Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Pain
FirstpublishedFriSep30,2005substantiverevisionFriMay29,2009
Painisthemostprominentmemberofaclassofsensationsknownasbodilysensations,which
includesitches,tickles,tingles,orgasms,andsoon.Bodilysensationsaretypicallyattributedto
bodilylocationsandappeartohavefeaturessuchasvolume,intensity,duration,andsoon,thatare
ordinarilyattributedtophysicalobjectsorquantities.Yetthesesensationsareoftenthoughttobe
logicallyprivate,subjective,selfintimating,andthesourceofincorrigibleknowledgeforthosewho
havethem.Hencethereappeartobereasonsbothforthinkingthatpains(alongwithothersimilar
bodilysensations)arephysicalobjectsorconditionsthatweperceiveinbodyparts,andforthinking
thattheyarenot.Thisparadoxisoneofthemainreasonswhyphilosophersareespeciallyinterested
inpain.Oneincreasinglypopularbutstillcontroversialwaytodealwiththisparadoxistodefenda
perceptualorrepresentationalviewofpain,accordingtowhichfeelingpainisinprinciplenodifferent
thanundergoingotherstandardperceptualprocesseslikeseeing,hearing,touching,etc.Butthereare
manywhothinkthatpainsarenotamenabletosuchatreatment.
1.Thecommonsenseconceptionofpain
1.1Firstthread:painassomethinginabodypart
1.2Secondthread:painassubjectiveexperience
1.3Thetensionbetweenthetwothreads
2.Sensedatumtheories
2.1Introduction
2.2Problemsforsensedatumtheories
3.Perceptualtheories
3.1Introduction
3.2Theappearance/realityproblem
3.3Theproblemofpainlocation
3.4Directandindirectperceptualtheories
3.5Adverbialistperceptualtheories
4.Representationaltheories
4.1Introduction
4.2Theproblemoffocus
4.3Theproblemofaffectivequalia
5.Evaluativeandmotivationaltheories
6.Eliminativismaboutpain
6.1Theargumentfromreactivedissociationforeliminatingpain
6.2Otherargumentsforeliminativism
7.Conclusion
Bibliography
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1.Thecommonsenseconceptionofpain
Therearetwomainthreadsinthecommonsenseconceptionofpainthatpullinoppositedirections.

Wemightcallthistensiontheactobjectduality(orambiguity)embeddedinourordinaryconceptof
pain.

1.1Firstthread:painassomethinginabodypart
Thefirstthreadtreatspainsasparticularsspatiallylocatedinbodyregions,ormoregenerally,as
particularconditionsofbodypartsthathavespatiotemporalcharacteristicsaswellasfeaturessuchas
volumeandintensity(amongothers).Thisthreadmanifestsitselfincommonwaysofattributingpains
tobodilylocations,suchasthefollowing:
(1)Ihaveasharppaininthebackofmyrighthand
(2)Thereisathrobbingpaininmyleftthigh
(3)Myrightshoulderhurts
(4)Mywisdomtoothachesintensely.
Accordingtothisthread,painsarelikephysicalobjects,orspecificconditionsofphysicalobjects.We
alsocommonlyusetheverbsfeelorexperiencetodescribeourepistemicrelationtopains
attributedtobodyparts:
(5)Ifeelasharppaininthebackofmyrighthand
(6)Iamexperiencingpaininmyupperleftthigh,etc.
(5)suggeststhatwestandinsomesortofperceptualrelationtoaspatiotemporalparticular.Without
anindefinitearticle,(6)suggeststhatIperceivesomequantifiablefeatureorconditionofmythigh.
Whenwefeelpainsinbodilylocations,ourattentionandnursingbehavioraredirectedtowardthose
locations.
Lessfrequently,wealsotalkaboutthesamepainreturningorlastingintermittently:
(7)IhavebeenhavingthesamepaininmykneeassoonasIstartjogging
(8)Myheadachereturnedthemomentwestartedhavingthesameargumentagain.
Soaccordingtothisthreadwhenwefeelpaininpartsofourbodies,weperceivesomethingorsome
conditioninthoseparts,andwhenwereportthembyutteringsentenceslike(1)through(8),weseem
tomakeperceptualreports.Thesereportsseemonaparwiththemorestraightforwardperceptual
reportssuchas:
(9)Iseeadarkdiscolorationonthebackofmyrighthand
(10)Iseetheredappleonthetable
(11)Iheardabigexplosion
(12)Iamsmellingthesweetodorcomingfromtherosegarden
(13)Ifeelthesmoothtextureofthesurface,etc.
Compare,forinstance,(5)and(9):theyseemtohavethesamesurfacegrammardemandingasimilar
perceptualreadingaccordingtowhichIstandinsomesortofperceptualrelationtosomething.
Thus,thisthreadinourordinaryconceptionfavorsanunderstandingofpainsasiftheywerethe
objectsofourperceptions.Whenthisiscombinedwithourstandardpracticeoftreatingpainsas
havingspatiotemporalpropertiesalongwithothersimilarfeaturestypicallyattributedtophysical
objectsorquantities,itthuspointstoanunderstandingofpainsaccordingtowhichpainsmight
plausiblybeidentifiedwithphysicalfeaturesorconditionsofourbodyparts,probablywithsomesort
ofphysicaldamageortraumatothetissue.Indeed,whenwelookatthewaysinwhichwetalkabouta
pain,weseemtobeattributingsomethingbadtoabodilylocationbyreportingitssomatosensory
perceptionthere,justaswereporttheexistenceofarottenappleonthetablebyreportingitsvisual
perception.

Nevertheless,theverysamecommonsense,althoughitpointsinthatdirection,resistsidentifyinga
painwithanyphysicalfeatureorconditioninstantiatedinthebody.Thusitalsoseemstoresist
identifyingfeelingpaininbodyregionswithperceivingsomethingphysicalinthoseregions.
Aquickthoughtexperimentshouldconfirmthis.Supposethatwedoinfactattributeaphysical
condition,callitPC,whenweattributepaintobodyparts,andthatPCistheperceptualobjectofsuch
experiences.So,forinstance,John'scurrentexcruciatingexperience(callthisE)iscausedbyand
representsaphysicalconditioninhisrightthighandourordinaryconceptofpainappliesinthefirst
instancetothisconditioninhisthigh.Fromthisitwouldfollowthat
(a)JohnwouldnothaveanypainifhehadE,butnoPCinhisthigh
(asinthecaseof,forinstance,phantomlimbpainsandcentrallygeneratedchronicpains
suchassciatica),
and,conversely,
(b)JohnwouldhavepainifhehadPCbutnoE
(aswouldbethecase,forinstance,ifhehadtakenabsolutelyeffectivepainkillersorhis
thighhadbeenanesthetized).
Butthesestatementsareintuitivelyincorrect.Theyappeartoclashwithourordinaryordominant
conceptofpain,whichseemstotracktheexperienceratherthanthephysicalcondition.This
resistancetoidentifyingpainswithlocalizablephysicalconditionscomesfromthesecondthread
foundintheverysamecommonsenseconceptionofpain.

1.2Secondthread:painassubjectiveexperience
Thatpainisasubjectiveexperienceseemstobeatruism.Givenourcommonsenseunderstandingof
pain,thisseemstobethemoredominantthread:insteadoftreatingpainsasobjectsofperceptual
experience,ittreatsthemasexperiencesthemselves.Indeeditisthisthreadthattheofficialscientific
definitionofpainpicksupandemphasizes,whichwasfirstformulatedinthe1980sbyacommittee
organizedbytheInternationalAssociationfortheStudyofPain(IASP),andhasbeen,sincethen,
widelyacceptedbythescientificcommunity:[1]
Pain:Anunpleasantsensoryandemotionalexperienceassociatedwithactualorpotential
tissuedamage,ordescribedintermsofsuchdamage.
Note:Painisalwayssubjective.Eachindividuallearnstheapplicationoftheword
throughexperiencesrelatedtoinjuryinearlylife...Experienceswhichresemblepain,
e.g.,pricking,butarenotunpleasant,shouldnotbecalledpain.Unpleasantabnormal
experiences(dysaesthesia)mayalsobepainbutarenotnecessarilysobecause,
subjectively,theymaynothavetheusualsensoryqualitiesofpain.Manypeoplereport
painintheabsenceoftissuedamageoranylikelypathologicalcauseusuallythis
happensforpsychologicalreasons.Thereisnowaytodistinguishtheirexperiencefrom
thatduetotissuedamageifwetakethesubjectivereport.Iftheyregardtheirexperience
aspainandiftheyreportitinthesamewaysaspaincausedbytissuedamage,itshould
beacceptedaspain.Thisdefinitionavoidstyingpaintothestimulus.Activityinducedin
thenociceptorandnociceptivepathwaysbyanoxiousstimulusisnotpain,whichis
alwaysapsychologicalstate,eventhoughwemaywellappreciatethatpainmostoften
hasaproximatephysicalcause.(IASP1986,p.250cf.IASPTaskForceOnTaxonomy
1994)
Likeotherexperiencesasconsciousepisodes,painsarethoughttobeprivate,subjective,self
intimating,andthesourceofincorrigibleknowledge.Theseelementscancertainlybefoundinthe

