1. CECILIA ZULUETA vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (Nia Abiquibil)

Answer to Question #1
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a
driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, canceled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible intrusion and from unlawful
means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical
practice.
RULING: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
2. People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 129296 342 SCRA 25, September 25, 2000 (Kyle Almero)
Answer to Question# 2
FACTS: Based on a tip from an informer, police officers went to the place of the accused where they found
marijuana plants being cultivated approximately twenty-five meters from the house of the accused. They
uprooted the plants and arrested the accused. They asked the accused who owned the plants and the
accused admitted that they belonged to him. The prosecution offered the plants and the admission of the
accused as evidence. The accused claimed that the warrantless search was illegal while the police officers
claimed that the plants were found in plain view.
ISSUE: Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
HELD: No. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination
of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that
they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed
his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information
in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused
on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them.
The marijuana plants were not in plain view. For the plain view doctrine to apply, the following
must be present: (a) there was a valid prior intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently

discovered by the police who have the right to be where they were; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) plain view justified seizure of the evidence without further search. In this case, the
police officers located the plants before they arrested the accused without a warrant. Also, they were
dispatched to appellants kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the marijuana plants. The seizure of
evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis
plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they
first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana
plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants
in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be
made to apply.
ANSWER TO # 2:
No, the marijuana leaves are not admissible in evidence under the plain view doctrine. In the instant case,
there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable
cause. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. The marijuana plants were not in
plain view. For the plain view doctrine to apply, the following must be present: (a) there was a valid prior
intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they were; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified seizure of the
evidence without further search. In this case, the police officers located the plants before they arrested
the accused without a warrant. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. Hence, the "plain view"
doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
3. Saado vs Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 546 (Angelica Ariola)
Answer to Question 3(a)
FACTS:
The defunct Philippine Fisheries Commission issued an Ordinary Fishpond Permit in favor of Saado
covering 50 hectares situated in Brgy. Monching, Siay, Zamboanga del Sur. Later, Saado entered into a
contract of fishpond development and financing with private respondent Nepomuceno. On September 28,
1979, the Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended the conversion of the Ordinary
Fishponde Permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which was later on approved in favor of
petitioner. To oppose the said loan, Nepomuceno informed the Bureau of Fisheries about his
financing/development contract with the petitioner..
On July, 17, 1981, Saado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery of
possession and damages, alleging that Nepomuceno failed to deliver Sanados share of the net harvest
among other things. While this case was pending, the then Minister of Agriculture and Food canceled the
Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the improvements thereon in favor of government. Later, said order
was reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given priority to apply for the area and that his
improvements thereon were not considered forfeited in favor of the government.
Saado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal was dimissed on July 19, 1989.
Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision over Sanados complaint for recovery of possession in his
favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President has any legal effect on the civil case for
recovery of possession.
RULING:
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a
license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasijudicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon
the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights
and liabilities determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is
explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department
headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the
executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of

the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the President,
his powers and duties.
4. THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
ROMAN MENESES Y MARIN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 111742 March 26, 1998 (Beverly Baluyot)
Answer to Question 3(b)

PHILIPPINES

vs.

