constitutional intent led it to a grave error never
envisioned by the framers of our constitution.
By ordering the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC and for the latter to act in
accordance with the new ruling laid down by the Court i.e., allowing political parties
to participate in the party-list elections without need of proving that they are
"marginalized and under-represented" (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong
Bayani), and in recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral party or organization
may be validly included in the list of nominees the Court would not be violating the
principle of prospectivity. 9
The rationale behind the principle of prospectivity both in the application of law and of
judicial decisions enunciating new doctrines is the protection of vested rights and the
obligation of contracts. When a new ruling overrules a prior ruling, the prospective
application of the new ruling is made in favor of parties who have relied in good faith on
the prior ruling under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. CTHDcE
Obviously, the force of this rationale finds no application in this case, for, a ruling
overturning Ang Bagong Bayani broadens the base of participation in the partylist system of election based on the text and intent of the Constitution. Thus, no one

can claim that the application of this ruling in the upcoming 2013 election would operate
to the prejudice of parties who relied on the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling; the marginalized
and under-represented sectors (as the term in understood in Ang Bagong Bayani)
continue to be eligible to participate in the party-list elections, subject to the
determination of parties' individual circumstances by the COMELEC.
B.COMELEC power to register
and to cancel registration of a
party-list group is an exercise of
its administrative powers
The COMELEC En Banc's authority under COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 i.e., to
conduct summary hearings for the purpose of determining the registered parties'
continuing compliance with the law and the regulations and to review the COMELEC
Division's ruling granting a petition for registration is appropriately an exercise of the
COMELEC's administrative power rather than its quasi-judicial power. In the exercise
of this authority, the COMELEC may automatically review the decision of its Divisions,
without need for a motion to reconsider the grant of a petition for registration; it may also
conduct summary hearings when previously registered party-list groups file their
manifestation of intent to participate in the coming elections.
The case of Santiago, Jr., etc. v. Bautista, et al. 10 already provides us ample guidance
and insights into what distinguishes administrative and quasi-judicial powers from one
another. On the issue of whether the remedy of certiorari (which can only be invoked
when the respondent exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions) would lie against a
public school committee whose function was to determine the ranking of selected honor
students for its graduating class, the Court gave a negative answer and said: ScHADI
From the [foregoing], it will be gleaned that before a tribunal,
board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As
pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record
about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down
to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of
rating them for honors, such function involves the determination
of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically
vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. 11 (citation omitted;
emphases ours)
In the present case, no pretense at all is claimed or made that a petition for registration
or the determination of a registered party's continuing compliance with existing laws,
rules and jurisprudence entails the assertion of a right or the presence of a conflict of
rights. In a registration or compliance proceeding, an applicant simply attempts to prove
its possession or continued possession of the requisite qualifications for the purpose of
availing the privilege of participating in an electoral exercise. Thus, no real adjudication
entailing the exercise of quasi-judicial powers actually takes place.
Additionally, the inapplicability of the principle of res judicata in these registration
proceedings necessarily weakens any claim that adjudication, done in the exercise of

quasi-judicial functions, is involved. Each election period is sui generis a class in

itself, and any registration or accreditation by a party-list group is only for the purpose of
the coming election; it does not grant any registered party-list group any mantle of
immunity from the COMELEC's power of review as an incident of its power to register.
To hold otherwise would emasculate the COMELEC as an independent constitutional
commission, and weaken the crucial role it plays in our republican democracy.
IV. DISCUSSION: MERITS OF THE PETITIONS
I take the firm position that this Court should now revisit its ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani before our party-list system drifts any farther from the text and spirit of the
constitutional and statutory commands. HEScID
These Discussions shall dwell on the reasons supporting this approach and my
conclusions.
A.The Constitutional Provisions
on the Party-list System
a.The Constitutional Text.
The only constitutional provisions directly dealing with the party-list system of election
are Section 5 (1) and (2) of Article VI, and Sections 2, 6 and 7, Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution.
The cited Article VI section reads:
Section 5.(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector. [emphasis,
underscores and italics ours] EHcaDT
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, is the article on the COMELEC,
and the cited sections quoted below are its provisions related to the party-list system.
Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(5)Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other

requirements, must present their platform or program of

government; and accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission on Elections. . . .
xxx xxx xxx

7.The Constitution allows a free and open party system that shall
evolve according to the free choice of the people, within
the limits of the Constitution.
c.Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation

Section 6.A free and open party system shall be allowed to

evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the
provisions of this Article.
Section 7.No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization,
or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution. [emphases and
italics ours]
These provisions are specifically mentioned and shall be cited throughout this
Separate Opinion as they are the essential take-off points in considering,
appreciating and implementing the party-list system.
b.The Constitutional Text Summarized
Paraphrased and summarized, the terms of the Constitution relating to the party-list
system essentially provide that:
1.The House of Representatives shall be composed of members
elected from legislative districts, and those who are
elected through a party-list system. ICAcaH
2.The members of the House of Representatives under the
party-list system are those who are elected, as
provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of
the system to future legislation.
3.The members under the system shall be elected through
registered national, regional, sectoral parties and
organizations, thus, textually identifying the recognized
component groupings in the party-list system; they must
all register with the COMELEC to be able to participate.
4.To be voted under the party-list system are the component
political parties, organizations and coalitions, in
contrast with the individual candidates voted upon in
legislative district elections.
5.The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives, including those
in the party-list.
6.For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural minorities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.

Unmistakably, the quoted constitutional texts are both terse and general in their terms.
However, they are not, in fact, as bare as they would seem, as the words used carry
meanings and intents 12 expressed during the deliberations and the voting that took
place to determine what the Constitution would exactly provide. 13
Basic in understanding the constitutional text is the intent that led to the
modification of the system of legislative district elections that the country has used even
before the 1935 Constitution.
The traditional system, incidentally, is the legislative district system that remains
described in the Constitution as election by district "apportioned among the provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 14 AIcaDC
The proponent, Commissioner Christian Monsod, described the new party-list system
in terms of its purpose, as follows: 15
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,
we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we
count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000
votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of
the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way,
they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly
even if they would not win individually in legislative districts.
So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system. [italics, emphases and
underscores ours]
These same purpose and objective were reiterated in the Commissioner's
subsequent statement when he said
The whole purpose of the system is precisely to give room for
those who have a national constituency who may never be able
to win a seat on a legislative district basis. But they must have a
constituency of at least 400,000 in order to claim a voice in the
National Assembly. 16
thus, leaving no doubt on what the party-list system conceptually is and why it
was established.
B.RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act
Following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon Aquino appointed
representatives of the sectors mentioned in the Constitution, namely: labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and youth, who acted as the partylist representatives for the first three (3) elections under this Constitution.
In March 1995, Congress enacted RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, as the law
that would implement the party-list election scheduled for May 1998. The law at the
same time fleshed out the mechanics for party-list elections, in accordance with the
terms of the Constitution. The law specifically provided for: SHECcT

a.a declaration of the policy behind the law;

b.a definition of terms, specifically defining the terms national,
political, regional, and sectoral parties, and their
coalitions;
c.the requisites and terms for registration; the grounds for refusal
and cancellation of registration; and the certified list of
registered parties;
d.the nomination and qualification for party-list representatives;
e.the manner of voting;
f.the number and procedure for the allocation of party-list
representatives; and
g.the proclamation of the winning party-list representatives,
their term of office; the limitation on their change of
affiliation; their rights; and the provisions in case of
vacancy.
Reflecting the constitutional intents, the law defined the party-list system as:
a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently provided the coalition of which
they form part does not participate in the party-list system. 17
(emphases and italics ours)
and clarified the State's policy, objectives and means, as follows:
a.the promotion of proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof;
b.with the aim of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members
of the House of Representatives; and
c.for the development and guarantee of a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature under the simplest scheme possible. 18 IaSCTE
RA No. 7941 likewise succinctly defined the component groupings recognized by
law in the party-list system, as follows:
(b)A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c)A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the

general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate

means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports
certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated [labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals] whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes
or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f)A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes. 19 (emphases and italics ours)
Notably, the definitions carried no significant qualifications, preferences, exclusions or
limitations by law on what the recognized party-list groupings should be, although
Section 6 of RA No. 7941 specified and defined the grounds for disqualification.
C.Jurisprudential Developments
a.The Ang Bagong Bayani Case
In 2001, the first judicial test in the implementation of the party-list system came through
the Ang Bagong Bayani case where the petitioners sought the disqualification of the
private respondents, among whom were major political parties. The Court resolved,
among others, the following issues:
1.whether political parties may participate in party-list elections; and
2.whether the party-list system is exclusive to "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors and organizations. DTISaH
The majority ruling held that political parties may participate in party-list elections,
provided that the requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the Constitution and RA No. 7941. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies, identifying them, non-exclusively, as the labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The party-list nominees, as well, must
be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties.
Based on its conclusions, the majority provided the guidelines for the party-list system,
summarized below:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must

represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show
through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily,
majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict
of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by
RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system,
they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other
words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that
they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Third, [by an] express constitutional provision[,] the religious sector
may not be represented in the party-list system. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification[.]
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party
or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens
and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. . . .
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of
the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
[contains the qualifications of party-list nominees, with special agerelated terms for youth sector candidates].
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees. . . . [U]nder Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." . . .
Eighth, . . . the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. 20 (italics and emphases ours) DAHSaT

b.BANAT Case
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.
Commission on Elections 21 is essentially a case on the computation of the allocation of
seats based on the party-list votes. Despite the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling, the question
of whether the Constitution prohibits political parties from participating in the
party-list elections remained a live issue in this case.
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to disallow major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly; thus, effectively
reversing the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani that major political parties may participate in
the party-list system, provided they represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno cited two reasons for disallowing the
participation of major political parties:
1.Limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major political
parties from participating in the election of their representatives are aligned with the
constitutional mandate to reduce social, economic and political inequalities and remove
cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good.
2.Allowing major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process
will suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty, and betray the
democratic spirit of the Constitution.
The minority view 22 took the position that neither the Constitution nor RA No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. It maintained
that, on the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings, and this Court
cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from party-list elections, in patent violation of the Constitution and
the law. TIEHSA
Moreover, the minority maintained that the Party-List System Act and the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to
coalesce with sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. The other major
political parties can thus organize or affiliate with their chosen sector or sectors,
provided that their nominees belong to their respective sectors. Nor is it necessary that
the party-list organization's nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution, and infirmity," as
there is no financial status or educational requirement in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he must be a fisherfolk, if the
nominee represents the senior citizens, he must be a senior citizen.
D.The Party-list System of elections under the constitution and
RA 7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani and its errors
I opened these Discussions by quoting the plain terms of the Constitution and of the law
to stress these terms for later comparison with Ang Bagong Bayani. In this manner,
Ang Bagong Bayani's slanted reading of the Constitution and the laws can be seen in
bold relief. Its main mistake is its erroneous reading of the constitutional intent,
based on the statements of a constitutional commissioner that were quoted out
of context, to justify its reading of the constitutional intent. 23 Specifically, it relied
on the statements of Commissioner Villacorta, an advocate of sectoral representation,
and glossed over those of Commissioner Monsod and the results of the deliberations,

as reflected in the resulting words of the Constitution. 24 Thus, its conclusion is not truly
reflective of the intent of the framers of the Constitution. This error is fatal as its
conclusion was then used to justify his interpretation of the statute, leading to a bias for
the social justice view. SaDICE
a.The Aim or Objective of the Party-List System
a.1.From the Constitutional Perspective.
The aim of the party-list provision, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is
principally to reform the then existing electoral system by adding a new system of
electing the members of the House of Representatives. The innovation is a party-list
system that would expand opportunities for electoral participation to allow those who
could not win in the legislative district elections a fair chance to enter the House of
Representatives other than through the district election system.
Otherwise stated, the aim is primarily electoral reform not to provide a social
justice mechanism that would guarantee that sectors (described in social justice
context by its constitutional deliberation proponents as "marginalized") would
exclusively occupy, or have reserved, seats in the House of Representatives under the
party-list system. This is one glaring error that is evident right from the opening
statement of Ang Bagong Bayani when it described the party-list system as "a social
justice tool." While the party-list system can indeed serve the ends of social justice by
providing the opportunity through an open, multi-party system for the social justice
sector groups that have no chance to win in legislative district elections, the party-list
system was not established primarily for this purpose.
The best proof of this characteristic comes from the words of the Constitution itself
which do not provide for exclusive or guaranteed representation for sectoral groups in
the party-list system. If at all, the constitutional text only provided a guarantee of 50%
participation for specified sectoral groups, but the guarantee was only for the first
three (3) elections after the ratification of the Constitution. 25
The deliberations where the words of the Constitution were framed and adopted confirm
the primacy of electoral reform as against social justice objectives. The electoral reform
view was espoused by the author of the provision, Commissioner Monsod, and his
proposed amendment 26 met vigorous objections from Commissioner Eulogio Lerum
and Commissioner Jaime Tadeo, who then sought to have guaranteed or reserved
seats for the "marginalized" sectors in order to prevent their "political massacre" should
the Monsod amendment be allowed. 27 TAESDH
When voting took place, those against reserved seats for the marginalized sector won.
Eventually, what was conceded to the latter was what the Constitution, as worded now,
provides i.e., "For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from" the enumerated sectors.
Indeed, if the concept of "marginalized" would be applied to the party-list system, the
term should apply to the national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
that cannot win in the traditional legislative district elections (following the
explanation of Commissioner Monsod), not necessarily to those claiming
marginalization in the social justice context or because of their special interests or
characteristics. The term, of course, can very well be applicable to the latter if they
indeed cannot win on their own in the traditional legislative district elections. These
aspects of the case are further discussed and explained below.

a.2.From the Statutory Perspective.

Even from the perspective of RA No. 7941, the policy behind the party-list system
innovation does not vary or depart from the basic constitutional intents. The objective
continues to be electoral reform, expressed as the promotion of proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions, under a full, free and open party system in order to attain
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives. 28
It should be noted that it was under RA No. 7941 that the words "marginalized and
underrepresented" made their formal appearance in the party-list system. It was used in
the context of defining one of the aims of the system, i.e., to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. ECSaAc
This entry and use of the term is admittedly an effective and formal statutory recognition
that accommodates the sectoral (in the special interest or concern or social justice
senses) character into the party-list system (i.e., in addition to the primary electoral
reform purpose contemplated in the Constitution), but nevertheless does not render
sectoral groups the exclusive participants in party-list elections. As already mentioned,
this conclusion is not justified by the wording, aims and intents of the party-list system
as established by the Constitution and under RA No. 9741.
Nor does the use of the term "marginalized and underrepresented" (understood in the
narrow sectoral context) render it an absolute requirement to qualify a party, group or
organization for participation in the party-list election, except for those in the sectoral
groups or parties who by the nature of their parties or organizations necessarily are
subject to this requirement. For all parties, sectors, organizations or coalition, however,
the absolute overriding requirement as justified by the principal aim of the system
remains to be a party, group or organization's inability to participate in the legislative
district elections with a fair chance of winning. To clearly express the logical
implication of this statement, a party, group or organization already participating in the
legislative district elections is presumed to have assessed for itself a fair chance of
winning and should no longer qualify to be a participant in the party-list elections.
CSDcTH
b.Party Participation under the Party-list System
The members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system are
those who would be elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics
of the system to future legislation. They are likewise constitutionally identified as the
registered national, regional, sectoral parties and organizations, and are the partylist groupings to be voted under the party-list system under a free and open party
system that should be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people
within the limits of the Constitution. 29
From the perspective of the law, this party structure and system would hopefully foster
proportional representation that would lead to the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens: (1) who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and (2) who lack well-defined

constituencies; but (3) who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this
policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and underrepresented,"
and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" has been partly discussed above and
would merit further discussion below. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC, 30 on the other hand, defined the term "proportional representation" in this
manner: CIDTcH
[I]t refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section
5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural, communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. 31
As well, the case defined the phrase "who lack well-defined political constituency" to
mean:
refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group,
like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented.
32
Thus, in both instances, Ang Bagong Bayani harked back to the term "marginalized and
underrepresented," clearly showing how, in its view, the party-list system is bound to this
descriptive term. As discussed above, Ang Bagong Bayani's use of the term is not
exactly correct on the basis of the primary aim of the party-list system. This error
becomes more glaring as the case applies it to the phrases "proportional
representation" and "lack of political constituency."
For clarity, Section 2 the only provision where the term "marginalized and
underrepresented" appears reads in full: HaAISC
Section 2.Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
the marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to
become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.
As defined in the law, a party refers to any of the three: a political party, a sectoral party,
or a coalition of parties (Section 3 [b] of RA No. 7941). As distinguished from sectoral
parties or organizations which generally advocate "interests or concerns" a

political party is one which advocates "an ideology or platform, principles and
policies" of the government. In short, its identification is with or through its program of
governance.
Under the verba legisor plain terms rule of statutory interpretation 33 and the maxim ut
magis valeat quam pereat, 34 a combined reading of Section 2 and Section 3 shows
that the status of being "marginalized and underrepresented" is not limited merely to
sectors, particularly to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law. The law itself
recognizes that the same status can apply as well to "political parties."
Again, the explanation of Commissioner Monsod on the principal objective of the partylist system comes to mind as it provides a ready and very useful answer dealing with
the relationship and inter-action between sectoral representation and the party-list
system as a whole: cACEaI
We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list
system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved
seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a
sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and
present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two
votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the
representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that
same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or
coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And
here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are
entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a
sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a
regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say
that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the
Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the
day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been
garnered by each party or each organization one does not
have to be a political party and register in order to participate as
a party and count the votes and from there derive the
percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition.
xxx xxx xxx
It means that any group or party who has a constituency of,
say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district
that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a
group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral
or special interest group, should not have a voice in the
National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are
three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a
group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of them get
one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they
will begin to think that if they really have a common interest, they

should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the
vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are
the dynamics of a party list system. TcEaAS
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making sure that those
who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency
will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These
sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a
seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a
seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a
nationwide basis.
xxx xxx xxx
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting
that when we speak now of party list system though we refer to
sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list rather than
sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the
party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors
because the sectors would be included in the party list
system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list
system.
BISHOP BACANI: Thank you very much. 35 (emphases and
underscores supplied)
These exchanges took place on July 22, 1986. When the discussion on the partylist system of election resumed on July 25, 1986, Commissioner Monsod proposed
an amendment 36 (that substantially became Section 5 [1], Article VI of 1987
Constitution) that further clarified what this innovative system is.
Thus, the words "marginalized" and "underrepresented" should be understood in the
electoral sense, 37 i.e., those who cannot win in the traditional district elections and
who, while they may have a national presence, lacked "well-defined political
constituency" within a district sufficient for them to win. For emphasis, sectoral
representation of those perceived in the narrow sectoral (including social justice) sense
as "marginalized" in society is encapsulated within the broader multiparty (party-list
system) envisioned by the framers.
This broader multiparty (party-list system) seeks to address not only the concerns of the
marginalized sector (in the narrow sectoral sense) but also the concerns of those
"underrepresented" (in the legislative district) as a result of the winner-take-all system
prevailing in district elections a system that ineluctably "disenfranchises" those
groups or mass of people who voted for the second, third or fourth placer in the district
elections and even those who are passive holders of Filipino citizenship.
RA No. 7941 itself amply supports this idea of "underrepresented" when it used a broad
qualitative requirement in defining "political parties" as ideology or policy-based groups
and, "sectoral parties" as those whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of identified sectors.
Based on these considerations, it becomes vividly clear that contrary once again to
what Ang Bagong Bayani holds proportional representation refers to the

representation of different political parties, sectoral parties and organizations in

the House of Representatives in proportion to the number of their national
constituency or voters, consistent with the constitutional policy to allow an "open
and free party system" to evolve.
In this regard, the second sentence of Section 2 of RA No. 7941 is itself notably
anchored on the "open and free party system" mandated by Article IX-C of the
Constitution. For some reason, Ang Bagong Bayani never noted this part of Section 2
and its significance, and is utterly silent as well on the constitutional anchor provided by
Section 6, Article IX-C of the Constitution. It appears to have simply and conveniently
focused on the first sentence of the Section and its constricted view of the term
"marginalized and underrepresented," while wholly fixated on a social justice
orientation. Thus, it opened its ruling, as follows:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to
give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in
life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized
and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy. 38 (emphasis supplied)
Reliance on the concept of social justice, to be sure, involves a motherhood statement
that offers little opportunity for error, yet relying on the concept solely and exclusively
can be misleading. To begin with, the creation of an avenue by which "sectoral parties
or organizations" can meaningfully join an electoral exercise is, in and by itself, a social
justice mechanism but it served other purposes that the framers of the Constitution were
addressing. Looking back, the appeal to the social justice concept to make the party-list
elections an exclusive affair of the "marginalized and underrepresented sector" (as
defined in Ang Bagong Bayani) proceeds from the premise that a multiparty-system is
antithetical to sectoral representation. This was effectively the argument of the
proponents of the exclusive sectoral representation view in the constitutional party-list
debates; to allow political parties to join a multiparty election is a pre-determination of
the sectors' political massacre. This issue, however, has been laid to rest in the
constitutional debates and should not now be revived and resurrected by coursing it
through the Judiciary. TEAaDC
As the constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers envisioned was a
multiparty system that already includes sectoral representation. Both sectoral
representation and multiparty-system under our party-list system are concepts that
comfortably fall within this vision of a Filipino-style party-list system. Thus, both the text
and spirit of the Constitution do not support an interpretation of exclusive sectoral
representation under the party-list system; what was provided was an avenue for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the electoral system it is
an invitation for these sectors to join and take a chance on what democracy and
republicanism can offer.
Indeed, our democracy becomes more vibrant when we allow the interaction and
exchange of ideas, philosophies and interests within a broader context. By allowing the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors who have the numbers, to participate
together with other political parties and interest groups that we have characterized,
under the simple and relatively inexpensive mechanism of party-list we have today, the

framers clearly aimed to enrich principled discourse among the greater portion of the
society and hoped to create a better citizenry and nation.
b.1.Impact on Political Parties
To summarize the above discussions and to put them in operation, political parties are
not only "not excluded" from the party-list system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed by
law to participate. This participation is not impaired by any "marginalized and
underrepresented" limitation understood in the Ang Bagong Bayani sense. DaHISE
As applied to political parties, this limitation must be understood in the electoral sense,
i.e., they are parties espousing their unique and "marginalized" principles of governance
and who must operate in the party-list system because they only have a "marginal"
chance of winning in the legislative district elections. This definition assumes that the
political party is not also a participant in the legislative district elections as the
basic concept and purpose of the party-list innovation negate the possibility of
playing in both legislative district and party-list arenas.
Thus, parties whether national, regional or sectoral with legislative district election
presence anywhere in the country can no longer participate as the party-list system is
national in scope and no overlap between the two electoral systems can be allowed
anywhere.
c.The Parties and Their Nominees
c.1.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Party Registration
Due
to Nominee Problems
The COMELEC's refusal and cancellation of registration or accreditation of parties
based on Section 6 of RA No. 7941 is a sore point when applied to parties based on the
defects or deficiencies attributable to the nominees. On this point, I maintain the view
that essential distinctions exist between the parties and their nominees that
cannot be disregarded. As quoted in the Summary of Positions, however, the need to
make a distinction between the two types of nominees is relevant only to sectoral
parties and organizations. DAaIEc
The cancellation of registration or the refusal to register some of the petitioners on the
ground that their nominees are not qualified implies that the COMELEC viewed the
nominees and their party-list groups as one and the same entity; hence, the
disqualification of the nominee necessarily results in the disqualification of his/her party.
Sadly, this interpretation ignores the factual and legal reality that the party-list group,
not the nominee, is the candidate in the party-list election, and at the same time blurs
the distinction between a party-list representative and a district representative. DEICTS
c.2.The Party-Nominee Relationship
That the party-list group, rather than the nominee, is voted for in the elections is not a
disputed point. Our essential holding, however, is that a party-list group, in order to be
entitled to participate in the elections, must satisfy the following express statutory
requirements:
1.must be composed of Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties;