IASPcharacterization,whichalsoaddsthatpainexperiencesareunpleasant.Indeed,byemphasizing
thatpainisalwaysapsychologicalstatethenotewarnsagainstaconceptionofpainsuggestedby
thefirstthreadabove.
Interestingly,however,whenwetalkaboutpainsasexperiences,wealso,inthesamebreath,talk
aboutfeelingthemasiftheseexperienceswerealsotheobjectofsomesortofinnerperception,which
suggestsintrospection.Indeedthediscussionofprivacy,subjectivity,selfintimation,and
incorrigibilitynaturallyforcesustotalkthisway.
Painsaresaidtobeprivatetotheirownersinthestrongsensethatnooneelsecanepistemically
accessone'spaininthewayonehasaccesstoone'sownpain,namelybyfeelingitandcomingto
knowoneisfeelingitonthatbasis.Thissharplycontrastswiththepublicnatureofobjectsof
standardperception,thatis,perceptionofone'simmediateextramentalenvironmentincludingone's
body.Let'scallthisexteroception,tocontrastwithintrospectionwhichisaccesstoone'sintramental
activity.So,forinstance,theverysameappleIseeonthetablecanbeseenbyothersinpossiblythe
exactwayIseeit,soisnotprivateinthissense.
Painsalsoseemtobesubjectiveinthesensethattheirexistencedependsonfeelingthem.Thereisan
airofparadoxwhensomeonetalksaboutunfeltpains.Oneisnaturallytemptedtosaythatifapainis
notbeingfeltbyitsownerthenitdoesnotexist.Againcomparethesubjectivityofpainstothe
objectivityoftheobjectsofstandardexteroception.TheappleIseedoesnotdependonmy
perceivingitinordertoexist:(paceBerkeleyandphenomenalists)itsexistenceisindependentofmy,
orforthatmatteranyoneelse's,seeingit.
Notonlypeopleseemtohaveaspecialepistemicaccesstotheirpains,theyseemtohaveavery
specialepistemicauthoritywithrespecttotheirpain:theyseemtobeincorrigible,oreveninfallible,
abouttheirpainsandpainreports:necessarily,ifIsincerelybelievethatIaminpain,thenIamin
pain.Conversely,ifIfeelpain,thenIknowthatIaminpain.Againthisconditionalseemsnecessarily
true.Thisistheselfintimatingaspectofpainexperiences.
Inshort,theredoesn'tseemtobeanyroomforapossiblegapbetweentheappearanceofpainand
beinginpain(thatis,noappearance/realitydistinctionisapplicabletopain).AsKripkefamouslyput
it:
Tobeinthesameepistemicsituationthatwouldobtainifonehadapainistohavea
paintobeinthesameepistemicsituationthatwouldobtainintheabsenceofpainisnot
tohaveapain.Painisnotpickedoutbyoneofitsaccidentalpropertiesratheritis
pickedoutbyitsimmediatephenomenologicalquality.Ifanyphenomenonispicked
outinexactlythesamewaythatwepickoutpain,thenthatphenomenonispain.(Kripke
1980,pp.15253)
Ifthereisnoappearance/realitydistinctionapplicabletopain,thenitseemsthatonecannotbe
mistakenaboutone'sbeliefsaboutone'spainformedonthebasisoffeelingpaininthewayonecan
bemistakenabouttheexistenceandpropertiesoftheappleonesees.Inthelattercase,appearances
canbemisleadingpreciselybecausetheperceptualappearanceofanapplemightnotcorrespondto
whattheappleislikeinreality.Inapparentcontrasttopain,normalexteroceptionalwaysinvolvesthe
possibilityofmisperception,andthusmiscategorization(thatis,misapplicationofconceptstothe
objectsofexteroception).

1.3Thetensionbetweenthetwothreads
Nowthatthetwothreadsinourordinaryconceptionofpainareinfullview,wecanbetterappreciate
whytheyareintension.Experiencesareinthehead,iftheyareanywhere.Indeed,formost
physicalists,theyareintheheadbybeingrealizedinthebrainorinthecentralnervoussystem.Sowe

can'tbelocatingpainsquaexperiences(orquasensations,forthatmatter)inbodypartswhenwe
correctlyuttersentencessuchas(1)through(6)discountingheadachesperhaps.Butthenwhatare
welocatingwhenweseemtoattributepainstobodyparts?Recallthat,althoughthefirstthreadinour
commonsenseconceptiontreatspainsasspatiotemporallylocatableparticularsorparticular
conditionsofbodyparts,itdoesnotidentifypainswiththemitonlyexertspressuretowardssuch
anidentificationinthelightofthefactthattheredoesn'tseemtobeanyothercrediblealternative(but
seebelow).WehavealreadyconductedalittlethoughtexperimenttobringthisoutinSection1.1.
Comparingthefollowingtwosentenceswillhelpusunderstandthetensionbetter:
(5)Ifeelasharppaininthebackofmyrighthand
(9)Iseeadarkdiscolorationonthebackofmyrighthand.
Itisreasonablyclearthatfor(9)tobetrue,Ihavetostandintheseeing(perceiving)relationtoadark
discolorationinthebackofmyrighthand,i.e.,toacertainsurfaceregiononthebackofmyhand
markedbyadarkershadeoftheusualcolorofmyskin,acertainregionthatcanbeseenbyothers
possiblyinthesamewayinwhichIseeit.NotethatifIamhallucinatingadarkdiscolorationonthe
backofmyhand,then(9)issimplyfalse.Alsonotethatalthoughthetruthof(9)doesn'trequirethe
possessionofanyconceptbymeexpressedbythewordsmakingupthesentence,myutteringof(9)
tomakeareporttypicallydoesifwetakesuchutterancesasexpressionsofone'sthoughtsandtake
thoughtstobecomposedofconcepts.Somyseeingwouldtypicallyinducemetoconceptually
identifysomethingonthebackofmyhandasadarkdiscoloration.Thisisatypicalcaseof
categorizationofsomethingextramentalunderaconceptinducedbyanexteroceptiveexperience.Of
course,myutteringof(9)doesmorethanattributeaphysicalpropertytoabodilyregion,italso
reportsthatIamseeingit.
Whathastobethecasefor(5)tobetrue?Whateverthecompleteanalysisofsentenceslike(5)turns
outtobe,onethingseemsreasonablyclear:thetruthconditionsof(5)putnoconstraintswhatsoever
onhowthingsphysicallyarewithmyhand.Anyonewhohasasufficientmasteryofourordinary
conceptofpainhasnodifficultyinunderstandinghow(5)couldstillbetrueeventhoughthereis
nothingphysicallywrongwithmyhand,whichistypicallythecaseincentrallycausedchronicpain
syndromes.[2]
Sowestandardlyusesentenceslike(5)tomakecorrectstatementsaboutapainfeltinabodily
locationevenwhenthereisnothingwrongwiththatlocation.Inotherwords,whenwemakeclaims
aboutwhereithurts(attributepaintobodilylocations),strictlyspeakingweinfactrescindfrom
logicallycommittingourselvestotherebeinganythingphysicallywronginthoselocationseven
thoughwenormallyexpecttofindsomephysicaldisorderinthem.Comparethistomyuttering(9)on
thebasisofmyhavingaveryvividvisualhallucinationofadiscolorationonthebackofmyhand.In
suchacase,myutterancewouldbeincorrect,becauseinuttering(9)Icommitmyselftofindingsome
physicalcondition(namely,adarkdiscoloration)onthebackofmyhand.IfandwhenIrealizethatI
havehallucinated,thenIcorrectmyselfandreverttointrospectivemodebysayingthingslikeI
seemedtoseeadiscolorationonthebackofmyhandoritappearedtomethattherewasa
discoloration,etc.NothingofthissorthappenswhenIrealizeoramtoldthatthereisnothing
physicallywrongwithmyhand:IstillcorrectlycontinuetoreportthepainIfeeltherebyutteringthe
verysamesentence,(5),oritsequivalents.Idon'tneedtomakeanycorrectioninmypainreport.This
showsthatdespitethepressureexertedbythefirstthread,itisthesecondthreadthatseemstocapture
thedominantcommonsenseconceptionofpainasindeedtheIASPdefinitionaboveindicates.
Stillthepuzzleremains:whatisitthatIamdoingwhenIappeartobeattributingsomethingtothe
backofmyhandbycorrectlyuttering(5)if,asagreed,Iamnotattributingamentalexperienceor
aphysicalconditionthere?Itisnotclearwhetherthereisacommonsenseanswertothisquestion.
Justasthescientificdefinitiondoesn'ttouchontheissueofourcommonpracticeofcorrectlylocating
painsinhealthybodyparts,thecommonsensewouldprobablydrawablankiftheproblemwere
articulatedexplicitlyandthequestionispressedreallyhard.

