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Anepistemological
sciences?
introduction
Donatella
dellaPoftaandMichael
Keating
ffid,*, inthesociat
sciences
Partisansarticulatetheir positionswith passionand intensity,yet the nature of what
dividesthem is hard to pin down. At timeswe hearof a stand-offbetween'qualitative'
scholars,who make use of archival research,ethnology,textual criticism, and dis-
'quantitative'
courseanalysis;and scholars,who deploy mathematics,game theory,
and statistics.Scholarsin the former tradition supposedlydisdain the new, hyper-
numerate, approachesto political scienceas opaque and overly abstract,while
'old'ways
scholarsof the Iatterstripederidethe of studyingpolitics asimpressionistic
and lackingin rigor.At other times the schismis portrayedasbeing about the proper
aspirationof the discipline- betweenthosewho believethat a scientificexplanation
of political life is possible, that we can derive something akin to physical laws of
human behavior, and those who believeit is not . . . at still other times the rivals are
'rational
portrayed as choicetheorists,'whosework is animatedby the assumption
that individualsarerationalmaximizersof self-interest(often economics,sometimes
not), and thosewho allow for a richer rangeof human motivations (Shapiro,Smith
and Masoud 2004a:l).
19
Donatella Keating
dellaPodaandMichael
I Thegoalisinference. research
Scientific isdesigned or explana-
to makedescriptive
of empiricalinformationabouttheworld. . .
on thebases
torv inferences
The proceduresare public. Scientificresearchusesexplicit, codifi.ed,and public
methodsto generateand analysedatawhosereliabilitycanthereforebe assessed ...
areuncertain. . .
The conclusions
4 Thecontentis themethod.. . . scientific
research to a setof rulesof infer-
adheres
enceon whichitsvaliditydepends.
reEr
Whatcanweknowandhow?Ontologies
andepistemologies
inthesocial
sciences
it
:
Usually,competing approachesin the social sciencesare contrastedon (a)
relatedto the existenceof a realand objectiveworld; (b)
lirl
their ontologicalbase,
their epistemologicalbase, relatedto the possibilityof knowing this world and iili
tli'l
the forms this knowledgewould take;(c) their methodological base,referring
to the technicalinstrumentsthat are usedin order to acquirethat knowledge
l:iii
i:ili
Iitit
(Corbetta 2003: 12-13). liill
The ontologicalquestionis about whatwe study,that is, the objectof inves- liill
tigation. Disputesabout the existenceof a physicalworld go back to the tiill
ancients.This is not the point at issuehere,sincefew peoplenow bother to
dispute the existenceof physicalobjects.rRather,the question is how the
iliii
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world fits togetherand how we makesenseof it. The natural sciencesare still
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home to argumentsabout how we identif| natural phenomena,for example ii,il
whether taxonomiesof speciesreally exist in nature or are the product of j;i
scientificclassification
. For nominalists,categories only existbecausewe arbi- ii;ii
trarily createthem. For realists,2 the categoriesare there to be discovered.
Again,we shouldnot overstatethis point. Therearecertaincategories that are lir{
unchallengedand others that everyone acceptsare the product ofconvention. ilr$
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dellaPortaandMichaelKeating
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Howmany inthesocial
approaches sciences?
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Table
2.1.Howmanyontologies
andepistemologles
inthesocial
sciences?
Ontologicalissues
Doessocial Objective; Objective, Objectiveand Subjective:
reality exist? realism critical realism subjectiveas scienceof the
intrinsically spirit
linked
g:r.x. :..;i::.-j
kS,.."*",|J Donatella
dellaPortaandMichaelKeating
Lif-: rtii'tril
'Since
words of Emil Durkheim (1982: 159), the law of causality has
beenverified in other domains of nature and has progressivelyextendedits
authority from the physicaland chemicalworld to the biologicalworld, and
from the latter to the psychologicalworld, one may justifiably grant that it is
Iikewisetrue for the socialworld.'
In neo-positivismand then post-positivism, theseassumptionsare relaxed.
Realityis still consideredto be objective(externalto human minds), but it is
only imperfectly knowable. The positivist trust in causal knowledge is
modified by the admissionthat somephenomenaare not governedby causal
laws but, at best, by probabilistic ones. This does not representa sharp
break with the natural sciencesbut follows modern scientificdevelopments
(Delanty 1999). If positivism closely resemblesthe traditional scientific
method (or Newtonianphysics)in its searchfor regularities,post-positivism
is closerto modern scientificapproaches,which accepta degreeof uncer-
tainty. Criticalrealistepistemologyholdsthat thereis a realmaterialworld but
that our knowledgeof it is often sociallyconditionedand subjectto challenge
and reinterpretation.6There are mechanismsgoverninghuman affairsthat
may be unobservedand unobservable,but theseare not thereforeto be dis-
counted.Again, this is also true in the natural sciences,where theorieshave
often beenformulatedand appliedbeforethe underlyingcausalmechanisms
havebeenexplicated.