2.has no well-defined political constituencies; and

3.must be capable of contributing to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.
The Constitution requires, too, that the members of the House of Representatives
are those who are elected from legislative districts, and those who are elected
through a party-list system (Section 5 [1], Article VI) where the votes are in favor of
a political party, organization or coalition (Section 6, Article IX-C).
These requirements embody the concept behind the party-list system and demonstrate
that it is a system completely different from the legislative district representation. From
the point of view of the nominee, he or she is not the candidate, the party is the
entity voted for. This is in far contrast from the legislative district system where the
candidate is directly voted for in a personal electoral struggle among candidates in a
district. Thus, the nominee in the party-list system is effectively merely an agent of
the party. 39 It is the party-list group for whom the right of suffrage 40 is exercised by
the national electorate with the divined intent of casting a vote for a party-list group in
order that the particular ideology, advocacy and concern represented by the group may
be heard and given attention in the halls of the legislature. ISaTCD
This concept and its purpose negate the idea that the infirmities of the nominee that do
not go into the qualifications of the party itself should prejudice the party. In fact, the law
does not expressly provide that the disqualification of the nominee results in the
disqualification of a party-list group from participating in the elections. In this regard,
Section 6 of RA No. 7941 reads:
Section 6.Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1)It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes; IacHAE
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding

elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

[italics supplied]
Notably, all these grounds pertain to the party itself. Thus, if the law were to be
correctly applied, the law, rules and regulations that the party violated under Section 6
(5) of RA No. 7941 must affect the party itself to warrant refusal or cancellation of
registration.
To take one of the presented issues as an example, it is only after a party's failure to
submit its list of five qualified candidates, after being notified of its nominees'
disqualification, that refusal or cancellation of registration may be warranted. Indeed, if
the party-list group inexcusably fails to comply with this simple requirement of the law
(Section 8 of RA No. 7941), then its registration deserves to be denied or an existing
one cancelled as this omission, by itself, demonstrates that it cannot then be expected
to "contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." 41
The nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and concerns of the party-list group to
which he/she belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of the
party-list group. However, unlike the political parties' official candidates who can, for
whatever reason, disaffiliate from his party and run as an independent candidate the
linkage between a nominee and his party-list group is actually a one-way mirror
relationship. The nominee can only see (and therefore run) through the party-list group
42 but the party-list group can see beyond the nominee-member.
While the nominee is the entity "elected" to Congress, a companion idea that cannot be
glossed over is that he only carried this out because of the nomination made by the
party to which he belongs and only through the unique party-list system. Note in this
regard that the registration with the COMELEC confers personality (for purposes of
election) on the party-list group itself and to no other. Note, too, that what the
Constitution and the law envision is proportional representation through the group and
the latter, not the nominee, is the one voted for in the elections. Even the manner of his
nomination and the duties his official relation to his party entails are matters that are
primarily determined by the party's governing constitution and by-laws. To be sure,
political dynamics take place within the party itself prior to or after the period of
registration that transcend the nominee's status as a representative. These realities
render indisputable that a party has the right (in fact, the duty) to replace a nominee
who fails to keep his bona fide membership in the party i.e., keeping true to the
causes of the party even while the nominee is serving in Congress. HTCAED
The preceding discussions show that the COMELEC's action of apparently treating the
nominee and his party as one and the same is clearly and plainly unwarranted and
could only proceed from its commission of grave abuse of discretion, correctible under
Rule 65.
These distinctions do not discount at all the position or the role of the party-list nominee;
it is from the list of nominees submitted by the party that party-list representatives are
chosen should the party obtain the required number of votes. In fact, once the party-list
group submits the list of its nominees, the law provides specific grounds for the change
of nominees or for the alteration of their order of nomination. While the nominee may
withdraw his nomination, we ruled it invalid to allow the party to withdraw the nomination
it made 43 in order "to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list
organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the
electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations." 44 cSICHD

We also recognize the importance of informing the public who the nominees of the
party-list groups are as these nominees may eventually be in Congress. 45 For the
nominees themselves, the law requires that:
1.he has given his written consent to be a nominee;
2.he must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
3.he must be a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election;
4.he must be able to read and to write;
5.he must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election; and
6.he must be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
From this list, what clearly serves as the legal link between the party and its
nominee is only the latter's bona fide membership in the party that wishes to
participate in the party-list system of election. Because of this relationship,
membership is a fact that the COMELEC must be able to confirm as it is the
link between the party the electorate votes for and the representation that the
nominee subsequently undertakes in the House of Representatives. To
illustrate, if a sectoral party's nominee, who does not "actually share the attribute or
characteristic" of the sector he seeks to represent, fails to prove that he is a
genuine advocate of this sector, then the presence of bona fide membership cannot
be maintained.
To automatically disqualify a party without affording it opportunity to meet the challenge
on the eligibility of its nominee or to undertake rectifications deprives the party itself of
the legal recognition of its own personality that registration actually seeks. aSTAHD
The qualifications of a nominee at the same time that it determines whether registration
shall be granted. 46 When under the COMELEC's lights, the shadow cast by the partylist nominee is not truly reflective of the group he/she is supposed to represent, what the
COMELEC must do is to give the party the opportunity to field in the five qualified
candidates. The COMELEC acts with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately
cancels or refuses the registration of a party without affording it the opportunity to
comply.
In line with the idea of proportional and sectoral representation, the law provides that a
nominee-representative who changes his affiliation during his term forfeits his seat.
Likewise, in providing for the rule in case of vacancy for seats reserved for party-list
representatives, the reason for the vacancy is broad enough to include not only the valid
causes provided for in the party's constitution and by-laws (such as the non-possession
of the necessary qualifications), but likewise includes the situation where the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal finds that the nominee-representative unqualified for
failure to measure up to the necessary statutory and other legal requirements. 47 If
these can be remedied without affecting the status of the party itself, no reason exists
why the registration of a party-list group should automatically be cancelled or refused by
reason of individual failures imputable and affecting only the nominee.

Based on these considerations and premises, the party-list group and its nominees
cannot be wholly considered as one identifiable entity, with the fault attributable and
affecting only the nominee, producing disastrous effects on the otherwise qualified
collective merit of the party. If their identification with one another can be considered at
all, it is in the ideal constitutional sense that one ought to be a reflection of the other
i.e., the party-list group acts in Congress through its nominee/s and the nominee in so
acting represents the causes of the party in whose behalf it is there for. TCAScE
E.Observations on Chief Justice Sereno's Reflections.
Essentially, the Reflections defend the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and do not need to be
further discussed at this point lest this Opinion be unduly repetitious. One point,
however, that needs to be answered squarely is the statement that this Separate
Opinion is not "appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the 1987
Constitution] arose." The Reflections asserted that the heart of the 1987 Constitution is
the Article on Social Justice," citing, in justification, the statements endorsing the
approval of the 1987 Constitution, particularly those of Commissioner Cecilia Muoz
Palma, the President of the 1986 Constitutional Commission; President Munoz Palma
described the Constitution as reaching out to the social justice sectors.
These cited statements, however, were endorsements of the Constitution as a whole
and did not focus solely on the electoral reform provisions. As must be evident in the
discussions above, I have no problem in accepting the social justice thrust of the
1987 Constitution as it indeed, on the whole, shows special concern for social
justice compared with the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution. The Reflections,
however, apparently misunderstood the thrust of my Separate Opinion as already
fully explained above.
This Separate Opinion simply explains that the provisions under consideration in the
present case are the Constitution's electoral provisions, specifically the elections for the
House of Representatives and the nation's basic electoral policies (expressed in the
Article on the Commission on Elections) that the constitutional framers wanted to
reform.
What the 1987 Constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of electoral reform, was to
"open up" the electoral system by giving more participation to those who could not
otherwise participate under the then existing system those who were marginalized in
the legislative district elections because they could not be elected in the past for lack of
the required votes and specific constituency in the winner-take-all legislative district
contest, and who, by the number of votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the
district elections, showed that nationally, they had the equivalent of what the winner in
the legislative district would garner. This was the concept of "marginalized and
underrepresented" and the "lack of political constituency" that came out in the
constitutional deliberations and led to the present wordings of the Constitution. RA No.
7941 subsequently faithfully reflected these intents. DIEcHa
Despite this overriding intent, the framers recognized as well that those belonging to
specifically-named sectors (i.e., the marginalized and underrepresented in the social
justice sense) should be given a head-start a "push" so to speak in the first three
(3) elections so that their representatives were simply to be selected as party-list
representatives in these initial elections.
Read in this manner, the party-list system as defined in the Constitution cannot but be
one that is "primarily" grounded on electoral reform and one that was principally driven

by electoral objectives. As written, it admits of national and regional political parties

(which may be based on ideology, e.g., the Socialist Party of the Philippines), with or
without social justice orientation. At the same time, the system shows its open embrace
of social justice through the preference it gave to the social justice sectors (labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector) in the first three
elections after ratification of the Constitution, and to the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals, in the RA No. 7941 definition of sectoral party.
The objection regarding the "textualist" approach has been fully discussed in the
Summary of Positions and need not be repeated here.
F.The Eleven-Point Parameters for the COMELEC
I close this Opinion by outlining the eleven-point parameters that should guide the
COMELEC in the exercise of its power to register parties under the party-list system of
elections. For ease of application, these parameters refer back to the Ang Bagong
Bayani guidelines, particularly on what points in these guidelines should be discarded
and what remains intact and effective. TcDIEH
In view of our prior ruling in BANAT v. Commission on Elections (disqualifying political
parties from participating in the party-list elections), the petitioners understandably
attempted to demonstrate, in one way or another, that they represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, as the term is understood in Bagong Bayani. As
discussed in this Separate Opinion, however, the requirement of being marginalized and
underrepresented should be understood, not only in the narrow sectoral sense, but also
in the broader electoral sense.
We likewise take note of the fact that this is the first time that the Court ever attempted
to make a categorical definition and characterization of the term "marginalized and
under-represented," a phrase that, correctly understood, must primarily be interpreted in
the electoral sense and, in case of sectoral parties and organizations, also partly in the
special interests and social justice contexts. The COMELEC understandably has not
been given parameters under the present pronouncements either in evaluating the
petitions for registration filed before it, on one hand, or in determining whether existing
party-list groups should be allowed to participate in the party-list elections. Hence, the
need for the following parameters as we order a remand of all these consolidated
petitions to the COMELEC.
1.Purpose and Objective of Party-list System. The primary
objective and purpose of the party-list system (established
under the Constitution and RA 7941 is electoral reform
by giving marginalized and under-represented parties (i.e.,
those who cannot win in the legislative district elections
and in this sense are marginalized and may lack the
constituency to elect themselves there, but who
nationally may generate the following and votes
equivalent to what a winner in the legislative district
election would garner), the chance to participate in the
electoral exercise and to elect themselves to the House of
Representatives through a system other than the
legislative district elections. DcIHSa

At the same time, the party-list system recognizes sectoral

representation through sectoral organizations (that, as
defined did not require or identify any social justice
characteristic but were still subject to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" and the "constituency"
requirements of the law), and through sectors identified by
their common "social justice" characteristics (but which
must likewise comply with the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and "constituency" requirements of the
law).
2.For political parties (whether national or regional): a) to be
classified as political parties, they must advocate an
ideology or platform, principles and policies, for the
general conduct of government. The application of the
further requirement under RA No. 7941 (that as the most
immediate means of securing the adoption of their
principles of governance, they must regularly nominate
and support their leaders and members as candidates for
public office) shall depend on the particular circumstances
of the party.
b) The marginal and under-representation in the electoral
sense (i.e., in the legislative district elections) and the lack
of constituency requirements fully apply to political parties,
but there is no reason not to presume compliance with
these requirements if political parties are not participants
in any legislative district elections.
c) Role of Major Political Parties in Party-list Elections. Major
political parties, if they participate in the legislative district
elections, cannot participate in the party-list elections, nor
can they form a coalition with party-list parties and run as
a coalition in the party-list elections. ADaECI
A coalition is a formal party participant in the party-list system; what
the party-list system forbids directly (i.e., participation in
both electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do
indirectly through a coalition.
No prohibition, however, exists against informal alliances that they
can form with party-list parties, organizations or groups
running for the party-list elections. The party-list
component of these informal alliances is not prohibited
from running in the party-list elections.
The plain requirements intrinsic to the nature of the political party
evidently render the first and second Ang Bagong
Bayani guideline invalid, and significantly affects the
fourth guideline. To stress, political parties are not only
"not excluded" from the party-list system; they are, in fact,
expressly allowed by law to participate without being
limited by the "marginalized and underrepresented"

requirement, as narrowly understood in Ang Bagong

Bayani.
3.Sectoral parties, groups and organizations must belong to the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 5 of RA No. 7941 that are mainly
based on social justice characteristics; or must have
interests, concerns or characteristics specific to their
sectors although they do not require or need to identify
with any social justice characteristic.
In either case, they are subject to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and the "constituency" requirements of the
law through a showing, supported by evidence, that they
belong to a sector that is actually characterized as
marginal and under-represented. aCSEcA
Sectoral parties, groups and organizations are additionally subject
to the general overriding requirement of electoral
marginalization and under-representation and the
constituency requirements of the law, but there is no
reason why compliance with these requirements cannot
be presumed if they are not participants in any legislative
district elections.
4.Registration with the COMELEC.
Political parties (whether national or regional, already registered
with the COMELEC as regular political parties but not
under the party-list system) must register under the partylist system to participate in the party-list elections. For
party-list registration purposes, they must submit to the
COMELEC their constitution, by-laws, platform or program
of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and
other relevant information that the COMELEC may
require. 48
Similarly, sectoral parties, groups or organizations already
registered under the general COMELEC rules for
registration of political parties (but not under the party-list
system), must register under the party-list system to be
eligible to participate in the party-list elections, and must
likewise submit relevant documentation that the
COMELEC shall require.
Political and sectoral parties, groups or organizations already
previously registered and/or accredited under the
party-list system, shall maintain their previous
registration and/or accreditation and shall be allowed to
participate in the party-list elections unless there are
grounds for cancellation of their registration and/or
accreditation under Section 6, RA 7941. aSIAHC
5.Submission of Relevant Documents. The statutory requirement
on the submission of relevant documentary evidence to

the COMELEC is not an empty and formal ceremony. The

eighth (8th) Ang Bagong Bayani guideline relating to
the ability of the party-list group (not just the nominee but
directly through the nominee or indirectly through the
group) to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation remains
wholly relevant and should be complied with through the
required submissions the COMELEC shall require.
The platform or program of government, among others, is very
important considering the significant role the party-list
group itself, as a collective body, plays in the party-list
system dynamics even as its nominee or nominees is the
one who is considered "Member" of the House of
Representatives. The statutory recognition of an
"appropriate legislation" beneficial to the nation injects the
meaningful democracy that the party-list system seeks to
add stimulus into.
6.Party Disqualification. Political parties and sectoral parties and
organizations alike must not possess any of the
disqualifying grounds under Section 6, RA 7941 to be able
to participate in the party-list elections.
Insofar as the third Ang Bagong Bayani guideline merely
reiterates the first ground for cancellation or refusal of
registration under Section 6, RA 7941 that the party-list
group is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purpose and the
same ground is retained under these parameters.
7.Compliance with Substantive Requirements. To justify their
existence, all party-list groups must comply with the
substantive requirements of the law specific to their own
group, their own internal rules on membership, and with
the COMELEC's Rules of Procedure. aTcIAS
8.Prohibited Assistance from Government. The party or
organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by the
government. It must be independent of the government.
This is the fifth Ang Bagong Bayani guideline. While
this requirement only contemplated of the marginalized
and underrepresented sector in the narrow sense in Ang
Bagong Bayani, no reason exists not to extend this
requirement even to political parties participating in the
party-list elections.
To emphasize, the general overriding requirement in the party-list
elections is inability to participate in the legislative
district elections with a fair chance of winning. If a
political party at the very least obtains the assistance of
the government, whether financially or otherwise, then its
participation in the party-list system defeats the broad

electoral sense in which the term "marginalized" and

"underrepresented" is understood as applied to political
parties.
9.Qualification of Party-list Nominee. The sixth Ang Bagong
Bayani guideline, being a mere faithful reiteration of
Section 9 of RA 7941 (qualification of a party-list
nominee), should remain. In addition, the party-list
nominee must comply with the proviso in Section 15 of RA
7941.
10.Party and Nominee Membership. For sectoral parties and
organizations, the seventh Ang Bagong Bayani
guideline i.e., that the nominees must also represent
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors refers
not only to the actual possession of the marginalized and
underrepresented status represented by the sectoral party
or organization but also to one who genuinely advocates
the interest or concern of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector represented by the sectoral party
or organization. IHTASa
To be consistent with the sectoral representation envisioned by the
framers, majority of the members of the sectoral party or
organization must actually belong to the sector
represented.
For political parties, it is enough that their nominees are bona fide
member of the group they represent.
11.Effects of Disqualification of Nominee. The disqualification of
a nominee (on the ground that he is not a bona fide
member of the political party; or that he does not possess
the actual status or characteristic or that he is not a
genuine advocate of the sector represented) does not
automatically result in the disqualification of the party
since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of
registration pertain to the party itself.
The party-list group should be given opportunity either to refute the
finding of disqualification of its nominee or to fill in a
qualified nominee before cancellation or refusal of
registration is ordered. Consistent with Section 6 (5) and
Section 8 of RA 7941, the party-list group must submit a
list containing at least five nominees to the COMELEC. If a
party-list group endeavors to participate in the party-list
elections on the theoretical assumption that it has a
national constituency (as against district constituency),
then compliance with the clear requirement of the law on
the number of nominees must all the more be strictly
complied with by the party-list group.
Considering that the thirteen petitioners, who are new applicants, only secured a Status
Quo Ante Order (instead of mandatory injunction that would secure their inclusion in the

ballots now being printed by the COMELEC), the remand of their petitions is only for the
academic purpose of determining their entitlement to registration under the party-list
system but not anymore for the purpose of participating in the 2013 elections. IDSaTE
Any of the remaining party-list groups involved in the remaining 40 petitions 49 that
obtain the number of votes required to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives
would still be subject to the determination by the COMELEC of their qualifications based
on the parameters and rationale expressed in this Separate Opinion.
REYES, J., concurring and dissenting:
In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the
masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it
invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past
the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement to come out and participate, as
indeed many of them came out and participated during the last
elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle. 1
The Court is tasked to resolve the fifty-three (53) consolidated Petitions for Certiorari
and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Rules of Court by various party-list groups and organizations. The petitions assail
the resolutions issued by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that
either cancelled their existing registration and accreditation, or denied their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system. 2 TEDHaA
Of the fifty-three (53) petitions, thirteen (13) are instituted by new applicants to the
party-list system, whose respective applications for registration and/or accreditation filed
under Republic Act No. 7941 3 (RA 7941) and COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 4 dated
February 21, 2012 were denied by the COMELEC En Banc upon its review of the
resolutions of a division of the Commission.
The forty (40) other petitions are instituted by party-list groups or organizations that
have been previously registered and accredited by the COMELEC, with most of them
having been allowed to participate under the party-list system in the past elections.
These 40 petitions involve the COMELEC's recent cancellation of their groups'
registration and accreditation, which effectively denied them of the chance to participate
under the party-list system in the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
The Antecedents
All petitions stem from the petitioners' desire and intent to participate as candidates in
the party-list system of representation, which takes its core from Section 5, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Article VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5.1.The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their

respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and

progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
2.The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector. aAHISE
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
In 1995, RA 7941 was enacted to provide for the matters that shall govern the party-list
system, including the registration of party-list groups, the qualifications of party-list
nominees, and the election of party-list representatives. In 1998, the country's first
party-list election was held. Since then, the Court has been called upon on several
instances to resolve controversies on the system, oftentimes on questions involving the
qualifications of party-list groups and their nominees. Among the landmark cases on
these issues is Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 5 decided by the
Court in 2001, wherein the Court laid down the eight-point guidelines 6 in the
determination of the qualifications of party-list participants.
Pursuant to its specific mandate under Section 18 of RA 7941 to "promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the]
Act," the COMELEC issued on February 21, 2012 Resolution No. 9366. About 280 7
groups, comprised of new applicants and previously-registered party-list groups,
formally signified their intent to join the party-list system in the May 13, 2013 elections.
ESCDHA
As required in Rule 1, Resolution No. 9366 on the registration of organized groups that
are not yet registered under the party-list system, among the groups that filed with the
COMELEC their respective petitions for registration were: (1) Alab ng Mamamahayag
(ALAM), petitioner in G.R. No. 204139; (2) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204367; (3) Ako An Bisaya (AAB), petitioner in G.R. 204370; (4) Alagad ng Sining
(ASIN), petitioner in G.R. No. 204379; (5) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN), petitioner in G.R. No. 204394; (6) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204402; (7) Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs and
Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH), petitioner in G.R. No. 204426; (8) 1 Alliance Advocating
Autonomy Party (1AAAP), herein petitioner in G.R. No. 204435; (9) Manila Teachers
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers), petitioner in G.R. No. 204455;
(10) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and Associations of the Philippines, Inc.
(ALONA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204485; and (11) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204490. The political parties Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI), petitioner
in G.R. No. 204436, and Partido ng Bida (PBB), petitioner in G.R. No. 204484, also
sought to participate for the first time in the party-list elections, although their petitions
for registration were not filed under Rule 1 of Resolution No. 9366.

