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Chinas influence in North American trade is expanding
Shaiken et al 13
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
This paper highlights the reality that China has indeed integrated
massive trade volume with both the U.S. and Mexico. The analysis presented herein shows that Chinas
rapidly developing trade relationship with both Mexico and the U.S. has had
significant effects on each countrys respective trade dynamics . For instance, today China
is the second largest trading partner for both Mexico and the United States,
falling behind only the total intra-NAFTA trade volume . As we have seen from our examination of
the top twenty products imported by Mexico from the U.S. and China, the structure of trade in the region is
shifting significantly : for Mexico, its export share in the U.S. market has fallen
sharply, contrary to the trade growth of Asia , and particularly of China. As discussed previously, from
2000-2011 both the U.S. and Mexico endured substantial losses in their respective
export markets in the NAFTA region, particularly in regards to the manufacturing sector and in
products such as telecommunications equipment, electric power machinery, passenger motor vehicles, and clothing
accessories and garments, among many others. NAFTA, since its origins, has passed through two distinct phases. During the first
phase (1994-2000), the region was deeply integrated as a result of trade, investment, and rules of origin in specific industrial sectors
such as autoparts-automobiles (AA) and yarn-textile-garments (YTG). In this first phase, NAFTA evolved in accordance with some of
the predictions and estimations that we discuss in the literature survey. The region as a whole grew in terms of GDP, trade,
investment, employment, and wages, among other variables, while intra-industry trade increased substantially. While some
of the gaps between the U.S. and Mexico were slowly closing , however, this was only
true for a small portion of Mexicos highly polarized socioeconomic and territorial
structure. In other words, even in Mexican sectors highly integrated with NAFTA , the
integration process did not allow for the promotion of backward and forward
linkages in Mexico. In the second phase (2000-), NAFTA has shown a deterioration of this
process of integration in terms of investment and intra-industrial trade , among other
variables. During this time period, both Mexico and the United States have been on the losing end
of competitions with third-party countries, a topic only discussed somewhat in debates on NAFTA (see the
survey in part two of this paper).
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 88-9]
The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how these strategies evolve over time: Mexicos
regional and
global position is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and trade
diversification. The decline in US influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector may
open more room for Mexico to adjust to a growth strategy less dependent on the
United States . Chinas rising role as a regional and global power and the new
economic scenario marked by higher wages and growing concentration in industrial
commodities and products are likely to affect the pace of change according to which Chinas
going out strategy will develop in the near future. If Mexico and China reorient their strategies, it is
likely that t here will be an adjustment in the triangles dynamic , which may result in a
closer relationship between these two countries .
developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving
to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of
development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which
enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive
experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In
the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a
more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global
security . In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more
practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation
while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism . The clash of civilizations
Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying . "In a world,
which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet
promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash
of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which
means to respect other nations, and learn from each other . This philosophy is, in fact,
wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts
have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural
conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western
counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most
soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist
developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues . As the China model
improves, it will continue to surprise the world.
UQ
Competition Now
Chinese engagement is outpacing the US
Goodman 5-29
underscore how Latin Americas natural resources and rising middle class are
making it an increasingly attractive trade partner for the worlds top two
economies . Competing with Chinas checkbook isnt easy for the U.S. Seeking South American
soy, copper and iron ore, China boosted imports from Latin America 20-fold, to $86 billion
in 2011 from $3.9 billion in 2000, according to calculations by the Inter-American Development Bank. By
contrast, the U.S. policy of pursuing free-trade accords has been controversial , said Kevin
Gallagher, a Boston University economist. If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play
with, said Gallagher, author of the 2010 book The Dragon in the Room, about Chinas inroads in the region. The onus is
on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy
because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to .
investment with China , if only to diversify away from the U.S ., buyer of 80 percent of the countrys
exports.
Chinas purse, which the US is increasingly unable to match . The speed and extent
of Chinas growth in Latin America also raises concerns about its geopolitical and
military policy objectives in the Americas. Many Chinese firms, especially in telecommunications, have
longstanding ties to the Peoples Liberation Army, and that should raise red flags.
tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico precedes a visit to California for his first face-totrip to Latin America and the Caribbean, coming
so early in Xis presidency, reflects the rising confidence of the Chinese leadership
face talks with Obama since taking office. The
as it pursues its strategic interests with little concern for U.S. reaction, said Evan Ellis, a
professor at the National Defense University in Washington. China in recent years has ousted the U.S. to
become the top trade partner for Brazil and Chile . In the past Chinese presidents
were very deferential to the U.S., always making reference to Washingtons backyard, said Ellis, the author of
dozens of papers and a book about Chinas penetration of Latin America. You dont hear any of that from Xis
team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either.
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
Economic ties between China and Mexico have greatly improved , given that
Mexico is one of the largest Latin American countries. From 2000 to 2009, China went
from being the 19th largest importer of Mexican goods to the 7th, while going from
7th place to 2nd in terms of exports to Mexico (ECLAC 2011). By 2011, total trade
between China and Mexico has increased significantly, and bilateral trade volume
has reached 42.1 billion USD a 19% increase compared to the previous year (MOFCOM 2011). Most importantly,
China has become the third largest export destination of Mexican goods . Chinese imports
from Mexico increased from 0.09% in 1993 to 1.35% in 2010. In dollar amounts, Chinese imports from Mexico
increased from 44.8 million USD in 1993 to 3.7 billion in 2010 (Hernndez Hernndez
2012:65). During the one-year period from 2010 to 2011, Chinese imports from Mexico increased 54.8%,
while Mexican imports from China grew 16% (see Table 1).
companies have yet to attain the level of "key employers " or have a major role in many Latin
American communities, they play a growing role in strategically important sectors in many
Latin American countries . For example, in telecommunications, the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE are
increasingly important product, service, and infrastructure providers,8 and in logistics, companies such as China Shipping,
China Overseas Shipping, and Hutchison Whampoa play increasingly vital roles in Latin
America's foreign trade.
US Engagement Low
US engagement is decreasing
Priest 5-1
[Dana. Latin American Reporter for the Washington Post. U.S. role
to decrease as Mexicos drug-war strategy shifts The Washington
Post, 5/1/13 ln]
For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have forged an unparalleled alliance
against Mexicos drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational planning. But much of
that hard-earned cooperation may be in jeopardy . President Obama heads off Thursday on a threeday visit to Mexico to cement relations with the newly elected president, Enrique Pea Nieto, with vows of neighborly kinship and
future cooperation. Obamas visit comes as the fight over border security and
immigration overhaul has begun to consume Congress. The December inauguration of Pea
Nieto brought the nationalistic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) back to power after 13 years, and with it a whiff
of resentment over the deep U.S. involvement in Mexicos fight against narcotraffickers. The new administration has shifted priorities away from the U.S.backed strategy of arresting kingpins, which sparked an unprecedented level of violence among the cartels,
and toward an emphasis on prevention and keeping Mexicos streets safe and calm, Mexican authorities said.
America can also be excused if its a little irked if its asking the U.S., Why
feels more
urgency to look south at the moment largely because of Chinas increasing
incursion into the hemisphere: annual ChinaLatin America trade exceeds $200 billion
did you wait so long to make this outreach, if you really are making a genuine outreach? Washington
today compared with less than $10 billion in 2000. U.S.Latin America trade may be robust. But this month Sabatinis publication,
Americas Quarterly, lays out striking evidence of U.S. decline: in 1995 , for example, the
U.S. sent Brazil, Latin Americas largest economy and now the worlds sixth largest, more than a fifth of that
countrys imports; by 2011 it was 15%, the same share sent from China . Ditto with regard
to Brazils exports: in 1995 the U.S. bought 21%, but just 10% in 2011, while for China it was 17%. China, as a result, surpassed the
U.S. as Brazils top trading partner in 2009. Whats more, business with the Americas as a share of total U.S. trade has actually
dropped over the past decade. The investment tally is even more striking: in 1995, the U.S.
accounted for 37% of Brazils foreign direct investment vs. 10% in 2011 less than
Chinas . Granted, its good for Latin America to be less dependent on the U.S. But its hardly unreasonable to
conclude that Washington wouldnt be facing this China syndrome in its own
hemisphere if it had simply taken high-level engagement on Latin America more
seriously a decade or more ago. Or even four years ago, when Obama took office pledging a more benign U.S. foreign policy
toward the region and then used that, say critics, as an excuse for benign neglect.
