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A Comparison of Hobbes and Locke on Natural Law and

Social Contract
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Dean A.
Steele
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A COMPARISON OF HOBBES AND LOCKE ON

NATURAL LAW AND SOCIAL CONTRACT
IV
DEAN ALLEN STEELE, B.S.
REPORT
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
August 1993
A COMPARISON OF HOBBES AND LOCKE ON

NATURAL LAW AND SOCIAL CONTRACT
APPROVED:
SUPERVISOR.-
Aloysius P. Martinich
i-Aocesslon For
FITTS tl'AI
DTI C 7
ion-
F-____
QUAL
!_o
Copyright
by
Dean Allen Steele
1993
For
my mother, Sally,
and
my father, Ron
Acknowledgments
I would like to acknowledge all of the people who supported me
while I was preparing for and writing this report.
I owe a great deal of gratitude to Professor Al Martinich who
showed tremendous patience with me and guided me throughout this
endeavor. I extend my appreciation to the Philosophy Department of
the University of Texas, especially the Graduate Coordinator Jill
Glenn. Jill always makes time in her busy schedule to listen to
students and help them with whatever problem they have, whether it
be personal or academic. I would also like to thank Professor Jay
Budziszewski who unknowingly inspired me through his class on
"Early American Thought" to include John Locke in my report.
During my stay in Texas I endured some personal hardships
which I feel would have prevented me from finishing my studies if not
for the support I received from the terrific friends I have made here in
Austin. Reinato Olivas was virtually my therapist considering how
often he had to listen to me work out my problems. Thank you. I have
several friends such as Linda, Scott, Izabela, Dean and Jan, Otto,
Reymundo, Hiram and Corina, and Aurelio and Rosa, all of which
helped me in countless ways. I thank you all very much.
Additionally, Maria and her son Joe Manuel made my last few weeks
in Austin special ones.
Finally, and most of all, I would like to thank my mother, my
father, and my three brothers, Dana, Rob, and Rich. All of you helped
v
me in numerous ways and continually encouraged me to follow my

dreams and to never quit something once I have started. Thank you
and I love you.
Dean Allen Steele
University of Texas, Austin
July 23, 1993
vi
Table of Contents
Introduction ..............................................................................
Chapter I: The State of Nature .................................................
I.a. Hobbes' State of Nature ................................................ 5

I.b. Locke's State of Nature ..............................................
Chapter II: The Social Contract .............................................
10
24
II.a. Hobbes' Social Contract ........................................... 24

II.b. Locke's Social Contract ............................................... 32
Conclusion: Similarities and Differences ................................. 44
Bibliography .........................................................................
51
V ita ......................................................................................... 52
vii
Introduction
The study of social and political states has linked philosophers
across the ages. Some questions that have occupied these
philosophers' discussions are Was there ever a period of time when
men lived outside of societies and what was it like?, How did men
escape that period and enter into a new time of societies?, Was it
through force or mutual agreement?, Once a form of government is
chosen, or appointed, who rules and is the rights of the individual
preserved? Several of these questions are addressed by both Thomas
Hobbes in Leviathan, and by John Locke in Two Treatises of
Government.1
Both Hobbes and Locke wrote of that period prior to the
formation of societies, referred to as the State of Nature, when
individuality, rather than collectivity, described mankind. Each also
wrote of how mankind was able to leave the State of Nature and form
civil societies. This transition from the State of Nature to government
was considered a contract by both of these 17th century philosophers.
Hobbes is traditionally labeled as having an alienation theory, while
Locke is considered as having an authorizationtheory. 2
1 Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, ed C.B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin Books,
1985); Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991). References to Leviathan will be page numbers in
Macpherson's edition. Those references to the Two Treatises will be corresponding
treatise number, page number, chapter and line numbers to Laslett's edition.
2 Locke is considered here to have a revocable theory because he allows society to
legitimately revolt against the government. This topic will be discussed in more
detail in the conclusion.
2
The fundamental difference between alienation and
authorization theories concerns what happens to an individual's
rights once the contract is executed. Alienation theory considers the
contract as irrevocable. Jean Hampton wrote in Hobbes and the Social
Contract Tradition that the individuals rights are surrendered to the
Sovereign. 3 The only justifiable way to retrieve one's rights after the
contract is initiated is to form a new contract. Authorization theory,
on the other hand, considers the contract as revocable. The
individual, as opposed to the Sovereign, retains the authority to
terminate the contract at any time. Hampton called it an agency
theory, retaining Hobbes' terms, where the rights of each subject are
only loaned to the Sovereign. 4 In 17th century England, topics such as
whether the people can legitimately terminate a king's rule were
important; and Hobbes and Locke were both trying to justify particular
answers to these types of questions.
The intent of this paper is to look more closely at what Hobbes
and Locke wrote concerning the pre-politie al or pre-social state called
the State of Nature; and the transition from the State of Nature to
society, referred to as the social contract. The discovery of Locke's
papers comprising the Lovelace collection has provided a better
understanding of Locke's views on the State of Nature and Natural
Law. Since this material became available philosophers have been
3 Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, Jean Hampton (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), p. 3.
4 Hampton, p. 3.
3
trying to disassociate Locke with Hobbes altogether. I agree with the
few philosophers who have actually found evidence that Locke had
more in common with Hobbes than others would like to admit.
Whether or not the similarities are commcn beliefs held by Locke's
contemporaries or material taken from Hobbes' works directly is
another matter. My intent is to show that they exist and that further
research is needed into that period to resolve the issue. Furthermore,
the similarities between these vvo philosophers may hold the
beginnings of another political theory.
I will begin my discussion with the State of Nature as each
philosopher described it. Then I will examine their contract theories.
Finally, I will discuss similarities and differences between the two
philosophers, such as the types of governments which are consistent
with each theory. Throughout the paper, I will consider Hobbes as
having written the Leviathan from a religious perspective. I realize
that this is a controversial issue; however, I do not think that his work
can be interpreted correctly otherwise. I will now turn to the first
chapter of my discussion, that on the State of Nature.
Chapter I
The State of Nature.
The State of Nature is the conditions under which men lived
prior to the formation of societies, which may be considered as an
historical fact or a hypothetical claim. It is not important if this precontractual situation ever actually occurred, nor does it matter if there
are actually men living in it still today or that societies will collapse
back into this pre-social condition once the contract terminates. What
is important is that assuming a State of Nature existed allows one to
analyze society in such a way as to provide a direction for suggesting
what are the ends of the state which will remedy the problems
illustrated in the State of Nature. As regards explanatory power, the
hypothetical claim is just as valid as the actual historical fact. In fact,
Hobbes did not consider the State of Nature as having existed generally
throughout the world. 5 Locke on the other hand says that it is a state
men are naturally in and will remain so unless men consent to form a
civil society. 6 ,7 Nevertheless, both did claim that some examples of
pre-contractual groups did exist, such as the savages of America for
Hobbes and the Peruvian Indians for Locke. 8 The State of Nature was
5 Leviathan, p. 187.
6 Locke seems to consider the State of Nature and the social contract as an historical
fact rather than merely an hypothetical claim. In fact, he goes as far as to argue
contrary to Hooker. Locke usually cites Hooker to add credibility to his claims, and
Hooker does not think that the social contract is ever an actual occurrence.
7 Second Treatise p. 276-78; ch.14, lns. 1-6, and ch.15, Ins. 13-14. Locke, like
Hobbes, considers governments in the State of Nature with respect to each other.
8 Leyiathan, p. 187; Second Treatise, p. 277, ch. 14, Ins. 12-19.
5
described quite differently by Hobbes than by Locke. I will discuss
what Hobbes considered to be the State of Nature and then I will
provide Locke's view.
Ia. Hobbes' State of Nature.

Let's distinguish between Hobbes's State of Nature prior to the
Laws of Nature and the State of Nature after the Laws of Nature have
been discovered through reason. The first has been referred to as the
Primary State of Nature, or "mere Nature" to Hobbes, and the latter is
the Secondary State of Nature. 9 I will argue that there is no authority
to bind the words of men in the Primary State of Nature, but in the
Secondary State of Nature God is the common power Hobbes requires
to enforce covenants. Hobbes believed that God reveals the Laws of
Nature to us through our reason, which he wrote "is the undoubted
Word of God", that is, the Natural Word of God.10
The Primary State of Nature is a State of War. Hobbes arrives at
this conclusion after considering the condition men think that they are
in with respect to each other. Men are naturally made so equal in
physical and mental abilities taken together that one cannot consider
his greater strength or quicker mind alone as sufficient enough to
make him superior to others. Hobbes wrote that a man could
outmaneuver a stronger opponent by either using his cunning or by
9 The Two Gods of Leviathan, A-P. Martinich (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), pp. 77-8.
6
banding together with others who were similarly endangered to
overcome the common threat. 11 Since men are equal in ability, they
are equally similar in hope for attaining the ends of their desires 12
Furthermore, two people cannot both have the same thing which each
desires, so they "endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other".13
Hobbes wrote earlier in the Leviathan, that men are generally inclined
to desire power after power, perpetually, until death brings an end to
their struggle. 14 From these strong desires and competition from
other men begins a diffidence which Hobbes wrote allows "no way for
any man to secure himselfe", except, "by force, or wiles, to master the
persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great
enough to endanger him ...
".15
Since all men are basically equal,
there is no common power to keep them in check. That is why a State