Party-list groups that were previously registered and accredited merely filed their
Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the
May 13, 2013 Elections, as provided in Rule 3 of Resolution No. 9366. Among these
parties were: (1) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum), petitioner in G.R. No. 203766;
(2) AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB), petitioner in G.R. Nos. 203818-19; (3) Association
of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), petitioner in G.R. No. 203922; (4) Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM), petitioner in G.R. No. 203936; (5)
Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA), petitioner in G.R. No.
203958; (6) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc. (1-CARE), petitioner in G.R.
No. 203960; (7) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO),
petitioner in G.R. No. 203976; (8) Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
Leadership (ARAL), petitioner in G.R. No. 203981; (9) Alliance for Rural Concerns
(ARC), petitioner in G.R. No. 204002; (10) Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD), petitioner in G.R. No. 204094; (11) 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204100; (12) 1 Guardians Nationalist
Philippines, Inc. (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), petitioner in G.R. No. 204122; (13) Agapay
ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204125;
(14) Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204126; (15) The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country, and People)
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY), petitioner in G.R. No. 204141; (16)
Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG MASDA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204153;
(17) Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc. (ABROAD), petitioner in G.R. No.
204158; (18) Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT), petitioner in G.R. No. 204174; (19)
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), petitioner in G.R. No.
204216; (20) Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG LINGKOD), petitioner in G.R. No.
204220; (21) Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K), petitioner in G.R. No. 204236;
(22) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP), petitioner in G.R. No. 204238; (23) Green Force
for the Environment Sons and Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE), petitioner
in G.R. No. 204239; (24) Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng Pilipinas
Movement (AGRI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204240; (25) Blessed Federation of Farmers
and Fishermen International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List), petitioner in G.R. No.
204263; (26) United Movement Against Drugs Foundation (UNIMAD), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204318; (27) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204321;
(28) Bayani Party List (BAYANI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204323; (29) Action League of
Indigenous Masses (ALIM), petitioner in G.R. No. 204341; (30) Butil Farmers Party
(BUTIL), petitioner in G.R. No. 204356; (31) Alliance of Advocates in Mining
Advancement for National Progress (AAMA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204358; (32) Social
Movement for Active Reform and Transparency (SMART), petitioner in G.R. No.
204359; (33) Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY), petitioner in G.R. No. 204364; (34) Binhi
Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI), petitioner in G.R. No.
204374; (35) Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor Youth Advancement and
Welfare (PACYAW), petitioner in G.R. No. 204408; (36) 1-United Transport Koalisyon
(1-UTAK), petitioner in G.R. No. 204410; (37) Coalition of Associations of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS), petitioner in G.R. No. 204421 and
G.R. No. 204425; (38) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), petitioner in G.R. No. 204428; and (39)
1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204486. SaHTCE
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which provides for
additional rules on the Commission's disposition of the new petitions and manifestations

of intent that were filed with it under Resolution No. 9366. Resolution No. 9513, entitled
In the Matter of: (1) The Automatic Review by the Commission En Banc of Pending
Petitions for Registration of Party-List Groups; and (2) Setting for Hearing the
Accredited Party-List Groups or Organizations which are Existing and which have Filed
Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the 2013 National Elections, reads in part:
WHEREAS, it is necessary and indispensable for the Commission
En Banc to review and affirm the grant of registration and
accreditation to party-list groups and organizations in view of its
role in ensuring that only those parties, groups, or organizations
with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the partylist system is registered and accredited to participate in the partylist system of representation;
WHEREAS, Section 4, Rule 1 of the Commission's Rules of
Procedure authorize[s] the suspension of the Rules or any portion
thereof in the interest of justice and in order to obtain the speedy
disposition of all matters pending before it; and
WHEREAS, Section 19 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure on
Motions for Reconsideration should be suspended in order for the
Commission En Banc to fulfill its role as stated in the Ang Bagong
Bayani case. EDATSC
NOW THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission on
Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution,
the Omnibus Election Code, and Republic Act No. 7941 or the
"Party List System Act", hereby RESOLVES to promulgate the
following:
1.In all pending cases where a Division grants the
Petition for Registration of a party-list group or
organization, the records shall be forwarded to
the Commission En Banc for automatic review
within five (5) days from the promulgation of the
Resolution without need of a motion for
reconsideration. It shall be understood that a
party-list group shall not be deemed accredited
without affirmation from the Commission En Banc
of the Division's ruling. For this purpose, the
provisions of Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure shall be suspended.
2.To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the
Commission En Banc, for purposes of
determining their continuing compliance with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines
in the Ang Bagong Bayani case, and, if noncompliant, cancel the registration of the following:
(a)Party-list groups or organizations which are
already registered and accredited and
will participate in the May 13, 2013
Elections, provided that the Commission

En Banc has not passed upon the grant

of their respective Petitions for
Registration; and
(b)Party-list groups or organizations which are
existing and retained in the list of
Registered Party-List Parties per
Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27
April 2012, and which have filed their
respective Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation in the May 13, 2013
Elections.
With the provision in Resolution No. 9513 on the COMELEC'S determination of the
continuing compliance of registered/accredited parties that have filed their
manifestations of intent, the Commission En Banc scheduled summary hearings on
various dates, and allowed the party-list groups to present their witnesses and submit
their evidence. 8 After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc issued the following
resolutions: DACaTI
1.Resolution 9 dated October 10, 2012 in SPP No. 12-154 (PLM)
and SPP No. 12-177 (PLM)
The COMELEC retained the registration and accreditation of AKB
10 as a political party, but denied its participation in the
May 2013 party-list elections. The COMELEC's ruling is
founded on several grounds. First, the party does not
represent or seek to uplift any marginalized and
underrepresented sector. From its constitution and bylaws, the party seeks to represent and uplift the lives of
Bicolanos, who, for the COMELEC, cannot be considered
or even associated with persons who are marginalized
and underrepresented. Second, the provinces in the Bicol
Region already have their respective representatives in
Congress. To allow more representatives for the Bicolanos
and the Bicol Region would violate the rule on proportional
representation of "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Manila in accordance with the number of their inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 11
Third, AKB's nominees, a businessman, three lawyers
and an ophthalmologist, are not marginalized and
underrepresented; thus, they fail to satisfy the seventh
guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2.Omnibus Resolution 12 dated October 11, 2012, which
covers SPP No. 12-161 (PLM), SPP No. 12-187 (PLM),
SPP No. 12-188 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-220 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of
Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC and UNIMAD.
The COMELEC held that Atong Paglaum's 13 nominees do not
belong to the sectors which the party represents, i.e., the

urban poor, consumer, women and youth. While these

include the women and youth sectors, five of the party's
six nominees are all male, and all of its nominees are
above 30 years 14 of age. Further, the COMELEC ruled
that the personal circumstances of the nominees belie the
claim that they belong to the urban poor sector: (1) its first
nominee 15 served as vice-president in a multinational
corporation; (2) its second nominee 16 is the owner of a
corporation engaged in the business of pineapple contract
growing with Del Monte Philippines; (3) its third nominee
17 is the owner and manager of two business
establishments; and (4) its sixth nominee 18 is an
electrical engineer and three-term member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon.
Finally, the COMELEC cited the party's failure to file its
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures when it
participated in the 2010 Elections, despite having been
ordered to do so during the summary evidentiary hearing.
HAaECD
In ruling against ARAL, 19 the COMELEC cited the party's "failure
to comply, and for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations pursuant to Section 6 (5) of RA No. 7941, in
connection with the fourth, sixth, and seventh guidelines in
Ang Bagong Bayani." 20 The Commission explained that
while the party seeks to represent the women and youth
sectors, only the first of its seven nominees is a woman,
and only its second nominee is below 30 years of age. The
Commission further took note that: first, some of its
activities were jointly conducted with religious
organizations, and second, its fifth nominee is a pastor.
"Although these circumstances are not sufficient proof that
the organization is itself a religious sect, denomination or
association and/or is organized for religious purposes, one
nevertheless cannot but hold doubt." 21
The registration of ARC 22 was cancelled for the failure of its
nominees to qualify. The party claims to represent landless
farmers, agrarian reform beneficiaries, fisherfolk, upland
dwellers, indigenous people and Bangsa Moro people. 23
However, none of its nominees belongs to any of these
sectors. In addition, the party failed to prove that a majority
of its members belong to the sectors that it seeks to
represent. The party's advocacy for the "development of
the rural sectors" is also not limited to the cited sectors, as
it may even include sectors that are not marginalized and
underrepresented. DTAIaH
UNIMAD 24 claims to represent "the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors which include young
professionals like drug counsellors and lecturers, veterans
and the youth, among others." 25 For the COMELEC,

however, such sectors are not marginalized and

underrepresented. The fight against illegal drugs is an
issue that interests the general public, and not just
particular sectors of the society. There are also existing
laws, such as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and various
specialized government agencies, such as the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Dangerous
Drugs Board (DDB), that already address the problem of
illegal drugs. In cancelling UNIMAD's registration, the
COMELEC also cited the party's failure to establish its
track record as an organization. Furthermore, while the
party claims to represent the youth and young
professionals, none of its nominees is aged below thirty
years.
3.Omnibus Resolution 26 dated October 16, 2012, which
covers SPP No. 12-196 (PLM), SPP No. 12-223 (PLM)
and SPP No. 12-257 (PLM)
The main reason for the cancellation of 1BRO-PGBI's 27
registration was its failure to define the sector that it seeks
to represent. An affidavit executed by its second nominee
indicates that the party represents professionals, while its
Manifestation of Intent indicates that it is multi-sectoral.
For the COMELEC, such differing statements from the
party reveal that 1BRO-PGBI does not really intend to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Instead, it only seeks to represent its members, and that it
is more of a "fraternity/brotherhood composed mostly of
military men with esoteric learnings." 28 The party's
nominees also did not appear to belong to a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, being a barangay captain,
consultant, guidance counselor, lawyer and retired
captain/security consultant. cSEaDA
The registration of 1GANAP/GUARDIANS 29 was also cancelled,
following the COMELEC's finding that it is a military
fraternity. The Commission also cited the following
grounds: first, there is a "glaring similarity between
1GANAP/GUARDIANS and 1BRO-PGBI;" 30 second, "it
wishes to protect the interests of its members; however, it
failed to establish . . . the group's service outside the walls
of its 'brotherhood';" 31 third, the "community volunteer
workers" sector which it seeks to represent is too broad to
allow for meaningful representation; and fourth, its
nominees do not appear to belong to the said sector.
A BLESSED Party-List 32 claims to represent farmers and
fishermen in Region XI. The COMELEC resolved to cancel
its registration after finding that three of its seven
nominees are "not themselves farmers and fishermen,
[and] none of its nominees are registered voters of Region
XI, the particular region which they seek to represent." 33

4.Resolution 34 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP No. 12-260

The COMELEC cancelled the registration of 1-CARE 35 on the
following grounds: (1) rural energy consumers, the sector
which 1-CARE intends to represent, is not marginalized
and underrepresented; (2) the party's track record and
activities are almost exclusively related to electric
cooperatives and not to rural energy consumers; and (3)
its nominees, all of whom are/were high-level officials of
various electric cooperatives in the country, do not belong
to the sector of rural energy consumers.
5.Resolution 36 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-201
(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of
APEC 37 on the following grounds: (1) a review of its
constitution and by-laws shows that it does not represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, as it is merely
an economic lobby group for the electric power industry;
and (2) all of its nominees, being an employee, electrical
engineer, sugar planter and retired government employee,
do not appear to belong to the sector that the party claims
to represent. DHTECc
6.Resolution 38 dated October 23, 2012 in SPP No. 12-232
(PLM)
In cancelling AT's 39 registration and accreditation, the COMELEC
ruled that: first, the party, which represents the sectors of
women, elderly, youth, labor and urban poor, does not
appear to have a bona fide intention to represent all these
sectors, as it has, in fact, failed to uplift the welfare of all
these sectors through the authorship or sponsorship by its
incumbent representative in Congress of house bills that
are beneficial to the elderly, youth and urban poor; and
second, its nominees, being all professionals, do not
belong to any of the marginalized sectors that the party
seeks to represent.
7.Omnibus Resolution 40 dated October 24, 2012, which
covers SPP Case No. 12-288 (PLM)
The COMELEC's resolution to cancel ARARO's 41 registration and
accreditation was founded on the following: (1) the
separate interests of the peasant and urban poor sectors,
which the party both represents, differ and even oftentimes
conflict; (2) most of its nominees cannot be considered
members of any of these sectors, as they reside "in the
gated subdivisions of Metro Manila"; 42 hence, such
nominees can be considered more as landowners, and not
farmers as they claim themselves to be; (3) the party failed
to show that three of its nominees 43 are among its bona
fide members; (4) Its nominee Quirino De La Torre (De La

Torre) appeared to be a farmland owner, rather than an

actual farmer; and (5) It failed to present any document to
show that its Board had resolved to participate in the May
2013 elections, and that De La Torre was authorized to
sign and file with the COMELEC the documents that are
required for the said purpose. CASTDI
8.Omnibus Resolution 44 dated October 24, 2012, which
covers SPP Case No. 12-279 (PLM), SPP No. 12-248
(PLM), SPP No. 12-263 (PLM), SPP No. 12-180 (PLM),
SPP No. 12-229 (PLM), SPP No. 12-217 (PLM), SPP No.
12-277 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-015 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AGRI, AKMA-PTM,
KAP, AKO BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG
MASDA and KAKUSA.
In AGRI's 45 case, the COMELEC ruled that: (1) for more than a
year immediately after the May 2010 elections, AGRI
stopped existing as an organization, and this constitutes
as a ground to cancel registration under Section 6 of RA
7941; (2) its nominees did not appear to actually belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
peasants and farmers, which the party seeks to represent;
(3) it submitted a list of only four nominees, instead of five
as mandated by Section 8 of RA 7941; and (4) there is no
showing that it undertook meaningful activities for the
upliftment of its constituency.
AKMA-PTM's 46 registration as a party to represent the farmers
sector was cancelled for its failure to show that majority of
its members and officers belonged to the marginalized and
underrepresented. There was also no proof that its first to
fourth nominees, 47 who were an educator and persons
engaged in business, actually belonged to a marginalized
and underrepresented sector. Its fifth to ninth nominees,
although all farmers, had not been shown to work on
uplifting the lives of the members of their sector. CAIHTE
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of KAP 48 (formerly Ako
Agila ng Nagkakaisang Magsasaka, Inc. Ako Agila) on
the following grounds: (1) its Manifestation of Intent and
Certificate of Nomination were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the party, as required by Section 3,
Rule 2 of Resolution No. 9366; (2) it failed to show that it
has continued to work for the betterment of the lives of the
members of the sectors it represents, i.e., farmers and
peasants; and (3) it failed to show that its nominees
actually belong to the sectors which the party represents,
or that they have undertaken meaningful activities which
address the concerns of said sectors.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AKO BAHAY 49 for its
failure to prove that its nominees actually belong to the

marginalized and underrepresented sector that the party

seeks to represent, i.e., the urban poor, or to have
engaged in meaningful activities that tend to uplift and
enrich the lives of the members of said sector.
BANTAY 50 claims to represent the "peasants, urban poor, workers
and nationalistic individuals who have stakes in promoting
security of the country against insurgency, criminality and
their roots in economic poverty." 51 The COMELEC held
that the party failed to prove that the majority of its
members belonged to the marginalized and
underrepresented. In addition, there was no proof that its
first and third nominees, a dentist and private sector
employee/businesswoman, respectively, actually belonged
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors which
BANTAY seeks to represent. ESDHCa
The registration of PACYAW 52 was cancelled on the following
grounds: first, since the party desired to change the sector
to represent, i.e., from the "urban poor youth" sector to the
"urban poor" sector, it needed to file a new application for
registration; second, it failed to show a credible track
record of working for the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented; third, it failed to prove that majority of
its officers and members were from the urban poor sector;
and fourth, its nominees are also not members of the
urban poor sector.
PASANG MASDA's 53 registration was cancelled on two grounds.
First, it represents both drivers and operators, who may
have conflicting interests that may adversely affect the
party's mandate to represent both sectors. Second, its
nominees are all operators or former operators, making
the COMELEC question the party's capacity to represent
the interests of drivers.
The registration of KAKUSA, 54 a party "organized to represent
persons imprisoned without proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt," 55 was cancelled by the COMELEC for
lack of proof that majority of its officers and members
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. The
Commission also took note of its failure to show that its
incumbent representative has been working on any
legislation in Congress to uplift the lives of those whom the
group allegedly represents. The party showed no credible
track record, and its nominees, being persons engaged in
business, did not appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented. AECDHS
9.Resolution 56 dated October 30, 2012 in SPP Case No. 12-256
(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled AG's 57 registration and accreditation on
three grounds. First, the party failed to appear during the

summary hearing scheduled by the COMELEC. For the

Commission, such failure shows the party's "wanton
disregard for the rules and regulations of [the]
Commission" 58 and constitutes a sufficient ground to
cancel its registration under Rule 2, Section 2 (f) 59 of
Resolution No. 9366. Second, the party does not intend to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector,
as evidenced by its lack of track record. In addition,
nowhere in its constitution, by-laws and platform of
government does it state the marginalized and
underrepresented sector that it seeks to represent. It is
only in its Memorandum later submitted to the COMELEC
that it mentions aiding the marginalized sectors of security
guards, drivers, vendors, tanods, small-scale businesses
and the jobless. Third, its nominees do not belong to any
of the mentioned sectors.
10.Resolution 60 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-185 (PLM)
ANAD's 61 registration and accreditation were cancelled by the
COMELEC on several grounds. First, it does not represent
an identifiable marginalized and underrepresented sector,
judging from the party's declared "advocacies to publicly
oppose, denounce and counter, communism in all its form
in the Filipino society, in industries, in the academe and in
the labor sector; to publicly oppose, denounce and counter
all acts of terrorism and insurgency; to preserve, protect
and promote the democratic principles of good
government and governance by peaceful and democratic
means under a regime of law and order; to generate and
provide avenues for the development of skills of its
members as aide in providing income opportunities;
develop and implement livelihood programs for its
members." 62 Second, the party submitted a list of only
three nominees, in violation of Section 4, Rule 3 of
Resolution No. 9366 that requires the submission of a list
of at least five nominees. Third, its nominees do not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. Fourth,
it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures for the 2007 National and Local Elections.
11.Omnibus Resolution 63 dated November 7, 2012, which
covers SPP No. 12-060 (PLM), SPP No. 12-254 (PLM)
and SPP 12-269 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of
GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K and ALIM. DECcAS
The ruling against GREENFORCE 64 was based on the following
grounds: (1) the party is only an advocacy group
composed of environmental enthusiasts intending to take
care of, protect and save Mother Earth and the country's

natural reserves from destruction or degradation; (2) even

if a liberal stance is adopted on the meaning of sectoral
representation, the accreditation of GREENFORCE still
merits cancellation for the party's failure to prove its
continuing compliance with the track record requirement;
(3) based on their certificates of acceptance, the personal
circumstances of GREENFORCE's nominees
demonstrate that they cannot be classified as
marginalized citizens. The first and second nominees are
businessmen, the third and fourth nominees are lawyers,
leaving only the fifth nominee, a fish farmer, as the only
marginalized citizen among the nominees.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of FIRM 24-K 65 after
finding that its nominees do not belong to the sectors
which the party represents. It pointed out that while FIRM
24-K supposedly represents the urban poor and peasants
in the National Capital Region, only two of its nominees
actually reside therein. Also, the COMELEC held that
FIRM 24-K failed to prove its track record as an
organization; that the photographs it submitted, showing
its tree-planting activities, are self-serving and incapable of
exhibiting an organized program for the urban poor.
DTCSHA
ALIM's 66 registration was cancelled for its failure to establish that
its nominees, or at least a majority of them, are members
of the indigenous people sector which the party seeks to
represent. Only its first nominee submitted a certificate
from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), which confirmed his membership with the Itawes
Indigenous Cultural Communities. In addition, the
COMELEC explained that while ALIM's president, Fatani
Abdul Malik, testified that their party specifically represents
the indigenous masses from Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, only two of the party's five nominees hailed
from those areas. Finally, the party had nominees who did
not appear to belong to a "marginalized class," being a
businessman, lawyer and real estate developer.
12.Resolution 67 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-204
(PLM)
In cancelling the registration of AAMA, 68 the COMELEC held that
the sectors it represents, namely, employees, either skilled
or ordinary labor, professionals directly engaged in mining
activities or occupation incidental thereto and nongovernment groups advocating advancement of
responsible mining for national progress, is a specifically
defined group which may not be allowed registration under
the party-list system. In addition, AAMA failed to establish
that its nominees actually represent and belong to said
sectors, that they have actively participated in the activities

of AAMA, that they truly adhere to its advocacies, and are

bona fide members of the party.
13.Resolution 69 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-272
(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of SMART 70 after
finding that its nominees are disqualified from representing
the sectors which the party represents, i.e., workers,
peasants, youth, students, women, professionals and
those belonging to sectors such as domestic helpers,
vendors, drivers and construction workers, since: first, the
party claims to represent the youth sector, yet four of its
five nominees are more than 30 years of age while its fifth
nominee would be more than 30 years of age on May 13,
2013; second, the party claims to represent the women
sector, yet four out of its five nominees are male; and third,
its nominees are composed of businessmen, a doctor, an
executive chef and a computer programmer, who are thus
not marginalized. Also, the COMELEC observed that the
party's activities do not specifically cater to the interest and
needs of the sectors which it represents. Lastly, the lack of
restrictions in the class of persons who may join SMART
casts doubt as to whether a majority its members are
indeed marginalized and underrepresented. EcaDCI
14.Resolution 71 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-173
(PLM)
The COMELEC held that the registration and accreditation in 2010
of ABP 72 as a party-list group was defective. The party
was initially accredited by the COMELEC in 2009 as a
regional political party. In November 2009, it only filed a
Manifestation of Intent to participate in the May 2010
elections, instead of a petition for registration under
Section 5 of RA 7941. Acting on the recommendation of its
Law Department, the COMELEC accredited ABP as a
party-list group on January 15, 2010. The COMELEC then
ruled that ABP could not be accredited for the May 2013
Elections as a party-list group sans the filing of a petition
for registration. Also, the COMELEC held that ABP does
not represent any sector. While it claimed during the
summary evidentiary hearing that it represents
construction workers and professionals, its constitution
and by-laws indicate that its membership is composed of
men and women in Region V. Lastly, none of ABP's
nominees are employed in the construction industry.
15.Resolution 73 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-210 (PLM)
BAYANI 74 claims to represent "the marginalized and
underrepresented professional sector [comprised] of
millions of jobless and underemployed professionals such

as the registered nurses, midwives, engineers, lawyers,

[certified public accountants], among others." 75 Its
registration and accreditation were cancelled by the
COMELEC on the ground of its failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the marginalized and
underrepresented sector of professionals. In addition, the
party's second nominee, 76 being a businessman, was
declared unqualified to represent the sector of
professionals.
16.Resolution 77 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-252 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of AANI 78 were cancelled on
several grounds. First, the party has failed to establish a
track record of enhancing the lives of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers which it claims to represent. Its
activities that include relief operations and consultative
meetings did not appear to primarily benefit the said
sector. Second, more than majority of the party's
nominees are not farmers, contrary to the seventh
guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani that a party's nominees
must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector to be represented. HDITCS
17.Resolution 79 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-292 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of A-IPRA, 80 which claims to
represent and advance the interests of indigenous
peoples, were cancelled on the ground of its failure to
prove that its five nominees are "indeed indigenous
people; have actively participated in the undertakings of AIPRA; truly adhere to its advocacies; and most of all, that
the said nominees are its bona fide members." 81
18.Resolution 82 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-202 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of
COCOFED 83 on several grounds. First, the party is
already affiliated with a number of coconut agencies, both
private and government. COCOFED admits that it sits in
the board of the United Coconut Association of the
Philippines (UCAP), the Philippine Coconut Research and
Development Foundation (PCRDF), Coconut Investment
Co. (CIC), Cocofed Marketing Corporation (CMC) and the
Quezon Coconut Planters Savings and Loan Bank
(QCPSLB). Such circumstance negates the claim that it is
still marginalized. Second, a party-list group must not be
an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded by
the government. Contrary to this guideline, COCOFED
openly admits that it is assisted by the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA) in various farmer-oriented projects. Third,

