Battle of Prokhorovka

VORONEZH FRONT
(Vatutin)

Oboyan

6th Guards Army

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Army Corps
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KEMPF
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ARMY GROUP SOUTH

(von Manstein)

Belgorod

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FRON

4th PANZER ARMY

(Hoth)

On 5 July 1943, the German high command launched

Operation Citadel with the aim of enveloping and destroying the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient. The Soviet
high command, Stavka, had been forewarned of the German intentions, and employed a defence in depth strategy,
preparing a series of defensive lines along the routes of
the planned German attack. The German oensive was
conducted by three armies. In the southern side, the 4th
Panzer Army, with Army Detachment Kempf on its eastern ank, attacked the Soviet defences of the Voronezh
Front. The Soviets also massed several armies as the
Steppe Front, which included the 5th Guards Tank Army,
deep behind their defences, which they intended to use
to launch their own counteroensives once the German
strength had dissipated.

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5th Guards
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The Battle of Prokhorovka was fought on 12 July 1943

near Prokhorovka, 87 kilometres (54 mi) southeast of
Kursk, in the Soviet Union, during the Second World
War. Taking place on the Eastern Front, the ghting was
part of the wider Battle of Kursk, and occurred when the
5th Guards Tank Army of the Soviet Red Army attacked
the II SS-Panzer Corps of the German Wehrmacht in one
of the largest tank battles in military history.[lower-alpha 10]

The German advance to Prokhorovka

sume a defensive posture instead. This would allow the

Germans to weaken themselves in attacking prepared positions, after which the Soviet forces would be able to
reposture and go on the oensive.[9][10] A similar strategy discussion occurred on the German side, with Field
Marshal Erich von Manstein, arguing for a mobile defence that would give up terrain and allow the Soviets to
advance, while the Germans launched a series of sharp
counterattacks against their anks to inict heavy attrition. For political reasons Hitler insisted that the German
forces go on the oensive, choosing the Kursk salient for
the attack.[11]

A week into the German oensive, the Soviets launched

powerful counterattacks against the attackers. In the
south at Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army attacked the II SS-Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army,
resulting in a large clash of armour just outside the settlement on 12 July 1943. The 5th Guards Tank Army
was decimated in the attack, but succeeded in preventing the Germans from capturing Prokhorovka and breaking through the third defensive belt to achieve operational
freedom. Subsequently, the German oensive was cancelled and their forces withdrawn. The Red Army went
on a general oensive and seized the strategic initiative
on the Eastern Front, which it was to hold for the rest of
the war.

The German oensive plan, called Unternehmen Zitadelle (Operation Citadel), envisioned an assault at
the base of the Kursk salient from both the north and
south, with the intent of enveloping and destroying the
Soviet forces in the salient.[12][13] The two spearheads
were to meet near Kursk. From the south, the XLVIII
Panzer Corps and General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer
Corps, forming the left and right wings of the 4th Panzer
Army commanded by Colonel General Hermann Hoth,
would drive northward. The III Panzer Corps of Army
Detachment Kempf was to protect Hoths right ank
from counterattack by the Soviet strategic reserves known
1 Background
to be located just east of the salient. The 4th Panzer
Army and Army Detachment Kempf were under Army
See also: Battle of Kursk
As the spring rasputitsa season came to an end in 1943, Group South, commanded by Manstein; and their air supby Colonel General Otto Deloch's
both the German and Soviet commands considered their port was provided
[14][15][16]
Luftotte
4.
plans for future operations. Stalin and some senior Soviet ocers wanted to seize the initiative and attack the Multiple delays by the Germans allowed the Soviets a
German forces inside the Soviet Union, but they were great deal of time to prepare their defences. Employconvinced by a number of key commanders, including ing defence in depth, they constructed a series of dethe Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov, to as- fensive lines to wear down the attacking panzer forma1

tions. Six belts made up of extensive mineelds, antitank ditches, and anti-tank gun emplacements were created, although the last three belts were mostly unoccupied
and less fortied than the rst three.[17][18] The Soviet
forces in the salient were organised into two fronts. The
Voronezh Front, commanded by General Nikolai Vatutin,
was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient.
The Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Ivan
Konev, included Lieutenant General Alexei Zhadov's 5th
Guards Army and Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov's
5th Guards Tank Army, and formed the strategic reserve
force to be held behind the front until it was needed for
the counteroensive.[19][20]

1.1

German advance
Prokhorovka

leading

up

to

BACKGROUND

By the end of 8 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced

about 29 kilometres (18 mi) and broken through the rst
and second defensive belts.[30][31][32][33] However, slow
progress by the XLVIII Panzer Corps caused Hoth to
shift elements of the II SS-Panzer Corps to the west
to help the panzer corps regain its momentum towards
Oboyan. On 10 July the full eort of the II SS-Panzer
Corps was shifted back to its own forward progress, away
from Oboyan due north, to the northeast toward the town
of Prokhorovka.[34] Hoth had discussed this move with
Manstein in early May, and it had been part of the plan
since the outset of the oensive,[35][36][37] although the
plan originally envisioned the III Panzer Corps and elements of XLVIII Panzer Corps joining in the attack towards Prokhorovka, but this could not be realized.[37]

Soviet intelligence reports issued from 8 to 9 July indicated that defensive works were being constructed by
German infantry all along the anks of 4th Panzer Army
Main article: Operation Citadel
and that German armoured formations could not be spotThe Germans launched their attack on the morning of 5
ted on the anks despite armoured counterattacks that
should have provoked their appearance.[38] The Voronezh
Front headquarters concluded that the Germans were
reaching their limit, and hence it decided on a major
counteroensive as the next course of action.[38]

A column of Panzer III tanks at Kursk

July 1943 and were met with heavy resistance.[21] The

density of Soviet anti-tank guns, mineelds, anti-tank
ditches and large numbers of Soviet tanks were all much
greater than had been anticipated, and made a breakthrough far more dicult to achieve.[22] By the end of
6 July, II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced through the rst
defensive belt and reached the second.[23] But its advance
was greatly behind schedule, as according to the Citadel
plan it should have penetrated the rst two belts and been
on its way to the third by the end of the rst day.[24]
The corps beneted from close air support provided by
the Luftotte 4s VIII Fliegerkorps,[25] commanded by
General Hans Seidemann,[26] whose aircraft helped destroy Soviet strong points and artillery positions. To the
southeast, III Panzer Corps had great diculty crossing
the Northern Donets River on 5 July.[27] They eventually
formed a bridgehead across by the morning of 6 July,[27]
but stubborn Soviet resistance meant they were unable
to protect the east ank of the II SS-Panzer Corps.[21]
On 8 July, the Soviets launched powerful counterattacks
against the II SS-Panzer Corps with several tank corps.
These failed to destroy the II SS-Panzer Corps as hoped,
but succeeded in slowing its progress.[28][29]

A Tiger I of a Waen-SS unit res at a target during Operation

Citadel.

