You are on page 1of 7

Basel III

Basel III (or the Third Basel Accord) is a global, vol


untary regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy,
stress testing and market liquidity risk. It was agreed
upon by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 201011, and was scheduled to be
introduced from 2013 until 2015; however, changes
from 1 April 2013 extended implementation until 31

March 2018 and again extended to 31 March 2019.[1][2]


The third installment of the Basel Accords (see Basel I,
Basel II) was developed in response to the deciencies
in nancial regulation revealed by the nancial crisis of
200708. Basel III was supposed to strengthen bank
capital requirements by increasing bank liquidity and de2.2
creasing bank leverage.

A mandatory capital conservation buer, equivalent to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. Considering


the 4.5% CET1 capital ratio required, banks have
to hold a total of 7% CET1 capital, from 2019 onwards.
A discretionary counter-cyclical buer, allowing
national regulators to require up to an additional
2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth.
The level of this buer ranges between 0% and 2.5%
of RWA and must be met by CET1 capital.

Leverage ratio

Basel III introduced a minimum leverage ratio. This is


a non-risk-based leverage ratio and is calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by the banks average total consolidated
assets (sum of the exposures of all assets and non-balance
Unlike Basel I and Basel II, which focus primarily on the
sheet items).[6][7] The banks are expected to maintain a
level of bank loss reserves that banks are required to hold,
leverage ratio in excess of 3% under Basel III.
Basel III focuses primarily on the risk of a run on the
bank by requiring diering levels of reserves for dierent forms of bank deposits and other borrowings. Therefore Basel III does not, for the most part, supersede the
Tier 1 Capital
3%
guidelines known as Basel I and Basel II; rather, it will
Total exposure
work alongside them.

2
2.1

Overview

In July 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve announced that


the minimum Basel III leverage ratio would be 6% for 8
Systemically important nancial institution (SIFI) banks
and 5% for their insured bank holding companies.[8]

Key principles
Capital requirements

2.3 Liquidity requirements

The original Basel III rule from 2010 required banks to


hold 4.5% of common equity (up from 2% in Basel II) of
Basel III introduced two required liquidity ratios.[9]
risk-weighted assets (RWAs). Since 2015, a minimum
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 4.5% must be
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio was supposed to remaintained at all times by the bank.[3] This ratio is calcuquire a bank to hold sucient high-quality liquid aslated as follows:
sets to cover its total net cash outows over 30 days.
Mathematically it is expressed as follows:
CET1
4.5%
RWAs
High quality liquid assets
The minimum Tier 1 capital increases from 4% in Basel LCR = Total net liquidity outows over 30 days 100%
II to 6%,[4] applicable in 2015, over RWAs.[5] This 6%
is composed of 4.5% of CET1, plus an extra 1.5% of
The Net Stable Funding Ratio was to require the
Additional Tier 1 (AT1).
available amount of stable funding to exceed the reFurthermore, Basel III introduced two additional capital
quired amount of stable funding over a one-year pebuers:
riod of extended stress.[10]
1

2
2.3.1

3 IMPLEMENTATION
U.S. version of the Basel Liquidity Coverage
Ratio requirements

On 24 October 2013, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors approved an interagency proposal for the U.S.
version of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)'s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The ratio would apply to certain U.S. banking organizations and
other systemically important nancial institutions.[11] The
comment period for the proposal is scheduled to close by
31 January 2014
The United States LCR proposal came out signicantly tougher than BCBSs version, especially for larger
bank holding companies.[12] The proposal requires nancial institutions and FSOC designated nonbank nancial
companies[13] to have an adequate stock of high-quality
liquid assets (HQLA) that can be quickly liquidated to
meet liquidity needs over a short period of time.
The LCR consists of two parts: the numerator is the value
of HQLA, and the denominator consists of the total net
cash outows over a specied stress period (total expected
cash outows minus total expected cash inows).[14]