COCOFED's nominees are not members of the

marginalized sector of coconut farmers and producers,
which the party claims to represent. HcISTE
19.Resolution 84 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No. 12-238
(PLM)
ABANG LINGKOD's 85 registration was cancelled for its failure to
establish a track record of continuously representing
marginalized and underrepresented peasant farmers.
Further, the party failed to show that its members actually
belong to the sector which it claims to represent. As
regards the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD's
nominees, there was a failure to show that they are
themselves marginalized and underrepresented, that they
have actively participated in programs for the
advancement of peasant farmers, and that they truly
adhere to the advocacies of ABANG LINGKOD.
20.Resolution 86 dated November 14, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-158 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of ABROAD 87 were cancelled
on several grounds. First, the party was accredited as a
regional multi-sectoral party to represent the sectors of
labor, overseas workers, professionals, urban poor and
peasants. However, the documents submitted by the party
indicate that it only advances the welfare of the labor,
overseas workers and professionals sectors, and fails to
champion the causes of the urban poor and peasants
sectors. In addition, while the party was registered way
back in September 2009, the documents presented to
prove its track record only show its activities beginning
January 15, 2011. The COMELEC held, "(w)hat transpired
from September 4, 2009 to December 2010 is a puzzle to
us. ABROAD could have already carried out its purposes
and platform of government in this period of time to
promote the interests of its members, but it did not." 88
Third, ABROAD's nominees do not fall under any of the
sectors which the party seeks to represent.
21.Resolution 89 dated November 28, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-228 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and accreditation of
BINHI 90 on the following grounds: (1) the party's
component organization, the Cabanatuan City Seed
Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CCSGMPC), being a
cooperative duly registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), cannot be considered as a
marginalized or underrepresented sectoral organization as
it already receives ample assistance, attention and
protection from the State through the CDA; (2) being a
cooperative, the party receives assistance from the

government through the Department of Agriculture, in

violation of the fifth guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani; and
(3) while it may appear from the documents submitted
during the summary evidentiary hearing that BINHI/
CCSGMPC indeed promotes the interests and concerns of
peasants, farmers and farm tillers, there is no proof,
however, that the group, as a whole, is marginalized and
underrepresented. cADEHI
22.Resolution 91 dated November 28, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-136 (PLM)
The registration and accreditation of BUTIL 92 were cancelled on
two grounds. First, in the Judicial Affidavit submitted by its
Secretary General to the Comelec, it is stated that the
party represents "members of the agriculture and
cooperative sector." For the COMELEC, BUTIL failed to
establish that the "agricultural and cooperative sectors"
are marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the
party's nominees neither appear to belong to the sectors
which they seek to represent, nor to have actively
participated in the undertakings of the party. DcCEHI
23.Resolution 93 dated December 3, 2012 in SPP No. 12-194
(PLM)
1st KABAGIS 94 was found by the COMELEC to have ceased to
exist after the 2010 elections. The documents which it
submitted to prove its continued existence were
substantially the same as those it presented to support its
petition for registration in 2009. Furthermore, 1st
KABAGIS appeared to have "recycled the documentation
of its activities in 2009 to deliberately mislead the
Commission to believe that it has existed continuously." 95
For the COMELEC, these circumstances constitute
sufficient grounds for the cancellation of the party's
registration, as provided in Section 6 (6) and (7) of RA
7941 on a party's declaration of untruthful statements in
the petition and failure to exist for at least one year. Finally,
the COMELEC took note that while 1st KABAGIS intends
to represent the labor, fisherfolks and the urban poor
indigenous cultural communities sectors, none of its five
nominees belong to any of these sectors.
24.Resolution 96 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-198
(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled 1-UTAK's 97 accreditation, holding that:
First, the party does not factually and truly represent a
marginalized sector considering that drivers and
operators, which 1-UTAK seeks to both represent, have
diametrically opposing interests. The advocacy of drivers
pertains to wages and benefits while operators are mainly
concerned with their profits. Second, the party's nominees

do not belong to any marginalized and underrepresented

sector. The party did not even include among its nominees
a representative from the drivers' sector.
25.Resolution 98 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM)
In cancelling the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS, 99 the
COMELEC explained that, first, its nominees during the
May 2010 elections had agreed on a term-sharing
agreement, which circumvented Section 7, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that mandates a three-year term for
members of the House of Representatives. The termsharing agreement was also declared contrary to public
policy since a given term of public office cannot be made
subject to any agreement of the parties; it is not a
commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made
subject of any private agreement. The Commission further
cited Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366,
and emphasized that a violation or failure to comply with
laws, rules and regulations relating to elections is,
pursuant to Section 6 (5) of RA 7941, a ground for the
cancellation of a party's registration. TASCEc
26.Resolution 100 dated December 5, 2012 in SPP No. 11-002
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's
resolution to grant the registration and accreditation of
PBB 101 as an NCR Political Party, but prohibited it from
participating in the 2013 party-list elections based on the
following grounds: (1) the party does not represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector, as it is
composed of businessmen, civil society groups, politicians
and ordinary citizens advocating genuine people
empowerment, social justice, and environmental
protection and utilization for sustainable development; (2)
it failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and
(3) it failed to establish its track record as an organization
that seeks to uplift the lives of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
The COMELEC En Banc's authority under Resolution No. 9513 to conduct an
automatic review of the COMELEC divisions' resolutions favoring new registrants also
resulted in the COMELEC En Banc's issuance of several resolutions. It reversed the
rulings of the Commission's divisions through the issuance of the following:
1.Resolution 102 dated November 23, 2012 in SPP No. 12-099
(PLM)
ASIN's 103 petition for registration was denied by the COMELEC
En Banc on the following grounds: first, the "artists" sector,
which is among the sectors which ASIN seeks to
represent, is not considered marginalized and
underrepresented under RA 7941 and relevant

jurisprudence; second, ASIN failed to prove its track

record as an organization, there being no sufficient
evidence to show that it had performed acts that tend to
advance the interest of the sectors which it seeks to
represent; and third, ASIN failed to show that its nominees
are qualified under the provisions of RA 7941 and the
guidelines laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2.Omnibus Resolution 104 dated November 27, 2012, which
covers SPP No. 12-041 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-011
(PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied the registration of Manila
Teachers and ALA-EH.
In denying Manila Teachers' 105 petition, the COMELEC En Banc
reasoned that a non-stock savings and loan association
cannot be considered a marginalized and
underrepresented sector under the party-list system of
representation, for being neither a part of the "working
class," "service class," "economically deprived," "social
outcasts," "vulnerable" and "work impaired." 106
Furthermore, the COMELEC held that a non-stock savings
and loan association is mandated to engage, exclusively,
in the legitimate business of a non-stock savings and loan
association; thus, the very foundation of its organization
would be forfeited should it pursue its party-list campaign.
107 Even granting that Manila Teachers may seek
registration under the party-list system as a group
representing public school teachers, the fact that its first
and second nominees are not teachers by profession
adversely affects the party's application. aDSIHc
The denial of ALA-EH's 108 petition was based on its failure to
show that its members, particularly businessmen, sports
enthusiasts, donors and hobbyists, belong to an
identifiable group of persons which the law considers as
marginalized. Further, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that
the group's nominees did not appear to be qualified, as
they were individuals doing financially well in their
respective businesses that do not contribute to the welfare
of Filipino athletes and sports enthusiasts. 109
3.Resolution 110 dated November 27, 2012 in SPP No. 12-057
(PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied 1AAAP's 111 petition on the
ground of the failure of the party's nominees to qualify.
While the group seeks registration as a regional political
party under Region XI, its third and fourth nominees 112
are not residents of the said region. For the COMELEC En
Banc, such circumstance disqualifies them as nominees,
for "it would be difficult for the said nominees to represent
the interest of 1AAAP's supposed constituency who are

residents and voters of Region XI." 113 In addition, the

group failed to satisfy the second guideline in Ang Bagong
Bayani, with the Comelec En Banc taking note that four
114 of its five nominees do not belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector. cdasia
4.Resolution 115 dated November 27, 2012 in SPP No. 12-104
(PL)
AKIN 116 claims to be an organization of health workers and social
workers from urban poor communities. The denial of its
petition is founded on the group's failure to show that its
nominees belong to the urban poor sector. Its first and
second nominees 117 are lawyers, its second nominee
118 is a retired government employee, its fourth nominee
119 is an accountant/social volunteer worker, and its fifth
nominee 120 is a secretary.
5.Resolution 121 dated November 29, 2012 in SPP No. 12-011
(PP)
AAB 122 applied for registration as a regional political party in
Region VIII, allegedly with "constituencies [composed of]
the men and women (registered voters) of Region VIII, its
provinces, cities, municipalities and all other Bisayans
from the other parts of the Philippines whose roots can be
traced to the Bisayan Regions of Region VIII . . . ." 123 In
denying AAB's petition, the COMELEC En Banc cited the
following grounds: first, the records do not show that the
group represents a marginalized sector of the society,
other than by its claim to have formed a sectoral wing, the
Association of Bisayan Farmers-R8 (ABF-R8), registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on
May 4, 2012 and aiming to pursue legislation and
programs for the benefit of the Bisayan farmers in Region
VIII; second, AAB's alleged constituencies in Region VIII
are not underrepresented because they already have their
district representatives in Congress; third, granting that
ABF-R8 is a legitimate sectoral group of AAB, it has been
in existence only since May 4, 2012, putting into question
its track record of representing peasants and farmers; and
fourth, its nominees are neither farmers nor peasants
three are lawyers, and the two others are company
employees. HAECID
6.Resolution 124 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP Case Nos.
12-009 (PP) and 12-165 (PLM)
Although the COMELEC En Banc affirmed AI's 125 registration as
a regional political party in Region VI, it denied the party's
registration under the party-list system on several
grounds. First, the party failed to show that it represents a
marginalized and underrepresented sector, considering
that the Province of Iloilo already has "no less than five (5)

incumbent district representatives in Congress." 126

Second, the party made untruthful statements in the
Memorandum it filed with the COMELEC, when it claimed
that some of its nominees are members of its sectoral
wings Patlad-Cayos Farmers' Association (Patlad-Cayos)
and Alyansa ng Industriya ng Bigas (ANIB), composed of
farmers and NFA-accredited retailers, respectively. The
COMELEC En Banc took note that none of its nominees
are farmers and food retailers, judging from their
occupations or professions as declared in the certificates
of acceptance to their nominations. Third, AI's fourth
nominee 127 has withdrawn his acceptance to his
nomination, while its first 128 and fifth 129 nominees have
filed their certificates of candidacy for local elective
positions in Iloilo.
7.Resolution 130 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP No. 12-175
(PL)
ALONA 131 claims to be an aggrupation of citizen groups
composed of homeowners' associations, urban poor,
elderly organizations, young professionals, overseas
Filipino workers, women, entrepreneurs, cooperatives,
fisherfolk, farmers, labor, transport, vendors and youth
groups. In ruling against the party's petition, the
COMELEC En Banc cited: first, the group's failure to
establish how it can represent all these fourteen (14)
sectors which have different, even conflicting, causes and
needs; second, the sectors of homeowners associations,
entrepreneurs and cooperatives are not marginalized and
underrepresented; and third, three of the party's
nominees, a businessman and two lawyers, do not belong
to any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Among the petitioners, only the petitions for registration of ALAM, KALIKASAN, PPP
and GUARDJAN were denied by a division of the COMELEC in the first instance. The
divisions' rulings were elevated to the COMELEC En Banc by virtue of motions for
reconsideration, which were resolved via the following Resolutions:
1.Resolution 132 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP 12-127 (PL)
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's
finding that ALAM 133 failed to sufficiently prove its track
record as an organization, and to show that it actually
represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized and the
underrepresented. Further, the COMELEC En Banc ruled
that the myriad of sectors which ALAM seeks to
represent, i.e., community print journalists, news dealers,
news sellers, newsboys, tribesmen who learned to love
the liberty of the press, B'laan tribesmen who cry for
ancestral lands, urban poor or informal settlers, drivers
and small-time operators of transport units, poor residents
in urban barangays, and labor and jury system advocates,

is too broad and unrelated to one another. Although there

is no prohibition against multi-sectoral representation in
the party-list system, a party, organization or coalition
which seeks registration must be capable of serving fully
all the sectors which it seeks to represent. HcaDIA
2.Resolution 134 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP Case No.
12-061 (PP)
KALIKASAN, 135 a group which claims to be a pro-environment
political party representing the sectors of workers, informal
settlers, women, youth, elderly, fisherfolks, handicapped,
overseas workers and ordinary professionals who are
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and
environmental degradation, 136 was denied registration,
on the following grounds: (1) the principles and objectives
stated in its constitution and by-laws reflect an advocacy
for the protection of the environment rather than for the
causes of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
it seeks to represent; (2) there is no proof that majority of
its membership belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented; (3) it seeks to represent sectors with
conflicting interests; and (4) its nominees do not belong to
any of the sectors which the party claims to represent.
3.Resolution 137 dated November 14, 2012 in SPP No. 12-145
(PL)
GUARDJAN's 138 petition for registration was denied on the
ground of its failure to prove its membership base and
solid track record. The group failed to present the activities
that sufficiently benefited its intended constituency of
guards, utility helpers, aiders, riders, drivers, domestic
helpers, janitors, agents and nannies. Its nominees were
also found to be unqualified, as they do not belong to any
of the sectors which GUARDJAN seeks to represent;
rather, they are the owner, consultant or manager of
agencies which employ security guards. For the
COMELEC En Banc, such circumstance will only result in
a conflict of interest between the owners or managers of
security agencies on one hand, and the security guards on
the other.
4.Resolution 139 dated December 5, 2012 in SPP No. 12-073
(PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings of the COMELEC
First Division, which cited in its Resolution 140 the failure
of PPP 141 to show a constituency of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The group claims to represent
the entire four provinces and five cities of Region XII, all
already belonging to eight congressional districts, and
already represented by eight district congressmen.
Furthermore, the group has failed to show a track record

of undertaking programs that are aimed at promoting the

welfare of the group or any sector that it claims to
represent. IcTCHD
The issuance by the COMELEC En Banc of the foregoing resolutions prompted the
filing of the present petitions, which delve primarily on the following contentions:
First, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 9513. The petitioners challenge the
COMELEC En Banc's authority under the Resolution to conduct an automatic review of
its division's resolutions notwithstanding the absence of a motion for reconsideration.
For the petitioners, the COMELEC En Banc cannot dismiss with the procedural
requirement on the filing of motions for reconsideration under Rule 19 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure before it can review a decision or resolution rendered by
any of its divisions in quasi-judicial proceedings.
As regards the COMELEC's resolve to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
the continuing compliance of previously-registered and accredited party-list groups, the
COMELEC En Banc denied the parties of their right to due process and has violated the
principle of res judicata that should have otherwise worked in the petitioners' favor.
Further, the COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers, which they claim to
include the cancellation of existing registration and accreditation, could not have been
exercised at the first instance by the COMELEC En Banc, but should have been first
decided by a division of the Commission.
Second, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in refusing or cancelling the petitioners' registration and
accreditation under the party-list system. The petitioners assail the COMELEC En
Banc's appreciation of facts and application of pertinent laws and jurisprudence,
especially the eight-point guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani, in determining their sectors',
groups' and nominees' respective qualifications.
Given the common questions and the similarity in the issues that are raised in the 53
subject petitions, the Court has resolved, through its Resolutions of November 13, 2012,
November 20, 2012, November 27, 2012, December 4, 2012, December 11, 2012 and
February 19, 2013 to consolidate the petitions, and require the COMELEC to comment
thereon.
With the petitioners' inclusion in their respective petitions of prayers for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court also ordered,
via the afore-mentioned resolutions, the issuance of Status Quo Ante Orders (SQAOs)
in all the petitions. HDATCc
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the respondent COMELEC,
filed its Consolidated Comments on the petitions. In refuting the petitioners' claim of
grave abuse of discretion against the COMELEC, the OSG submitted the following
arguments: 142
First, the COMELEC has the power to review existing party-list groups' or organizations'
compliance with the requirements provided by law and the guidelines set by
jurisprudence on the party-list system. The OSG cites Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution which enumerates the powers and functions of the COMELEC, giving
emphasis on paragraph 1 thereof that gives the Commission the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, and paragraph

5 that cites the Commission's power to register political parties, organizations or

coalitions.

Constitution, the powers and functions of the COMELEC were

defined as follows: HSaIDc

Second, the COMELEC's review of the parties' qualifications was a valid exercise by the
COMELEC of its administrative powers; hence, the COMELEC En Banc could have,
even at the first instance, ruled on it.

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have

exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall
exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon
it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to
vote, all administrative questions affecting elections,
including the determination of the number and location of
polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors
and of other election officials. All law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when
so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies
for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest
election. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the
Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme
Court. . . .