AT//Relations High
Relations may be high, but US economic engagement vis--vis China is
sufficiently low to generate uniqueness for the DA - Shaiken says
trade volume and new sectors of engagement mean future trends
ensure Chinese leadership
Hold any of their link uniqueness claims to a high threshold US
actions never reflect diplomatic rhetoric
Padgett 5-27
trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do
analysis (translated into English by InSight Crime) reports that 20 of Mexicos 32 states saw fewer homicides between January and
October in 2012 compared to the same period last year. Areas associated with high rates of violence saw notable drops, with
homicides decreasing by 32 percent in Chihuahua, 25 percent in Nuevo Leon, and 23 percent in Sinaloa. Last month, Ciudad Juarez
logged fewer homicides than Chicago. [A]re we still in a security crisis? asks the articles author, Mexican security expert Alejandro
Hope. I would say no: crime and violence continue (and will continue for a while) at unacceptable levels, but it can no
relationship is to reach its full potential. Many of these are domestic issues that each
nation should resolve for its own self-interest but that would nonetheless meaningfully improve the
bilateral economic relationship. Among these are, from Mexicos side, reforms in fiscal, energy and
competition policy, as well as the continuing implementation of labor and
education reforms. Working with Mexicos other two main political parties, Pena Nietos Institutional Revolution Party
(PRI) has successfully begun the reform process. But the Mexican presidents honeymoon period is
coming to an end, and the most difficult issues remain unresolved. From the U.S.
perspective, comprehensive immigration reform would boost the economy by regularizing, and
therefore capitalizing on, immigrant workers already in the United States contributing to economic production. The United
States would also do well to quickly pass the transboundary hydrocarbons
agreement with Mexico, which would open up opportunities for cooperation with
Mexican state energy company Pemex in the Gulf of Mexico.
Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America programme at the Wilson Center,
calls Latin America far behind in developing policies that might leverage
inclusive growth. There is not a sense of shared responsibility when your social policy is
remittance, when your lack of social policy is permitted, she told reporters on Friday. The region, she said, needs a widespread
recognition of the role the private sector needs to play in paying taxes, improving government [and] institutions. In a
Members of the U.S. Congress and advocacy groups here are also wary of turning a
blind eye to human rights concerns in Mexico. The dire human rights situation in Mexico is not going
to solve itself, Maureen Meyer, a senior associate for Mexico and Central America with the Washington Office on Latin America
(WOLA), an advocacy group, said in a statement. As the bilateral agenda evolves, it is critical that
the U.S. and Mexican governments continue to focus on how best to support and
defend human rights in Mexico. In a press release issued last week, WOLA expressed agreement with a letter
from 23 members of Congress to Secretary of State John Kerry that stressed that [t]he human rights crisis will not improve until
there are stronger legal protections, increased human rights training for Mexicos security forces, and more government agents held
responsible for the human rights violations they commit. Even as the focus of U.S.-Mexico relations
AT//TPP Thumper
TPP will divide Latin America doesnt secure trade or US influence
Wagner and Parker 5-16
grow considerably with the inclusion of Japan and South Korea - which are both actively exploring entry in the Partnership. Many
potential signatories, including the U.S., have expressed a desire for conclusion of the Partnership this year. As is the case with any
multilateral negotiation, getting to the finish line has not been easy. The derailment of negotiations over the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the Doha Development Round
had a significant impact on the perceived realism of regional trade agreements,
while negatively effecting Latin America's ability to uniformly and robustly engage
with its largest trading partners. The radically different trade policy paths that
have emerged - pitting the notion of collaboration against economic nationalism -have given rise to a region divided over how, and whether, it should approach
trade liberalization going forward.
Link
American migrants from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. And, he must develop a stable southern border, one that counts
with a state presence and adequate infrastructure. The spirit of the transformation of the southern border must preserve the positive
aspects of border integration processes while achieving efficiency in formal operations that will allow it to triumph over illegality.
The second priority is to take advantage of more favorable economic winds in both Mexico and the United States. Pea Nieto
(Robert contributing writer for Global Voices Online, New Yorkbased political analyst, U.S. and Latin America Economic
Cooperation Without Militarization?
www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/05/20/us-and-latin-americaeconomic-cooperation-without-militarization)
In May, President Barack Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica and vowed to strengthen economic ties with these two countries and
the rest of Latin America. He pledged to expand renewable energy development and education initiatives in recognition of the joined
fates of the United States and Latin America. This approach to Latin America is refreshing, but its impact on the ongoing War on
Drugs remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, the United States bears much of the responsibility for the failed campaign, but the
Obama administration has seen that some Latin American countries are taking
their own lead in tackling the drug trade and are increasingly relying less on
Washington. The Obama administration, for its part, has realized that shifting the
always go to energy, drugs, and immigration. And yes, Mexican leaders must figure out how to produce
more oil and natural gas. Yes, the United States must reduce our appetite for drugs and control the illicit export of weapons and drug
money. U.S. politicians will reform our immigration policy when they understand that we need Mexican workers and that antiLatino sentiments will cost them elections. What is vital, if less sexy, is to realize that Canada, Mexico,
and the United States are one economic entity. The focus must be on North
American competitiveness. While respecting national sovereignty, we need to recognize that
supply chains straddle borders. The manufactured exports of each contain components from all three. NAFTA
was the cutting edge laptop of 1992. Its time for the North American equivalent of the iPhone 5. We must accelerate
the movement of sub-components and finished products (and tourists) across our
borders. We need to make it easier for technicians to work temporarily in each
others countries. We need to harmonize our regulations and standards. Together the
three nations need to develop markets with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the European Union, APEC, and the Pacific Alliance.
Thats how to generate growth in all three North American nations.
needs of a bygone era. This became evident as never before when on September 14, 2011, the San Ysidro, California
port of entry the busiest land port of entry in the worldhad to shut down its 24
north-bound lanes due to the collapse of part of its roof , injuring several people and damaging
vehicles trying to cross into the U.S. from Tijuana, Mexico. According to a report by the San Diego Association of Governments,
inadequate infrastructure capacity just at the border crossings between San Diego
County and the state of Baja California creates traffic congestion and delays that
cost both the U.S. and Mexican economies on average an estimated $7.2 billion in
forgone gross output and more than 62,000 jobs on an annual basis. These border
delays could cause $86 billion in output losses over the next ten years. The border has
been a filter to what shouldnt get in, when it can be a facilitator to what should get in. Rachel Poynter, U.S. State Department
These delays are significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that American firms are constantly attempting to
reduce their inventory costs in an attempt to remain competitive. While importing from China to the U.S. may require a company to
hold more than 100 days of inventory, if efficiently managed, our proximity to Mexico can provide American firms with a constant
and predictable flow of goods that may reduce inventory costs and provide firms the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to
sudden market changes. With this fundamental fact in mind, in May of 2010 the U.S. and Mexico signed the 21st Century Border
Management Joint Declaration. Recognizing the importance of fostering the commercial
that these regional processes will eventually make the overall binational
infrastructure-building process more transparent, more robust and ultimately a
better fit for two such powerful economies and next door neighbors. Much Opportunity,
but the Real Work Has Only Just Begun Total trade between the United States and Mexico has
expanded by more than 600% since 1990. Yet we need further commitment and
investment in the infrastructure needed to sustain such growth, which is critical
keep reaching businesses, workers and consumers on both sides of our shared
border. We will be able to accomplish this if leaders can explain the critical nature
of our commercial relationships in ways that are more concrete and easier for
citizens to understand. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet
tomorrows demands, acting as a facilitator and conductor of the lawful flows of
goods, services and people between our nations, so that we may capitalize on the
full potential of our partnership. If a billion dollars worth of trade crosses the
U.S.-Mexico border on a daily basis and sustains six million jobs in the U.S.,
imagine what could be accomplished with a truly 21st century border.
border infrastructure will give an added boost to our regions safety and
competitiveness in the world. Much Opportunity, but the Real Work Has Only Just Begun The poor
infrastructure, the inadequate staffing levels and the heavy focus on security that
prevails at the U.S. Mexico border have cost both economies billions of dollars in
gross output annually. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet todays demands, acting as a facilitator and
conductor of lawful flows of goods, services and people across our nations so that we may capitalize on the full potential of our
partnership. If a billion dollars worth of trade crosses the U.S.-Mexico border on a
daily basis now while sustaining six million jobs, imagine what could be
accomplished with a truly 21st century border. 4 An Introduction to our Unknown Neighbor, Mexico
It is imperative for the United States to engage in a national conversation regarding the value of economic integration and
interdependence, cross-border trade with Mexico, and the cost of inefficiencies at our long and dynamic shared border. As the U.S.
economy struggles to create high-quality jobs and the export sector assumes more importance, our nation needs to discover every
dollar of value in the relationship with our nations number two export market: Mexico. There is no other
relationship for the United States that is as dismissed and yet ironically as crucial
for our countrys well-being as the one with Mexico , a country with a population of over 113 million
people. Mexico is much more than a country with which we just happen to share a 2,000 mile long land border. Although it is often
unknown to us, it is important to realize that Mexico is one of our most significant commercial
partners in the world. To illustrate Mexicos overall development and the trends in its development, we can look a few
examples from its physical infrastructure, its human capital, what it produces and its trade relationships. To begin with, in
2010 Mexico invested an unprecedented five percent of its GDP in infrastructure.
With 76 seaports along its 11,000 kilometers of seashore on the Pacific and
approval could lead to the development of access roads and decongestion at the
actual border. Mexican presidential encouragement to NADBANK's directors to seek PPPs and U.S. presidential urging to
the EPA for a broad interpretation of its mandate could result in a decade's work of new infrastructure projects. This will
facilitate the anticipated tripling of cross-border trade as both countries negotiate
a Trans-Pacific Partnership and Mexico negotiates a Pacific Trade Alliance with its
South American partners. Presidential decisions to advance on instructing NADBANK to move forward with PPPs
for these infrastructure projects are relatively easy. Their consequences will enhance the trade and prosperity of both nations.