of War exists between them.
A State of War does not need to consist of fighting, according to
Hobbes, but in a tendency to do so. He wrote that it can be compared to
the weather.
For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre
or two of rain; but in the inclination thereto of many dayes
together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all
the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other
time is PEACE. 16
11
12
13
14
15
16
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Lejnath,
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
183.
184.
184.
161.
184.
186.
7
The mistrust men have of one another is the foundation of
Hobbes' State of Nature. He wrote that even in societies where there
are laws to protect one against harm and thieves, men arm
themselves when they travel; they lock their doors at night; they even
lock their chests within their own homes. He thought that men
accuse their fellow man, their servants, and even their families by
their actions. 17 What Hobbes is trying to illustrate is that since a man
does not know whom to trust, he must fear all men in general. It is
this fear which serves as the basis for the State of War which Hobbes
wrote of. Fear is the inclination which perpetuates the State of War
even though no actual fighting occurs. And, it is the State of War
which does not allow man to enjoy any of his life, or whatever he
possesses at any given time. The State of War is:
... every man against every man, ..., Where there is no
common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no

Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two
Cardinall vertues, ..., It is consequent also to the same
condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no

Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans
that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it.18
Furthermore, war does not permit societies, nor any
cooperation on a large scale. As Hobbes wrote, in war:
there is no place for Industry ... no commodious Building
... no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and

which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of
violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short. 1 9
17 Leviathan, pp. 186-7.
19 Leiathan, p. 186.
As I discussed above, the State of War is lawless, with no common

power over all men. Men live according to the Right of Nature and
nothing else. The Right of Nature is defined by Hobbes as:
... the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he
will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that
is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any
thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee
20
shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
Liberty, according to Hobbes is simply the absence of external
impediments to motion, which will prevent a person from some
actions, but not from all the actions available to him or her.2 1 So, there
is not much in the Primary State of Nature to prevent war. However,
men are driven to peace because of fear of death, desire for what is
necessary for good living, and the hope of attaining the ends of their
desires through perseverance. 2 2 What provides an avenue for men to
attain peace are the Laws of Nature, which Hobbes considered
available to men through reason. 2 3 With the Laws of Nature begins
the Secondary State of Nature.
In the Secondary State of Nature, Hobbes introduces the Laws of
Nature. The difference between the two Hobbes explained in that a
"RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or forbeare; Whereas LAW,
determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right,
differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty ... "24 So, a right allows a
20
21
22
23
24
Leviathan, p. 189.
Leviathan, p. 189.
Leviathan, p. 188.
Leviathan, p. 188.
Leviathan, p. 189.
9
great amount of liberty, while the law incurs obligations. Hobbes laid
out nineteen laws pertinent to peace and the formation of civil
societies.
A law consists of content plus an authority's command. The
Laws of Nature contain the content of the law, while God is the
authority who enforces the laws. 2 5 The Law of Nature, generally
considered by Hobbes, is a:
... Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by
which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive
of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be
best preserved. 26
From this general definition of a Law of Nature, in addition to
the principle contained in the Right of Nature, Hobbes derives the
other laws. The First and Fundamental Law of Nature forms the first
part, f what Hobbes considers a general rule of reason. This precept
is, "That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has
hope of attainingit; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek,
and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre".27 The first half is
considered the Fundamental Law of Nature, that is "to seek Peace,
and follow it". The second half is simply restating the Right of Nature,
that is "By all means we can, to defend our selves". How does one seek
peace? This is where the Second Law applies by stating:
25 Discussion with A.P. Martinich in Humanities class, HMN 350, Fall Semester,
1992, University of Texas, Austin.
10
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farreforth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think
it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be
contented with so much liberty against other men, as he
28
would allow other men against himselfe.
Finally, the Third Law of Nature states "That men performe
their Covenants made."2 9 Although Hobbes considers all nineteen
laws as necessary for the formation of society and civil government,
these first three are all that I think are necessary for his social
contract. Before I discuss Hobbes' contractarian views, I will explain
Locke's view of the State of Nature.
Lb. Locke's State of Nature.
Paul Sigmund discusses in his book, Natural Law in Political
Thought, the idea that Locke has been accused of being a Hobbesian.
Sigmund provides two authors, Leo Strauss and Richard Cox, who
defended this view that L, !Leadopted several of Hobbes' ideas while
trying to pass them off as having been derived from Hooker. 30
Sigmund argues that Strauss' and Cox's arguments are nonconclusive. It is known that Locke owned a copy of the Leviathan, but
it was lent out in 1674 and not returned until 1691. Since the Two
Treatises were written sometime between 1979 and 1681, Sigmund
suggests that Locke was not influ.. :,-cd '1y Hobbes. Added to the lack of
not having a copy of the Leviathan around while he wrote the Two
29 Leviathan- p. 201.
30 Natural Law in Political Thought, Paul E. Sigmund (Washington, D.C.:
Winthrop Publishers, Inc, 1971), p. 82.
11
Treatises, Sigmund also points out the fact that Locke's Essays on the
State of Nature, from the Lovelace collection at Oxford, show that
Locke took quite a different perspective than Hobbes did concerning the
State of Nature and Natural Law. 3 1 Whereas Hobbes' Primary State of
Nature is violent, lawless, and unproductive, Locke's State of Nature,
generally, is composed, regulated, and fruitful. I think that it is clear
that Locke was inspired by Hobbes' work, despite Sigmund suggesting
that he was not. In John Locke: Essays on the State of Nature, von
Leyden suggests that Locke was influenced by Hobbes in that Hobbes'
ideas caused Locke to explore the idea of Natural Law and Hobbes'
extreme views. 32 I will address Locke's view of the State of Nature
keeping Hobbes in mind.
Locke said that one is not likely to find records of the State of
Nature because, generally, the keeping of records begins with civil
societies, that is, political bodies. 3 3 However, Locke tried to show his
view of what most likely was the origin of civil society. Locke derived
his idea of the State of Nature, in part, from his own social conditions
and problems which existed at the time. He then combined his
observations with traditional Christian views on natural law and God
to arrive at a possible origin of the civil state.
31 Sigmund, 82.
32 John Locke: Essays on the Laws of Nature, ed. Wolfgang von Leyden (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 37.