Ormaybenot.Intuitivelyandsomewhatnaively,whatcommonsensewoulddriveustosaywhen
pressedhardmightbesomethinglikethefollowing.[3]Granted,byuttering(5)Iamnotattributing
anysortofphysicalthingorconditiontothebackofmyhand,noramIlocatingamentalexperience
thereexperiencesandsensationsarestrictlyspeakingintheheadiftheyareanywhere.ButwhenI
attendtomyhandwithmymind'sinnereye,sotospeak,Iclearlyfeelsomethingthere.Ican
introspectivelyexaminedifferentqualitiesofthatthingsuchasitssharpness,volume,intensity,
unpleasantness,burningquality,etc.Icaninrealtimefollowthechangesinit:itisnowsomewhat
lessintenseandunpleasant,nowmoreitisgettingdullernow,itwassharperandbrighteramoment
agoitseemstobemovingtowardmyfingers,etc.Clearly,Iseemtobeconfrontedoracquainted
withsomethingthatIcanintrospectivelyexaminecarefullyinrealtimeandreportonitsvarious
qualities.Itisthisthing,theobjectofmyinnerattention,whichislocatedinthebackofmyhand,
whichseemsessentiallyprivate,subjective,andaboutwhichIcan'tbewrong.
Ifthisiswhatonemightliketosayintuitivelyandnavely,oneshouldbepreparedtoswallowits
strangeconsequences:thisobjectofmyinnerattentionisbothlocatedinpublicspaceandlogically
private,thatis,onlyIcanhaveepistemicaccesstoitdespiteitsbeingspatiotemporallylocated.Also,
theexistenceofthisobjectseemstoliterallydependonmyepistemicaccesstoit:itseemstogooutof
existencewhenIceasetofeelit(perceiveit).Inaddition,ifitistheobjectofmyattention(separate
frommyattention),howcoulditbethecasethatIcannotbewrongaboutit?Andimportantly,ifthis
objectisnotphysical,whatsortofthingcoulditbe?AghostlymentalparticularthatIcan
introspectivelyattendtowhichisneverthelessspatiotemporallylocatedbeyondmyhead?
Theactobjectdualityembeddedinourordinaryconceptofpainyieldsstrangeresultswhenfollowed
intuitivelyandnaivelytoitslogicalend.Butperhapsthisdualityisarobustsymptomofadeeper
truthunderlyingallperceptionandintrospection.Perhapspainissimplythemostparadigmatic
exampleofabroadrangeofperceptualexperienceswherethisdeepunderlyingicebergshowsittip
mostprominentlyandrevealinglyalbeitconfusedly.Indeedthisisexactlythecaseaccordingtoso
calledsensedatumtheories,ormorebroadly,indirectrealism.

2.Sensedatumtheories
2.1Introduction
Standardperception(exteroception)canbeanalyzedasinvolvingtheperception(act)ofapublic
object.Theperceptualactonthepartoftheperceivingsubject,inturn,isanalyzedasinvolvingan
experiencewhichtypicallyinducesconceptualcategorization,i.e.,applicationofconceptstothe
objectofperceptionanditsqualitiesnottotheexperience.Thusperceptualexperiencesseem
transparenttotheperceiver,whomaybesaidtoperceivetheextramentalrealitydirectly,withoutfirst
perceivingorsomehowbeingawareoftheexperienceitselforitsqualities.Thisviewissupportedby
commonsenseandistypicallycallednaiveordirectrealism.
Accordingtotheindirectrealists,thisdirectnessisanillusionweareinfactdirectlyawareof
experientialintermediaries,andweperceivetheextramentalworldonlyindirectly,invirtueofbeing
directlyawareoftheseintermediaries.Mostearlyindirectrealists(e.g.,Moore1903,1939Russell
1912Price1950)thoughtoftheseintermediariesasphenomenalormentalparticulars,typically
calledsensedata.Considerahallucinationofaredapple.Intuitively,thepersonhavingthe
hallucinationseemstoseesomething.Thissomethingisnot,ofcourse,anapple.Butitisanobject,
accordingtosensedatumtheorists,whichisshapedlikeanappleandisreallyred.Itisasensedatum,
aphenomenal(mental)individualwhichreallyhasthequalitiesthatitvisuallyappearstohave.Sense
data,however,arenoordinaryobjects:theyareprivate,subjective,selfintimating,andthesourceof
incorrigibleknowledge.Accordingtosensedatumtheorists,sensedataareinternaltoone's
consciousness:theyarenotbeforeone'ssenseorgans.Thesetheoriesclaimthatthereisahiddenact
objectstructureintheperceptualawarenessitself.Everyperceptualawarenessinvolvestheactof

beingawareofphenomenalobjectsthatcharacterizethisperceptualawareness,whetherornotthis
awarenessisanhallucinationoraveridicalperceptionofexternalobjects.
Soonsensedatumtheories,oneperceivesexternalobjectsandtheirqualitiesindirectlybydirectly
perceiving(beingawareof,oracquaintedwith)sensedatainternaltoone'sconsciousnessthat
resembleinvariousdegreesthephysicalobjectsthatcausethem.Accordingtosensedatumtheorists,
however,wearerarely,ifever,awareofthisindirectioninordinary(veridical)exteroception.Itis
onlycriticalphilosophicalreflectiononfeaturesofperceptualawarenessthatrevealsthatthe
indirectionmustoccur.Theimportanceofpainandother(intransitive)bodilysensationsliesinthe
factthattheindirectionseemstobeeasilyrevealedintrospectivelyasisshownbyourunwillingness
toidentifythepainweattributetobodypartswithanythingphysicalinthoseparts.
Whatevermeritssensedatumtheoriesmighthavewithrespecttogenuineperception(exteroception)
andmisperception,itsattractionseemsundeniablewhenitcomestoitstreatmentofpainsandother
intransitivebodilysensationslikeitches,tickles,tingles,etc.[4]Accordingtomanysensedatum
theorists,painsareparadigmexamplesofphenomenalindividuals,mentalobjectswithphenomenal
qualitieswhoseexistencedependsontheirbeingsensedorfelt,andthusarelogicallyprivatetotheir
ownerswhofeelthem.Thispositionpresumablyexplainswhywehavetheactobjectdualityor
ambiguityinpaintalkthatwediscussedearlier:painsqualocalizableobjectscannotexistwithoutthe
correspondingacts,i.e.,withoutsomeone'sactsofexperiencingthem(Broad1959).[5]Inotherwords,
theconceptofpainplausiblyappliestoboththeobjectpartoftheactobjectpairandtotheactof
beingdirectlyawareoftheseobjects.
Thepuzzleoflocatingpainsinbodypartscanbetreatedinmorethanonewaywithinthisframework.
Themoststraightforwardwayissimplytotakethephenomenaatfacevalueandsaythatpainsas
mentalobjectsorsensedataareliterallylocatedwheretheyseemtobelocatedinbodypartsoreven
inemptyspacewhereone'slimbwouldhavebeen,say,beforetheamputation.Thatpainsaremental
particularsanddependfortheirexistenceonbeingsensedapparentlydoesnotlogicallyprecludetheir
beingcapableofhaving,literally,aspatiallocation(seeJackson1976,1977forthisline).[6]
Asecondandmorepopularwayofhandlingthelocationproblemistosaythateventhoughpains
cannotliterallybelocatedinphysicalspace,theycanhavelocationinaphenomenalspaceorfield
thatissomehowisomorphicorsystematicallyrelatedtotheircounterparts(say,tissuedamage)in
physicalspace.Infact,thismovewouldalsoworkforvisualsensedatathatrequiresome
spatiotemporalframework.Inthecaseofbodilysensations,thisphenomenalspaceissometimes
calledone'ssomaticfieldbyanalogytoavisualfieldthatmapsontophysicalspace(Price1950).[7]

2.2Problemsforsensedatumtheories
Themostimportantstrengthofsensedatumtheoriesisthattheyaretailormadeforthepeculiarities
ofpainexperiencesaswellasotherintransitivebodilysensationsthatwehavediscussedabove.
Indeed,thesetheoriesseemtotakethenave,perhapssomewhatconfusedbutintuitiveunderstanding
ofpainembeddedincommonsenseandturnitintoafullfledgedphilosophicaltheorysupportedona
generalandindependentplatformaboutwhatperceptioninvolves.Inotherwords,thesetheoriesseem
tovindicatetheactobjectdualityembeddedincommonsenseconceptionofpain.
Thereisironyinthis.Theironyisthatsensedatumtheoriesfindtheirmostnaturalhomein
intransitivebodilysensationslikepainthathavebeentraditionallyandhistoricallycontrastedwith
standardexteroceptualexperiencesratherthancoclassifiedwiththem(formany,feelingpainisnota
perceptualaffairatall).Thisisironicfortworeasons.First,themainproponentsofsensedatum
theoriesadvancedthesetheoriesmainlyastheoriesofexteroception,thatis,perceptionofexternal
physicalreality.Second,whenappliedtostandardexteroception,sensedatumtheoriesdon'tseemto
supporttheperceptualdirect(nave)realismofcommonsenseatall.Indeed,accordingtocommon