of law. Along the border, U.S. policymakers have sought to balance security and
commercial concerns. The U.S. and Mexican governments resolved a longstanding trade dispute in 2011 involving NAFTA trucking provisions and have sought to improve competitiveness
through regulatory cooperation. Bilateral trade surpassed $460 billion in 2011.The February 2012 signing of a TransBoundary Hydrocarbons Agreement for managing oil resources in the Gulf of Mexico could create
new opportunities for energy cooperation.
reality in our labor needs and legal protections for immigrants who are here helping build our economy. The U. S. must implement a
debt reduction program combining serious spending cuts and revenue increases to give certainty and new impetus to growing our
economy. Mexico must implement judicial and law enforcement reforms that will give
confidence to businesses and citizens that a rule of law prevails there . Energy reforms are
needed to attract private capital to fully realize Mexico's abundant opportunities. Mexico needs tax reform that increases revenue,
reduces the informal economy, and provides the framework to close the deep wealth divide among its citizens. To accomplish this
and to further reduce the 40 million living in poverty, Mexico needs to make massive investments in infrastructure and quality
education. Mexico's growing middle class is impressive but to expand that even more will create market and economic power that
will be the envy of the hemisphere. North America sits near the pinnacle of its greatest economic strength in history. Together we
can take it to the top.
outdated perceptionson both sides. You simply cant expect to have a strategic relationship that functions in real time if
perceptions lag present realities. Theres been new research and insightful commentary recently highlighting the gap between
Americans perceptions of Mexico and the countrys current reality. President Enrique Pea Nieto faces the daunting task of moving
Main Street U.S. perceptions of Mexico closer to where the views of economists, investors, and discerning travelers are on the
country. He will help this along by conveying his administrations absolute commitment to carrying through promised economic
reforms, implementing anti-corruption and transparency initiatives, and reinforcing cooperation on security. For President
Obama, its important to signal that his new team is completely schooled in the
reality of todays Mexico and that they are prepared to take advantage of the moment to recast the relationship to the
benefit of both countries. Delivering on immigration reform and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership trade agreement are rare opportunities for a U.S. administration to
fundamentally alter Mexicans perceptions of their northern partner . As Mexicos
place in the world rises and the U.S. continues to recalibrate its foreign alliances,
theres a unique opportunity to move the bilateral relationship to a more strategic
levelbut it will take some work.
Trade Key
Commercial relationship is crucial to both Mexico and US economies
New Policy Institute 2/9/12
economy struggles to create high-quality jobs, our nation needs to discover every dollar of value in our relationship with our nations
number two export market: Mexico. Trade with Mexico: An Abundance of Value That Is Hidden In Plain Sight Trade is
enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and given the complementarity of the U.S. and Mexican
economies, bilateral trade has grown exponentially, reaching a record high of nearly $400 billion in 2010. Mexico is now the thirdranked commercial partner of the U.S. and the second largest market for U.S. exports. Mexico spent $163 billion on
U.S. goods in 2010, and trade with Mexico sustains six million jobs in the U.S. This
is economic value that for many in the U.S. remains hidden in plain sight. To
provide a better idea of what this commercial partnership means to our country, U .S. sales to Mexico are larger
than all U.S. exports to the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) combined, as well
as all combined sales to Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands .
Twenty-two states count Mexico as their No. 1 or No. 2 export market, and it is a top-five
market for 14 other states. American consumers and businesses import large quantities of jointly produced products and services
from Mexico such as automobiles, produce, and petroleum, just to name a few. Still, for every dollar Mexico makes
from exporting to the U.S., it will in turn spend 50 cents on U.S. products or
services, which are a considerable benefit to our economy and demonstrates the
truly unique quality of this trade or joint production relationship.
The United States and Mexico have a close and complex bilateral relationship as
neighbors and partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although
security issues have recently dominated the U.S. relationship with Mexico , analysts
predict that bilateral relations may shift toward economic matters now that President Enrique
Pea Nieto has taken office. Pea Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) defeated leftist Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador and Josefina Vzquez Mota of the conservative National
Action Party (PAN) in Mexicos July 1, 2012 presidential election. As a result, the PRI, which controlled Mexico from
1929 to 2000, retook the presidency on December 1, 2012. Some analysts have raised concerns regarding the PRIs
return to power, but President Pea Nieto has pledged to govern democratically and to forge
cross-party alliances.
When U.S. President Barack Obama travels to Mexico on May 2, he will arrive amid a period of
sweeping transformation in the country. Embroiled in myriad political battles and seeking to implement an
extensive slate of national reforms, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's administration has been
focused almost solely on internal affairs. Meanwhile, after years of delay, the U.S. Congress has been
debating gun control and immigration reform -- two issues of serious interest to the Mexican government. U.S.-Mexican
relations are strategically important to both countries, and Mexico's period of
transition has created opportunities for each to reshape the partnership . And although
U.S. media attention has focused primarily on bilateral security issues ahead of Obama's visit -- namely cooperation in Mexico's drug
war -- the Pena Nieto
Pea Nieto of Mexico said the group would comprise Mexican ministers and their US counterparts, and include input from Joe
Biden, the US vice-president. It would meet for the first time in the autumn. The Mexican president said the idea was to act as an
enabler ... in terms of how government can support efforts by the private sector to have a strong economic integration. The
reorient his countrys role in the fight against drugs, prioritising efforts that lead to a reduction in violence over the pursuit of drugcartel kingpins. Some experts have interpreted that as a deliberate desire to create
some distance from the US on the security issue, with the potential to downgrade what has undoubtedly
been a period of co-operation for both countries against organised crime. But on Thursday Mr Obama, who is on a three-day visit
to Mexico and Central America, said he supported Mr Pea Nietos intentions of reducing the murder rate, which has almost tripled
in the past six years largely as a consequence of the military-led fight against the cartels. Saying that he and Mr Pea Nieto had
discussed the security issue in depth, Mr Obama added that it is up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures ...
we support the Mexican governments focus on reducing violence. Mr Obama also commended his Mexican counterpart on an
ambitious economic reform agenda including the central goal to raise Mexicos annual growth rates to as high as 6 per cent within
the next six years. The US leader called Mexicos reform programme a necessary change. On the high-level
working group, Mr Obama said it was necessary to upgrade and revamp the two
countries trade relationship. Since the signing of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta),
bilateral trade has flourished and is now worth about $1.4bn a day. Mr Obama said that it was important to
do more. We cant lose sight of the larger relationship, he said, calling it a
historic opportunity to foster more trade and more jobs on both sides of the
border.
www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12961/strategic-posturereview-mexico)
Instead, both
sides are eager to reframe the bilateral agenda and shift the emphasis to
trade and energy. During Obamas recent visit to Mexico City, both presidents pledged to
concentrate more on commerce and business, which have been eclipsed by the drug war. In an April
2013 meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry, Mexican Foreign Secretary Jose Antonio
Meade sounded a similar note, also stressing the need to transcend drug issues
and concentrate more on trade and investment. Meade pointed out that Mexico is the most
important export market for 22 of the 50 [U.S.] states, and added that the U.S. exports
more to Mexico than it does to China and Japan combined.
China
[Howard. Analyst for Capitol Media. Fox says US-Mexico ties deter
China's influence 9/14/12 http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/fox-says-us-mexico-ties-deter-china-sinfluence/article_b8fd3834-acdc-5b33-b1fb-d983fdf8d2de.html]
Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the
recognizing the benefits of migrant labor -
international agenda on its own terms . "The threat is this so-called power shift from
the West to the East ," he told a press conference Thursday at an economic development event organized by the city of
Peoria. "Those nations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead ," Fox explained,
saying there are forecasts showing the Chinese economy will be larger than that of
the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us: Under
what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their
leadership?" Fox said. His point: The U.S. would be better off dealing with Mexico and
other Latin American countries than perhaps those with different worldviews. "We have
our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that
challenge."
That means bolstering the economies of the United States and Mexico , he
said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needs to be a recognition that
Mexicans in the United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both
countries. And that, he said, will require resolving the issue of who can come to this
country and under what circumstances. "It has to be based on humanism, on compassion, on love, on friendship, on
neighborhood and on partnership that we have together," Fox said. "Otherwise, we will keep losing the jobs to
the East." Fox, who served as president from 2000 to 2006, insisted he is not in favor of "open borders." "But I am in favor
of the use of our talent, our wisdom, our intelligence," Fox said. And that requires finally filling the vacuum of what kind of laws on
immigration are necessary. In his speech, Fox did not address Arizona's approval of SB 1070 two years ago in an effort to give state
and local police more power to detain and arrest suspected illegal immigrants. But in response to a question afterward, he said
Arizona and other states have waded into the fray with their own laws out of frustration with the lack of action in Washington. "At
the very end, migration is a national issue," Fox said. With immigration reform stalled in Congress, "state governments and state
legislatures have been forced to get involved." Fox said that what's needed now is for lawmakers in Washington to come up with at
least a framework for reform. "We need to know what the playground is and what the rules of the game are," he said, calling on
leaders to "put aside xenophobia, put aside all of our complaints that we might have, and sit down and discuss the differences." Fox
said it also needs to be recognized that
power was introduced in 1990 by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, who defined it as "a dynamic
created by a nation whereby other nations seek to imitate that nation, become
closer to that nation, and align its interests accordingly ."1 Although the term is used to refer to a
the specific context of Latin America. The United States has long exercised significant influence in the region,
while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China's economic footprint in Latin America, and
analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S.
influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English
language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also
important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and
not necessarily on objective reality. Although
soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the
PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous
business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with
globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to
Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and
infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to
the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for
Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft
power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the
political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and
the general population.
must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must
reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily . That
means no more allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a
hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in
limbo for years, before President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.