33 Hobbes and Locke: Power and Consent, Ramon M. Lemos (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1978), p. 89.
12
God is a primary figure for Locke in his theory, just as He is in
Hobbes.' According to Locke, God's will is presented in two forms:
divine inspiration and the Law of Nature. 3 4 The only difference
between the two is how each is disclosed by God and apprehended by
men. Men are lead to a realization of God through the design and
purpose of Nature. Once men understand that there is a Creator, they
come to the belief that He must have some purpose for them just as He
does for everything else in Nature. 3 5 They realize that God is just as
wise as He is Powerful, and thus He must have a purpose for man
relevant to man's nature. Since man can discover God through his
natural abilities, he can discover the Law of Nature as well. 3 6
Locke did not think that the Law of Nature was written in the
hearts of men. 3 7 In his Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke says that
if the Law of Nature was written in the hearts of men, then why do so
many differ as to the content of that law or even if it exists at all. Locke
claims rather that the Law of Nature is discovered through the use of
reason. Locke says, "There is a great deal of difference between an
innate law and the law of nature; between something imprinted on
our minds in their very original and something that we, being
ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use of and due
34 Essays on the Laws of Nature, Essay VI, p. 189.
35 Essays on the Laws of Nature, Essay II, p. 133.
36 von Leyden, p. 49.
37 Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, Essay III, p. 137. This entire Essay is a
refutation that the Law of Nature is written in the hearts of men.
13
application of our natural faculties"'3 8 . In his Essays on the Laws of
Nature, Locke confirms his idea that the Law of Nature is not an
innate idea.
The Law of Nature, according to Locke, is not acquired by a
priori knowledge, nor is it traditional knowledge, which is second
hand knowledge acquired by instruction or as information. Rather, it
is acquired through sense-experience and reason, referred to as the
Light of Nature. Locke says that
by saying that something can be known by the light of
nature, we mean nothing else but that there is some sort
of truth to the knowledge of which a man can attain by
himself without the help of another, if he makes proper
use of the faculties he is endowed with by nature. 39
Locke considers reason, needed to discover the truths
"necessary for the direction of life and the formation of character," as
"the discursive faculty of the mind, which advances from things
known to things unknown and argues from one thing to another in a
definite and fixed order of propositions.'"40 He says that it is this
reason which leads men to the Law of Nature, however, the
foundation is sense experience which provides the "entire as well as
the chief subject-matter of discourse and introduce it into the deep
recesses of the mind." 4 1
38 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understandin , Book I, ch 2, sec. 13, in
Great Books of the Western World, 60 volumes, Editor in Chief, Philip W. Goetz,
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 1990), vol. 33, pp. 107-8. This passage was
used by Sigmund, p. 87, footnote 15.
39 Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, Essay II, p. 123.
40 Locke, Essay on the Law of Nature, Essay IV, p. 149.
41 Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, Essay !V, p. 149.
14
Locke's position as I have presented it is from his Essays on the
Law of Nature. In the Two Treatises, he does seem to vacillate on
whether or not the Law of Nature is written in the hearts of men. In
the First Treatise he says:
For the desire, strong desire of Preserving his Life and
Being having been Planted in him, as a Principle of Action
by God himself, Reason, which was the Voice of God in
him, could not but teach him and assure him, that
pursuing that natural Inclination he had to preserve his
Being, he followed the Will of his Maker, and therefore
had a right to make use of those Creatures, which by his
Reason or Senses he could discover would be serviceable
thereunto. 4 2
Also, in the Second Treatise, Locke mentions that in the book of
Genesis in the Bible, after murdering his brother Abel, Cain was
worried that upon the discovery of his brother's body, everyone would
kill him for the crime. Cain was so convinced because he knew that
they had a right to punish such a crime, "so plain was it writ in the
Hearts of all Mankind."4 3
I propose that Locke is not contradicting his previous position,
but rather that he is referring to an inclination or a desire to possibly
seek out and learn the Law of Nature. Through reason, God's voice
within us, men are provided with a principle of action, an inward
instinct to discover it.44 Nevertheless, the content of the Law of Nature
is found in Nature itself through our senses, and what we discover is
that the Law of Nature says that:
42 Fj
reisei, p. 205, ch. 86, Ins. 19-26.
43 Se
Treaise, p. 274, ch. 11, Ins. 28-3 1.
44 I think that this is Locke's position gathering from what he wrote in Essay IV.
15
no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty,
or Possessions. For Men being all the Workmanship of
one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; ... they are his
Property ... to last during his, not anothers Pleasure. And
being furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one
Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such
Subordination ... that may Authorize us to destroy one
another. 4 5
Not only are men to preserve themselves, but they are required
to help preserve all of mankind. Locke wrote that as a man "is bound
to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully; so by the like
reason when his own Preservation comes not into competition, ought
he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind".4 6
Locke's Natural Right, then, is that all men are equal, that is,
they are all human beings created by God. 4 7 No man has any
jurisdiction over any other and each has an equal right to his Life,
Liberty, and Property.4 8 Concerning life and liberty, Locke wrote that
men are in "a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and
dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon
the Will of any other Man".4 9 Men are able to live their lives free from
the demands of anyone else. In addition to perfect freedom, men are
also equals since they are all "Creatures"of the same species, "born to
45 Second Treatise, p. 271, ch. 6, Ins. 9-17.
47 Lemos, 75.
48 The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, C.B. Macpherson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 199. Second Treatise. p. 269, ch. 4.
49 Se,o.nTreati
p. 269, ch. 4, Ins. 3-6.
16
all the same advantages of Nature."50 What Locke means by equality
is not equality of abilities nor wealth, because these obviously vary
from one person to another; he means that men are equal in their
right of not being subjected to the will of another with respect to their
perfect freedom. Locke also says that men are equal with regard to
their property.
Concerning property, Locke wrote, "The great and chief end
therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and putting
themselves under Government, is the Preservationof their
Property."5 1 However, Locke's idea of property is expressed in both a
broad sense and a narrow sense. 5 2 The narrow sense only means
estates, while the broad sense means all of man's Natural Rights; that
is, Life, Liberty, and Estates. 53 Locke based the right to property on the
natural right to one's life and person, so, he uses both the narrow and
the wide sense to develop his theory of property.
At this point I need to introduce C. B. Macpherson's
interpretation of Locke's theory on property and the State of Nature.
Recall the distinction between the Primary State of Nature and the
Secondary State of Nature from the section on Hobbes. The Primary
State did not have the Laws of Nature, while the Secondary State did.
In the Two Treatises of Government, Locke also seems to describe a
dual State of Nature. In order to clarify this duality, C.B. Macpherson
50
51
52
53
p. 269, ch. 4, Ins. 7-10.

S,
Secnd reise p. 350-1, ch. 124, Ins. 1-3.
Lemos, 80.
This is a distinction which Macpherson makes as well (Macpherson, p. 198).
17
divides Locke's State of Nature into two parts. He discusses his
interpretation of Locke in his book titled The Political Theory of
Possessive Individualism.
Macpherson argues that Locke has two stages in the S'.jte of
Nature; one prior to the use of money and one after the consent to
money and unequal possessions. 5 4 His argument follows from the fact
that Locke considered men capable of making contracts, based on their
consent, prior to the formation of any government. Contracts in the
State of Nature are possible because men are obligated to keep their
promises. 5 5 Locke goes on to say, though, that one of these contracts
forms a civil society, putting an end to the State of Nature and forming
a commonwealth. 56 Macpherson says, however, that one of these
agreements between men, prior to that which forms the
commonwealth, was the formation and use of money. Thus, dividing
the State of Nature into two stages. This division is important in
interpreting Locke's theory, as I wil"' explain.
Macpherson argues that it is plain enough that Locke
considered men to have a natural right to property, as Locke discusses
in the Second Treatise. Locke points out in chapter 25 that the Earth
was given to men in common, an accepted medieval belief which did
not lead to individual ownership of property. However, Locke wrote
54 Macpherson later uses the terms Pre-Monetary and Post-Monetary State of Nature
(Macpherson, 242),
55 In the S
p. 277, ch. 14, Ins. 17-19, Locke wrote that keeping promises
is a natural obligation and not an effect of society.
56 SeondT.eatis, p. 277, ch. 14, lns. 7-11.
18
that men have property in their persons. 5 7 Since they have property in
their persons, their labor is also their property. 58 Through labor, man
removes something from the state nature placed it into and makes it
his property. Locke refers to this process as appropriation. 5 9
There are three limits to appropriation of property. The first is
that when a person removes something from what is considered
owned in common, he must leave enough for others to appropriate as
well. 6 0 Second, a person can only take what he can use without it
spoiling. 6 1 Finally, there is an implied limit that one can only
appropriate by his own labor. 6 2 In the beginning this was enough to
make everyone's share equal, but then the introduction of money
allowed men to collect more than they could use directly. This
hoarding eventually prevented others from appropriating property.
This was acceptable so long as nothing went to waste and everyone
was allowed at least a bare subsistence. Even though some people
would not own property and would have to rely on their labor to earn a
bare subsistence, Locke considered people better off when all the land
was used compared to where it was not. Land that is labored upon
only increases its value and makes it better than land that is lying in
57 S nd Trei
, p. 287, ch. 27, Ins. 1-2. Locke originally said that men were the
property of God. I can only assume that he meant that men were stewards of their
bodies for God, so had ownership in that respect. Otherwise, this is another
contradiction for Locke.
58 Second Treatise, p. 287-8, ch. 27, Ins. 3-4.
59 Secnd Trtis
p. 289, ch. 29, Ins. 7-10.
60 ScondTrtaj.s, p. 287, ch. 27, Ins. 12-13.
61 S
p. 290, ch. 31. Ins. 7-9.
62 Locke treats servants as property in this sense, so their labor belongs to their
owners. Secnd Treatis, p. 289, ch. 28, Ins. 21-24.
19
waste.63 However, everything which Locke argued for in the
beginning of the Treatise changes. There is no longer any equality,
which I will explain.
Prior to the use of money, natural limits disallowed anyone to
accumulate more than he or she could use without spoiling. However,
after the use of money was consented to, the natural limits were
changed. As I mentioned above, the sufficiency limit no longer
applied because men have a better standard of living where all the
land is appropriated. 64 Furthermore, the spoilage limit was rendered
ineffective when money was considered. 65 Spoilage only concerned
66
what was bought and sold, or what a parcel of land produced.
Money also allowed Locke to introduce into the State of Nature a

market economy beyond bartering. 6 7 Macpherson argues that Locke
went from a limited ownership of land and possessions to an
unlimited ownership. He also considers this "hoarding" as consistent
with Locke's views. In Some Considerations of the Consequences of
the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money (1691), Locke
says that hoarding land and money serves to drive trade and
commerce. 6 8 All of these results are what Locke introduced into the
63 Second Treatise p. 296, ch. 40. Locke mentions the increase of value in several
places beginning in ch. 37, through ch. 45.
64 Second Treatise, p. 296-7, ch. 41.
65 Second Treatise, p. 300-1, ch. 47.
66 Second Treatise, p. 300, ch. 46, lns. 17-30.
67 Macpherson, p. 209.
68 Works, 1759, vol. ii, pp. 22-3. Quoted in Macpherson, p. 205.
20
State of Nature with the introduction of money, which begins the PostMonetary State of Nature. Locke wrote:
... the same Rule of Propriety, (viz.) that every Man
should have as much as he could make use of, would hold
still in the World, without straitning any body, since there
is Land enough in the World to suffice double the
Inhabitants had not the Invention of Money, and the tacit
Agreement of Men to put a value on it, introduced (by
Consent) larger Possessions, and the Right to them;6 9
The Post-Monetary State of Nature is characterized by unlimited
appropriation of goods and property. Men have agreed, outside of
society, to this "disproportionate and unequal share" of property, by a
tacit agreement to the use of money. 70 This is possible because money
cannot spoil, so people can sell their excess goods without any going to
waste. However, not everyone will be able to appropriate property.
Some people will have no other recourse but to sell their labor for
wages. 7 1 At this point in time, labor begins as a form of property. 7 2
Locke does not consider this stage of nature as full of greedy men. On
the contrary, as Macpherson argues, Locke considers the
appropriation of money as commerce. 7 3 Added to that, it is morally
justified. Since the original right was that men had a right to
appropriate what was needed for survival, cultivating the land only
increases what is available for others. 7 4 Also, people would still be
69
70
71
72
73
74
S
p. 293, ch. 36, Ins. 33-9.
SecnTreatis, p. 301-2, ch. 50.
Macpherson, p. 211.
Secnd reais, p. 302, ch. 51, Ins. 1-4.
Macpherson, p. 205.
SecondTtise, p. 294-5, ch. 37.
21
able to use their labor to obtain their basic subsistence, which

