G.R. No.

L-68053 May 7, 1990

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA
YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the
Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in
AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the
decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it
ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral
survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it
awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court
dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B
which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros
Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of
the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on
October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962
while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.
Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is not
included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot
823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of
around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also
cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left
the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According
to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of
land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of
the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella
(Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate
of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square
meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral
survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.

The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered
in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695
(28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that
Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in
consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix
thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots
773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958,
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on
April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were
respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino,
namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez
and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and
possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of
the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after
court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be
delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages
in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots
773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos.
30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his
name for assessment purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other
plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022
stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim,
monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection
with the above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo
Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the
Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said

defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the

plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the
complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages
of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25

16

It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned
in the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his
return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot
773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of
Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be
delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein
private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a
declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo
Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title
covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and
658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any
knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the
cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto;
and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not
only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final
and executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its
order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the
certificates of title mentioned therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution
in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil
Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for
the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be
enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property
with damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora
Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses
prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being
null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in
accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery
of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or,
if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and
severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an

In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A
and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had
become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 On
their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been
"barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased
the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further
medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the
Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens"before the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in
question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of
the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court
approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds
are (sic) hereby dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the
legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the
sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of
P5,000.00 representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees,
all with legal rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final
payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the
defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby
dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby
ordered to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.

29

The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its
decision of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it
ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees

the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B
of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it
awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of
said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered
defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum
of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the
cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it
awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

32

Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate
court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and
properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if
ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which
has been docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever
barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022,
supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver
(Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra where the private
respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed
all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and
773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated
November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even
impliedly or indirectly denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale
of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever
there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to
the petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the
Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey

the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and
executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case,
the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It
ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by
this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But
there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return
for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if
endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to
the detriment of the administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been
finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the
uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of
ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under
review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer
be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the
pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the
controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled
beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in
favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered
the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private
respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the
subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy
of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a
different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing
the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the
undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is
precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil
Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant
case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly
considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but
they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be

heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which
has longing become final and executory.

strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of

its performance by a specific person and by no other.

Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and
773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the
late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.

xxx xxx xxx

Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on
the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate
children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of
Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is
not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a
deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue
is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever
payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the
heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been
entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of
patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has
characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept
of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a
relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment
because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their
father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable
in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value
of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that
there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount
adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.]
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimantAppellant.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
presided by Judge Hermogenes Caluag, dismissing its claim against the Estate of K. H.
Hemady (Special Proceeding No. Q-293) for failure to state a cause of action.
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by
the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of
the Luzon Surety Co.s of having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different
creditors. The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity agreements, all contained the following
stipulations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Premiums. As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and severally,
agree to pay the COMPANY the sum of ________________ (P______) pesos, Philippines
Currency, in advance as premium there of for every __________ months or fractions
thereof, this ________ or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect.
Indemnity. The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify the
COMPANY and keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and against any
and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and expenses of
whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any time sustain or incur
in consequence of having become surety upon this bond or any extension, renewal,

substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of the undersigned or any of them
or any order executed on behalf of the undersigned or any of them; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand to pay, reimburse and make good to the COMPANY, its
successors and assigns, all sums and amount of money which it or its representatives
shall pay or cause to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account of the undersigned or
any of them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of the amount involved in the
litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for counsel or attorneys
fees, but in no case less than P25. It is hereby further agreed that in case of extension or
renewal of this ________ we equally bind ourselves for the payment thereof under the
same terms and conditions as above mentioned without the necessity of executing
another indemnity agreement for the purpose and that we hereby equally waive our right
to be notified of any renewal or extension of this ________ which may be granted under
this indemnity agreement.
Interest on amount paid by the Company. Any and all sums of money so paid by the
company shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum which interest, if not paid, will
be accummulated and added to the capital quarterly order to earn the same interests as
the capital and the total sum thereof, the capital and interest, shall be paid to the
COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY shall have become liable therefore, whether it shall
have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or not.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Waiver. It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any question
which may arise between them by reason of this document and which has to be submitted
for decision to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court of competent jurisdiction
in the City of Manila, waiving for this purpose any other venue. Our right to be notified of
the acceptance and approval of this indemnity agreement is hereby likewise waived.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Our Liability Hereunder. It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against
the principal upon his default, or to exhaust the property of the principal, but the liability
hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and severally, a primary one, the
same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence of
such default. (Rec. App. pp. 98- 102.)
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the
twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for
judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12
per cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemadys estate, the
lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on
two grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that the premiums due and cost of
documentary stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a
part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred
after the execution of the counterbonds; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) that
whatever losses may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate,
because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.
Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the
reasoning of the court below ran as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a
guarantor terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or damage
was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court believes that there is

merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code. It should
be noted that a new requirement has been added for a person to qualify as a guarantor,
that is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary integrity. As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix,
integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon the death of
Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss
therefore, may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate because
upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.
Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied on the
personality, character, honesty and integrity of the now deceased K. H. Hemady, was the
fact that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is a paragraph entitled
Security by way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived and renounced by the
security company. The security company has not demanded from K. H. Hemady to comply
with this requirement of giving security by way of first mortgage. In the supporting papers
of the claim presented by Luzon Surety Company, no real property was mentioned in the
list of properties mortgaged which appears at the back of the indemnity agreement.
(Rec. App., pp. 407-408).
We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as
under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that
Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their
decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle
remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to
his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of
the preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.
In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all
the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and cannot be regarded as third
parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate
of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
xxx

xxx

xxx

The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the new
Code of Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle, the heirs of a deceased
person cannot be held to be third persons in relation to any contracts touching the real
estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythey take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon
in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.
(See also Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman vs. Salak, 91
Phil., 265).

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and
paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The
reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by
the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or
reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the
progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by
Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position,
barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu
personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. The
transition is marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or
guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are
contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon
Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the
counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co.
might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This
reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the
reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so
long as the money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the
parties. Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should
not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly
inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued
upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. Lo general es la transmisibilidad de darechos y
obligaciones; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryle excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada
se diga en contrario impera el principio de la transmision, como elemento natural a toda
relacion juridica, salvo las personalisimas. Asi, para la no transmision, es menester el
pacto expreso, porque si no, lo convenido entre partes trasciende a sus herederos.
Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen los
efectos de los vinculos juridicos creados por sus antecesores, y para evitarlo, si asi se
quiere, es indespensable convension terminante en tal sentido.
Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir ms all de las personas que les
dieron vida, y a ejercer presion sobre los sucesores de esa persona; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarycuando no se quiera esto, se impone una estipulacion limitativa
expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la
concresion del concreto a las mismas personas que lo otorgon. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil,
Tomo XX, p. 541-542) (Emphasis supplied.)
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed to
have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to
expressly stipulate to that effect; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhence, his failure to do so is
no sign that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon

Surety Co., did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates nothing
more than the companys faith and confidence in the financial stability of the surety, but
not that his obligation was strictly personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when
they are not transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes reference to those
cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as
is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article
603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726), partnership (Article 1830 and agency
(Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or
suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished
upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that one
who is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity,
capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he
guarantees. It will be noted, however, that the law requires these qualities to be present
only at the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty. It is self-evident that once
the contract has become perfected and binding, the supervening incapacity of the
guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand if that be true of his capacity to bind himself, it should also
be true of his integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.
The foregoing concept is confirmed
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

by

the

next

Article

2057,

that

runs

as

ART. 2057. If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime involving
dishonesty or should become insolvent, the creditor may demand another who has all the
qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is excepted where the creditor
has required and stipulated that a specified person should be guarantor.
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty of the
guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound)
does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a replacement
of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the creditor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
it is his right, not his duty; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe may waive it if he chooses, and
hold the guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article 2057 of the present Civil Code is
incompatible with the trial courts stand that the requirement of integrity in the guarantor
or surety makes the latters undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his individuality that
the guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not
being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the
stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability
thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give
rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5, Rule 87 (2 Moran,
1952 ed., p. 437; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 814).
The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is
bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary
contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he
himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When
he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the principal
to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed something to the payment of
the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of
action against anybody no claim that could be reduced to judgment. (May vs. Vann, 15

