Reasons for Moral Conduct:

Groundwork of Scanlon's
Contractualism
Zbigniew Jan Marczuk
Claremont Graduate University
Zbigniew.Marczuk@cgu.edu

ABSTRACT: Scanlon grounds all moral principles in claims about ''what

individuals have reasons to agree to." Analyzing Scanlon's groundwork, I

discuss his central reason for being concerned with morality and why personal
and impersonal reasons for moral conduct cannot co-exist in his contractualism.
I demonstrate that personal values and reasons are incommensurable with
impersonal values and reasons. Thus, Scanlon needs to exclude impersonal
reasons from the moral theory he advocates. But I argue that there may be a
means of inclusion of both the personal and impersonal values and reasons. I
propose Aristotelian virtue ethics as a plausible foundation for subordinating the
impersonal values and reasons to the value of human rationality in its full
capacity. This subordination may provide the defensible condition that
Scanlon's contractualism requires to justify moral principles to each person on
the grounds of respect for human rationality.
PERSONAL VALUES AND REASONS are incommensurable with
impersonal values and reasons. I propose Aristotelian virtue ethics as a plausible
foundation for subordinating the impersonal values and reasons to the value of
human rationality in its full capacity. This subordination may provide the defensible
condition that Scanlon's contractualism requires to justify moral principles to each
person on the grounds of respect for human rationality.
Describing his contractualism Scanlon writes:
A theory may, as mine does, ground ethical claims in claims about what
individuals have reasons to agree to ... Claims about reasons figured in two
ways in the argument of my book. First, in order to defend claims about the
Philosophy in the Contemporary World 17:1 (Spring 2010)

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content of morality, according to my version of contractualism, one needs to

make claims about reasons that individuals have for accepting or rejecting
certain principles as standards of conduct. Second, I claimed that we have reason
to care about the justifiability of our actions to others and that is a central reason
for our concern with the morality of our actions (Scanlon 2003, 425-6).
Hence, I find Scanlon making the following assertions:
A) We (everyone) have reason to act toward others in ways that are justifiable to
them (from the second claim).
B) The reason we all have for caring about the justifiability of our actions to
others is a central reason for being concerned with the morality of our actions
(from the second claim).
C) Claims about an individual person's reasons for accepting or rejecting certain
principles as standards of conduct allow the defense of contractualist claims
about the content of morality (from the first claim).
Scanlon makes two restrictions concerning (C). First, "We cannot reasonably
reject some principle by appealing to claims about the goodness of outcomes"
(Scanlon 1998,222). Second, "In rejecting some moral principle, we must appeal to
this principle's implications only for ourselves, or for any other single person" (Ibid,
229). Thus, I restate (C) as:
C1) It is only the claims about an individual person's reasons for accepting or
rejecting principles as standards of conduct, which are not derived from the
goodness (or badness) of outcomes, that allow defending the contractualist content
of morality.
Scanlon does not explicitly state that the goodness of outcomes cannot be a
reason to accept a principle of conduct. But in his reply to Philip Pettit he writes:
He takes the promotion of the best consequences as the ultimate basis on which
standards of conduct should be justified. I disagree. [ ... ] I argue, on the other
hand, that the idea of promoting the best consequences, while it is worthy of
respect, should be subordinated to the idea of justifiability to others (Scanlon
2003,439).
I believe these three claims about reasons constitute the groundwork for
Scanlon's contractualism. This groundwork deserves careful inquiry because it is
challenged by the alternative Kantian contractualist theory, proposed by Derek
Parfit (Parfit 2004 and 2006). Parfit argues that Scanlon's contractualism would
become stronger if Scanlon would allow impersonal reasons for moral conduct in
his groundwork (parfit 2003, 388-9). I agree with Parfit that impersonal reasons for
moral conduct are relevant to Scanlon's contractualism. But the question that I
address is whether there is a plausible way for including impersonal reasons for
moral conduct in Scanlon's contractualism.