Macpherson states "Locke found to be a natural consequence of the
introduction of money".7 5
Another characterization of the Post-Monetary State of Nature
was that it somewhat resembled Hobbes' State of War. A class
distinction develops with the property owners and the working class
and this unequal class status creates an insecure environment,
eventually leading to a State of War. In the Pre-Monetary State of
Nature, men are equally rational, following a traditional Christian
natural law view, because they are equally capable of following the
Law of Nature. 76 In the Post-Monetary State, men are no longer
equally capable of being fully rational. I will explain Macpherson's
position.
Macpherson's reasoning is that there is an unequal distribution
of property which forces people who cannot appropriate land to
exchange their labor for wages. This introduces a class distinction of
property owners and the laboring class. Locke wrote in the
Considerationsthat the laboring class has no other property but their
labor and have no other resources but their wages; "living generally
from hand to mouth."7 7 Furthermore, the laborer never has the time
to raise his thoughts above earning his wages, except when some
78
common disaster unites all the workers together in armed force.
75
76
77
78
Macpherson, p. 214.
Macpherson, p. 243.
Works (1759), ii. 13-16. From Macpherson, p. 216-17.
Works (1759), ii. 36. From Macpherson, p. 223.
22
Macpherson argues that Locke uses this passage to show that the
laboring poor do not even have enough rationality to make political
decisions. In another passage Locke indicates that the laboring class
in less than fully rational.
In The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke says that the
laboring class is incapable of following rational ethics without divine
help. He requests that moral sanctions be made clearer so that the
laboring class can accept them on faith alone, without having to
reason about them. 7 9 Macpherson says that this belief about the
laboring class, which includes the poor, is a common belief for Locke's
day and it would be surprising if Locke did not hold it as well. I think
that the evidence I have given shows that Locke did indeed consider
the Laboring class as less than fully rational.
In fact, the laboring class was unable to be rational because they
could not fulfill the Law of Nature. In chapter 34 of the Second
Treatise, Locke says that the "Industrious and Rational" follow the
Law of Nature and subdue the earth by their labor, while the
"Quarrelsom and Contentious" only meddle with what another has
already labored on. 8 0 In the Pre-Monetary stage, "the essence of
rational behavior is industrious appropriation."'8 1 Macpherson argues
that this is rational in the moral sense as well as the expedient sense
because if it was only the expedient sense, then the "meddling" with
79 Works (1759), ii. 585-6. From Macpherson, p. 224-5.
80 Secnd reise p. 290, ch. 32 and p. 291, ch. 34.
23
anothers property would be acceptable. 8 2 However, in the PostMonetary stage, there are some who are left with no land and so
cannot be rational in this original sense. These are the laborers.
Macpherson goes on to say that Locke's unequal class status
and the unequal rational morality, once read back into Locke's State of
Nature, provide an unsafe and insecure state. This state needs a civil
society with laws to govern and protect it. He also says that Locke's
view was the product of his comprehension of his own society. "It
reflected accurately enough the ambivalence of an emerging bourgeois
society which demanded formal equality but required substantive
inequality of rights."83 Locke was able to keep the traditional view of
natural law and also to justify a natural inequality as well, both to the
satisfaction of his contemporaries. 8 4
Chapter H
The Social Contract.
Now that it is clear what the State of Nature is for both Hobbes and
Locke, I would like to discuss their theories of social contract.
ILa. Hobbes' Social Contract.

A covenant is necessary, according to Hobbes, to escape the State
of Nature and enter civil society. However, covenants are not possible
in the Primary State of Nature. Since it contains neither a law nor a
common power, and covenants need a common power to enforce them,
an apparent covenant formed in the Primary State of Nature would be
void. 85 Without a common power to enforce compliance with the
agreement, whoever performs first is not assured that the other will
perform at all and so betrays himself to his enemy, contrary to Right of
Nature. 8 6
When the Secondary State of Nature is considered, with the
Laws of Nature providing the content of the obligation and God as the
common power to enforce the Laws, a contract can be made. Hobbes
says, "All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to
87
Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth."
Men no longer need to worry that their performance will not be

24
25
followed by performance of the other party, or if not, that at least the
other party will be held accountable. Hobbes considered it against
reason to break a covenant and anyone who thinks that it is reasonable
to do so should be barred from entering into the social contract
altogether. 8 8 Also, the keeping of one's word, his covenant, is the only
89
way of "gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of Heaven."
In chapter seventeen of the Leviathan, Hobbes stated the covenant that

binds all men to the Common-wealth as follows:
I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe,
to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition,
that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his
90
Actions in like manner.
Hobbes's language in this passage is ambiguous because he
uses the language both of authorizing the Sovereign and alienating
one's rights together. It appears that Hobbes wants both senses of
giving up rights in his theory. Just prior to the above passage, Hobbes
wrote that in order for men to have security and to escape the State of
War that exists in the State of nature, they must "conferre all their
power and strength upon one Man" and that this man will "beare
their Person." 9 1 This passage illustrates that Hobbes wants the
strength that an alienation theory provides for the Sovereign, but
mixes the language with that of authorizing. At the same time, he
wrote that everyone should "... owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be
91 Leviathha, p. 227.
26
Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act ... ".92
This passage illustrates that Hobbes wants the control an
93
authorization theory provides for the individual within society.
Before I try to sort out just what Hobbes was saying, I will explain
covenants, alienation, and authorization.
A covenant, for Hobbes, is a contract where at least one party
performs his part of the contract in the future. Until the time when
the other party acts, he is to be trusted.94 A contract is considered a
mutual transferring of rights.
Hobbes wrote that covenants are just words and that the force of
words is not sufficient to hold men to their actions. However, it is
possible to strengthen that bond with either, the "... Feare of the
consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing
not to need to breake it." 9 5 The latter rarely occurs. Men seldom keep
their word simply to show that they can so. So, Hobbes considered fear
to be the "Passion to be reckoned upon ... ,96 This fear has two forms:
fear of the "Power of Spirits Invisible" and fear of the "Power of those
men they shall therein Offend."9 7 Hobbes believed that God's power
was the greater power, but men feared the collective power of other
men more. 9 8 Hobbes seemed to think that men are afraid of
94 Leviathan, pp. 192-3.
98 Since men feared the wrath of other men more than God, the Sovereign had more
apparent power to enforce the laws than God Himself.
27
immediate threats more than the remote threat of angering God and
possibly losing eternal life. Hobbes wanted to make sure that even
though men swore an oath, it was not the oath that bound them to act
according to the covenant, but God Himself. The oath adds nothing to
the obligation of a valid covenant, just as an invalid covenant is not
obligatory even though it was sworn to by an oath. 9 9
Covenants are relevant to both Hobbes's alienation and
authorization theories. In the case of alienation, the covenant is made
between all men in society. The Sovereign is considered a third party
beneficiary. This interpretation is traditionally considered Hobbes's
theory. However, Hobbes also uses authorization language in his
discussion of covenants, which is why his theory is inconsistent.
In alienation, rights are laid down, and to "lay downe a mans
Right to any thing, is to devest himselfe of the Liberty, of hindering
another of the benefit of his own Right to the same."1 0 0 In effect, the
person removes himself as an external impediment to another person
exercising his own right. No additional rights are created for others,
since they already have a right to everything in the Primary State of
Nature. There are two forms of laying down one's rights:
transferringa right and renouncing one. Transferringa right is
laying it down, or giving it up, so that the benefit is intended for a
particular person. Renouncing a right occurs when the benefit falls
on no person in particular. In making covenants, Hobbes seems to
99 Leyiathan, p. 201.
100 Leviathan p. 190.
28
refer to the definition of transferringrights since the Covenant is
between each man, with the Sovereign receiving the benefit of the
alienated rights of all his subjects. Alienation does not permit a
person to retrieve the transferred rights unless a new covenant is
made, or the old one is voided. Hobbes considered covenants void by
either compliance or being forgiven by the other party. 1 0 1 Also, no one
can covenant in such a way as to violate the Law of Nature. If a
person said something to that effect, he or she must be considered as
not understanding the consequences of his or her actions. Trying to
covenant something which is impossible to comply with is also not
considered a covenant. Finally, any new covenant takes precedence
over an old one that is in conflict with the latter.
I have been discussing alienation, which is the easier part of
Hobbes' theory to understand. In chapter eighteen, he states very
clearly that the subjects only covenanted with one another and not
with the Sovereign himself, indicating alienation. Hobbes wrote that:
... the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to
him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to
another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen
no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne ... 102
Since the covenant is not with the Sovereign, but between each
individual, the Sovereign remains in the State of Nature and retains
his right to all things. He is the powerful ruler which Hobbes wants
his theory to establish. However, he tries to keep the Sovereign free
102 Leyiatban p. 230.
29
from any responsibility for his actions. To do this he also uses
authorization language in his theory. Authorization requires more
explanation than Hobbes' alienation theory.
Before explaining it, I need to introduce some basic terminology.
First, a person is someone "... whose words or actions are considered,
either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other
man ... "103 Second, a "NaturalPerson"is one who uses his own
words, while an "Artificial Person" is one who represents the word or
actions of another person. 10 4 Finally, an Actor is an artificial person
who contracts by "License from him whose right it is". The person
who owns the right is called the "Author`'10 5 Hobbes uses these terms
to describe the roles that citizens and the Sovereign play with regard to
authorization theory.
Hobbes's theory of authorization appears to involve a covenant
between all of society and the Sovereign. The evidence I use to support
this claim comes from chapter sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen of
Leviathan. He wrote in chapter eighteen:
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a
Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with
every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men,
shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the
Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their
Representative;)every one, as well he that Voted for it, as
he that Voted against it, shall Authorize all the Actions
and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the
same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live
30
peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against
10 6
other men.
This paragraph uses alienation language in the sense that each
person agrees with every other person to bestow some power on an
individual who is not a party to that agreement.
The covenant being
described is a transferring of everyone's right to govern themselves to