U.S. diplomacy . The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department
means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that
China has a deep respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how
important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the
midst of massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of
respect will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties . A good model to
follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is
reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region . Perhaps its time to
do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries
from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes
sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance
of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region .
Minimizing
unproductive
restrictions
Pressing
harder for democratic and economic reforms, prioritizing support for these pur poses, and reenergizing public diplomacy.
assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest extent possible. Performance requirements are blunt instruments
that do not cover every situation. Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcotics cooperation and Article 98 letters
that withhold security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies in areas of mutual interest. If Congress
considers such restrictions absolutely necessary, it should tailor them to suspend only economic aid that is not crucial to immediate
U.S. interests. Press harder for reforms and use public diplomacy . Once Latin America had elected
leaders and fledgling markets in the 1990s, U.S. support for democracy and economic reforms declined. Although each country is
responsible for solving its own problems, external pressure can encourage progress. U.S. public diplomacy, which is
mostly reactive toward Latin America, should
American scholars, China's current practice isnt much different from that of Western colonizers of the last century. These scholars
believe that China doesnt care about local human rights or the state of democracy when dealing with countries. All China is
interested in is establishing long-term, stable economic relations . This realistic path is exactly
opposite to that of America's newfound idealism. Thus China has become a close collaborator of certain
Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, that are in sharp conflict with the United
States. The global financial crisis of 2008 was a chance for China to become an
increasingly important player in Latin American. As Europe and the United States were caught in a
financial quagmire, China, with nearly $3 trillion of foreign exchange reserves as backing, embarked on "fundsfor-assets" transactions with Latin American countries . So what does China want exactly in
entering Latin American? Is it to obtain a stable supply of energy and resources, and thus inadvertently acquire political influence?
Or the other way round? Presumably most U.S. foreign policy-makers are well aware of the answer. China's
[Nicholas, China and India Vie for Energy Security, May 25,
http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2012/05/25/china-and-indiavie-for-energy-security-11177.html]
The competitive relationship between China and India has become a defining
feature of the strategic environment across emerging Asia. While both nations are currently not in direct
conflict, there are several areas of strategic interest which could potentially be clashing
points in the future. Energy security is one such point; and while escalation between China and India
As China and India are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet
their energy demands, they are more susceptible to supply disruptions and price
fluctuations. In response, both countries have partly followed geopolitical energy
policies, based on notions of traditional security . Ultimately, what we see is the arrival of military and
political planning in trying to solve the issue of natural resource shortages . Energy security is of utmost
strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their
economies. Rapid growth rates in both countries have grown in tandem with increased demand for energy. By 2020, it is
estimated that China and India combined will account for roughly one-third of the worlds GDP and, as such, will require vast
amounts of energy to fuel their economies. As such, the competition for energy resources such as oil
and natural gas will only become fiercer. An important aspect of energy security is
maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. The sea lines of communication that run through Asia
effectively act as the vital arteries for both countries. Maritime security is thus of major national
interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security.
Recent military modernization within China has been focused towards upgrading
its naval capabilities, and ultimately moving towards creating a strong and
powerful blue-water navy. Indias drive for maritime dominance has resulted in its
naval budget increasing from US$1.3 billion in 2001 to US$3.5 billion in 2006, with plans to further increase naval
spending 40 percent by 2014. Chinas thirst for oil has doubled over the last decade, and is only predicted to rise. Similarly, India
relies on the energy shipped through maritime regions to fund its own industrialization. India continues to state its
maritime goals in pure geopolitical terms, even explicitly acknowledging in their 2004 Maritime Doctrine
that control of the choke points would be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of
military power remains a stark reality. Thus it is clear that energy security has been directly
translated into a national security issue, which has both political and military
implications. The geopolitical rivalry in Myanmar between China and India provides great insight into their adversarial
energy relationship. In Myanmar, both Chinese and Indian geopolitical and geoeconomic interests collide, and as such, may become
a point of contention between China and India. Myanmar holds vast strategic importance for both China and India due to its
location and abundance of natural resources. It has vast reserves of natural gas, so for both China and India it is presented as a
source of energy free from the geopolitical risks of the Middle East. There has thus been major competition between China and India
for access to the market. India has signed a US$40 billion deal with Myanmar for the transfer of natural gas, and has also had
frequent discussions about building a pipeline from Myanmar to India. However, China has increasingly gained the most from
Myanmars available resources. In 2005, for example, Myanmar reneged on a deal with India, and instead signed a 30-year contract
with China for the sale of 6.5 trillion cubic liters of natural gas. For China, Myanmar is also important as it provides a land route to
the Indian Ocean that vital resources could be shipped through in place of the Strait of Malacca. The potential for the
Kahn 9
Beginning in August, stories about new Chinese incursions into India have
dominated the 24-hour TV news networks and the newspaper headlines. China claims some 90,000
square kilometers of Indian territory. And most of those claims are tangled up with Tibet. Large swaths of
India's northern mountains were once part of Tibet. Other stretches belonged to semi-independent kingdoms that paid fealty to
Lhasa. Because Beijing now claims Tibet as part of China, it has by extension sought
to claim parts of India that it sees as historically Tibetan, a claim that has become
increasingly flammable in recent months. Ever since the anti-Chinese unrest in Tibet last year, progress toward
settling the border dispute has stalled, and the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The emergence of videos showing Tibetans
beating up Han Chinese shopkeepers in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities created immense domestic pressure on Beijing to crack down.
The Communist Party leadership worries that agitation by Tibetans will only encourage unrest by the country's other ethnic
minorities, such as Uighurs in Xinjiang or ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia, threatening China's integrity as a nation. Susan
Shirk, a former Clinton-administration official and expert on China, says that "in the past, Taiwan was the 'core issue of sovereignty,'
as they call it, and Tibet was not very salient to the public." Now, says Shirk, Tibet is considered a "core issue of national sovereignty"
on par with Taiwan. The implications for India's security--and the world's--are ominous. It turns what was once an
obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a
flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors . And that
makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than
just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of
Asia ought to take notice--a conflict involving India and China could result in a
nuclear exchange. And it could suck the West in--either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy,
as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.
dominance over the waters within this first island chain . At the southern end of the first island
chain, the South China Sea is crucial to Chinas commercial shipping , energy flows, and the
access of its Hainan island-based submarines to the Pacific. But the South China Seas southern and
western access points the Sunda, Lombok, Luzon and Malacca Straits are controlled by allies or
partners of the United States. The best way to offset this vulnerability is to control
the South China Sea itself and thereby loosen the American position in Southeast
Asia. Influential elites in China view the South China Sea as blue territory that is, as much a part of Chinas sovereign territory
as Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan. To this line of thinking, any surrender of its claims in the South China Sea would signal a weakening of
its rights to Tibet, Xinjiang or Taiwan and is therefore unthinkable. Chinas 1992 Territorial Law classified the South China Sea as
Chinas internal waters, meaning foreign naval vessels and aircraft must first gain Beijings permission before transiting, submarines
must surface, and that China retains the right to evict other countries shipping at any time. Beijings willingness to enforce this law
has been growing apace with its naval power in the western Pacific. In recent weeks, Beijing has placed the Spratly and Paracel
Islands and the Macclesfield Bank under prefectural-level administration, established a 45-member legislature to administer the
1100 people who live on the islands, and approved the deployment of a Peoples Liberation Army garrison to the islands. 2.