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In what follows, I discuss Scanlon's central reason for being concerned with
morality, why personal and impersonal reasons for moral conduct cannot co-exist in
Scanlon's contractualism, and why personal values and reasons are
incommensurable with impersonal values and reasons. I demonstrate why Scanlon
arrives at his position that it is necessary to exclude impersonal reasons from the
moral theory that he advocates. But I argue that there may be a means of inclusion
of both the personal and impersonal values and reasons. I propose Aristotelian
virtue ethics as a plausible foundation for subordinating the impersonal values and
reasons to the value of human rationality in its full capacity. This action may
provide the defensible condition that Scanlon's contractualism requires to justify
moral principles to each person on the grounds of respect for human rationality.
Central Reason to Be Concerned with Morality

Scanlon thinks that all rational beings are valuable. In Scanlon's view, ''to call
something valuable is to say that it has other [natural] properties that provide
reasons for behaving in certain ways with regard to it" (Scanlon 1998, 96).
Rationality is a natural reason-giving property that requires treating each rational
being with respect. Respecting human lives involves "seeing reasons not to destroy
them, reasons to protect them and reasons to want them to go well" Scanlon 1998,
104). But Scanlon qualifies this statement, saying that these reasons "are matters of
respect and concern for the person whose life it is rather than of respect for human
life." Respectful acts toward another person are those which are rationally
justifiable to this person. On account of their rationality, human beings have the
capacity to assess reasons and justifications, and select a life that is worth living
from the various ways of living that are possible to them. Thus, the reason we all
have for acting toward others in ways that are justifiable to them rests in the fact
that we understand the value of a rational being. We understand that each person is
a "locus of reasons" to live a better life.
Scanlon observes that people may have a variety of reasons for selecting one or
another way of living. If we need to respond to these reasons, we ought to address
them in a way that respects human reason-assessing and self-governing capacities.
To accomplish this, he advises us ''to treat rational creatures only in ways that
would be allowed by principles that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they,
too, were seeking principles of mutual governance which other rational creatures
could not reasonably reject" (Scanlon 1998, 106).
Human beings can be best respected within agreeable social living. Scanlon
thinks that social agreeableness is a valuable state of affairs in itself. A community
is a desirable form of human living, as it contributes to the happiness of its
members. Social agreeableness is the best state of communal affairs. Therefore,
everyone has reasons to pursue communal agreeableness. Agreeable living
inevitably calls for justifiable standards to regulate and evaluate social conduct.
Scanlon proposes that such standards for social conduct become moral
principles if no member of the community could reasonably reject them, provided
this community shares the aim of finding principles such that no one could
reasonably reject. The term reasonable, in Scanlon's theory, means to take into

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account other people's interests, "given the supposed aim of reaching agreement or
finding a course of action that everyone will be happy with" (Scanlong 1998, 33,
192). Many critics noted that the term "reasonable" is ambiguous in Scanlon's
theory. Explaining this term, Derek Parfit writes: "Though 'reasonable' usually
means much the same as 'rational', Scanlon uses this word in a different moral
sense. We are unreasonable, in this sense, if we ignore or give too little weight to
some other people's well-being or moral claims" (Parfit 2003, 368). Principles that
no one could reasonably reject are morally authoritative to all community members
because they are justifiable to every person of this community. Thus, according to
Scanlon, our understanding the value of human rationality gives us reason to act
toward others in ways that are justifiable to them, and this reason becomes central
for us to be concern with the justifiable (moral) rules for conduct (A and B).
But Scanlon restricts the reasons that people can offer to one another in the
process of selecting justifiable principles for conduct to the individual person's
reasons (Cl). This restriction is questionable for Scanlon recognizes the state of
agreeable social living as valuable in itself. The value of social agreeableness gives
everyone a strong impersonal reason for promoting a social arrangement that
maximizes peaceful living. Everyone's rational concern for preserving social
agreeableness implies relevant impersonal reasons that should be considered in the
process of seeking justifiable principles for social conduct. Scanlon's rejection of
the impersonal reasons from the process of selecting authoritative principles for
social conduct requires an explanation, for he recognizes the validity and strength of
both impersonal and impartial reasons for acting. Scanlon's contractualism is a wide
value-based theory, recognizing that people may have strong personal and
impersonal reasons for acting. In this view, some personal reasons to care for one's
own well-being, or the well-being of people one loves, may be rationally as strong
as the impersonal reasons to care for communal welfare. The wide value-based
theories oppose the narrow value-based theories, which promote either personal or
impersonal reasons for acting.
Rejection of Impersonal Basis for Morality
According to Scanlon's Contractualism, reasons for acting, believing, and
desiring are derived from the natural features and properties of things, people,
events, and states of affairs. Scanlon argues that these features and properties "count
in favor of' one's acting in certain ways, believing, and desiring. The "counting in
favor of' certain acting, believing, and desiring, constitutes reasons for so doing.
For example, the fact that cold weather has a natural feature that causes one's
discomfort when outdoors and the fact that going indoors will relieve this
discomfort, give a person reason to go inside (Scanlon 2003, 424-5).
Reasons can be personal or impersonal. According to this theory, reasons are
personal when they promote a single person's interests. Reasons are impersonal
when they promote a common welfare. Impersonal reasons are impartial when they
give equal weight to every person's well-being. According to Scanlon, a reason for
acting is "a consideration that in fact counts in favor of some action." Thus, the
reasons that in fact count in favor of an action determine what action is rationally