Eyewitness identification is vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution. Subject of the Court's scrutiny in the instant criminal case is the credibility of a child's alleged
eyewitness account on which the appellant's conviction by the trial court was solely anchored.
FACTS: At around three o'clock in the early morning of December 15, 1991, thirty-three year old Cesar
Victoria was stabbed to death while sleeping by his seven-year old son Christopher in a rented makeshift
room in Tondo, Manila. Appellant Roman Meneses was charged with the murder of Cesar Victoria. The
prosecution presented the following witnesses: Christopher R. Victoria, SPO3 Jaime Mendoza, SPO3
Eduardo Gonzales and Medico-Legal Officer Florante Baltazar.
Christopher R. Victoria testified that he witnessed the stabbing of his father. He testified that while he lived
with his Kuya Odeng on Kasipagan Street, Tondo, on the night of December 14, 1991, he went to his
father's rented makeshift room to sleep after he (Christopher) was whipped by his brother. He further
testified that he was awakened from sleep and saw his father being stabbed in the heart with a "veinte
nueve."
SPO3 Jaime Mendoza, a police investigator of the Western Police District testified that when he questioned
Christopher, who was then in the house, Christopher could not identify nor describe the attacker, but that
the child said he could identify him because he knew his face. On re-direct examination however, Mendoza
said that Christopher identified the assailant as appellant. On December 26, 1991, Christopher was again
brought to the precinct where, during a confrontation with appellant, Christopher identified appellant as
the person who stabbed his father. SPO3 Eduardo C. Gonzales testified that at about two o'clock in the
morning of December 25, 1991, he arrested appellant. The arrest was based on the report of Angelina
Victoria, appellant's wife, who implicated appellant in the crime. The policemen found appellant at the
place pointed to by Angelina, which was a flower box at the corner of Tuazon and Mithi Streets. Frisked,
appellant yielded a balisong. After announcing that they were policemen and that appellant was being
arrested as the suspect in the stabbing of Cesar Victoria, Gonzales and his companions brought appellant
to Police Station No. 2. Appellant was later transferred to the Homicide Section.
The lone witness for the defense was the appellant himself, Roman Meneses. He interposed the defense of
denial and alibi. On the day of the crime, appellant alleged that he was in San Isidro, Mexico, Pampanga,
and had been there since the tenth or eleventh of that month, after he had a misunderstanding with
Angelina. He further testified that he was arrested on December 24, 1991, without a warrant after being
implicated in the crime by his wife. He was brought to the police station where he was mauled by
policemen; he never admitted though to killing Cesar Victoria, his brother-in-law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove Meneses guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: The issue in the instant case is credibility. The judgment of appellant's conviction is anchored
entirely on the testimony of the single eyewitness, Christopher Victoria, who identified appellant as the one
who he allegedly saw stab his father. It was established that the crime took place in the wee hours
of the morning, before the crack of dawn, at around three o'clock. The court can take judicial
notice of the "laws of nature," such as in the instant case, that at around three in the morning
during the Christmas season, it is still quite dark and that daylight comes rather late in this
time of year. Such judicial notice of the laws of nature is mandatory under Section 1, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court. Nowhere in the description of the crime scene by witness SPO3 Mendoza in his
testimony was it established that there was light or illumination of any sort by which Christopher could see
the attacker.
The prosecution failed to paint a crystal-clear picture of the environment by which Christopher could have
made an accurate and reliable identification of the attacker. Christopher's testimony being improbable, is
not credible. Evidence is credible when it is "such as the common experience of mankind can approve as

probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity
to our knowledge, observation, and experience."
In Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that an identification of the accused during a "show-up" or
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, is seriously flawed. We
stated thus:
. . . the mode of identification other than an identification parade is a show-up, the presentation of
a single suspect to a witness for purposes of identification. Together with its aggravated forms, it
constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police.
From Mendoza's testimony we can gather that appellant was presented as the suspect in the crime to
Christopher inside Mendoza's office in the Homicide Section of the police station, or later in the detention
cell the boy was made to approach. While Mendoza did not literally point to appellant as in the Tuazon
case, equally pervasive in the "confrontation" in the instant case is what Wigmore calls "the suggestion of
guilty identity."
Even applying the totality of circumstances test set in People v. Teehankee, Jr., formulated and used by
courts in resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we must hold the
identification of appellant by Christopher to be seriously flawed. The test lists three factors to consider:
. . . (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness'
degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.
Indeed, we cannot discount the angle that young Christopher was influenced by prior prompting or
manipulation by an adult, his aunt Angelina. Rather than reinforce the identification, the circumstances
pointed out by the trial court plants in mind the plausibility that appellant's wife Angelina could have
coached the young impressionable Christopher. These circumstances are:
First, was the insistence of [appellant's] wife as testified by the accused himself, that he was the
one who killed the victim, and was pointed to by her as the assailant, thus, he was arrested.
Another was the resentment of the accused against his brother-in-law-victim brought about by the
latter's intervention in that serious quarrel between him and his wife. Thirdly, that the accused no
doubt disliked the financial support and subsistence being given by his wife to the victim.
Quite revealingly, Angelina was the one who went to the police to implicate appellant in the crime and who
directed the police to where he could be found. She later herded Christopher to the police station for the
boy to give his statement. She was also with the boy when he was made to identify appellant during the
"confrontation." We see Angelina's actuations as suspect, especially when we consider that per SPO3
Mendoza's testimony, when he questioned Christopher immediately after the crime, the boy could not
simply name the attacker.
It is conceded that appellant's defense of alibi is weak. The settled rule however is that conviction should
rest on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The onus is on the
prosecution to prove the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, in view of the constitutional
presumption of the innocence of the accused. We must rule that the prosecution failed to so discharge its
burden.
Appellant acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
5. Republic vs. CA (Gala Bolen)
6. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE vs. CA Digest G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998 (Donna Bollos)
Answer to Question # 3 (d) - Occurance of a typhoon which destroyed the roof of a building.
Yes. Courts may take Discretionary Judicial Notice on matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration.. as provided for Sec. 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. .

