Koha Digest # 77

EDITORIAL

BESNIK DEFENDS TUZLA

by VETON SURROI

The radio inside the BMW informs automatically that it is 21:30. One week before, this was a
sign that curfew starts thirty minutes later. Besnik does not care. No only because there is no
more curfew in Tuzla and many other parts in Bosnia, but because there was never any
curfew for him. His BMW is known to the whole town, as the car of one of the best warriors
of this area.

We pass through the middle of the town. Near the cafe where several months ago a grenade
killed 77 youths - another sign of resistance. The youths are again on the streets: Italian
fashion on men, girls compete whose skirts are shorter. Fingernails and hair fashion reflect
the seducing smiles. Essentially different from the camp inhabited by refugees from
Srebrenica. In the morning, a foreigner bought 180 bubble gums for refugee children: as soon
as they saw them, the mothers started pushing the children and taking the gums for
themselves.

Besnik glances discretely. He just turned twenty two and for a moment, interrupts his story
about war. Looks at the youths on the street in the last days of October. "You see them today,
but they could surprise you tomorrow. If needed, all would be on the first line of the front".
He probably knows what he is talking about. He is a Captain of the Bosnian Army, its elite
part, the special units. Together with his commander, also Albanian, he was one of the first
who entered Gorazde, with the special mission to send explosives to fill up the ammunition
which would defend this enclave. He was also among the first to see the surprise of the locals:
"We were masked as we entered the town, and our only signs of identification were the
Albanian and Bosnian flags. When the locals saw the Albanian flag, they asked whether
Albania had joined the war too".

One of his commanders is in Sarajevo, and the other one is in Doboj. Both of them are
Albanians, and this I stress not because of curiosity or national feelings, but because it is a
very important element for Tuzla. When was started, states the secretary of the municipality
and member of the Tuzla crisis headquarters, the organization of the defence of Bosnia was
lead by now a legendary Albanian officer, deserted from the YPA. Not only did he organize
the excellent military formation which didn't allow the fall of this town, but Serbian forces
saw themselves forced to retreat some thirty kilometers. The radio commanding orders were
given in Albanian, so Karadzic's forces wouldn't understand a thing. "At one stage, we could
hear them say: Albanians are attacking us!", claims the secretary.

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
-1-
The car is leaving the center. We pass by his shop, Levi's exclusive representative in Tuzla. In
front of his shop, a bookstore. As soon as the door opens, a huge picture of Alija Izetbegovic
stands up front and some twenty versions of the Koran. On the right hand side, Tudjman's
works (who is indirectly responsible for Besnik's wounding in the kidney) and Momo Kapor
(who is bit more directly responsible for Besnik's life in state of war) together. On the left, the
whole old edition of philosophy and sociology. On the top, Latin-American and French
novels. "Can you find anything similar to Tuzla anywhere?", asks Besnik. Nowhere.
"When will war stop?", I ask him. "When the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes
ours", says.

I still hear "ours" echoing in my ears. Everything is so relative in this town.

DIALOGUE

IS KOSOVA CHECHENYA?

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

"There are important rumors that Slobodan Milosevic, in the same

way Yeltsin calls Ruslan Hasbulatov to settle the problems with the
Chechens, - is willing to call Mahmut Bakalli and Azem Vllasi to
actively become part of the process to find a solution for Kosova"
- says Nasa Borba on last Saturday's edition, in a comment which
has "upset" the Albanian readers. The article actually departs from
the idea that "Rugova is now between the radicals and the moderate"
in regard to the dialogue with the Serbian side, grounded on their
interpretation of the interview with Adem Dema‡i, as well as the
internal divisions of the political structure of the Albanians and
the largest Albanian political party in regional groups - "Llap",
"Gjakova", etc.

Thus, according to the author of the comment, Vice-Chairman Hyseni

is part of the "Llap Group" (LLAP is the area comprising Podujeva
municipality), although he was born in Gjilan, and allegedly this
clan is mainly composed of young people and the "Marxist-Leninists"
of '81, while the "Gjakovans" are comprised of the former political
establishment. Rugova has allegedly been isolated by the radicals
and the moderate who accuse him of not being able to take advantage
of the situation and get out more for Kosova, and according to Nasa
Borba, in the expected turmoil, Rugova could "be burned", and
instead, he would be replaced by Vllasi and Bakalli. This is not
the first article of the kind and it could be a trend which is
"discovering" "blasts", "changes", etc. among Kosova Albanians...
but, what to the "actors" of these rumors say?

Asked by KOHA to comment on these claims, Mahmut Bakalli considers

that "we should not waste our political energies giving a reply to
a journalist of Nasa Borba, as one our parties did..." Our

-2-
collocutor considers that the article is a poor comment which
doesn't reflect Kosova's reality, but takes some "stereotypes" and
invented differences, as is the case with the alleged regionalist
groups, as a starting point... Our collocutor further states that
he never belonged to any group, including the "Gjakova group".
"This is an invention of the UBD (secret police) created in
Rankovic's time, and which was revived after 1981 and was helped by
some Albanian officials longing for a career...

"The only division ever possible in Kosova would be who is in favor

of the independence of Kosova and who is not!". "I and all the
other names mentioned in the article, and I believe the Albanian
people in general", continues our collocutor, "is in favor of the
independence of Kosova. In case there are differences between us,
further considers Bakalli, those are "secondary", therefore it is
useless to try and find a "realist" among us, who would agree to
keep Kosova under the Serbian rule, says Bakalli, and continues:
"The comparisons with Chechenya are crazy. Kosova is not Chechenya,
and here there are no Hasbulatovs, and Serbia is not Russia nor is
Milosevic Yeltsin!" Thus, considers Bakalli, the only ones to be
"burned" in the Kosovan political scene are only the ones against
the independence of Kosova. I have no ambitions for a political
career, but I am fighting for the independence of Kosova as Rugova
and all the others who are mentioned in this article". In regard to
the qualifications "radical" and "moderate", he said that this is
not primary in Kosova and stresses that "all are in favor of
political solutions through negotiations, but we are also all
determined to establish the independence of Kosova". Bakalli
considers that there are no Albanian-Serb contacts, and "as far as
it concerns me, I do not contact or negotiate with the regime in
Serbia and its political parties, because I would tell all of them
to talk to Ibrahim Rugova as the legitimate representative...",
concludes Bakalli.

The other actor of this critical text, Azem Vllasi responded from
Texas, where he has been for some time. Vllasi considers that the
conditions to start the dialogue are more favorable than in the
beginning of the crisis, before all because of Milosevic's changed
behavior, who was now forced to "become pragmatic and finally was
convinced that his aspiration to create Greater Serbia by war and
hurting the others is not accomplishable. "Serbia and Serbs are
sick of war", says Vllasi.