Pla., 553; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGibson vs. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519; chan

roblesvirtualawlibraryMaxey vs. Carter, 10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521 Reeves vs. Pulliam, 7 Baxt.
[Tenn.], 119; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryErnst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)
For Defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where
the surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand it is urged that the rule does not apply to the case before us,
where the late Hemady was a surety, not a principal debtor. The argument evinces a
superficial view of the relations between parties. If under the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon
Surety Co., as guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal
debtors if the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a
claim against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his
principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal debtor it
may equally claim from the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the
latter does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor.
The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix
against the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the New Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his death,
and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a
contingent claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estates
liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this
question, the Luzon Suretys claim did state a cause of action, and its dismissal was
erroneous.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to
the court of origin, with instructions to proceed in accordance with law. Costs against the
Administratrix- Appellee. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
which seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in

CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case
No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was
intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural AllPurpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to
May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,[4] this
time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase
price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories,
and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement[5] for the loan dated
December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.[6] Subsequently in
March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs,
was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.[7] During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two
(2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken
by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities[9] was executed
by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank
of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to
pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against
both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States
and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer[13] and alleged that
the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that
the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the
joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently
rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of
the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as
the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The
trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund
and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent.
However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the
probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been
probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the
now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets
and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola
that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement
executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of
action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of
Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A)
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION
AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER
RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to
his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped respondent Florence S.
Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement
had been signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to
present the same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the
agreement was not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the
deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S.
Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the
claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the
petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner
should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null
and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated.
According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject
properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as all other
properties. Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case
did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION
AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.

proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement
and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held
liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file
its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both
surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the
deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner
is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim
should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the
execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of
which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which
might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute
the said agreement.

IV.

According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the
agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court
a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not
invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.

RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING
GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.

Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing
guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that
she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.

V.

The petition is bereft of merit.

THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE
FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]

The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs
liable on the obligation of the deceased.

The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to
approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the
deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S.
Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from
asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic
will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the
complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation
and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the
petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the
probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement
to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be equivalent
to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.

At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine
all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.[21]

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED
HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts
failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund
executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between
the late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation.
Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed
by the late Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence,
made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of
a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication
of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator
and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for
the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will.[23] In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a
holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after
my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding
paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at
that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said
tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement[25] executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the
time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all
the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any
way without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction
which the Court cannot allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.[27] Thus, in executing
any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in
the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of
its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant
case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of
the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the
court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for
Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3)
tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who
may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness
of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it
provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and
take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of
First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the
happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their
respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs
in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability
cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly
a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the
probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All
claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they
may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may
bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may

set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against
each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though
the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory.[30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each
claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.[32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence
S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it
may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes
and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against
the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we
find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown
that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.[33] The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by
virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines[34] However, the
documentary evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with
the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners
participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial
evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is
now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its
decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or
did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union
Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The power to take judicial
notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting.
Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of
Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-4963

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is
likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a
common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate
children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945
much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that
when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time
passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657,
old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321).
From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested.

January 29, 1953

MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land
situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson
against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador,
and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the
lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria
Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law
wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their
possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria
Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby
they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation,
Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her
right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit
1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered
decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession
of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed
the present appeal.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in
question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband
may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on
February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition;
Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil.,
531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are
illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not
entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in
force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and
article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the
first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new
Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights
which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so
only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.
Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code,
it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may
have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right
does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already
stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is
so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The
new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria
Uson over the lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a
gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children
for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother
and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much
can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said
assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it
involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a
public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one

(Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it
results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:p

Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja, 1 from the
approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its
Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja,
Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the
same compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its
Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda.
de de Borja, Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda
Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as
the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal
asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains
exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No.
832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.

G.R. No. L-28040

August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee;

JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and
CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568

August 18, 1972

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE

BORJA, special Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611

August 18, 1972

TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late

Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco,
defendant-appellant.
L-28040

It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6
October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was
probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and
administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When
Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate
of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto
himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted
testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was
appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was
questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has
been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar,
some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate
of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to
put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963, 2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton
Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.

WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the
various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in
connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of
the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first
spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any
reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and
conditions:
1.
That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties
situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa
Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de
la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por
el Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia
Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per
square meter.
2.
That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine
Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as
pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and
this shall be considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary
share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco,
Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any
properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will
and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her
for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall
depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala,
"Poblacion."
3.
That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that
particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to
approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and
Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00,
more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the
payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this
Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirschildren of Francisco de Borja.
4.
Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly
to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under
paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants,
who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5.
In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose
de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors,

executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw,

waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause or
causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and
demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have
against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and
Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No.
7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release
each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or
partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the
assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first
spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly
and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the
estate of Francisco de Borja.
6.
That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under
paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and
documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose
de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receive thereof.
7.
That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total
and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion",
otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID
AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October
1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again,
on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No.
832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court
approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and
unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the
Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while
administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is
not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the
ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating
the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of
the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it
were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the
Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil.
479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate
is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise
pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules
explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by
agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts,
and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal
representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva

Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja
stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision
was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a
will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already
divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless
ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the
will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is
apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and
Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of
P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco
shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary share in
the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to
any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last
Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to
her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not
applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate
of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear
object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as
a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate. 4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is
ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract
does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement
that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court
enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and
should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the
contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only
because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present
Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional
interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would
exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous
probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to
the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand,
and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding

on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without
previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference between an
extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the
latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on
the point:
8.
Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite
period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days
for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was
expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with
the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all
surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition,
Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the following clause:
III.
That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of
the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely,
Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said
property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price
thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this
agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a
party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been
finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this day of October 1963";
and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so
done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise
contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of
the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the
"prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which
corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is
proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja under date 12
October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize
agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the
contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the
formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the
sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of the
agreement with Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as
improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to
raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of
Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court
of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term
of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out
by the parties for the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to
approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not
an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was
an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what
was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late
husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned from
the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As

owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of

whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by
article 1088 of the present Civil Code:

We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore,
its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.

In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has
affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of
P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is
that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was
primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally
entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the
devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a
revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of
the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.

If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a
coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void
because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco
de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with
Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself
definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that
would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended
Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October
1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared
that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja
himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed amicable settlement
"had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and
motion above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which
already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What
the record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally
attempted to back out from the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons
restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly intended
resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by the probate of
Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that
Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of
Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was
natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new
settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of
Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final
remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of
Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant
Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September
1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a
more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not
invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in
finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be
ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.

Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first
wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by his second
spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial)
partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio
Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the
presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja
has become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the
two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana
Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the
sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But
as the question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is
still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally
acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their
title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case
No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465).
Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta
section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the
part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De
Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S.
Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more
or less, assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case
No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco
(Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared
exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose
de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article 160 of the
Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect
that:

Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and
exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the
plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco
de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its
possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda
in question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted
by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory
that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special
Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2");
and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings
aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as
oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7
September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties
of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco,
as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory
wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the
Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of
the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special
Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain
admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his
estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts,
supporting the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below
declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the
private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the
following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951
(Exhibit "F") that
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337
hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire
Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100
was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt
of a subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000,
Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a coowner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00
to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would represent Francisco's contribution
in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further testified that
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when
he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2
February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the
admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since

probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property,
but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his
share of the original Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can not
be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the buyer,
pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(4)

That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.

We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness
Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his
share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was
merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of
ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were
already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since
there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and when
Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is
clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14)
does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de
Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3
and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja,
one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m.,
which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the
affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition, Francisco's
characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving,
and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3",
"4" and "7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but
as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the
declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of
much greater probative weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F").
Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof.
Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion)
declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for
damages should be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement
of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja in all three (3) cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO
BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL
BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO
GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra, respondents.
MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil
Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for
reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance
of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before
the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the
complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said
motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff
confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor
children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing
immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party
in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the
complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal
pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for
the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a
written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be
allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for
lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in
violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint
in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of
dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be
substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case
show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31,
1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction
over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure
whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted.
Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ...
it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to
give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff
when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9,
1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court,
however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that
a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil
Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become
the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent,
and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite
right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs
to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their
being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore,
died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs
have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in
the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be
granted ... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature
of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the wrong
complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to
the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is
an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally
property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is,

therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the
deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court
did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was
dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal
representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of
a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not
have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor
children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as
guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the
family. But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that
the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because
the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the
respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for
them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not
complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint
in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the
respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children, who
are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a qualified person as
guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118464. December 21, 1998]

HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES,
BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A. SAMPAYO,
ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A. SAMPAYO, GENEROSO
C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO,
DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C. SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A.
SAMPAYO in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO,
respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 30 March 1994 Decision and 21
December 1994 Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the right of
private respondents as heirs of Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition under Art. 494 of
the Civil Code.
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of the
property in litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and
Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City, covered by TCT No. T15374, with a house erected
thereon.[1] On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died intestate without issue.[2]
Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S. Palilio,
Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico A. Sampayo,

Carlos A. Sampayo, Generoso C. Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo,

Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia A. Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A.
Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes,
with Lolita A. Sampayo acting also in her own behalf and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A.
Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo, filed an
action for partition and damages before RTCBr. 54, Lucena City.[3]
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that
private respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were the rightful
heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.[4] On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was substituted
as party-defendant by his children Asuncion, Francisco, Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego
and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.[5]
At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo
to prove that they were the collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
therefore entitled to her rights as co-owner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the
original copy of her certificate of live birth showing that her father was Inocentes Reyes
and her mother was Josefina Sampayo,[6] Lydia Sampayo Reyes testified that she was one
of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the only living
sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios J.
Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo
who died in 1983 and 1960, respectively. To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and
Manuel were siblings of Lourdes, their baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of
the birth certificate of Manuel Sampayo were offered in evidence. These documents
showed that their father and mother, like Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio Sampayo and
Brigida Jaraza.
The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia Sampayo Reyes
were prepared by Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all data therein written
were in accordance with the church records, hence, the lower left portion of the
documents bearing the seal of the church with the notation as to where the documents
were logged in particular.[7] The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the birth
certificates because the repository of those documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Lucena City, had been razed by fire on two separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30
August 1983, thus all civil registration records were totally burned.[8] On the other hand,
a photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate dated 25 October 1919 (Exh. "I")[9] showed that
it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena, Tayabas (now Lucena City).
Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her husband Manuel was the
brother of the deceased Lourdes, and with the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the
only living sibling of Lourdes was Josefina.[10]
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot, petitioners
presented Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosa Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario
testified that the subject property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio
Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject
property since 1937.[11] In fact, she said that her late husband Ignacio Conti paid for the
real estate taxes[12] and spent for the necessary repairs and improvements thereon[13]
because by agreement Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them.[14]
However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary or holographic,
was presented by petitioners to substantiate this claim.[15] Rosario also disclosed that
when Lourdes died her remains were taken by her relatives from their house.[16] When
cross examined on who those relatives were, she replied that the only one she
remembered was Josefina since there were many relatives who came. When asked who

Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall. Likewise, when asked who the
parents of Lourdes were, Rosario denied having ever known them.[17]
Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she used to be the neighbor and
hairdresser of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who told her that upon her death her share
would go to Ignacio Conti whom she considered as her brother since both of them were
"adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord,[18] although
she admitted that she did not know whether Lourdes had other relatives.[19]
According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures of the tombs bearing the
tombstones of Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as well as that of
Lourdes Sampayo who was supposed to have been interred beside her "adoptive" parents.
However, as revealed by Rosario during her direct examination, Lourdes was not in fact
interred there because her relatives took her remains.[20]
On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respondents as the rightful heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo. It further ordered private respondents and petitioners to submit a
project of partition of the residential house and lot for confirmation by the court.[21]
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred
in finding that private respondents were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were
entitled to the partition of the lot and the improvements thereon.[22]
On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC decision and held[23]In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and establish
by preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes
Sampayo and therefore the lower court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now
private respondents] and defendants [now petitioners] to submit a project of partition of
the residential house and lot owned in common by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
defendant spouses Conti for confirmation by the court x x x x Considering our earlier
finding that the lower court did not err in declaring herein plaintiffs [now private
respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and therefore entitled to inherit her property,
the argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the plaintiffs [now private
respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of merit (insertions in [ ] supplied).
Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua[24] and Marabilles v. Quito[25],
that a prior and separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary[26] and that
private respondents became the co-owners of the portion of the property owned and
registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death and, consequently, entitled to
the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownership as provided
for by law including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code,[27] and
Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa[28] holding that the property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of death of the decedent, as completely as if he had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death.
The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the
probative value of the documentary and testimonial evidence of private respondents and
faulted petitioners for not having subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she was a vital
witness in the case.[29] Hence, petitioners pursued this case arguing that a complaint for
partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannot prosper without
prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance with all legal requirements,
especially publication, and private respondents were not able to prove by competent
evidence their relationship with the deceased.[30]