While the German attack was in progress, the 5th

Guards Tank and the 5th Guards Armies of the Steppe
Front had been moving up from their reserve position since the evening of 6 July, travelling at night to
avoid detection.[39] The 5th Guards Tank Army covered the 390 kilometres (240 mi) over three nights,
and arrived at the Prokhorovka area on the night of 9
July,[40] and the 5th Guards Armys 33rd Guards Rie
Corps arrived on the night of 10 July.[41] Throughout 11
July, the 5th Guards Tank Army organized itself around
Prokhorovka in preparation for the forthcoming massive
counteroensive.[42]
On morning of 11 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps continued its attack toward Prokhorovka. In the ensuing attacks, its 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte
SS Adolf Hitler had the most success, penetrating the Soviet defences manned by the 2nd Tank Corps, and re-

2.2

Soviet plans for 12 July

inforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division and 301st

Anti-tank Artillery Regiment, both from the 33rd Guards
Rie Corps.[43][44] They cleared Soviet resistance at the
October state farm (Russian: ),
crossed a 15-foot (4.6 m)-deep antitank ditch at the base
of Hill 252.2 and seized the hill itself after a brief but
bloody battle.[45][46][47] North of Leibstandarte, the 3rd
SS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf failed to expand
their bridgehead across the Psel River nor capture Hill
226.6, which were defended by the 31st Tank Corps,
the 33rd Guards Rie Corps 95th Guards Rie Division,[48][49][47] and the 10th Tank Corps 11th Motorized
Rie Brigade.[50] To the south, the 2nd Guards Tank
Corps and the 48th Rie Corps 183rd Rie Division repelled the attack of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division
Das Reich.[47] By days end on 11 July Leibstandarte had
advanced deep into the Soviet third defensive belt and
was only 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) from Prokhorovka,[46][51]
but its anks were exposed, as there was a 5-kilometre
(3.1 mi) gap between it and Totenkopf,[52] and Das Reich
lagged behind by 4 kilometres (2.5 mi).[47] Leibstandarte
disrupted the 5th Guards Tank Armys preparations for
its forthcoming counterattack, by capturing its planned
artillery positions and assembly areas, forcing Rotmistrov
to hastily revise his plans and select new positions.[53][54]

Planning

Paul Hausser, commanding ocer of the II SS Panzer Corps

for a massive armoured attack the following day.[58][59]

Throughout the night, German frontline troops could hear
Late on the evening of 11 July, General Paul Hausser, the the ominous sounds of Soviet tank engines to the east as
commander of the II SS-Panzer Corps, issued orders for the 18th and 29th Tank Corps moved into their assembly
[60][61]
a classic manoeuvre battle for the following days advance areas.
on Prokhorovka. It was known that the Soviets had dug in
many anti-tank guns on the west slopes of Prokhorovka,
2.2 Soviet plans for 12 July
making a direct attack by Leibstandarte very dicult.
[55]
The plan was for Totenkopf to capture Hill 226.6, and
advance northeast along the Psel river to the KartashvkaProkhorovka road, and then strike southeast into the
ank and rear of Soviet forces at Prokhorovka.[56][55]
Leibstandarte was ordered to nudge forward and secure
Storozhevoe just outside Prokhorovka,[55] then it and Das
Reich were to wait until Totenkopf 's attack had disrupted the Soviet positions, after which Leibstandarte
was to attack the main Soviet defences on the west slope
of Prokhorovka. To Leibstandarte 's right, Das Reich
was to advance eastward to the high ground south of
Prokhorovka, then turn south away from Prokhorovka
to roll up the Soviet defences and force a gap.[56] The
VIII Fliegerkorps was to make their main eort in supPavel Rotmistrov, left, commander of 5th Guards Tank Army
port of the advance of the II SS-Panzer Corps, with the
XLVIII Panzer Corps to the west assigned limited air The 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army of
resources.[57]
the Steppe Front had been brought up from reserve

2.1

German plans for 12 July

Unbeknownst to Hausser, on the night of 11 July Rot- and reassigned to the Voronezh Front on 8 and 11 July
mistrov had moved his 5th Guards Tank Army to an respectively.[62] On 11 July Vatutin ordered that the folassembly area just south of Prokhorovka in preparation lowing day the armies of the Voronezh Front were to go

over onto the oensive along the entire front of the southern salient.[63] This counterattack was planned to be in
concert with the Soviet Operation Kutuzov in the northern side of the Kursk Salient.[64] Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to destroy the German forces near Prokhorovka
with his 5th Guards Tank Army, without allowing the
Germans to withdraw southwards.[65] Rotmistrov ordered
his tanks to move forward at speed to engage the German
armour in order to nullify the advantages the Tiger tanks
had in the range and repower of their 88 mm guns. He
believed the more manoeuvrable T-34 would be able to
quickly close and obtain eective anking shots against
the German heavy tanks.[56][66] In fact, Soviet intelligence
had greatly overestimated the numbers of Ferdinands and
Tigers possessed by the II SS-Panzer Corps.[lower-alpha 11]
In actuality there were no Ferdinands with the 4th Panzer
Army, as they were all deployed in the northern side of
the Kursk salient with the 9th Army.[67]
Late on the night of 12 July, the III Panzer Corps
crossed the Northern Donets at Rzhawes (also known as
Rzhavets). This jeopardised Rotmistrovs entire plan by
threatening the ank of the 5th Guards Tank Army.[68][60]
Early on 12 July, Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to send reinforcements to the Soviet 7th Guards and 69th Armies
facing the III Panzer Corps.[68][36][60] He organised a task
force under the command of his deputy, General Kuzma
Grigorevich Trufanov, which consisted of the 26th Tank
Brigade from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, the 11th and
12th Guards Mechanized Brigades from the 5th Guards
Mechanized Corps, and the 53rd Guards Tank Regiment
from the 5th Guards Tank Army.[68] Other units from
the reserve also were attached to the group on its way
south.[68] In doing so Rotmistrov had committed over half
of his reserves to an essential ad-hoc advance before the
Battle of Prokhorovka began.[60]

OPPOSING FORCES

German forces in the southern Kursk salient during Operation

Citadel

SS-Panzer Corps: Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and

Totenkopf.[72] On the evening of 11 July, the serviceable armour strength of the II SS-Panzer Corps was
294 tanks and assault guns, which included 15 Tigers.
The armoured strength of Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and
Totenkopf were 77, 95, and 122 tanks and assault guns
respectively.[67] Ten of the Tigers were to the north of the
Psel river with Totenkopf, four were with Leibstandarte,
and Das Reich had just one.[73][66]