no haircut. Notably, the Fed chose not to include


GSE-issued securities in Level 1, despite industry
lobbying, on the basis that they are not guaranteed
by the "full faith and credit" of the U.S. government.
Level 2A assets generally include assets that would
be subject to a 20% risk-weighting under Basel
III and includes assets such as GSE-issued and guaranteed securities. These assets would be subject
to a 15% haircut which is similar to the treatment of
such securities under the BCBS version.
Level 2B assets include corporate debt and equity
securities and are subject to a 50% haircut. The
BCBS and U.S. version treats equities in a similar
manner, but corporate debt under the BCBS version
is split between 2A and 2B based on public credit
ratings, unlike the U.S. proposal. This treatment of
corporate debt securities is the direct impact of the
DoddFrank Act's Section 939, which removed references to credit ratings, and further evidences the
conservative bias of U.S. regulators approach to the
LCR.

The Liquidity Coverage Ratio applies to U.S. banking operations with assets of more than $10 billion. The pro- The proposal requires that the LCR be at least equal to
or greater than 1.0 and includes a multiyear transition peposal would require:
riod that would require: 80% compliance starting 1 January 2015, 90% compliance starting 1 January 2016, and
Large Bank Holding Companies (BHC) those with 100% compliance starting 1 January 2017.[16]
over $250 billion in consolidated assets, or more in
on-balance sheet foreign exposure, and to systemi- Lastly, the proposal requires both sets of rms (large bank
cally important, non-bank nancial institutions;[13] holding companies and regional rms) subject to the LCR
to hold enough HQLA to cover 30 days of net cash requirements to submit remediation plans to U.S. regulaoutow. That amount would be determined based tors to address what actions would be taken if the LCR
on the peak cumulative amount within the 30-day falls below 100% for three or more consecutive days.
period.[11]
Regional rms (those with between $50 and $250 3 Implementation
billion in assets) would be subject to a modied
LCR at the (BHC) level only. The modied LCR
requires the regional rms to hold enough HQLA 3.1 Summary of originally (2010) proto cover 21 days of net cash outow. The net cash
posed changes in Basel Committee lanoutow parameters are 70% of those applicable to
guage
the larger institutions and do not include the requirement to calculate the peak cumulative outows[14]
First, the quality, consistency, and transparency of
the capital base will be raised.
Smaller BHCs, those under $50 billion, would remain subject to the prevailing qualitative supervi Tier 1 capital: the predominant form of Tier
sory framework.[15]
1 capital must be common shares and retained
earnings
The U.S. proposal divides qualifying HQLAs into three
Tier 2 capital: supplementary capital, howspecic categories (Level 1, Level 2A, and Level 2B).
ever, the instruments will be harmonised
Across the categories the combination of Level 2A and
Tier 3 capital will be eliminated.[17]
2B assets cannot exceed 40% HQLA with 2B assets limited to a maximum of 15% of HQLA.[14]
Second, the risk coverage of the capital framework
will be strengthened.
Level 1 represents assets that are highly liquid (gen Promote more integrated management of marerally those risk-weighted at 0% under the Basel
ket and counterparty credit risk
III standardized approach for capital) and receive

3.2

U.S. implementation
Add the credit valuation adjustmentrisk due
to deterioration in counterpartys credit rating

Strengthen the capital requirements for counterparty credit exposures arising from banks
derivatives, repo and securities nancing transactions

Improved calibration of the risk functions, which convert loss estimates into
regulatory capital requirements.
Banks must conduct stress tests that include widening credit spreads in recessionary scenarios.

Raise the capital buers backing these exposures

Promoting stronger provisioning practices


(forward-looking provisioning):

Reduce procyclicality and


Provide additional incentives to move OTC
derivative contracts to qualifying central counterparties (probably clearing houses). Currently, the BCBS has stated derivatives cleared
with a QCCP will be risk-weighted at 2% (The
rule is still yet to be nalized in the U.S.)
Provide incentives to strengthen the risk management of counterparty credit exposures
Raise counterparty credit risk management
standards by including wrong-way risk
Third, a leverage ratio will be introduced as a
supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based
framework.
intended to achieve the following objectives:
Put a oor under the buildup of leverage
in the banking sector
Introduce additional safeguards against
model risk and measurement error by supplementing the risk based measure with a
simpler measure that is based on gross exposures.