Southeast Asia avoiding the bad old days If unaddressed, the dynamics in the South China Sea
could return Southeast Asia to the bad old days of inter-state divisions , domestic
instability and competitive great-power interventions . On no other issue have the
disagreements and rivalries between ASEAN member states been so sustained and
obvious. The Philippines and Vietnam demand that the organisation supports them in standing up to Beijing. On the other side are
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, with no direct stake in the conflict and which refuse to endorse the Philippines and Vietnams
confrontational stance. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are concerned about the dispute, but believe that avoiding confrontation
with China will improve the prospects for productive negotiations. The stand-off over the South China Sea
exposes the hollowness of Asian institutions reliance on the principle of unanimity which
means that any members objection can keep an issue, no matter how pressing, off the agenda. Beijings refusal to discuss the South
China Sea in any regional meeting, and its implicit threat to withdraw from any organisation that doesnt respect this wish, shows
Southeast Asias confidence that it could socialise China by welcoming it into regional institutions was misplaced. Asian institutions
allow Beijing to make apparent concessions, such as its 2002 agreement with ASEAN to a Declaration of Conduct on the South
China Sea, without actually surrendering any part of its position. As China and the United States increase the stakes in the South
China Sea, ASEANs cardinal principle of neutrality is threatened . The Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia are tightening their strategic relationships with the United States, just as Cambodia, Laos and
Thailand deepen their links to China. And there are signs that the disputes have become entangled in domestic politics in the
Philippines and Vietnam, making their stances even more uncompromising. In Manila, following allegations that Beijing used
corrupt payments to soften the former Arroyo administrations stance on the South China Sea, the current Aquino administration
and its Parliamentary opposition are vying for the most uncompromising policies on the issue. To counter rumours circulating
around Hanoi that Beijing has bought the Vietnams senior leadership, the Vietnamese government has passed a law claiming
sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. 3. For the United States its about Credibility within limits It is in the South
China Sea that Southeast Asias anxieties about China overlap with American anxieties about Beijings naval buildup. Over the past
two years, the United States has taken an active interest and position in what had formerly been a dispute between China and the
other claimants. This means there are now in effect two layers to this dispute: a basic stand-off between the territorial claimants; and
an overarching strategic contest between Beijing and Washington. For the United States, whats at stake in
the South China Sea is the viability of its entire presence in the western Pacific.
The US Navys access to the South China Sea is contested by Beijing . China claims it will
respect the freedom of passage of ships and aircraft through the area, on the condition that they are en route to another destination,
and do not conduct military exercises or collect intelligence or militarily useful data. Washington is adamant that
the South China Seas sea lanes are international waters, and are therefore subject to
freedom of navigation, which in international law allows the conduct of military exercises and the collection of
intelligence and militarily useful data. If Washington surrenders its ability to navigate the South
China Sea on its own terms, it will lose a major foothold in the western Pacific . The
South China Sea in effect pits a Chinese expansive claim (sovereignty based on historical usage) against an American expansive
claim, that freedom of navigation allows the collection of intelligence and military data. The American claim is contested in other
waters by Malaysia, Indonesia and India, though supported by other regional countries. China accuses the US of hyping the
freedom of navigation question, arguing that it hides an intention to use the issue to build a coalition against China. For the
and partner in the Pacific. It realises that its arms-length response to the Asian Financial Crisis eroded its position in
Asia and set China on its path towards building soft power in the region. For Southeast Asians worried that Washingtons attention
or will to stay in the region may erode, there is virtue in keeping the South China Sea on the agenda. But Washington cant
give its allies and partners a blank cheque which allows them to confront , and even
provoke, China from the comfort of the assumption that the United States will back them up. And some in Southeast
Asia are watching Washingtons moves very closely, sensitive that any concession
could signal its acceptance of Chinas claims in the South China Sea. 4. Solutions are Part of
the Problem Either multilateral mediation or international law is most often used to
resolve disputes of this sort but in the South China Sea they act to exacerbate the
situation. Beijing refuses to discuss the dispute in any multilateral context , fearing that
it will facilitate the formation of a front against China. The Southeast Asian claimants, however, are
adamant that they must deal with China as a coalition , with Manila particularly insistent that
ASEAN must negotiate a common position before negotiating with China. The result is a stand-off: the Philippines
insists that ASEAN must find a common position before negotiating with China, while China will only negotiate if ASEAN abandons
the search for a common position. International law also intensifies the dispute. The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea does
Chinas evolving international personality, the response of its neighbours to its rising power, and the longevity of the United States
position in the western Pacific. With the growth of trade and investment around Asias IndoPacific coast, the South China Sea will
become ever more crowded with shipping and commerce.
Dowd 12
drilling in Cubas swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig
to extract Cuban oil. For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba . New
offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer . With
some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington
Times reports, and China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime
beneficiary of Brazilian oil. Chinas state-run oil and banking giants have inked
technology-transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil . Plus, as the Times
details, China came to the rescue of Brazils main oil company when it sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10
billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down $3.1 billion for
Chvez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing after being elected president, for example, Morales
proclaimed himself to be a "great admirer of Mao," while Chvez has exclaimed that Mao and South American revolutionary icon
Simn Bolvar would have been "great friends." While these leaders may primarily be seeking
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Ellis 11
and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from
being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese
markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements,
whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated
trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the
PRC benefits from the challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in
the region by regimes such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and
investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable . Nonetheless, as
mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes, which could
damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.
A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate
into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary
actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia,
Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all
other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the
United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully
annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and
begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into
India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of
military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a
full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or
[Stu. Staffer for China Radio Intl. American Dream now a Chinese
Reality 8/10/10 Xinhua]
As part of the commentary which focuses upon the general relationship between the developed and developing world, more often
than not a clear delineation is drawn between the way of life pursued by the people in the Eastern hemisphere and that of the
developed Western world, while Africa is generally left out altogether. Although it is necessary to acknowledge differences during
any analysis of East and West, the reality is that the most powerful country in the 'new'
Eastern/Asian bloc, i.e. China, has inherited many of the characteristics that made
America into the power it is today. The number of similarities between the two societies is astounding. China
is not only on the verge of becoming an equal partner within the world balance of power over the next 50 years; it is also set to
take America's place as a beacon for prosperity and opportunity . The United States of
America, as we know it today, came to being as a result of the culmination of the 1929 Wall Street Crash and the Second World War.
These two events allowed America to emerge as the worlds strongest power and accelerated the decline of former colonial powers
Britain, France and Germany. At this time, Asia was not even part of the equation. Today, however, it is possible to see a very similar
situation. This time it is China that remains well afloat within a sea of global recession and
Middle Eastern skirmishes. The fact that China holds huge dollar-denominated assets as part of their foreign
exchange reserves reaffirms Americas remaining importance within the global financial system, but it is generally
accepted by all that China will eventually balance America in terms of both hard
and soft power. The soft power that China cultivates often exists within the
developing world and is often seen as a rallying bloc contrasted against the selfseeking interests of developed nations. Building soft power was a priority for America post 1949 as it is for
China going into the 21st Century. China is going through the same stages of formation, albeit at an accelerated pace, that the United
States went through from the 1920s onwards. Disregarding the question of history (i.e. that China boasts a 5000 year history which
nobody below the age of 50 is willing to study in-depth, and America only possesses around 200 years of modern history, most of
which they would rather forget to a large extent), the similarities are quite clear to see. Not unlike America, China has become home
to many people from outside of its borders. Many people have set up a home here in hope of pursuing what is fast becoming the
both to
not that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end
China's growth miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge
China into a major economic downturn . The Chinese financial system will
implode
greater bitterness . Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to
manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows
what will happen if the growth stops.
bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while
the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the
prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of
central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated
by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed
on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate
more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese
society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and
social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to
include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are
unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or
severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings.
Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede , perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey
Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such
developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of
communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its
existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after
the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it
as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would
not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send
the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that served as the basis for the party's authority, the
CCP has adopted economic growth as the central justification for its one-party rule. The CCP
has pegged its political future to a type of "performance legitimacy" n12 - it governs
because it can provide faster growth and higher standards of living than any alternative form of central
authority. In Eastern China, the CCP's approach has been a nearly unqualified success. Special coastal economic zones, favorable
banking policies, and massive decentralization of government have combined to spur blistering economic growth. Western
China, however, has been left starkly behind: per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Western China is less than
half of what it is in Eastern China. The result has been rising income inequality, social instability, and dramatic
divisions between East and West, rural and city, and peasants and urban residents, along with the creation of a roaming underclass
kudzu-like economic growth. Where Marxism once served as the unifying national ideology, the CCP has
substituted wealth generation and prosperity as the touchstones of the regime and
suggested that the Chinese people judge the legitimacy of CCP rule by the increases
in their own standards of living. Economic growth in China has been spectacular, but it has also been highly
uneven. Eastern, coastal provinces have become wealthy, while central and western provinces have lagged far behind. In effect, there
is no longer simply "China." There is now Eastern China, which is urban, industrialized, and relatively prosperous, and Western
China, [*332] which is rural, agrarian, and relatively poor. This divergence in economic outcomes - a divergence that in places
coincides with pre-existing ethnic and religious fault lines - poses a serious threat to social stability within China. n19 In response,
the CCP has begun an aptly named "Western Development Program" in an attempt to prioritize economic growth, encourage
national integration, and curb nationalist unrest in Western provinces. Accordingly, the governing regime will be reluctant to join a
climate agreement that might contribute to greater instability by stunting crucial economic development in Western China. A.