Third, the requirements of due process were satisfied because the petitioners were
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC's resolve to
suspend its own rules was sanctioned by law, as it was aimed for a speedy disposition
of matters before the Commission. Furthermore, no petitioner had previously
questioned the procedure that was adopted by the COMELEC on the review of the
parties' registration; instead, the groups voluntarily submitted to the Commission's
jurisdiction and actively participated in its proceedings.
Fourth, the COMELEC faithfully applied the grounds for denial and cancellation of a
group's registration, as provided by statute and prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG
specifically cites Sections 5 to 9 of RA 7941 and the eight-point guidelines in Ang
Bagong Bayani. TADCSE
Fifth, the COMELEC's findings of fact in each petitioner's case are supported by
substantial evidence; thus, are final and non-reviewable as provided in Section 5, Rule
64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In prcis, the fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions concern two main issues: the
procedural issue as to the COMELEC En Banc's power to automatically review a
decision of its division without the requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration, and the
substantive issue as to the COMELEC's alleged grave abuse of discretion in denying or
cancelling the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system of the
petitioners.
I signify my assent to the ponencia's rulings on the procedural issue; however,
consistent with afore-quoted pronouncement of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani, 143 I
signify my strong dissent on major points in the ponencia's resolution of the substantive
issue, including its discussions on the nature of the party-list system and its disposition
on the qualifications of political parties which seek to participate under the party-list
system of representation. Furthermore, notwithstanding the new standards that the
ponencia now provides for party-list groups, the remand of all 53 petitions to the
COMELEC is unnecessary.
Procedural Aspect
The Powers and Functions of the
COMELEC
Under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized as the sole authority in the
enforcement and administration of election laws. This grant of power retraces its history
in the 1935 Constitution. From then, the powers and functions of the COMELEC had
continuously been expounded to respond to the call of contemporary times. In Mendoza
v. Commission on Elections, 144 the Court briefly noted:
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative
agency whose powers have been increased from the 1935
Constitution to the present one, to reflect the country's awareness
of the need to provide greater regulation and protection to our
electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In the 1935

These evolved into the following powers and functions under the
1973 Constitution:
(1)Enforce and administer all laws relative to
the conduct of elections.
(2)Be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and
elective provincial and city officials.
(3)Decide, save those involving the right to
vote, administrative questions affecting
elections, including the determination of the
number and location of polling places, the
appointment of election officials and inspectors,
and the registration of voters. cCAaHD
These powers have been enhanced in scope and details under the
1987 Constitution, . . . 145
Under the 1987 Constitution, the intent to reinforce the authority of the COMELEC is
evident in the grant of several other powers upon the Commission, specifically under
Section 2, Article IX-C thereof which reads:
Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
1.Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
2.Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate

jurisdiction over all contests involving elective

municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory, and not appealable.
3.Decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of
polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters.
aTCAcI
4.Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
5.Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present
their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and
adhere to this Constitution, or which are
supported by any foreign government shall
likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign
governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections, constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be
an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
6.File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions

constituting election frauds, offenses, and

malpractices.
7.Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies. IDAESH
8.Recommend to the President the removal of
any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its
directive, order, or decision.
9.Submit to the President and the Congress, a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or
recall.
Essentially, the COMELEC has general and specific powers. Section 2 (1) of Article IXC partakes of the general grant of the power to the COMELEC to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall." The authority given to the COMELEC under this
provision encapsulates all the other powers granted to it under the Constitution. The
intention in providing this general grant of power is to give the COMELEC a wide
latitude in dealing with matters under its jurisdiction so as not to unduly delimit the
performance of its functions. Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this constitutional
provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve
the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. 146 The
rest of the enumeration in the mentioned provision constitutes the COMELEC's specific
powers.
As to the nature of the power exercised, the COMELEC's powers can further be
classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and, in limited instances,
judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the Commission embraces the power to resolve
controversies arising in the enforcement of election laws and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations
to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. 147 cTSDAH
In Baytan v. COMELEC, 148 the Court had the occasion to pass upon the classification
of the powers being exercised by the COMELEC, thus:
The COMELEC's administrative powers are found in Section 2
(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987
Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should
exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division.
The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative
powers in the "Commission on Elections," while providing that the

COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the

COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its
administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the
COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers are
found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
"Section 2.The Commission on Elections shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 149 (Emphasis
supplied)
The distinction on the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is crucial
to the procedure which has to be observed so as to stamp an official action with validity.
In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates
the COMELEC to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion for
reconsideration, by the COMELEC En Banc. 150 Section 3 of Article IX-C states:
DAaIEc
Section 3.The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
On the other hand, matters within the administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC may
be acted upon directly by the COMELEC En Banc without having to pass through any of
its divisions. 151
The Issuance of Resolution No. 9513
as an Implement of the Power to
Register Political Parties,
Organizations and Coalitions
One of the specific powers granted to the COMELEC is the power to register political
parties, organizations and coalitions articulated in Section 2 (5) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, thus:
(5)Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements,
must present their platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse

to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported

by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
xxx xxx xxx
The essence of registration cannot be overemphasized. Registration and the formal
recognition that accompanies it are required because of the Constitution's concern
about the character of the organizations officially participating in the elections. 152
Specifically, the process of registration serves to filter the applicants for electoral seats
and segregate the qualified from the ineligible. The purity of this exercise is crucial to
the achievement of orderly, honest and peaceful elections which the Constitution
envisions.
The power to register political parties, however, is not a mere clerical exercise. The
COMELEC does not simply register every party, organization or coalition that comes to
its office and manifests its intent to participate in the elections. Registration entails the
possession of qualifications. The party seeking registration must first present its
qualifications before registration will follow as a matter of course. TAacIE
Similar with all the specific powers of the COMELEC, the power to register political
parties, organizations and coalitions must be understood as an implement by which its
general power to enforce and administer election laws is being realized. The exercise of
this power must thus be construed in a manner that will aid the COMELEC in fulfilling its
duty of ensuring that the electoral exercise is held exclusive to those who possess the
qualifications set by the law.
It is pursuant to this duty that the COMELEC found it imperative to promulgate
Resolution No. 9513. The said Resolution seeks to manage the registration of party-list
groups, organizations and coalitions that are aspiring to participate in the 2013 National
and Local Elections, with the objective of ensuring that only those parties, groups or
organizations with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system are registered and accredited to participate in the party-list system of
representation.
Plainly, the resolution authorized the COMELEC En Banc to automatically review all
pending registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions and to set for
summary evidentiary hearings all those that were previously registered to determine
continuing compliance. To effectively carry out the purpose of the Resolution, the
COMELEC suspended Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically
the requirement for a motion for reconsideration.
In the implementation of Resolution No. 9513, a number of applicants for registration as
party-list group, organization or coalition were denied registration by the COMELEC En
Banc, while several others that were previously registered and/or accredited were
stripped of their status as registered and/or accredited party-list groups, organizations or
coalitions.
Given the circumstances, I agree with the majority that the action of the COMELEC En
Banc was well-within its authority.
The arguments of the petitioners proceed from a feeble understanding of the nature of
the powers being exercised by the COMELEC in which the procedure to be observed
depends. Indeed, in a quasi-judicial proceeding, the COMELEC En Banc does not have
the authority to assume jurisdiction without the filing of a motion for reconsideration. The
filing of a motion for reconsideration presupposes that the case had been heard, passed

upon and disposed by the COMELEC Division before the same is subjected to review of
the COMELEC En Banc. cITaCS

law. There are no contending parties or actual controversy. It is merely the applicant
proving his qualifications to participate in the elections.

In Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Esteva, 153 the Court defined quasi-judicial power, to wit:

The foregoing ratiocination, however, does not suggest that the COMELEC En Banc
can forthwith act on pending petitions for registration and subject previously-registered
party list groups, organizations and coalitions to summary evidentiary hearings to
determine continuing compliance simply because it is administrative in nature. Indeed, it
may do so, but only with respect to the latter group.

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other

hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the
rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since
rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be
observed in the conduct of the proceedings. 154
To be clear, the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers in deciding election contests
where, in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, it holds hearings and exercises
discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertains the facts from the parties'
submissions, determines the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of
all these, decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. 155
However, the registration of political parties, organizations and coalitions stated in
Section 2 (5) of Article IX-C of the Constitution involves the exercise of administrative
power. The Court has earlier declared in Baytan that Sections 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7),
(8) and (9) of Article IX-C pertain to the administrative powers of the COMELEC. 156 It
reiterated this pronouncement in Bautista v. COMELEC 157 where it further deliberated
on the distinctions between the administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the
COMELEC. And recently, in Magdalo v. COMELEC, 158 it made a categorical
pronouncement that the power of the COMELEC to register political parties and
ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in
character. 159
Distinguishing the nature of the power being exercised by the COMELEC is relevant
because of the different set of rules that applies to each. For instance, in Canicosa v.
COMELEC, 160 the Court stressed that matters falling under the administrative
jurisdiction of the COMELEC may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC En Banc.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution underscores the
requirement for a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take
action in quasi-judicial proceedings. DAHSaT
The COMELEC's determination as to whether a party is a political party entitled to
registration is an exercise of its constitutional power of administering the laws relative to
the conduct of elections. 161 The same principle applies in the registration of party-list
groups, organizations and coalitions. In the process of registration, the COMELEC
determines whether the applicant possesses all the qualifications required under the

I distinguish between (1) new or pending petitions for registration (referred to as the first
group), and; (2) previously registered and/or accredited party-list groups, organizations
and coalitions (referred to as the second group).
As regards the first group, the COMELEC En Banc cannot directly act on new petitions
for registration as there is a specific procedure governing the performance of this
function. It bears noting that pursuant to the authority vested in the COMELEC to
promulgate rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of cases, 162 it
drafted the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which will govern pleadings, practice
and procedure before the Commission. Under Section 32 of the said Rules, the
registration of political parties or organizations is classified under Special Proceedings,
together with annulment of permanent list of voters and accreditation of citizen's arms of
the Commission. In relation to this, Section 3 of Rule 3 states: SCaDAE
Section 3.The Commission Sitting in Divisions. The
Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide
protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special
cases, provisional remedies, contempt, and special proceedings
except in accreditation of citizens' arm of the Commission.
(Emphasis ours)
The same rule applies to the registration of party-list groups, organizations or coalitions.
Thus, petitions for registration of party-list groups, organizations and coalitions are first
heard by the COMELEC Division before they are elevated to the En Banc on motion for
reconsideration. It is this requirement for a motion for reconsideration of the resolutions
of the COMELEC Division granting new petitions for registration that the COMELEC
suspended in Resolution No. 9513. In doing so, the COMELEC resorted to Section 4,
Rule 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
Section 4.Suspension of the Rules. In the interest of justice and
in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before
the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be
suspended by the Commission.
Surely, the suspension of the rule will serve the greater interest of justice and public
good since the objective is to purge the list of registrants of those who are not qualified
to participate in the elections of party-list representatives in Congress. Ultimately, it will
help secure the electoral seats to the intended beneficiaries of RA 7941 and, at the
same time, guard against fly-by-night groups and organizations that are seeking for the
opportune time to snatch a chance. By virtue of the suspension of the requirement for
motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc may then automatically review
pending petitions for registration and determine if the qualifications under the law are
truly met. It is a measure that was pursued in order that the COMELEC may fulfill its
duty to ensure the purity of elections. And, as the rules of procedure are designed to

facilitate the COMELEC's performance of its duties, it must never be a stumbling block
in achieving the very purpose of its creation.
With respect to the second group, the COMELEC En Banc may directly order the
conduct of summary evidentiary hearings to determine continuing compliance
considering that there is no specific procedure on this matter. The petitioners cannot
invoke Section 3, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure since this provision
relates only to new petitions for registration. Absent a special rule or procedure, the
COMELEC En Banc may directly act or perform an otherwise administrative function,
consistent with our pronouncement in Canicosa.
The authority of the COMELEC En Banc to subject previously-registered and/or
accredited party-list groups, organizations and coalitions to summary evidentiary
hearing emanates from its general power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election 163 and duty to ensure "free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections." 164 Part and parcel of this duty is the
maintenance of a list of qualified candidates. Correlative to this duty of the COMELEC is
the duty of the candidate or, in this case, the registered party-list groups, organizations
or coalitions to maintain their qualifications. TEDaAc
Consistent with the principle that the right to hold public office is a privilege, it is
incumbent upon aspiring participants in the party-list system of representation to
satisfactorily show that they have the required qualifications stated in the law and
prevailing jurisprudence. Specifically, a party-list group or organization applying for
registration in the first instance must present sufficient evidence to establish its
qualifications. It is only upon proof of possession of qualifications that registration
follows.
The process, however, does not end with registration. Party-list groups and
organizations that are previously allowed registration and/or accreditation are dutybound to maintain their qualifications.
In Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 165 the Court emphasized:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title
may be seasonably challenged. 166
It can be gathered from the foregoing that the fact that a candidate who was allowed to
participate in the elections and hold office does not give him a vested right to retain his
position notwithstanding loss of qualification. The elective official must maintain his
qualifications lest he loses the right to the office he is holding.
Further, the fact that a candidate was previously allowed to run or hold public office
does not exempt him from establishing his qualifications once again in case he bids for
reelection. He must maintain and attest to his qualifications every time he is minded to
join the electoral race. Thus, he is required to file a certificate of candidacy even if he is
an incumbent elective official or previously a candidate in the immediately preceding
elections.
Similar to individual candidates, registered party-list groups, organizations and
coalitions must also establish their continuing compliance with the requirements of the
law which are specific to those running under the party-list system of representation.

Registration does not vest them the perpetual right to participate in the election. The
basis of the right to participate in the elections remains to be the possession of
qualifications. Resolution No. 9513 is a formal recognition of the COMELEC's duty to
ensure that only those who are qualified must be allowed to run as party-list
representative. It cannot be defeated by a claim of previous registration.
Therefore, it is my view that the COMELEC cannot be estopped from cancelling existing
registration and/or accreditation in case the concerned party-list group or organization
failed to maintain its qualifications. Being the authority which permits registration and/or
accreditation, it also has the power to cancel the same in the event that the basis of the
grant no longer exists. SHADcT
Inapplicability of the Doctrine of Res
Judicata
Similarly, the COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing pending registration and
existing registration and/or accreditation of party-list groups, organizations and
coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited in a long line of
jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. 167
Moreover, the application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence of four
(4) elements, viz.: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties during the trial of the case; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action. 168
Here, the resolutions of the COMELEC Division, allowing the registration of the
applicant party-list groups and organizations do not partake of a final judgment or order.
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to
be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on
the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are and which party is right. Once rendered, the task of
the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and
liabilities of the litigants is concerned. 169 ETHCDS
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot be considered an adjudication on the
merits since they do not involve a determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties
based on the ultimate facts disclosed in the pleadings or in the issues presented during
the trial. 170 They are simply recognition by the COMELEC that the applicant party-list
or organization possesses the qualifications for registration. They do not involve the
settlement of conflicting claims; it is merely an initiatory procedure for the conduct of
elections. On the other hand, previous registration and/or accreditation only attests to
the fact that the concerned party-list group, organization or coalition satisfactorily proved
its qualifications to run as party-list representative in the immediately preceding
elections. It does not, however, create a vested right in favor of the registered party-list
group, organization or coalition to participate in the succeeding elections.
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot also become final as to exempt the
party-list group or organization from proving his qualifications in the succeeding
elections. As in individual candidate, a party-list group, organization or coalition desiring
to participate in the elections must possess the required qualifications every time it

manifests its intent to participate in the elections. It must prove and attest to its
possession of the required qualifications every time it bids for election.
The inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata is even made more apparent by the fact
that the group, organization or coalition which was denied registration may still apply for
registration in succeeding elections and even be allowed registration provided that the
qualifications are met. The same holds true with previously registered and/or accredited
party-list group, organization or coalition which was stripped of its registration and/or
accreditation.
Procedural due process was properly
observed.
There is even no merit in the petitioners' claim that their right to procedural due process
was violated by the COMELEC's automatic review and conduct of summary evidentiary
hearings under Resolution No. 9513. ASCTac
As regards the first group, I have explained why I deem the COMELEC's suspension of
its own rules on motions for reconsideration justified, given its duty to ensure that votes
cast by the electorate in the party-list elections will only count for qualified party-list
groups, in the end that the system's ideals will be realized.
Equally important, the settled rule in administrative proceedings is that a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one's side satisfies the requirements of due process.
Its essence is embodied in the basic requirements of notice and the real opportunity to
be heard. 171
Consistent with the foregoing, Section 6 of RA 7941 only commands the minimum
requirements of due notice and hearing to satisfy procedural due process in the refusal
and/or cancellation of a party, organization or coalition's registration under the party-list
system. It reads:
Section 6.Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
The petitioners then cannot validly claim that they were denied of their right to
procedural process. We shall not disregard the proceedings that ensued before the
COMELEC's divisions, before whom the groups were given due notice and the ample
opportunity to present and substantiate their plea for registration. The COMELEC En
Banc's resolution to later review the resolutions of its divisions did not render
insignificant such due process already accorded to the groups, especially as we
consider that the En Banc decided on the basis of the evidence submitted by the groups
before the divisions, only that it arrived at factual findings and conclusions that differed
from those of the latter.
The second group's right to procedural process was also unimpaired, notwithstanding
the COMELEC's conduct of the summary evidentiary hearings for the purpose of
determining the parties' continuing compliance with rules on party-list groups. The
notice requirement was satisfied by the COMELEC through its issuance of the Order
dated August 2, 2012, 172 which notified the party-list groups of the Commission's
resolve to conduct summary evidentiary hearings, the dates thereof, and the purpose

for which the hearings shall be conducted. The specific matters that are expected from
them by the Commission are also identified in the Order, as it provides:
To simplify the proceedings[,] the party-list groups or organizations
thru counsel/s shall submit the following:
1.The names of witness/es who shall be the
Chairperson, President or Secretary General of
the party-list groups, organization or coalition;
ICTaEH
2.Judicial Affidavit/s of the witness/es to be
submitted at prior to the scheduled hearing;
and
3.Other documents to prove their continuing
compliance with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang
Bagong Bayani case. 173 (Emphasis
supplied)
There is then no merit in most petitioners' claim that they were not informed of the
grounds for which their existing registration and/or accreditation shall be tested,
considering that the parameters by which the parties' qualifications were to be assessed
by the COMELEC were explained in the Order.
That the parties were duly notified is further supported by their actual participation in the
scheduled hearings and their submission of evidence they deemed sufficient which, in
turn, satisfied the requirement on the opportunity to be heard.
Substantive Aspect
The common contention raised in the consolidated petitions is that the COMELEC erred
in assessing their qualifications which eventually led to the denial of their petitions for
registration and cancellation of their registration and/or accreditation.
A deliberation on the purpose and contemplation of the relevant laws and prevailing
jurisprudence is imperative.
The Party-List System of
Representation
Contrary to the view of the majority, it is my staunch position that the party-list system,
being a complement of the social justice provisions in the Constitution, is primarily
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; the ideals of social justice
permeates every provision in the Constitution, including Section 5 (2), Article VI on the
party-list system. cCaDSA
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the
great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. 174 It is not simply a mechanism for electoral
reform. To simply regard it as a mere procedure for reforming the already working and
existing electoral system is a superficial reading of RA 7941 and the Constitution, from
which the law breathed life. The idea is that by promoting the advancement of the
underprivileged and allowing them an opportunity to grow, they can rise to become
partners of the State in pursuing greater causes.

The ideals of social justice cannot be more emphatically underscored in the 1987
Constitution. The strong desire to incorporate and utilize social justice as one of the
pillars of the present Constitution was brought forth by the intent to perpetually
safeguard democracy against social injustices, desecration of human rights and
disrespect of the laws which characterized the dark pages of our history. It is
reminiscent of the unified and selfless movement of the people in EDSA who, minuscule
in power and resources, braved the streets and reclaimed their freedom from the leash
of dictatorship. The gallantry and patriotism of the masses and their non-negotiable
demand to reclaim democracy are the inspirations in the drafting of our Constitution.
The ambition of the framers of the Constitution for a state which recognizes social
justice at the forefront of its policies brought them to propose a separate article on social
justice and human rights. Initially, the proposed provision defined social justice as
follows:

If our 1986 Constitution would enshrine the people's aspirations as

dramatically expressed in the revolution and ensure the stability,
peace and progress of our nation, it must provide for social justice
in a stronger and more comprehensive manner than did the
previous Constitutions. IcaHCS
xxx xxx xxx
In Sections 1 and 2, the provisions mandate the State to give social
justice the highest priority to promote equality in the social,
economic and political life of the nation through the redistribution of
our resources, wealth and power for the greater good. 176
Further in the deliberations, Commissioner Bennagen remarked on the aspects of social
justice, viz.:

SOCIAL JUSTICE

MR. BENNAGEN: . . .

SECTION 1. Social Justice, as a social, economic, political,

moral imperative, shall be the primary consideration of the
State in the pursuit of national development. To this end,
Congress shall give the highest priority to the formulation and
implementation of measures designed to reduce economic
and political inequalities found among citizens, and to promote
the material structural conditions which promote and enhance
human dignity, protect the inalienable rights of persons and sectors
to health, welfare and security, and put the material wealth and
power of the community at the disposal of the common good.
DTIACH

We did not fail to incorporate aspects of attitudinal change, as well

as structural change, and these are fairly evident in the first two
sections. As indicated in Section 1, we did emphasize that
social justice should be a social, economic, political and moral
imperative. The moral component is important because we feel
that a justice provision should be on the side of the poor, the
disadvantaged, the so-called deprived and the oppressed. This
is a point that has been raised a number of times especially by
social scientists. Specifically, I would like to mention Dr. Mahar
Mangahas who, in his extensive studies on social justice, feels
that the State itself has been a major source of injustice and
that, therefore, the State should be able to correct that and
must assume a moral stance in relation to the poor, the
deprived and the oppressed, a moral stance that we feel
should also permeate the bureaucracy, the technocracy and
eventually, with the changes in structures, also the whole of
our Philippine society. 177 (Emphasis ours)

SECTION 2. Towards these ends, the State shall regulate the

acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its fruits,
promote the establishment of self-reliant, socio-political and
economic structures determined by the people themselves, protect
labor, rationalize the use and disposition of land, and ensure the
satisfaction of the basic material needs of all. 175 (Emphasis
supplied)
In her sponsorship speech, Commissioner Nieva delved into the primacy of the
promotion of social justice in the ideals that the Constitution will carry. She explained:
Our Committee hopes that social justice will be the centerpiece of
the 1986 Constitution. The rationale for this is that social justice
provides the material and social infrastructure for the realization of
basic human rights the enhancement of human dignity and effective
participation in democratic processes. Rights, dignity and
participation remain illusory without social justice.
Our February 1986 Revolution was not merely against the
dictatorship nor was it merely a fight for the restoration of human
rights; rather, this popular revolution was also a clamor for a more
equitable share of the nation's resources and power, a clamor
which reverberated in the many public hearings which the
Constitutional Commission conducted throughout the country.