Of the three divisions, Leibstandarte had advanced the

most deeply towards Prokhorovka and was situated in
the centre of the German position. A railway line ran
through the Leibstandarte positions, heading northeast to
Prokhorovka. The railbed was about 30 feet high and
divided the area of the Leibstandarte division north and
south. The bulk of the division was positioned to the
north of the rail line, including the divisions panzer regiment, its 2nd Panzergrenadier regiment, and the divisions reconnaissance, artillery and command units. To
the south of the rail line was Leibstandarte 's 1st PanzSoviet air support in the southern side of the salient ergrenadier regiment, along with the divisions Panzerwas provided by the 2nd Air Army and the 17th Air jaeger battalion.[74] To the southeast of Leibstandarte
Army,[69] commanded by Lieutenant General Stepan stood Das Reich, which protected the southern ank.[75]
Krasovsky and Lieutenant General Vladimir Sudets,
respectively.[70][71] However, the bulk of the air sup- To the northwest of Leibstandarte was Totenkopf. The
port was committed in support of Soviet units attacking divisions panzer regiment had largely crossed over the
XLVIII Panzer Corps to the west of Prokhorovka and the river Psel in preparation for the assault. Leibstandarte
III Panzer Corps to the southeast, and only limited num- placed its lightly armed reconnaissance battalion in the
bers of aircraft were available to support 5th Guards Tank 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) gap between it and Totenkopf, together with the divisions four remaining Tigers, which
Armys attack.[69]
were commanded by SS-Second Lieutenant Michael
Wittmann, to provide some ank protection.[76][77]

Opposing forces
3.2 Soviet

See also: Battle of Kursk order of battle

The main Soviet armoured formation involved in the battle was the 5th Guards Tank Army, which controlled
ve corps by 12 July: the 2nd Guards, 2nd, 5th Guards
3.1 German
Mechanized, 18th and 29th Tank Corps.[78][79][80] All together they elded 793 tanks and 37 to 57 self-propelled
The German forces involved in the Battle of Prokhorovka guns for a total of approximately 840 armoured ghting
were from the three Waen-SS divisions of the II vehicles.[81][82][83] About two-thirds of these tanks were

5
T-34s, while the remainder were T-70 light tanks,[84]
with some 31 to 35 Churchill heavy tanks as well.[85][86]
Not all of the 5th Guards Tank Army was present in
the Prokhorovka area during the battle, as part of the
formation had been sent south to check the advance
of the III Panzer Corps.[68] The Soviet armour of the
5th Guards Tank Army including the newly attached
2nd Guards[lower-alpha 3] and 2nd[lower-alpha 2] Tank Corps,
as well as the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps[lower-alpha 4]
held in reserve facing the II SS Panzer Corps on 12 July
was about 616 tanks and self-propelled guns.[87][88] In addition, ve artillery regiments, one artillery brigade, and
one anti-aircraft artillery division were attached to the 5th
Guards Tank Army for the assault.[89]
The main attack of the the 5th Guards Tank Army was
conducted against Leibstandarte by its fresh 29th and 18th
Tank Corps that had been brought up from the Soviet
strategic reserve.[90][91] These two Soviet tank formations
together provided the greatest number of tanks in the
attack,[92] with the 18th Tank Corps elding 190 tanks
and self-propelled guns, and the 29th Tank Corps elding 212 tanks and self-propelled guns.[91][93] Infantry support to the 18th and 29th Tank Corps was provided by
the 9th Guards Airborne Division.[91] A portion of the
18th Tank Corps was directed against the eastern ank of
Totenkopf 's Regiment Eicke.[91] On the southeastern
wing of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Rotmistrov deployed
the remaining forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps that
were not sent south, which numbered about 80 tanks.[92]
The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, supported by the remnants
of the 2nd Tank Corps, was to attack Das Reich.[36][94]
Their infantry support was provided by the 183rd Rie
Division.[95] The northwestern ank of the 5th Guards
Tank Army, which faced Totenkpf, was defended by the
33rd Guards Rie Corps 42nd and 95th Guards Rie
Divisions,[96][97] supported by the remnants of the 31st
Tank Corps and the heavily depleted 23rd Guards Rie Corps 52nd Guards Rie Division.[98][97] The forces
of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps that were not sent
south were held as reserve north of Prokhorovka,[89][92]
and they numbered about 113 tanks and self-propelled
guns.[93]
Despite having suered signicant losses over the previous weeks ghting, on 12 July the 2nd Air Army still
had some 472 aircraft operational, while the 17th Air
Army had 300 remaining operational aircraft; however,
only a few of these were made available to support the
5th Guards Tank Army.[69]

Battle

At 05:45 on 12 July, Leibstandarte 's headquarters started

receiving reports of the sound of a great number of tank
engines as the Soviet tanks prepared for their advance.[99]
At around 06:50 , elements of Leibstandarte 's 1st SSPanzergrenadier Regiment nudged forward and drove the

Soviet infantry out of Storozhevoe,[100][101][102] while the

bulk of Leibstandarte waited to commence their main
task for the day.[103] The Soviets began a preparatory artillery barrage at around 08:00,[104][101][105] and as the
last shells fell at 08:30, Rotmistrov radioed the code
words Stal! Stal! Stal!" (Steel, Steel, Steel!") the
order to commence the attack.[106][105] With that the Soviet armour of the 5th Guards Tank Army began their
advance.[66][107][102]

German Panzer IV and Sdkfz 251 halftrack

Down o the west slopes before Prokhorovka charged

the massed Soviet armour of ve tank brigades of the
18th and 29th Tank Corps, ineectually ring as they
came at Leibstandarte 's positions.[108] As the Soviet tanks
rolled down the slopes, they carried the men of the 9th
Guards Airborne Division on their hulls.[107] In total,
about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 5th Guards
Tank Army attacked the positions of the II SS Panzer
Corps,[107] doing so in two massive waves, with 430 tanks
in the rst echelon and 70 more in the second.[109][89]
Exhausted from the previous weeks ghting, the troops
of Leibstandarte were just starting their day at the outset of the attack and were largely taken by surprise.[110]
As the Soviet armour appeared, several German outposts
began ring purple warning ares signaling a tank attack.
Obersturmfhrer Rudolf von Ribbentrop of the 1st SSPanzer Regiments 2nd Battalion stated later that he knew
at once a major attack was underway.[66] He ordered his
company of seven Panzer IVs to follow him over a bridge
across the tank ditch. Crossing the bridge they fanned out
on the lower slope of Hill 252.2. Above them, on the crest
of the hill, Joachim Peiper's 2nd SS-Panzergrenadiers
and their armoured half-tracks were being overrun. As
Ribbentrops tanks spread out he looked up the hillside
and was suddenly confronted by the wave of Soviet tanks:
In front of me appeared fteen, then twenty, then thirty,
then forty tanks. Finally there were too many of them to
count. The T-34s were rolling toward us at speed, and
carrying mounted infantry.[111]
As the Soviet armour charged down the west slope of Hill
252.2 a hotly contested tank battle ensued. A Panzer IV
to Ribbentrops right was set ablaze.[111] Soon the company was swamped by the Soviet tanks coming down the