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justifiable, and what action people could reasonably object to as being unfair,
hannful, or unjust to them (Ibid., 435).
Scamon admits that there are social aims such as justice or fair distribution that
imply equal consideration for all members of the community. Such aims give
impersonal reasons for acting and call for impartial assessment of their strength.
However, the impersonal impartial reasons for acting in a certain way are umikely
to support the value of rational beings or an aim that is rationally most worthy for an
individual person. Apparently, the impersonal impartial reasons are the strongest
form of the impersonal reasons. Scamon separates these reasons from the personal
reasons while selecting the moral principles, for it is not possible to evaluate the
weight of impersonal impartial reasons against the personal reasons. As Scanlon
says, there is no a single concept of ''well-being that is, at the same time, a notion
that is central to the deliberation of the individual whose life is in question and a
notion that captures the way in which benefits and burdens for that individual
should be measured" (Scanlon 2003, 426). Hence, he thinks that it is implausible to
devise a moral theory that appeals to the rational requirement of respecting an
individual person and, at the same time, to what is impersonally best from the
impartial perspective. There is no agreeable solution to conflicts between the value
of a rational being and what is best for the society from the impartial perspective,
for there is no reliable account that allows measuring the strength of personal
reasons against the strength of impersonal impartial reasons. We cannot measure the
strength of these reasons because, without qualifications, the value of a rational
being and her rational interests are incommensurable with the value of communal
welfare or the value of social institutions. I use the notion of incommensurability
advocated by Joseph Raz. Two values are incommensurable if it is false that "either
one is better than the other or they are of equal value" (Raz 1986,342).
The life that a person selects as worth living for her includes certain aims that
make this life choiceworthy. But Scamon thinks that a person may have good reason
to choose aims that result in a lower level of her well-being. For example, a person
may have a good reason to sacrifice her comfort and many pleasures to benefit her
children. This sacrifice is choiceworthy for her, because it may give her children a
better life. But there is no reliable way to measure whether or not, and to what
extent, this choiceworthy decision contributes to a net gain in her well-being. Thus,
Scanlon argues that from the perspective of an individual person the notion of wellbeing is indeterminate (Scanlon 1998, 131; Scanlon 2003, 426-7).
A similar choiceworthy aim may be valued less, more, or equal by different
individuals. Since the value of a choiceworthy aim is agent-related, then, depending
on the person, this choiceworthy aim can provide reasons that are stronger, weaker,
or equal to the strength of impersonal reasons impartially derived from the value of
some impersonal aim. Responding to this issue David So sa writes:
What is best from your point of view may not be obvious to you, even given the
point of view you occupy. It may look to you as if caring for the relative
involves a lower level of well being; but whether or not it does, even/or you, is
not settled by the way things look to you (Sosa 2004,373-4).