Pursuant to the ends discussed by the framers of the Constitution, they came up with
Article XIII which specifically deals with Social Justice and Human Rights. Section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution carries the positive command to the Congress to uphold
social justice. It reads:
Section 1.The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
xxx xxx xxx
One of the modes by which the Constitution seeks to achieve social justice is through
the introduction of the party-list system. Sections 5 (1) and (2), Article VI thereof
provide:
Section 5.(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan

Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective

inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis
ours) cDIHES
Considering that the provisions on party-list system of representation are not selfexecuting, the Congress enacted RA 7941. The said law defined the parameters of the
party-list system, the procedural guidelines and the qualifications of those intending to
participate in the exercise. In enacting RA 7941, the legislature did not mean to depart
from the impetus which impelled the members of the Constitutional Commission to
provide for this scheme of representation social justice. The underlying principle
remains to be the reduction of political inequality by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power. Certainly, there could be no other intended beneficiaries for this
provision than the powerless and underprivileged. It could not have been intended for
those who already have the power and resources who may be lesser in number but are
in command of the machinery of the government.
As so fervently declared in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani, the party-list system of is a
social justice mechanism, designed to distribute political power. In the said case, the
Court held:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to
give more law to the great masses of our people who have less
in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment
of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive
recipients of the State's benevolence, but active participants in
the mainstream of representative democracy. 178
The objective to hold the party-list system for the benefit of the marginalized and
underrepresented is expressed in clear language of Section 2 of RA 7941. It reads:
Section 2.Declaration of policy. The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole,
to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this

end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Emphasis ours) AHECcT
A reading of Section 2 shows that the participation of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions in the party-list elections are qualified by
three (3) limiting characteristics: (1) they must consist of Filipino citizens belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations or coalitions; (2) who
lack well-defined political constituencies, (3) but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The
term "marginalized and underrepresented" effectively limits the party-list system
to sectors which directly need support and representation. The law could not have
deemed to benefit even those who are already represented in the House of
Representatives lest it results to a wider gap between the powerful and the
underprivileged. In empowering the powerless, the law must necessarily tilt its partiality
in favor of the marginalized and underrepresented if genuine social justice must be
achieved.
The favor of the law towards the marginalized and underrepresented, which was first
articulated by former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Ang Bagong Bayani, was
later affirmed and reiterated by no less than another former Chief Justice of this Court,
Reynato S. Puno, in his erudite separate opinion in BANAT v. COMELEC. 179 He
forcefully articulated:
History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to
find their voice, even as they are relegated to the sidelines as
genuine functional representation systemically evades them. It is
by reason of this underlying premise that the party-list system
was espoused and embedded in the Constitution, and it is
within this context that I register my dissent to the entry of major
political parties to the party-list system.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on
solid grounds when we interpret the Constitution to give
utmost deference to the democratic sympathies, ideals and
aspirations of the people. More than the deliberations in the
Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the text of
the Constitution which the people ratified. Indeed, it is the
intent of the sovereign people that matters in interpreting the
Constitution. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is
to harmonize the whole instrument, its every section and clause.
We should strive to make every word of the fundamental law
operative and avoid rendering some words idle and nugatory. The
harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with related
constitutional provisions will better reveal the intent of the

people as regards the party-list system. Thus, under Section 7 of

the Transitory Provisions, the President was permitted to fill by
appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation under
the party-list system from a list of nominees submitted by the
respective sectors. This was the result of historical precedents that
saw how the elected Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa
and the regular Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral
representation and delay the seating of sectoral representatives on
the ground that they could not rise to the same levelled status of
dignity as those elected by the people. To avoid this bias against
sectoral representatives, the President was given all the leeway to
"break new ground and precisely plant the seeds for sectoral
representation so that the sectoral representatives will take roots
and be part and parcel exactly of the process of drafting the law
which will stipulate and provide for the concept of sectoral
representation." Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the
marginalized and excluding the major political parties from
participating in the election of their representatives is aligned
with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good"; the right of the people and their organizations to effective
and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and
economic decision-making; the right of women to opportunities that
will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation; the right of labor to participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic force;
the right of teachers to professional advancement; the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their
cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national
plans and policies, and the indispensable role of the private sector
in the national economy. DaCTcA
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and
underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987
Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list
system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic
dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how
the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be
frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery
and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow
major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral
process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized,
frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the
Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the partylist system.
The intent of the Constitution to keep the party-list system exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to frustrate

the spirit of the law and the sacred intention to hold inviolable the safeguards of
social justice embedded in the Constitution.
In the same line, RA 7941 must not be interpreted as merely a mode for electoral
reform. It could not have been that too simplistic. Far from being merely an electoral
reform, the party-list system is one concrete expression of the primacy of social justice
in the Constitution. It is well to remember that RA 7941 was only implementing the
specific mandate of the Constitution in Section 5, Article VI. It should not be disengaged
from the purpose of its enactment. The purpose of the mentioned provision was not
simply to reform the electoral system but to initiate the equitable distribution of political
power. It aims to empower the larger portion of the populace who sulk in poverty and
injustice by giving them a chance to participate in legislation and advance their causes.
DCSETa
The parameters under RA 7941 were also further elaborated by the Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani, which outlined the eight-point guidelines for screening party-list
participants. Succinctly, the guidelines pertain to the qualifications of the (1) sector, (2)
party-list group, organization or coalition, and (3) nominee. These key considerations
determine the eligibility of the party-list group, organization or coalition to participate in
the party-list system of representation. Thus, for purposes of registration and continuing
compliance, three (3) basic questions must be addressed:
(1)Is the sector sought to be represented marginalized and
underrepresented?
(2)Is the party, organization or coalition qualified to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sector?
(3)Are the nominees qualified to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented party, organization or coalition?
In seriatim, I shall expound on what I deem should be the key considerations for
qualifying as a party-list group, organization or coalition. TEDAHI
The sector must be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Section 2 of RA 7941 underscored the policy of the State in enacting the law. Tersely,
the state aims to promote proportional representation by means of a Filipino-style partylist system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,
1)who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2)who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3)who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole. 180
RA 7941 gives emphasis on the requirement that the party, organization or coalition
must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. A marginalized and
underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who, by reason of status or condition,
are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata. Remote from the core of institutional
power, their necessities are often neglected and relegated to the least of the

government's priorities. They endure inadequacies in provisions and social services and
are oftentimes victims of economic, social and political inequalities.
Section 5 of RA 7941 enumerates the sectors that are subsumed under the term
"marginalized and underrepresented" and may register as a party-list group,
organization or coalition. It states:
SEC. 5.Registration. Any organized group of persons may
register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or
secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
bylaws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. (Emphasis ours) CDaSAE
Based on the provision, there are at least twelve (12) sectors that are considered
marginalized and underrepresented: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals. The enumeration is, however, not exclusive. During the drafting of
our Constitution, the members of the Commission expressed reluctance to provide an
enumeration of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors because of their
apprehension that the longer the enumeration, the more limiting the law becomes. 181
Instead of an enumeration, then Commissioner Jaime Tadeo suggested the criteria by
which the determination of which sectors are marginalized can be based, viz.:
1.The number of people belonging to the sector;
2.The extent of marginalization, exploitation and deprivation of
social and economic rights suffered by the sector;
3.The absence of representation in the government, particularly in
the legislature, through the years;
4.The sector's decisive role in production and in bringing about the
basic social services needed by the people. 182
The Constitutional Commission saw it fit to provide a set of standards which will
approximate the sectors that the Constitution regards as marginalized and
underrepresented and evaded a definite enumeration. The reason is that a specific
enumeration is antithetical to the purpose of the party-list system. The party-list system
of representation endeavors to empower the underprivileged sectors, tap their innate
potentials and hone them to become productive and self-sustaining segments of the
society. Sooner, they are expected to graduate from their status as marginalized and
underrepresented. During the process, some formerly self-sufficient sectors may drift to
the bottom and regress to become the new marginalized sectors. The resilience in the
enumeration of the sectors accommodates this eventuality. STADIH
Qualifications of the Party-List
Group, Organization or Coalition

Among the eight (8) points mentioned in the guidelines for screening party-list
participants inAng Bagong Bayani, five (5) pertain to the qualifications of the party-list
group, organization or coalition. The first point in the enumeration reads:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified
in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of
government and track record that it represents and seeks to
uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of
its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of
interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors. 183
Certainly, it takes more than a mere claim or desire to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented to qualify as a party-list group. There must be proof, credible and
convincing, to demonstrate the group's advocacy to alleviate the condition of the sector.
ECTIcS
The rigid requirement for the presentation of evidence showing the party's relation to the
causes of the sector goes to the uniqueness of the party-list system of representation.
In the party-list system of representation, the candidates are parties, organizations and
coalitions and not individuals. And while an individual candidate seeks to represent a
district or particular constituency, a party-list group vying for seats in the House of
Representatives must aim to represent a sector. It is thus important to ascertain that the
party-list group, organization or coalition reflects the ideals of the sector in its
constitution and by-laws. It must have an outline of concrete measures it wishes to
undertake in its platform of government. Moreover, its track record must speak of its firm
advocacy towards uplifting the marginalized and underrepresented by undertaking
activities or projects directly addressing the concerns of the sector.
It is likewise imperative for the party-list group to show that it effectively represents the
marginalized and underrepresented. While a party-list group is allowed to represent
various sectors, it must prove, however, that it is able to address the multifarious
interests and concerns of all the sectors it represents. That a multi-sectoral party-list
group undertakes projects and activities that only address the interests of some of the
sectors, neglecting the concerns of the other marginalized and underrepresented
sectors it supposedly represents, is nugatory to the objective of giving a meaningful and
effective representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Equally important is that the majority of the membership of the party-list group,
organization or coalition belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector. This
means that a majority of the members of the sector must actually possess the attribute
which makes the sector marginalized. This is so because the primary reason why partylist groups are even allowed to participate in the elections of the members of the House
of Representatives, who are normally elected by district, is to give a collective voice to
the members of the sectors who are oftentimes unheard or neglected. This intention is
put to naught if at least the majority of the members of the party-list do not belong to the
same class or sector. Thus, it is incumbent upon the party-list applicant to present all
the evidence necessary to establish this fact. Without a convincing proof of legitimate
membership of a majority of the marginalized, the COMELEC has no reason to believe

otherwise and may thus deny a petition for registration or cancel an existing registration.
EcICDT
The second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani underscores the policy of the state to hold
the party-list system of representation exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented, a distinguishing feature which sets our system apart from systems of
party-list representation in other jurisdictions. The guideline states:
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by
RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system,
they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors . . . to be elected to the House of Representatives." . . . 184
The second guideline was an offshoot of the declaration of policy in RA 7941.
Specifically, Section 2 of the statute emphasized the state's policy of promoting
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, . . . to become members of the House of Representatives. As it is exclusively for
the marginalized and underrepresented, it is an inflexible requirement that the group
applying for registration must represent a sector. The rationale behind this qualification
was highlighted in Ang Bagong Bayani, thus:
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented
in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution
and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was
enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine
power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger
affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly
empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine
c h a n g e . Ve r i l y, i t i n v i t e s t h o s e m a r g i n a l i z e d a n d
underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the fisher folk,
the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to
come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this
social justice vehicle. 185 cHEATI
RA 7941 also provides that a party desiring to register and participate in the party-list
elections must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. While the law did
not restrict the sectors that may be subsumed under the term "marginalized and
underrepresented", it must be construed in relation to the sectors enumerated in RA
7941, the enabling law of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. Based on the foregoing, a
mere association of individuals espousing shared "beliefs" and "advocacies"
cannot qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The term "marginalized and underrepresented" is descriptive of the sector that may join
the party-list elections. A sector pertains to a "sociological, economic or political

subdivision of the society" 186 which consists of individuals identified by the activity,
status or condition, or attribute that specifically pertains to them. It is identified by a
common characteristic pertaining to the individuals composing the same. ESHAcI
On the other hand, an association of individuals espousing a common belief or
advocacy is aptly called a group, not a sector. Specifically, advocacy groups consist of
individuals engaged in the "act of pleading for, supporting, or recommending active
espousal" 187 of a cause. Contrary to a sector which is identified by a common
characteristic of the members, advocacy groups are identified by the causes that they
promote. The members coalesced to pursue causes or fulfil patriotic ends that do not
specifically pertain to them, but even to those who are not part of their circle.
Certainly, it takes far more than beliefs and advocacies before a group of individuals can
constitute a sector. There are underlying sociological and economic considerations in
the enumeration of the sectors in the Constitution and RA 7941. These considerations
must be strictly observed lest we deviate from the objectives of RA 7941 of providing a
meaningful and effective representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. To
relegate the contemplation of the law of what is a "marginalized and underrepresented
sector" to a mere association of individuals espousing a shared belief or advocacy, is to
disregard the essence of the party-list system of representation and the intent of the law
to hold the system exclusive for the marginalized and underrepresented.
Consistent with the purpose of the law, political parties may apply for registration and/or
accreditation as a party-list provided that they are organized along sectoral lines. 188
This pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani was expounded in BANAT by referring to
the exchange between the members of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed
the party list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty
system. . . . We are for opening up the system, and we
would like very much for the sectors to be there. That
is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party
that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to
classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the
party list concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only? TCaEAD
MR. VILLACORTA.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as
for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can
also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30

percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are

allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates
and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD.
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list
system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
aIAcCH
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say
Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether
he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if
they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political
parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and
that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political
parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD.

Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question
to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system? aEACcS
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for
the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. 189 (Emphasis
supplied)
In his erudite separate opinion in BANAT, former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
expressed his approval of keeping the party-list system of representation exclusive to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To further safeguard the sanctity of the
purpose of the law, he conveyed his vehement objection to the participation of major
political parties in the party-list system of representation because of the likelihood that
they will easily trump the organizations of the marginalized. He opined:
Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and
excluding the major political parties from participating in the election
of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate to
"reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good"; the right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels
of social, political, and economic decision-making; the right of
women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable
them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation; the
right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a
primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional
advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the
consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in the
formulation of national plans and policies, and the indispensable
role of the private sector in the national economy.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no
match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is
borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major
political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for.
The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners
in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would
figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties

which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the

top 50. 190 (Citations omitted)
By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided in BANAT to revert to its ruling in the 2000 case
Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec 191 that major political parties are barred from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. ATHCac
Consistent with our pronouncement in BANAT, I maintain that major political parties
have advantages over minority political parties and sectoral parties in the party-list
elections. By their broad constituency and full resources, it is easier for these major
political parties to obtain the required percentage of votes for party-list seats, a
circumstance which, in turn, only weakens the minority parties' chance to be elected.
I, however, agree with the view of the majority that it is unjustified to absolutely
disqualify from the party-list system the major political parties solely by reason of their
classification as such. Nonetheless, the privilege to be accorded to them shall not be
without reasonable restrictions. Political parties shall only be allowed to participate in
the party-list system if they do not field candidates in the election of legislative district
representatives. The justification therefor is reasonable. The party-list system was
adopted by the state purposely to enable parties which, by their limited resources and
citizens base per district, find difficulty in placing representatives in Congress. Major
political parties that field candidates for district representatives can do so with ease,
given that they satisfy the standards set by Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, for their classification, to wit: (a) the established record of the
said parties, coalition of groups that now compose them, taking into account, among
other things, their showing in past elections; (b) the number of incumbent elective
officials belonging to them ninety (90) days before the election; (c) their identifiable
political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their organized chapters; (d) the
ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the position of the
President; and (e) other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative
organizations and strengths. As the Court explained in Ang Bagong Bayani:
(T)he purpose of the party-list provision is to open up the system,
in order to enhance chance of sectoral groups and organizations
to gain representation in the House of Representatives through
the simplest scheme possible. Logic shows that the system has
been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it
those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who
therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so.
Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who
have long been within it those privileged sectors that have
long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly
understood when compared to a student dormitory "open house,"
which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously,
the "open house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the
dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such
special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is
only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular
elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress. 192

The contemplated limitation against the major political parties who wish to participate
may then allay the fear contemplated by the justification given in BANAT for the
disqualification. TASCDI
Nonetheless, a guiding principle remains the same: the party-list system must be held
exclusive for the marginalized and underrepresented. Regardless of the structure or
organization of the group, it is imperative that it represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. Thus, it is my submission that political parties which seek to
participate in the party-list system must observe two rules: (1) they must be
organized along sectoral lines; and (2) they must not field in candidates for
district representatives.
The importance of the requirement for representation of marginalized and
underrepresented sector cannot be overemphasized. The very essence of the party-list
system of representation is to give representation to the voiceless sectors of the society.
It is the characteristic which distinguishes party-list representatives from the regular
district representatives in Congress.
That a party-list group must represent a marginalized and underrepresented
sector is the only hurdle which keeps all other organizations from joining the
party-list elections. If this lone filter we have against fly-by-night organizations will be
junked, then the COMELEC will be flocked with petitions for registration from
organizations created to pursue selfish ends and not to the benefit of the voiceless and
neglected sectors of the society.
The move to open the party-list system free-for-all will create a dangerous
precedent as it will open the doors even to illegitimate organizations.
Organizations aspiring to join the party-list election can simply skirt the law and organize
themselves as a political party to take advantage of the more lenient entrance. The
organization need only to register as a political party to dispense with the stringent
requirement of representing a sector. It will automatically be off the hook from the
danger of being disqualified on the ground that it is not representing a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. Other organizations, even those organized as sectoral parties,
may follow through and may even disrobe themselves as sectoral parties and opt to
become political parties instead because it is the easier way to be allowed participation
in the party-list elections. Thus, once again, the causes of the marginalized and
underrepresented are lagged behind. acCTIS
The second requirement for political parties is that they must not field in candidates for
district representatives. The reason is that the party-list system is solely for the
marginalized and underrepresented. Certainly, political parties which are able to field in
candidates for the regular seats in the House of Representatives cannot be classified as
such.
The third guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani expresses the proscription against the
registration of religious groups as party-list groups. The idea is that the government acts
for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. 193 Despite the
prohibition, members of a religious group may be nominated as representative of a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. The prohibition is directed only against
religious sectors registering as a political party 194 because the government cannot
have a partner in legislation who may be driven by the dictates of faith which may not be
capable of rational evaluation.

The fourth and fifth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani pertain to disqualifying
circumstances which can justify the denial of the petition for registration of party,
organization or coalition, thus:
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under
Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
"(1)It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal; IAETDc
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of
its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules
or regulations relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered."
xxx xxx xxx
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or
organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and
operated by citizens. . . . 195
To be eligible for registration, the party, organization or coalition must prove that it
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications stated in the law. The
grounds for disqualification stated in Section 6 of RA 7941 pertain to acts, status or
conditions which render the applicant group an unsuitable partner of the state in
alleviating the conditions of the marginalized and underrepresented. These disqualifying
circumstances are drawn to further implement the state policy of preserving the partylist system exclusively for the intended beneficiaries of RA 7941. ACTESI
On the other hand, the disqualification mentioned in the fifth guideline connotes that the
party-list group must maintain its independence from the government so that it may be

able to pursue its causes without undue interference or any other extraneous
considerations. Verily, the group is expected to organize and operate on its own. It must
derive its life from its own resources and must not owe any part of its creation to the
government or any of its instrumentalities. By maintaining its independence, the group
creates a shield that no influence or semblance of influence can penetrate and obstruct
the group from achieving its purposes. In the end, the party-list group is able to
effectively represent the causes of the marginalized and underrepresented, particularly
in the formulation of legislation intended for the benefit of the sectors.
Qualifications of the Nominees
The sixth, seventh and eighth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani bear on the
qualifications of the nominees, viz.:
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the
law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads
as follows:
SEC. 9.Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.
No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years
of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees
must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give
genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
AcSCaI
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined
political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. . . . 196

Except for a few, the basic qualifications of the nominee are practically the same as
those required of individual candidates for election to the House of Representatives. He
must be: (a) a natural-born citizen; (b) a registered voter; (c) a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; (d) able to read and write; (e) bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days before the day of
election; (f) at least twenty five (25) years of age on the day of election; (g) in case of a
nominee for the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of election. Owing to the peculiarity of the party-list
system of representation, it is not required that the nominee be a resident or a
registered voter of a particular district since it is the party-list group that is voted for and
not the appointed nominees. He must, however, be a bona fide member of the party-list
group at least ninety (90) days before the elections.
The nominee must be a bona fide
member of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector

workers working abroad is difficult to comply with without the nominee being excluded
from the literal definition of who belongs to the sector. The strict interpretation also
discourages growth, as in the nominee from the urban sector, since the moment he
rises from his status as such, he becomes disqualified to represent the party. HTSaEC
The second type of nominee addresses the gap. An advocate or one who is publicly
known to be pursuing the causes of the sector is equally capable of fulfilling the
objective of providing a genuine and effective representation for the marginalized and
underrepresented. He is one who, notwithstanding social status, has always shown
genuine concern for those who have less in life. Unlike the first type of nominee who
shares a common characteristic with the members of the group, the advocate shares
with them a common aspiration and leads them towards achieving that end. He serves
as a catalyst that stirs movement so that the members of the sector may be encouraged
to pursue their welfare. And though not bound with the group by something physical, he
is one with them in spirit and heart. He is known for his genuine commitment and
selfless dedication to the causes of the sector and his track record boldly speaks of his
advocacy.

In some of the petitions, the COMELEC denied registration to the party, organization or
coalition on the ground that the nominee does not belong to the sector he wishes to
represent. The quandary stems from the interpretation of who are considered as one
"belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented." The COMELEC supposed that
before a person may be considered as one "belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector," he must actually share with the rest of the membership that
common characteristic or attribute which makes the sector marginalized and
underrepresented. SHAcID

At the outset, it may seem that the foregoing ratiocination translates to a more lenient
entry for those aspiring to become a nominee. However, the standard of scrutiny should
not change and nominees shall still be subject to the evaluation by the COMELEC of
their qualifications. They bear the burden of proof to establish by concrete and credible
evidence that they are truly representative of the causes of the sector. They must
present proof of the history of their advocacy and the activities they undertook for the
promotion of the welfare of the sector. They must be able to demonstrate, through their
track record, their vigorous involvement to the causes of the sector.

The construction seemed logical but to be consistent with the letter of the law, it must be
harmonized with Section 9 of RA 7941, the specific provision dealing with the
qualifications of the nominee. In the mentioned provision, aside from the qualifications
similarly required of candidates seeking to represent their respective districts, the
nominee is required to be a bona fide member of the party, a status he acquires when
he enters into the membership of the organization for at least ninety (90) days before
the election. From the point in time when the person acquires the status of being a bona
fide member, he becomes one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector."