6
hill. The Soviet tanks were ring on the move. Rotmistrovs tactic to close at speed disrupted the control
and co-ordination of the Soviet tank formations and also
greatly reduced their accuracy.[36]

5 FOLLOWING THE MAIN ENGAGEMENT

entire battle, while our own aircraft, and particularly the
ghter aviation, was totally insucient.[115]
By the end of the day, Leibstandarte still held Hill 252.2
and had lost no signicant ground,[116] but was exhausted
by the struggle turning back the ve brigades of the two
tank corps.[36][117] To its left, Totenkopf had succeeded
in capturing Hill 226.6 and its panzer group had advanced along the north bank of the Psel to reach the
Karteschevka-Prokhorovka road, 8 kilometres (5.0 mi)
northwest of Prokhorovka.[118] Of the three SS-Panzer
divisions, it had been on the oensive the most and its
panzer regiment had suered the heaviest losses. Though
its hold on the forward ground was tenuous, it was in position to outank the Soviet forces at Prokhorovka.[119]
Das Reich had been forced onto the defensive by the
2nd Guards Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Corps,[120][95]
along with the Soviet infantry of the 183rd Rie Division, which precluded its own planned attack.[95]

The advance of Soviet armour was held up at the base

of the Hill 252.2 when they reached the anti-tank ditch.
Some vehicles crashed into the 15-foot ditch while others
moved along the edge looking for a way to cross. Heavy
ring occurred between the Soviet armour and the two
other companies of the 1st SS-Panzer Battalion on the opposite side of the ditch, while the Soviet tanks searched
for a route across.[112] Meanwhile, with the passage of
the rst waves of Soviet tanks Peipers surviving panzergrenadiers emerged from trench lines to engage the Soviet paratroopers and attack the Soviet tanks with magnetic anti-tank grenades. Twenty of the battalions halftracks were lost in the ghting, some of which were destroyed when they attempted to ram the much heavier Soviet tanks in an eort to stop them.[113]
On the Soviet side, 5th Guards Tank Army and all tank
units under Rotmistrov involved in the battle suered
heavy losses.[121] The Soviet attack had been repelled
and Rotmistrov was forced to shift his tank army over to
defence.[122] Despite this, German intelligence reported
to the German command that the forces opposing the
II SS-Panzer Corps still had over 300 tanks available.
The Germans knew that the Soviet forces opposing them
were still considerable and a clear decision had yet to be
reached.

5 Following the main engagement

A weary ocer lights the cigarette of his NCO in the southern
salient.

The 2nd and 17th Air Armies ew 893 sorties compared

to the VIII Fliegerkorpss 654 sorties over the southern
part of the salient. Of note, most of the Soviet sorties own that day were own against the XLVIII Panzer
Corps to the west and the III Panzer Corps to the south.
Low clouds in the morning and thunderstorms in the afternoon inhibited air operations in Prokhorovka by both
sides.[114] Over the Prokhorovka battleeld the Luftwae
gained control of the air. Formations of Stukas, including a small number of experimental 3.7-centimetre (1.5
in) BK 37 cannon-equipped G-2 variants, commanded
by Staelkapitan Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Fw 190 ghterbombers and Hs 129 ground-attack aircraft equipped
with 3-centimetre (1.2 in) anti-tank cannon attacked the
Soviet formations.[109] The 31st Tank Brigade reported:
We suered heavy losses in tanks through enemy artillery and aircraft. At 10:30 our tanks reached the Komsomolets State Farm, but due to continuous air attacks,
they were unable to advance any further and shifted to
the defence.[102] The tank brigade also reported: our
own air cover was fully absent until 13:00.[115] The 5th
Guards Tank Army reported: the enemys aircraft literally hung above our combat formations throughout the

On the night of 12 July, Vatutin ordered the Soviet

forces facing the II SS-Panzer Corps to take a defensive stance.[123] Orders issued by the Germans for 13
July instructed Totenkopf to consolidate its gains of the
previous day and then attack into the ank and rear of
the Soviet forces around Prokhorovka.[124] Leibstandarte
was to strengthen its front line and co-ordinate its attack
on Prokhorovka from the south with Totenkopf 's attack
from the northwest.[124] Das Reich was to consolidate and
strengthen its front line and prepare for an oensive operation to link up with the III Panzer Corps.[125]
On the morning of 13 July, the 5th Guards Mechanized
Corps and the 33rd Guards Rie Corps launched attacks against Totenkopf 's left ank.[126] By afternoon
these Soviet attacks had been beaten o, but they did
prevent Totenkopf from attacking to the south toward
Prokhorovka.[126] Around noon, Leibstandarte was ordered to attack northward toward the Psel River to consolidate its front line with Totenkopf 's position.[126] This
attack confronted the defensive positions held by the 33rd
Guards Rie Corps, which had been supplemented by
the remaining armour of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps.
Leibstandarte 's attack was unsuccessful.[126] That afternoon, Totenkopf was ordered to abandon their positions

7
northwest of Prokhorovka and return to a more defendable positions along the north bank of the Psel River.[127]
Soviet attempts to sever the salient were unsuccessful, and
the unit completed its withdrawal by nightfall.[127]

5.1

Aftermath

On 13 July Adolf Hitler summoned Manstein and Field

Marshal Gnther von Kluge to his headquarters, the
Wolfsschanze in East Prussia.[128][129] The Allied invasion
of Sicily on the night of 910 July combined with the Soviet counteroensive of Operation Kutuzov against the
ank and rear of Models 9th Army on 12 July and the
violent attacks by strong Soviet forces at Prokhorovka the
same day had caused him to stop the oensive and shift
forces to the west.[129][130] He ordered his generals to terminate Operation Citadel.[130][131][132][133]
Kluge welcomed the decision, as he was already in the
process of withdrawing units of the 9th Army from the
Kursk salient to deal with Soviet attacks on his ank.[132]
Manstein was greatly disappointed. He argued that his
forces were now on the verge of achieving a major breakthrough. As he saw it, with his III Panzer Corps about
to link up with the II SS-Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka,
and with the XXIV Panzer Corps available as his operational reserve, they would be halting the oensive just
at the moment when victory was in hand. With an eye
toward the west, Hitler was unwilling to continue the
oensive.[130][134][135] Manstein persisted, proposing that
his forces should at least destroy the Soviet reserves in the
southern Kursk salient before Citadel was nally terminated, so the Soviet ghting capacity in the sector would
be depleted for the rest of the summer.[134][135] Hitler
agreed to continue oensive operations in the southern
salient until Mansteins goal was achieved.[134][135]