Similar ideasarepresentin (social)constructionlsz(sometimescalledcon-
structivismT).This approachdoesnot, asis sometimesthought, arguethat the
physicalworld itself is the product of the imaginationof the socialscientist;
rather, it is he/shewho puts order onto it. As Hacking (1999:33) explains:
'Social
constructioniststend to maintain that classificationsare not deter-
mined by how the world is but are convenientwaysto representit.'Theories
are not descriptionsto be evaluatedby their literal correspondence to some
discoverablereality, but partial ways of understandingthe world, which
shouldbe comparedwith eachother for their explanatorypower (Kratochwil,
ch. 5). The world is not just there to be discoveredby empirical research;
rather,knowledgeis filteredthrough the theory the researcheradopts.
Theseontologiesand epistemologies shadeinto the interpretivisfapproach.
Here, objective and subjective meanings are deeply intertwined. This
approachalso stresses the limits of mechanicallaws and emphasizes human
volition. Sincehuman beingsare'meaningful'actors, scholarsmust aim at dis-
coveringthe meaningsthat motivatetheir actionsrather than relying on uni-
versallaws externalto the actors.Subjectivemeaning is at the core of this
knowledge.It is thereforeimpossibleto understandhistoricaleventsor social
a
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Howmanyapproaches
inthesocialsciences?
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therefore impossible,and scholarsshould focus on the meaning through iiti:l
empatheticknowledge. itl;i
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Howmanymethodologies
in thesocialsciences? li
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Donatella
dellaPortaandMichael
Keating
ff :j
'grounded
theory', it may be built up in the courseof the research,but then
be availablefor further researchand the study of other cases.Casesare not
broken down into variablesbut consideredasinterdependentwholes;gener-
alization is achievedby assigningcasesto classesand approximatingthem
to ideal types. Context is consideredas most important since researchon
human activity must consideran individual's situationalself-interpretation
(Flyvbjerg2001:47).Predictabilityis impossiblesincehuman beingschange
'practice
in time and spaceand,in the words of Bourdieu(1977:109), hasa
logic, which is not that of logic'. The outcomeof the researchthen takesthe
form of specificexplanationsof cases,but also of refined conceptsfor the
analysisof future cases.
This tlpe of research,like the positivist approach,seeksexplanationsfor
social outcomesbut does not expect to derive thesefrom universalrules.
Rather,explanationcomes from the interpretation of people'smotives for
their actions. Ferejohn (2004: 146) clarifiesthis distinction by contrasting
'externalist'
and'internalist' explanations:
FEqWlwl@
to method
Frommethodology
It would thereforebe a greatsimplification to saythat there is a distinction
betweenquantitativeand qualitativemethods correspondingto the distinc-
tion between positivist and interpretivist epistemologies.Methods are no
more than ways of acquiring data. Questionsabout methods do, however,
come togetherwith epistemologyand theory in discussionsabout method'
ology,whichrefersto the way in which methodsareused.Herewe facechoices
Howmanyapproaches
inthesocial
sciences?
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ffijffi dellaPodaandMichaelKeating
Donatella
inthesocialsciences?
Howmanymethodologies
Table2.2.
E{fri{Nff{#ffi
Howmanywaysto knowledge?
where only one paradigm is consideredas the right one, combining theory,
methods and standardstogether,usually in an inextricablernixture (Kuhn
1962:109).Thosewho seethe socialsciences asparadigmaticstressthe impor-
tanceof convergingon (or imposing) one singleway to knowledge.
(b) Anarchist,hyper-plurqlistic
approach.At the other extreme,there is an
'inclusive'
position that combinesscepticismabout a 'true'knowledge with
enthusiasmfor experimentationwith different paths to knowledge.Those
who subscribeto this position to various extentssupport Feyerabend's anar-
chism and his belief that:
problem, on the other hand, will tend to look for the method and approach
that seemsto offer more by way of understandingof the case.Exponentsof
the first approachare accusedof studying methods for their own sakeand
choosingonly issuesthat are amenableto that method - summed up in the
old adagethat if the only tool you haveis a hammer,everyproblem startsto
look like a nail (Greenand Shapiro1994;Shapiro2004).Thosewho focuson
problems,in contrast,are accusedof adding nothing to the writings of his-
torians and journalists(Shapiro,Smith and Masoud 2004a).
Waysof combining knowledgecan be characterized assynthesis,triangu-
lation, multiple perspectivesand cross-fertilization. Synthesisinvolves
merging elementsof different approachesinto a single whole and can be
done at various levels. Synthesizingdifferent epistemologiesis virtually
impossible,sincethey rest on different assumptionsabout socialreality and
knowledge.Methodologiesmay be easierto syrrthesize since,aswe haveseen,
they are not necessarilytied to specific epistemologicalassumptions.