In the case of Kosova, Milosevic got convinced that Albanians are

patient, that they can't be broken by violence, while Kosova can
not be held by force forever, and meanwhile he was forced by the
international community to cooperate, which at the same time,
stated that the problem of Kosova exists and it seeks a solution -
considers Vllasi. "These factors" - further says Vllasi - "also
insist that the problem of Kosova should be solved by dialogue and

-3-
political methods, and the Albanians chose this option as the only
way to solve their problem". Vllasi thinks that none of the parties
should put conditions for dialogue, but one precondition would be
that none of the parties can't choose the "desired" collocutor...;
the other would be to accept the mediation of the third party, i.e.
the international community (because this is the only way to
achieve something); the principle of equality should be applied,
and not that "Albanians are asking for something and the Serbs are
giving it to them".

"The hesitations of the author of the text in Nasa Borba that

Mahmut Bakalli and myself are Milosevic's "desired favorites" in
conversations about Kosova, are first of all ill-purposed
speculations coming from Belgrade, so we would get disqualified in
the eyes of the local Albanians... "Anyhow, this is not a private
issue, or something that depends on someone's wish, therefore mine
neither. It is quite well known how the people who participate in
official conversations are selected!"

If something can be concluded from these direct statements, then

one thing is sure: Kosova is far away from Caucasus and that there
are no essential differences between these two Kosovan politicians
and the Kosovan political center which according to the 1992
elections has the mandate to talk. It seems that our collocutors
don't dispute this mandate and that, as a determination line, they
are both in favor of the independence of Kosova. It is very hard to
find the "moderate" and "radical" groups in this unison
determination.

Asked by KOHA whether the LDK has authorized anyone to contact or

start a dialogue with the Serbian party, the vice-chairman of this
party Hydajet Hyseni denies this possibility by saying "that this
didn't happen in our presidency".

In fact, having in mind the actualization of this issue in Serbia

media, now repeated also by some Serb media, as was the case of
"Nova Demokratija", the impression is that Belgrade wishes to speak
more of the problems regarding the dialogue rather than have the
dialogue running. This impression is also gotten by accusing the
Albanian party that Albanians have internal problems, and that in
fact this was the reason why dialogue wasn't starting! This is also
how one can start thinking after reading the Serbian media and
their pronunciations about the "moderate" and "the suitable" and
the others with "whom it is very hard to talk to!" This leads
towards the conclusion that the intention is to find "suitable"
Albanian collocutors, and that the problem is elsewhere and not in
Belgrade. Nevertheless, without wanting to justify the postures of
Kosovan political parties and individuals, there is no way to evade
the ascertainment that the key to the dialogue and the beginning of
the conversations stands in Belgrade! The Albanian party has,

-4-
monotonously, at least every week in the LDK press conference,
repeated that it wants dialogue. It is no secret that the dialogue
is the Albanians' main card... This doesn't mean that the Albanian
representatives are not fearing the conversations, which were even
stressed in public, after insisting on having the "third party"...

However, there is no other way out. In regard to the other side,

the impression is that the feeling about the need to have the
conversations start is increasing on a daily basis, but it is still
not ceratin how to do that. What is evident is that it is insisted
on not having the dialogue at a high level, which would include the
highest political instances, including Milosevic. This was said by
"Nova Demokratija" in a conversation we transmitted in KOHA...
Regardless of the disagreements with the Albanian party about
dialogue, they do not determine the fate of the dialogue at all.
The key to the dialogue is in Belgrade. If this has to be proven,
then it is very easy. Just make a public call for dialogue and we
will soon see who will reply to it...

KOSOVA IN THE RE-REGIONALIZED FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Related to the reactions caused by the statement of the vice-

chairman of Nova Demokratija about the lack of success in
establishing a contact for dialogue with the LDK and "the
suitability" of Vllasi's postures, we tried to contact Mr. Lekovic
at the Parliament of Serbia, but we were told that he was
officially in Kragujevac. Asked about this issue, Vllasi declared
that he doesn't know Lekovic and that he never met him. "Therefore,
I don't know about what postures is he talking about. Long ago, I
met with Tanic in a conversation, as well as with ND's chairman
Mihajlovic who used to be my staff from the "Socialist Youths'"
time, and who even today calls me "boss". But I know of no
conversations and postures apart from these private ones...",
states Vllasi, who concludes by saying that there are tendencies of
disqualification in all these words...

Asked about this issue, Tanic said that Lekic's statement is his
personal view. "Lekic has not participated in any official contacts
about Kosova and is not authorized to give any statements on behalf
of our party. Our attempts to establish a serious contact with the
LDK have failed but do not feel that everything has failed
completely...

We have agreed in some conversations is that things should start

from small steps-education, health, police treatment, etc.
Our attempts were done also in the name of the government, but were
not realized, even though we consider that all doors are not closed
yet!

-5-
An idea to include even more political personalities in this
dialogue which would be valid for both sides (it would, e.g. be
good to have Draskovic on the Serbian side) would rather have the
purpose to expand the negotiating teams which would make
conversations easier, says Tanic.

"Our posture is that a problem as Kosova, even though it should be

observed respecting the sovereignty of Serbia, should be solved, in
fact, in a wider scope of contemporary reintegrations in the former
Yugoslavia in the political, economic aspect and that of collective
security, etc.", states Tanic. "This would be an optimal solution
for the region, including the Kosovan problem", concludes the high
ranked "Nova Demokratija" official.

ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CHECKER BOARD

Hydajet Hyseni, vice-chairman of the LDK speaks of the problem of

Serb-Albanian dialogue, postures, obstacles...

KOHA: What is LDK's posture about dialogue?

HYSENI: LDK's and the democratic movement's orientation, in

general, about dialogue for the solution of Kosova's issue
peacefully, implies dialogue as a way to solve the problem. There
are many speculations about dialogue, lately. It is very
understandable that political dialogue also implies a portion of
shrewdness. But when this comes out on the surface, when the
schemes are done on purpose, then dialogue has not many chances to
succeed. The impression is that the Serbian politics is not ready
to have a real dialogue and a just solution for the issue of
Kosova. If it were interested for this, Serbia wouldn't have even
created the unbearable and dangerous situation. In a way, dialogue
is accepted, however this is done just formally, as a consequence
of the pressure it undergoes. The dialogue is accepted just to make
it fail.

KOHA: Do you think the contrary will happen, now with the
"cooperative policy" Belgrade is applying...?