Foundations of CCP Rule: Economic Growth Since 1949, China has been governed by the autocratic CCP, dominated by Chairman
Mao's conception of Marxism and designed to bring "socialist glory" to China while preserving party rule. After the Cultural
Revolution and Mao's death in 1976, however, the CCP, led by Deng Xiaoping, began to move away from the Marxist ideological
foundation that served as the legitimating discursive force for CCP authority. n20 Concerned with increasing levels of apathy toward
communism and questions about its efficacy as the governing regime, n21 the CCP turned to two new sources of authority and
legitimacy to galvanize support among the populace and strengthen its hold on power. The first of these was a new Chinese
nationalism. The second was an emphasis on continued economic growth - a type of "performance legitimacy" n22 - as a benchmark
and measure of the regime's success. From the late 1970s until the suppression of student-led democratic protests in Tiananmen
Square in 1989, Deng and the CCP moved slowly toward a reform of China's centralized economic policies and internal governance
structure. Deng and some of the reformers began to argue that the Chinese people wanted a higher standard of living, technological
dynamism, and economic efficiency, not more ideology and excessive bureaucracy. To be economically successful, they argued,
China needed the CCP's one-party rule to ensure stability and regain international prestige. In the words of one scholar, "in the most
fundamental sense ... China's economic reform strategy has been guided by a strategic [*333] vision at the top of the political
system. This vision links China's security, global influence, and domestic stability to the state of its economy." n23 Sustained
The CCP's economic policies have reduced the role of the state in the affairs of
daily life, leaving ordinary citizens more free to engage in social and economic
activities. In so doing, the CCP has reinforced the norm that prioritizing hypergrowth polices and ensuring economic development are the party's overriding
responsibilities. China is hardly unique in favoring continued economic growth; there are few nations on earth that are not
attempting to grow their economies and produce wealth for their citizens. In China, however, economic growth is
not merely a matter of policy. Growth, particularly in certain geographic regions, is viewed by the
CCP as a political imperative, integral to the regime's survival. As subsequent discussion will
demonstrate, this focus on economic growth significantly impacts the CCP's incentives to curb environmental degradation and
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
percent in the final quarter of the year.3 Energy exports have fuelled the Russian boom, but if oil remains
below $80 per barrel (the minimum price of oil as calculated by the Russian government to maintain its budget), Russian citizens
may begin questioning their lack of civil liberties or an electoral system that maintains the status quo. As markets begin to stabilize,
the immediate threat to these regimes appears to be diminishing. Nevertheless, understanding the impact of the
crisis on such countries can help us understand the impact that future crises may
have on governments whose legitimacy depends on economic growth .
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Abebe et al 10
discontent with rising inequality, unfair income distribution, and rampant corruption has made parts of
Chinese society volatile cesspools of potential instability." n61 At the same time, the CCP must
balance the need to ensure social stability [*341] with providing high rates of growth for elites. Regional disparities,
economic inequality, social instability, and class conflicts raise the possibility of a
new "revolutionary struggle" if the CCP is "unable to bring income redistribution to a point that is satisfactory to
the lower classes without disillusioning the entrepreneurial class and other well-to-do social strata and thereby hampering growth in
the economy." n62 Second, the East-West economic divide manifests itself as an urban-rural schism as well: n63 the vast
majority of job and wealth creation has occurred in urban areas. This has
produced a floating population, estimated at one-hundred million Chinese, that has left the rural areas to pursue
economic opportunities (mostly in the coastal cities). n64 The population exodus has placed greater stress on
the CCP to either improve economic conditions in the rural areas and the West (via the WDP) n65 to
slow the flow of migrants or fund the coastal regions' absorption of unskilled labor migrating
from the West. These forces generate a vicious cycle: the CCP's economic policies
favoring the eastern provinces encourage migration to those provinces, requiring
additional investment to maintain high levels of growth . Finally, as we noted briefly in the previous
section, Western China contains a number of ethnic separatist movements that might
challenge the CCP. The party has already struggled in dealing with pro-independence activities in Tibet, and it has
reason to fear that the fifty-six non-Han minority groups represented in (mostly
Western) China might push for self-determination. n66 For instance, Uighur separatists in the
Xinjiang province - an area rich with mineral resources n67 - are increasingly aligning themselves with Islamic fundamentalist
movements. n68 It is hard to overstate the significance of these types of prospects for
unrest in a developing state dependent on natural resources for [*342] much of its
growth: "The western region contains more than half the nation's reserves in 13 of the 45 main minerals ... [and] 80% of the
nation's potential hydropower and 58% of the nation's natural gas reserves." n69
products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively uncompetitive in China and subject to multiple formal and informal barriers
to entry. Despite the rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in this
arena can be measured in terms of the multitude of business owners who are
willing to invest millions of dollars and countless hours of their time and operate in China at a loss for years, based on
the belief that the future of their corporations depends on successfully positioning
themselves within the emerging Chinese market. The hopes of selling products to
China have also exerted a powerful impact on political leaders seeking to advance
the development of their nations. Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, for example, made
Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of Chile's economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin
American nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan Garcia made similar efforts to showcase that nation as a bridge to
China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2008. Governments in the region
(Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador), among others, as well as representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other
Chinese cities, with the objective of helping their nationals to place products in those
countries. Latin American leaders, from presidents to mayors, lead delegations to the PRC
and fund elaborate pavilions in Chinese culture and trade shows such as the
Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai World Expo in an effort to help their
countries' businesses sell products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese Investment. China's
combination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings rates
gives the PRC significant resources that many in Latin America hope will be
invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread
the region, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3
billion commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt $10 billion to Argentina to modernize its
rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1 billion advance payment to Ecuador for
petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for a hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3 billion to $5 billion in additional
investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho, Rio Blanco,
Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Au, and another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake in Brazilian
offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's Petrobras for the development of its
offshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For Latin America, the
timing of the
arrival of the Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major deals ramping up in
2009, at a time when many traditional funding sources in the region were frozen
because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil company Petrobras has
commented, China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 89-90]
Although the interdependencies between Mexico, the
trade . The US-Colombia free trade agreement, for example, which was ratified in May 2012, is seen
in China as a possible alternative to Mexico for Chinese and other producers seeking to enter the US
market (Portafolio 2011). Similar calculations exist within the nations of Central America
and the Dominican Republic concerning their own free trade agreements with the US, such as CAFTA-DR, as well as the US-Panama
Free Trade Agreement (ratified in October 2011) and the US-Peru Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect in 2009. As with
US commercial agreements with the rest of the region, the
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 88-9]
Crime and Security Interdependencies. Growing criminal activities linking China,
Mexico, and the US are driven by many of the same factors associated with the commercial
ties between the three nations, including the strategic position of Mexico with respect
to PRC access to the US market. To date, such triangular connections have
manifested themselves in two areas: human smuggling and narcotrafficking, with
money laundering remaining a matter of potential concern. With respect to human
trafficking, Mexico is not only a transit country for persons migrating from Central
and South America to the United States, but also for those coming from the PRC
and other parts of Asia. Organized crime groups such as Red Dragon smuggle
Chinese immigrants through a variety of different routes transiting Europe and the
Americas, frequently leveraging Chinese communities en route, generally with the US
and Canada as final destinations. As of mid-2012, such routes included entry through the
Mexican Pacific ports of Puerto Vallarta in Jalisco, Manzanillo in Colima, and Coyoacn,
in Mazatln. In other cases, Chinese immigrants are smuggled into South America often through Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru - and from there, via land routes through Central
America8, crossing into Mexico at entry points such as Frontera Corozal in the state of Chiapas
and on to Tapachula, where there is a sizeable Chinese community. From that point, Chinese
migrants reportedly follow a route that begins with a journey by train to the Atlantic coast, and
then follow the coast northward through territory controlled by Los Zetas, to ultimately arrive in
the United States (Ellis 2012/a/b). Still others arrive by air directly to Mexico City, where the
activity of Chinese trafficking networks has been publicly reported by the Mexican Attorney
Generals office. In addition to human trafficking, the supply chain for illegal drugs
creates another connection between the PRC, Mexico, and the United States.
Mexican cartels, such as Sinaloa and Tijuana, obtain many of their precursor chemicals from
Asia including, but not limited to, essential ingredients for methamphetamines, such as
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (El Peridico de Mxico 2011; La Prensa 2009; Ellis 2012/a; El
Universal 2010). The Mexican cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacin, for example, is believed to
import ephedrine from China and India to produce methamphetamines, which are ultimately
sold in the United States (Noticias24 2012). Mexican authorities have made multiple seizures of
such precursor chemicals arriving from China and India in recent years at Mexican commercial
ports such as Lzaro Crdenas and Michoacn (Carvallo 2012; Noticias24 2012) Shipments of
precursor chemicals have also been intercepted coming into other Latin American
countries such as Peru, and have been linked to Mexican cartels such as those of Sinaloa
and Tijuana (Reforma 2011), suggesting the emergence of a global narcotics supply
chain with China, Mexico, and the US as key nodes for source chemicals, management
and production, and consumption, respectively. With respect to money laundering, the
proliferation of Chinese commercial banks in the region offers new options for
Mexico-based cartels to convert drug earnings generated in the United States into
legitimate income in Mexico. The use of Chinese companies and banks is attractive due to
even while the U.S. combination of liberal democracy, free markets, and privatization is increasingly
seen
as ineffective for solving the region's endemic problems , such as corruption, poverty, and
Chinese model is particularly attractive because
it suggests that it is possible to achieve prosperity and growth without
relinquishing political power.
inequality. For traditional Latin American elites, the
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 67-68]
The end of the Cold War and East-West confrontation ushered in an environment conducive
to economic globalization. Globalization is the defining feature of our current age .