sense,whenIseearedappleonthetable,Iamdirectlyseeingtheapple(atleastitssurfacefacing
me)anditsqualitieslikeitsredness.Inshort,althoughsensedatumtheoriesthatareexplicitly
advancedastheoriesofperception(exteroception)don'tgeneratemuchconviction,theyseemtobe
moreconvincingwhenappliedtointransitivebodilysensationslikepainsthatarenotusuallythought
tobeperceptual.
Despitetheclashwithcommonsense,variousphilosophershaveadvancedpowerfulargumentsfor
sensedatumtheoriesaboutwhatperceptioningeneralinvolves(Moore1903,1939Russell1912
Price1950Broad1959Jackson1977,amongothers).Therearealsopowerfulargumentsagainst
sensedatumtheories.Bothsortsofargumentstendtobegeneralargumentsnotdirectlyrelatedto
pain,sowewon'tcoverthemhere(butseetheentryonsensedata).Whateverthefateofsensedatum
theoriesmightbeasgeneraltheoriesofexteroception,theirappealasamodelforunderstandingpains
andotherintransitivebodilysensationsisverystrong.Indeed,asnotedbefore,introspectionseemsto
betherightmodeofaccessinvolvedinpain.Soevenifonefindstheantisensedatumarguments
convincingandrejectsindirectrealismofthiskindforstandardexteroception,thereisstillroomfor
adoptingasensedatumtheoryforintransitivebodilysensationsandforpaininparticular.
Nevertheless,itisplausibletoarguethatthemostimportantstrengthofsensedatumtheoriesofpain
isalsooneoftheirmainweaknesses,inthattheirfunctionseemstomerelycodifytheconceptual
peculiaritiesofpainintoatheoryratherthanexplainthem.Afterwearetoldhowthesensedatum
theoriestreatpainsandotherbodilysensations,ourunderstandingofthesesensationsdon'tseemtobe
deepenedoradvancedsignificantly.Whateverpuzzleswehadatthestartwithonlythecommon
senseconceptionofpainathand,theyseemtobetransformedintopuzzlesaboutwhatthetheories
themselvessayorimply.
Forinstance,thequestionaboutwhatitisthatweseemtoattributetoorlocateinourbodypartswhen
weclaimtohavepainsinjustthosepartsisanswered,ononeversionofthetheory,bysayingthatwe
literallylocatementalobjectswithphenomenalqualitiesinthoseparts.Butpains,evenbythe
standardsofsensedatumtheories,areminddependentobjects,andmanyhavetakenthistoimply
thatpainsareinternaltoone'sconsciousnessorexperience,andareepistemicallytransparenttotheir
ownerspartlybecauseofthis(Perkins1983,2006).[8]Iftheywereliterallyinphysicalspace,does
thismeanthatone'smindspatiallyextendsoroverlapswithone'sbody?Alternatively,shouldn'titbe
possibleforothers,atleastinprinciple,tocomeacrossthesepains,thatis,accessandinteractwith
themphysically?Itisonethingtosaythatthereisnologicalinconsistencyaboutpainsliterallybeing
inphysicalspace,butitisanothertomaketheviewplausible.Thelatterrequiresgivingpositive
argumentsshowingwhyourintuitionstothecontrarymightmisleadushere.
Ontheotherversionofthetheory,wearetoldthateventhoughweseemtolocatesomethinginpublic
space,appearancesaremisleading,wearelocatingprivatementalobjectsinaprivatephenomenal
space.Sopainsarenot,afterall,locatedinbodyparts,ordinarilyunderstood.Butitisnotclearhow
thesetwospacesaresupposedtorelatetoorinteractwitheachother.Phenomenalspaceisnot
physicalspace,norisitasubregionofthatspace.Thusthequestionofhowtheycancausallyinteract
becomesanissuefortworeasons.First,thereisthestandardworryabouthowaphysicaleventcan
influenceorbeinfluencedbyanonphysicaleventinanonphysicalspace.Second,thesetwospaces
needtobesystematicallycorrelatedwitheachother,butitisnotclearwhetheraprincipledmapping
functioncanbedefinedforthecorrelationespeciallyintheabsenceofcausation.Atanyrate,these
constitutesignificantchallengestothedefendersofthisview.
Apartfromtheirstrangeconsequences,sensedatumtheoriesseemtocommittheirdefenderstoanti
physicalism.Anaturalistwhoistryingtounderstandpainphenomenawithinaphysicalistframework
couldhardlyadmittheexistenceofphenomenalobjects(Lycan1987a,1987b).Iftherearesensedata,
physicalismseemsjustfalse.Aphysicalistcannotadmitactualobjects,whichare,say,literally
colored,shaped,movingandsoon,thatoneisdirectlyawareofbutarenotidenticaltothe
extramentalobjectsofperception.Sounderstood,thereseemtobenosensedatatobefoundinthe

physicalworld.

3.Perceptualtheories
Becausesensedatumtheoriesaremostplausiblewhenappliedtointransitivebodilysensations,many
philosophers,whobelievethatanaturalistaccountofordinaryperceptioncanbegivenwithout
introducingsensedata,haveattemptedtounderstandpainsandotherbodilysensationsasspeciesof
ordinaryperception(exteroception).Thesocalledperceptualtheoriesofpainareadvancedand
defendedonthehopethatpainsandotherintransitivebodilysensations,contrarytofirstappearances,
arespeciesofinformationgatheringwhichworkonthesameprinciplesthatgovernothersensory
modalitiesforwhichasuccessfuldirectrealistaccountcanbegiven.

3.1Introduction
Thecorecommitmentofanyperceptualviewofpain,putasbroadlyaspossible,isthatnormally,in
havingorfeelingpain,oneisperceivingsomethingextramental.Inotherwords,feelingpainnormally
involvesperceivingsomethinginthesamesenseinwhichoneperceivesaredapplewhenoneseesit
ingoodlight.Itinvolvesexteroception.Sometimes,inordinaryparlance,thetermperceptionisused
inconjunctionwithpainasinpainperceptiontomeanawarenessofpain,orjust
feeling/experiencingpain.Thisisintrospectiveuseofperceptionandshouldbesharply
distinguishedfromwhattheperceptualtheoristsmeanwhentheyclaimthatfeelingpaininvolves
perceivingsomething.Theyhaveexteroceptioninmind,andwe'llusethetermalwaysinthissense.
Accordingtoperceptualtheorists,whenonefeels,say,asharppaininthebackofone'shand,one
perceivessomephysicalfeatureorconditionofone'shand.Thepropermodalityforthisperceptionis
somatosensory,similartothesensorymodalityoftouchorproprioception(thesensorymodality
internaltoone'sbodythatinformsoneaboutthepositionandmovementofone'sbodyandbody
parts).Mostperceptualtheoristsidentifythisfeaturewithtissuedamageorsomeconditionofthe
tissuethatwouldlikelyresultindamageifsustainedinthatcondition.Moreabstractly,itissomesort
ofphysicaldisorderduetosometissuetrauma,irritation,inflammation,orsomesuchpathological
condition,oraconditionclosetosuch.Itisalsopossibletoidentifytheobjectofperceptioninpain
withtheactivationofnociceptorsinnervatingthedamagedorirritatedtissue.(Nociceptorsare
peripheralnerveendingsspecializedtorespond,normally,onlytopotentiallydamagingstimuli,i.e.,
tonociceptivestimuli).Let'susetissuedamageasastandinforwhateverphysicaldisorderly
conditionofbodilytissueissaidtobeperceivedinfeelingpainaccordingtoperceptualtheorists.
Normally,whenwetalkaboutthelocationofapain,wearetalkingaboutthelocationofthis
perceptualobject,i.e.,thelocationwherethetissuedamageisoccurringorabouttooccur.
Perceptualtheoriesofpainasalternativestosensedatumtheorieswerefirstexplicitlystatedand
philosophicallydevelopedinthe1960s.Themostinfluentialandprominentdefenderswere
Armstrong(19621968)andPitcher(19701971).Therewereothers,butintermsofsettingthetone
andphilosophicalagendaforthesubsequentdiscussionfordecadestocome,itisfairtosaythatno
onehassurpassedtheirenormousinfluence.[9]Atthetime,thedominantviewwasthatpainsand
otherintransitivebodilysensationsarenotperceptualatall:theywereconceivedtobesensationsor
experiences(lasensedatumtheories)thatarereliablycausedby(actualorimpending)injuryor
damagetobodytissueorinternalorgans.Theyarethususefulwarningsignals,buttheydon'thave
muchincommonwithstandardwaysofperceivingextramentalworld.Thisviewhasstillsome
defenderstoday:althoughtheconceptionofpainsassensedatahasbeenlargelyabandoned,those
whoarenotsympathetictoperceptualtheoriesstillholdwhatmightbecalledthesensationorqualia
viewofpain,accordingtowhichpainisnotaphenomenalobjectbutaphenomenalqualityofone's
experience,oralternatively,itisasubjectiveexperiencewithcertainqualiaorqualitativecharacter
thatoneisdirectlyawareofwheninpain.Withthisadjustmentfromobjecttoqualitykeptinmind,
mostofwhatwehavesaidaboutsensedatumtheoriesabovecanbeapplied,mutatismutandis,tothe

qualiaviewofpain.(Conee1984defendsaqualiaviewofpain.Buthedrawsadistinctionbetween
thestateofbeinginpainandthisstate'squalitativecontent,qualia.Heclaimsthatweusepainfor
both,dependingonthecontext.)