a person, or group, outside of the agreement. However, this person is
considered the Representative of everyone in the contract. Referring to
the person who is receiving the transferred rights as the
representative is comparing him to an actor, or an artificial person
acting in behalf of another person. Added to that, Hobbes also uses the
word authorize in that each individual authorizes the representative to
act in his or her behalf. I consider these two references as indications
that Hobbes is using authorization theory in conjunction with his
alienation theory. Hobbes also says that the representative is the
Sovereign, so there is no mistaking who the representative is. In
chapter s :enteen, Hobbes wrote that:
And in him consisteth the Essence of the Commonwealth; which (to define it,) is One Person, of whose Acts a
great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another,
have made themselves everyone the Author, to the end he
may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall
think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.
And he that carryeth this Person, is called the
SOVERAIGNE, and said to have Soveraigne Power, and
10 7
every one besides, his SUBJECT.
Also in chapter sixteen, Hobbes wrote that:
106 Leaithan, pp. 228-9.
107 Levyjan, p. 228.
31
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are
by one man, or one Person, [or group], Represented; so
that it be done with the consent of every one of that
Multitude in particular. 10 8
Hobbes further explains that the One Person refers to the
common representative chosen by all of society, while the multitude
must always be considered as many "Authors, of every thing their
Representative ... doth in their name." 109 I interpret these passages to
mean society as a whole has one common representative, the
Sovereign. Each subject bears responsibility for all the actions the
Sovereign takes, within the bounds set by the covenant and no further.
This is explained more in the following passage:
Every man giving their common Representer, Authority
from himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions
the Representer doth, in case they give him authority
without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what,
and how farre he shall represent them, none of them
1 10
owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.
These four passages support my claim that Hobbes uses
alienation and authorization concepts inconsistently. I interpret
Hobbes in the quotation from chapter seventeen as saying that
everyone authorizes the Sovereign to use the power each of them have
to protect themselves; that is their strength and ability to provide for
their peace and safety. He uses alienation theory in that each subject
covenants with each other to decide who should be their
representative. Also, from the second Law of Nature and the very
32
definition of a covenant, the very act of making this agreement
assumes that each member of the covenant is laying down, alienating,
his right to everything in the State of Nature. Hobbes tried to make it
clear that the right to protect oneself was an inalienable right, so this
right is impossible to contract away. At one and the same time it
seems that the covenant is both an alienation theory ana an
authorization theory.
Alienating a right restricts the future actions of the person who
alienated his rights. The rights are no longer his to exercise in any
way. He has transferred his authority over those rights to the
Sovereign. If this is the case, then the Sovereign is responsible for
antecedent actions. If, on the other hand, the subjects retain authority
and responsibility for the actions of the Sovereign, then the Sovereign
has an obligation to his subjects. Neither of these consequences are
acceptable for Hobbes. Locke, on the other hand, considers the ruler to
have some obligation to the subjects, so he would favor an agreement
different than Hobbes in that particular sense. I will now present
Locke's social contract theory.
Mlb. Locke on Social Contracts.

In the Second Treatise, chapters 124 thru 126, Locke wrote that
there were three reasons why men could not remain in the State of
Nature.1 1 1 The first was that men are nct likely to follow the laws of
111 Secndratia, p. 350-1, chs. 124-6.
33
nature. Some men will follow their own interests and are not always
going to observe the Law of Nature. The second reason is that:
every one in that state being both Judge and Executioner of
the Law of Nature, Men being partial to themselves,
Passion and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and
with too much heat, in their own Cases;
So, men are not impartial judges because they are lured by selflove and friendships, as well as ill nature, passion and revenge
towards others. 1 12 The final reason is that the State of Nature lacks a
common power to enforce punishments once the judgment has been
decided. These problems exist in both stages of the State of Nature,
however, the Post-Monetary State of Nature has the added problem
that men are in a State of War. 113 Since the State of War is a primary
reason men join together to form civil societies, it warrants some
discussion. 114
The State of War can exist in both the State of Nature and in civil
government. Both Locke and Hobbes define the State of Nature as the
absence of a common superior on Earth. The State of War also
includes this element. However, it only says that there is no superior
power to appeal to for relief, so the State of War can exist in society as
well as in the State of Nature.115 Locke wrote:
112 Scd
Trai,, pp. 275-6, ch. 13, Ins. 3-9.
113 I argue that the Post-Monetary State of Nature is a State of War because on
several occasions Locke says that the commonwealth collapses back into the State of
War again. Ch. 205, Ins. 6-9, ch. 226, Ins. 13-14; ch. 227, Ins. 4-8, 17-18; ch. 232, Ins.
1-2.
114 Seond TreaLise, p. 282, ch. 21, Ins. 1-5.
115 Lemos, p. 87.
34
Men living together according to reason, without a
common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge
between them, is properly the State of Nature. But force,
or a declared design of force upon the Person of another,
where there is no common Superior on Earth to appeal to
for relief, is the State of War... 116
A State of War can exist when a person, such as a criminal,
quits the Laws of Nature and places himself at war with the rest of
mankind, or his victim, and may be killed as one would kill a beast of
the field. 1 17 In society, once the actual force stops, then an appeal to
the law may be done to remedy the situation, if possible. In the State of
Nature, there is no appeal to a common judge, so the State of War
continues. 118 As I mentioned above, the only way to escape the State of
War is to enter civil society by mutual consent.
Just as property provides a reason to enter into the social
contract, and the State of War furnishes the motivation to do so,
consent is necessary to legitimize the contract. Locke wrote:
Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal
and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and
subjected to the Political Power of another, without his
own Consent. The only way whereby any one devests
himself of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of
Civil Society is by agreeing with other men to joyn and
unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and
peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure
Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security
against any that are not. 1 19
116 S
ndrats,
p. 280, ch. 19, Ins. 6-10.
117 SecondTaise, p. 274, ch. 11, Ins. 21-6.
118 S
l.ati,
p. 281, ch. 20, Ins. 1-7. There is a common judge for men in the
State of Nature; God. However, like Hobbes, Locke does not consider men likely to
recognize God in this respect, so they will seek a judge on Earth (Second Treatise, p.
280-1, ch. 19).
119 SeondITreatis, p. 330-1, ch. 95, Ins. 1-9.
35
Consent is either express or tacit. But which does Locke
subscribe to? The answer is both. Macpherson explained that Locke
had developed the State of Nature into an environment of unequal
class structure. Originally, when ownership of property applied to
everyone, anyone could enter society with some right to transfer.
However, once the inequalities were introduced, Locke had a problem,
considering his narrow view of property, that is estates only. If the
narrow view of property is taken, which I think Locke had in mind,
then only property owners could enter into the social contract. In
chapter 138 of the Second Treatise, Locke says that the end of
government is the preservation of property, and so it necessarily
requires that the people should have property in order to be
members. 12 0 What happens with all the laborers?
Macpherson argues that Locke considered everyone still subject
to the government as part of the social contract. 12 1 However, only the
property owners were entitled to participate in the ruling of the
government. Locke wants everyone to be obliged and bound by the law,
so he introduces tacit consent. 12 2 Nevertheless, tacit consent does not
make everyone a full member of society. The only way to be a full
member of society is to enter into an express agreement, and only
12 3
those that do so are the owners of land.
p. 360, ch. 138, Ins. 2-5.