HYSENI: It would be normal, but we have no signs that something of

the kind will happen. A good sign for this would be the immediate
halt of repression. Exerting pressure and at the same time asking
you to talk with them is the same as to shut someone's mouth and
invite him to have a chat! On the other hand, every time dialogue
is mentioned, Serbian media starts a propaganda campaign full of
intrigues, misinformation and disqualification... As if the Serbian
leadership were interested to have a dialogue start but not to have
a real dialogue, but actually have a monologue. It actually wants

-6-
to be on both sides of the checker board. We would also want to
have as collocutors people who are not chauvinists, who have done
no harm to our people, who are democrats. But it is not our
business to determine the members of the Serbian delegation. This
is a matter of the Serbian government, people and public. In the
same way, it is not Serbia's business to determine the
representatives of Kosova. Kosova and Serbia should talk as equal
subjects. I would say as a conversations between two republics...
Kosova could be represented only by the representatives which were
elected in the free elections and who have the mandate. Only those
who have created the republic can speak in the name of the Republic
of Kosova, and not those who are against it. Time of Esat Pasha
Toptani's diplomacy is over.

KOHA: You believe then, that there are Hasbulatovs among Albanians?

HYSENI: I don't, because the previous experience has proven what

would their end be... I am glad that some former politicians of
Kosova do understand this and are not allowing themselves to be
trapped.

KOHA: Does the LDK believe in dialogue with the Serbs?

HYSENI: The LDK and I would say the whole democratic movement has
no reason to avoid dialogue. On the contrary, our chances are in
the dialogue. We have invested a lot in dialogue, but in an equal
dialogue which would be also serious and fruitful. To have it so,
we believe that there must be dialogue in the presence of a third
party.

KOHA: What about the "internal divisions" and "Llap or Gjakova

groups" inside the LDK? Would these represent an obstacle to create
an Albanian team to start conversations?

HYSENI: These are speculations which don't deserve our attention.

BS!

BBC INTERVIEWS

ILIJAZ KURTESHI, Former politician

INDEPENDENCE - THE BEST SOLUTION

* Having in mind the current situation in Kosova, as well as the

latest developments in the former Yugoslavia, but also the actual
relation of forces in the Balkans, which would, according to you,
be the best solution for Kosova?

-7-
KURTESHI: The best and most realistic solution would be full
independence of Kosova. We must have in mind the realistic and
objective situation we are facing, therefore, we must discuss all
other options and alternatives, so we can come to an adequate and
possible solution right now.

This means that we must orient our engagement in the direction of

those solutions which are more suitable, but not forgetting that
both our preparation and the influence of the international factor
will be decisive.

* You used to be one of the high ranked party and political

officials in the former federation. You were even President of the
Federal Parliament during one mandate. Perceived from this
position, which would be the importance of the constitutive element
which Kosova had in the former Yugoslav federation in the solution
of its status today?

KURTESHI: We always must refer to the constitutional position of

1974. According to that constitution, Kosova was an equal unit of
the federation, and it was part of Serbia only formally. Looked
upon from this position, it comes out that independence of Kosova
is not only grounded on the historic right, but also on the rights
it had in the former Yugoslav system.

* How do you explain the fact that one of the reasons why Belgrade
insisted on lifting the autonomy was the so called "existence of a
state in a state"?

KURTESHI: I said that Kosova's independence in that system was

quite big, and this bothered Belgrade a lot. I can say that after
the adoption of the '74 constitution, some processes to restrict or
annul the positions of the provinces had started. The attempts
failed, because the system had some defending mechanisms for what
it adopted itself.

The 1974 Constitution and the position of Kosova in it has always

been object of discussion for Serbia. Therefore, the attempts to
suspend the autonomy started in 1974.

* Who do you think is the most responsible for the loss of, how you
say, the independence of Kosova in the former Yugoslav system?

KURTESHI: The main to blame is Serbia's leadership which wouldn't

agree to the position of the Provinces in that system. I believe
that the other republics are also to blame, for they haven't
supported us to defend the constitutional right of Kosova.
Kosova's officials are also guilty, because they failed to mobilize
all the forces we had to defend the position we had. They allowed
Serbia to suspend everything Kosova had in that period.

-8-
* How do you comment the requests of some individuals and circles
to have the former politicians return to politics, you being one of
those former politicians?

KURTESHI: I believe it is necessary and a very big responsibility

of the present structures to use the existing human potential they
have at their disposal, in Kosova and the diaspora. I believe that
here we have many unexploited resources. I also believe that
capable people, regardless of what they do or where they are,
should be engaged, and finally I think that young, energetic and
dynamic people should also invited to join the activities.
In regard to my person, I believe it would be much better to engage
younger people who have not be used properly. But, I believe that
whoever wishes good to Kosova, including myself, have to be ready
to give due contributions for Kosova.

BBC INTERVIEW

AZEM VLLASI, former politician & attorney at law

CREDIBILITY DOESN'T RUN OUT?

* It seems that there must be consent of Belgrade for any political

solution regarding Kosova. What do you think about some rumors that
Belgrade would be ready to offer Kosova the status of a republic in
the "FRY", and would this solution be acceptable?

VLLASI: We should be careful with these things, for it could be a

deception as it happened so many times in regard to Bosnia and
Croatia during the past 4 years. But, if that solution would be a
compromise, and politics in the Balkans (including the solution to
the former Yugoslav issue) is full of compromises, then relevant
factors of the international community must be the warrant of such
relations in a Yugoslavia which would eventually be a Union of
equal sovereign states in which Albanians would be completely equal
political subjects, with the right to secession from that
Yugoslavia if freedom, equality and the democratic right are
endangered.

But we must not hurry. Our determination for independence still

remains just and legitimate. Serbia knows this very well,
especially knowing that Serbs do not want to live with anyone in a
common and equal state. One day, world will have to agree with
this.

* Several days ago, you met British Secretary of State, Nicholas

Bonsor in Prishtina. What do you think is the role of Great Britain
in overcoming the actual contradictions and the situation in

-9-
Kosova?

VLLASI: The British diplomacy is quite active and mainly respects

the determinations of the other international factors about
Kosova's question. It has no special posture and in essence it is
in favor of the compromise solution acceptable for both sides and
thus evade war.

They are willing to mediate in the eventual Serb-Albanian dialogue

in concrete issues, as education, the end of repression for
political motives, etc. until a global solution for Kosova is
found.

* You used to be Kosova's top official, even in the times when

Belgrade started taking away Kosova's competencies. Having in this
in mind, can there be any talk about of your responsibility and
that of other officials in Kosova for what happened later?