5.2

Operation Roland

Manstein hastily put together the plans for Operation

Roland, realizing that he only had a few days to conduct
the operation before he lost the SS-Panzer Corps.[136]
The plan called for Das Reich to attack east and south
and link up with III Panzer Corps, which would attack
to the northwest. Leibstandarte and Totenkopf were to
anchor the left and northern anks of Das Reich. Once
the link was achieved and the Soviet forces encircled, the
Soviet defence would be crippled and Prokhorovka would
likely fall shortly thereafter.[136] The goal of the operation
was to destroy the Soviet armoured reserve massed in the
southern sector of the Kursk salient, and thereby check
Soviet oensives for the rest of the summer.[135][137]
The orders for Operation Roland were issued in the
closing hours of 13 July 1943.[138][139] However, following Hitlers meeting with Manstein, Hitler countermanded the XXIV Panzer Corps deployment to the
Kursk salient, sending them on 14 July to support the

1st Panzer Army to the south.[140] The assault began at

0400 on 14 July.[138][141][142] Following a brief artillery
barrage, the Der Fuhrer Panzergrenadier Regiment of
Das Reich struck out for the high ground south-west of
Pravorot, evicting the remnants of the 2nd Guards Tank
Corps from the village of Belenikhino following violent
house-to-house and hand-to-hand ghting. The panzer
regiment of the division fought o a series of counterattacks, destroying a number of T-34s in the process, and
forced the Soviets to withdraw to the east. A new line was
taken, and Zhukov ordered elements of the 10th Guards
Mechanized Brigade out of reserve to reinforce the position. To the south, the 7th Panzer Division made contact with Das Reich, but Trufanov, commanding the Soviet forces in the gap, was aware of the threat and conducted a ghting withdrawal. Though the Soviets had
to abandon a substantial number of anti-tank guns, the
link-up failed to entrap many Soviet forces.[143] Operation Roland failed to produce a decisive result,[144] and
Totenkopf began withdrawing from its positions north of
the Psel, following orders issued late on 15 July, as the II
SS-Panzer Corps assumed a defensive stance.[145][146]
On 17 July the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts
launched a major oensive across the Mius and Donets
Rivers against the southern wing of Army Group South,
pressing upon the 6th and 1st Panzer Armies.[147][148] In
the early afternoon of 17 July, Operation Roland was
terminated with an order for the II SS-Panzer Corps to
begin withdrawing from the Prokhorovka sector back to
Belgorod.[149][145] The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf anticipated the order and began executing it as early as the evening of 16 July.[150][151] Leibstandarte 's tanks were distributed between Das Reich
and Totenkopf and the division was hastily redeployed to
Italy,[152][153] while Das Reich and Totenkopf were dispatched south to meet the new Soviet oensives.[154][155]

6 Casualties and losses

Losses are dicult to establish for either combatant.
Tank losses attributed to the Germans vary,[156] in part
due to the Wehrmachts methodology for counting and reporting equipment losses. Only equipment that could not
be repaired or that had to be abandoned were counted as
losses, but damaged equipment that could be recovered
and repaired were simply listed as such.[157][158] Likewise, reliable gures for tank and personnel casualties for
the Soviets in the battle of Prokhorovka are dicult to
establish.[159]

6.1 German
The II SS Panzer Corps reported 842 men killed,
wounded, or missing for 12 July.[160] Since the Germans
controlled the Prokhorovka battleeld until 17 July, they

7 OUTCOME

were able to recover most of their disabled armoured

vehicles.[157] German historian Karl Frieser has attributed
between three and ve permanent tank losses to the II SS
Panzer Corps.[161][162]
Archival data of the II SS Panzer Corps shows that the
corps had 294 operable tanks and assault guns on the
evening of 11 July[67] and 251 on the evening of 13
July.[163][67] Allowing for the possibility that some repaired tanks were returned to service on 13 July, these
numbers indicate that at least 43 tanks and assault guns
became inoperable during the battle of Prokharovka,
which includes all 10 Tigers belonging to Totenkopf and
one belonging to Leibstandarte. However, all of the inoperable Tiger tanks were repairable, and none were writeos.[163] An estimated total of between 60 and 80 of
II SS-Panzer Corps armoured vehicles were damaged
or destroyed in combat on 12 July.[164][165] By the end
of 16 July, the II SS Panzer Corps had 292 serviceable
tanks and assault guns, almost the same number it had at
the beginning of the battle on 12 July.[166] On 12 July,
Schlachtgeschwader 1 of the VIII Fliegerkorps and its attached squadron of Stukas reported eleven aircraft damaged, of which six were total write-os, all by Soviet
ak.[115]

6.2

for all of its ve corps, as well smaller units directly subordinated to the army headquarters.[170] The document
reported the following irrecoverable losses: 222 T-34s,
89 T-70s, 12 Churchill tanks, 8 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and
240 support vehicles.[170] The document reported damaged vehicles still under repair as 143 T-34s, 56 T-70s,
7 Churchill tanks, 3 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s, and no gures
for support vehicles.[170] The document reported personnel casualties as 2,940 killed in action, 3,510 wounded in
action, and 1,157 missing in action.[170] This adds up to a
total of 334 irrevocable losses in tanks and self-propelled
guns,[159] with another 212 tanks and self-propelled guns
under repair, and 7,607 casualties.

7 Outcome

Soviet

Destroyed Soviet T-34 in the southern salient

Exact Soviet losses for 12 July are not known, but have
been estimated by military historians. Personnel losses
at Prokhorovka were estimated by the historian Christer Bergstrm to have been as high as 5,500 men.[115]
For equipment damaged or destroyed, David Glantz and
Jonathan House estimate that the 5th Guards Tank Army
lost at least 400 tanks in its attacks on 12 July.[167] George
Nipe puts the losses in armour as between 600 and 650
tanks.[168] 5th Guards Tank Army losses were estimated
by the Soviet historians Grigoriy Koltunov and Boris
Soloviev to have been about 300 tanks and self-propelled
guns.[115][169]

Prokhorovka battleeld memorial

Debate exists over the signicance and outcome of

the battle. The Germans destroyed many Soviet tanks
and temporarily degraded the striking power of the
5th Guards Tank Army, but they were unable to take
Prokhorovka or break through into open ground.[36] For
the Soviets, the massive armoured attack of 12 July failed
A document prepared on 17 July 1943 by the 5th Guards to destroy the II SS-Panzer Corps or throw it onto the
Tank Army Headquarters summarised the combat losses defensive, but succeeded in exhausting the Germans and
incurred by the formation from 12 to 16 July inclusive eventually contributed to checking their advance.[171][172]

8.2

Citations

Thus, neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II

SS-Panzer Corps accomplished their objectives for the
day.[172][173] While the battle is generally considered a
tactical success for the Germans due to the high numbers
of Soviet tanks destroyed,[174][175] ultimately there was no
German breakthrough at Prokhorovka, and with the end
of Operation Citadel the strategic initiative permanently
swung over to the Red Army.[176]