120 Sond Tis,
121 Macpherson, pp. 248-9.
122 SeondTr,ati, pp. 347-8, ch. 119.

, pp. 348-9, chs. 120-22.
123 Se,ondTr.ea
36
Locke considered express consent as an obvious declaration of
one's membership into society. He wrote that "No body doubts but an
express Consent, of any Man, entring into any Society, makes him a
perfect Member of that Society, a Subject of that Government." 12 4
Furthermore, speaking again of members of a commonwealth,
"Nothing can make any Man so, but his actually entering into it by
positive Engagement, and express Promise and Compact." 12 5
Although Locke did not see express consent as a problem, John Dunn,
in The PoliticalThought of John Locke, thought that it is unclear who
gives express consent. 12 6 Dunn could give examples, such as an oath
of allegiance to the king, but Locke does not seem to specify any
himself. However, Dunn also suggests that Locke may have thought
examples were not necessary since during the 17th Century there
were so many example of such oaths. 127 Although Locke was secure
in his use of express consent, he did consider it necessary to explain
the use of tacit consent.
After introducing express consent, Locke wrote that the
"...
difficulty is, what ought to be look'd upon as a tacit Consent, and how
far it binds."'12 8 He wrote:
126 The Political Thought of John Locke, John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), p. 133.
127 The oaths of Allegiance prescribed by James I in 1606; Engagement Oath of 1650;
oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy of 1559; oaths under the Test Acts. (Dunn, p. 138-
9).
128 Secod Treti, p. 347, ch. 119, Ins. 9-11.
37
... whether this his Possession be of Land. to him and his
Heirs for eyer, or a Lodging only for a Week; or whether it
be barely travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect,
it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the
Territories of that Government. 12 9
There are two points in this definition of tacit consent that are a
problem for Locke, which I have underlined. The latter point
concerning residing within the territory I will discuss first.
In Hobbes and Locke, Ramon Lemos also discusses Locke's
theory on consent. Lemos gives an example of 100 people living in
some region together. 13 0 Forty of these people consent to form a
government, leaving the other sixty in the State of Nature, with respect
to themselves and the newly formed government. Lemos says Locke
argued that only those who consented were allowed into the State.
This is true. Lemos then argues that all the others within the territory
of that State, who have not consented, are not considered a part of that
government and do not have to obey the civil laws of that State. 13 1
Whether or not Lemos has a case for presenting a problem for Locke is
another matter. What does matter is that Locke did state that those
within the territory of the State did have to obey the laws. Lemos'
point, however, is a good one to discuss.
Do those that live within the territory of a particular State benefit
from it? Locke infers that they do because they benefit from the
129 S nd.Trtatis, p. 348, ch. 119, Ins. 18-22. Underlining added for emphasis.
130 Lemos, pp. 93-4.
131 Lemos, p. 94.
38
security and protection which the government provides for its citizens.
Dunn paraphrased Locke very well when he wrote that:
Tacit consent is incurred by anyone who voluntarily takes
any advantage of the resources of the country. Simple
voluntary presence in the territory of the country is a
sufficient condition for being held in this way to have
consented tacitly ...132
Lemos' argument is that Locke does not allow for a government
to force people within its borders to become citizens. However, he
suggests that Locke's theory does not prevent a government from
demanding express consent at some time during a person's life.
Examples would be military service and the right to vote or participate
in government such as voting. It seems that Lemos' observation that
there is no difference between members of society and those without
membership who reside within the boundaries of the State, is a valid
one.
The other point from Locke's definition of tacit consent which is
problematic is his reference to property. Recall from his idea of
express consent that only property owners were complete citizens.
However, in the quotation on tacit consent, Locke includes property
owners there also. It seems to me that Locke would want all of the
property owners to participate in the social contract since property is
the reason they enter into it and property is so important to Locke.
Permitting a person who owns property not to participate in the
132 Dunn, 131.
39
original contract seems to detract from Locke's theory. Part of my
reasoning concerns taxes.
Taxes are considered a part of a man's property by Locke and no
one can take away a man's property without his consent. 133 If not all,
or at least most, of the property owners are full citizens, then not all of
them will pay taxes. The incentive to be a citizen vanishes if a person
can own property, yet never having to pay taxes. The problem with
this reference to property becomes even more complex considering
that Locke also allows a person who did not give his or her express
consent to will the land to his or her heirs. Does the family member
need to give his or her express consent in order to inherit the land?
I thought perhaps that the person could have it only until he or
she dies, then it could not be willed to the children. If it was, then the
children would be considered as providing their express consent by
accepting it. However, the previously cited passage on tacit consent
explicitly mentions that it refers to those having property for
themselves and their heirs forever with no mention of express
consent. Furthermore, Locke states that children have a right to their
parents possessions. In the chapter on conquest Locke says that man
is born with a double right; the right to his person and the right to
inherit the possessions of his father. 13 4 In the succeeding paragraph,
Locke continues to say that the child is not required to give consent to
the government of his forefathers just because he is born under its
133 Seon Teais, p. 362, ch. 140.
134 Secondrea~tis, pp. 393-4, ch. 190.
40
rule. Though, his right to inherit the possessions of his father hinges
on the his acceptance of it as the lawful government.
This is not enough evidence to suggest that the consent is tacit
or express. However, in the section concerning whether or not
children are automatically citizens of the nation in which they were
born, with respect to inheritance, Locke clarifies his view that
ac
ing an inheritance signifies that the person is giving his or her
express consent. He says