Advocating a change in the accounting standards towards an expected loss


(EL) approach (usually, EL amount :=
LGD*PD*EAD).[18]
Fifth,a global minimum liquidity standard for internationally active banks is introduced that includes
a 30-day liquidity coverage ratio requirement underpinned by a longer-term structural liquidity ratio called the Net Stable Funding Ratio. (In January
2012, the oversight panel of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision issued a statement saying
that regulators will allow banks to dip below their
required liquidity levels, the liquidity coverage ratio, during periods of stress.[19] )
The Committee also is reviewing the need for
additional capital, liquidity or other supervisory
measures to reduce the externalities created by
systemically important institutions.
As of September 2010, proposed Basel III norms asked
for ratios as: 79.5% (4.5% + 2.5% (conservation buer)
+ 02.5% (seasonal buer)) for common equity and 8.5
11% for Tier 1 capital and 10.513% for total capital.[20]

On 15 April, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) released the nal version of its Supervisory
Fourth, a series of measures is introduced to pro- Framework for Measuring and Controlling Large Expomote the buildup of capital buers in good times sures (SFLE) that builds on longstanding BCBS guidthat can be drawn upon in periods of stress (Re- ance on credit exposure concentrations.[21]
ducing procyclicality and promoting countercyclical
On 3 September 2014, the U.S. banking agencies (Fedbuers).
eral Reserve, Oce of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) issued their
Measures to address procyclicality:
nal rule implementing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
Dampen excess cyclicality of the mini(LCR).[22] The LCR is a short-term liquidity measure inmum capital requirement;
tended to ensure that banking organizations maintain a
Promote more forward looking provi- sucient pool of liquid assets to cover net cash outows
sions;
over a 30-day stress period.
Conserve capital to build buers at individual banks and the banking sector that
3.2 U.S. implementation
can be used in stress; and
Achieve the broader macroprudential goal of
The U.S. Federal Reserve announced in December 2011
protecting the banking sector from periods of
that it would implement substantially all of the Basel III
excess credit growth.
rules.[23] It summarized them as follows, and made clear
Requirement to use long-term data hori- they would apply not only to banks but also to all instituzons to estimate probabilities of default, tions with more than US$50 billion in assets:
downturn loss-given-default estimates,
Risk-based capital and leverage requirements inrecommended in Basel II, to become
cluding rst annual capital plans, conduct stress
mandatory

4 ANALYSIS OF BASEL III IMPACT


tests, and capital adequacy including a tier one 3.4 Key milestones
common risk-based capital ratio greater than 5 percent, under both expected and stressed conditions 3.4.1 Capital requirements
see scenario analysis on this. A risk-based capital
surcharge
3.4.2 Leverage ratio
Market liquidity, rst based on the United States 3.4.3 Liquidity requirements
own "interagency liquidity risk-management guidance issued in March 2010 that require liquidity
stress tests and set internal quantitative limits, later 4 Analysis of Basel III
moving to a full Basel III regime - see below.
The Federal Reserve Board itself would conduct
tests annually using three economic and nancial
market scenarios. Institutions would be encouraged to use at least ve scenarios reecting improbable events, and especially those considered impossible by management, but no standards apply yet to
extreme scenarios. Only a summary of the three ofcial Fed scenarios including company-specic information, would be made public but one or more
internal company-run stress tests must be run each
year with summaries published.
Single-counterparty credit limits to cut "credit exposure of a covered nancial rm to a single counterparty as a percentage of the rms regulatory capital.
Credit exposure between the largest nancial companies would be subject to a tighter limit.
Early remediation requirements to ensure that
nancial weaknesses are addressed at an early
stage. One or more triggers for remediation
such as capital levels, stress test results, and riskmanagement weaknessesin some cases calibrated
to be forward-looking would be proposed by the
Board in 2012. Required actions would vary based
on the severity of the situation, but could include restrictions on growth, capital distributions, and executive compensation, as well as capital raising or asset
sales.[24]