8
8.1

References
Notes

[1] The 5th Guards Tank Army was transferred from the control of the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 11
July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327) All of its subordinate
corps as of 12 July are listed below;(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 48) the divisions, regiments and battalions
directly subordinate to the Armys Headquarters are not
listed below.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 327)
[2] The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was initially not part of the
5th Guards Tank Army. It was transferred from the control of the 1st Tank Army to the 69th Army on 10 July,
and then to the 5th Guards Tank Army on 11 July.(Glantz
& House 2004, p. 318)
[3] The 2nd Tank Corps was initially not part of the 5th
Guards Tank Army, but was transferred from the control of the Southwestern Front to the 5th Guards Tank
Army on 11 July.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 321) Due to
earlier combat, by 12 July the 2nd Tank Corps had few
tanks left, many of which were locked in combat elsewhere outside the battleeld of Prokhorovka and out of
contact with their parent headquarters. Therefore it was
reinforced with the 10th Antitank Brigade and relegated
to a supportive role in Prokhorovka.(Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 106; Glantz & House 2004, p. 179,181)
[4] Two of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps four brigades
the 10th, 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized, and the
24th Guards Tank Brigades were sent south to block
the III Panzer Corps, leaving its 10th Guards Mechanized
and 24th Guards Tank Brigades near Prokhorovka on 12
July.(Clark 2012, p. 379; Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p.
101; Glantz & House 2004, p. 321)
[5] The 5th Guards Army was transferred from the control of
the Steppe Front to the Voronezh Front on 8 July.(Glantz
& House 2004, p. 323) Only one of its two corps
were present on the battleeld of Prokhorovka the 33rd
Guards Rie Corps.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 167) The
other corps the 32nd Guards Rie Corps was deployed further west, near Oboyan.(Clark 2012, p. 230)
The divisions, regiments and other smaller units directly
subordinate to the Armys Headquarters are not listed
below.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 323)
[6] The 10th Tank Corps was transferred from the control of
5th Guards Army to the Voronezh Front on 7 July and
to the 1st Tank Army on 8 July.(Glantz & House 2004, p.

324) Only its 11th Motorized Rie Brigade was in the battleeld of Prokhorovka on 12 July.(Glantz & House 2004,
p. 166,195,417) It is not uncommon for this formation to
be portrayed as part of the 5th Guards Army during the
Battle of Prokhorovka, but that is a metachronistic error.
[7] The 6th Guards Army bore the brunt of the German oensive from the very opening hours of it; therefore, its subordinate units present at the Battle of Prokhorovka were
already heavily depleted.(Glantz & House 2004, p. 167)
[8] These are only for the II SS Panzer Corps.
[9] These are for the whole 5th Guards Tank Army.
[10] See also: Battle of Brody (1941), Battle of Raseiniai,
Operation Goodwood, Battle for Golan Heights (1973),
and others.
[11] A Soviet General Sta report estimated that the II SSPanzer Corps and III Panzer Corps had 100 Tigers and
Ferdinands on 12 July.(Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 222)

8.2 Citations
[1] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... a local, tactical
German victory..
[2] Clark 2012, p. 408, Excerpt reads: Even though II
SS-Panzer Corps could claim to have won a tactical victory in the monumental armoured clash at Prokhorovka ...
Haussers men did not do enough to change the course of
the operation..
[3] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: The Waen-SS
won a tactical victory on July 12..
[4] Nipe 2012, p. 86, Excerpt reads: The small expansion of
the Psel bridgehead by Totenkopf and the advances of Das
Reich around the southern edges of Prochorovka were tactical victories at best and not decisive by any denition..
[5] Showalter 2013, p. 269, Excerpt reads: Operationally,
however, the palm rests with the Red Army..
[6] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 561, The counterattack
did not achieve its basic goal. The enemy [II SSPanzer Corps] was not routed, but the further advance of
the II SS-Panzer Corps beyond Prokhorovka was nally
halted..
[7] Healy 2008, p. 347, Excerpt reads: "... the clash was,
when set against the much wider strategic backdrop of the
oensive, no more than a local, tactical German victory.
It was of no consequence or signicance in helping to realise any of the wider oensive objectives of Operation
Zitadelle, which was in any case by this date already a
failure..
[8] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108, If we take a look
at how the front lines changed during these ve days one
could interpret it as some sort of success for the Germans
... However, if we compare the outcome with the German
orders for the battle, which stated that Prokhorovka was
the target, it is clear that the Germans fell short of their
goals. The Red Army had hoped to push the II SS-Panzer

10

Corps back and crush it. This failed completely, but at

least the 5th Guards Tank Army prevented the Germans
from taking Prokhorovka..
[9] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 2829].

[43] Clark 2012, pp. 350353.

[44] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 169, 171.
[45] Glantz & House 2004, p. 172.

[10] Clark 2012, p. 189.

[46] Clark 2012, pp. 352353.

[11] Healy 2008, p. 43.

[47] Nipe 2012, p. 315.

[12] Clark 2012, p. 187.

[48] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 95.

[13] Glantz 1986, p. 2325.

[49] Clark 2012, p. 352.

[14] Clark 2012, pp. 194,196197.

[50] Glantz & House 2004, p. 166.

[15] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 5153.

[51] Dunn 1997, p. 153.

[16] Glantz 2013, p. 184.

[52] Glantz & House 2004, p. 173.

[17] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 6365.

[53] Glantz & House 1999, pp. 176.

[18] Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 41, 49.

[54] Clark 2012, p. 356.

[19] Glantz 2013, p. 195.

[55] Glantz & House 2004, p. 178.

[20] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 34.

[56] Nipe 2010, p. 310.

[21] Clark 2012, p. 407.

[57] Bergstrm 2007, p. 79.

[22] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 269272.

[58] Nipe 2010, p. 276.

[23] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 112.

[59] Bergstrm 2007, p. 77.

[24] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 8990.

[60] Nipe 2010, p. 315.

[25] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 101.

[61] Healy 2008, p. 330.

[26] VIII. Fliegerkorps.

[62] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 323, 326.

[27] Clark 2012, pp. 256260.

[63] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 178, 198.

[28] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 134135.

[64] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 227.

[29] Clark 2012, pp. 297299.

[65] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 179.

[30] Clark 2012, pp. 68, 279, map on page 68 shows 1820
miles.

[66] Clark 2012, p. 364.

[31] Glantz & House 2004, p. 130, the map shows 1820
miles.

[68] Glantz & House 2004, p. 202.

[32] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 90, this places it at 28 km

at the end of 7 July.

REFERENCES

[67] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 103.

[69] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7881.

[70] 17th Air Army.

[33] Bauman 1998, pp. 8-5 to 8-6, this places it at 23 km.

[71] Glantz & House 2004, p. 317,321.

[34] Glantz & House 2004, p. 146147.

[72] Dunn 1997, p. 154.

[35] Newton 2002, p. 6.

[73] Nipe 2010, p. 309.

[36] Brand 2003.

[74] Nipe 2012, p. 326.

[37] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 2933.

[75] Healy 2008, p. 320.