3.2Theappearance/realityproblem
Themainsourceofresistancetoaperceptualviewofpainscomesfromthecommonsense
conceptionofpainaccordingtowhichpainsaresensationswithessentialprivacy,subjectivity,self
intimation,andincorrigibility.Theseapparentlyessentialfeaturesofpainsposedifficultiesforany
perceptualtheory.Indeed,theycanbeusedinadvancingantiperceptualistargumentswhosegeneral
formcanbeputinthefollowingway.Genuineperceptionalwaysinvolvesthepossibilityof
misperceivingtheperceptualobjectthatisnotessentiallyprivateandsubjective.Inotherwords,there
isalwaysanappearance/realitydistinctionapplicabletotheobjectsofgenuineperceptionwhichgives
risetothepossibilitythattheperceptualappearanceofthisobjectmisleadsusaboutwhattheobjectis
likeinreality.Themainreasonforthisisthattheseobjectshavearealitybeyondtheirappearances.
Theyarethuspublicobjectsandcapableofexistingontheirownwithoutanyone'sperceptionof
them.Butfeelingpainhasnoneofthesefeatures.Therefore,itcannotbegenuineperception.
So,howdotheperceptualtheoristshandlethisobjection,whichliesbehindtheintuitiveresistanceto
treatingpainasaformofperception?Giventhecorecommitmentofperceptualviews(namely,that
feelingpaininvolvesperceivingsomethingextramental),onemightthinkthatperceptualtheorists
identifypainwithtissuedamage.Indeed,ifonetakesthisview,theaboveobjectionseemsalmost
decisiveagainstit.Butrelativelyfewdefendersactuallytakethisrouteamongthemostnotableare
Newton(1989),StephensandGraham(1987),andHill(2004,2006).Mostothers,including
ArmstrongandPitcher,bowedtocommonsenseunderstandingofpainandidentifiedpainswithpain
experiencesorsensations,understoodinadirectrealistfashion.Ifpainsareidentifiedwith
experiences,notwiththeircauses(i.e.,tissuedamage),thentheaboveobjectionseemstodisappear
(butseebelow).
Itisprimarilyforthisreasonthatmostperceptualtheoristsidentifyfeelingpainwithhavingan
experienceinthefirstplacejustasthepainscientistsdo(seeIASPdefinitionabove)followingthe
secondthreadinourordinaryconceptionofpain.Butthisistheexperiencemediatingorinvolvedin
theperceptionoftissuedamage.Inotherwords,theygrantthatthe(dominant)conceptofpainisthe
conceptofasubjectiveexperience,buttheyinsistthatthisexperienceisessentiallyperceptual:it
constitutesourperceptionoftissuedamage.Comparethesituationwithseeing.Inseeingaredapple
ingoodlight,Iamhavingavisualexperiencewhichisperceptual:itconstitutesmyseeingthered
apple.Thedifferenceliesnotintheflowofinformation,butinthelocusofourspontaneousinterest
andconceptualidentificationdirectlyinducedbytheperceptualexperience.Accordingtomost
perceptualtheorists,weapplytheconceptofpain,PAIN,primarilytotheperceptualexperiencewe
arehaving,nottotheobjectofthisexperience,i.e.,tissuedamage(eventhough,asdiscussedabove,
commonsensealsousesconfusinglythesamewordpaintoindicatewherethetissuedamagemight
beoccurringbyapplyingittoabodilylocationmoreonthisshortly).Inotherwords,painnames
asubjectiveexperience.Invision,however,thelocusofconceptualidentificationisdifferent:
normallyitistheobjectofourvisualexperienceweareinterestedin,say,aredappleseeningood
lightandidentifiedassuch.Thus,webothperceptuallyandconceptuallyfocusonitanditsvisible
propertiessuchasitsredness,roundness,etc.,byapplyingourconcepts,RED,ROUND,APPLE,toit
onthebasisofourvisualexperience.Ofcourse,wearesometimesinterestedinandcanfocusand
reportonourvisualexperiencestoo,butthishappensusuallywhenwearenotsureaboutwhatweare
seeing.
(Inwhatfollows,itisusefultodenoteconceptsbycapitalizedwordsthatnamethem.So,forinstance,
REDdenotestheconceptofredwhichinturnexpressesthepropertyofbeingred.Inotherwords,
REDexpressesthepropertyofbeingred,orrednessinshort.EventhoughhereIassumefor
conveniencearepresentationalistframeworkforconceptsaccordingtowhichconceptsaremental

representationsrealizedinthebrainwhichisthepsychologist'spreferredreading,nothingofany
importancehangsonthis:thereadermaysubstitutehisorherownpreferredinterpretationofhow
conceptsaretobeunderstood.Forinstance,conceptsmaybemerelycertainsortsofmentalor
behavioralcapacitiesthatarefunctionallyordispositionallycharacterized.)
Thereisthusanasymmetryinourspontaneousreactiontoincomingstimuliinseeingandhaving
painthatis,ourspontaneousinterestandfocusdirectlyresultingfromtheperceptualexperiencesis
differentineachcase.Wecanrepresentthisasymmetrywithaschematic(Figure1).

Figure1:Thereisasymmetryinconceptapplicationevenwhenitisassumedthatthe
structureofinformationflowissymmetricalinthecontrastcases.
Thustheincorrigibilitymentionedbeforereducestoone'sincorrigibilityaboutone'soccurrent
experiences.Totheextenttowhichweareincorrigibleindiscriminatingandconceptuallyidentifying
ourownexperiences,tothatextentwecannotbewrongaboutourownpains.Hencethelocusof
conceptapplicationarethepainexperiences,eventhoughitmightseemtousasifwewereapplying
theconceptofpaintobodilylocations(seebelow).Itfollowsthathallucinationsorillusionsare
possible,inonesense,notaboutfeeling/experiencingpain,butaboutwhethertheseexperiences'
correctlyrepresentingsometissuedamage,thatis,theobjectofperceptioninfeelingpain.
Theprivacyandsubjectivityofpainsareexplainedsimilarly.Ifpainsareexperiences,theycannot
existwithoutbeingthestateofsomeone'smind.Inotherwords,theyexistinsofarasonehasthem:
theyarementalstatesorevents,henceessentiallyminddependent.Theprivacyofpainsagainreduces
totheprivacyofexperiences.Theremaybephilosophicalproblemsabouthowprivacy,subjectivity
andincorrigibilityarepossibleinacompletelyphysicalworld,butiftherearesuchproblems,theyare
generalproblemsabouthavingperceptualexperienceofanykind,notnecessarilypertainingtopains
andotherintransitivebodilysensations.

3.3Theproblemofpainlocation
Theperceptualistidentificationofpainswithexperiencesisnotintheclearyet:theperceptualtheorist
hastogiveanaccountofthecommonpracticeofattributingpainstobodilylocations.Forifpainsare
perceptualexperiencestheycan'tbeintelligibly(letalonecorrectly)locatedinbodyparts(except
perhapsinthehead).

Themostcommonperceptualisttreatmentofthisproblemconcedesthatthereisnowaytoanalyze
sentencesattributingpaintobodyparts,suchas(1)(6),whichwoulddocompletejusticetoallthe
aspectsofourcommonsenseconceptionofpain.Nevertheless,theresultingaccount,itisclaimed,
comesprettyclose.Accordingtothebasicproposal,whenIutterasentencelike
(5)Ifeelasharppaininthebackofmyrighthand
Iprimarilyselfattributeacertainkindofexperiencewhichhasanintentionalcontent(Armstrong
1962,1968,pp.314316andPitcher1970,pp.383385,1971seealsoDretske1999,2006Tye
1997,2006a).Tosaythatanexperiencehasanintentionalcontentistosaythatitrepresentsacertain
situationorstateofaffairs(whichmaybequitecomplex).Soforinstance,whenIseearedappleon
thetable,Iamhavingavisualexperiencewhichrepresents,amongotherthings,aredappleonthe
table.Someperceptualistsmightdescribetheproperintentionalorrepresentationalcontentof
experiencesinlessobjectualtermsbynotnamingwhatisrepresentedintermsofordinaryobjectslike
applesandtables.Forthesetheorists,itismoreappropriatetocharacterizetherepresentational
contentofperceptualexperiencesintermsofthewaysinwhichthesensiblequalitiesofthoseobjects
areinstantiatedordistributedinone'sperceptualfield.Experiencesdetectortrackthesequalities.For
instance,theymaysaythatmyvisualexperiencerepresentstheinstantiationofrednesswiththe
instantiationofacertain(applelike)shapequality,etc.Butbothwaysofcharacterizingthiscontent
aremeanttobeobjectiveinthesensethattheyrepresentextramentalreality(atleast,partlyitall
dependsonhowoneconceivesofsocalledsecondaryqualities).Treatingperceptualexperiencesas
havingintentionalcontentisappropriateandinlinewiththenaturalisticmotivationbehind
developingperceptualaccountsingeneral,becausethisishowtheyservetheirprimaryfunctionof
informingtheirownersabouttheirimmediateextramentalenvironment,includingbodily
environment.
Sotheproposalisthat,justlikeotherperceptualexperiences,painexperiencesalsorepresent.They
representtissuedamageasoccurringinacertainregionofone'sbody.Thelocationofpain,then,is
thelocationoftissuedamageasrepresentedbypainexperiences.Thelocationisanintentional
location.So(5)shouldbeanalyzedasselfattributinganexperiencewhichrepresentsacertainkindof
tissuedamageoccurringinthebackofmyhand.Inotherwords,eventhoughthesurfacestructureof
sentences(5)suggeststhatthereisanattributionofpaintoabodilylocation(morestrictly,thatI
standinthefeelingrelationtoapainwhichislocatedinapartofmybody),theproposedanalysis
saysthatthisisnotwhatisgoingon.WhatIdowhenIutter(5)isanattributionofadifferentsort:I
attributetomyselfafeelingstate(anexperience)whichhasanintentionalcontenttotheeffectthata
certainregionofmybodyisinaphysicalconditionofacertainsort.
Onthisview,thereisthusaconfusionincommonsensewaysoftalking,duetothefactthatthepain
isnotinmyhandthepain,beingastateoffeelingorexperience,isinmymind.Itisthephysical
disturbancethatisinmyhandwhichmyfeelingstaterepresents(inaconfusedandindistinctway,as
Descarteswouldputit).Uponreflection,however,wemayrealizethatinuttering(5)Iactually
attributeanintentionalfeelingstatetomyselfwhichinturnattributesaphysicaldisturbancetomy
hand.Thecolloquialwaysofspeakingjustjumblethepainwiththedisturbance,andthusconfuseand
misleadus.Pains,onthisview,areexperiences,notobjectsofourexperiences.Moreover,sincethese
experienceshaveintentionalcontent,theyhaveaccuracyconditions:theycanbecorrectorincorrect
theycanveridicallyrepresentormisrepresent.Butevenwhentheymisrepresent,theseexperiences
arepainexperiences.SoIcanbeingenuinepain,eventhoughthereisnothingphysicallywrongwith
myhand.
Notethataccordingtothisanalysis,thereare,inasense,twokindsofapropertyattributiongoingon:
anattributionofanexperienceandanattributionoftissuedamagetoabodypart.Butinuttering(5)I
doonlytheformerattribution,notthelatter.Thelatterattributionisdonenotbymebutbymy
experience,sotospeak,byrepresentingitashappeninginmyhand.ThisiswhyIamnotlogically
committedtofindingtissuedamageinmyhandintrulyuttering(5)eventhoughthisiswhatI
normallyexpecttofindthere.Indeed,asobservedinthefirstsection,ifitturnsoutthatthereis