Techniquesand methods are most easilycombined since,aswe havenoted,
many of them canbe adaptedto differentresearchpurposes.Socomparative
history and historicalinstitutionalismhaveadoptedand adaptedtechniques
from comparativepolitics,history and sociologyto gain new insight into
processes of change.
Tiiangulationis aboutusingdifferentresearchmethodsto complementone
another.Again,it is difficult to triangulatedistinct epistemologies,
easierwith
methodologiesand very common with methods.So positivistscan incorpo-
rateinterviewsand textualanalysisinto their researchdesigns,althoughusing
theseashard dataratherthan in the mannerof interpretivists.Casestudiesare
frequentlyusedto complementlarge-Nstatisticalanalyses aswaysof opening
'black
the box'of explanation(seeHdritier, ch.4). Surveyresearchmay be
complementedby ethnographicwork, which exploresthe way in which ques-
tions areunderstoodand the meaningsof the responses.
Multiple perspectives impliesthat a situationmay havemorethan one inter,
pretationaccordingto how we view it. De Tocqueville( 1999)wrote that in his
life he had met theoristswho believedthat eventsin the world owedeverlthing
to generalcauses,and practicalpeoplewho imaginedthat daily eventsand
actionswerethosethat movedthe world - he addedthat both weremistaken.
Allison's (I971) study of the CubanMissile Crisis examinedthe sameevents
using differentframesto comeup with differentexplanations.
It hasbeen said that everyoneis born either an Aristotelianor a Platonist
(Hacking 1999:84),yet hardly any socialscientistnow is a naive empiricist
who believesthat the world representsitself to us without interpretation.
ff;:*riii:::{{ry
inthesocialsciences?
Howmanyapproaches
ffiffi
'eclectic
different parts of the enterprise must respectinternal coherence.If an
knowledge' of qualitative and quantitative techniques enriches a researcher's
curriculum, human limits, together with the increasing sophistication of most
qualitative and quantitative techniques, impose some specialization. The
following chapters offer difrering approaches in ontology, epistemology and
methodology but also indicate points of commonality and overlap.
NOTES
W
I This is eitherbecausethey acceptthe materialworld, or becauseit is a questionthat cannot
and neednot be answeredand is thereforefutile to debate.
2 This is one of the termsin socialsciencethat hasa multiplicity of meanings.In international
relationsit hasa rather differentmeaningfrom the one givenhere (seeKratochwil,ch. 5).
3 In fact,eventhe individualistsolution,reducingthe ontologyto the individualhuman being,
doesnot answerthis questiondefinitively,as one might arguethat eventhe self-regarding
rational individual is an artefact of social sciencemethodologyand not somethingthat
occursnaturally,sincethe original condition of human beingsis the group.This is arguedin
Adam Ferguson's( 1966)Enlightenment classtc,Essayon theHistory of Civil Society,of 1767.
4 Aclassicexampleofthisisthecaseofgender-Whilenobodydeniestheexistenceofsexua
differences,there is a big disputeover the categoryof gender,which includesa lot of other
attributesand roleswhich havebeenmappedonto sexdifferences.
5 Van Langenhove(2007)claimsthat late twentieth-centurysocialscientistshaveoften por-
trayedthe classicalsociologistsas more simplisticallypositivistthan they reallywere.
'a
6 Critical realismhasbeendefinedas philosophicalview of scienceand/or theologywhich
assertsthat our knowledgeof the world refersto the-way-things-really-are, but in a partial
fashion which will necessarilybe revised as that knowledge develops'.Christopher
Southgate,www.meta-library.netI .
seeHacking (i999: 47-9).He recommendsleavingthe
7 For a discussionof the dift'erence,
term'constructivism'to the mathematicians.
8 This taps into a long-standingdivision in philosophy betweendeterministsand those
emphasizingfree will. While for St Augustineand John Calvin, determinismwas a matter
of divine selection,for modern socialscientistsit is a matter eitherof geneticprogramming,
socialconditioningor a predictableresponseto institutionalincentives.Believersin freewill
cannotby definition be certainabout how anotheractor will behave,no matter what con-
straintsthey are under.
9 In practice,socialscientistsoften go back and forth between and theory-driven
approachesas they seekto frame their projects.
l0 This is not to be confusedwith the pure deductivemethod,in which conclusionsarederived
from premisesby pure reasoning,with no empirical researchinvolved. H6ritier (ch.4)
explainsthe link betweeninduction and deductionin the positivisttradition.
I I Theseterms are not usedin a value-ladenway to suggestthat one is better than the other.
Hard methodscorrespondto the view that socialsciencecanbe madeto resemblethe phys-
ical sciences;
soft methods to the view that socialreality is more elusive.
Howmanyapproaches
inthesocialsciences?
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