VLLASI: It is true that since 1981 there were huge pressures coming
from Serbia to restrict the constitutional functions of Kosova.
And, until the end of 1988 and beginning of 1989, we defended our
constitutional competencies and the government mechanism in Kosova
functioned, when Serbs, facing our resistance, the strong
resistance of the people, started penetrating in Kosova through the
federal organs which had competencies over the federal units,
including us, and especially in some extraordinary cases. Then, the
Presidency of Yugoslavia decided to use the force, I was arrested,
and the constitutional autonomy was stepped on, by violence. The
other instrument of violence was the Communist League as the ruling
party, and the reason was that the Albanians stepped out from it
massively.

There would be talk about responsibility if Kosova would have been

handed over without resistance and political manipulations. There
were no conditions whatsoever for armed resistance.

* How do you comment Adem Demaçi's suggestions but also of some

others to see you involved in politics again, and on the other
hand, what doo you think about the comments by some circles that
you have wore out your political credibility?

VLLASI: I take this as one of Vllasi's proposals, within the frame

of real evaluation of our general situation. Evaluations,
suggestions and proposals coming from Adem should be respected. He
is very realistic and thinks and suggests the engagement of all
political forces, including all individuals which could contribute
for the cause.

Political credibility, which you refer to, is not something that

wears out. Credibility only grows, with fails and losses, and the

- 10 -
lessons it teaches - meaning that only by learning something from
the political situation, one can contribute in a way.

* If you were the creator of the politics in Kosova, or its leader,

how would this policy develop or look like?

VLLASI: The determination for independence from Serbia must remain

strong. The eighty years' long experience taught us. We need
dynamics and bigger invention. All means and methods of the
political and democratic struggle, excluding terrorism, accepted
and applied by the world, should be applied by us, as well.

I don't understand the peaceful policy as a passive politics and

politics of just sitting, but as a politic which implies more
activity to have something happen on a daily basis or the
realization of the democratic rights.

MONUMENTS

HISTORY IN GARBAGE CANS

by ASTRIT SALIHU / Prishtina

Kosova is more and more looking like a Serbian province. Regardless

of the fact that it is inhabited by 90% Albanians. The names of
streets on the facades of the buildings are written in cyrillic,
while the inscriptions in the shops, even though they mean
something only in Albanian or a foreign language, must by all means
be written also in cyrillic.

In the offices of the Serbian administration we find pictures of

the Serbian leader Milosevic and Arkan the criminal hanging, beside
the orthodox icons or a medieval Serbian saint, cyrillic
documentations and by all means accompanied by the tunes of Serb
folkloric music coming from small transistors broadcasting first
program of Radio Prishtina, which "speaks" only in Serbian since
five years ago.

And not only this, but different centers of Kosova there are always
more busts of personalities from the Serbian past and history and
less and less Albanian figures. It wouldn't be strange to find a
bust of an Albanian personality in sewage recipient holes or
garbage containers, as it happened with Emin Duraku's bust in
Gjakova and Hasan Prishtina's in Prishtina.

In Kosova, Albanian history and culture are thrown into garbage

cans. After each discharge of Albanian historic facts, something
Serb erects.

- 11 -
Therefore, all Kosova's facades are full of cyrillic inscriptions
and all urban centers are being filled up with monuments and busts
of Serbian personalities.

Walking down the core of Prishtina, one can see the achievements of
Serb "reconstruction". The Serb Orthodox Church is being
constructed in the University Campus, in front of the Rectorate
stands the monument to Dositej Obradovic, on the grounds of the
Faculty of Philosophy stands the bust of Vuk Karadzic. All of this
would imply the existence of a Serbian culture if those monuments,
temples and busts were erected in an unused location or a location
not comprised by the urbanism plan. However, Vuk Karadzic's
monument was erected on the fundament of the monument to 104
victims of fascism - created by sculptor Radoslav Musa Miketic -
while the bust of Dositej Obradovic was placed in front of the
building of the Rectorate when the sculptures of the Symposium of
Contemporary Sculpture which aimed at becoming an international
event, were removed from the grounds.

The idea was to have these sculptures spread on all areas of the
University Center. Naturally, these pieces had no national or
ideological determinations; the themes were various and sculptors
from all parts of the Former Yugoslavia participated, including
Vojislav Vujisic, Agim Çavdërbasha, Svetomir Arsic, etc. We could
say that such "cultural" initiatives of Serbia have very low
motives and the least they have are cultural purposes. Behind stand
the political purposes aiming at the Serbianization of any Albanian
trace, be it cultural, traditional, urban or architectural.

All monuments of Serb "reconstruction" of the living environment in

Kosova are in a way, artificial implantation of the rigid bodies of
the Serbian past in the Albanian cultural ind. These are cruel aims
to de-historicize, marginalize and ignore one people. The fact that
out of 417 streets in Prishtina, only 8 hold the names of Albanian
personalities, of those who can hardly be found in books of
Albanian history, proves this. The background of this whole thing
is clear: Albanians must feel de-historicized, they must feel as a
people without a past and at the same time must have implanted the
feeling of the lack of future in these lands.

What is more disappointing in this row of political barbarianism is

the fact that it didn't happen in Prishtina alone or another town,
but it is happening all over Kosova. In Prizren's old core, near
the Serbian orthodox church, Czar Dusan's monument was placed, and
it's location is very close to the department store which was
constructed when the motto "let's ruin the old and build the new"
was in fashion. Naturally, the urban center near the orthodox
church where the largest concentration of silver filigran shops
originating from the 19th century, was destroyed. This motto was
radically applied especially in Kosova in the name of communist

- 12 -
ideology, which destroyed or disfigured towns, as happened with the
ancient core of Prishtina, along with the mosques from the 14th
century, the synagogue and the catholic church (the same location
where the new church was built), which were "replaced" also by a
department store. The experts on the construction policy interpret
this as a trademark of Serbia and Yugoslavia in these areas without
urban culture and tradition, whose "style" is noticeable throughout
Kosova, where the towns are completely "new" and "constructed" with
the application of Yugoslav socialism in them.

All of those which have no urban continuity are being changed with
the installation of Serbian monuments or busts. Even those which
were constructed to the memory of the triumph against fascism here
- are disappearing, maybe even on purpose, on the fiftieth
anniversary of the victory against fascism! The removal of the
monument to brotherhood and unity of the Kosova people in Gjakova
was also cynical. It happened in the time when the Serbian
president again referred to this ex-Communist political slogan in
his policy towards Kosova. The reasons why this monument was
removed are found in the great Serbian religiousness! They needed
another orthodox church.

The monument in Klina was ruined in the most vandal way possible.
It was projected by Slobodan Maldini (student of famous Bogdan
Bogdanovic). What is paradoxical in all of this, as the well known
attorney and human rights activist Nekibe Kelmendi says, is that
this monument cost as much as twenty apartments, while the contract
for its construction was signed in 1985 by Milos Jeremic, then
President of the Municipality of Klina.