In the case of Southeastern College v Ca, the court held that: It is a matter of judicial notice that
typhoons are common occurrences in this country. Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the
city government service since 1974, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the
same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a
matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school buildings
roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and
several typhoons even stronger than Saling.
Facts: On October 11, 1989, powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the
roof of Southeastern Colleges building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying
portions of the roofing of private respondents Dimaanos house.
Private respondent alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them
to stay temporarily in others houses.
An ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city
building official. The fourth floor of subject school building was declared as a structural hazard.
Lower court awarded damages. CA affirmed but reduced damages.
Issue: WON the damage of the PRs house resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school
buildings roof ripped off was due to fortuitous event? NO
Held: Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned
report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioners school building after the
typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is
visual to the eye through is not always reflective of the real cause behind.
Petitioners obtained a permit from the city building official before the construction of its building. Having
obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy is prima facie evidence of the regular and
proper construction of subject school building. When part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted
by typhoon Saling, the city engineer gave the go-signal for such repairs without any deviation from the
original design. It subsequently authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building. These
only prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect.
Petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified that an annual
maintenance inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was
even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but
private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and simply stipulated that it would be
corroborative of the vice presidents narration. Besides, no complaint regarding any defect on the same
structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter
of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school buildings roofing
was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several
typhoons even stronger than Saling.
Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its
school building in question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by
private respondents house.
7. People v Estomaca 256 SCRA 421, April 22, 1996 (Carmela Caupayan)
Answer to Question 3(e)
Summary: 5 complaints were filed against Estomaca for committing rape and sexual assault against his
daughter. In his arraignment, he pleaded guilty to all 5 cases, but he contradicted himself by saying that
he only committed 2 out of the 5 offenses. Court found that lower court improperly followed the
procedures regarding arraignment. Judgment of conviction for the 2 cases was reversed and they were
remanded to the lower courts.
How it reached the Supreme Court:

5 separate complaints (for 5 separate instances of rape and sexual assault) were filed in RTC Iloilo
City against Estomaca. Only 2 complaints are being challenged in this case.
Estomaca waived presentation of evidence for defense. Court required prosecution to establish
Estomacas guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Estelita, the complainant, appeared and testified in
court.
Lower court imposed penalty of RP for sexual assault and Death for penalty of death for rape.
Automatic review by Supreme Court