impact

4.1 Macroeconomic impact


An OECD study released on 17 February 2011, estimated
that the medium-term impact of Basel III implementation on GDP growth would be in the range of 0.05% to
0.15% per year.[28] Economic output would be mainly
aected by an increase in bank lending spreads, as banks
pass a rise in bank funding costs, due to higher capital requirements, to their customers. To meet the capital requirements originally eective in 2015 banks were
estimated to increase their lending spreads on average
by about 15 basis points. Capital requirements eective as of 2019 (7% for the common equity ratio, 8.5%
for the Tier 1 capital ratio) could increase bank lending
spreads by about 50 basis points.[29] The estimated eects
on GDP growth assume no active response from monetary policy. To the extent that monetary policy would no
longer be constrained by the zero lower bound, the Basel
III impact on economic output could be oset by a reduction (or delayed increase) in monetary policy rates by
about 30 to 80 basis points.[28]

4.2 Criticism

Think tanks such as the World Pensions Council have argued that Basel III merely builds on and further expands
the existing Basel II regulatory base without fundamentally questioning its core tenets, notably the ever-growing
reliance on standardized assessments of credit risk marketed by two private sector agencies- Moodys and S&P,
As of January 2014, the United States has been on track thus using public policy to strengthen anti-competitive
to implement many of the Basel III rules, despite dier- duopolistic practices.[30][31] The conicted and unreliable
ences in ratio requirements and calculations.[25]
credit ratings of these agencies is generally seen as a major contributor to the US housing bubble.

3.3

Europe implementation

Main article: Capital Requirements Directive

Opaque treatment of all derivatives contracts is also criticized. While institutions have many legitimate (hedging, insurance) risk reduction reasons to deal in derivatives, the Basel III accords:

The implementing act of the Basel III agreements in the


European Union has been the new legislative package
comprising Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) and Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 on prudential requirements
for credit institutions and investment rms (CRR).[26]

treat insurance buyers and sellers equally even


though sellers take on more concentrated risks (literally purchasing them) which they are then expected
to oset correctly without regulation

The new package, approved in 2013, replaced the Capital


Requirements Directives (2006/48 and 2006/49).[27]

do not require organizations to investigate correlations of all internal risks they own

5
do not tax or charge institutions for the systematic or frequently as Basel III remains under development.
aggressive externalization or conicted marketing of
risk - other than requiring an orderly unravelling of
derivatives in a crisis and stricter record keeping
5 See also
Since derivatives present major unknowns in a crisis these
are seen as major failings by some critics [32] causing several to claim that the too big to fail status remains with
respect to major derivatives dealers who aggressively took
on risk of an event they did not believe would happen but did. As Basel III does not absolutely require extreme
scenarios that management atly rejects to be included
in stress testing this remains a vulnerability. Standardized external auditing and modelling is an issue proposed
to be addressed in Basel 4 however.
A few critics argue that capitalization regulation is inherently fruitless due to these and similar problems and - despite an opposite ideological view of regulation - agree
that too big to fail persists.[33]

Basel I
Basel II
Basel 4
Systemically important nancial institution
Operational risk
Operational risk management

6 References
[1] Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision an-

nounces higher global minimum capital standards (PDF).