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Sosa suggests that choiceworthiness may not be reliably evaluated even from the
perspective of the person whose well being is at stake. Thus, he questions the merit
of appealing to what is best for an individual person to choose from her own
perspective. I think this observation does not invalidate Scanlon's argument. The
point is that whether or not there is an objective reference point indicating what aim
is best for a person, this person may still find it worthy to choose an aim that she
knows is not contributing the most to her well-being. For example, she may choose
to bring her impoverished parents in to her home because of her love for them. She
makes this in spite of her moderate means and limited living space. The love she has
for her parents can provide strong reasons for her to pursue aiding her parents and
so choosing to lower her living standard.
Personal choiceworthy aims are agent-related and, for this reason, the concept of
an individual person's well-being is unspecified. Without qualification, neither the
value of a choiceworthy aim can be measured against an objective value, nor can
the personal reasons to pursue this value be measured against the impersonal
reasons to pursue an objective value. The impossibility of measuring personal
values and reasons against impersonal values and reasons disallows subordination
of one set of these values and reasons to the other set. Scanlon believes that a moral
theory needs to take into account an individual person's interests (insofar as they are
rational) and her reasons for supporting her own better life. But moral theories that
deny the supreme value of a rational being, also deny the claim that each person's
reasons for having a better life are an important part of a moral foundation. Such
theories have a build-in preference for the impersonal impartially best events over
the personal interests.
Scanlon thinks that theories that deny the supreme value of each rational being
and pursue the impartially best states of social affairs (for example, social choice
theories, or theories of justice) do not capture the notion of well-being that is
explicitly moral. These theories focus on ''the degree to which success in an aim ...
contributes to a person's own well-being," instead of ''the moral question of how
just social institutions must aid individuals in the pursuit of their aims" (Scanlon
2003,427). He denies the moral content of theories that declare the impartially best
states of social affairs to be a "master value," or a moral criterion. To avoid this
problem in his contractualism, Scanlon excludes the impersonal reasons from the
process of justifying principles for social conduct. This maneuver ensures
consideration of an individual person's claims and selection of moral principles
based on an individual person's reasons.
Personalists vs. Impersonalists

Parfit argues that Scanlon's moral theory would be stronger if it allowed

appealing to both the impersonal and the personal reasons in the process of
justifiability of moral principles. Parfit argues that "If Scanlon dropped his
Individualist Restriction [provided in my text below]... That would strengthen his
theory" Parfit 2003, 388-9). Let us assume a social arrangement in which some
agents take personal reasons for their moral basis (call them Personalists), some
others take impersonal reasons (call them Impersonalists), and both groups are

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willing to acknowledge all reason-based claims to seek moral principles justifiable

to both sides. Now the questions are: a) what counts as moral concern(s) and b)
what is the common ground to justify standards of conduct, when the Impersonalists
and Personalists disagree about what factors are morally relevant and decisive?
Scanlon advocates that the moral concerns should address such questions as: "What
measures must I take to avoid possible injury of others? Does this inconvenience
count as a good reason to disappoint someone's expectation? Is it permissible to
impose this cost on one person in order to benefit others in that way?" Scanlon
believes these are the first-order moral questions a systematic moral theory should
answer (see Scanlon 2002, 517).
These questions may not be the primary moral concerns of the Impersonalists.
The Impersonalists would presumably fmd moral concerns in the impartially good
and bad events and would derive decisive reasons for being concerned with morality
from the rational requirement to promote events of maximum value for their
community. That reason would allow them to consider as justifiable some principle
which maximizes distribution of a communal benefit but also requires sacrificing
the welfare of few unfortunate agents. Whether these few unfortunate agents were
Personalists or not, the Personalists would reject such an Impersonalist principle as
being morally unjustifiable to them, because such a principle subordinates the value
of human (rational) beings to the value of communal welfare. Moreover, they would
deny that the Impersonalist approach to promote maximized social benefits had any
moral characteristic, because this approach denies the principal value of an
individual person.
Personalists would find morally relevant concerns in facts such as ''the fact that
acting in a certain way would kill or injure someone, or the fact that someone needs
help, or the fact that someone is counting on him or her to do something" (Scanlon
2002, 516-7). Scanlon lists these considerations while discussing his view on the
normative basis of morality. They would derive their decisive reason for acting
from the understanding that each human being has a primary value that deserves
respect. They would declare the primary importance of respecting each rational
being. If this ground was universally justifiable, the reasons that the value of a
rational being provides for respecting each person would surpass the impersonal
reasons derived from the maximized social benefits.
The Impersonalists would reject the priority of respecting each individual
person, for such a priority does not aim to support the impartially best choices,
events, states of affairs. How do the Personalists and Impersonalists decide whether
they should choose that which is rationally recognized as most valuable or that
which is rationally recognized as most beneficial as their moral objective? Scanlon
thinks that people have reasons to choose what is rationally determined as most
valuable, that is, human rationality, even if this choice is not the most beneficial to
them. This reason comes from our actual understanding the fact that human
rationality surpasses any other human value. Thus, each rational being is most
valuable. He proposes two restrictions for the justifiability of moral principles to
each person (these two conditions are named the Anti-Consequentialist Restriction
and the Individualist Restriction by Parfit and not Scanlon).