nothingphysicallywrongwithmyhand,Iamnotwrong.(5)isstilltrue.Butmyexperienceisnow
wrong:itmisrepresentsthebackofmyhandashavingsomethingphysicallywrongwithit,asifsome
tissuedamagewereoccurringthere.IamhavinganillusionaboutmyhandbutIamstillingenuine
pain.Illusoryorhallucinatorypainexperiencesarestillgenuinepains.
Armstrong'sandPitcher'sperceptualaccountsofpainlocationhavebeenveryinfluential.Treating
painlocationastheintentionallocationoftissuedamageasrepresentedinthepainexperience,inone
formoranother,seemstodominatethethinkinginthisarea.Nevertheless,thereisasizable
philosophicalliteratureontheproblemofpainlocationorthespatialityofpainingeneral.The
followingisasampling.ForaccountspredatingArmstrongandPitcher,seeBaier(1964),Vesey
(1965,1967),Taylor(1965,1966),Holborow(1966),andCoburn(1966).Formoremodern
discussion,seeHolly(1986),Hyman(2003),Wyller(2005),andBain(2007).Thereisalsoan
extendeddebatebetweenPaulNoordhofandMichaelTyeaboutwhetherthesenseinwhichwelocate
painsinbodypartsrequirespecialsensesofinthatmightnotbespatialandwhetherthisisin
conflictwithrepresentationalismaboutpain.SeeNoordhof(2001,2002,2006)andTye(2002,2006a,
2006b).Olivier(2006)isacriticalcommentaryonthedebatebetweenNoordhofandTye.

3.4Directandindirectperceptualtheories
Theperceptualviewofpainaspresentedsofarisaviewevenanindirectrealistcansubscribeto,
although,asamatterofhistoricalfact,veryfewindirectrealistshavedoneso(Perkins1983,2006
Maund2003,2006).Asensedatumtheoristissomeonewhothinksthatallperceptionofextramental
realityisindirect,mediatedbyadirectperceptionofsensedatathatstandincertainsystematic
relationstoextramentalobjectsintheworldinvirtueofwhichsensedatacontingentlycometo
representthem.Soitisentirelypossible,infactreasonable,toholdthatpainsensedataarealso
representational.Inotherworlds,directawarenessofpainsensedatacouldconstitutetheindirect
perceptionoftissuedamageinbodilyregionswhichtypicallyandsystematicallycausethesesense
data.
Thereasonwhythislinewasnotpursuedbyindirectrealistshasprobablysomethingtodowiththe
intuitiveresistanceagainstanyperceptualviewofpainalreadyembeddedinourordinaryconception
thatwediscussedabove.[10]Indirectrealistslikesensedatumtheorists,aswehavealreadyseen,have
thetheoreticalresourcestoaccommodatetheintuitiveunderstandingofpainwithoutforcingitintoa
perceptualistmold.Withoutanyqualms,theycansaythatwearedirectlyandimmediatelyawareof
painquaamentalobjectorquality,whetherornotthisrepresentsorsignalstissuedamage.Thisisto
saythattheyalreadyhavealocusofconceptapplicationintheirtheoryfortheconceptofpain:PAIN
directlyappliestotheexperienceortoitsinternaldirectobject,i.e.,toeitherasensedatumortoits
directawareness.Thisseemstoaccommodatealltheintuitionsembeddedincommonsensewhygo
further?Furthermore,ifoneisnotaperceptualist,onedoesn'thaveanobligationtodealwithwhat
we'llcallbelowtheproblemoffocus,theproblemofexplainingwhythereisanasymmetryin
conceptualfocusbetweenpainandstandardexteroceptionifbotharegenuinelyperceptual.
Inpractice,however,almostalldefendersofperceptualviewofpainsaredirectrealists.Ifonewants
torunadirectrealistversionoftheperceptualtheory,however,oneimmediatelyrunsintothe
difficultyoffindinganappropriatelocusfordirectperceptualawareness,andforthatmatter,alocus
forimmediateconceptapplicationthatis,onerunsintothedifficultyoffindinganobject,state,or
eventtowhichwespontaneouslyapplyPAIN,ITCH,TICKLE,etc.,whenweareintrospectively
awareofourpains,itches,tickles,etc.,andreportthemonthisbasis.Thisdifficultyarisesbecausethe
markofany(early)directrealisminthetheoryofperceptionistherepudiationofconsciously
availableperceptualintermediariesthatmediatestandardexteroception:whenIseearedappleonthe
table,thereisnoobjectorqualitydistinctfromtheappleanditsrednesssuchthatIseetheapplein
virtueofseeingit(ormoregenerally,invirtueofdirectlyperceivingorbeingawareofit).Onthis
view,whenIseeanapple,Idirectlyperceive,oramdirectlyacquaintedwith,theappleandits
qualitiessuchasitsredness.Thisviewworkswellinveridicalperception:thelocusofconcept

applicationisalwaysthepublicobjectofperception,liketheappleanditsproperties.Italsoexplains
whythespontaneousconceptapplicationisthewayitisevenwhenonehallucinatesorhaveillusions:
evenwhenonehallucinatesaredapple,oneisnaturallydisposedtoapplytheconceptREDAPPLEto
whatoneeithertakesoristemptedtotaketobethepublicobjectofone'sepistemiceffortsandits
publiclyavailablefeatures,andrarely,ifever,towhatonebelievestobeaprivatementalobjector
quality.
Buthowistherepudiationofconsciouslyavailableperceptualintermediariestobereconciledwiththe
admissionthattheconceptofpainistheconceptofasubjectivesensation/experienceofacertainsort?
Recallthatmostperceptualtheoristsadmitthatintrospectivereportsofpaininbodyregionsare
reportsofexperiencesthatrepresentphysicaldisorderofsomesortinthoseregions.Thisisjusttosay
thatwhenoneisinpainoneisdirectlyawareofasensationorexperience,i.e.,pain.Thisinturn
meansthattheconceptswearespontaneouslypromptedtoapplyinhavingpainsandother
intransitivebodilysensationsdirectlyapplytothepromptingsensations/experiencesinthefirstplace
appearancestothecontrary.Sohowtounderstandthedirectrealist'stalkofconscioussensations
orexperiences?

