SANIDAD vs.

COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled
30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent
election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite
on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign
period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should
be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.

Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity,
time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured.
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646
(a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any
elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been
granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners
exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.

Adiong vs. Comelec, G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992; 207

SCRA 713
FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals
and stickers on mobile places, public or private, and limit their location or
publication to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial
candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last
medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on
radio, tv and print political advertisements.

ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.

HELD: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobileplaces

whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which is unconstitutional. There is no public interest
substantial enough to warrant the prohibition.

6 IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS CA, 259 SCRA 529 Facts:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel
2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and
propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in
comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent
Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program
Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for
public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it
appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128
which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante,
Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent
Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional
guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses
any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that
the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of itsTV program and in x-rating them.

It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer,
respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the
bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be
condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it
outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA
however reversed it hence this petition. Issue: WON the "ang iglesia ni cristo"
program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and
expression. Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with
presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this
presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck
down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions . RTCs ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of
religion. attack is different from offend any race or religion. The respondent
Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives
it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are
often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics,
the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning
towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of
religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace
of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm
the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
harm. Prior restraint on speech, includingreligious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is
inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because
the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of
speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be
measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended
cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such
vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of
protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by
an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may
only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Capulong, 160 SCRA 861,

G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Constitutional Law Right to Free Speech, Public Figure)

FACTS: Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the
production and filming of the projected motion picture The Four Day Revolution,
which relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at EDSA, for
its unlawful intrusion upon the formers right to privacy.

Petitioners contends that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom
of speech and expression; and the subject matter of the motion picture is one of
public interest and concern and not on the individual private life of respondent
senator.

ISSUE: WON the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free
speech.

HELD: Yes. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is
one of public interest. Private respondent is a public figure due to his participation in
the culmination of the change of government. The right of privacy of the a public
figure is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.

DOCTRINE:

Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. The general
principle is that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption.
The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption
is against its validity.

Gonzales vs Kalaw Katigbak

FACTS:

* The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films.
* The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (BRMPT),
with Maria Kalaw Katigbak as its Chairman and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada as its
Vice-Chairman, also named respondents. * On October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit
the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain
changes and deletions enumerated was granted by a sub-committee of the BRMPT.
* Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the classification of
the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. For petitioners, such classification "is
without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic
expression. The film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to
which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the
film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced
by the Board as basis for its classification. * The respondents in their answer
submitted that the standard of the law (Executive Order 878) for classifying films
afford a practical and determinative yardstick for the exercise of judgment. For
them, the question of the sufficiency of the standards remains the only question at
issue.

ISSUE:

* WoN the standards employed by the BRMPT are sufficient and conform to what the
Constitution ordains.

HELD:

* YES. Petition dismissed.

RATIO:

* The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not...