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Anti-Consequentialist Restriction: "We cannot reasonably reject some principle

by appealing to claims about the goodness of outcomes."
Individualist Restriction: "In rejecting some moral principle, we must appeal to
this principle's implications only for ourselves, or for any other single person."

Scanlon's reasoning may be unconvincing to the Impersonalists. The

Impersonalists' appeal to the value of the best social arrangement is grounded in the
instinct of self-preservation that is fundamental to all living beings. To enhance
communal sustainability, every society needs to have some internal order. Thus,
every society needs a set of rules that regulate the social arrangement. Any social
arrangement that secures communal sustainability is valuable to the members of this
society. The arrangement that is most effective in this task makes the society the
most sustainable. Now, the social arrangement that maximizes communal benefits
makes the society the most sustainable; thus, this arrangement becomes the most
valuable to its members. The value of this arrangement provides everyone with
reasons to support it and select a set of rules that maximize communal benefits.
This reasoning shows that the claims that appeal to the goodness of outcomes
are relevant for justifying principle for social conduct that the Personalists and
Impersonalists aim to find. There is no reason to exclude claims that appeal to the
most sustainable social arrangement from the process of selecting justifiable
principles of social conduct. Eliminating impersonal reasons derived from the most
sustainable social arrangement, while selecting principles of conduct, is
unjustifiable to the Impersonalists.
However, if the Personalists agree to dismiss Scanlon's restriction from the
process of mutual justification, the moral scope opens to the sets of claims that
extend beyond what Personalists consider to be morality. The Personalists' claims
would have to compete against claims about what is politically, economically, or
lawfully most beneficial to the society. Such claims provide reasons with which the
Personalists' reasons for moral conduct cannot pair.
Suspending the Individualist Restriction, the Personalists would have to defend
their claim that ''what we owe to each person" cannot be subordinated to the
communal welfare. In this defense, their primary arguments would appeal to the
understanding the value of a rational being and to the primary importance of
respecting this value in each person. But their appeal would compete against the
Impersonalists' appeal to the impartially best arrangement for the communal
sustainability. As long as the principle of self-preservation is not justifiably
subordinated to any superior value, everyone may perceive the maximum selfpreservation as the overall strongest reason-giving factor.
Scanlon observes that the claims that appeal to the goodness of outcomes do not
capture that which he regards as essentially moral, that is, respecting the interests of
an individual person. Eliminating these claims from the process of selecting moral
principles would keep his contractualism separate from non-moral theories. But the
grounds he offers for this separation, which are the incommensurability of values
and incommensurability of reasons derived from these values, do not justify

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excluding impersonal reasons from the contractualist process of selecting justifiable

principles of conduct.

Human Rational Perfection: Kantian or Aristotelian Approach?

