A Study On The Uyghur Radicalization and Terrorism

Dong Yu
The University of Pittsburgh
April, 2012
A Study on the Uyghur Radicalization and Terrorism

Dong Yu
ABSTRACT
As a retrospect of Chinese counter terrorism (CT) policy towards the Uyghurs, this paper reveals
the complex nature of ethno-nationalistic violence and the difficulties in determining an appropriate
policy response. The first part of the paper reviews Chinas policy towards Uyghurs and Xinjiang after
1949 and focuses on the increasing violence after the late 1980s. In the second part, the paper
introduces some current theories on the radicalization process of Uyghurs and emerging terrorism in
Xinjiang, as well as statistically tests some major economic factors proposed by these theories. This
paper concludes that none of the explanations can perfectly and statistically prove the reasons for
oscillating violence in Xinjiang. It illustrates the consistent mysteries of Uyghur radicalization process
and argues that new political, social, economic models and methodologies are should be introduced or
invented in future study.
Xinjiang has been an unsolved puzzle in Chinas national policy for the past sixty years. Although
the Peoples Republic of China had established the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in
1955, the remote land has been perturbed by insurgencies, ethnic conflicts and multiple violent
incidents. The Soviet Unions dissolution and the new Central Asian countries independence awoke
ethnic nationalism in Eurasia since the early 1990s, with Xinjiang being one of these cases. Internally,
the violent outbreaks in Xinjiang had reached a historical high in 1995 and again in 1997, severely
disrupting the local social order. Some separatists began to build up their connections with terrorist
groups abroad and conduct transnational terrorism, such as weapons smuggling, assignation, and
bombing.
As a response to the rising violent Uyghur separatism, China dramatically changed the
relatively open and conciliatory policy that it used to adopt in the 1980s toward Xinjiang, and turned
to a carrot and stick approach. Internationally, the exiled Uyghurs abroad established many Uyghur
rights advocacy groups and gained international attention and sympathy.
After 2001, the United States and China found they had a common interest in stabilizing the
region and began to cooperate on the War on Terror. Some groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) was accused of being responsible for conducting terrorism activities and
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endangering Chinese national security, came under attack by U.S. unmanned drone campaigns in
Afghanistan and the security forces in Pakistan.
23
In the meantime, Chinese officials have been
gradually linking the terms Uyghur Separatism and Uyghur Terrorism, justifying more intensive
control should be imposed in the special condition. This controversial policy not only raises
international concern regarding the condition of Uyghur human rights, but also exacerbated the
domestic Han ChineseUyghur tension, which led to a riot with massive casualties on July 5th, 2009.4
Similar to ethnic-separatism in other parts of the world, todays Xinjiang at an uncertain interim,
which may follow with a total out-break of national separatist movement. On one hand, wide-scale of
Uyghurs protests and movements are deterred by governments harsh security enforcement, yet such
ostentatious harmony and expedient stability cannot conceal the persistent disaffection among the
Uyghurs. On the other hand, although the country of China has a long history of governing ethnic
minorities, yet the current Chinese government has inherited many principles and policies dated back
to a century ago, controlling the Uyghurs under nominal autonomy. In this sense, in order to find out
an appropriate and fundamental solution within its authorization political institution, it is critical for
the Chinese government to understand the complexity of Uyghurs radicalization, especially the
interactions between governments policy and Uyghurs responses during the radicalization process.
This brings up a question of how to study radicalization.
There exist problems within todays Uyghur studies on the radicalization. First, International
scholars mostly emphasize Uyghurs undermined ethnic status and citizen rights; scholarship has
criticized the Chinese governments arbitrary policy response and law enforcement without due
juridical procedure, such as arresting and jailing Uyghur suspects without court hearing. In China,
political and security studies on Xinjiang unanimously attribute Uyghurs radicalization to
transnational terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism, while ethnology and sociology scholars mainly
focus on urban-rural inequity, income gap and economic status.5 However, there is no effective model
or theory to bridge the four fields of studies and collectively explain the radicalization. Second
because of the lack of credible data in domestic China and the opacity of Chinese policy, many papers
are based on individual interviews, information from Uyghur advocacy groups and government reports
from the U.S. and China. These references involve subjectivities and information controls, thus may
lead scholars to biased conclusions. Finally, among all these studies, most are qualitative studies of
policies, while others are case studies on individual Uyghur or a single event. There are few studies
take a quantitative approach to research the correlation between violent events and different social
factors in Xinjiang in a given period of time.
Dong Yu
April, 2012
HISTORY AND POLICY

Uyghurs in Xinjiang: A Politicalized History
From an ethnographic perspective, the Uyghur ethnic minority is one of the many branches of the
Persian-speaking Turkish people living in the eastern part of Central Asia, sometimes known as East
Turkestan. This region roughly includes modern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Tarim Basin, part
of Northern Tibet, and Xinjiang.6 This ethnographic classification was proposed by Russian sinologist
Nikita Bichurin distinguishing of between Central Asia, which was under the Russian Empires sphere
in 1829, and Chinese Turkestan.7 Like the Uzbeks, Kazaks and many other nationals in Central Asia,
the Uyghur nation was more of a product of Russias delimitation and demarcation of ethnic groups in
1921 than an existing ethnic group. Uyghur was originally used to describe the Muslim Turk from
China.8 In this sense, the term is an invented identity.9
Despite their artificial ethnic identity, the Uyghur people have been living on the land as a
collection of tribes since the 8th century. This collective evolved its own unique and prosperous culture,
which integrated the influences of the Turkish and Han Chinese civilizations. After the rule of the
Mongolian Chagatai Khanate and the Zunghar Khanate for six centuries, the Uyghurs gradually
finished their Turkization and Islamization. Beginning with the 1600s, the land on which the Uyghur
people lived had been a peripheral part of the Great Game in Central Asia, a competition that began
between the Russian Empire and the British Empire, along with China in the last two centuries.
Despite Chinas sparse military occupation of the region, most Uyghur affairs were highly autonomous.
The Russian Empire and the later Soviet Union used Xinjiang to exert significant influence on local
politics and the Chinese government. In the 1930s and 1940s, Joseph Stalin even supported local
Uyghurs to establish two East Turkistan republics in Xinjiang.
Chinas Evolving Policy toward Xinjiang: a self-conflicting nation ideology
Ever since the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Xinjiang in 1949 and the XUAR was
founded in 1955, the remote land has never been easy for the central government to govern. For one
thing, an anti-Han sentiment has been prevalent among the Uyghurs due to decades of harsh rule by
Han Chinese warlords. For another, the Soviet Union continually instigated Uyghur nationalism and
insurgencies in Xinjiang after the Sino-Soviet split. In light of these challenges, the Chinese
government implemented a harsh policy to consolidate its rule in Xinjiang. Under the leadership of
General Wang Zhen, a quasi-military unit known as Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
(XPCC) was founded in 1954.10 In addition, the local government suppressed local insurgencies and
curbed religious activities as much as it could.
At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government and Mao Zedong had adopted
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both the national ideologies of multi-nationalism and national self-determination. These two principles
were seemed to be conflicting with each other, though it was believed as the best way to govern the
new China.11 On the one hand, the Chinese government learned from the national and ethnic group
policy of the Soviet Union, and it launched an ethnic group identification campaign to establish the
state recognition of many ethnic minorities. The government also ensured that quota of local officials
and cadre positions would be held by the local ethnic minorities.12 In Xinjiang, Tatar Burhan Shahidi
was appointed as the first president of the XUAR.13 The government also prescribed a long list of
political, social, economic, and education privileges for ethnic minorities. On the other hand, almost a
million Han Chinese organized by the central government immigrated to Xinjiang to develop local
agriculture and economy.14 It also slightly relaxed the harsh control over Uyghur culture and religion
for a short period of time.15
From the 1950s to late 1970s, although China had experienced several political movements and
dramatic volatile policies, the policy towards Xinjiang and the Uyghurs had remained the same to a
large extent. During the liberal leader Hu Yaobangs era, more political and cultural autonomy had
been endowed to Xinjiang, Economic reforms were launched as well.
Things changed dramatically in the early 1990s. For one thing, after the Tiananmen Square
Incident, the liberal-democratic faction of the CCP was undermined and the original autonomous
policies were revoked due to the Communist Partys fear of losing power and the collapsing like the
Soviet Union. For another, the independence of five Central Asian states instigated ethno-nationalism
on the continent, such as the insurgencies in Uzbekistan and Chechnya. Xinjiang also suffered from a
great number of violent incidents in the middle 1990s, which forced the Chinese government to
expand its strike hard campaign, a series of cracking down on criminal activities, as a response from
eastern Chinese region to Xinjiang.16 While intensified its control over Uyghur culture and religious
activities, Beijing also reviewed its past policies and began to deal with the Uyghurs disadvantages in
employment and education. For example, the government initiated the double-track language teaching
policy (teaching in both Chinese and Uyghur) in Xinjiangs schools in 2001. However such a policy
has not been supported by multitude as China expected, and it was criticized as a tool of assimilating
ethnic minority by the Uyghurs and international scholars.17 Even worse, the revised policy and ethnic
privileges also angered Han Chinese nationalists and exacerbated the tension between the two ethnic
groups.
THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS AND EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM

In the Strike-Hard campaign against violent incidents and attacks of the 1990s, the Chinese
government seldom used the term terrorism to describe Uyghur suspects and groups. Rather, it more
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often used the phrase extreme national splittism to describe these individuals and organizations.
When China initiated the regional cooperation mechanism with Russia and the five Central Asian
countries in 1996 (which later became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), it was not totally
immune from Terrorism. It was after September 11th that China started to take the threat of terrorism to
national security into serious consideration. The government rapidly adopted the use of the term
terrorism and integrated it into a new term: three evil powers.18 It also actively cooperated with
international organizations, the United States, and Pakistan on identifying terrorist group and pursuing
terrorist suspects. In August 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage identified the ETIM as
an international terrorist group.19 In October 2002, China pushed the UN to put the ETIM onto the list
of international terrorist organization.20 In 2003, the founder of the ETIM, Hasan Mahsum, was killed
in a U.S.-Pakistan military action.21 In 2010, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, another important leader of the
organization, was died in a US drone attack in northwestern Pakistan.22 Beyond military actions,
Beijing has been condemning overseas Uyghur human rights organizations and Uyghur information
websites and claiming they have connection with violent and terrorist activities. Madam Rebiya Qadir
and her World Uyghur Congress are the major targets of these accusations.
Because of lagging domestic legislation on terrorism and the distrust of Chinese policies in
Xinjiang, many scholars and observers debate over whether China is facing a substantial threat of
Uyghur terrorism. Most Chinese and Taiwanese scholars believe that terrorism has emerged
dramatically after the 1990s. Pan Zhiping and Ahmed Rashid attribute the East Turkestan terrorism to
the combined influence of international Islamic fundamentalism and national separatism in Central
Asia. 23 Uyghur reporter Gheyret Niyaz asserts that the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an international Sunni
pan-Islamic political organization, is responsible for most violent events.24 J.Todd Reed and Diana
Raschke agree with the theory that the ETIM present a serious terrorism threat to Chinas national
security,25 while James Millward and Dru Gladney believe that the threat is exaggerated.26 Some
scholars, such as Gardner Bovingdon, think most violent incidents are populist response to Chinas
internal colonialism and human rights abuses.27
Despite the argument over the official definition of terrorism, it is clear that Uyghur nationalism
has turned into a rapid and popular radicalization, accompanying an increasing number of Uyghur
related violent incidents since the early 1990s.28 This paper researches Uyghur related violent events
accessible through open resources on the Internet. As the methodology of summarizing violent events,
the paper takes reference from Organized Protests and Violent Events in Xinjiang of Gardner
Bovingdons book: The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, as well as Michael Clarkes separate
studies.29 The event summary excluded those peaceful protests in Bovingdons records. In addition,
this paper also addresses a variety of types of violent incidents that have more than at least two
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sources covering them or appear on terrorism study database.
April, 2012
30
Table A. Violent events and attacks related to Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang (1949 2008)31
Time
Civil
Assassination
Armed
Period
Riot
against
rebellion;
celebrities
Insurgency
Bombing
Direct
Others
Total
Assault
and leaders
19491958
22
23
19591968
19691978
19791988
19891998
11
12
16
45
1999 2008
22
38
Total
17
12
27
17
38
117
Figure 1. Violent events and attacks related to Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang (1949 2008)
50
45
40
35
Total Violent Event
30
Bombing
25
Assasination
20
Direct Assault
15
Others
10
5
0
1949 -- 1958 1959 -- 1968 1969 -- 1978 1979 -- 1988 1989 -- 1998 1999 --2008
Table A and Figure 1 show the frequency of violent events for each year in the six decades from
1949 to 2008. It is clear that there has been a significant increase in violent events since the 1990s,
especially in the forms of successful or attempted bombing and assassinations. This development
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pattern can be defined as a level shift (fundamental change in terrorist activity model) according to
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler.32
Table B. Characteristics of Violent Events and Attacks (1949 2008)
Types
Identified leader
Identified or
Presented political
and suspected
suspected
objective and slogan (East
conductor
group
Turkestan Independence or
(leadership)
(organized)
anti-Chinese ruling related)
Civil Riot
3 (17.6%)
2 (11.9%)
6 (35.3%)
Assassination
6 (50%)
Insurgency
17 (63.0%)
4(14.8%)
14 (51.9%)
Bombing
3 (17.6%)
8 (47.1%)
Direct Assault
4 (66.7%)
1 (16.7%)
1 (16.7%)
Others
25 (65.8%)
14 (36.8)
9 (23.7%)
Total
58 (49.6%)
29 (24.5%)
30 (25.6%)
Table B shows the violent events statistics by different types/methods, conductors, and
purpose/objective.
Using the terrorism definition above to measure these violent events, there are three features
related to identifying terrorist activity.
First, there was an ascendant trend of violent events that involved typical terrorist attack methods
in the 1990s, such as bombing, assassination and direct assault. These types of attack had clear targets
and were specifically aimed at Han Chinese and select Uyghurs who cooperated with the government.
Second, almost half of the violent events had identified leaders and arrested them. In Chinas
legal practice, the police and the court tend to publicly announce the identifications of criminals and
suspects and display them in the public as a deterrent. However, there were a few Uyghur
organizations that were claimed responsibility for conducting these events by the government. In
addition, bombing is the least common type of attack conducted by the organizations that have
recognized. If these events were conducted by terrorist groups, such as those in North Ireland,
Chechnya and Sri Lanka, it seems logical that the groups would raise their profile and stature among
amongst Uyghur nationals by claiming responsibility for such attacks.
Third, there is a surprisingly rare occurrence the group propagandizing a political goal or
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presenting an ideology in the violent events. Insurgency and civil riot are the types of events which
displayed political slogans more frequently. Again, it seems counter-intuitive that nationalist and
terrorist groups did not publicly propagandize their ideology and political goals to attract more
Uyghurs support. A possible explanation is that the strict censorship blocks most political and national
slogans on Chinese media reports.
With further analysis, the paper illustrates that most violent events can barely be categorized as
terrorism if we strictly refer to the existing definition. Most of them are individual or populist violent
activities. Some extremely radical actors have a specific political or extreme national ideology, and
they utilize similar methods of other terrorist attacks employ. These events can be identified as
quasi-terrorist activity, or individual terrorist activity, since there is an absence of one or several of the
following components of terrorist activity: (1) meticulous planning (they were conducted in a
random way) and (2) significant organization presence. There are only a few violent activities
conducted by well-organized terrorist groups such as the ETIM and the East Turkistan Liberation
Organization (ETLO) in the 1990s.
Despite the fact that organization is a more economic and effective form of conducting terrorist
activity, it is unclear why Uyghur extreme nationalists and individuals conduct terrorist activities in
random and spontaneous ways. There is not a specific study regarding this phenomenon of Uyghurs so
far. As far as the author is aware, a potential explanation can be the anthropologic study on Uyghurs
national characteristics. Since Uyghurs national identity was formed in a relatively late period, they
have not totally erased their differences and diversities between different Uyghur groups and regions.
As Loura Newby describes, the discrete group conscience and factionism and civil disunion are still
the main nature of the Uyghur society. Such localism characters are also found ethnic groups in many
Central Asia countries, such as Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Punjabis Pakistan.33
The comparison of the standards as to what defines terrorism and the summary of terrorist events
reveals that most of these violent events cannot be identified as terrorist attacks. However, the reality
is much more complicated. The number of quasi-terrorist activities has substantially increased since
the early 2000s and has been trending toward well-planned individual terrorist activity and organized
activity, which have been influenced by transnational terrorist groups in Central Asia and in
Afghanistan. According to the case studies of several events in the 1990s and 2000s, there were some
attacks that were well-organized and had a solid national and Islamic political goal behind them,
reflecting the emergence of organized violence in Xinjiang. For example, on July 10 of 2008, the local
police launched an investigation of an apartment in the Chenguang Garden in Urumqi. Fifteen
Uyghurs resisted and attacked police officers with blades and daggers, shouting sacrifice for Allah.
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After the fight, five Uyghurs were killed and the rest were arrested. The police found hundreds of
brochures with contents propagandizing Jihad against Han infidels and establish a Uyghur Caliph.
The arrested suspects later admitted they were from a so-called Jihad Training Section ()
and had been taking Islamic jihad lectures for months.34
U.S. investigations of the six Uyghur
terrorist suspects in Guantanamo Base who were captured in Afghanistan also shows that a few
Uyghurs received military training in Central Asia and returned to China in order to carry out attack.35
Other occasional appearances of Uyghur Jihadist groups videos on Uyghur and Islam Jihadist
websites accompanied increasingly frequent riots and attacks in Xinjiang around 2008. This reflects an
exacerbating situation in Xinjiang.
Despite these developments, it is worth reflecting on and evaluating Chinas current CT and
ethnic national policies toward Uyghur related violent incidents.
Reflecting on the Terrorism Definition in China