But, these don't happen only because of the individual initiatives

of the people who hold the power in the local administration in
Kosova.

These acts are result of decisions and acts adopted by the highest
legislative organ - the parliament. As Kelmendi stresses, referring
to the construction of the church inside the University Campus, the
"Parliament of Serbia, with a Decision on the supplement to the
Decision for the Adoption of the Detailed Urbanism Plan of the
University Center in Prishtina, adopted on 15 December 1990, and
published in the "Official Herald of the RS" #18/90, added
paragraph 4 which states: "A Serbian orthodox temple will be built
in the part of cadastre lot # 7090 of the municipality of
Prishtina, and so will the Institute for Serb ecumenical history
and its accompanying buildings." So, in a complex exclusively
foreseen for superior education, a religious temple was to be
forcibly constructed, and what is worse, by violating the law.
These violations were evidenced in many aspects: the elaboration
and adoption of the act was done without the participation of the
local authorities where the site is located; the act was not

- 13 -
adopted by the competent organ - the Municipal Assembly of
Prishtina; the draft program for the preparation of the space plan
was not done by the competent organ - The Planning and Development
Institute of Prishtina; the local association never discussed about
the proposal, and the proposal never came from the executive organ
of the municipality, which is a legal must. This Decision was also
contrary to the Decision for the adoption of the Urbanistic Plan of
Prishtina until the year 2000. But, the authors of this plan were
not only Albanians. The plan was elaborated during autonomy which
tends to be presented by Serbs as the period of Albanization of
Kosova. The co-authors of this plan were also the Institute for the
Construction of the Town of Belgrade, the Road Institute in
Belgrade, the Center for the Urban Planning and Development in
Belgrade and the Urbanism Institute of the SR of Croatia.

The last case is that regarding the League of Prizren, which is of

big cultural importance, since it is one of the main monuments of
the national movement in the 19th century. This case illustrates
the lack of respect and devaluation of everything Albanian by the
Serbs. By decision of a municipal organ, all valuable historical
and cultural objects were removed from the building, for the
accommodation needs of Serbian refugees from Croatia. Ethnographer
Shpresa Siçeca evaluates this decision, as well as that for the
erection of Czar Dusan's monument as "vandal and barbarian acts
which respect no civilizing norms. These works are only Serbian
folkloric decorations which don't respect the cultural tradition
and continuity and whose purpose is the Serbianization of the
environment". Many things were Serbianized in Kosova. Only
Albanians that have nothing Serbian in them remain. As if the
dilemmas how to Serbianize Albanian are making Serbs more
aggressive. Thus it happened with a young Albanian who was "drawn"
the four "s" Serbian cross on his skin by the Serbian police. Maybe
this Albanian will become one of the most original monuments of the
Serbian culture in Kosova...

MACEDONIA

CONTROLLED INSTABILITY TRAINING!

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

Twenty four days after the attempt against President Gligorov's

life, the Macedonian public was given the first details on the
investigation conducted by the Macedonian police in cooperation
with experts from 12 other states. In a press conference, the
Minister of Interior of Macedonia, in his first appearance in
public after the attempt, confirmed that a strong financial-
economic group from the neighboring country stands behind the

- 14 -
attempt, and that its representative remained in Shkup on September
28, and set up the explosive device!

The purpose of the attempt to physically liquidate Gligorov, was to

create a situation "of controlled instability" in Macedonia. As
expected, the minister communicated that he offered his resignation
to the Premier Crvenkovski. Only several days before this, the
President of Macedonia was released from the hospital and is now at
home. The main surgeon, Jovica Ugrinovski, who conducted the
complicated surgery on Gligorov, announced the President's comeback
to the political scene, in "Nova Makedonija": "We consider that the
recovery was fast. The public shouldn't be surprised if within a
couple of weeks, Gligorov will be talking to the journalists at a
press conference".

At the press conference, Frckovski declared that investigations

were organized and conducted on two levels: the criminal and
counter-informative. On the first level, 25 experts from the USA,
Great Britain and Germany, besides the local experts, participated
actively the maximum was reached. On the second level,
investigations were conducted in cooperation with other 12 experts
(which do not include the experts from Serbia, Bulgaria and
Russia). This group managed to establish only one fact: the name
and last name of the representative of this grouping seated in the
neighboring country, who remained one day in Shkup and set the
bomb.

Frckovski considers that the attempt was realized in three steps:

first, the inspirator, second the organizer and third - the
executioner. For the time being, there are facts about the first
and second level. The political motives for the attempt, according
to Frckovski, are the following: first, Gligorov's elimination -
would cause the controlled instability in the state, i.e. the
restriction of its political and economic sovereignty, and the
subjugation to all possible interests of the inspirator. The
purpose of the attempt was also the restructuring of the political
team, now in power, meaning that the new team would function in
accordance with the political interests of the inspirator. The
chosen moment was, conditionally said, the second round of
Macedonia's independence and economic stability, which would allow
the "clean capital" to get into the country.

Frckovski also said that the attempt could have been directed
against the governmental organs, the Ministry of Interior in
particular. At the end of his statement, Frckovski said that he was
politically responsible, and immediately after the press
conference, he offered his resignation to Premier Crvenkovski.
The journalists were very much interested to listen to as many
details as possible about the attempt, but Frckovski gave evasive
answers. This was explained by the need of secrecy at this stage of

- 15 -
investigations. There was no answer to the question which was the
neighboring country, what was the name of the "representative",
whether Macedonian nationals were involved, whether foreign secret
services were involved, and why was the impression that opposition
parties were involved created, with the permanent interrogations of
their members... The name of the former Interior functionary Pavle
Trajanov was mentioned several times, and he was the first one to
mention that organized crime was active in Macedonia, and that high
ranked officials were involved in it. Frckovski declared that this
had nothing to do with the attempt, and then stated that the
changes in the leading posts of the Ministry of Interior are result
of the new organization of the Ministry, done in accordance with
the law. Asked when could the public expect full information on the
case, or whether the police has everything under control, the reply
was direct: "The police does not have everything under control.
This form of criminal acts are very hard to discover even in more
serious states".

It seemed that the press conference confirmed what was supposed -

that investigations "at the first level didn't lead to the
perpetrators, while the results achieved in the following two steps
were reached thanks to the cooperation with the foreign police
services. If Frckovski is proven to be right, then it will confirm
Reuters's supposition that financial interests of organized crime
are behind the attempt against Gligorov.