... Commonwealths not permitting any part of their
Dominions to be dismembred, nor to be enjoyed by any but
those of their Community, the Son cannot ordinarily
enjoy the Possessions of his Father, but under the same
terms his Father did; by becoming a Member of the
Society: whereby he puts himself presently under the
Government, he finds there established, as much as any
other Subject of that Commonwealth. 13 5
Summing up, Locke permits some people not to enter into the
original agreement to form a civil society, regardless if they have
property or not. However, if they continue to reside in the country,
then they are understood to have given their tacit consent to the
government and must follow its laws. Also, property is passed on
through inheritance only if the recipient gives express consent to the
government. The problem still exists that there is a fine line between
being a citizen and just being obliged to follow the laws of the state.
If the only difference between those that gave express consent
and those that gave tacit consent is citizenship, what are the benefits of
135
ond.Trei,
p. 346, ch. 117, Ins. 2-8.
41
being a citizen? There seems not to be very many and Locke does not
discuss this matter directly. Additionally, those that gave their
express consent are permanently locked into that agreement unless
the government or some calamity that dissolves government releases
them from it.136 I would consider this a handicap of giving express
consent rather than a benefit, since those that only give their tacit
consent have more freedom to move about or leave if the government is
unfavorable.
I h. 7e shown that men enter into a civil society by giving their
consent. But what are the people consenting to? What are they
transferring to the government? In the state of Nature men have the
power to execute the Law of Nature, but, as Locke argues, without a
common power over all men, a State of War exists. Through the social
contract a common power is established. The people transfer to the
government their executive power over the Law of Nature. Locke
wrote:
Where-ever therefore any number of Men are so united
into one Society, as to quit every one his Executive Power
of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick, there
and there only is a Political,or Civil Society. (lines 1-4).
For hereby he authorizes the Society, or which is all one,
the Legislative thereof to make Laws for him as the
publick good of the Society shall require; to the Execution
whereof, his own assistance (as to his own Decrees) is
due. And this puts Men out of the State of Nature into
that of a Commonwealth, by setting up a Judge on Earth,
with Authority to determine all the Controversies, and
redress the Injuries, that may happen to any Member of
136 Second Teatis, p. 349, ch. 121, Ins. 11-8.
42
the Commonwealth; which Judge is the Legislative, or
Magistrates appointed by it.(lines 8-16)137
So, men authorize the government to use the combined
executive power of all the subjects to keep the peace. I argue that
Locke's contract, like Hobbes', is ambiguous; it has elements of
alienation theory, yet, it is clear that Locke wants a theory of
authorization. As I stated in the section concerning express consent,
the consent was irrevocable, suggesting an alienation theory. Also,
the quotation above concerning executive power states that the power
is resigned to the public, emphasizing an alienation type agreement as
well in the sense that the individual no longer has the power.
However, Locke considers all of the arrangements within the Social
Contract as a simple trust, which when violated, can be dissolved by
the people and another erected in its place. He wrote:
For since it can never be supposed to be the Will of the
Society, that the Legislative should have a Power to destroy
that, which every one designs to secure, by entering into
Society, and for which the People submitted themselves to
the Legislators of their own making;(lines6-10) ... By this
breach of Trust they forfeit the Power, the People had put
into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to
the People, who have a Right to resume their original
Liberty, and, by the Establishment of a new Legislative
(such as they shall think fit) provide for their own Safety
and Security, which is the end for which they are in
Society.(lines 20-26)138
This passage provides strong evidence that Locke holds an
authorization theory of consent. Furthermore, Locke provides several
137 Segnd T
p. 325, ch. 89.
138 Sconreatis pp. 412-14, ch. 222.
43
examples of breaches of contract, and what follows from those
breaches, in the chapter on Dissolution of Government.
Chapter III.
Conclusion: Similarities and Differences
Recall that in the introduction to Locke's State of Nature I
mentioned that Locke has been accused of being a closet Hobbesian.
Locke draws from the writings of several philosophers throughout the
Treatises, so it is difficult to say whether or not Locke sympathized
with Hobbes' theory or not; especially considering that it was not very
fashionable to be a Hobbesian at that time. Traditionally people have
focused on the differences between Hobbes and Locke such as having
very distinct States of Nature. Remember that Hobbes' State of Nature
is very violent, while Locke's Pre-Monetary State of Nature tended to be
more congenial. In fact, Locke considered the State of Nature and the
State of War to be as different as a "State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual
Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity, Malice, Violence,
and Mutual Destruction are from one another." 13 9 Locke introduced
this phrase with an apparent acknowledgment of Hobbes in that Locke
says that some men have confused the two states. While I do not think
that Locke subscribed to Hobbes' theory as a whole, it is quite evident
that Locke did hold similar views in some areas.
Despite Locke's desiring a calm and agreeable State of Nature,
he acknowledges that ultimately the State of Nature develops into the
State of War. In this respect, the two philosophers agree that civil
society is the remedy for the State of War. 140
140 I&Aaffgn, p. 223; S
Treatise p. 282, ch. 21, Ins. 1-4.
44
45
To cscape the State of Nature each philosopher uses a contract
theory. The contract must be between rational people, because neither
Hobbes nor Locke permit children or non-rational adults, such as the
insane, to form contracts. 14 1 Although Hobbes desires an alienation
theory and Locke a theory of authorization, neither philosopher can
seem to completely define his theory in terms of only one form of
contract theory. Recall earlier that I discussed how Hobbes uses
authorization language to explain his alienation theory, and that
Locke uses alienation language to show that the contract is one of
authorization.
Another point of agreement is that the majority will make
decisions concerning any issue which arises once the contract is
agreed to. Hobbes says that the minority voters must stand with the
majority once the covenant is made, since they, the minority,
originally voluntarily agreed to covenant with the rest. 142 Similarly,
Locke argues for a majority to determine the type of government once
the contract is accepted. 14 3 One of the provisions of the contract is to
transfer some power to the government to rule and provide for the
safety of its subjects. Both Hobbes and Locke consider the power that is
given the Sovereign as man's power to enforce the Law of Nature.
In the Leviathan, Hobbes argues that men are the judges in the
State of Nature, and this judicial power extends to having the power
141 Leviahan, p. 219; SndTets
142 Le-Athan, p. 231-2.
143 Seo.Trets,
p. 333, ch. 99.
pp. 307-8, ch. 60.
46
over life and death. 14 4 It is this same power of defending others which
Hobbes says in the opening paragraphs of chapter 28 of Leviathan that
is transferred to the Sovereign so that he can punish criminal 3.
Hobbes also states in that same passage that the end of punishment is
"that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to
obedience.-
14 5
In addition, men are bound to help the Sovereign when
he needs it. In the Second Treatise, Locke also argues that men in the
State of Nature have the power to judge and enforce the Laws of
Nature. 14 6 Locke says that this power is contracted away to the
government when men enter civil society. Like Hobbes, Locke states
14 7
that men are also obliged to help the government when necessary.
Related to punishment is the fact that Hobbes and Locke both

consider a person's body as the workmanship of God and so men are
only stewards, as it were, of their bodies. For this reason, Hobbes does
not consider it possible to alienate one's right to self-preservation;
allowing a person to transfer the right to defend others, but not to
alienate their right to protect themselves. 14 8 Just the same, Locke also
considers a man's body as belonging to God. 14 9 Additionally, men
cannot transfer their right to protect themselves to the government
either. 150
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
Leviathan, p. 189 & 199.

Leviathan, p. 353.
S
dTre,, p. 274-5, chs. 12 & 13.
Second Tratise, pp. 324-5, ch.88, Ins. 8-16.
Leviathan, pp. 199 & 353.
Scnd Trai,
p.271, ch.6, Ins. 10-14.
Secondreatis, p. 357, ch. 135, Ins. 9-12.
47
Finally, the types of government consistent with both theories
appear very similar, but are actually quite different. Hobbes says in
chapter 19 of Leviathan that his theory allows for a monarchy when
the sovereign power resides in one person only; democracy when the
people are represented by an assembly; or aristocracy when the
representative is a part of the people only. He then goes on to say that
when people are dissatisfied with the government, these three forms of
government are referred to by different names; tyranny, oligarchy,
and anarchy, respectively. In chapter 10 of the Second Treatise, Locke
refers to the same three types of government with the exception that he
calls an aristocracy an oligarchy; but the definitions are the same.
Where the two theories differ is that Hobbes says the sovereign power
must be given to one of these types of government and there can be no
mixing of the power. Locke, on the other hand, allows for mixes
between the three. In fact, he prefers a legislative branch to have the
power of making laws, while the executive has the power of enforcing
those laws. 151 Finally, Hobbes and Locke have similar and
contrasting views on the dissolution of government.
Hobbes compares the Sovereign to a mortal god, a Leviathan, in
the last paragraph of chapter 28 in Leviathan. Then, in chapter 29, he
says that the Sovereign is the soul of society. When the government
151 Hobbes desires the power of government to reside in a single person because he
considers it stronger and more durable that way. If the power is divided, the
different factions will argue and eventually the government will fall. Leviathan,
pp. 368-73. Locke on the other hand wants to protect the citizen from the government,
so he wants the power divided in order to keep any one power from becoming too
strong.
ec
Tratise pp. 364-5, ch. 143-45.
48
collapses, the soul no longer exists and each member of society must
seek a new sovereign to protect them. Likewise, Locke says in chapter
19 of the Second Treatise, that the Legislative "is the Soul that gives
Form, Life, and Unity to the Commonwealth." 152 Although they use
similar language here to describe the power source of their respective
governments, Hobbes and Locke have different views about whether or
not that power can be legitimately taken back by the people.
In chapter 18 of Leviathan, Hobbes says that once the power is
transferred to the Sovereign, the process is irreversible. Outside
forces, such as a conquering nation, may cause the government to fall,
forcing the people back into the State of Nature where they can
contract again. However, all internal causes of the dissolution of the
government are unjustified, such as the people withdrawing their
support of the Sovereign. 153 They promised their support by
contracting to form the government, and so are bound to continue that
support until the Sovereign can no longer fulfill his part of the
contract. Locke, on the other hand, allows for the contract to be
justifiably broken internally.
Locke, contrary to Hobbes, says in chapter 13 of the Second
Treatise that the power of the legislative is given through a trust.
Once that trust is violated, the people retain the supreme power to
152 Second Treati5e, p. 407, ch. 19, Ins. 5-10.
153 Discussion with A-P. Martinich, PHL 398r, Summer, 1993, University of Texas,
Austin.
49
remove or alter the legislative. 1 54 In the end of the Second Treatise,
Locke is arguing about the dissolution of the government. 15 5 He says
that some people consider the right to form a new government by the
people as detrimental to the existence of any government. Locke
answers them by saying three things. First, it doesn't matter if they
are right or wrong; people will revolt and overthrow the government if
they are mistreated. Second, people will tolerate a great amount of
poor governing without revolting, so long as the mistakes do not
continue. Thirdly, having the reasons which warrant for a revolt by
the people written down in the constitution is the best defense against
rebellion. Nevertheless, the body of people will be the judge to
determine when the government violates its trust. 156 Since the body of
people is the judge, Locke's theory must be an authorization theory
after all.
What I have been trying to prove is that Locke has a great deal
in common with Hobbes, but at the same time he is unwilling to accept
man's nature as pessimistic and egotistical as Hobbes does. Since the
discovery of the all the material Locke wrote which comprises the
Lovelace collection, philosophers have been trying to show that Locke
had little, if anything, in common with Hobbes. I hope that I have
154 This is another reason why I think that, basically, Hobbes is an alienation
theorist and Locke is an authorization theorist. The two theories just need to be
redefined to correct any references to the other.
155 ScndTreise, pp. 414-16, chs. 223-226.
156 ScdTai,
p. 426-7, ch. 240, Ins. 1-5.
50
made it clear that Hobbes and Locke did hold some very similar views,
despite the different objectives each sought to attain.
I am not suggesting that Locke was a Hobbesian, nor that the
similarities to Hobbes' work was plagiarized by Locke. I am only
saying that either the similarities were prevalent among the
philosophers of the time or that Locke arrived at some of the same
conclusions Hobbes did. Locke could have been directly influenced by
Hobbes through reading his works, or indirectly by being motivated by
the notoriety of Hobbes' conclusions. I think that it is very likely that
most of the similarities were common assumptions many of the
writers of the seventeenth century held. A more detailed study of all of
the philosophers of that period is needed to clarify the matter.
Bibliography
Dunn, John. The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical

Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government.'
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Hampton, Jean. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. C.B. Macpherson. New York:
Penguin Books, 1985.
Johnston, David. The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the
Politics of Cultural Transformation. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1986.
Kavka, Gregory S. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986.
Lemos, Ramon M. Hobbes and Locke: Power and Consent. Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1978.
Locke, John. Essays on the Laws of Nature. Ed. Wolfgang von
Leyden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. Ed. Peter Laslett.
Student Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991.
Martinich, A.P. Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion
and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Macpherson, C.B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism:
Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
Sigmuid, Paul E. Natural Law in Political Thought. Washington,
D.C.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1971.
Tuck, Richard. Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and
Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
51
/4wml-
24-2
Prepared lAW AFITR 53-1 Paragraph 7-7

Title:
Second-Order Optical Properties Study And The Poling Induced

Dipole Alignment Stabilization Of Second-Order Nonlinear Optical
Polymers
Author:
Peter Miyagi Ranon
Rank:
Captain
Service:
United States Air Force
Year:
1993
No. Pages: 248

Degree:
Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical Engineering
Institution: University of Southern California
Abstract
The methodical approach to polymer structure design that alters the
second-order nonlinear optical properties and the pi., k. induced dipole
alignment stabilities is presented. The specific nonlinear cpum,
molecule used to
demonstrate the feasibility of the concept is a chromophore with amino-donor

and sulfone-acceptor with azostilbene ir-conjugated bond separating the acceptor
and donor.
The spacer units used to de-couple the segmental motion of the
chromophores from that of the backbone are either flexible carbon chains,
methylmethacrylate
segments,
or
benzene
rings
with
the
appropriate
substituents [1]. The premise is that we can take a building block approach to
construct the prepolymer structure to obtain the desired effects [2].
Sufficient theoretical tools are provided to aid in the analyses given
throughout this dissertation.
The methods of introducing nonlinearity to

1
Prepared IAW AFITR 53-1 Paragraph 7-7

macroscopically amorphous polymer films and the second-harmonic generation
and thermal stability studies are presented.
The second-harmonic generation
coefficients d33 as high as 160 pm/V with stable operating temperature as high as
155TC are reported [1-4]
We also present the preliminary work on photonic
device fabrication using the polymers in this dissertation.

[ 186 words]
Bibliography
[1]. P.M. Ranon, Y.Q. Shi, W.H. Steier, C. Xu, B. Wu, and L.R. Dalton, "New
random main chain second-order nonlinear optical polymers," Appl. Phys. Lett.,
Vol. 62, No. 21, pp. 2605-2607, 1993.
[2]. Y. Shi, P.M. Ranon, W.H. Steier, C. Xu, B. Wu, and L. Dalton,
"Improving the thermal stability by anchoring both ends of chromophores in the
side-chain nonlinear optical polymers," submitted to Appl. Phys. Lett., 1993.
[3]. C. Xu, B. Wu, L.R. Dalton, Y. Shi, P.M. Ranon, and W.H. Steier, "Novel
double-end crosslinkable chromophores for second-order nonlinear optical
materials," Macromolecules, Vol. 25, pp. 6714-6716, 1992.
[4]. C. Xu, B. Wu, L.R. Dalton, P.M. Ranon, Y. Shi, and W.H. Steier, "New
random main chain second-order nonlinear optical polymers," Macromolecules,
Vol. 25, pp. 6711-6713, 1992.
Aiit"weat
1 o-4 2

Title:
Second-Order Optical Properties Study And The Poling Induced

Dipole Alignment Stabilization Of Second-Order Nonlinear Optical
Polymers
Author:
Peter Miyagi Ranon
Rank:
Captain
Service:
United States Air Force
Year:
1993
No. Pages: 248

Degree:
Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical Engineering
Institution: University of Southern California
Abstract
The methodical approach to polymer structure design that alters the
second-order nonlinear optical properties and the poling induced dipole
alignment stabilities is presented. The specific nonlinear optical molecule used to
demonstrate the feasibility of the concept is a chromophore with amino-donor
and sulfone-acceptor with azostilbene 7r-conjugated bond separating the acceptor
and donor. The spacer units used to de-couple the segmental motion of the
chromophores from that of the backbone are either flexible carbon chains,
methylmethacrylate
segments,
or
benzene
rings
with
the
appropriate
substituents [1]. The premise is that we can take a building block approach to
construct the prepolymer structure to obtain the desired effects [2].
Sufficient theoretical tools are provided to aid in the analyses given
throughout this dissertation.
The methods of introducing nonlinearity to

I

macroscopically amorphous polymer films and the second-harmonic generation
and thermal stability studies are presented.
The second-harmonic generation
coefficients d33 as high as 160 pm/V with stable operating temperature as high as
155TC are reported [1-4]
We also present the preliminary work on photonic
device fabrication using the polymers in this dissertation.

[186 words]
Bibliography
[1]. P.M. Ranon, Y.Q. Shi, W.H. Steier, C. Xu, B. Wu, and L.R. Dalton, "New
random main chain second-order nonlinear optical polymers," Appl. Phys. Lett.,
Vol. 62, No. 21, pp. 2605-2607, 1993.
[2]. Y. Shi, P.M. Ranon, W.H. Steier, C. Xu, B. Wu, and L. Dalton,
"Improving the thermal stability by anchoring both ends of chromophores in the
side-chain nonlinear optical polymers," submitted to Appl. Phys. Lett., 1993.
[3]. C. Xu, B. Wu, L.R. Dalton, Y. Shi, P.M. Ranon, and W.H. Steier, "Novel
double-end crosslinkable chromophores for second-order nonlinear optical
materials," Macromolecules, Vol. 25, pp. 6714-6716, 1992.
[4]. C. Xu, B. Wu, L.R. Dalton, P.M. Ranon, Y. Shi, and W.H. Steier, "New
random main chain second-order nonlinear optical polymers," Macromolecules,
Vol. 25, pp. 6711-6713, 1992.
Vita
Dean Allen Steele was born in Sonoma, California, on July 24,

1964, the son of Sally Sue Steele and Ronald Eugene Steele. He
graduated from Sonoma Valley High School in 1982 and proceeded to
attend the University of California, at Davis. After one year at Davis,
he was accepted as an officer candidate at the United States Air Force
Academy (USAFA) in Colorado Springs, Colorado. After graduating
in May, 1987, with the degree of Bachelor of Science, he attended
Undergraduate Flying Training (UPT) at Reese Air Force Base in
Lubbock, Texas. In July, 1988, he moved to McGuire AFB, New
Jersey, to fly the C-141, a jet transport. In the C-141 he flew in Just
Cause in Panama in December of 1989, and also in Desert Shield and
Desert Storm from August, 1990, through December, 1991. In
January, 1992, he entered The Graduate School of The University of
Texas, at Austin.
Permanent address: 6705-B Skynook
Austin, Texas 78745
This report was typed by the author in collaboration with Longhorn

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A Comparison of Hobbes and Locke on Natural Law and

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A COMPARISON OF HOBBES AND LOCKE ON

DEAN ALLEN STEELE, B.S.

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

A COMPARISON OF HOBBES AND LOCKE ON

me in numerous ways and continually encouraged me to follow my

Chapter I: The State of Nature .................................................

I.a. Hobbes' State of Nature ................................................ 5

II.a. Hobbes' Social Contract ........................................... 24

Ia. Hobbes' State of Nature.

Since all men are basically equal,

there is no common power to keep them in check. That is why a State

common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no

condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no

... no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and

As I discussed above, the State of War is lawless, with no common

Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 37.

p. 269, ch. 4, Ins. 7-10.

Money also allowed Locke to introduce into the State of Nature a

able to use their labor to obtain their basic subsistence, which

ILa. Hobbes' Social Contract.

Men no longer need to worry that their performance will not be

In chapter seventeen of the Leviathan, Hobbes stated the covenant that

100 Leviathan p. 190.

The covenant being

described is a transferring of everyone's right to govern themselves to

Mlb. Locke on Social Contracts.

p. 360, ch. 138, Ins. 2-5.

122 SeondTr,ati, pp. 347-8, ch. 119.

ing an inheritance signifies that the person is giving his or her

express consent. He says

p. 346, ch. 117, Ins. 2-8.

pp. 307-8, ch. 60.

In addition, men are bound to help the Sovereign when

Related to punishment is the fact that Hobbes and Locke both

Leviathan, p. 189 & 199.

Tratise pp. 364-5, ch. 143-45.

Dunn, John. The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical

Prepared lAW AFITR 53-1 Paragraph 7-7

Second-Order Optical Properties Study And The Poling Induced

Peter Miyagi Ranon

United States Air Force

No. Pages: 248

Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical Engineering

Institution: University of Southern California

demonstrate the feasibility of the concept is a chromophore with amino-donor

The spacer units used to de-couple the segmental motion of the