Many criticisms surrounding Chinas current response to violence in Xinjiang pertain to Chinas
terrorism definition of being too broad and law enforcement of being too harsh. People accuse China
of human rights abuses.36 However, as readers take a broader perspective and compare Chinas
definition of terrorism with other countries definitions which suffer from rampant terrorist activities,
they may think differently:
China Ministry of Public Safety 2003 Definition of Terrorist group: (1) [it] endangers
national security, social stability and peoples lives and properties by violent means,
regardless of whether its head-quarter is located within China or not; (2) [it possesses] a
certain degree of leadership, organization structure and division; any group that meets both of
the two clauses above and meets any one of the standards below is a terrorist group: a. the
group organizes, plans, instigates, implements or participates in terrorist activities; it can also
be in the process of organizing, planning, instigating, implementing or participating in
terrorism activities; b. it finances or supports terrorist activity; c. it establishes base, or
organize the recruitment and training of terrorists; d. it has connections with other
international terrorist groups (such as financing, training, information exchanging with other
terrorist groups, or collectively participating in other terrorist activity).
The Russian Federal Law on Countering Terrorism (2006): terrorism is an ideology of

violence and a practice affecting the way decisions are made by national and local authorities
or international organizations, related to intimidation of the population and (or) to other illegal
violent acts.
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The Emergency Regulation of Sri Lanka (2006): any unlawful conduct, which inter alia,
involves the use of violence, threatens or endangers national security, intimidates a
civilian population or group there of, disrupts or threatens public order, causing
destruction or damage to property if such conduct is aimed at, inter alia, threatening or
endangering the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Sri Lanka or any other political or
governmental change.38
Spain: [a] planned activity that, proceeded to individually or under the cover of an
organization, repeatedly or on an isolated occasion, and by carrying out acts aimed at creating
a state of serious insecurity, social fear or public peace disturbance, has the objective of
subverting, fully or partially, the social and institutional order.39
As cited above, many countries, which share the same ethnocentric splittism and terrorism
problems as China does, have special legislation on terrorism. Their definitions of terrorism are almost
the same as the Chinese version in the sense of the organizational characters, political goals and the
effort of terrifying the public. Yet they all are general and vague. In fact, scholars and international
observers admit that the vagueness of the terrorism definition is a common problem. On the one hand,
such vagueness leaves space for the state to use its sovereign rights to determine what kind of events
should be seen as terrorist activity. On the other hand, such vagueness also poses a problem. The
potentially too broad definition of terrorism and the similar term terror crimes and endangering
national security in China has extended the arm of state authority to dealing with political dissent and
other ethnic rights advocacy, especially at the local level. But again, this is common occurrence in
legislation and policy making around the world, even in the United States. The difference is that the
negative effect of such vague legal application of terrorism is amplified in Chinas undemocratic
political system with the opaque legal procedures. The abuse of self-determination by the police and
the court does not only severely harm the social liberties and the rights of the people, but also
instigates discontent and anger among Uyghurs and has the potential to worsen the situation. Moreover,
even there is an increasingly intensive relationship between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs, Beijing
has still enacted numerous preferable policies and privileges toward the Uyghur peoples.
As a conclusion of the study on violent events, this part of the paper discusses only a few violent
events that can be categorized as typical terrorist activity, while the qusai-terrorist activity and the
trend of organized terrorism increasing since 2000, imposing terrorist threat to Chinas security. In
addition, it argues that current criticisms on Chinas Xinjiang policy attribute too much to the broad
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definition of terrorism in China and oversimplify the complexity of the reality on the ground.
ANALYSIS OF THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Theories of Radicalization of Terrorism and the case of Uyghurs

In general studies on the radicalization process, scholars have purposed a set of typology of
radicalization and different phases of radicalization to describe different cases in specific contexts. In
Jamie Bartlett and Carl Millers study, they outlined three sets terrorists, radicals and Young
Muslimsto describe different levels and phases of radicalization. 40 Other scholars created a
pyramid model and 11 mechanisms of different levels of radicalization.41 Some political economists
try to use economic models and game theories to describe the interactions between government and
radicals and try to determine under what cost-benefit calculation for achieving a specific political
purpose would radicals turn into terrorists.42
In the study of Uyghurs radicalization, scholars tend to examine the historical roots of Uyghur
nationalism. This research approach is a chronological one: they analyze the interaction between
Uyghurs ethnic identity crystallization and the response to external factors. For example, Dru
Gladney and some Turkish and European scholars believe that there exists an internal colonialism in
Xinjiang imposed by Han Chinese since the early 20th century and that this has been reinforced over
time. This colonialism undermined Uyghur self-identity as an independent nation in the aspects of
language, culture and religion. Ironically yet reasonably, Chinas harsh policy collided with the
emerging Uyghur nationalism and strengthened the Uyghurs self-identity, especially among the
Uyghur youth in remote areas43 Many Western scholars see the restrictions on the Uyghurs freedom
of religion and cultures after 1949 as the major factor for the continuing insurgencies and violent
incidents.44 Some Scholars, such as Wang Yuan-kang, points out that there are similarities between
Uyghur radicals in China and other insurgency groups in the rest of the world have caused such
nationalism, while others cite that the Uyghurs underrepresentation in the political process and their
nominal political autonomy are the main causes of the Uyghurs discontent and opposition.45 Other
explanations include cultural discrimination and oppression;46 immigration of Han Chinese to the
region and the competition for jobs; 47 governments tough response against violent events; 48
environmental contamination;49 and the international Islamic fundamentalism movement emerged in
the late 1970s.50
Most of the existing studies focus on a single aspect of the Uyghurs radicalization and fail to
provide a coherent theory consistent with the key factors they used, such as Chinas dramatically
changing policies, the relatively static population composition in Xinjiang after the 1980s, and the
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static political status of the Uyghurs since 1950s. Besides, because of the difficulty of getting data
outside of China, only a few studies take a quantitative method to verify their theories. Zang Xiaowei
recently conducts statistical research based on a sociology surveys among 900 Uyghurs in Xinjiang,
revealing that education plays a key role in determining Uyghurs self-identification of social class.51
In China, there are also few empirical studies on Uyghur nationalism and separatism. Some local
political economic scholars have done relative empirical research on economic inequity and social
stability and security. Han Jiabin and Yu Hongjuns study on Xinjiangs income gap between urban
and suburban residents. 52 However, there is not a comprehensive study and statistical
that
specifically focuses on the evolution of the Uyghurs economic situation since 1949.
Statistical Analysis
This paper attempts to conduct a statistical analysis on the correlation between the violent
incidents from 1989 to 2008 which this paper has summarized above, along with the factors that
existing theories claim are the cause of Uyghur radicalization.53
In order to conduct correlation analysis, a multiple regression model is established:

Y = a + b x1 + c x2 + d x3 + e x4 + f x5 + . + n xn *
Note-Limit of the Statistical Test: the number of dependent variables (Y) is less than the requirement of the
sample size of a typical time-series statistics (N > =30).
The dependent variable (Y) is defined as the amount of radical activities and terrorist attacks in
each year from 1989 to 2008.
The independent variables (X) are defined below:
X1: The average income gap between Han Chinese and Uyghurs.
The income gap between nationalities is a direct reflection of the equality of social wealth
redistribution and an indirect indication of employment opportunity fairness. In China, the government
usually uses basic macroeconomic data, such as GDP per capital, annual disposable income per person,
annual disposable income per family, Gini Coefficient, and Engel curve, in order to monitor and
evaluate national income level and income gap and design economic policy. The National Bureau of
Statistics and local statistics bureaus generally compare income difference statistics based on
administration regions, geographic regions,54 sectors,55 urban and rural,56 and occupations. The basic
units of income statistics are the individual and the household units. As a consequence, there are no
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specific income measurements based on the unit of nationality, and there are only a few empirical
studies on the income gap between ethnic groups.57 The over-simplified and non-specific economic
data directly affects the Chinese governments non-precise evaluation of the Uyghurs economic
status.
In order to facilitate this study, this paper calculates an indirect and inferred data as an alternative
in a limited time and data access:
First, the paper dichotomizes two groups of regions: one is the Uyghur regions (with a Uyghur
majority population, over 70% of the total population), and the other is the Han Chinese regions (with
a Chinese majority population, over 70% of the total population). The Uyghur group administrative
regions include prefecture, city and county.
As the next step, the paper calculates the average annual income per capita from 1989 to 2008 of
each group. Finally, it gets the ratio of the average annual income per capita of the two groups from
1989 to 2008.58
A larger income gap indicates a more severe economic inequality between the two groups. The
paper expects a larger income gap to have a positive relation with violent incidents.
Table C. SPSS Result of Y = a + b x1
Descriptive Statistics
Violent
Mean
Std. Deviation N
4.2632
4.59277
19
1.2563
.15561
19
Incidents
Income
Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized
Standardized
95.0% Confidence Interval
Coefficients
Coefficients
for B
Upper
B
1
Std. Error
(Constant) -3.774
8.843
Income
6.988
6.398
Beta
.217
Sig.
Lower Bound
Bound
-.427
.675
-22.432
14.883
.915
.373
-8.346
21.142
a. Dependent Variable: Violent Incidents
Table C above shows the result of statistical analysis. SPSS has a regression model of Y = - 3.774 +
6.398 X1, with a standard error of 6.988 and standard coefficient of 0.2117. Since the p-value of
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Income (0.373) is larger than the 0.05 threshold, this model does not significantly reflect the positive
correlation between Income and Violent Events.
X2: Ratio of the percentage of Uyghur people working in the lowest income group within the
whole Uyghur population, and the percentage of Uyghur people working in the highest income
group within the whole Uyghur population.
According to the opportunity-cost theory, it is assumed that people with jobs and fairly good
salaries are less likely to conduct riot, insurgency or terrorism activity, since they do not have a strong
incentive to pursue political or economic benefits through these highly risky activities. However, an
empirical study on Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines rejects this traditional positive correlation
between unemployment and insurgency, saying there is no significant correlation between
unemployment and attacks that kill civilians.59 These findings reveal that the study on the correlation
between the equality of economic opportunity and terrorism operates in more complicated ways, and
new theoretical approaches should be developed.
In Xinjiangs case, similar to the income gap, there are not any credible quantitative studies and
comprehensive statistics on employment imbalance between Han Chinese and the Uyghur people, nor
are there any qualitative studies or surveys on subjective employer preference and discrimination of
the two groups.
After reviewing all existing data, this paper sets this ratio as the independent variable. The
variable not only indirectly indicates the employment inequality between the two ethnic groups, but
also helps us to observe the income gap between Han Chinese and the Uyghurs from another angle.
Since the population data in this paper can only be acquired from the Uyghur population censuses
of three national population censuses performed by the Peoples Republic of China (1990, 2000 and
2010), only the designed methodology is presented.60
Firstly, this paper reviews the data of the average income from 16 job sectors: (1) Farming,
Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery; (2) Mining and Quarrying; (3) Manufacturing; (4)
Production and Supply of Electricity, Gas and Water; (5) Construction; (6) Geological Prospecting and
Water Conservancy; (7) Transport, Storage, Post and Telecommunication Services; (8) Wholesale and
Retail Trade & Catering Services; (9) Finance and Insurance; (10) Real Estate Trade; (11) Social
Services; (12) Health Care, Sports and Social Welfare; (13) Education, Culture and Arts, Radio, Film
and Television; (15) Government Agencies, Party Agencies and Social Organizations; (16) Others
(excluded).
Secondly, two job categories are defined: preferable jobs with highest incomes and the
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disadvantage jobs with lowest incomes. The prior category of jobs mainly includes jobs in the sectors
in which government monopoly exists and state-owned corporations play great roles, such as
electricity, gas and telecommunication. It also contains jobs in the emerging financial market, such as
insurance and real estate trade. According to this definition, this paper selects the top five sectors with
highest average wage and labels them as the Preferable Job Groups. Based on data from 2000, the top
five sectors (in descending order of salary) were (14) Scientific Research and Polytechnic Services, (9)
Finance and Insurance; (4) Production and Supply of Electricity, Gas and Water; (10) Real Estate
Trade; (7) Transport, Storage, Post and Telecommunication Services.
The latter category is a group of jobs in traditional household agriculture, sunset industry and
small private businesses (such as retails). Similarly, the paper selects the two sectors with lowest
average wage and labels them as the Disadvantage Job Groups. In 2000, the bottom 2 sectors were (1)
Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery; and (8) Wholesale and Retail Trade & Catering
Services.61
Thirdly, we look for the Uyghurs data on the Ethnic Population by Gender and Sector, as well as
the total number of Uyghur employees.62 In 2000, the total amount of Uyghurs employed was
4,507,840. Of this number, only 2.05% Uyghurs employees are in the Preferable Job Group, and more
than 84.5% of them are in Disadvantage Job Group.63
This ratio between the Disadvantage Job Group and the Preferable Job Group is 40.27. This
means among forty-two Uyghurs, only one works in a preferable job sector.
In this paper, it is expected that this ratio has a positive correlation with violent events.
The reason that only a few Uyghur people have occupations within the Preferable Job Group is
employment inequity. Again, it should be noticed that the Production and Supply of Electricity, Gas
and Water sector and Transport, Storage, Post and Telecommunication Services sector are state
monopolies and jobs in these two sectors have a higher salary than others. In inner China, getting jobs
in these state-own enterprises is highly competitive among Han Chinese and requires high levels of
education. Moreover, the quota and distribution of these positions usually involve corruptions and
patronage networks, leaving the Uyghurs do not typically benefit. In addition, the Scientific Research
and Polytechnic Services, Finance and Insurance and Real Estate Trade sectors are relatively
underdeveloped in Xinjiang, so there are fewer opportunities for local Uyghurs in these sectors.
X3: GDP per Capita

