La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. et al. v. Ramos et al.

27 January 2004
Parties
Petitioners:
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION,
INC., Respondents: VICTOR O. RAMOS, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND
GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN TORRES,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC (PHILIPPINES) , INC.
Background:
Nature and Case History
25 July 1987 EO 279 authorized DENR to accept, consider
and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon
appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President
may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering into
such proposals, the President shall consider the real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country that will be realized, as well as the development
and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be
promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until
Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for
purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for
contracts or agreements for mineral resources exploration,
development, and utilization involving a committed capital
investment in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty
Million Dollars in United States Currency (US $50,000,000. 00)
3 March 1995 RA 7942 signed into law
30 March 1995 Government entered FTAA with WMCP
99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat,
Davao del Sur and North Cotabato .
9 April 1995 30 days after publication on 10 March 1995, RA
7942 took effect
20 December 1996 DENR Secretary Victor Ramos issued
DAO 96-40
10 January 1997 counsels for petitioner sent letter to
Ramos demanding DENR to stop implementing RA 7942 and
DAO 96-40.
No response, thus this petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with prayer of TRO and preliminary injunction
(denied) claiming that petitioner Ramos acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in implementing the assailed
Constitutionality of RA 7942 [1], of DENR Administrative
Order 96-40 [2], and of the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement entered into on 30 March 1995 between the
Republic of the Philippines and WMC (Philippines) , Inc..
23 January 2001 Manifestation of respondents that WMCP
is no longer foreign-owned as WMC has sold 100% of its
equity to Filipino company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. which is

60% owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations.

WMCP is renamed as Tampakan Mineral Resources
Corporation.
18 December 2001 DENR approved the transfer and
registration of FTAA to Sagittarius from WMCP.
Supreme Court said that this manifestation and transfer does
not render the issue moot since the question of validity of the
FTAA will affect even that held by Sagittarius.
FACTS OF THE CASE
-Stated in case historyISSUE/S
Preliminary Issue: Standing of Petitioners
1WON EO 279 is an invalid law having been issued two days
before President Aquinos legislative powers expired with the
convening of Regular Congress and having thus took effect
after which.
2WON RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional and
consequently the FTAA entered pursuant to above stated
laws is invalid
Ratio Decidendi
Preliminary Issue: Petitioners have standing since they are
residents of the land covered by the FTAA. Since the petition
if for mandamus and prohibition and the issue is of
constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme is no longer
concerned whether or not petitioners are real parties of
interest to the contract/agreement.
1NO. EO 279 is valid and whether or not the laws effectivity
date lies beyond the expiration of the Presidents legislative
power is irrelevant since it was still enacted when the
president held such power. It does not run counter to EO 200
requiring laws to have 15 days after publication requirement
before its effectivity since EO 200 also provides unless it is
otherwise provided, EO 279 having stated its own effectivity
as shall take effect immediately. In addition, the 15-day
post-publication requirement was for the information of the
public and does not in any way affect the date of enactment
and is not a ground for invalidation. EO 279 nonetheless was
published on the Official Gazette on 3 August 1987.
2Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides The President may
enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.[3]

The Constitution provides for four modes by which the States

may explore, develop, and Utilize Natural Resources
(1) State may directly undertake such activities
(2) State may enter into co-production, joint-venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or
qualified corporations (60% Filipino owned)
(3) Congress may allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens
(4)
For the large-scale exploration, development, or
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, the
President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporation for technical or financial assistance.

agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five

years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.

The framers of this Constitution expressly omitted the phrase

service contracts that was provided for in the 1973
Constitution which allowed foreign companies to manage
and operate mining activities and replaced it with technical
or financial assistance only.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of

natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the FTAA between the government

and WMCP allows for the management and operation of the
foreign-owned corporation for the large-scale exploration,
development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils. Although counsel for respondents claim that
technical is a very broad term that may cover the
management and operation of such activities, it is still clear
from the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission that
they intended to limit the utilization of the natural resources
for the sole enjoyment of the Filipinos.
DECISION
Petition Granted. Certain provisions of RA 7942 are declared
null and void. So are all provisions of Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 9640, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this Decision,
and the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and WMC Philippines, Inc.
Appendix:
[1] Philippine Mining Act of 1995
[2] Implementing Rules and Regulations pursuant to RA 7942
issued by the DENR
[3] Cont. Art. XII, Sec. 2, par. 4
Const. Art. XII Sec. 2.
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its

archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned

corporations involving either technical of financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract
entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
Chavez vs PEA
GR 133250, July 9, 2002
Facts: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates
Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation (AMARI) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay and to construct Phases I and II
of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the
total reclaimed land. . The petition further seeks to enjoin
PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving
such reclamation.
Issue: Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for
the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed
on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?
Ruling: Under CA No. 141, known as the Public Land Act,
authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of
the government to corporations and individuals. Since the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. The transfer of such

reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will
be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Amended JVA violates Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution and is therefore declared null and void ab
initio.
Chavez vs PEA
G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003
Facts: Petitioner asked to legitimize a government contract
that conveyed to a private entity 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro
Manila. However, published reports place the market price of
land near that area at a price higher than negotiated price.
The private entity somehow managed to deceive the
government to sell the reclaimed lands without public
bidding in patent violation of the Government Auditing Code.
The Senate Committees established the clear, indisputable
and unalterable fact that the sale of the public lands is grossly
and unconscionably undervalued based on official documents
submitted by the proper government agencies during the
Senate investigation.
Issue: Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for
the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed
on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?
Ruling: The bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are
still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Of the 750
hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 78% of the total area is
still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the
submerged lands even before their actual reclamation,
although the documentation of the deed of transfer and
issuance of the certificates of title would be made only after
actual reclamation. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of
the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands is
in violation of Sec. 2 Article XII of the constitution.
USERO vs, CA
G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005
Property Law
FACTS: This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private
respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels of
land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with
stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a storm or heavy
rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing damage
to houses of the Polinars prompting them to build a concrete
wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters from their
house and riprapped the soil in that portion.
The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the
halt of the construction but the Polinars never heeded
believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the

Polinars offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed
to settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible entry.
The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner,
while the regional trial court reversed and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the existence of the
creek between the lots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the
creek hence part of public domain
Held: YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code (NCC)
provides for properties which are part of public domain. A
creek is included in the phrase "and others of similar
character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a river
is a property belonging to the public domain, therefore not
susceptible of private ownership. Being a public water, it
cannot be registered under the Torrens system under the
name of any individual.
Vda. De Tantoco v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo [G.R. No.
24950. March 25, 1926.]
Facts: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of
Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being thepurchase price
of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592
sq. m., and the other on CalleAldiguer consisting of 59 sq. m.,
which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening
said street. The CFI Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to
pay the Tantoco the amount so claimed, plus the interest.
Said judgment was appealed, and was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.On account of lack of funds the municipality
of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore
plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of
the said municipality, by virtue of which thesheriff attached
two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police stations onMabini street, and in Molo
and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the
corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and
Mandurriao. After notice of the sale of said property had
been made, and a fewdays before the sale, the provincial
fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that the
attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said
attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and
violative of the rights of the municipality. By order of 12
August 1925, the Court declared the attachment levied upon
the aforementioned property of the municipality null and
void, thereby dissolving the said attachment. Fromthis order
Tantoco has appealed by bill of exceptions.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from
with costs against Tantoco.
HELD: Property of public domain applies to municipal
property for public use; both not within the commerce of
man
The principle governing property of the public domain of the
State is applicable to property for public use of the
municipalities as said municipal property is similar in
character. The principle is that the property for public use of
the State is not within the commerce of man and,
consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription.
Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not
within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the
public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.

Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of Zamboanga 22

SCRA 1334
Facts
Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality
of Zamboanga was the provincial capital of Zamboanga
Province. By virtue of Commonwealth Act 39, section 50
providing that the buildings and other properties that the
Province will abandon in view of its conversion as Zamboanga
City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to
be fixed by the Auditor General, the said properties consisting
of 50 lots were identified and the price were fixed thereof. An
allotment for its payment was authorized by the BIR
Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and
it amended section 50 of the Commonwealth Act 39
providing that all buildings, properties, and assets belonging
to the Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of
Zamboanga are transferred free of charge in favor of the City
of Zamboanga. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction
contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as it deprives
the Province of its properties without just compensation and
due process.
Issue: Whether or not RA 3039 is unconstitutional?
HELD:
The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to
identify the nature of the properties in dispute. The
properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by
the province in its governmental capacity. Those that are not
devoted for public use remain as patrimonial property of the
Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as the properties
that are devoted for public use or owned by the province in
its governmental capacity and thus must retain its public
purpose. Hence these governmental properties need not be
paid by the City of Zamboanga.
With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in
dispute, the RA 3039 cannot be applied in order to deprive
the province of its own patrimonial properties that are not
devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall
pay just compensation to the Province of Zamboanga for
these patrimonial properties.
G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Governor of the
Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his capacity as
Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch
XXIII, Court of First Instance of Manila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS,
in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila; and the CITY OF
MANILA, respondents-appellees.
FACTS: City of Manila owner in fee simple of a parcel of
land known as Lot 1, Block 557 of Cadastral Survey of City of
Manila, containing an area of 9689.80 sqm. On various dates
in 1927, City of Manila sold portions of the parcel of land.

When the last sale was effected August 1924, Transfer

Certificate of Title 22547 covering the residue of the land
7490.10 sam was issued in the name of City of Manila.
On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila adopted a
resolution requesting the President to consider the feasibility
of declaring the land under Transfer Certificate of Title 2554525547 as patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of
selling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. The
resolution was then transmitted to the Congress. The bill was
then passed by Congress and approved by President, and
became Republic Act 4118, converting the land from
communal property to disposable and alienable land of State.
To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of
Manila to deliver the Citys TCT 22547 in order to obtain title
thereto in the name of Land Authority. The request was
granted with the knowledge and consent of City mayor,
cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of
Land Authority.
City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an action to
restrain, prohibit, and enjoin Land Authority and Register of
Deeds from implementing RA 4118, and praying for the
declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.
Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional and
invalid on the ground that it deprived City of its property
without due process of law and payment of just
compensation.
Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that the land is
a communal land, or a portion of public domain owned by
State; that the land has not been used by City of Manila for
any public purpose; that it was originally a communal land
not because it was needed in connection with its organisation
as a municipality but rather for the common use of its
inhabitants; that the City mayor merely enjoys the usufruct
over said land and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling
parts thereof did not necessarily convert the land into a
patrimonial property of City of Manila nor divert the State of
its paramount title.
Issue:
Whether the aforementioned land is a private or patrimonial
property of the City of Manila.
Held: The land is public property.
As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of
the land in the possession of municipality, excepting those
which it acquired in its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held for the State for the benefit of
its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes. The legal situation is the same if the State itself
holds the property and puts it to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which it did not
acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds

(the land was originally given to City by Spain), the legislature

can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of
the National Government to be disposed of according to its
discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional
mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of the people.
The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its
own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. The land was
part of the territory of City of Manila granted by sovereign in
its creation. Furthermore, City expressly recognised the
paramount title of the State over its land when it requested
the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the lot as
patrimonial property for selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that
said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in
usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But
since the City did not actually use said land for any recognized
public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied
for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no
presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City
of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is
its own private or patrimonial property.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and
petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled
implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any
obstacle from the respondents. Without costs.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OSCAR C. FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IMPERIO,
ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO, CONRADO
IMPERIO, ERNESTO IMPERIO, ALFREDO IMPERIO, CARLOS
IMPERIO, JR., JUAN IMPERIO and SPOUSES MARCELO PINEDA
and LUCILA PONGCO, respondents.
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de
Imperio, et al. vs. Municipal Government of San Miguel,
Bulacan, et al.", the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
on April 28, 1978, rendered judgment holding herein
petitioner municipality liable to private respondents, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
Municipal Government of San Miguel Bulacan, represented
by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure and its Municipal Treasurer:
1. ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of Donation
signed by the deceased Carlos Imperio in favor of the
Municipality of San Miguel Bulacan, dated October 27, 1947
insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Block 11 of Subdivision
Plan Psd-20831 are concerned, with an aggregate total area
of 4,646 square meters, which lots are among those covered
and described under TCT No. T-1831 of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of San
Miguel Bulacan,

2. ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding Deed

of Reconveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of
the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided one-half ()
share in the name of plaintiffs Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio,
Adoracion, Rodolfo, Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and
Juan, all surnamed Imperio, and the remaining undivided
one-half () share in favor of plaintiffs uses Marcelo E. Pineda
and Lucila Pongco;
3. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs
in the proportion mentioned in the immediately preceding
paragraph the sum of P64,440.00 corresponding to the
rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and
occupation of the premises from 1970 up to and including
1975, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from January
1970 until fully paid;
4. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over
the five lots in question in favor of the plaintiffs in the same
proportion aforementioned;
5. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P3,000.00 for attomey's fees; and to pay the cost of suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of evidence presented to substantiate the
same.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 11-12, Rollo)
The foregoing judgment became final when herein
petitioner's appeal was dismissed due to its failure to file the
record on appeal on time. The dismissal was affirmed by the
then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 and by this
Court in G.R. No. 59938. Thereafter, herein private
respondents moved for issuance of a writ of execution for the
satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent judge, on July 27,
1982, issued an order, to wit:
Considering that an entry of judgment had already been
made on June 14, 1982 in G. R. No. L-59938 and;
Considering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs'
motion for execution dated July 23, 1983;
Let a writ of execution be so issued, as prayed for in the
aforestated motion. (p. 10, Rollo)
Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ
of execution on the ground that the municipality's property
or funds are all public funds exempt from execution. The said
motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent
judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of
execution stands in full force and effect.
On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order
which in part, states:
It is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has
more than enough funds to meet its judgment obligation.
Municipal Treasurer Miguel C, Roura of San Miguel, Bulacan
and Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan Agustin O. Talavera are
therefor hereby ordered to comply with the money judgment
rendered by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao against said
municipality. In like manner, the municipal authorities of San
Miguel, Bulacan are likewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs'
legal possession of the property already returned to plaintiffs
by virtue of the alias writ of execution.
Finally, defendants are hereby given an inextendible period of
ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this order by the Office

of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan within which to submit

their written compliance, (p. 24, Rollo)
When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to
comply with the order of September 13, 1982, respondent
judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be
release only upon compliance thereof.
Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of
the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the
provincial and municipal treasurers of Bulacan and San
Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from
execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil
Case No. 604-B.
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to
levy and execution. The reason for this was explained in the
case of Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that
they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for
the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal
corporations are created, and that to subject said properties
and public funds to execution would materially impede, even
defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose." And, in
Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held
that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the
public property but also the taxes and public revenues of
such corporations Cannot be seized under execution against
them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it.
Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such
judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject
to execution unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is clear
that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession
of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in
the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also
public funds and as such they are exempt from execution.
Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree
on Local Fiscal Administration", Section 2 (a), provides:
SEC. 2. Fundamental Principles. Local government financial
affairs, transactions, and operations shall be governed by the
fundamental principles set forth hereunder:
(a) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific
statutory authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding
appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality
may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown
that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this
effect.
Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court,
outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money
judgment:
(a) By levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real
or personal, not otherwise exempt from execution, or only on
such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient
property for the purpose;
(b) By selling the property levied upon;
(c) By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the proceeds
as will satisfy the judgment and accruing costs; and

(d) By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if any,

unless otherwise, directed by judgment or order of the court.
The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of
respondent judge, dated July 27, 1982, granting issuance of a
writ of execution; the alias writ of execution, dated July 27,
1982; and the order of respondent judge, dated September
13, 1982, directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and
the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Bulacan to comply
with the money judgments, are SET ASIDE; and respondents
are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of
execution.
Government v. Cabangis53 Phil. 112
FACTS:A certain lots were formerly a part of a large parcelof
land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimantsand
appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wearaway,
due to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until theyear
1901 when the said lots became completely submergedin
water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state
until1912 when the Government undertook the dredging of
VitasEstuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all
thesand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the
lowlands
which
were
completely
covered
with
water,surrounding that belonging to the Philippine
ManufacturingCompany, thereby slowly and gradually
forming the lots, thesubject matter of this proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not the lots in question are of propertyof
public dominion.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the lots in
questionhaving disappeared on account of the gradual
erosion due tothe ebb and flow of the tide, and having
remained in such astate until they were reclaimed from the
sea by the filling indone by the Government, they are public
land in the sensethat neither the herein claimants-appellees
nor theirpredecessors did anything to prevent their
destruction.