The above analysis does not support Parfit's view that Scanlon's contractualism
would become stronger if he would admit impersonal reasons for moral conduct to
his groundwork. But Scanlon's theory would become stronger if he justifiably
subordinated all social claims to the single value of a rational being. For example,
Scanlon could affirm fully realized human rationality as the chief value for every
person. The fully realized human rationality may be equated with the human
perfection inscribed in the idea of human species. I believe, the realization of human
perfections may be accepted as the highest aim by all individual persons. For each
individual human being has potentiality to develop all human perfections in her own
self. This would prioritize respecting each human being and an individual preron's
rational interests to live a choiceworthy life.
In this view, the Impersonalists may be compelled to accept human rationality as
the supreme value based upon the acknowledgement that the impartially best
choices, events, states of affairs are consequences of human rationality. These
consequences are secondary to human rationality. From this position, rational
beings are not subjected to the basic instinct of self-preservation the way other
living beings are. A person can rationally choose to scarify her life for a noble
cause.
This Aristotelian modification of Scanlon's contractualism is in agreement with
Kant's concept of the 'Realm of Ends,' that is, an ideal world that requires treating
each other in a way to which everyone could rationally consent. Kant's Realm of
Ends becomes the 'Greatest Good' when all human beings that are striving for
universal virtue are able to attain all the happiness they deserve (Parfit 2006, 109,
120). Kant thinks that rationality commands human beings to contribute as much as
they can to attain the human perfection and state of the Greatest Good.
The concept of the Greatest Good is also the leading idea in Parfit's Kantian
Contractualism. Discussing the way people should treat each other, Parfit writes: If
we all treat each other only in ways to which everyone could rationally consent, we
would achieve the ideal world that Kant calls the Realm of Ends. We might be able
to achieve this ideal. We cannot always let everyone choose how we treat them. But
it might be possible for everyone always to act in ways to which everyone could
rationally consent. And, if that is possible, Kant might be right to claim that this is
how everyone ought to act (see Parfit 2006, 292). To promote the realm of
universal virtue and deserved happiness, Parfit offers his Kantian Contractualist
Formula, 'We ought to act on principles whose being universal laws everyone could
rationally will' (see Parfit 2006, 186-7,212; and Parfit 2004,339). Parfit's formula
aims at selecting principles such that 'everyone could rationally will,' and requires
that each agent evaluates any potential principle of conduct from the impartialist
position (Parfit 2006,224). Parfit affirms impartialism when giving arguments for
or against moral principles, but he rejects it at the level of a particular action (see,
n.348). Impartialism requires giving equal weight to everyone's well-being, while

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considering other agents' reasons for accepting and rejecting each principle. These
reasons can be both personal and impersonal. However, Parfit argues that from the
impartialist position, the strongest reasons supporting the best possible state of
affairs cannot be outweighed by any other conflicting reasons. This fundamental
claim in Parfit's theory presupposes that the impersonal impartial reasons are
always conclusive for the principle-seeking agents.
Scanlon's contractualism cannot support Parlit's formula for it is committed to
the subjectivity of choiceworthiness. Because of the agent-dependent
choiceworthiness, Scanlon's agents cannot adopt the impartialist position while
evaluating personal reasons against impersonal reasons in the process of seeking
principles such that "everyone could rationally will.' The strength of personal
reasons is agent-dependent; thus, it is not possible for agents to know which
principle is such that everyone could rationally choose. If Scanlon accepted Parlit's
formula as a method to establish social principles of conduct, aiming to promote
human perfection within a communal living, he would have to renounce his
commitment to the subjectivity of personal well being. He could not advocate
respecting each person on the grounds of her individual reason-assessing and selfgoverning capacities to live a better life.
Furthermore, the establishment of principles for conduct according to Parlit's
formula requires that the agents have full knowledge about each other and the
society. Such knowledge is necessary to evaluate a potential principle as universally
willable. This requirement is highly demanding and may not be satisfied in practice.
The inability to attain the relevant knowledge that is necessary for rmding a 'set of
principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best' makes it
impossible to select any verifiable set of principles for conduct.
The Aristotelian approach seems more promising to establish a social
arrangement that supports the rational fulfillment of each person. Provided that
rationality is the distinguishing characteristic of a human species and the most
advanced power of the human being, everyone has a decisive reason for pursuing
the development of the human rational potentials. If this development is best
achieved in an agreeable social arrangement, then everyone has reason to care for
social agreeableness. This supports Scanlon's commitment to the "moral question of
how just social institutions must aid individuals in the pursuit of their aims."
Seeking the fulfillment of human rational potentials justifies respecting each
person's rational interests.
Assuming the supreme value of human rationality in its full capacity, each
person has both personal and impersonal reasons for promoting the events and state
of affairs which contribute the most to the development of human rational
perfections in her own self and in others. Alternatively, the same commitment to
human rationality in its fullness gives everyone reasons to reject a social
arrangement that generates the best aggregated outcomes on the expense of some
unfortunate rational beings. Thus, assuming the realization of human rational
perfections as the central reason for morality would keep Scanlon's theory separate
from the theories that focus on social success sum total.
This Aristotelian interpretation would support Scanlon's formula for selecting
principles for conduct, for no one could reasonably reject principles for social