Facts: Estomaca is an illiterate laborer charged with raping his own daughter Estelita. 5 complaints were
filed and 2 of them are being challenged in this appellate review. The 2 instances which are the subject of
the complaints happened on December 1993 and March 6, 1994. They both took place inside their
residence in Iloilo. Lower court imposed penalty of RP for sexual assault in 1993, and Death for rape
allegedly committed in 1994. From a perusal of the records of the case, it appears that the procedural
rules to be observed for the validity of the arraignment of the accused were irregularly complied with;
similar to what happened in the case of Alicando. Estomaca claims to have performed only 2 out 5 cases
filed against him, but he pleaded guilty to all 5 cases. This shows that the accused did not really
understand the consequences of his actions during the arraignment.
Issue: Was there a valid arraignment?
Ruling: No. [Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that:
1. Arraignment should be made in open court by judge or by clerk of court
2. The accused be furnished a copy of complaint or information with list of witnesses stated
therein
3. Reading of complaint or information in the language or dialect that is known to him
(mandatory requirement)
4. Asking him what his plea is to the charge
The arraignment is an avenue for the accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and allows him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. This is an integral
aspect of the due process clause. The transcript of the arraignment shows that it merely consisted of the
bare reading of the five complaints. It was reported in the transcript that: Reading the
information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect. Since it was stated in the singular, Court
speculates whether all five criminal complaints were actually read, translated or explained to Estomaca on
a level within his comprehension considering his limited education.
It is apparent that there was irregularity in the arraignment because after the accused pleaded guilty to
the 5 complaints, he subsequently stated that he wasnt guilty of the 3 cases filed against him.
Judicial Notice (Mandatory): Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the
complaints were supposedly read to appellant in Ilonggo/local dialect. Parenthetically, there was no
statement of record that appellant fully understood that medium of expression. This assumes added
significance since Ilonggo, or properly called Hiligaynon, is a regional language, spoken in a major part of
Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with variations, in Capiz. Within a province or major geographical
area using a basic regional language, there may be other local dialects spoken in certain parts thereof. If
said indication in the aforequoted portion of the transcript intended to convey that Ilonggo is merely a local
dialect and was also the idiom referred to, the same is egregious error; it would be different if local
dialect was used to denote an alternative and different medium but, inexplicably, without identifying what
it was. The significance of this distinction is found right in the provisions of Section 1(a) of Rule 116 which,
cognizant of the aforestated linguistic variations, deliberately required that the complaint or information be
read to the accused in the language or the dialect known to him, to ensure his comprehension of the
charges. The Court takes judicial notice, because it is either of public knowledge or readily
capable of unquestionable demonstration, that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo province
and all the way up to and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were
committed and of which appellant and his family are natives, the local dialect is known as kinaray-a.
Judgment of Conviction in the 2 criminal cases SET ASIDE. Cases REMANDED to trial court.
8. People vs. Espinosa (Mary Cimeni)
Answer to Question 3(f)

Summary: The accused (Jesus Espinosa alias Jingjing) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the
trial court for having murdered Agusto Elon, 21 years old, and an employee of Basic Fruit Corporation (his
work was peeling banana to be made into banana chips) by use of a handgun (caliber unknown).
Facts:
On February 13, 1993 in IloIlo city, Jingjing Espinosa conspired with Rodney Espinosa to kill Agusto Elon, a
deaf mute. At 11:40 in the evening the latter was urinating near gate of the fence of the house of his
sister, Cynthia Villanueva when he was shot by the accused at the back of his head three times thereby
causing his death.
During that time, Juan Elon (father of the victim) was staying at the house of his daughter Cynthia, which is
just located along Zamora Street whereby he saw his son being shot dead. Upon witnessing the incident,
he ran downstairs and reached into his son who was already dead. He embraced his son and saw the bullet
bulging in his forehead while his neck was bleeding.
The crime was also witnessed by Zamora, who at that time was on his way home from the Rotary Park His
testimony was used to corroborate the testimony of Agustos father.
Trial Court decision: The trial court convicted Jingjing Espinosa as principal under Article 248 with no
mitigating circumstance or aggravating circumstance. At the time, the trial court did not take into
consideration the voluntary surrender of Jingjing Espinosa even if it was on the record because the record
and warrant of arrest was not formally offered. On the other hand, Rodney Espinosa was acquitted for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. From this decision the accused
appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the court can take into consideration the fact that JingJing Espinosa voluntarily
surrendered in fixing his penalty despite the fact that the record and warrant of arrest was not formally
offered.
Ruling: Yes. The court agreed with the accused-appellant (Jingjing) that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. There was no need to formally
offer it as evidence because it was shown on the records and the court can take cognizance of it. The court
cited the ruling in Universal Textile Mills Inc vs. Court of Industrial Relations, which says It is a well settled
rule that a tribunal may at any time take judicial notice of the records of a case pending before it.
9. People vs. Kulais (Ken Cruz)
10.People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 116918, June 19, 1997 (Ruth Dinoy)
Answer to QUESTION No. 3(h)
FACTS:
At about 6:30 PM of December 28, 1991, while Michael Buenvinida, Glorivic Bandayanon (the guardian of
Michael and his siblings), and several other occupants of the Buenvinida residence were watching
television, a man armed with gun, jumped over the low fence, went in the house through the open front
door and introduced himself as a policeman. On cue, two men followed the first man in entering the house
and promptly covered their faces with handkerchief. The intruders tied the occupants of the house and
brought them to the masters bedroom with guns pointed at the victims. The burglars seized the cash and
bottles of perfume in the room. One of the perpetrators asked Michael to unplug all the appliances they
could possibly take. They also asked the victims for jewelleries but when they couldnt give them any, they
brought Glorivic to the childrens bedroom to search for jewelleries in the room. When Glorivic wasnt able
to find anything, the first man pointed his gun to her and asked her to take her clothes off, despite her
pleas, the man succeeded in removing her clothes and had carnal knowledge with her. After which, the
second man entered the room, but the cloth covering his face fell on his neck so Glorivic was able to
identify him (Martinez). Martinez also succeeded in having carnal knowledge with Glorivic as well as the
third man after. Michael was able to witness the three coming in and out of the room as it was left open
and heard Glorivics cries and implorations to her tormentors. When Glorivic was brought back to her
companians, her hair was in disarray, and there was blood on the lower parts of her body.
After more than two years, appellant Martinez was arrested on March 3, 1994. Glorivic was able to
positively identify him among the 8 detainees suspected to be her malefactor. In a separate instance,
Michael was also able to positively identify him with 6 other inmates due to his prominent mole on the
right cheek.