The law puts a heavy burden on the nominee to prove his advocacy through his track
record. To be clear, the track record is not a mere recital of his visions for the
organization and the trivial activities he conducted under the guise of promoting the
causes of the sector. He must actually and actively be espousing the interests of the
sector by undertaking activities directly addressing its concerns. DSATCI

It is my view that the foregoing interpretation accommodates two (2) types of nominees:
1.One who actually shares the attribute or characteristic which
makes the sector marginalized or underrepresented (the
first type);
2.An advocate or one who is genuinely and actively promoting the
causes of the sector he wishes to represent (the second
type).
The first type of nominee is one who shares a common physical attribute or status with
the rest of the membership. That he possesses this common characteristic of
marginalization is what entitles him to nomination as representative of the group. This is
because of the reasonable presumption that those who have experienced the
inadequacies in the sector are the ones who can truly represent the same. However,
there are instances when this strict construction becomes impracticable, if not
altogether impossible. For instance, a representation from the organization of skilled

In Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, 197 the Court enumerated the list of evidence which the
party-list group and its nominees may present to establish their qualifications, to wit:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary
evidence in consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other
laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent,
which may include but not limited to the following:
a.Track record of the party-list group/organization
showing active participation of the nominee/s in the
undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party
or coalition they seek to represent;
b.Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior
declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/s showing

his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-list

group/organizations);
c.Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide
member of the party-list group/organization for at least
ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d.In case of a party-list group/organization seeking
representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is
not only an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/
are also a bona fide member/s of said marginalized and
underrepresented sector. 198
Regardless of whether the nominee falls under the first or second type, proof of his
track record is required. The requirement is even more stringent for the second type of
nominee as he must convincingly show, through past activities and undertakings, his
sincere regard for the causes of the sector. The history of his advocacy and the
reputation he earned for the same will be considered in the determination of his
qualification. aEcHCD
Admittedly, the foregoing clarification partakes of a new guideline which the COMELEC
failed to take into consideration when it conducted automatic review of the petitions for
registration and summary evidentiary hearings pursuant to Resolution No. 9513.
Disqualification of the nominee and
its effects
In a number of resolutions, the COMELEC disqualified some party-list groups on the
ground that one or some of its nominees are disqualified. Apparently, the COMELEC is
of the impression that the group, upon filing their petition for registration, must submit
names of at least five (5) nominees who must all be qualified. In the instances when
some of the nominees were found to be suffering from any disqualification, the
COMELEC deemed the party to have committed a violation of election laws, rules and
regulations and denied its petition for registration.
I agree with the majority that the construction made by the COMELEC is misplaced.
It is the COMELEC's supposition that when the party-list group included a disqualified
nominee in the list of names submitted to the COMELEC, it is deemed to have
committed the violation stated in Section 6 (5) 199 of RA 7941. This feeble deduction,
however, is not within the contemplation of the law. The mentioned provision does not
suggest that all kinds of violations can be subsumed under Section 6 (5) and justify the
disqualification of the group. To warrant such a serious penalty, the violation must be
demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or public policy. It must be taken
to refer to election offenses enumerated under Sections 261 and 262, Article XXII of the
Omnibus Election Code or any other acts or omissions that are inconsistent with the
ideals of fair and orderly elections. It does not intend to cover even innocuous mistakes
or incomplete compliance with procedural requirements. AHSEaD
Accordingly, it is a mistake on the part of the COMELEC to suppose that failure to
comply with Section 8 of RA 7941 is within the contemplation of Section 6 (5) thereof.
Section 8 reads:
Section 8.Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each
registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the

COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a
list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
xxx xxx xxx
The language of the law is clear and unambiguous; it must be given its plain and literal
meaning. A reading of the provision will show that it is simply a procedural requirement
relating to the registration of groups, organizations and coalitions under the party-list
system of representation. Plainly, it requires the applicant under the party-list system to
submit a list of nominees, not less than five, at least forty-five (45) days before the
election. The group's compliance with this requirement is determinative of the action of
the COMELEC. In case of failure to comply, the COMELEC may refuse to act on the
petition for registration. If the applicant, on the other hand, tendered an incomplete
compliance, as in submitting a list of less than five (5) nominees, the COMELEC may
ask it to comply or simply regard the same as a waiver. In no way can the mere
submission of the list be construed as a guarantee or attestation on the part of the
group that all of the nominees shall be qualified especially that the assessment of
qualifications is a duty pertaining solely to the COMELEC. In the same way, the
provision did not intend to hold the group liable for violation of election laws for such a
shortcoming and to mete out the same with the penalty of disqualification. Such an
absurd conclusion could not have been the intention of the law. DHSEcI
Indeed, there are instances when one or some of the nominees are disqualified to
represent the group but this should not automatically result to the disqualification of the
latter. To hold otherwise is to accord the nominees the same significance which the law
holds for the party-list groups of the marginalized and underrepresented. It is worthy to
emphasize that the formation of party-list groups organized by the marginalized and
underrepresented and their participation in the process of legislation is the essence of
the party-list system of representation. Consistent with the purpose of the law, it is still
the fact that the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to
consider. That one or some of its chosen agents failed to satisfy the qualifications for
the position should not unreasonably upset the existence of an otherwise legitimate
party-list group. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure
to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of
the party-list group itself with defect.
The point is that the party-list group must thus be treated separate and distinct from its
nominees such that qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and parcel of
the qualifications of the former. The features of the party-list system of representation
are reflective of the intention of the law to treat them severally.
To begin with, the electorate votes for the party-list group or organization itself, not for
the individual nominees. 200 The nominees do not file a certificate of candidacy nor do
they launch a personal campaign for themselves. 201 It is the party-list group that runs
as candidate and it is the name of the group that is indicated in the ballot. The list of
nominees submitted to the COMELEC becomes relevant only when the party-list group
garners the required percentage of votes that will entitle it to a seat in Congress. At any
rate, the party-list group does not cease in existence even when it loses the electoral
race. And, should it decide to make another electoral bid, it is not required to keep its
previous list of nominees and can submit an entirely new set of names. aCTcDS

Further, there are separate principles and provisions of law pertaining to the
qualifications and disqualifications of the party-list group and the nominees. The
qualifications of the party-list group are outlined in Ang Bagong Bayani while the
grounds for the removal/cancellation of registration are enumerated in Section 6 of RA
7941.
On the other hand, Section 9 of the law governs the qualifications of the nominees. As
to their disqualification, it can be premised on the ground that they are not considered
as one "belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector" or that they lack
one or some of the qualifications. They may also be disqualified under Section 15 202
and Section 8 203 of RA 7941, particularly under the second paragraph thereof. Even
after the COMELEC's determination, interested parties may still question the
qualifications of the nominees through a petition to cancel or deny due course to the
nomination or petition for disqualification under Sections 1 204 and 2, 205 Rule 5 of the
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, respectively.
It is worth emphasizing that the selection of nominees depends upon the choice of the
members of the party-list group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely
dependent upon the will of the party. 206 More often than not, the choice of nominees is
grounded on trust and confidence, not on the vague or abstract concepts of
qualifications under the law. The method or process by which the members of the partylist group choose their nominees is a matter internal to them. No set of rules or
guidelines can be imposed upon them by the Court or the COMELEC in selecting their
representatives lest we be charged of unnecessarily disrupting a democratic process.
Regrettably, the COMELEC did intrude in the party-list groups' freedom to choose their
nominees when it disqualified some of them on the ground that their nominees are
disqualified. While the COMELEC has the authority to determine the qualifications of the
nominees, the disqualification of the group itself due to the failure to qualify of one or
some of the nominees is too harsh a penalty. The nexus between the COMELEC's
outright disqualification of the group due to the disqualification of the nominees and the
avowed objective of RA 7941 of encouraging the development of a "full, free and open
party-list system" is extremely hard to decipher. AHDaET
In other words, the Court cannot countenance the action of the COMELEC in
disqualifying the party-list group due to the disqualification of one or some of the
nominees. There is simply no justifiable ground to support this action. It is unthinkable
how the COMELEC could have conceived the thought that the fate of the party-list
group depends on the qualifications of the nominees, who are mere agents of the
group, especially that the agency between them is still subject to the condition that the
group obtains the required percentage of votes to be entitled to a seat in the House of
Representatives. Until this condition is realized, what the nominees have is a mere
expectancy. ScEaAD
It may also be helpful to mention that in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on
Elections, 207 the Court emphasized the three-seat limit rule, which holds that each
qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled only to
a maximum of three (3) seats. 208 The rule is a reiteration of Section 11 (b) 209 of RA
7941. Relating the principle to Section 8, it becomes more apparent that the action of
the COMELEC was made with grave abuse of discretion. It bears noting that while
Section 8 requires the submission of the names of at least five (5) nominees, Section 11
states that only three (3) of them can actually occupy seats in the House of
Representatives should the votes they gather suffice to meet the required percentage.

The two (2) other nominees in the list are not really expecting to get a seat in Congress
even when the party-list group of which they are members prevailed in the elections. If
at all, they can only substitute incumbent representatives, if for any reason, they vacate
the office. Therefore, if the right to office of three (3) of the nominees is based on a mere
expectancy while with the other two (2) the nomination is dependent on the occurrence
of at least two (2) future and uncertain events, it is with more reason that the
disqualification of one or some of the nominees should not affect the qualifications of
the party-list group.
I have also observed that in some of the consolidated petitions, the party-list group
submitted a list of nominees, with less than five (5) names stated in Section 8 of RA
7941. In some other petitions, only some out of the number of nominees submitted by
the party-list group qualified. Again, Section 8 must be construed as a procedural
requirement relative to registration of groups aspiring to participate in the party-list
system of representation. In case of failure to comply, as in non-submission of a list of
nominees, the COMELEC may deny due course to the petition. In case of incomplete
compliance, as when the party-list group submitted less than 5 names, it is my view that
the COMELEC must ask the group to comply with the admonition that failure to do so
will amount to the waiver to submit 5 names. The implication is that if the party-list group
submitted only one qualified nominee and it garners a number of votes sufficient to give
it two (2) seats, it forfeits the right to have a second representative in Congress.
Therefore, for as long as the party-list group has one (1) qualified nominee, it must be
allowed registration and participation in the election. The situation is different when the
party-list group submitted a list of nominees but none qualified and, upon being asked to
submit a new list of names, still failed to appoint at least one (1) qualified nominee. In
this case, the party can now reasonably be denied registration as it cannot, without at
least one qualified nominee, fulfill the objective of the law for genuine and effective
representation for the marginalized and underrepresented, a task which the law
imposes on the qualified nominee by participating in the "formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole." 210 More importantly, the
party-list group's inability to field in qualified nominees casts doubt on whether the group
is truly representative of the marginalized and underrepresented. Considering that the
majority of the group must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented, it should
not have any trouble appointing a qualified nominee. ADaSET
Ruling on each of the petitions
As opposed to the vote of the majority, I deem it unnecessary to remand ALL the
petitions to the COMELEC, completely disregarding the ground/s for the cancellation
or denial of the party-list groups' registration, and even on the supposition that the
ponencia had substantially modified the guidelines that are set forth in the Ang Bagong
Bayani.
I vote, instead, to REMAND only the petitions of the party-list groups whose
remaining ground for denial or cancellation of registration involves the new
guideline on the qualifications of a party's nominees. While I agree on modifying the
qualifications of major political parties, no remand is justified on this ground since none
of the 52 211 petitioners is a major political party. On all other issues, the standard of
grave abuse of discretion shall already be applied by the Court.
For an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justified, the tribunal or administrative body
must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution with grave abuse of
discretion. 212 In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 213 the Court recognized that

along with the limited focus that attends petitions for certiorari is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial
evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to
support a conclusion. 214
Guided by the foregoing principles, I vote to DISMISS the petitions for failure to
substantiate grave abuse of discretion, and to AFFIRM THE COMELEC's DENIAL OR
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION, of the following party-list groups:
GREENFORCE, KALIKASAN, UNIMAD, AAMA, APEC, 1-CARE, ALA-EH, 1BROPGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, ASIN, Manila Teachers, KAKUSA, BANTAY,
GUARDJAN, PACYAW, ARC, SMART, ALAM, ABANG LINGKOD, AKMA-PTM,
BAYANI, FIRM 24-K, KAP, COCOFED, AANI, ABROAD, AG, ALONA, AGRI, 1ST
KABAGIS, ARAL, BINHI, SENIOR CITIZENS, Atong Paglaum, ANAD, PBB, PPP,
1AAAP, ABP, AAB, AKB and AI.
The COMELEC's conclusion on the said groups' failure to qualify, insofar as the grounds
pertained to the sectors which they seek to represent and/or their capacity to represent
their intended sector finds support in established facts, law and jurisprudence.
ON THE OTHER HAND, I find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC in ruling on the disqualification of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT
and ARARO on the supposed failure of these parties to substantiate their eligibility as
a group, specifically on questions pertaining to their track record and the sectors
which they seek to represent. IHSTDE
Although as a general rule, the Court does not review in a certiorari case the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence presented to it, in exceptional
cases, as when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is
not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of
judgment to one of jurisdiction. 215 To this exception falls the COMELEC's
disqualification of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO.
1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA
1-UTAK is a sectoral organization composed of various transport drivers and operators
associations nationwide with a common goal of promoting the interest and welfare of
public utility drivers and operators. 216 On the other hand, PASANG MASDA is a
sectoral political party that mainly represents the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of jeepney and tricycle drivers and operators across the National Capital
Region. 217 Contrary to the conclusion that was inferred by the COMELEC from the
common circumstance that 1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA represent the sectors of
both public utility drivers and operators, it is not a sufficient ground to cancel their
respective registration as party-list group.
To a great extent, the supposed conflict in the respective interests of public utility drivers
and operators is more apparent than real. It is true that there is a variance in the
economic interests of public utility drivers and operators; the former is concerned with
wages while the latter is concerned with profits. However, what the COMELEC failed to
consider is that the two sectors have substantial congruent concerns and interests.
To my mind, the interests of public utility drivers and operators are aligned with each
other in several instances. To name a few: first, the effects of fluctuation in the prices of

petroleum products; second, their benefit from petitions for fare increase/reduction; and
third, the implications of government policies affecting the transportation sector such as
traffic rules and public transport regulation. In these instances, it is mutually beneficial
for drivers and operators of public utility vehicles to work together in order to effectively
lobby their interests. Certainly, the interrelated concerns and interests of public utility
drivers and operators far outweigh the supposed variance in their respective economic
interests. HIcTDE
Accordingly, my view is that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the registration of 1-UTAK and PASANG MASDA as party-list groups on the
ground of the sectors which they aim to represent.
BUTIL
Similarly, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it cancelled the registration
of BUTIL on the alleged ground that the party failed to prove that the "agriculture and
cooperative sectors," which the party represents, are marginalized and
underrepresented. 218
In arriving at the said conclusion, the COMELEC noted that the Secretary-General of
BUTIL, Wilfredo A. Antimano affirmed in his judicial affidavit that BUTIL is an
organization "representing members of the agriculture and cooperative sectors." From
this declaration, the COMELEC ruled that since the agriculture and cooperative sectors
are not enumerated in RA 7941, it is incumbent upon BUTIL to establish the fact that
the sectors it is representing are marginalized and underrepresented. Since the party
failed to discharge this burden, the COMELEC cancelled the party's registration.
I stress, however, that in determining whether the group represents a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, all of the evidence submitted by the party should be duly
considered by the Commission. Thus, Antimano's statement in his judicial affidavit that
BUTIL represents the "agriculture and cooperative sectors" should be read in
conjunction with the other documents submitted by the party, including the oral
testimony that was given by the party's witness. Significantly, during the clarificatory
hearing conducted by the Commission En Banc on August 23, 2012, Antimano
explained: ScCEIA
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Isa lang. Gusto ko lang malaman, sino ho ang mga myembro nyo?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Ang myembro po ng aming partido ay mga magsasaka, maliliit na
magsasaka at maliliit na mangingisda sa kanayunan.
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Ang tanong ko ho eh, gusto ko lang malaman, small farmers ang
inyong nire-represent?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Small fishermen, kasama ho ba yun?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.

CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Pati maliliit na mangingisda?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo, sa kanayunan. Meron po kasing maliliit na mangingisda sa
karagatan pero yung sa amin, yun pong maliliit na
mangingisda na nag-aalaga ng maliliit na . . . 219 aTIAES
It can be reasonably gathered from the foregoing that Antimano's reference to the
"agriculture and cooperative sector" pertains to small farmers and fishermen. Likewise,
on the basis of the evidence on record, the term "cooperative" in Antimano's affidavit
should be taken to refer to agricultural cooperatives which, by their nature, are still
comprised of agricultural workers.
Time and again, the Court has recognized small agricultural workers as marginalized
and underrepresented. Based on the records, BUTIL appears to fully adhere to and
work towards their cause. I also give due consideration to the fact that since the partylist system was first implemented in 1998, the party had been able to obtain the
necessary votes for at least one seat in the House of Representatives. This affirms the
party's constituency that may deserve a continued representation in Congress.
AT
AT is an incumbent party-list group that claims to represent six (6) marginalized sectors
labor, urban poor, elderly, women, youth and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs). 220
In disqualifying AT, the COMELEC found that its incumbent representative,
Congresswoman Daryl Grace J. Abayon, failed to author house measures that will uplift
the welfare of all the sectors it claims to represent. 221
In so ruling, however, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in failing to
appreciate that effective representation of sectors is not confined to the passage of bills
that directly identify or name all of the sectors it seeks to represent. In the case of AT,
there is evidence that it adopted and co-sponsored House Bills that advanced the
interests, not only of the sectors it represents, but even other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. 222 AT also established with sufficiency an exceptional track
record that demonstrates its genuine desire to uplift the welfare of all of the sectors it
represents. 223 It is broad enough to cover legislation which, while directly identifying
only some of the sectors as main beneficiaries, also benefits the rest of the sectors it
seeks to represent.
ARARO
ARARO is a party-list group that seeks to represent peasants and the urban poor. It
was disqualified by the COMELEC on the ground that these two sectors involve
conflicting interests, for instance, in the matter of land use.
However, I do not see, and the COMELEC failed to show, how the issue of land use can
be conflicting between these sectors. Peasants generally belong to the class of
marginal farmers, fisherfolk and laborers in the rural areas. On the other hand, the
urban poor, as the term connotes, are those in the urban areas. While they may have
different interests and concerns, these are not necessarily divergent.
I also do not adhere to the COMELEC's conclusion that ARARO's alliances with other
sectoral organizations "muddle" the sectors it represents. 224 These are mere alliances,
i.e., ties. It does not necessarily follow that ARARO, because of these ties, will also
represent the interests of these sectors. As long as ARARO's platform continually

focuses on the enhancement of the welfare of the peasants and the urban poor, there
can be an effective representation in their behalf.
On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, I then vote to nullify the COMELEC's
cancellation of the registration of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO
on the ground of these parties' supposed failure to prove their eligibility to represent
their intended sectors.
The COMELEC also committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the outright
cancellation of the five parties' registration on the ground of the supposed failure of their
nominees to qualify. I have fully explained that the qualification of a party-list group shall
be treated separate and distinct, and shall not necessarily result from the qualification of
its nominees. ADScCE
In any case, my vote to nullify the aforementioned actions of the COMELEC shall not be
construed to automatically restore the five parties' registration and accreditation, which
would otherwise allow their participation in the May 2013 elections. As has been
discussed, each party must still be able to field in qualified nominees, as it is only
through them that the party may perform its legislative function in the event that it
garners the required percentage of votes for a seat in the House of Representatives.
With this circumstance, and considering a new guideline on nominees' qualifications, I
then find the necessity of remanding their petitions to the COMELEC.
ALIM, A-IPRA, AKIN, A
BLESSED Party-List and
AKO-BAHAY
The denial of the registration of AKIN, and the cancellation of the registration of ALIM,
A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and AKO-BAHAY were based solely on the alleged
failure of their respective nominees to prove that they factually belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector that their parties seek to represent. I
reiterate that a party-list group must be treated separate and distinct from its nominees;
the outright disqualification of the groups on the said ground is not warranted. The
COMELEC's ruling to the contrary is an act exhibitive of grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, I deem it appropriate to nullify the COMELEC's resolve to deny AKIN's
registration and cancel the registration of ALIM, A-IPRA, A BLESSED Party-List and
AKO-BAHAY. Nonetheless, as in the case of 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT
and ARARO, this does not necessarily restore or grant their registration under the
party-list system. CITcSH
I submit that in view of my stand regarding the qualifications of nominees, specifically on
the two types of qualified nominees, it is only proper that the petitions that involve the
ground of disqualification of the nominees be remanded to the COMELEC to afford it
the opportunity to revisit its rulings. In so doing, the COMELEC may be able to assess
the facts and the records, while being guided by the clarification on the matter. It must
be emphasized, however, that not all of the petitions necessitates a remand considering
that from the records, only ten (10) out of the fifty-three (53) consolidated petitions
solely involved the disqualification of the party's nominees. The bulk of the petitions
consist of cancellation or denial of registration on the ground (1) that the party-list group
does not represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, or; (2) that the group
itself, on the basis of the pertinent guidelines enumerated in Ang Bagong Bayani, failed
to qualify. If the ground for the denial or cancellation of registration is disqualification on
the basis of sector or group, it is a futile exercise to delve into the qualifications of the

nominees since notwithstanding the outcome therein, the party-list group remains
disqualified. It is well to remember that the law provides for different sets of
qualifications for the party-list group and the nominees. The law, while requiring that the
party-list group must have qualified nominees to represent it, treats the former as
separate and distinct from the latter, not to treat them as equals but to give a higher
regard to the party-list group itself. Thus, in the event that the nominees of the party-list
group fail to qualify, the party-list group may still be afforded the chance to fill in qualified
nominees to represent it. The reverse, however, is not true. The lack of qualifications, or
the possession of disqualifying circumstances by the group, impinges on the legitimacy
or the existence of the party-list group itself. Absent a qualified party-list group, the fact
that the nominees that are supposed to represent it are qualified does not hold any
significance.
Even though the ponencia modifies the qualifications for all national or regional parties/
organizations, IT STILL IS NOT NECESSARY TO REMAND ALL THE PETITIONS. It
bears stressing that of the 52 petitioners, only eleven are national or regional parties/
organizations. The rest of the petitioners, as indicated in their respective
Manifestations of Intent and/or petitions, are organized as sectoral parties or
organizations.

parties 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT, AKIN, ALIM, A-IPRA, ARARO, A
Blessed Party List and AKO-BAHAY, respectively, and their cases shall be
REMANDED to the COMELEC, which shall be DIRECTED to: (a) allow the party-list
groups to present further proof that their nominees are actually qualified in light of the
new guideline on the qualification of nominees, (b) evaluate whether the nominees are
qualified to represent the group, and (c) grant or deny registration depending on its
determination; caITAC
2.DISMISS the petitions in G.R. No. 204139, G.R. 204370, G.R. No. 204379, G.R. No.
204394, G.R. No. 204402, G.R. No. 204426, G.R. No. 204435, G.R. No. 204455, G.R.
No. 204485, G.R. No. 204490, G.R. No. 204436, G.R. No. 204484, G.R. No. 203766,
G.R. Nos. 203818-19, G.R. No. 203922, G.R. No. 203936, G.R. No. 203958, G.R. No.
203960, G.R. No. 203981, G.R. No. 204002, G.R. No. 204094, G.R. No. 204100, G.R.
No. 204122, G.R. No. 204126, G.R. No. 204141, G.R. No. 204158, G.R. No. 204216,
G.R. No. 204220, G.R. No. 204236, G.R. No. 204238, G.R. No. 204239, G.R. No.
204240, G.R. No. 204318, G.R. No. 204321, G.R. No. 204323, G.R. No. 204358, G.R.
No. 204359, G.R. No. 204374, G.R. No. 204408, G.R. No. 204421, G.R. No. 204425,
G.R. No. 204428 and G.R. No. 204486.