Countries have connected with each other more closely than ever before , and the
cross-border flow of capital, goods, and personnel has become an integral part of
modern life. When adjusting to the tide of globalization, some countries make special arrangements in their region so that
their interests can be better served. Regional cooperation is used to manage and even control
the flows of capital, goods, and personnel in any given region, yet the hindrance of
cross-border flows of production elements does not seem to be a goal of such cooperation.
Regional cooperation is not meant to resist globalization. It is simply an instrument developed by
countries to aid in adjusting to the globalization process. It would be wrong to use regional cooperation as a synonym for
exclusiveness, as there is no reason that regional cooperation should prevent the formation of new international partnerships.
Regional cooperation in this case in the form of the North American free trade zone
can substantially influence relations between the United States, Mexico, and
China. The North American free trade zone was established in the 1990s, and is composed of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. Each countrys economy complements the others, given that each is in a
different economic stage and has its own unique advantages. The U.S., Mexico, and Canada
together form a solid market, conducive to the production of manufactured goods and energy. As a major supplier of
manufactured goods, Mexico benefits a great deal from this type of cooperation .
However, North America is not isolated from the global economy . With the establishment of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 1, 1995, the United States - as a global superpower and the
largest economic body in the world can no longer constrain itself to a regional market . It is almost
inevitable for North American countries to come into contact with actors from other parts of the world. Some countries
may find that their shares in regional markets are diminishing with the arrival of
outside countries prompted by the framework of the WTO, yet the presence and influence of external countries may bring
new opportunities to these regions. For example, in regards to the relationship between China and
Mexico, the two countries may compete to some degree in terms of exporting to
the United States. However, Chinese-Mexican relations go far beyond exporting to the
U.S. market . As an emerging power and a representative of a region enjoying robust economic development,
China now means more to Mexico economically than does the United States . Firstly,
the adjustment of Chinas economic structure may help to change the false
impression of Chinese-Mexican trade relations and allow Mexico to further pursue
interests in economic cooperation with China. In regards to Chinese-Mexican relations, the common
perception is that the two countries compete with each other in the U.S. market due
to the fact that their exports are very similar. However, this may not necessarily be the case , as some scholars
have pointed out that the competition between China and Mexico has been exaggerated, and
in fact the two nations complement each other in more aspects than in which they
compete
United States.
would be beneficial for Mexico . Thirdly, China can also act as a bridge that
Mexico can use to engage with other East Asian countries. East Asia is a region that
has been attracting global attentions due to its strong economic performance. The region has not
only maintained a high growth rate, but it also has a vast market with great potential,
with over one billion people in the region entering into a so-called middle class. Therefore, the U.S. is
increasing its investment in and shifting its attention to Asia - actions that would benefit Mexico
as well. However, it appears that Mexico has not found an effective way to develop cooperative
relations in East Asia. The U.S., for example, does not seem overly eager to involve Mexico
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Mexico therefore must depend on itself to step into the
western region of the Pacific, making it even more crucial for Mexico to strengthen its
relations with East Asian countries. China, as a major player in East Asia, has extensive economic and
trade relations with other countries in the region, and could help Mexico put its
foot in the door, so to speak. China and Mexico, therefore, have the potential to help each other
achieve intra-regional cooperation .
countries
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 86-7]
Trade and Investment. The
consumers in recent years has, to some degree, come at the expense of Mexico-based manufacturers and
Mexican jobs. The competition for the US market , as it has played itself out in the last decade has not
only involved competition between Mexican and Chinese exporters, but also
decisions by foreign-owned multinational firms about where to conduct
outsourcing operations.5 When the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in December
1992, a key selling-point of the agreement for Mexican audiences, in the eyes of then Mexican President Carlos Salinas,
was the prospect of attracting foreign investment to the country , with a particular interest to
the access that Mexico would provide to the US market (Salinas de Gortari 2008). By the early 2000s, however, the presence
of the PRC in the equation, was resulting in dynamics not fully contemplated
during the debate over approval of the original agreement. With the entry of the PRC
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, multinational companies increasingly began
to locate their manufacturing operations in the PRC . Although the displacement
of foreign direct investment from the Mexican maquiladora sector to China (Garca
Herrero and Santabrbara 2005) was strongly emphasized during the early years following the PRCs accession to the
WTO, by 2007, a new dynamic had begun to emerge: Chinese companies investing in Mexico , with the
objective of securing access not only to the Mexican market, but also to tariff-free access to the US
under the terms of NAFTA. Examples proposed auto plants by Chinese automaker FAW in Hidalgo and Geely in
Leon (Dickerson 2007) a plant for the Chinese computer company Lenovo for manufacturing laptops in Monterrey, as well as a cloth
manufacturing facility in Durango for the Chinese firm Sinatex (Hernndez Camargo 2011). The economic
interdependence between Mexico, the US, and China via the US market was
further highlighted by the PRCs January 2012 proposal to negotiate a free trade
agreement with Mexico (Daz 2011), providing incentives for Chinese (as well as other)
companies to conduct final assembly operations in Mexico to export to the US market,
not only to avoid tariffs under the provisions of NAFTA, but also to more effectively serve the US market due to Mexicos relative
proximity. The
limited to trade
and investment.
and wages, another revenue flow from the US to Mexico that impacts the purchase
of Chinese goods comes in the form of remittances. In 2010, Mexicans working in the United States
sent an estimated $21 billion in remittances to their families and friends in Mexico, a more significant source of income for the
country than foreign tourism (Jimnez 2011). The impact of each of the above-mentioned revenue streams
on
Mexican consumption of Chinese goods is distinct . Remittance and wage income
goes directly to families, and is therefore arguably the most correlated with
Mexican purchases of Chinese consumer goods. The Mexican production process
itself, by contrast, is linked to the consumption of intermediate goods from the PRC, while
the corporate earnings of exporters is tied to Mexicos purchase of Chinese capital
goods.
dealings with Latin America, consistent with the "nonthreatening" character that
Beijing wishes to emphasize in these interactions. Despite PRC "marketing efforts," by contrast to the global
impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is arguably one of the PRC's weakest levers of soft
power in Latin America, with interest in Chinese culture arguably reflecting, more than driving, China's influence in
the region. Although some Chinese culture is reaching the Latin American
mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally limited and
superficial, sometimes based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in those countries. Such
perceptions are often mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a sense
of mystery regarding Chinese culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from
the perceived differentness of that culture and commercial competition from
Chinese products.
AT//China Bad
Chinese interaction in Latin American markets inevitable
Shaiken et al 13
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
Several policy recommendations result from this analysis. First, solely
production and trade integration between Mexico and the U.S . Second, NAFTA
countries require additional policies and incentives to encourage competitiveness
in the region, particularly regarding the manufacturing sector. Behind the substantial trade losses since the year 2000 are
million of jobs. If the governments of the United States and Mexico are sincere in their
aim to maintain and increase high-quality jobs, manufacturing will play a critical
role. Coordination of policies in these areas within NAFTA from industrial and innovation
policies to research and development should be promoted actively not only at the national level, but at the regional
level as well.
Fortified by both globalization and its economic policies, China has thus become
an ardent supporter of the existing international economic orderan almost total
reversal from Maos opposition in the 1950s and 1960s. In international relations, dominant states typically want
to preserve the status quo and rising states want to change it. But today, it is China that wants to preserve key features of the current
world order,whereas the United States, the lone superpower, seems bent on shaking it up by creating coalitions of the willing
assembled outside established international organizations. Chinas national strategy is designed to
continue its fast domestic economic growth, the regimes principal legitimizing
factor besides nationalism; attract maximum resources (technology, investment, and strategic materials) from the international
system; and reduce external threats that might deplete its resources. This strategy
does not emphasize rapid military growth, and with good reason: fast expansion of
the armed forces would alarm the outside world and likely produce countervailing
coalitions; high military expenditures would also drain Beijing of badly needed
human and material resources just as President Hu Jintao, emphasizing the importance of turning China into a
harmonious society, sets out to expand human, environmental, and infrastructure investment for those Chinese left behind by the
countrys rapid development. After Maos dependence on coercive power and Dengs on economic power, China now seeks
Chinas peaceful
Rosenberg 5
The Chinese
defense budget has grown by double-digit increases for the past fourteen years. This
year it's up by 12 percent. But that is not significantly faster than the Chinese economy as a whole is growing. China is modernizing
its defenses -- adding anti-ship missiles to aircraft, acquiring AWACS-airborne early warning and control systems, guided missile
destroyers and frigates. However, its power projection capabilities are limited. It lacks any
long-range amphibious capability or support infrastructure to supply forces over long distances
for a protracted period. It also lacks heavy cargo-carrying aircraft, comprehensive air
defenses, seaworthy ships, and aircraft carriers. Given the current state of Chinese equipment and
training, the Chinese have no capability to pursue an expansionist maritime policy in
the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. [1] By contrast, the U.S. has overwhelming
military superiority and an expansive network of military bases across the Asia-Pacific. The
U.S. Pacific Fleet is the world's largest naval command, including approximately 190 ships, about 1,400 Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft and 35 shore installations. Over 300,000 Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, and Intelligence military
personnel are integrated under the unified command of PACOM, the U.S. Pacific Command. What are China's strategic goals
between the Straits? China's Defense White Paper of 2002 emphasizes the importance of
Aff
Slayer 2AC
US influence in Latin Americas resilient and the thesis of the DA is
wrong
Duddy & Mora 5-1
presence of foreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe,
Latin America was the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel
every year to Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-
interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the
importance of our ties to the region. We have many individual national partners in the
Americas. We dont need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a
whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy . A greater commitment to
work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to
Link NUQ
Economic engagement now
Valencia 5/20/13
(Robert contributing writer for Global Voices Online, New Yorkbased political analyst, U.S. and Latin America Economic
Cooperation Without Militarization?