Basel III has been criticized similarly for its paper burden
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 12 September
and risk inhibition by banks, organized in the Institute
2010.
of International Finance, an international association of
global banks based in Washington, D.C., who argue [2] Financial Times report Oct 2012
that it would hurt both their business and overall economic growth. The OECD estimated that implemen- [3] http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3_phase_in_
arrangements.pdf
tation of Basel III would decrease annual GDP growth
[28][34]
by 0.050.15%,
blaming the slow recovery from [4] http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3_phase_in_
the nancial crisis of 200708 on the regulation.[35][36]
arrangements.pdf
Basel III was also criticized as negatively aecting the
[5] http://www.riskbank.com.br/anexo/boletim0910.pdf
stability of the nancial system by increasing incen[37]
tives of banks to game the regulatory framework. The [6] http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf
American Bankers Association,[38] community banks
organized in the Independent Community Bankers of [7] http://www.allbankingsolutions.com/banking-tutor/
basel-iii-accord-basel-3-norms.shtml
America, and some of the most liberal Democrats in the
U.S. Congress, including the entire Maryland congres- [8] US Federal Reserve Bank announces the minimum Basel
sional delegation with Democratic Senators Ben Cardin
III leverage ratio.
and Barbara Mikulski and Representatives Chris Van
Hollen and Elijah Cummings, voiced opposition to Basel [9] http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
III in their comments to the Federal Deposit Insurance [10] Hal S. Scott (16 June 2011). Testimony of Hal S.
Corporation,[39] saying that the Basel III proposals, if imScott before the Committee on Financial Services (PDF).
plemented, would hurt small banks by increasing their
Committee on Financial Services, United States House of
Representatives. pp. 1213. Retrieved 17 November
capital holdings dramatically on mortgage and small busi2012.
ness loans.[40]

Others have argued that Basel III did not go far enough to [11] http://www.federalreserve.gov/FR_notice_lcr_
20131024.pdf
regulate banks as inadequate regulation was a cause of the
nancial crisis.[41] On 6 January 2013 the global banking
[12] Fed Liquidity Proposal Seen Trading Safety for Costlier
sector won a signicant easing of Basel III Rules, when
Credit. Bloomberg.
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision extended
not only the implementation schedule to 2019, but broad- [13] Nonbank SIFIs: FSOC proposes initial designations
more names to follow. http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/
ened the denition of liquid assets.[42]
financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/
fs-reg-brief-nonbank-sifi.pdf, June 2013.

4.3

Further studies

In addition to articles used for references (see References), this section lists links to publicly available highquality studies on Basel III. This section may be updated

[14] Liquidity coverage ratio:


another brick in
the
wall.
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/
financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/
fs-reg-brief-dodd-frank-act-basel-iii-fed-liquidity-coverage-ratio.
pdf, October 2013.

EXTERNAL LINKS

[15] http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
20131024a.htm

[32] http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/vstavrak/files/
derivregntr_article.pdf

[16] http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
9f61345c-3cb1-11e3-a8c4-00144feab7de.html#
axzz2jWZZfSmH

[33] http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/04/
basel-iii-capital-standards-do-not-reduce-the-too-big-to-fail-problem

[17] Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector


(PDF). BCBS. December 2009. p. 15. Tier 3 will be
abolished to ensure that market risks are met with the
same quality of capital as credit and operational risks.
[18] Basel II Comprehensive version part 2: The First Pillar Minimum Capital Requirements (PDF). November
2005. p. 86.
[19] Susanne Craig (8 January 2012). Bank Regulators to Allow Leeway on Liquidity Rule. New York Times. Retrieved 10 January 2012.
[20] Proposed Basel III Guidelines: A Credit Positive for Indian
Banks
[21] Stress testing: First take: Basel large exposures framework.
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/
regulatory-services/publications/index.jhtml''. PwC Financial Services Regulatory Practice, April 2014.
[22] First take: Liquidity coverage ratio. http://www.
pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory-services/
publications/first-take-liquidity-coverage-ratio.jhtml''.
PwC Financial Services Regulatory Practice, September,
2014.
[23] Edward Wyatt (20 December 2011). Fed Proposes New
Capital Rules for Banks. New York Times. Retrieved 6
July 2012.
[24] Press Release. Federal Reserve Bank. 20 December
2011. Retrieved 6 July 2012.
[25] Basel leverage ratio:
No cover for US
banks
(PDF).
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/
financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/
dodd-frank-basel-leverage-ratio.jhtml''. PwC Financial
Services Regulatory Practice, January 2014.
[26] http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/regcapital/
legislation-in-force/index_en.htm
[27] http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/
implementing-basel-iii-europe
[28] Patrick Slovik; Boris Cournde (2011). Macroeconomic Impact of Basel III. OECD Economics
Department Working Papers.
OECD Publishing.
doi:10.1787/5kghwnhkkjs8-en.
[29] ?
[30] M. Nicolas J. Firzli, A Critique of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Revue Analyse Financire,
10 November 2011 & Q2 2012
[31] Barr, David G. (23 November 2013). What We Thought
We Knew: The Financial System and Its Vulnerabilities
(PDF). Bank of England.