The party-list groups that are organized as national parties/organizations are:

LEONEN, J., concurring and dissenting:

1.Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) 225

2.Bantay Party-List (BANTAY) 226
3.Allance of Bicolnon Party (ABP) 227
On the other hand, the following are regional parties/organizations:
1.Ako Bicol Political Party (AKB) 228
2.Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM) 229
3.Ako an Bisaya (AAB) 230 DTcHaA
4.Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN) 231
5.1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP) 232
6.Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI) 233
7.Partido ng Bayan and Bida (PBB) 234

I agree with the ponencia in substance, but dissent in so far as there is no finding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

8.Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP) 235

Accordingly, even granting credence to the ponencia's ratiocination, it does not follow
that a remand of all the cases is justified; as we have pointed out the ponencia has
been able to explain the necessity of a remand of only eleven petitions for further
proceedings in the COMELEC, in addition to the ten petitions that I have recommended
for remand.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to:
1.PARTLY GRANT the petitions in G.R. No. 204410, G.R. No. 204153, G.R. No.
204356, G.R. No. 204174, G.R. No. 204367, G.R. No. 204341, G.R. No. 204125, G.R.
No. 203976, G.R. No. 204263 and G.R. No. 204364. The assailed Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-198 (PLM), SPP No.
12-277 (PLM), SPP No. 12-136 (PLM), SPP No. 12-232 (PLM), SPP No. 12-104 (PL),
SPP No. 12-269 (PLM), SPP No. 12-292 (PLM), SPP No. 12-288 (PLM), SPP No.
12-257 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-180 (PLM) shall be NULLIFIED insofar as these
declared the outright disqualification of the parties 1-UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL,
AT, AKIN, ALIM, A-IPRA, ARARO, A Blessed Party List and AKO-BAHAY,
respectively, NULLIFIED insofar as these declared the outright disqualification of the

National political parties may participate in party list elections, provided that they have
no candidate for legislative districts. The constitution disqualifies political parties, which
have candidates for legislative districts, from the party list system. 1 I also agree that
they need not be organized sectorally and/or represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented".
We take this opportunity to take a harder look at article VI section 5 (1) and (2) in the
light of article II section 1 of the Constitution. We now benefit from hindsight as we are
all witness to the aftermath of the doctrines enunciated in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC 2 as qualified by Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 3
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC. 4
TAEDcS
In my view, the Constitutional provisions have always created space for "national,
regional and sectoral parties and organizations" to join the party list system. It is
textually clear that national political parties or regional organizations do not need to be
organized on sectoral lines. Sectoral parties or organizations belong to a different
category of participants in the party list system.
Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that all those who participate in the
party list system "must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups" as
mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941. 5 This law is unconstitutional in so far as it makes
a requirement that is not supported by the plain text of the Constitution.
There is also a constitutional difference between the political parties that support those
who are candidates for legislative districts and those that participate in the party list
system. It is inconsistent for national political parties who have candidates for legislative
districts to also run for party list. This, too, is the clear implication from the text of article
VI, section 5 (1) of the Constitution.

The insistence on the criteria of "marginalized and underrepresented" 6 has caused so

much chaos to the point of absurdity in our party list system. It is too ambiguous so as
to invite invidious intervention on the part of COMELEC, endangering the fundamental
rights to suffrage of our people. Hewing more closely with the text of the Constitution
makes more sense under the present circumstances.
Besides, there was no clear majority in support of the ratio decidendi relevant to our
present cases in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. v. COMELEC 7 and BANAT v.
COMELEC. 8
I vote for the grant of the Petitions and the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No.
9513, s. August 2, 2012. This will have the effect of reinstating the registration of thirty
nine (39) existing party list groups that have already registered for the 2010 elections
especially those that have won seats in the current Congress. This will also
automatically remand the thirteen (13) cases of new party list registrants for proper
processing and evaluation by the Commission on Elections. cHCSDa
Textual analysis
of the relevant provisions
Different kind of political party in the party list system
The core principle that defines the relationship between our government and those that
it governs is captured in the constitutional phrase that ours is a "democratic and
republican state". 9 A democratic and republican state is founded on effective
representation. It is also founded on the idea that it is the electorate's choices that must
be given full consideration. 10 We must always be sensitive in our crafting of doctrines
lest the guardians of our electoral system be empowered to silence those who wish to
offer their representation. We cannot replace the needed experience of our people to
mature as citizens in our electorate.
We should read article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) in the light of these overarching
consideration.
Article VI, section 5 (1) provides:
"(1)The House of Representative shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations." (emphasis provided)
There are two types of representatives in the House of Representatives. Those in the
first group are "elected from legislative districts". Those in the second group are "elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations." TaCDIc
The differences in terms of representation are clear.
Those who are elected from legislative districts will have their name in the ballot. They
present their persons as the potential agent of their electorate. It is their individual
qualifications that will be assessed by COMELEC on the basis of the Constitution and
relevant statutes. Should there be disqualification it would be their personal

circumstances, which will be reviewed, in the proper case, by the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The individual representative can lose
subsequent elections for various reasons, including dissatisfaction from those that
initially elected him/her into office.
Incidentally, those who present themselves for election by legislative districts may or
may not be supported by a registered political party. This may give them added political
advantages in the electoral exercise, which includes the goodwill, reputation and
resources of the major political party they affiliate with. However, it is not the nature of
the political party that endorses them that is critical in assessing the qualifications or
disqualifications of the candidate.
The elected district representative in the House of Representative is directly
accountable to his/her electorate. The political party s/he affiliates with only shares that
political accountability; but, only to a certain extent. Good performance is usually
rewarded with subsequent election to another term. It is the elected representative, not
the political party that will get re-elected. We can even take judicial notice that party
affiliation may change in subsequent elections for various reasons, without any effect on
the qualification of the elected representative.
The political party that affiliates those who participate in elections in legislative districts
organize primarily to have their candidates win. These political parties have avowed
principles and platforms of government. 11 But, they will be known more through the
personalities and popularity of their candidates. 12 Often, compromises occur in the
political party's philosophies in order to accommodate a viable candidate. TIaCcD
This has been the usual role of political parties even before the 1987 Constitution.
The party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of politics in our country,
one where voters choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate-nominees
secondarily. As provided in the Constitution, the party list system's intentions are
broader than simply to "ensure that those who are marginalized and represented
become lawmakers themselves". 13
Historically, our electoral exercises privileged the popular and, perhaps, pedigreed
individual candidate over platforms and political programs. 14 Political parties were
convenient amalgamation of electoral candidates from the national to the local level that
gravitated towards a few of its leaders who could marshall the resources to supplement
the electoral campaigns of their members. 15 Most elections were choices between
competing personalities often with very little discernible differences in their interpretation
and solutions for contemporary issues. 16 The electorate chose on the bases of
personality and popularity; only after the candidates were elected to public offices will
they later find out the concrete political programs that the candidate will execute. Our
history is replete with instances where the programs that were executed lacked
cohesion on the basis of principle. 17 In a sense, our electoral politics alienated and
marginalized large parts of our population.
The party list system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It could not have been
intended to enhance and further entrench the same system. It is the party or the
organization that is elected. It is the party list group that authorizes, hopefully through a
democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is also the party list group that can
delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace him or her, should he or she act
inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their
organization. In short, the party list system assists genuine political parties to evolve.

Genuine political parties enable true representation, and hence, provide the potential for
us to realize a "democratic and republican state". ISDCHA
Today, we are witness to the possibility of some party list groups that have maintained
organizational integrity to pose candidates for higher offices, i.e. the Senate. We can
take judicial notice that two of the candidates for the 2013 senatorial elections who
used to represent party list groups in the House of Representatives do not have the
resources nor the pedigree and, therefore, are not of the same mould as many of the
usual politicians who view for that position. It is no accident that the party list system is
only confined to the House of Representatives. It is the nurturing ground to mature
genuine political parties and give them the experience and the ability to build
constituencies for other elective public offices.
In a sense, challenging the politics of personality by constitutionally entrenching the
ability of political parties and organizations to instill party discipline can redound to the
benefit of those who have been marginalized and underrepresented in the past. It
makes it possible for nominees to be chosen on the basis of their loyalty to principle and
platform rather than their family affiliation. It encourages more collective action by the
membership of the party and hence will reduce the possibility that the party be
controlled only by a select few.
Thus, it is not only "for the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst . . . who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 18 that the party list system was enacted.
Rather, it was for everyone in so far as attempting a reform in our politics. TcSICH
But, based on our recent experiences, requiring "national, regional and sectoral parties
and organizations" that participate in the party list system to be representatives of the
"marginalized and underrepresented sector" and be "marginalized and
underrepresented themselves" is to engage in an ambiguous and dangerous fiction that
undermines the possibility for vibrant party politics in our country. This requirement, in
fact, was the very requirement that "gut the substance of the party list system". 19
Worse, contrary to the text of the constitution, it fails to appreciate the true context of the
party list system.
No requirement that the party or organization be "marginalized and underrepresented"
The disqualification of two "green" or ecological parties 20 and two "right wing"
ideological groups 21 (currently part of the party list sector in the present Congress) is
based on the assessment of the COMELEC en banc that they do not represent a
"marginalized" sector and that the nominee themselves do not appear to be
marginalized.
It is inconceivable that the party list system framed in our Constitution make it
impossible to accommodate green or ecological parties of various political persuasions.
Environmental causes do not have as their constituency only those who are
marginalized or underrepresented. Neither do they only have for their constituency
those "who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity". 22 In truth, all of us, regardless
of economic class, are constituents of ecological advocacies.
Also, political parties organized along ideological lines the socialist or even right wing
political parties are groups motivated by a their own narratives of our history, a vision
of what society can be and how it can get there. There is no limit to the economic class
that can be gripped by the cogency of their philosophies and the resulting political
platforms. Allowing them space in the House of Representatives if they have the

constituency that can win them a seat will enrich the deliberations in that legislative
chamber. Having them voice out opinions whether true or false should make the
choices of our representatives richer. It will make the choices of our representatives
more democratic.
Ideologically oriented parties work for the benefit of those who are marginalized and
underrepresented, but they do not necessarily come mainly from that economic class.
Just a glance at the history of strong political parties in different jurisdictions will show
that it will be the public intellectuals within these parties who will provide their rationale
and continually guide their membership in the interpretation of events and, thus, inform
their movement forward.
Political ideologies have people with kindred ideas as their constituents. They may care
for the marginalized and underrepresented, but they are not themselves nor for their
effectivity in the House of Representatives should we require that they can only come
from that class. DCESaI
Highlighting these groups in this opinion should not be mistaken as an endorsement of
their platforms. Rather, it should be seen as clear examples where interests and
advocacies, which may not be within the main focus of those who represent legislative
districts, cry out for representation. Surely, it should be the electorate, not the
COMELEC, which should decide whether their groups should participate in our
legislative deliberations. That these groups could be excluded even before the vote is
not what the party list system is all about.
These two instances arising from the consolidated petitions we are considering clearly
show why the text of article VI, section 5 (2) provides:
"(2)The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sectors." (emphasis provided)
What is plain from a reading of the text is that the qualification as to reserved seats is
applicable only for the "three consecutive terms after the ratification" of the Constitution.
Only one-half of the seats within that period is reserved to the "sectors" that were
enumerated, clearly implying that there are other kinds of party list groups other
than those who are sectoral.
To require that all the seats for party list representatives remain sectoral in one form or
the other is clearly and patently unconstitutional. It is not supported by the text. Its
rationale and its actual effect is not in accord with the spirit of these provisions.
Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. v. COMELEC
We are aware of the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec. 23 In that case, the Court
en banc declared that political parties may participate in the party list system but that
these political parties must be organized sectorally to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented". DEAaIS
The reasoning of the ponencia of that case derived from his fundamental principle that:

". . . The requisite character of these parties or organizations

must be consistent with the purpose of the party list system, as
laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941." 24
The ponencia then proceeded to put the interpretation of a statute at par with the
text of article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) the Constitution, thus:
"The foregoing provision on the party list system is not selfexecutory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like 'in
accordance with law' or 'as may be provided by law'; it was thus
up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution." 25
The 1987 Constitution is a complete document. Every provision should be read in the
context of all the other provisions so that contours of constitutional policy are made
clear. 26 To claim that the framers of the Constitution left it to Congress to complete the
very framework of the party list system is to question the fundamental character of our
constitution. The phrases "in accordance with law" and "as may be provided by law" is
not an invitation to the members of Congress to continue the work of the constituent
assembly that crafted the Constitution. Constitutional policy is to be derived from the
text of the constitution in the light of its context in the document and considering the
contemporary impact of relevant precedents.
From constitutional policy, Congress then details the workings of the policy through law.
The Constitution remains the fundamental and basic law with a more dominant
interpretative position vis-a-vis statute. It has no equal within our normative system.
DCScaT
Article VI, sections 5 (1) and (2) already imply a complete Constitutional framework for
the party list system.
Congress cannot add the concept of "proportional representation". Congress cannot
pass a law so that we read in the text of the Constitution the requirement that even
national and regional parties or organizations should likewise be sectoral.
Certainly Congress cannot pass a law so that even the one-half that was not
reserved for sectoral representatives even during the first three consecutive
terms after the ratification of the Constitution should now only be composed of
sectoral representatives.
There were strong cogent dissenting opinions coming from Justices Mendoza and Vitug
when Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC was decided in 2001. 27 Only six (6) justices
concurred with the reasoning of the ponencia. Two justices voted only in the result. Five
(5) justices dissented. Four (4) of them joining the dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente
Mendoza. There was no majority therefore in upholding the reasoning and ratio
decidendi proposed by the ponencia in that case. It was a divided court, one where
there was a majority to sustain the result but not enough to establish doctrine.
It was even a more divided court when the same issues were tackled in the case of
BANAT v. COMELEC in 2009. 28
Ostensibly, the rationale of the majority in BANAT was to prevent major political parties
from dominating organizations of the marginalized. Citing the concurring and dissenting
opinion of then Chief Justice Puno:
". . . . There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are
no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena.

This is borne out in the party list elections held in 2001 where
major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be
voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major
political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of
votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major
political parties made it to the top 50." 29 cDHCAE
The premise of course was the argument that major political parties that support
candidates for legislative districts were to be allowed to participate in the party-list
system. This is not the reading proposed today of the Constitution. Furthermore, the
opinion failed to foresee that even parties and organizations that claim to represent the
"marginalized" could crowd out each other further weakening the system.
Not only do we vote today without a precedent having a clear vote, we also do so with
the benefit of hindsight.
"Marginalized and underrepresented" is ambiguous
There is another reason why we cannot fully subscribe to the concept of "marginalized
and underrepresented". It is too ambiguous. There can be no consistent judicially
discernible standard for the COMELEC to apply. It thus invites invidious intervention
from COMELEC to undermine the right of suffrage of the groups that want to vie for
representation. Indirectly, it also violates the right of suffrage of the electorate.
COMELEC substituted its judgment for that of the electorate. It thus acted arbitrarily and
beyond its jurisdiction.
In none of the Orders of the COMELEC in question was there a definition of what it is to
be socially marginalized. No empirical studies have informed COMELEC's
determination as to which groups are "underrepresented" in government. In fact, there
is no indication as to what the characteristics of an individual's or group's identity would
lead the COMELEC en banc to consider that they were a "sector".
To the COMELEC en banc, for instance, the following are not marginalized or
underrepresented sectors: "Bicolanos", 30 "young professionals like drug counselors
and lecturers", 31 rural energy consumers, 32 "peasants, urban poor, workers and
nationalistic individuals who have stakes in promoting security of the country against
insurgency criminality and their roots in economic poverty", 33 "persons imprisoned
without proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt", 34 those who advocate "to publicly
oppose, denounce and counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino society"; 35
"environmental enthusiasts intending to take are of, protect and save Mother Earth", 36
"agricultural and cooperative sectors"; 37 "businessmen, civil society groups, politicians
and ordinary citizens advocating genuine people empowerment, social justice, and
environmental protection and utilization for sustainable development"; 38 "artists"; 39
"Bisayans"; 40 Ilonggos. 41 SCEDaT
What is plain is that the COMELEC declared ex cathedra sans any standard what were
the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors." This, in my opinion, constitutes grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. We are now asked to confirm their
actions. We are asked to affirm that COMELEC knew what a "marginalized and
underrepresented sector" was when they saw one.
COMELEC's process was a modern day inquisition reminiscent of the medieval hunt for
heretics and witches, a spectacle which may in a few cases weed out the sham

organization. But it was a spectacle nonetheless fraught with too many vulnerabilities
that cannot be constitutionally valid. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
As guardians of the text and values congealed in our Constitution, we should not lend
our imprimatur to both the basis and the procedure deployed by COMELEC in this case.
After all, we have a due process clause still in place. 42 Regardless of the nature of the
power that COMELEC deployed whether it was administrative or quasi-judicial the
parties were entitled to have a standard that they could apply in their situation so that
they could properly discern whether their factual situation deserved registration or
disqualification. ACIDSc
Neither was it possible for COMELEC to come up with a standard. Even Rep. Act No.
7941 was ambiguously worded. 43 There was no workable definition of "marginalized",
"underrepresented" and "sector." 44
Neither would it have been possible for Congress to define these concepts. In the first
place, our decisions have not given them guidance. In the second place, we could not
give guidance because it is not in the Constitution and could not be derived from its
provisions. This is also apart from the reality that "identity", "sector", "marginalized" and
"underrepresented" are heavily contested concepts in the fields of social science and
philosophy. 45
The fallacy of representation by "marginalized and underrepresented" groups
It is possible under our system for a party list group representing indigenous peoples to
be elected by peoples who do not belong to their sector but from a vote-rich legislative
district. The same is true with a party list group allegedly of security guards. 46 They,
too, can get elected without the consent of majority of all the security guards in this
country but simply from the required number allowed by our formula in BANAT v.
COMELEC. 47 In practice, we have seen the possibility for these "marginalized and
underrepresented" party list groups being elected simply by the required vote in some
legislative districts.
This sham produces the failure in representation. It undermines the spirit of the party list
system, violates the principle of representation inherent in a democratic and republican
state, and weakens rather than strengthen the abilities of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" to become lawmakers themselves. Constitutional construction
cannot lose sight of how doctrines can cause realities that will undermine the very spirit
of the text of our Constitution. 48
Allowing the existence of strong national and regional parties or organizations in the
party list system have better chances of representing the voices of the "marginalized
and underrepresented. It will also allow views, standpoints and ideologies sidelined by
the pragmatic politics required for political parties participating in legislative districts to
be represented in the House of Representatives. It will also encourage the concept of
being multi-sectoral and therefore the strengthening of political platforms. EDcIAC
To allow this to happen only requires that we maintain full fealty to the textual content of
our Constitution. It is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." 49 Nothing more, nothing less.
Requirements for Party List Groups
Preferably, party list groups should represent the marginalized and underrepresented in
our society. Preferably, they may not be marginalized themselves but that they may also

subscribe to political platforms that have the improvement of those who are politically
marginalized and economically destitute as their catapulting passion. But, this cannot be
the constitutional requirements that will guide legislation and actions on the part of the
Commission on Election.
I propose instead the following benchmarks:
First, the party list system includes national, regional and sectoral parties and
organizations;
Second, there is no need to show that they represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented". However, they will have to clearly show how their plans will impact
on the "marginalized and underrepresented". Should the party list group prefer to
represent a sector, then our rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani 50 and BANAT 51 will apply
to them;
Third, the parties or organizations that participate in the party list system must not also
be a participant in the election of representatives for the legislative districts. In other
words, political parties that field candidates for legislative districts cannot also
participate in the party list system;
Fourth, the parties or organizations must have political platforms guided by a vision of
society, an understanding of history, a statement of their philosophies and how this
translates into realistic political platforms; aICcHA
Fifth, the parties or organizations not only the nominees must have concrete and
verifiable track record of political participation showing their translation of their political
platforms into action;
Sixth, the parties or organizations that apply for registration must be organized solely for
the purpose of participating in electoral exercises;
Seventh, they must have existed for a considerable period, such as three (3) years,
prior to their registration. Within that period they should be able to show concrete
activities that are in line with their political platforms;
Eighth, they must have such numbers in their actual active membership roster so as to
be able to mount a credible campaign for purpose of enticing their audience (national,
regional or sectoral) for their election;
Ninth, a substantial number of these members must have participated in the political
activities of the organization;
Tenth, the party list group must have a governing structure that is not only
democratically elected but also one which is not dominated by the nominees
themselves;
Eleventh, the nominees of the political party must be selected through a transparent and
democratic process;
Twelfth, the source of the funding and other resources used by the party or organization
must be clear and should not point to a few dominant contributors specifically of
individuals with families that are or have participated in the elections for representatives
of legislative districts;
Thirteenth, the political party or party list organization must be able to win within the two
elections subsequent to their registration;

Fourteenth, they must not espouse violence; and CacEIS

Fifteenth, the party list group is not a religious organization.
Disqualification of existing registered party list groups
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC
With respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly
reposed on the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution
in article VI, section 17 clearly provides:
"Sec. 17.The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members . . ."
A more specific provision in the Constitution with respect to disqualifying registered
political party list groups should prevail over the more general powers of the COMELEC
to enforce and administer election laws. Besides, that the HRET is the "sole judge"
clearly shows that the constitutional intention is to exclude all the rest. 52
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I vote to:
(1)GRANT the Petitions and NULLIFY COMELEC Resolution No. 9135 and all the
COMELEC Resolutions raised in these consolidated cases; and
(2)REMAND the cases to COMELEC for proper proceedings in line with our decision.
||| (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, 203818-19, 203922, 203936,
203958, 203960, 203976, 203981, 204002, 204094, 204100, 204122, 204125, 204126,
204139, 204141, 204153, 204158, 204174, 204216, 204220, 204236, 204238, 204239,
204240, 204263, 204318, 204321, 204323, 204341, 204, April 02, 2013)