GDP per Capita is a common economic factor that widely used to measure regional economic
development and local standard of living. Since the late 1980s, China has been making national and
economic policies by mainly based on this data, and even became overreliance on GDP and using it as
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April, 2012
the most important determinant. As a consequence, when Xinjiang experienced rampant violence in
the mid-1990s, Beijing proposed the Western Development Strategy. This strategy took measures to
improve the living standard in Xinjiang, seeing it as a way to pacify the anti-Han sentiments and
Uyghur separatists. Such a feed your people and peace will come rationale has already been
disproved by many case studies in other countries. This paper uses the data of Xinjiang to test the
Chinese governments assumption.
From this logic, we statistically assume that GDP per capita has a negative correlation with
Violent Incidents.
64
Table D. SPSS Result of Y = a + c x3

Mean
Violent Incidents
GDP per Capita
Std. Deviation
4.2737
4.58268
19
7855.4211
5036.05208
19
Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized
Standardized
95.0% Confidence
Coefficients
Coefficients
Interval for B
B
1
(Constant)
GDP per Capita
Std. Error
4.328
2.043
-6.858E-6
.000
Beta
-.008
Sig.
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
2.118
.049
.016
8.639
-.031
.976
.000
.000
Table D above shows the result of the statistical analysis. Since the p-value of GDP (0.976) is
much larger than the 0.05 threshold, this model does not reflect a positive correlation between GDP
per Capita and Violent Events. Thus there is not a correlation between GDP per Capita and Violent
Events.
X4: External Influence: Terrorist Activities in Central Asia

Many researchers, especially those in China, believe that national extremism in Central Asia after
the Soviet Unions collapse, as well as the emerging international Islamic Fundamentalism since the
1990s, have greatly spurred the Uyghurs to conduct terrorism.65
Terrorism studies generally admit that there have been several significant incidents, such as the
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1968 hijacking of an El Al flight by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Iran
Hostage Crisis of 1979, have impacted international terrorism.66
As mentioned in the first part of this paper, the violent events related to the Uyghurs experienced
a level shift after the 1990s, indicating a potential link between violence in Xinjiang and national
extremism and terrorism in Central Asia. This paper attempts to test the assumption that the terrorism
incidents in Central Asia have a positive correlation with the violence in Xinjiang.
67
Table E. SPSS Result of Y = a + d x4

Mean
Violent Incidents
CA Terrorism
Std. Deviation
4.2211
4.62788
19
11.4737
13.35568
19
Coefficients
Model
Unstandardized
Standardized
95.0% Confidence
Coefficients
Coefficients
Interval for B
B
1
(Constant)
CA Terrorism
Std. Error
2.902
1.375
.115
.079
Beta
.332
Sig.
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
2.111
.050
.002
5.803
1.450
.165
-.052
.282
Table E above shows the result of statistical analysis. SPSS has a regression model of Y = 2.902
+ 0.115 X4, with a standard error of 0.079 and a standard coefficient of 0.332. Since the p-value of CA
Terrorism (Central Asian terrorism, 0.165) is larger than the 0.05 threshold, CA terrorism does not
statistically related to Violent Events in China.
However, it is worthwhile to elaborate on this statistical test and its deviation from our
assumption.
First, the two variables, X4 and Violent Events in China, have different contents, since they are
from two different data bases. GTD (Global Terrorism Database by the University of Maryland), the
major source which X4 refers to, only records terrorist activities, regardless that there are many other
ethnic violent events every year in Central Asia and China. Many descriptions of these events in GTD
are so incomplete and unclear that it is impossible to conduct a case-by-case identification that
whether these terrorist activities in GTD are as the same as terrorist incidents under this papers
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definition.
Second, regardless of the imperfect statistic model tests caused by the data-collections limits,
terrorist activities in Central Asia seems likely to have a correlation with the Violent Incidents
compared to the independent variables X1 and X2 in the former two assumed models. Figure 2 below
shows the patterns of the two variables. Although their amplitudes (the varying frequency of incidents)
differed, there is a coincidence in the timings of oscillations in violent events, especially in the period
from 1994 to 2006. Such a phenomenon may reflect a situation where Uyghur radical nationalists and
terrorists followed the pattern of terrorist activity in Central Asia. The high similarity of attack
methods and the reported linkage between East Turkestan groups and Central Asian extreme groups
both support this reasoning.
68
Figure 2. Violent events and attacks related to Uyghur and Terrorist Attacks in Central Asia (1989 to
2008)
45
40
35
30
25
Central Asia
20
China
15
10
5
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
X5: cases of Chinas law enforcement and suppression in Xinjiang the numbers of cases of
detention, imprisonment and the death sentence of the Uyghurs
International human rights observers and Uyghur human rights organizations have repeatedly
condemned the Chinese public security department and local legal offices for abusing their authority
and sentencing the Uyghurs without due process.69 Historically, heavy-handed laws and suppression
might temporarily reduce insurgency and opposition, but in the long term it leads to an explosive
rebound, as the cases of British India in the 19th century, the French in Albania in the 1950s, the
Palestinians uprisings against Israels rule and Russias costly governance in Chechnya. Victims of
these laws and suppressions can lead to personal or family revenge, which is an important cause of
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70
radicalization.
April, 2012
In this sense, the harshness extent of law enforcement and suppression can help us to
understand the interaction between the states policy and peoples response: will they become less
radical or more radical?
The numbers of cases of detention, imprisonment and death sentences of Uyghurs are reflections
of this factor. Although there is no open data for available analysis, this paper assumes that these
numbers would have a positive relation with the violent incidents.
X6: Religious freedom and cultural conservation

The Chinese governments restrictions of Uyghur religious publications and activities, as well as
its language and cultural impacts, are both widely criticized by international observers. Some scholars
that the paper has mentioned above see these restrictions as disrespect to the Uyghur people and as the
fundamental ideological cause of anti-Han Chinese sentiment.
However, some empirical studies on the relationship between terrorism, social liberty and
democracy show that terrorists are more likely to operate in a liberal democracy than a totalitarian
regime, since the abundant liberties in the former political system give terrorism the space to survive
and enable terrorist groups to spread their ideology. Furthermore, from a cost-benefit calculation
perspective, terrorists can launch attacks with much fewer risks and at less cost in a liberal
democracy.71 Studies on the development of Chinas religious policy toward Xinjiang also refute the
assumption of a positive relationship between suppression of religious and culture and insurgencies.
For example, although China adopted a more lenient and relaxed religious policy in the 1980s and
allowed the number of mosques and Islamic publications to increase in Xinjiang, the violence
perpetuated by Uyghurs still escalated gradually in the same period of time. 72 Once again, this
disconnection between of theory and facts reflects a more profound interaction between religion,
culture and state restriction.
There is another difficulty to empirically measure religious freedom and cultural integrity. Many
scholars merely use the numbers of mosques, religious activities and publications for analysis,
ignoring the qualitative content of these religious activities and publications. Although China has
restored cultural relics and allowed religious activities, most of these are highly selective and strictly
controlled by the state. Moreover, China began to allow Uyghur cultural events and relics for the Han
Chinese tourists to enjoyment. This policy brings revenue for local Uyghurs, while the tourism
industry somehow challenges some Uyghur traditions and customs.73
Other Alternative Theories