During the trial, appellant denies being involved in the robbery with rape committed in the Buenvinido
residence. He also raised an alibi that he was with his wife and children when the crime happened.
The trial court found appellant guilty of the composite crime of robbery with rape and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amount of the stolen and unrecovered personal
properties, moral damages to Glorivic Bandayanon, and cost of the suit. Appellant was ordered to
indemnify Ernesto Buenvinida in the sum of P73,000.00 as the value of his stolen and unrecovered
personal properties.
On appeal he questions the credibility of the witnesses identification: due to the long interval of time
before they were able to confront him; because the perpetrators covered their face with handkerchief and;
because they could have been so gravely terrified by the criminal acts as to have their mental faculties
impaired.
Appellant contends that the lower court should not have ordered him to pay the value of the unrecovered
personalties to Ernesto Buenvinida. Appellant claimed in his brief that the amounts alleged in the
information as the bases of his civil liability for robbery were just concocted and founded on speculation
and conjectures.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the witnesses were credible to give their testimony.
2. Whether or not appellant should pay the value for the unrecovered personalties.
RULING:
Answer to Issue #1:
When an accused assails the identification made by witnesses, he is in effect attacking the credibility of
those witnesses who referred to him as the perpetrator of the crime alleged to have been committed. The
case then turns on the question of credibility.
The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the prosecution were not only consistent with and
corroborative of each other. The transcripts of stenographic notes reveal that their narrations before the
lower court were delivered in a clear, coherent and unequivocal manner. The unhurried, studious and
deliberate manner in which appellant was identified by them in court added strength to their credibility
and immeasurably fortified the case of the prosecution.
The records also show that the memory of these witnesses were not in any way affected by the passage of
two years and three months since the tragedy. Appellants mole on his right cheek provided a distinctive
mark for recollection and which, coupled with the emotional atmosphere during the incident, would be
perpetually etched in the minds of the witnesses. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner in which the
crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a lasting
impression on the victims minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.
It is also doctrinally settled that in the absence of evidence showing that the prosecution witnesses were
actuated by improper motive, their identification of the accused as the assailant should be given full faith
and credit. Where conditions of visibility are favorable, as those obtaining in the Buenvinida residence
when the crimes were committed, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertions as to the
identity of the malefactor should be accepted as trustworthy.
Answer to issue # 2:
Yes. While it is claimed that hearsay testimony was involved, it is actually and not necessarily so. The rule
that hearsay evidence has no probative value does not apply here, since SPO4 Abner Castro was presented
as a witness and testified on two occasions, during which he explained how the value of the stolen
properties was arrived at for purposes of the criminal prosecution. During his testimony on his
investigation report and the affidavit of Ernesto Buenvinida on the amounts involved, appellant had all the
opportunity to cross-examine him on the correctness thereof; and it was this opportunity to cross-examine
which negates the claim that the matters testified to by the witness are hearsay. And, said documents