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conduct that instantiate the optimal conditions for the realization of human
perfections in each and every rational being. The strength of all reasons for
accepting or rejecting a principle may be derived from the conditions that the
proposed principle would set for the rational betterment of all members. Thus, a
principle that demands helping others when one can, would be accepted based upon
the fact that it recognizes and endorses the dignity that each person has as a locus of
all human perfections. A principle that allows breaking an insignificant promise
would be rejected because it undermines the value of honor and reliability, which
are essential parts of the human rational perfection.
Here, the obligation to keep a promise or to help others does not depend on the
harmful outcomes that the promise-break or failure-to-help may cause to another
person. The obligation depends on the understanding the value of the human
rational perfections. People accept and rely on promises because they trust that
those who offer them value honor and reliability. A person, who does not appreciate
honor, reliability, dignity, or any other human perfection, and values her own
achievements more than these perfections, violates the human rationality in her self.
Linking Scanlon's contractualism with Aristotelian virtue ethics requires careful
definition of the human nature and its perfection in order to formulate a guide for
the right (most rational) human conduct. But it may be worthwhile to undertake this
task. Sir David Ross proposes to seek such guidance in our moral intuitions.
Although he believes that the concept of "right" in the moral sense is indefinable, in
the eighth chapter of his Foundation ofEthics, Ross writes:
It is not the case that that singular judgments of rightness are always reached by
inference from general principles which assert entailments. On the contrary, the
general principles must have been reached by intuitive induction from particular
cases in which the compresence of rightness with certain non-ethical
characteristics was directly observed (Ross 2002, 283).
Ross thinks that the most reliable judgments of the rights and wrongs of human
actions come from the intuitions of "thoughtful and well-educated people," that is,
from the intuitions of people with practical wisdom. He admits that human beings
do not have a reliable intuitive faculty that provides them with exact knowledge
about what is the right thing to do in a given situation. He believes that this fallible
sense is the only guiding faculty we have (Ross 2002, 42). But the general
principles that thoughtful and well-educated people can inductively derive from
their moral intuitions may be codified into a set of guiding rules for the rationally
best conduct.
If Ross is right, we should try to formulate a guide for the right (most rational)
human conduct based upon judgments of people with practical wisdom. He suggests
that these judgments may be supported with some secondary features that indicate
the rational perfection of an agent, or the lack of it. For example, we should take
into account the wrong-making properties and the right-making properties, involved
in an action, which the agent noticed but ignored.

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Concluding Remarks
In Scanlon's view, living with others who are also committed to social
agreeableness creates certain expectations from each person of this society. The
most basic expectation is to acknowledge the value of human rationality in each
person. But this value is unavoidably challenged by the greatest benefit for the
society sum total. The society is valuable in itself and it deserves everyone's
support. If a conflict occurs between an individual person's interests, and the
interests of society as a whole, there is no agreeable solution, for we cannot measure
the importance of one kind of interests against another. We have to choose. But I
argue that it is unjustifiable to exclude one kind of reason from this conflict, without
sufficient grounds, to reach the desired results.
If Scanlon's idea of justifiability to each person is morally valid, as I think it is,
it may be justified by the value of human rationality in its full capacity. The
contractualist principles for moral conduct may be attainable if Scanlon
subordinates the value of agreeable social arrangement to the value of human
rationality in its full capacity. I believe that Aristotelian virtue ethics may provide
grounds for such subordination. From the Aristotelian perspective, the primary
value of the best social arrangement rests in its maximum conditions for developing
human rational potentials.

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