Social Cohesion: Economic Institutions, Political Equality and Social Status
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In addition to the theories addressed explored above which mainly focus on a single historical,
political, economic, ethnic, or social factor for the radicalization of an ethnic group, Zhao Tong
purposes a theory of social cohesion. This theory captures the linkage between economic institutions
and political and social equality, by applying Ivan Turoks five dimensions into explanation.74 In this
theory, social cohesion in Xinjiang is based on the basic economic system of a different era. From the
1950s to the late 1970s, agricultural collectives and the communal property rights were the basic
social units in China. These basic economic institutions fit the communal property ownership and
agriculture economy in Xinjiang at the time, sustaining strong social and political ties between
individuals and the collective economic units (the peoples communes). People were strongly tied to
the communes in their economic and political life. This, in turn, contributed to high degree of social
equality and reduced violent incidents in Xinjiang. After the 1980s economic liberalization, the
commune system was gradually replaced by a market economic system and private ownership. The
commune system collapsed and its function as a center that tied peoples economic and political lives
declined. This led to increasing political and economic inequality between the Uyghurs and Han
Chinese, who were more adapted to a mobile and market-directed society. As a result, the Uyghur
people tended to be psychologically isolated and resort to Islamic Puritanism, causing the increasing
violence since late 1980s.75
This theory seems to coordinate political and economic factors and the influence of their
interaction on the Uyghur radicalization. Unfortunately, due to the depth and scope of Zhaos social
cohesion theory, it is very difficult to test in an empirical way based on existing data. Besides, Zhao
also neglects several factors that may influence the number of Uyghur uprisings and insurgencies. For
example, in his observation of Xinjiang from the 1950s to 1970s, Zhao claims that there were fewer
Uyghur uprisings and insurgencies compared to the 1980s. This observation contradicts many existing
studies, and Zhao fails to give credible references or provide data. He also fails to consider the fact
that because of the underdevelopment communication networks and media industry, as well as the
social disorders in the 1950s to 1970s, many violent events were not reported or precisely recorded.
For this reason, the number of uprisings and insurgencies that he refers to may be underestimated.
Rational Actor Model and Game Theory

Many scholars of terrorism, such as Bruce Hoffman, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, conduct
research based on the assumption that terrorists are rational. In fact, as this paper mentions, many
details of violent incidents conducted by the Uyghurs do not perfectly support the assumption. For
example, when a riot broke out, many Uyghur people (especially those who live in urban areas) did
not participate in the riot. A plausible explanation is that the many of these people benefit from
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adopting Han Chinese education and culture. They are similar to Han Chinese in many aspects, but
also remain their Uyghur genes and many traditional customs. Such an In-Betweenness identity
among many Uyghurs made them reluctant to go against the Chinese government. If true, this
psychology based on personal interest and benefit consideration would further impede the formation
of terrorist groups.76
Furthermore, as cost-benefit calculation is a common model in current political and economic
research, it is necessary to utilize game theory and game models to study the behavior and
radicalization of Uyghurs. In the policy review part of this paper, as well as other academic studies, it
is believed that Uyghurs are rationally responding to the governments changing policy and Han
Chinese peoples attitude toward them. On some occasions, such as the more liberal political
atmosphere of the 1980s, both sides had a relatively clear understanding of each others needs and
interests. The Chinese government under Hu Yaobang replaced the original harsh restrictions on the
Uyghurs with more political, cultural and religious freedom. As a response, the violence related to
Uyghur nationalism declined. In this case, such coordination can be described by a Stag
Hunt/Assurance Game and non-Zero-Sum situation. Both sides coordinated and had informational
exchanges, which allowed them to reach an equilibrium with a more preferable result. Conversely,
when China adopted harsh policies and more severe law enforcement after the 2008 riot, the Xinjiang
local government attributed all the responsibilities to overseas terrorism, East Turkestan Splittism and
Mrs. Rebiya. The government did not either seriously review its own policies or consider Uyghurs
voices. As a result, Uyghurs responded with more violent riots and attacks in the next two years.77 In
this case, a chicken game may be adopted as a framework analysis.
CONCLUSION
This paper on violent events in Xinjiang and the radicalization of Uyghurs illustrates the
predicament of China. On the one hand, since extreme radical ethnonationalism and terrorism have a
blurred boundary, it is very easy for China to label the former as terrorism, harming ordinary
Uyghurs basic political and religious liberties and instigating more radical Uyghur sentiments toward
the Chinese government. On the other hand, a loose policy and a more liberal society (similar to the
environment of the 1980s) may leave space for extremism and terrorism to develop in the current
Xinjiang.
In the first part of the paper, the violent events summary and analysis, as well as the discussion of
the legal definition of the term of Terrorism, not only reveals the uniqueness and complexity of the
counter-terrorism situation, which is intertwined with a long-term ethnonationalism issue. It also leads
to questions of the comparison of how western countries and political systems deal with cross-ethnic
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April, 2012
issue. Apparently, the situation is very different. In a Western European state, since the state usually
has only an ethnic majority living in a specific and small geographic space. In the past several
centuries--even a millennium, the openness of geography condition and the transnational trade have
helped different ethnic groups highly integrated in to a society. The distinctions of culture and race
between nations become blurred.78 The situation in Asia, in countries such as China, India and
Afghanistan, is a totally different case, where localism, communalism and factionism have been
ingrained in the culture from the very beginning and are still prevalent. Moreover, China is the one of
the a few countries that still maintains the Soviet system of ethnic minority regional autonomy in a
republican government system. Within such a highly centralized and unified regime, diverse and
specific regional and ethnic policies that are complementary to the local situation and satisfactory to
the ethnic minoritys political needs are very difficult to achieve. In this sense, China must keep
searching for the right balance between national autonomy and state control, preventing itself from
resorting to territorial partition or another extremeinternal colonialism.
Making and implementing policy is an approach for a regime to achieve its specific purpose,
which is highly politicalized. More specifically, policy making reflects the political representation of
individual citizens and different social groups. It is a popular idea that modern democratic system and
its representative politics can optimally reflect and balance interests and needs of different groups.
However, whether a democratic system can perfectly deal with cross-ethnic relationship is a mystery.
For example, a proportional versus a representational democracyshould the individual citizen or
ethnic group be the basic unit of representative politics? Reality has showed that over-emphasizing
national rights usually intensifies cross-ethnic conflicts, and may prompt to an ethnic split in the
country, such as Indias Partition and the former Yugoslavia Republic Civil War.
In the second part of the paper, the statistical attempt to test existing theories of the radicalization
of Uyghurs reveals that even radicalization is not a one-way process that is solely influenced by a
single specific factor or a group of factors. Rather, it is a reciprocal interaction between the Chinese
governmental policy and Uyghurs responses. The paper further points out there are not any theory can
comprehensively and empirically explain the radicalization process. As a result, further comprehensive
studies, as well as new research approaches such as interdisciplinary methodologies of anthropology,
ethno-history, ethno-geopolitics and political economics are very important for both political scholars
and policy makers to take into account in order to better understand this process.
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Appendix 1 Methodology of Calculation of the Income Gap Ratio between Han Chinese and
Uyghurs
Han Chinese Region (Han Chinese population/Total local population): unit: RMB Yuan per capita per
year79
(1) Urumqi(1507720/2018443): 2326, 80 2539, 81 3046, 82 3313, 83 4189, 84 5546, 85 6758, 86 7625, 87
7975, 88 8668, 89 9594, 90 10850, 91 13199, 92 15099, 93 16746, 94 19052, 95 23836,
96
29483, 97
3359998
(2) Karamay (197542/262157)99: 2878, 3057, 3968, 4428, 5991, 7549, 9150, 10262, 13721, 14097,
15024, 16160, 16939, 17820, 19082, 19893, 24985, 29706, 33113
(3) Changji (1187458/1599436)100: 1981, 2139, 2198, 2375, 2600, 3616, 4925, 5269, 5957, 6253,
6435, 7633, 8227, 9426, 11357, 15874, 11880, 19085, 24419
(4) The percentage of Han Chinese population of three regions compare to total Han Chinese in
Xinjiang2892720/8121588 = 35. 62%101
(5) Average annual income of the Han Chinese Region2395, 2578, 3071, 3372, 4260, 5570, 6944,
7717, 9218, 9673, 10351, 11578, 12762, 14115, 15728, 18264, 20233, 26091, 30384
Uyghur Region (Uyghurs population/Total local population): unit: RMB Yuan per capita per year
1 Turpan414904/5896092093, 2363, 2734, 3036, 3591, 4775, 6725, 8203, 8906, 9865, 11162,
12779, 11617, 15419, 16350, 17849, 25200, 29415, 31719
2 Aksu (168475/2310163) 1774, 2057, 2380, 2663, 2808, 3636, 4570, 5386, 5799, 6128, 6686,
8050, 9423, 10237, 12906, 13940, 15980, 18207, 20964
3 Kashgar(3387253/3762689); 2107, 2331, 2443, 2710, 2922, 4010, 5038, 5389, 5762,6102,
6578, 7747, 9787, 11201, 12262, 13565, 16079, 19897, 21685
4 Hotan (1790968/1857563)2271, 2452, 2776, 2771, 2967, 4304, 5096, 5403, 5785, 6358, 6801,
7915, 10348, 12519, 13264, 14843, 17602, 20936, 23483
5 The percentage of Uyghur population of four regions compare to total Uyghurs in Xinjiang
5761600/9413796 = 61.20%
6 Average annual income of the Uyghur Region2061, 2301, 2583, 2795, 3072, 4181, 5357,
6220, 6563, 7113, 7819, 9123, 10294, 12344, 13696, 15049, 18715, 22114, 24463
Income Gap Ratio between the two groups: 1.16, 1.12, 1.19, 1.20, 1.38, 1.17, 1.30, 1.17, 1.40, 1.36,
1.32, 1.26, 1.24, 1.14, 1.15, 1.21, 1.08, 1.78, 1.24
Note: 2005 data is missing.
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Notes and Reference