having been admitted as part of testimony of the policeman, they shall accordingly be given the same
weight as that to which his testimony may be entitled.
Again, even under the rule on opinions of ordinary witnesses, the value of the stolen items was
established. It is a standing doctrine that the opinion of a witness is admissible in evidence on ordinary
matters known to all men of common perception, such as the value of ordinary household articles. Here,
the witness is not just an ordinary witness, but virtually an expert, since his work as an investigator of
crimes against property has given him both the exposure to and experience in fixing the current value of
such ordinary articles subject of the crime at bar. Incidentally, it is significant that appellant never dared to
cross-examine on the points involved, which opportunity to cross-examine takes the testimony of Castro
out of the hearsay rule, while the lack of objection to the value placed by Castro bolsters his testimony
under the cited exception to the opinion rule.
Also not to be overlooked is the fact that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice, in this case of
the value of the stolen goods, because these are matter of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. The lower court may, as it obviously did, take such judicial notice motu
proprio. Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace
evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve.
Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume (especially since the trial court
was presided by a lady judge) are undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of
unquestionable demonstration.
11.EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING v. CA and ANGELITA DIAMANTE (Rosel
Erames)
Answer to Question #4
FACTS: Petitioners are husband and wife. They have 6 children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who
was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and RN Lourdes Vasquez. Petitioner Bienvenida served
as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante. According to Bienvenida in August 1989,
Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do
some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., with Angelita as the latter usually takes care of the child while she was doing laundry. When
Bienvenida returned from the market, they were gone. Bienvenida proceeded to Angelitas house, but did
not find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told her to
come back later. She returned after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her
pleas for assistance. Bienvenida and her husband looked for their missing son in other places, but saw no
traces of his whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez,
allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son for the first time after four
years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas
Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy
despite her demand to do so.
The spouses filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. To
substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin
Lopez. The first witness, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27,
1989 at her clinic. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. The second witness, Benjamin
Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez as the latter was sterile. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas
Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. Angelita claimed
that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas
Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban and said birth was registered by Tomas
Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
RTC: Concluded that since Angelita and Tomas could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas
Lopez is an impossibility. The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person who is the natural child of petitioners.
CA: reversed the RTCs decision. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to
establish that she was the mother of the minor. l Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the
son of petitioners?
RULING: virtua1 1aw Since the conclusions of the CA and RTC contradict, this Court may scrutinize the
evidence on the record to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the
evidentiary facts. A close scrutiny of the records reveal that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomas is actually her missing son. First, there is evidence that Angelita
could no longer bear children as she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent
ligation before she lived with Tomas Lopez. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not
presented in court and no clinical records were ever submitted. Second, there is strong evidence which
directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Third, the birth certificate of John
Thomas was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of
his child and the certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.
Significantly, the birth certificate stated Tomas Lopez and Angelita were legally married which is false. This
false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. Fourth, the trial court observed several
times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces,
eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage. The trial courts conclusion should be given high respect, it
having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned.1ibrarAll these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners.
12.People v. Rullepa (Yasmeen Junaid)
FACTS:
A complaint was filed against Ronnie Rullepa (Kuya Ronnie) charging him for the crime of rape of a
3-year old child named Cyra May Francisco Buenafe.
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria (the mother) was about to set the table for dinner, Cyra May, told
her, Mama, si Kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko. Gloria asked her
daughter as to how many times and what else did the accused did to her which the latter answered. While
the accused was out with her husband Col. Buenafe, that night, he waited for them until arrival. Gloria then
sent accused out on an errand and informed her husband about their daughters plaint. Col. Buenafe
talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had earlier told her mother.
When the accused returned, the spouses verified from him the plaint of Cyra May. The accused
admitted the incident but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Then, he
was brought to Camp Karingal on the following morning. He admitted the imputations against him and he
was detained.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty. From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,
Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the accused was convicted
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced to death. Hence, this automatic review.
ISSUE: Does the court need to take judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in determining her
age?
RULING:
Several cases suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in
determining her age. On the other hand, a handful of cases hold that courts, without the requisite hearing
prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, cannot take judicial notice of the victims age.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance, as object
evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and such doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused. This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the
victims mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of death
to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved

with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims age
in the present case spells the difference between life and death.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the
penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
13.Agoncillo v. CA (Sheila Lara)
Answer to Question # 5 Issue B
Facts: Due to reports of rampant illegal fishing at Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz, personnel from the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources specifically from the Bureau of Fisheries as well as the
Barangay Captain of said place assisted by the local policemen created a team to conduct surveillance
within the Ivisan Bay. A team riding in two (2) pumpboats from the Barangay Basiao wharf proceeded
along the waters of Ivisan Bay. The team had to stop and listen for possible occurrences of illegal fishing
within their vicinity. They proceeded to the area around five hundred meters (500 m.) away from them.
They surrounded the area. At a distance of around ten meters, Joey de la Cruz, an employee of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, saw three persons diving into the water. Thereafter, they would
surface and throw their catch of fish to the unmotorized banca around four meters long nearby. In the
seashore of said islet, around three to four meters away from these three persons floating in the water,
were three other persons standing in the rocky portions around three meters apart. Joey de la Cruz
gathered seven fish samples from their banca while Rolando Amoroso went down from the pumpboat and
proceeded to the islet. However, upon inspection, he failed to find any explosive (dynamite) either on the
seashore or on the banca. No paraphernalia used in dynamite fishing were found. Both Joey de la Cruz and
Rolando Amoroso recognized the six persons as the herein accused by their faces.
While on their way, Joey de la Cruz externally examined the fish samples.
Upon their arrival at the fish cage, another external examination was conducted by Joey de la Cruz and
Rolando Amoroso. In both external examinations, the two found out that the fishes were caught with the
use of explosives because blood was oozing from their operculums and their eyes were protruding.
The fish samples were then placed in a plastic bag filled with ice at the house of Barangay Captain
Persinefles U. Oabe that evening. In the morning, Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso brought the fish
samples to their office in Roxas City where they conducted an internal examination. The examination
revealed that the fish samples were caught with the use of explosives because their air bladders were
raptured and deeply stained with blood; the vertebral columns were broken but with bloodstains; their ribs
were broken; and there were blood clots in their abdomens. Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso rendered
a written report of their internal examination to the Provincial Agricultural Officer.
The testimonies of Joey de la Cruz, Rolando Amoroso, and Persinefles U. Oabe above were
corroborated by Pat. Rafael Tupaz, one of the police escorts of the team.
ISSUE: A. WON the 7 pieces of fish samples taken by the team of fishing law enforcer can be used as
conclusive proof that the fish were killed with the use of explosives.
B. WON the presentation of the explosives or dynamite used in the crime of illegal fishing
is indispensable to conviction.
RULING:
A. The trial court correctly gave credence to these testimonies, thus:
Above three (3) accused would like the Court to believe that the seven (7) pieces of fish samples taken by
the team of fishing law enforcers were the catch of their fish net they locally called [sic] patuloy.
x x x.
With the external and internal examination by Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso showing that these
fishes were caught with the use of explosive, bare denial of above three (3) accused that they caught them
by means of a fishing net they locally call patoloy is insufficient to disprove such finding. It is simply a
superiority of weight of object evidence over testimonies of the accused.

Joey de la Cruz is an agricultural technologist of their office and a graduate of Bachelor of Science in
Fishery. Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso had undergone training course in fishery laws and
implementing regulations as well as actual demonstrations in sea to practice what they had learned in
theory. [As] xxx technical personnel of the Bureau of Fishery and Aquatic Resources, their finding after
an internal and external examination of fish samples to prove they were caught with the use of
explosives should be presented to show that these prosecution witnesses fabricated their story. There
is no ulterior motive which implied them to testify as they did. Furthermore, no evidence was
introduced by the defense to impeach their credibility nor evidence to discredit their
persons. Credibility of the testimonies having remained unimpeached, it shall be given great weight in
the determination of the guilt of the accused. Besides, being public officers to enforce fishing laws, in
the absence of ill-motive on their part, to impute to the accused a serious offense of illegal fishing with
the use of explosive, the presumption is that there was regular performance of public duty on their
part.
The presumption that the crime of illegal fishing was committed has, therefore, been clearly
established. Such presumption, however, is merely prima facie, and may be rebutted by the accused.
Petitioners attempt to overcome said presumption by disputing the findings of prosecution witnesses Joey
de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso. They claim that since not all their catch were examined, there can be no
conclusive proof that the fish were killed with the use of explosives. It is ridiculous to have expected
that all the fish found in the accused fishing boat would be subjected to an examination. It is
sufficient that, as in the case at bar, a random sample of the accuseds catch was examined
and found to have been killed with the use of explosives. A patent impracticality would result
if the law required otherwise.
B. NO. It is quite probable that petitioners dumped these materials into the sea while the raiding party
was approaching. Moreover, Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1058, provides:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; xxx -- It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather, or cause to be
caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (l), [7] (m)[8] and (d),
[9]
respectively, of Sec. 3 hereof xxx.
xxx.
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing combustible elements,
or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric fishing in any fishing boat or in
the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that the same were used for fishing in
violation of this Decree, the discovery in any fishing boat of fish caught or killed by the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or by electricity shall constitute a presumption
that the owner, operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of explosives, obnoxious or
poisonous substance or electricity.
In Hizon vs. Court of Appeals,[10] this Court held that the law, as contained in the last paragraph of
Section 33, creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when fish caught or killed with
the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. In
this case, it cannot be denied that the fishes found in petitioners banca were caught or killed by the use of
explosives.