There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before
the heirs can commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained
in Quison v. Salud [31] Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of
kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this
action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the
settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without such settlement, the heirs
cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by
the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate
passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the
claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of
paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title,
upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a
judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro
Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494[32] of the
Civil Code, from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to
which is the right to ask for partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were
transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding partition private respondents merely
exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the
action been for the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with
extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of
estates of small value.[33] But what private respondents are pursuing is the mere
segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her through intestate
succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. The applicable
law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate
of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested
in the property.
A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required as
erroneously maintained by petitioners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action
for partition. First, whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be
partitioned, and second, if answered in the affirmative, the manner of the division of the
property, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.[34] Thus, in this case, we must
determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have been able to
establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late
Lourdes Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a niece. These, private
respondents were able to prove in the trial court as well as before respondent Court of
Appeals.
Petitioners however insist that there was no such proof of filiation because: (a) mere
photocopies of birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b) certifications on non-availability
of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not prove filiation of
alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes,
alleged daughter of Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of
Josefina and Lourdes, were incompetent as Lydia was made to testify on events which
happened before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters merely narrated to her.[35]

We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted
are competent and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo. Private respondents assert that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share of the subject property by way of legal or intestate succession.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death
to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.[36] Legal or intestate
succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity.[37] If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the decedent.[38] It was established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and
without issue. Private respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the
collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,[39] the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved
by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a
record of birth or a parents admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private
document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[40] By
analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country.[41] The baptismal certificates presented in evidence
by private respondents are public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal
custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of
certificates, of the entries contained therein.[42]
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony
of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v.
de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]),[43] thus x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the
course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay
rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise
of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during the course of its
business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the
sacrament, but in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken
together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of
parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed testimony of Adelaida
Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister
Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates
have acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.
Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was
properly discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec.
3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself except
when the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the original certificate of birth of
Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the certification issued by the Office of the

Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to the effect that its office was completely destroyed
by fire on 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence
thereof, all civil registration records were totally burned.
Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners contention that the testimony of
Adelaida Sampayo cannot prove filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no
declaration ante litem motam as required by the rules, i.e., that the declaration relating to
pedigree was made before the controversy occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no
move to dispute her testimony in open court when she was mentioning who the brothers
and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly observed by the trial court in explicit terms, "the
documentary and testimonial evidence were not disputed by defendants" (now
petitioners).[44] Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took the witness stand, she admitted
that she was not aware of the identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs
counter to the relationship akin to filial bonding which she professed she had enjoyed with
the decedent. As wife of Ignacio Conti, she was supposedly a "sister-in-law" of the
deceased Lourdes Sampayo who regarded Ignacio as a brother. However, in sum, we rule
that all the pieces of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right
of private respondents to maintain the action for partition. Absent any reversible error in
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, this petition for review on
certiorari will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 March 1994 and
Resolution dated 21 December 1994 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177407

February 9, 2011

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.

exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the

document marked as Annex 2 to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000,
filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in
answer to this complaint;

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel
Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, assailed the Orders 2 issued by public respondent Board
of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem,
she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several
diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was
ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus,
she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant),
filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the
doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela
Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel
Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed
by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondents
fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his
evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her
formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary
evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her
kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She
described her exhibits, as follows:
"EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December
12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 2 as it was actually originally the
Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter affidavit filed with the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo
Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the
interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this

"EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January
30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it was actually likewise originally
an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed
by the herein complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries
which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of
the document marked as Annex 3 which is likewise dated January 30, 1997,
which is appended as such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated March 15,
2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable
Board in answer to this complaint.
"EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16,
1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on which are handwritten entries which
are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
"EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20,
1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten entries
which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final report of the same
examination which is the document appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively
to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III
in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document
which is marked as Annex 4 is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr.
Lantin, the document marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both
documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that
which are written on Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal
offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are
mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish
matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the
purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was
admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:
"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections
of [herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the

Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for
whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of this case.
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence
of the respondents.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same
reasons stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October
8, 2004. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can
determine its probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can
determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the
process of admission. x x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons
(Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE
FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD
THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY
RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF
PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD.4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to
assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed
Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the

judgment that completely or finally disposes of the case.5 At that stage, where there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only
and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the
CAs finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion
is the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the
best evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are
completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner
contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in
proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are
enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, 7 in connection with
evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility,
we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds,
but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason
that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn
out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence
and the probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals 9teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence
refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his
substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner
mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules
of Procedure, which reads:

Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these

Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the
admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall
not vitiate the proceedings.10
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the
substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby,
that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she
was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996,
January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Edithas
medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the
examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs
counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was
investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of
Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for
her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her "kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be
proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. 11
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth
respecting a matter of fact.12 Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are
established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both
mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically
biology,14 include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human
beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the
time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical
locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is
inapplicable.1awphil Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable
for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left
non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As
previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of
her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in
evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of
Edithas kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or
right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through
a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is
allowed.15 Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had
the originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to
the new building."16 Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly
admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the
probative value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals ( Sixteenth Division) dated January 14, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49926.
The facts of the case are not in dispute, thus:
Spouses Domingo and Josefa Nicolas are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land
located at Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 156339 and 156341 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. On these lots is the
residential house of spouses Nicolas and their two children, herein petitioners. These
properties are conjugal.

On May 19, 1986, Domingo Nicolas passed away.

On June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Among
the records destroyed were the original copies of TCTs Nos. 156339 and 156341.
Sometime in 1988, Josefa Nicolas, the surviving spouse of Domingo, filed with the Land
Registration Administration (LRA) an application for reconstitution of the two (2) land
titles.
In 1991, the LRA approved the application and ordered the reconstitution of the destroyed
TCTs but only in the name of applicant Josefa Nicolas.
In 1998, petitioners learned that their mother mortgaged the lots with the Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co., herein respondent; that the mortgage had been foreclosed; that
respondent had the land titles consolidated in its name; and that respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession (LRC Case No. Q-8019[96]) which was granted on January 15, 1998.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC, Branch 22, Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-98-34312 for
Annulment of Reconstituted Titles, Mortgage and Sale at Public Auction. This case is still
pending trial.
Petitioners also filed with the RTC, Branch 77, Quezon City a motion to quash the writ of
possession, but it was denied on September 10, 1998. Thereupon, they filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49926. However, the
appellate court dismissed the petition. It held that the trial court, in issuing the writ of
possession in favor of the respondent, did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the trial court has the
ministerial task to issue such writ.
Petitioners seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court
of Appeals in its Resolution of February 24, 1999.
HEIRS OF NICOLAS V. METROPOLITAN BANK
DECISION

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition for
certiorari, invoking our ruling in Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad[2] which reads:
The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit,
the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be
driven to an action in law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a process
and place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to
enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous actions and vexatious litigation. But
where a party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his
possession from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and
who entered into possession before the suit was begun, the court has no power to deprive
him of possession by enforcing the decree. Thus, it was held that only parties to the suit,
persons who came in under them pendente lite, and trespassers or intruders without title,
can be evicted by a writ of possession. The reason for this limitation is that the writ does
not issue in case of doubt, nor will a question of legal title be tried or decided in
proceedings looking to the exercise of the power of the court to put a purchaser in
possession. A very serious question may arise upon full proofs as to where the legal title
to the property rests, and should not be disposed of in a summary way. The petitioner, it is
held, should be required to establish his title in a proceeding directed to that end.
Here, petitioners as children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of spouses Nicolas, acquired
ownership of portions of the lots as their legitime upon the death of their father or prior to
the foreclosure of mortgage and the filing by the respondent of its petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession. Consequently, petitioners are strangers or third parties
therein whose rights cannot be determined as they were not impleaded by respondent.

Verily, they should not be deprived of their legitime by the enforcement of the writ of
possession. Clearly, therefore, the writ of possession should not include parts of the two
lots pertaining to petitioners.
Records indicate that the estate of Domingo Nicolas has not been judicially or extrajudicially settled.
It is basic that after consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor
to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right[3] and its issuance to a
purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.[4] However,
considering the circumstances obtaining in this case and following our ruling in Rivero de
Ortega, earlier cited, we hold that such writ of possession should apply only to the share
of Josefa as may be determined in Civil Case No. Q-98-34312 or in any other proceeding
that may be instituted by petitioners for the purpose of settling the undivided estate of
Domingo Nicolas.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 49926 is MODIFIED in the sense that the writ of possession issued by the RTC,
Branch 77, Quezon City in LRC Case No. Q-8019(96) shall apply only to such portion of the
lots
pertaining to Josefa Nicolas as may be determined in Civil Case No. Q-98-34312 or in any
other proper proceeding which petitioners may file.
SO ORDERED.