[38] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 258260.

[76] Healy 2008, p. 333.

[39] Glantz & House 2004, p. 138139.

[77] Clark 2012, p. 368.

[40] Healy 2008, p. 296.

[78] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 48, 101.

[41] Glantz & House 2004, p. 166167.

[79] Glantz & House 2004, p. 151.

[42] Clark 2012, pp. 350.

[80] Nipe 2012, p. 39.

8.2

Citations

11

[81] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 48, 105106, 793 tanks [117] Nipe 2010, p. 335.
and 57 self-propelled guns.
[118] Showalter 2013, p. 216.
[82] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 151, 328, 793 tanks and 37
[119] Clark 2012, pp. 388389.
self-propelled guns.
[83] Nipe 2012, p. 39, 850 tanks.

[120] Clark 2012, pp. 381, 389.

[84] Healy 2008, pp. 171172.

[121] Nipe 2012, pp. 48, 52.

[85] Healy 2008, pp. 171172, 35 Churchill tanks.

[122] Clark 2012, pp. 390391.

[86] Glantz & House 2004, p. 328, 31 Churchill tanks.

[123] Glantz & House 2004, p. 208.

[87] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 106-107.

[124] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 209210.

[88] Clark 2012, p. 362.

[89] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 181.
[90] Licari 2004.
[91] Glantz & House 2004, p. 180.
[92] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 106107.
[93] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 107.
[94] Glantz & House 2004, p. 180181.
[95] Glantz & House 2004, p. 192.

[125] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 209, 216.

[126] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 212215.
[127] Clark 2012, p. 394.
[128] Molony et al. 2004, pp. 5565.
[129] Clark 2012, p. 397.
[130] Nipe 2012, p. 71.
[131] Barbier 2002, p. 153.
[132] Clark 2012, pp. 395397.

[96] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 96.

[133] Glantz & House 2004, p. 208, Kutuzov and allied landings had an eect on the German High Command.

[97] Glantz & House 2004, p. 184.

[134] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 217218.

[98] Clark 2012, p. 378.

[135] Clark 2012, pp. 397398.

[99] Clark 2012, p. 363.

[136] Healy 2010, p. 358.

[100] Glantz & House 2004, p. 182.

[137] Glantz & House 2004, p. 218.

[101] Barbier 2002, p. 139.

[138] Glantz & House 2004, p. 219.

[102] Bergstrm 2007, p. 80.

[139] Barbier 2002, p. 163.

[103] Brand 2003, p. 8.

[140] Healy 2010, p. 356.

[104] Glantz & House 2004, p. 187, in Moscow time.

[141] Clark 2012, pp. 398.

[105] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 349.

[142] Healy 2010, p. 359, States 15 July in error.

[106] Glantz & House 2004, p. 188, in Moscow time.

[143] Healy 2010, p. 359.

[107] Glantz & House 2004, p. 188.

[144] Clark 2012, pp. 401402.

[108] Nipe 2010, p. 317.

[145] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 98.

[109] Bergstrm 2007, p. 7980.

[146] Nipe 2012, p. 70.

[110] Nipe 2010, p. 316317.

[147] Glantz & House 2004, pp. 204, 223.

[111] Nipe 2010, p. 320.

[148] Newton 2002, p. 24.

[112] Nipe 2010, p. 321.

[149] Glantz & House 2004, p. 223.

[113] Nipe 2010, p. 322.

[150] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 514515.

[114] Bergstrm 2007, pp. 7981.

[151] Barbier 2002, p. 164.

[115] Bergstrm 2007, p. 81.

[152] Nipe 2012, p. 72.

[116] Showalter 2013, p. 212.

[153] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 139, 218.

12

[154] Glantz & House 2004, p. 245.

[155] Nipe 2012, p. 87.
[156] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 531532, outlines various
gures proposed by various historians over the last three
decades.
[157] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 531532.
[158] Bauman 1998, pp. 5-14.
[159] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 108.
[160] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 105, 110, 247.
[161] Frieser 2007, p. 130, gives 3 losses.
[162] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 513, 598, attributes ve
losses to a claim by Frieser made in 1993.
[163] Healy 2010, pp. 346.
[164] Glantz & House 1999, pp. 212.
[165] Nipe 2012, pp. 6061.
[166] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 103, 105.
[167] Glantz & House 1995, p. 167.
[168] Nipe 2012, pp. 8586.
[169] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, p. 102.
[170] Zamulin & Britton 2011, pp. 536538.
[171] Overy 1997, p. 208.
[172] Zetterling & Frankson 2000, pp. 108109.
[173] Zamulin & Britton 2011, p. 553.
[174] Clark 2012, p. 408.
[175] Nipe 2012, p. 86.
[176] Glantz & House 1995, p. 166.

8.3

Bibliography

Barbier, Mary Kathryn (2002). Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle, 1943. London; New York: Zenith
Imprint. ISBN 978-0-7603-1254-4.
Bauman, Walter (1998). Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise Phase II (KOSAVE
II) (PDF). Maryland: US Army Concepts Analysis Agency. A study of the southern sector of
the Battle of Kursk conducted by the US Army
Concepts Analysis Agency and directed by Walter J. Bauman, using data collected from military
archives in Germany and Russia by The Dupuy Institute (TDI).
Bergstrm, Christer (2007). Kursk The Air Battle: July 1943. Hersham: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN
978-1-903223-88-8.

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Brand, Dieter (2003). Vor 60 Jahren: Prochorowka (Teil II)". sterreichische Militrische
Zeitschrift (in German) (Bundesministerium fr
Landesverteidigung und Sport) (6).
Clark, Lloyd (2012). Kursk: The Greatest Battle:
Eastern Front 1943. London: Headline Publishing
Group. ISBN 978-0-7553-3639-5.
Dunn, Walter (1997). Kursk: Hitlers Gamble, 1943.
Westport: Greenwood Press. ISBN 978-0-27595733-9.
Frieser, Karl-Heinz; Schmider, Klaus; Schnherr,
Klaus; Schreiber, Gerhard; Ungvry, Kristin; Wegner, Bernd (2007). Das Deutsche Reich und der
Zweite Weltkrieg Vol. 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44
Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten
(in German). Mnchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt
Mnchen. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2.
Glantz, David M. (September 1986). Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 (PDF). US
Army Command and General Sta College (Ft.
Belvoir). Soviet Army Studies Oce Combined
Arms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI Report
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Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathon (1995). When
Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. ISBN 9780-7006-0899-7.
Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (1999). The
Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas. ISBN 978-0-70060-978-9.
Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (2004)
[1999]. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0-7006-1335-9.
Glantz, David (2013). Soviet Military Intelligence
in War. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis (Routledge).
ISBN 978-1-136-28934-7.
Glantz, David M.; Orenstein, Harold S. (1999). The
Battle for Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Sta
Study. London: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass).
ISBN 0-7146-4933-3. This report, commissioned by the Soviet General Sta in 1944, was designed to educate the Red Army on how to conduct war operations. It was classied secret until
its declassication in 1964, and was subsequently
translated to English and edited by Orenstein and
Glantz. Its original title was Collection of materials for the study of war experience, no. 11 (Russian:
11, Sbornik materialov po izucheniiu opyta Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny
11)