14.ABELLA v. CA and COLARINA (Marquel Peonila)

Answer to Question # 6
FACTS:
On May 1987, Abella (lessor) and Colarina (lessee) signed a contract of lease over a portion of a building
effective July 1, 1987 until July 1, 1991 (4 years), for P3,000 a month.
Upon signing, Colarina paid Abella P40,000 and the latter issued the corresponding receipt. The receipt
provides that the P40K is an ADVANCED DEPOSIT, TO ANSWER FOR ANY RENTAL WHICH MR. CONRADO
COLARINA MAY FAIL TO PAY DURING THE TERM OF THE LEASE

 Intending to use the premises for his pawnshop business, Colarina introduced improvements thereon
amounting to P68,000.
Colarina discontinued paying from November 1987 to April 1988. Repeated demands were made by Abella,
later with notice of extrajudicial foreclosure pursuant to paragraph 13 of the lease contract, all were
unheeded.
Abella took possession of the property on May 1, 1988 with PNP and Barangay Officials assistance, who
made an inventory of all items found therein.
An action for enforcement of contract of lease with preliminary injunction and damages was filed by
Colarina against Abella before the RTC.
RTC RULING:
Dismissed. Ordered Abella to return the 40K less P18K (unpaid rental from Nov-Dec 1987 to April
1988) or the sum of P22K to Colarina together with the destroyed and removed materials and
improvements introduced by the latter.
COURT OF APPEALS RULING:
Reversed. Ordered Abella to restore to Colarina the possession of leased premises, to restore the
improvements or pay P68,000 and cost of suit.
ABELLAS ARGUMENTS:
The P40K represents goodwill money in payment for the privilege to occupy the vacant portion of
the building.
COLARINAS ARGUMENTS:
The P40K is an advance deposit to answer for any rental which Colarina may fail to pay [as
indicated in the receipt
SUPREME COURT: The receipt is clear and unequivocal that the amount is an advance
deposit which will answer for any rental that Colarina may fail to pay. It is a cardinal rule of
contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. No amounts of
extrinsic aid are required and further extraneous sources are necessary in order to ascertain
the parties intent, determinable as it is, from the receipt itself.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N Colarina violated the lease contract warranting its extrajudicial rescission.
(2) W/N possession of the premises may properly be restored to Colarina.
SUPREME COURT:
(1) NO. We are more convinced that the receipt expresses truly the parties intent on the purpose of said
payment as against the oral testimony of the petitioner that said amount is but only a goodwill
money. Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. "I would sooner trust the
smallest slip of paper for truth said Judge Limplin of Georgia, than the strongest and most retentive
memory ever bestowed on mortal man.
This is especially true in this case where such oral testimony is given by the petitioner himself, a
party to the case who has an interest in its outcome, and by Jesus Hipolito, a witness who claimed to
have received a commission from the petitioner. In addition, the trial court itself has found that this
receipt is genuine when it brushed aside the petitioner's claim that her signature appearing thereon
was a forgery. The authenticity of the receipt further enhances its probative value as against the oral
testimony of the petitioner and of her witness.
Hence, Colarina is not yet in arrears with his rental payment when Abella took possession of the
leased premises on May 1, 1988.
(2) Issue moot and academic by the time expiration of the term of the subject contract of lease on July
1,1991. Hence, Colarina has no more right to be restored to the possession of the leased premises,
said right being coterminous with the term of the contract.
DISPOSITION:

Modified. Abella ordered to return to Colarina P40K less P18K and pay the latter P68K for the
improvements.