1
Pan Zhiping, Wang Mingye and Shi Lan, East Turkestan: History and Current Situation (),
Minzu Press, 2006
2
Dong Yu, The Dragons Hovering Shadow: Chinas Involvement in Afghanistan, Pittsburgh Policy Journal, Spring
2012 Volume 4
3
Ibid
4
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/07/11/turkey.china.uyghurs/
5
Xiaowei Zang (2007), Minority Ethnicity, Social Status and Uyghur Community Involvement in Urban Xinjiang, Asian
Ethnicity, Volume 8, Number 1, February 2007

6
Ildiko, Beller-Hann, M. Cristina Cesaro, Joanne Smith Finley and others, Situating the Uyghurs between China and
Central Asia, Ashgate, 2007, p32p40,
7
Ibid
8
Ibid
9
Joseph Felcher
10
The XPCC is in fact a traditional form of Chinese military systemTuntian system. Such a system emerged in
Han Dynasty (220 BCE to 220 CE) and was designed to consolidate military control of remote or newly occupied
land, as well as sustain local agriculture and economic development. Soldiers served as peasants and farmers in peace
time and can be dispatched for military action in war time.
11
There is an evolution process of CCPs and Mao Zedongs idea of national policy. In 1930s, the CCP against the
National Governments Han Chinese prior policy and totally adopted the idea of self-determination rights. The CCP
utilized such and advocacy to unite ethnic minorities during the Sino-Japan war. In the middle of 1940s, as the CCP
began to consider state territorial integrity after the civil war, and gradually transfer to a national autonomous policy.
See Meng Fandong, On the Basic Feature of Mao Zedongs Harmony Nationality Thoughts, Heilongjiang National
Journal, 2011 Issue 3
12
It is worth mentioning here that the double-track Chinese government structure in Xinjiangs context. There are a
party chairman and a governor/president of each province or administrative district. The latter one is nominally the
head of government and mainly responsible for detailed governmental affairs and policy implementation. But the
local party leader has the final policy and decision making authority over the governor.
13
Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, Columbia Press, 2010, p50
14
Such an immigration policy is viewed as an assimilation endeavor by many Uyghurs and scholars. Others see it as
a part of exploiting Xinjiangs nature resource. See Dru Gladney, Freedom Fighters or Terrorists? Exploring the
Case of the Uyghur People, 2009
15
Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, Columbia Press, 2010, p50
16
Jagannath P. Panda, The Urumqi Crisis: Effect of Chinas Ethno-national Politics, Strategic Analysis, Volume 34,
Issue 1, 2010
17
Uyghurs Support Language Protest, Radio Free Asia, 2010-10-27, see
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/language-10272010181614.html?searchterm=None
18
Violent terrorism power, national splittism power, and regional extremism power. The first use of the term was
in Xinjiang Dailys headline of December 10, 2001. See http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2001-12-10/416568.html
19
Conclusion of China-visit press conference in Beijing by Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, US
Department of State, 26 August 2002
20
Dru Gladney, Freedom Fighters or Terrorists? Exploring the Case of the Uyghur People, 2009
21
Chinese militant shot dead, BBC News, 2003-12-23, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3343241.stm
22
Bill Roggio, Al Qaeda-linked Chinese terrorist leader reported killed in US strike in Pakistan, The Long War
Journal, 2010-3-1, see http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/al_qaedalinked_chine.php
23
Pan Zhiping, Wang Mingye and Shi Lan, East Turkestan: History and Current Situation (),
Minzu Press, 2006, p147-p148; also see Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: the Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale
University Press, 2002
24
Gheyret Niyazs comment, see Zaobao.com: http://www.zaobao.com/special/feature/pages/feature090727a.shtml
25
J.Todd Reed and Diana Raschke, The ETIM: Chinas Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat, Praeger,
2010
26
James Millward, Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi violence mark a turning point? A Special Issue : The
Uyghurs in China Questioning the Past and Understanding the Present, Central Asia Survey, Volume 28, Issue 4,
2009; also see Dru Gladney, Chinas National Insecurity: Old Challenges at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 2000
Pacific Symposium: Asian Perspectives on The Challenges of China
27
Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, Columbia Press, 2010; also see Dru Gladney,
24
Dong Yu
April, 2012
Internal Colonialism and the Uyghur Nationality: Chinese Nationalism and its Subaltern Subjects, Les Ouigours au
vingtieme sicle, 1998
28
In facilitating discussion, this paper adopts a Terrorism definition summarized by Bruce Hoffman, that Terrorism
(or a terrorism activity) should meet all five necessary compositions:
a) Ineluctably political in aims and motives;
b) violent or, equally important, threatens violence;
c) designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond victims;
d) conducted either by an organization or by individuals or a small collection of individuals influenced by the
ideological aims;
e) perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.
See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 1998, p40
29
Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, Columbia Press, 2010, p174p190; Michael
Clarke, Chinas War on Terror in Xinjiang: Human Security and the Causes of Violent Uyghur Separatism,
Regional Outlook Paper of the Griffith Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper, No. 11, 2007
30
One is Chinese official media, such as Xinhua Net, Foreign Ministry of China, the Peoples Daily, China.com, and
Global Times; as well as other credible media citations; the other is international media, such as CNN, BBC, Radio
Free Asia, etc.; as well as Terrorism Studies database, such as the Global Terrorism Database of the University of
Maryland.
31
(1) Bombing includes both single bombing and series of bombings, which categorized by the Chinese police
department
(2) Other excluded acupuncture attack, unverified event, unidentified categories (common murder or specific
targeting local authority or civilian; police arrest/attack with fire contact and casualty).
(3)Other includes murders with suspected Uyghur separatists, weapon smugglings, arsons, battles and gunfights
during Chinese Polices arresting, religious fractions clashes, small scale (less than 50 people) riots
(4) Direct assault is violent event that (a) does not use bombing or assassination as an attack method; (b) using
conventional weapon, such as firearm, blade, dagger, grenade or other explosive devices, etc.
(5) the number of other violent events and attacks may be greatly underestimated, since there is no enough open
source for identify and verify every event; the total attacks of 1999 to 2008 may be lower than exact number;
32
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p77
33
Dru Gladney, Freedom Fighters or Terrorists? Exploring the Case of the Uyghur People, 2009
34
See BBC Chinese.com. http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_7490000/newsid_7496700/7496798.stm
35
Yusef Abbas, Summarized transcripts of detainee Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), US Department of
Defense, p24
36
Michael Clarke, Widening the net: Chinas anti-terror laws and human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, The International Journal of Human Rights, Volume 14, Issue 4, 2010
37
Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law Defining Terrorism, October 1, 2008, p113 assess:
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf
38
International Commission of Jurists, Sri Lanka: Briefing Paper, Emergency Laws and International Standards,
March 2009, assess: http://www.icj.org/IMG/SriLanka-BriefingPaper-Mar09-FINAL.pdf
39
Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law Defining Terrorism, October 1, 2008, p115
40
James Bartlett and Carl Miller, The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and
Non-Violent Radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence, 2011-12-06
41
Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Mechanism of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,
Terrorism and Political Violence, 2008-7-3
42
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, Cambridge University Press, 2006
43
Dru Gladney, Responses to Chinese Rule: Patterns of Occupation and Opposition, in Xinjiang: Chinas Muslim
Borderland, edited by S. Frederick Starr, Armonk, N,Y, 2004
44
Joanne Smith Finley, Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities
among the Uyghurs, Journal of Contemporary China, 2007 issue 53
45
Wang Yuan-Kang, Toward a Sythesis of the Theories of Peripheral Nationalism: A Comparative Study of Chinas
Xinjiang and Guangdong, Asian Ethnicity, 2001, Issue 2
46
For example, see Nancy Eranosian, Chinese National Unity Vs. Uyghur Separatism: Can Information and
Communication Technologies Integrated with a Customized Economic Development Plan Help Avoid a Cultural
Collision? Tufts University, 2005, p17; also see Ildiko, Beller-Hann, M. Cristina Cesaro, Joanne Smith Finley and
others, Situating the Uyghurs between China and Central Asia, Ashgate, 2007
47
Ildiko, Beller-Hann, M. Cristina Cesaro, Joanne Smith Finley and others, Situating the Uyghurs between China
and Central Asia, Ashgate, 2007
48
Brent Hierman, The Pacification of Xinjiang: Uyghur Protest and the Chinese State, 1988 2002, Problems of
25
Dong Yu
April, 2012
Post-Communism 54, 2007 Issue 3