To be honest, one year ago, Frckovski himself declared that there

are attempts to introduce the capital lead by the former foreign
(neighboring) secret services in Macedonia. In this context, the
KOS (Yugoslav military secret service) and the Bulgarian secret
service, as well as some banks and firms were mentioned, as
allegedly linked to them. The statements stopped there, and it is
not clear what was the Ministry of Interior doing in the meantime,
and whether it did anything in that direction. To claim that the
seat of this grouping is in a neighbouring country, opens the path
to many combinations. In this direction, some mention Frckovski's
statement that the attempt has destabilized Bulgaria more than
Macedonia...

On the other hand, having in mind the often repeated confirmation

that organized crime in Macedonia also comprises a part of the
establishment, and if the recent confirmation about the background
of the attempt is proven, it de facto supports the opposition
leader's statement that the attempt is a part "of the quarrel at
home".

Another question was evaded during the press conference: what does
Frckovski's resignation really mean, whether it was irrevocable or
maybe there is a chance for the premier not to accept it. It is
clear that the premier is in a very delicate position: it would be

- 16 -
normal if he would accept the resignation as well as the opinion of
the minister himself about his political responsibility. But, on
the other hand, the Ministry of Interior is in the phase of
reorganization - classical police is created and the former secret
services are being put aside - and a counter-informing service is
created and it will be under direct subordination of the President
of the Republic. New posts are created, others ceased to exist.
Many people consider that the departure of the first man of
Interior in Macedonia would cause chaos, because allegedly the ones
who are leaving would like to take advantage of the situation and
gain space for domination. A similar situation by the end of the
eighties and the "case of the eight suspended" created real chaos,
then supported by Frckovski's statement that it is not known how
deep have the foreign informative services penetrated in the
Ministry of Interior.

The departure of Frckovski would be also expressed in the balance

of the government and the coalition. It would by all means mean the
weakening of premier Crvenkovski's line, if not also the
announcement for his departure. And this, according to the
majority, would mean a step backwards for many processes in
Macedonia, because the domination would be of the conservative
line.

Naturally, again, it all depends of when and will the first man of
the state come back.

MACEDONIA

A STATE WITHOUT THE "COLUMNS" OF STABILITY

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

One of the main arguments proving that Macedonia is functioning as

a state, regardless of the consequences of the attempt against
Gligorov's life, was and still is that all the institutions of the
system are functioning without any problems. On this occasion, it
was more than important to stress that two days after the attempt
against President Gligorov, the Parliament adopted the decision to
change the form of the flag, and later it ratified the agreement
with Greece, then the statal structures met and agreed to sign a
series of documents with the Greeks, despite all stories about who
won and who lost in the whole thing. This means that the attack
against Gligorov doesn't mean that the state can't function, nor
does this imply the alteration of the harmonized, statal policy.

The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the UN in which Stojan

Andov, Speaker of the Parliament, participated as acting President

- 17 -
of the Republic, who according to the Constitution replaces the
president in his absence or his incapacity (leaving aside that
there is nothing written about who is competent to detrmine this
and when) is one of the newest proofs that the state, in times of
Gligorov's incapacitation, functions without any problems. What's
more, the Macedonian delegation gathered additional political
points with the official inauguration of the Macedonian flag in
front of the UN building, and after signing the agreement with the
neighboring countries (but Greece) for the East-West communication
line...

Nevertheless, there is a delicate topic of discussion, and it seems

to be the Law on Local Self-Administration. The idea for the
adoption of this law goes as far as the constitution of the
Macedonian pluralist system, i.e five years ago. In that process,
the first victim of the first draft was the only woman minister of
the "experts' government" Gordana Siljanovska, whose only task was
to draft this act, meanwhile on the other hand, the undisputable
participation of her colleague Frckovski, first in charge of the
changes in the political system and then (after the - for some
enigmatic - death of the Minister of Interior Jordan Mijalkov) as
his replacement, a position he held in the next two government (the
first governmental coalition and now in the League for Macedonia),
brought him to the surface. In different phases, and with different
competencies, Lubomir Danailov Frckovski, had broad authority and
manoeuvring space - as one of the authors of the Constitution of
Macedonia, as one of them who had been involved in many variants of
the mentioned law on local self-administration not without elements
of confirmation that this law revises the Constitution of
Macedonia, or let's say, improves it, among others, also as a
result of the different pressures from abroad in which he also
participated directly as one of the sides in conversations or
negotiations, whichever.

It must be stated, that in all these phases, including the adoption

of the act, the impression was that this law was supposed to be
used for "overcoming" other present misunderstandings, first of
all, regarding the use of the language.

The Law on Local Self-Administration is the object of dispute which

can easily be placed in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations in
Macedonia.

The constitutional amendments adopted before the first multi-party

elections at the end of the eighties, aimed at stopping the
Albanian "invasion" - an idea supported by "easy-minded" Petar
Gosev, assisted by the last socialist government which he was
struggling against all the time. The deprivation of the
municipalities from the "statal" rights, which had been established
according to Kardelj's pattern, was first of all motivated by the

- 18 -
fear that after the elections, the Macedonian representatives would
lose participation in decision making, because the municipalities
were dominated by the "others". When the first "free" elections
took place, this tendency was enforced when the electoral units
were disfigured (the difference of the number of voters were the
best proof of this "fishy business").

After the electoral victory of the tripartite League for Macedonia,

the new government and parliament, among others, could deal with
the so called system laws, which couldn't be adopted because they
needed two thirds of the votes or the votes of 80 MPs. Thus came
the Local Administration Law's turn. The discussion about it,
especially after the deterioration of the relations between
Macedonians and Albanians following the events in Tetova and the
university, just completed the delicate picture. One of the key
issues, besides the existence of two "local governments", was also
the issue of determining the right for the official use of the
mother tongue as an official language. Right in the beginning, the
problems appeared with the percentage of the population which
guaranteed this right. The differences were evident: (National)
Macedonian parties requested the number to be 50%, meanwhile the
Albanians wanted that percentage to be at least 10%. The proposal
of the previous government was allegedly 40%. When it became
evident than none of the options could get 80 votes, the law simply
froze and awaited better times to come. Those times finally came,
and definitely the discussion about this law began. The amendments
were discussed on the 26th session of the Parliament. There were
150 amendments. The Government adopted some ten, which were really
"cosmetic". The whole thing ended up quite smoothly. Finally, as
supposed, the law was adopted - 83 MPs voted in favor, 8 were
against, two abstained, and five dissatisfied MPs demonstratively
left the session. Needn't say that the ones who voted against and
abstained belong to the PPD and/or were the independent, and the
ones who left were from the PPDSH.