3.5Adverbialistperceptualtheories
Directrealistsrejecttheactobjectanalysisofperceptualexperiencesadvancedbysensedatum
theoristsandotherindirectrealists.Accordingtomostearlydirectrealists(e.g.,Ducasse1952,Sellars
1975),evenwhenvisuallyhallucinatingaredappleonthetable,onedoesnotdirectlyseeaprivate
mentalparticularoraconstellationofmentalqualitiesratheroneishavingavisualexperiencethatis
likeanexperiencewhichisnormallybroughtaboutwhenoneactuallyseesarealredappleonthe
table.Directrealists,inotherwords,typicallyinsistthatsuchcasesshouldnotbeanalyzedintermsof
aperceiverstandinginacertainperceptualrelationtoaprivatementalobjectorquality.Ratherthe
analysisinvolvesonlyoneparticular,theperceiverherself,andherbeingincertainsortsof
(perceptual,experiential)statesorconditionsthataretypicallybroughtaboutundercertain
circumstancesinwhichonegenuinelyperceivessomething.Instandardcases,whenoneishavinga
veridicalperception,theexperientialstateoftheperceiverisbroughtaboutbytheactualobjectofher
perception,andtheperceiver'sstateisqualitativelydifferentiatedbythecausalinfluencesofthe
sensiblequalitiesofthepublicobject.Innonstandardcaseslikeinhallucinationsandillusions,
phenomenologicallythesamekindsofstatesarebroughtaboutbydifferentcausalroutes,andthe
qualitativedifferentiationofone'sexperientialstateinsuchnonveridicalcasesistheresultofdeviant
causalinfluences.(Pitcher1970,p.384)
Thissortofanalysisofexperiencesissometimesknownasadverbialismintheliteraturebecausein
perceivingaredobjectoneissaidtobeinastateofperceivingsomethingredly.Thetheoretical
importofthiswayoftalkingisthatperceivingsomethingthatisredisamannerofperceivingthat
objectthatwouldbedistinctfromthemannerofperceivingitiftheobjectwereblue,inwhichcase
onewouldbeperceivingitbluely.Similarlywhenonehallucinatesaredobject,thereisonlyone
object,theperceiverwhoissensinginacertainmanner,namely,redly.Inotherwords,redissaid
toqualifynotaprivateobjectbutratherastateoractivityofaperson,thatstatebeingamannerof
perceivingorsensingphysicalobjectsthatarered.[11]Forourpurposes,keepingupwiththegeneral
naturalisticmotivationbehinddevelopingdirectrealistviews,wecantakeadverbialismasanattempt
togetridofmysteriousmentalobjectsorqualitiesinfavorofmetaphysicallylesscostlystatesor
activitiesofpersonsormannersofperceivingthatqualifypersonsquasubjectsofexperience.Soa
painexperience,foradirectrealist,isaspecificmannerinwhichtissuedamageis(somatosensorially)
perceivedinabodilyregion.Whenwereportpain,wereporttheoccurrenceofexperiences
understoodthiswayadverbially.
Adverbialismofthissortcanbeeffectivelycombinedwithintentionalismorrepresentationalism
aboutexperience(formoreontheconnectionbetweenadverbialismandrepresentationalism,see
Kraut1982,andLycan1987a,1987b).Anadverbialisthastosomehowcharacterizethesewaysor

mannersofsensing/perceivingfordistinguishingbetweenthem,andanaturalwaytodothatisby
appealingtothestandardorcanonicalconditionsunderwhichthoseperceptualeventsarebrought
about(recallhowdirectrealistswanttohandleavisualhallucination:oneishavingavisual
experiencethatislikeanexperiencewhichisnormallybroughtaboutwhenoneactuallyseesareal
redappleonthetable).Thusitmaybereasonabletoarguethatthosecanonicalconditionsarewhat
thespecificperceptualeventsoractivitiesofthepersonsrepresent.Forinstance,itisplausibleto
claimthataspecificperceptualactivityconstitutestheperceptionofred(=theperceptualevent
representingtheinstantiationofred)becauseitisthekindofpsychologicaleventregularly
(canonically)causedbyredsurfacesindeedonemightexpectthatthepsychophysicsofsensory
modalitieswoulddetailthesecanonicalorstandardconditionsinobjectiveterms.Althoughthis
maneuverisopentodirectrealists,itisoptional.Whenonetakesthisoptiontheresultisprettymuch
astrongformofrepresentationalismforwhichseenextsection.
Therearevarioustechnicaldifficultieswithadverbialism,especiallywhendealingwith
phenomenologicallycomplexoverallexperiencessuchashavingthreepainsofdifferentqualitative
charactersimultaneouslyoccurringinthreedifferentlocationsinone'sbody.Itisnotclearwhether
adverbialistapproachescansuccessfullytietheappropriatemannerscorrespondingtodifferent
qualitieswiththerightpainsortissuedamageondifferentlocations.(SeeJackson1975,1977fora
detailedcriticismofthissortTye1996,pp.7477,containsausefulsummary.)Furthermore,even
whenonemightsuccessfullygetridofmysteriousmentalobjectslikesensedatawiththisadverbialist
move,itisnotclearwhetheradverbialismmightstillleadtoaformofpropertydualismaccordingto
whichoneisdirectlyawareofcertain(nonphysical)phenomenologicalqualitiesinstantiatedby
experiencesrealizedbybrainstates.Thesequalitiesseemtoberequiredtoexplainhowthemanners
ofdifferentperceptualactivitiesofaperceivercanbedifferentiated.
Thereareothersourcesofresistancetodirectperceptualtheoriesofpainandotherintransitivebodily
sensations.Someobjectionsstemfromconsiderationsaboutwhetherdirectperceptualtheoriescan
giveadequateaccountsofperceptioningeneral,soarenotspecifictotheirtreatmentofpain.Oneof
themostfrequentlydiscussedworriesaboutdirectperceptualtheoriesingeneraliswhethertheycan
dojusticetotheinternalistintuitionthatperceptualexperienceisphenomenallyrichinawaythat
cannotbepushedbacktotheextramentalworld.InthecaseofearlydirectrealistlikeArmstrongand
Pitcher,thisworryisevenmorepressingsincetheywerecognitivistaboutperceptualexperiencein
generalthatis,theyattemptedtoexplainperceptionintermsofbeliefacquisition(or,intermsof
acquisitionofbelieflikecognitivestates).Butbeliefsdon'tseemtohavetherightkindof
phenomenologyassociatedwithperceptualexperiencesandbodilysensations(seeEveritt1988and
Grahek1991forthiskindofcriticism).Aspointedoutearlier,earlydirectrealistsplayeddownthe
importanceofexperientialphenomenologyandsometimesevendenieditsexistencefearingthat
acknowledgingitwillleadtotheintroductionofsensedataorirreduciblypsychicqualia.[12]But
thisconcernaboutqualiadrovemanyawayfromtheearlydirectperceptualtheories(especiallythose
whowerenotmuchworriedaboutskepticismandepistemologyingeneral)withtheconvictionthat
thesetheoriesarenotadequateafterallforcapturingtherichphenomenologyofperceptual
experiences.

4.Representationaltheories
Confrontedwithsuchdifficultiesandmanyothers,itistemptingtoadoptastrongformof
representationalismthatopenlyadmitstheexistenceofphenomenologicallyrichexperiences,while
preservingthebasicintuitionandnaturalisticmotivationbehinddirectrealism.Indeed,manyhave
yieldedtothistemptation.

4.1Introduction
Representationalismaboutpainistheviewthattheentirephenomenologyofapainexperienceis

strictlyidenticaltoitsrepresentationalorintentionalcontent.Inotherwords,thephenomenaland
representationalcontentsofpainareoneandthesamething,thustheycannotcomeapart.Amongthe
defendersofpainrepresentationalismunderstoodthiswayareHarman(1990),Dretske(1995,1999,
2003),Tye(1996,1997,2006a,2006b),Byrne(2001),Seager(2002),andBain(2003).[13]
Mostearlydirectrealistaccountsofperception,asmentionedbefore,wereshyaboutacknowledginga
robustphenomenologyforexperiences.Thiswasprimarilybecauseexperientialphenomenologywas
associatedwithindirectrealismandsensedatatheoriesinparticular.Manyearlydirectrealists
embracedadverbialismbecauseadverbialismpromisedawayofbeingrealistaboutexperienceswhile
avoidinganactobjectviewofthem.Becausemostdirectrealistsidentifiedpainswithsensory
experiencesratherthantheirobjects,thedirectperceptualtheoristsaboutpainneededarobust
(realist)notionofexperience.Adverbialismgavewaytoastrongformofrepresentationalismby
suggestingwaysinwhichintentionalcontentcouldbenaturalizedonthebasisofthosecanonical
conditionsthatcausally/lawfullycontroltheoccurrenceofperceptualexperiencesinvirtueofwhich
theyrepresentthosebodilyconditions.Thisopenedupthepossibilityofdefendingdirectrealism
aboutarobustexperientialphenomenologywithcompletelynaturalisticcredentials.Theresultwas
strongrepresentationalismaboutallexperientialphenomenology,accordingtowhichtheentire
phenomenal(qualitative)contentorqualiaofanyexperienceismetaphysicallyconstitutedwithout
remainderbyitsrepresentationalcontent.
Hence,representationalismaboutqualiainthiscontextneedstobeunderstoodinareductionistsense.
Aswehaveseen,indirectrealism,especiallyintheformofsensedatumtheories,werealsoadvanced
asrepresentationalisttheories(perhapsexcludingtheintransitivebodilysensations).Indeed,theold
nameforindirectrealismwasrepresentativerealism.Onthesetheories,inhavingaperceptual
experiencewearedirectlyacquaintedwithqualia,understoodeitherasintrinsicqualitiesof
experiencesorasqualitiesofphenomenalindividualslikesensedata.But,atleastinstandard
exteroception,thesequalitiescontingentlyrepresentobjectivesensiblepropertiesofpublicobjectsin
virtueofeitherresemblingthemorbybeingregularlycausedbytheirinstantiationsorboth.In
otherwords,onanindirectrealistapproach,theyaredistinctexistences:qualiaorsensedatacometo
representpublicobjectsandtheirsensiblepropertiesinvirtueofsomecontingentrelationsholding
betweenthem(resemblanceorcausation).
However,inheracknowledgmentofphenomenology,thereductionistdirectrealistcannothavesuch
phenomenalobjectssomehowinternaltoone'smindorexperience,norcansheendorsetheexistence
ofqualitiesintrinsictoexperiencesthatwecanbecomedirectlyawareofinintrospectionthebasic
directperceptualistintuition,recall,isthatourexperiencesaretransparenttousinthattheypresentus
theworlddirectlyandimmediately(thisexternalrelationisprimary).Soifqualiaaretoberetainedin
one'sdirectrealistpictureofperception,thesequalianeedtobereducedtorepresentationalcontentof
perceptualstates.Wewillsometimesusestrongrepresentationalismtodistinguishthisviewfrom
representativerealism(seeBlock2006Blockusesrepresentationismtomarkthesame
distinction).
Likeearlierdirectrealists,strongrepresentationaliststendtobenaturalistsorphysicalists.Therefore
thesetheoriesusuallycomewithanaturalistaccountofhowthesestates(thoughtofasrealizedinthe
centralnervoussystem)acquiretheirrepresentationalcontent.Themostcommonaccountiseitheran
idealcausalcovariationtheory(informationalsemanticsseeDretske1981,Fodor1987,Aydede
andGzeldere2005)orateleologicalpsychosemantics(seeMillikan1984,Papineau1987)orboth
(Dretske1988,1995Tye1996).Theseareexternalisttheories.[14]
Torecap,strongrepresentationalismisthemodernday'sdirectrealismaboutperception,where
adverbialismisreplacedbyrepresentationalismrunonanaturalisticstoryabouthowperceptual
experiencesacquiretheir(analog)representationalcontentthatinturnconstitutestheir
phenomenology.So,accordingtostrongrepresentationalism,painexperiencesfeelthewaytheydoin
virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontent,andnothingelse.Theyrepresentvariousdisorderlyconditions