[34] Jones, Huw (September 2010). Basel rules to have little


impact on economy (PDF). Reuters.
[35] John Taylor (September 2012). Regulatory Expansion
Versus Economic Expansion in Two Recoveries.
[36] Philip Suttle (3 March 2011). The Macroeconomic Implications of Basel III. Institute of International Finance.
Retrieved 17 November 2012.
[37] Patrick Slovik (2012). Systemically Important Banks
and Capital Regulations Challenges. OECD Economics Department Working Papers. OECD Publishing.
doi:10.1787/5kg0ps8cq8q6-en.
[38] Comment Letter on Proposals to Comprehensively Revise the Regulatory Capital Framework for U.S.Banking
Organizations(22 October 2012, http://www.sifma.org/
workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8589940758
[39] 95 entities listed at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/2012-ad-95-96-97/2012-ad95.html Retrieved
13 March 2013
[40] http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/test112912.
pdf
[41] Reich, Robert. Wall Street is Still Out of Control, and
Why Obama Should Call for Glass-Steagall and a Breakup
of Big Banks. Robert Reich.org. Retrieved 2 March
2013.
[42] NY
Times
1
July
2013
http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/
easing-of-rules-for-banks-acknowledges-reality/

7 External links
Basel III capital rules
Basel III liquidity rules
Bank Management and Control, Springer Management for Professionals, 2014
U.S. Implementation of the Basel Capital Regulatory Framework Congressional Research Service
- Basel III in India
How Basel III Aects SME Borrowing Capacity

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

8.1

Text

Basel III Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basel_III?oldid=666756669 Contributors: Edward, Cherkash, Andrewman327, Tpbradbury, Topbanana, Goethean, Auric, Elgaard, Chowbok, Ksnow, Bobrayner, Rjwilmsi, Wragge, Chobot, Rjlabs, Wolbo, Zzuuzz, Bokken,
Stie, Ohnoitsjamie, Chris the speller, Deli nk, Vcrs, Robma, Ohconfucius, Dl2000, Headbomb, PhiLiP, MER-C, Eurobas, Cyktsui,
McDoobAU93, Fiachra10003, Mxbaraz, Itemirus, Falcon8765, North wiki, Rinconsoleao, Cptmurdok, Dr.glen, Doprendek, MystBot,
Addbot, MrOllie, Download, Basel Lisa, Yobot, Librsh, Amirobot, AnomieBOT, Quebec99, Omnipaedista, FrescoBot, Haeinous, CircleAdrian, Rockteam, RedBot, Hessamnia, Nataev, RjwilmsiBot, Gvi.shekar, Niek Wiltjer, EmausBot, Dubbs.b, Dewritech, ZroBot,
Tolly4bolly, JTW4, Ujax, ClueBot NG, Jmreinhart, Snotbot, Ntrikha, Redraiders203, Wikijasmin, Leurquin, AJonwiki, BG19bot, Kndimov, Oderinde, JonRaeside2, Mark Arsten, Aretina, FTonwiki, Rajnish Ramchurun, Vinyhang, Peterkortvel, B.Andersohn, BattyBot,
Wikimur, Domter, Vladberg, Righteousskills, Truther2012, Little green rosetta, Allison13579, Pep marfran, Tentinator, Wuerzele,
Rodie151, Akkermand18, Monkbot, CHIRANJIB2014, The Last Arietta, Kiranlove1, TaqPol, Triforcef, Adamlkhal and Anonymous:
113

8.2

Images

8.3

Content license

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0

You might also like