The debate and adoption of the law on local self-administration

proved that the essence of the dispute was the use of other
languages as official. The Government, as the proposer considered
that the constitutional foundations must be defined thus: the
percentage to determine the majority is over 50%, the category "a
considerable number of members of nationalities" is 20%. The
disputable figure was the second one. PPD's chairman, Abdurrahman
Aliti considered that there are no facts which would prove that 19
or 21 percent does not represent "a considerable number". According
to him, this is pure political voluntarism which depends on the
relation of forces. His evaluation is that the law is contrary to
the Constitution of the RM. The impression is that the whole
problem was reduced to the Macedonian-Albanian relations, even
though there are members of other ethnicities living in Macedonia,
and who get a quite relative right to use their language in

- 19 -
official communication (especially the Turks).

This is why the Minister of Justice, Vlado Popovski, saw it

necessary to comment on the "Albanian position" after the adoption
of the law, saying that Albanians have actively participated in the
adoption of all legal acts so far, and that the majority of their
efforts were incorporated in the legal acts. From the point of view
of Turks in Macedonia, the minister declared that the Turkish
nationality is fully integrated in the society as a whole, because
we are referring to a nationality which has professionals and
qualified people. When it comes to the cultural rights - education,
culture, traditions, religion, the private and public use of the
language, of the media etc., their application "is endless".
The adoption of the law proved the variety of internal Albanian
methods of political action. PPDSH's MPs showed their disagreement
not only by strongly opposing the governing coalition, but also
criticizing the PPD. Nevertheless, they "canalized" their
reactions. MP Ismet Ramadani clarified this by saying that they
tried the best they could to have the provisions change for the
better, but the relation of forces is such that they couldn't,
which doesn't mean that they will give up on their political
struggle and that their political life will end here: "our
political goal is to have the Albanian language become official,
along with the Macedonian language. But it seems that there is no
disposition of this Parliament to understand that Macedonia
represents a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual environment, and that
relations must be regulated accordingly. This is why we believe
that this very important law didn't fulfil our hopes".

Thus, this episode in the political scene of Macedonia can be

observed in two ways: as a system which is functioning despite the
temporary absence of the stability "column", but also as a
determined posture in the policy of postponing the problems for
times to come.

KOSOVA

A PRIVILEGE CALLED DILEMMA

by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Prishtina

After the "everything is done" promises of Warren Zimmerman in

1989, after Mother Teresa's visit to Kosova in September 1990,
after the proclamation and recognition of the constant independence
of Kosova and the issue of Kosova on all international levels;
after the political professional organization of Albanians in their
political parties (and the golden Kosovan promises to the Albanian
people about its dilemmas in regard to the results of the western

- 20 -
democracy and the local draft-constitution) - maybe time for
political standstill in such an energetic and effective state. And,
which it is said to last at least three years.

And since it was a policy of stagnation, maybe it would be too much

to repeat, once again, the unimportant political events occurred
since the end of 1990 till the end of 1995: the destruction of
Yugoslavia; war in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and their
recognition in the UN; the foundation and recognition of Macedonia;
the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, of the USSR...

Political Kosova, declared in favor of the "three options" and the

evasion of provocations, constantly lived the "insecure peace".
But, peace, nevertheless.

But, thanks to God and the "moisty rain in our political drought",
and thanks to the constellation in general, the last months did
evidence some important events and by all means useful to further
explain our national fate in the repressive daily life: thus, we
experienced the women mega-conference in Beijing, Adem Demaçi's
mega-interview in "Zëri", Rugova's and Bakalli's interviews by BBC
- Albanian section and Rexhep Qosja's interview in Belgrade's
"Intervju".

Let's put aside the cliched practice to claim that the harshest
criticism to the political flows in Kosova usually were and
continue being articulated by the most "independent" and the most
"marginalized" politically - the above interviews (apart from Dr.
Rugova's, "in accordance to the postures adopted by the
Presidency.."), would easily become part of the anthology of harsh
accusations against the (so far) one and only untouchable among us:
the LDK, its leadership and its chairman.

Hence, Adem Demaçi in "Between War and Capitulation" and Qosja in

"Rugova is a Decoration of Milosevic's Democracy", each one on his
own, described the situation in Kosova. As well as all the failures
and illusions of political Kosova about the solution of it's
question. But they also burdened the future responsibility on the
political staff in Kosova, first of all the LDK and it's
leadership.

Maybe Demaçi and Rugova are not spokespersons of any political

subject in Kosova. They claim they speak on their own behalf, as
engaged personalities, each one on his own. But, nevertheless, it
is hard to believe that there is not a considerable number of
people who support these critical standpoints. And which would be
comprised in stressing the basic problems of our national fate: the
internal organization - monopolized and "abused" by the LDK; the
unpreparedness for the inevitable dialogue with official Serbia,
and the continued propagation of the tragic illusion of the

- 21 -
invented independence and that "of the certain realization of our
national aspirations for freedom within the parallel system".

Adem Demaçi, enumerating the structural paradoxes in the Albanian

organization in Kosova, among the known - the farce of the MPs, the
non-functioning of the Parliament, the Coordinating Body, the
political and moral monopoly of the LDK - openly criticizes five
functions of the "Head" , as he refers to Ibrahim Rugova, and
suggests his discharge from this "serious" responsibility, as well
as the creation of a circle of officials and counsellors from
people excluded from the political life, who have knowledge,
capacities, energy and ambitions...

Rexhep Qosja sees the "parallel system", the political iconography,

as well as the Albanian media as a decoration of the Serbian regime
to prove "the existence of the rights and freedoms of Kosova
Albanians". Qosja thus states that, the symbiotic relations between
the political structures in Kosova were inevitably created -
especially between the LDK and the Presidency - with the Serbian
authorities in Belgrade. Qosja claims that dialogue with Serbs
never really started, but the contacts between the Presidency and
Belgrade have a continuance, for they are grounded on a profitable
political coexistence.

Mahmut Bakalli, on the other hand, doesn't exclude the possibility

of discussing about an eventual (provisional) solution which would
insist on the permanence of Albanians in FRY, as a republic, which
would depend on the "final declaration of the people". In regard to
the (inevitable) dialogue, Bakalli claims that the politics
practiced today - closed and monopolist - by the Kosovan political
leadership, does not allow any advances. Any qualitative changes,
according to him, would be done only after the elimination of
political isolation - with the creation of a broader decision-
making center, which would include capable and inventive people who
know and want to contribute...

What are Dr. Rugova's postures in regard to all of these? "Kosova

should not be perceived as an isolated problem, but as an issue
linked to all problems of the region in the former Yugoslavia",
states the President of the republic of Kosova, who remains
optimistic because of the political successes of Kosova in these
stormy years. The internationalization of the question of Kosova is
growing, he claims, while the efforts for dialogue do not stop,
through the ICFY and the insistent of the members of the EU.