13
Healy, Mark (2008). Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 417 July 1943.
Stroud: History Press. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0.
Healy, Mark (2010) [2008]. Zitadelle: The German
Oensive Against the Kursk Salient 417 July 1943.
Stroud: History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-5716-1.
Molony, C.J.C.; Flynn, F.C.; Davies, H.L. &
Gleave, T.P. (2004) [1973]. Butler, Sir James, ed.
The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume V: The
Campaign in Sicily 1943 and The Campaign in Italy
3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944. History of
the Second World War, United Kingdom Military
Series. London: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 184574-069-6.
Licari, Michael J. (2004). The Battle of Kursk:
Myths and Reality. Cedar Falls: University of
Northern Iowa. Archived from the original on 11
September 2014. Retrieved 1 November 2014.
Newton, Steven (2002). Kursk: The German View:
Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.
ISBN 0-306-81150-2.
Nipe, George (2010). Blood, Steel, and Myth: The
II.SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka.
Southbury; Newbury: RZM; Casemate (distributor). ISBN 978-0-9748389-4-6.
Nipe, George (2012). Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
ISBN 978-0-8117-1162-3.
Overy, Richard (1997). Russias War: A History of
the Soviet Eort. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN
0-14-027169-4.
Showalter, Dennis E. (2013). Armor and Blood:
The Battle of Kursk, The Turning Point of World War
II. New York: Random House.
Zamulin, Valeriy; Britton, Stuart (2011). Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka,
Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative. Solihull: Helion & Company. ISBN 1-906033-89-7.
Zetterling, Niklas; Frankson, Anders (2000). Kursk
1943: A Statistical Analysis. Cass Series on the Soviet (Russian) Study of War. London: Taylor &
Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-7146-5052-8.
VIII. Fliegerkorps. Retrieved 11 July 2015.
17th Air Army. Retrieved 11 July 2015.

9 Further reading
Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia
in the Second World War. London: Pan. ISBN 9780-330-48808-2.
Evans, Richard (2010). The Third Reich at War.
New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14311671-4.
Glantz, David (January 1991). Soviet Operational
Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle. London; Portland,
OR: Taylor & Francis (Frank Cass). ISBN 0-71464077-8.
Glantz, David (December 1991). From the Don to
the Dnepr: Soviet Oensive Operations, December
1942 August 1943. London: Taylor & Francis
(Frank Cass). ISBN 978-0-7146-3350-3.
Guderian, Heinz (1996) [1937]. Achtung-Panzer:
The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential. London: Arms and
Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-282-3.
Guderian, Heinz (1952). Panzer Leader. New York:
Da Capo. ISBN 0-306-81101-4.
Healy, Mark (1992). Kursk 1943: Tide Turns in the
East. London: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-211-0.
Kasdorf, Bruno (2000). The Battle of Kursk
An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles
(PDF). Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College. OCLC 44584575.
von Manstein, Erich (1982). Lost Victories. St.
Paul, MN: Zenith Press. ISBN 978-0-76032-0549.
von Mellenthin, Friedrich (1956). Panzer Battles.
Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 156852-578-8.
Moorhouse, Roger (2011). Berlin at War: Life and
Death in Hitlers Capital, 193945. London: Vintage. ISBN 978-0-09-955189-8.
Pinkus, Oscar (2005). The War Aims and Strategies
of Adolf Hitler. Jeerson, N.C: McFarland. ISBN
978-0-7864-2054-4.
Smith, J.R. (1966). Aircraft in Prole No.69 The
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42473519.
Willmott, Hedley Paul (1990). The Great Crusade:
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New York: Free Press. ISBN 978-0-02-934715-7.

14

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, (2006). [Prokhorovka
- the unknown battle of the Great War] (in Russian). : X. ISBN 5-17-0395485. Comprehensive description of Soviet and Germany troop movement based on Soviet and German
archives

10

External links

Prokhorovka battle (July 1943)" [

( 1943)] (in Russian). 1998. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
Maps of the Battle of Prokhorovka, July 1943.
Retrieved 17 July 2015.
Nipe, George. ""Kursk Reconsidered: Germanys
Lost Victory"". Retrieved 17 July 2015.
Review of Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis". Retrieved 17 July 2015.
Wilson, Alan. Kursk and Prokhorovka, July 1943
(maps)". Retrieved 19 June 2013.

EXTERNAL LINKS

15

11
11.1

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

Text

Battle of Prokhorovka Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Prokhorovka?oldid=672067946 Contributors: Pigsonthewing,

Altenmann, Wwoods, Itpastorn, Ezhiki, RivGuySC, Comatose51, Phe, Piotrus, Mzajac, Irpen, Ularsen, KNewman, Alsadius, Skorpionas,
Art LaPella, LtNOWIS, Trainik, Hohum, Shoey, Ghirlandajo, Larry Dunn, Pierre Aronax, Woohookitty, Camw, Tabletop, GraemeLeggett, Ketiltrout, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Toby Douglass, Leo44, Ansbachdragoner, RussBot, Bleakcomb, Xihr, Alex Bakharev, Hawkeye7,
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OrphanBot, MarshallBagramyan, Ctifumdope, Andreas1968, The PIPE, Ilvar, Noblige, Andrei Stroe, Ohconfucius, John, Minna Sora no
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Askari Mark, Buckshot06, Bernd vdB~enwiki, MetsBot, Dapi89, Rabidcentipede, CommonsDelinker, Geonarva, Andygx, Bad Night,
Johnadam789, Mrg3105, Tatrgel, MisterBee1966, Bogdan~enwiki, RabbitKing, W. B. Wilson, Andrein, Koalorka, WereSpielChequers,
Brozozo, Dormcat3, Faradayplank, Carpasian, Afernand74, Jaan, MBK004, Mild Bill Hiccup, Socrates2008, Arjayay, Sturmvogel 66,
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16

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TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original

artist: ?
File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_
Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax
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Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag of
the Soviet Union.svg.
File:General_Rotmistrov_,commander_of_the_7.Tank_corps.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b6/
General_Rotmistrov_%2Ccommander_of_the_7.Tank_corps.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: scan da 'Soviet tanks in combat
1941-1945' di S.J.Zaloga et al., Concord 1997 Original artist: fotoreporter sovietico sconosciuto
File:Kursk_south.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/Kursk_south.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Kursk_south.svg Original artist: Andrei nacu
File:ProkhorovkaMonument.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/ProkhorovkaMonument.jpg License:
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Updated by Time3000 17 April 2007 to use ocial Wikinews colours and appear correctly on dark backgrounds. Originally uploaded by
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