www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/05/20/us-and-latin-americaeconomic-cooperation-without-militarization)
President Obamas meeting with Mexicos President Enrique Pea Nieto centered
on the historic economic relationship between the two countries , and furthered their
conversation on economic and commercial initiatives as well as immigration issues. Additionally, Pea Nieto highlighted Mexicos
economic growth and the necessity for bolstering student exchange. Both leaders agreed to create an
economic team led by Vice President Joe Biden and Mexican Secretary of the
Treasury Luis Videgaray. They resolved to create projects to improve infrastructure and
security along the 3,000 kilometer-long border, one of the worlds largest.
Coop Inev
Cooperations inevitable
Seelke 13
AT//China
US-China influence isnt zero-sum
Xiaoxia 5-6
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 32-33]
If one simply looks at Chinas trade surplus with the United States and Mexico, one
would assume that China plays a very influential role in the triangular relations
between these three nations. However, as the Chinese saying goes, there is no diplomacy for a weak country ,
implying that developing nations inherently assume a submissive role in relations with
economic superpowers. In this sense then, economic power becomes the most important
factor in the context of international diplomatic relations . Applied to the framework of the
trilateral relationship between China, the United States, and Mexico, this theory clearly assumes the
existence of one key player . There is no doubt that the United States is a superpower, not only
will
surpass the U.S. in 2016 to become the worlds largest economy, the fact remains that
China is still a developing country and only one of the regional powers in Asia ,
unlike the United States, which is a leading global superpower . The economic performance of
the United States remains very impressive. Even though the economy of the U.S. was significantly
affected by the international financial crisis, and is still in the process of recovering from an economic
recession, the United States finds itself even now in a unipolar moment of
unchallenged superiority. Therefore, although China is referred to as the second
largest economy in the world, such accolades would be dampened if Chinas situation
were viewed comparatively, as a whole, with the United States. It is clear that Chinas economic status
among these three countries, but also in the world. Although the International Monetary Fund predicts that China
has been increasing in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), which is the correct unit of measurement when examining the cost of
living. However, the traditional measure of GDP, calculated in dollars at current exchange rates, [indicates] that the U.S. economy
remains nearly six times the size of Chinas (Stallings 2008:241). Furthermore, it is widely known that
most important economic partner, a status which is supported by the fact that the
U.S. is the second largest export destination for Chinas manufacturing products ,
following only behind Asia as a whole. What is more, China is the most significant shareholder of U.S.
stock, and both countries enjoy a close, mutually beneficial relationship in terms
of their economies, their militaries, and their cultural and interpersonal exchange .
To a certain extent, China and the U.S. are mutually dependent on each other. However, it is
worth noting that the United States holds the upper hand in terms of the bilateral
relationship between the two nations. Superficially speaking, Chinas swift economic
growth has greatly strengthened its economy, hence the reason it has been regarded as world-class
economic power (Smith 2008:215). However, the commodity boom is unlikely to last forever (He
2012:31). Chinas manufacturing road to modernity has become rocky and uncertain
for a number of reason: The first is related to increasing labor costs in China , not only
compared to what they were before, but also in terms of neighboring countries such as Vietnam and India. According to AlixPartner
Consultancy, compensation costs in East Asia a region that includes China but excludes Japan rose from 32% of U.S. wages in
2002 to 43% in 2007. And since wages have been increasing at a rate of 8% to 9% a year, taxes have been increasing as well. East
Asias overall costs have doubtlessly escalated even more during the last two years (Devonshire-Ellis 2011). The effects of
wage increase in China have been exemplified by American companies like Adidas
leaving China in response to escalated labor costs. What this ultimately means for
China is a gradual loss of its comparative advantage as the lowest-cost producer in
the manufacturing sector a status that it has maintained for decades. Secondly, United States-based
multinational companies (MNCs) are crucial in determining the structure of the
global production system, labor mobilization, and international trade flow. China ,
as the final assembler of goods produced by the MNCs, has enticed such companies with low costs of labor. This has
incentivized many MNCs in the manufacturing sector to build accessory plants in China, which now account for over 60% of Chinas
exports.2 Consequently, MNCs receive a large percentage of these export profits, calling into question the true trade surplus that
China has with the U.S. and Mexico. In other words, the United States, as a primary base for MNC-
explore a new model of development - that is, from an export-driven model to one
based on innovation - in order to sustain its economic growth .
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
The analysis of Ping Wang highlights that
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 68-9]
Secondly, although
developing economic relations with the major powers in the region, but also strengthening its cooperation with many medium-sized
countries as well as regional organizations. Some countries in the region, however, do not maintain diplomatic relations with
Mainland China, and do with Taiwan. Secondly, China has begun to pursue universal cooperation
with Latin American nations, with more and more dimensions emerging in its various relationships including
tourism, cultural exchange, security issues, climate change, etc. Thirdly, topics of interest between China and
Latin American countries have gone beyond the bilateral and regional levels , with
these nations exchanging views on the world order and global affairs. Thus , China believes that its relationship
with Latin America has strategic importance.2 Certain Chinese scholars have pointed out that the
Chinese-Latin American relationship has exhibited unprecedented growth in the new century (Zheng and Sun 2009). Chinas
increasing reinforcement of its relationship with Latin American countries, however, does
not imply any intention to enter into geopolitical competition with the United
States . Economic development is the primary goal of Chinas cooperation with Latin
American countries. Indeed, China wants to expand its exchange with Latin American
countries to include other areas such as education, culture, politics, security, etc., given Chinas belief that one-dimensional
relationships are both unhealthy and unsustainable. Chinese-Latin American economic cooperation
needs to be both complemented and supported by diplomacy in other areas. Therefore, from the
Chinese perspective, developing comprehensive relationships with Latin American
countries has little to do with strategic or military competition . In fact, Chinas
engagement with Latin American countries in the realm of security is quite limited ,
compared with their other economic and political partnerships. The Chinese military has just begun to interact with its Latin
American counterparts. There have been no regular or institutional arrangements between
which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies programand truly multinational Chinese corporationssuch as Hong
Kongbased Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTE the general
particularly in high technology, services, and commodity sector investments, while challenging the PRC monopoly
over "south-south" developing country partnerships in the region. When China cut off purchases of Argentine
soy oil, for example, it was India that picked up the slack .
[Harley. Prof in the Center for Latin American Studies at UCBerkeley. And Enrique Peters Center for Latin American Studies at
the University of Miami. And Adrian Hearn Centro de Estudios
China-Mexixo at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. China
and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas: China and the
Future of US-Mexico Relations, 2013. Pg 7-8]
However, closer
ties to China also have signifi cant disadvantages for both Latin
America and the United States: Growing trade deficits. Latin American leaders
who sign trade and investment deals with the PRC have noticed that China's
exports are more affordable than their own goods, which contributes to trade deficits. Chinese goods are
made by laborers who work for one-third of the wages of Latin American
counterparts and who tolerate worse working conditions . Officials in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico have signaled their unease about trade with such a hot competitor. In September 2005, Mexican President Vicente Fox made
it clear to visiting President Hu Jintao that dumping electronics and clothing was unacceptable. For every dollar that
Mexico makes from exports to China, the PRC makes $31 from exports to Mexico .
[9] Disinterest in economic reform . Some analysts believe that the commodities-based trade
model used by China will undermine the progress that Latin America has made
toward industrialization. While countries like Chile and Brazil have moved beyond raw materials exports, others with
powerful presidents or ruling oligarchies may be tempted to fall back on plantation economics. Income gaps between
the rich and poor may widen as a result. Moreover, such narrowly focused economies are
vulnerable to downturns in commodity prices. Some 44 percent of Latin Americans already live below
the poverty line. If these countries fail to adopt reforms, social inequality and political
instability could depress U.S. exports to the region and increase migration
problems. Scramble for resources. To obtain commodities, China offers tempting
investments in infrastructure. In contrast, the United States cannot offer direct tie-ins
to state industries and can only offer development aid , now in decreasing amounts. Chinese
competition may make Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) money a less effective incentive to democratize governments and
liberalize markets. The one-to-two year lead time from proposal to disbursement of MCA