49
and Central Asia, Ashgate, 2007
50
Jessica Koch, Economic Development and Ethnic Separatism in Western China: A New Model of Peripheral
Nationalism, Working Paper, Perth: Asia Research Centre, 2006, p11
51
Xiaowei Zang (2007), Minority Ethnicity, Social Status and Uyghur Community Involvement in Urban Xinjiang, Asian
Ethnicity, Volume 8, Number 1, February 2007
52
Han Jiabin, DIao Chunyou and Yu Hongjun, A Study on The Income Gap between Xinjiang Urban and Suburban
Residents since the Reform and Open, Technology and Economy, 2009, issue 1
53
It should be noticed that although this paper tries to conduct a total empirical research, the incomprehensive and
inconsistent official data and the limited access to useful data set great obstacles to test all factors and theories by
statistics.
54
Chinas regional economic development focus and plan is different, designed by state policy.
55
Agriculture, Industry and manufacturing, Service
56
Chinese political and economic institution: family register, since 1949; based on planned economy , communal
land ownership and planned employment systems
57
Han Jiabin and Yu Hongjun, A Study on the Income Gap between Ethnic Minorities and its Causes: a case study
on Uyghur, Northwest Population, 2009 Issue 3
58
Detailed data and calculation see Appendix 2.
59
Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph Felter and Jacob Shapiro, Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and
Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines
60
Because of its monolithic population, China has only conducted six national population censuses.
61
China Statistical Yearbook-2001 by National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistics Press, 2001, p140-p141
62
Chapter 2, Figure 2-1 Ethnic Population by Gender and Sector; also see the Tabulation on the 2000 Population
census of the Peoples Republic of China (by Population Census Office under the State Council & National Bureau
of Statistics of China; China Statistics Press, 2002): p815p824
63
Top 5: (4)19,300; (7)57,010; (9)11,620; (10) 1,850; (14)2,820; Bottom 2: (1)3,626,090; (8) 185,750
64
Data from Xu Yanqiu, A Study on Xinjiang Urbanization and Economic Development, Commercial Times
(Shangye Shidai), 2008 Issue 3
65
See Pan Zhiping, Wang Mingye and Shi Lan, East Turkestan: History and Current Situation (
), Minzu Press, 2006; also see Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven, 2002
66
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 1998
67
Global Terrorism Database by University of Maryland,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=2&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&region=7&count=1
00&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table
68
Such comparative is conducted through the comparison between the violent events in this paper and the terrorist
attacks types and details in the GTD.
69
Dru Gladney, Freedom Fighters or Terrorists? Exploring the Case of the Uyghur People, 2009; also see Gardner
Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, Columbia Press, 2010
70
Mia Bloom, Bombshells Women and Terror, 2011
71
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p29
72
Herbert Yee, Ethnic Relations in Xinjiang: A Survey of Uyghur-Han Relations in Urumqi, Journal of
Contemporary China, 2003, issues 12,
73
and Central Asia, Ashgate, 2007, p70
74
The five dimensions are: material condition, passive social relationships, active social relationships, external of
social inclusion, and the level of fairness regarding access to opportunities. See Zhao Tong, Social Cohesion and
Islamic Radicalization: Implications from the Uyghur Insurgency, Journal of Strategic Security, 2010 Volumes 3
75
Ibid
76
and Central Asia, Ashgate, 2007, p8p9
77
Fortunately, Beijing recently began to reflect on its own policies flaws. It replaced the tough-minded first
Secretary of the XUAR CCP Wang Lequan, who had been in the seat for the past 15 years and adopting very harsh
policies.
78
Ibid
79
The population data is based on 2007 population census
80
1989Table 12-9 average money wages of fully employed staff and workers, Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 1990, by
26
Dong Yu
April, 2012
Census Office of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Statistics Press, 1990, p587
81
1990: Table 12-9 average money wages of fully employed staff and workers, Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 1991, by
Census Office of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Statistics Press, 1991, p529
82
1991: Table 12-11 , Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 1992, by Census Office
of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Statistics Press, 1992) p563
83
1992: Table 12-11 , Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 1993, by Census Office of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Statistics Press, 1993) p446
84
1993: Table 12-10 , Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 1994, by Census Office of the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Statistics Press, 1994) p391
85
Census Office of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Statistics Press, 1995) p93
86
87
88
89
1998: Table 3-44 average wages of fully employed staff and workers, Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 1999, by Census
Office of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Statistics Press, 1999) p118
90
1999: Table 3-39 average money wages of fully employed staff and workers by Prefecture, autonomous prefecture,
city and county, Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 2000, by Census Office of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
China Statistics Press, 2000) p140
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Karamay is a very special case in our all seven sample regions. It is an oil production city. Most workers are Han
Chinese and working in State-Own Oil Corporation, with highest average income in Xinjiang.
100
Although its major population is Han Chinese, but it is a Hui Autonomous Prefecture.
101
The rest of Han Chines settle in Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture (1,888,258), Tacheng Administrative Office
(568,521), and Bayanggol Mongol Autonomous Prefecture (687,597), where neither Han Chinese nor Uyghur people
meet the 70% majority threshold. The Shihezi City (with 607,367 Han Chinese in a total population of 642,440) is
excluded in this statistics.
27

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Dong Yu

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In the meantime, Chinese officials have been

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HISTORY AND POLICY

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THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS AND EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM

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sources covering them or appear on terrorism study database.

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objective and slogan (East

anti-Chinese ruling related)

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U.S. investigations of the six Uyghur

Reflecting on the Terrorism Definition in China

The Russian Federal Law on Countering Terrorism (2006): terrorism is an ideology of

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ANALYSIS OF THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH

Theories of Radicalization of Terrorism and the case of Uyghurs

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In order to conduct correlation analysis, a multiple regression model is established:

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95.0% Confidence Interval

a. Dependent Variable: Violent Incidents

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X3: GDP per Capita

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Table D. SPSS Result of Y = a + c x3

a. Dependent Variable: Violent Incidents

X4: External Influence: Terrorist Activities in Central Asia

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Table E. SPSS Result of Y = a + d x4

a. Dependent Variable: Violent Incidents

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X6: Religious freedom and cultural conservation

Other Alternative Theories

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Rational Actor Model and Game Theory

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Notes and Reference

Ethnicity, Volume 8, Number 1, February 2007

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Post-Communism 54, 2007 Issue 3

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