According to Dr. Rugova, the parliament of Kosova functions, not in

parliamentary sessions but by commissions, the Coordinating Body of
the Political Parties functions, and so do the political parties,
"including the LDK". Therefore, he concludes, "pluralism and the
parties compose the people and work in favor of the vitalization of

- 22 -
the interests of the people and the nation...". Full stop.

In regard to the interviews and the postures expressed on them:

harsh criticism, we would say, almost accusing, and which for the
first time, does not spare the work and personality of Dr. Rugova.
But, not without any content: this time, the series of
dissatisfactions of the mentioned personalities didn't end with the
famous: "many forums and almost no work..." (?). The ones who read
carefully, will find suggestions in what Demaçi, Qosja or Bakalli
say, and not only that, but also quite pragmatic approaches, even
real-political ones.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to know what would have happened if

the same things would have been said two or even four years ago? We
can agree that (at least) in the past two years, apart from the
conventions of silence and of empty words, there was total
political stagnation in Kosova, and not only political. And, since
the failures and serious mistakes described with the words of these
personalities, are usually referred to the ones committed "at the
beginning".

Or, how much is it worth to be ceratin in politics today? Let's set

aside all ICFYs, where Kosova Albanians achieved to be recognized
as an "ethnic community" (London, summer 1993); set aside Robert
Dole's statements about autonomy for Kosova and Berisha's meeting
with actual US president in Washington and the "strong support for
the autonomy of Kosova" - how worth are the apocalyptic prophecies,
the regretful declarations, the critical discourses or postures for
the Albanian political engagement in Kosova today?

"There is no use to cry over spilled milk". Something could be said

almost for sure: there is not much interest among people - maybe
because of the medial gymnastics while verifying the "just and
pragmatic" course, or because of the search for the scapegoat for
the committed mistakes. This is illustrated by the very few
reactions to the mentioned critiques, which are so disclosed,
against the untouchable leadership among us (having in mind that
this place remembers the punishing circular notes in branches and
sub-branches for much "smaller" mistakes of declaring the opinion
about the internal political flows).

Political interest for these flows, absolutely reduced to the

active membership in branches and sub-branches (and journalists...)
can only serve as a barometer to prove anything - but the trust in
the efficacious course of the Kosova policy. But, dealing with
politics does not belong "to broad masses", as claimed by those who
are best acquainted with the western democratic regimes. Something
of the kind belongs only to the decision-making centers which won
the votes of the people. Fine.

- 23 -
Without elaborating how come the issue of national liberation was
defined (so quickly) as professionalized politics, a reserved one
and with the tendency to restrict even more the decision making
circle - the question would be: Who can profit from all this lack
of interest? The ones who propagated it, and who according to Qosja
and Demaçi (and not only them) are precisely the LDK and it's
leadership, which through "exclusions, exclusiveness and tagging"
got hold of the complete monopoly over the Kosova Albanians? Or the
contrary: this stagnation will turn into a silent witness of the
political lynch which would follow while looking for the
responsible of the capital failure which is more and more
emphasized - remaining in FRY?

Maybe even silence is news.

Do Kosova Albanians have dilemmas about their political fate today?

Do they have this privilege?

The resolutions of international organizations and "moisty rains"

have, so far, approved the existence of all the Albanian misery in
Kosova and condemned all the, for decades, unstoppable repression.
And, have openly excluded the recognition of the "independent and
neutral state" of Kosova. And, this was not only one week ago.
There are no dilemmas.

On the other hand, even the most diletant Serbian journalists is in

a situation to, through a high-rated Serbian newspapers among
Albanians (!), as is Nasa Borba, cause confusion and "sensation" by
making his own list of possible negotiators from Kosova. And not
only this, but manages to cause so many speculations which don't
stop in weeks: Is it really true that Bakalli and Vllasi are in the
combination?, Demaçi? Qosja? Surroi? Maliqi? We must not forget
that this place remembers the times when the Belgrade media would
publish whatever - the eyes of Kosova were turned towards the
democratic West. To the place where our fate would be sealed,
through the internationalization, the exodus of the MPs and 400
thousand Albanians, the fruitful meetings and other historical
successes. It seems that the Western institutions have sealed what
they planned to seal so far.

Who knows, maybe our political leadership knows something that the
mortal human is not allowed to know: maybe it knows "about the
politics of mimicry, conspiracies, gesticulations...". However,
Nasa Borba is often more read carefully. And here, there are no
dilemmas.

UNTANS? The idea of the UN trusteeship on Kosova, however explained

optimistically, doesn't perceive Kosova as an independent subject.
The engagement of a foreign NGO, which offered it's services as a

- 24 -
political mediator between Belgrade and Prishtina, based on its
plan known as UNTANS - United Nations Temporary Authority for
Negotiated Settlement in Kosovo, foresees also the withdrawal of
the Serbian police and the reduction of the army troops (only for
defending purposes), also the appointment of a foreign
Administrator - but not the abrogation of the discriminating laws
of Serbia or the dispute of the autonomy as something which evolves
towards the independence through political declaration. There are
no dilemmas here either.

Perceived in this way, it is hard to classify the political

discourses articulated in the interviews as "dilemmas" about the
strategies and the political fate. There is no doubt that they come
from public personalities of Kosova, which, individually, gained at
least one "moral-political" attribute in the past four years, be it
in party sessions or the media which commented "justly" the
contents of the party meetings: Qosja was the "radical and the
fatalist" without a clear vision about politics, the self-
proclaimed "father of the nation", a man who represents only
himself. Time "had ran over" Demaçi, he was a "Marxist-Leninist",
a Serb-lover, dictator, adventurist and he wants war" (he is the
guy!); on the other hand, Bakalli was a "compromiser, an
autonomist, Serbia's man, a phantom of the past".
Whatever they may be, they published their thoughts. They stated
that the political fate of Kosova is not and was never in their
hands, because they never dealt with active policy. Because they
are as they are. And because they were identified so "on time".
Maybe there is no dilemma in this case either.
Are such dilemmas a privilege today? Have times "when nothing was
known yet..." become a privilege? Cyrillic inscriptions all
around Kosova, sculptures of Dositejs and the destruction of the
complex of the League of Prizren didn't incite the minimal civil
disobedience, because we have people who will deal with politics.
The ones who stated 15 years ago that going to the hotels in Ulqin
was "an irrational torture" - tell me that the buildings have
become beautiful and comfortable (?). The beauty of compromise and
the rhetoric, we would add.

Could this be similar to the possible dilemmas of our political

future: How will be dress up the old body into new fashion? Bigger
possibilities or concealed beauties? Trusteeship? Autonomy?...

- 25 -