ofbodilytissue.Thewaytheyrepresenttheseconditionsisanalogoustothewayourvisualsystem
representscolors.Ifcolorsare(atleast,partly)objectivefeaturesofsurfacesliketheirsurfacespectral
reflectances,ourvisualexperiencesdon'trepresentcolorsassuch,sowecannotcometo
conceptualizecolorsasspectralreflectancesonthebasisoftheirgrainlessvisualpresentations.Soit
isnoobjectiontorepresentationalismthatourpainexperiencesdon'trepresenttissuedamageassuch,
whichistosaythatwecannotnecessarilyconceptualizewhatpainexperiencesrepresentastissue
damagesolelyonthebasisoftheseexperiences.
Itissometimessaidthatperceptualexperiencesrepresentwhattheydononconceptually,whichis
oftentimesequatedwithanalogcontent(realizedinpicturelikecontinuousrepresentations).Inthis
contextwecantakethisasaclaimaboutthewayexperiencesarerepresentationallystructured:they
arenotstructuredoutofconcepts(discreterepresentations)asthoughtsareusuallythoughttobe.
Everysensorymodalityhasarangeofproprietaryqualitiesthattheycandetect.Painexperiencesare
nodifferent,althoughtheymaybelessrichintermsoftheirinformationalcontentcomparedtovision
forinstance.Nevertheless,itisreasonabletoarguethatqualitativedifferencesinpainexperiencesare
duetotheirrepresentingdifferentbodilyconditions.Tyelistsanumberofcandidates:
atwingeofpainrepresentsamild,briefcaseofdamage.Athrobbingpainrepresentsa
rapidlypulsingdisorder.Achesrepresentregionsofdamageinsidethebodyratherthan
onthesurface.Theseregionsarerepresentedashavingvolume,asgraduallybeginning
andending,asincreasinginseverity,asslowlyfadingaway.Thevolumessorepresented
arenotrepresentedaspreciseorsharplybounded.Thisiswhyachesarenotfelttohave
preciselocations,unlikeprickingpains,forexample.Astabbingpainisonethat
representssuddendamageoveraparticularwelldefinedbodilyregion.Thisregionis
representedashavingvolume(ratherthanbeingtwodimensional),asbeingtheshapeof
somethingsharpedgedandpointed(likethatofadagger).Inthecaseofaprickingpain,
therelevantdamageisrepresentedashavingasuddenbeginningandendingonthe
surfaceorjustbelow,andascoveringaverytinyarea.Arackingpainisonethat
representsthatthedamageinvolvesthestretchingofinternalbodyparts(e.g.,muscles).
(Tye1997,p.333cf.Tye1996,2006a)
Theproblemofpainlocationishandledinthesamewaythattheearlyperceptualtheorieshandled
them:thelocationofpainisthelocationthatthepainexperiencesrepresentaswherethetissue
damageisoccurring.Thissortofaccountbecomesmoreattractiveinthelightofthefactthatwenow
haveamuchmorerobustandrealistnotionofexperiencewhosephenomenologicalcum
representationalcontentisadirectguidetothelocationoftissuedamage.Thephenomenologyofpain
experiencesnowdirectly/transparentlypresentstissuedamagetothesuffererinvirtueofitsidentity
withitsrepresentationalcontent(Tye2006a,2006b).

4.2Theproblemoffocus
Oneofthecentraldifficultiesforanyperceptual/representationalviewofpainistoexplainwhy,if
feelingpainisgenuinelyperceivingtissuedamageinabodypart,wereportitsexperienceratherthan
thetissuedamage(seePitcher1970,pp.37980Armstrong1962,p.125andAydede,forthcoming,
forthestatementofthedifficulty).[15]Wemaycallthisdifficultytheproblemoffocusforperceptual
theoriesingeneral(includingstrongrepresentationalistviews).Accordingtothecommonsense
conceptionofpain,andfollowingit,mostperceptualtheories,weare,epistemologicallyand
psychologically,moreinterestedintheexperiencethanitsobject,tissuedamage.Ourspontaneous
conceptualreactionalsofollowsthispattern:thereisamarkeddifferenceinthelocusofconcept
applicationorconceptualidentificationbetweenstandardexteroceptionandpain.Asdepictedin
Figure1above,thereisanobviousasymmetrybetweenthetwo.Iffeelingpainisnothingbut
perceivingtissuedamageinabodilyregiononaparwithseeingaredapple,thenonewouldnaturally
expectthatwhenwereportpaininbodyparts,wearereportingaperceptualrelationthatobtains
betweentheperceiverandanextramentalconditionperceived.

Butthisisnotwhatwefind.Instead,whatwefindisareportofanexperienceofacertainsortwhose
informational/representationaletiologymakesnodifferencetoitsownconceptualclassification.A
painreportisareportofanexperiencewhoserepresentationalaccuracyisofnorelevancetowhether
thereportitselfisaccurate.Recallthat,onmostperceptualtheories,whenIutterasentencelike(5),I
amsayingsomethinglikeIamhavinganexperiencewhichtellsmethatthereissomesortof
physicaldisorderinthebackofmyhand.Inotherwords,Isimplyreportanexperiencethattellsme
something.WhetherornotIcometobelievewhatittellsmeisamatteroffactorsthatoughtnottobe
readintotheanalysisofwhatthetruthconditionsof(5)are.Infact,thissortofanalysisproposedby
perceptualtheoristscomeswithininchestofullycapturingtheordinaryconceptionofpainandthusis
anargumentinfavorofsuchtheories.Butthisispreciselywheretheproblemliesforperceptual
theories.Whyisapainreportareportofanexperienceinthefirstinstanceiftheexperienceis
genuinelyperceptual(exteroceptual)?Isn'tthisstrange?Nothingofthissorthappensingenuine
perception.Infact,thisasymmetrycanbetransformedintoacompellingargumentagainstperceptual
(aswellasstrongrepresentationalist)theoriesinthefollowingwaycf.Aydede(forthcoming).
Everygenuinecaseofperceptioninvitesreportinganinstanceofperceptionintherelevantmodality
bysentencessimilarto(9)(13),wheretheperceptualverbisuseddominantlyasasuccessverb.For
instance:
(10)Iseearedappleonthetable.
Thisisforgoodreason:perceptionessentiallyisanactivitywherebyonegathersinformationabout
one's(extramental)environmentinrealtime(includingone'sinternalbodilyenvironmentofcourse).
Soitisnotsurprisingthatthedominantformofreportingisintheformofarelationbetweenthe
perceiverandtheperceivedwherethelatterareextramentalobjectsorconditionsofone's
environment.Itisalsonotsurprisingthatperceptiontypicallyyieldsconceptualcategorizationofthe
perceivedobjectorconditioninthefirstinstance:thetypicalresultofaperceptualprocessisbringing
theperceivedobjectunderaperceptualconcept.Genuineperceptionthusputsthepremiuminthe
perceivedobject,notintheperceptualactivityitselforintheperceptualexperiencewherebyoneis
typicallybroughtintoepistemiccontactwithone'sextramentalenvironment.Hencethetypicalresult
ofperceptionistheacquisitionofbeliefswithcontentsexpressiblebysentenceslike(9)(13).If
sentencesreportingpaininbodypartsdon'tfollowthispattern,i.e.,iftheyarenottobeconstruedas
reportsofperceptualrelationsbetweentheperceiverandtheperceived,thenpainreportsareprima
facienotperceptualreports,reportstotheeffectthatonestandsinaperceptualrelationtosomething
extramental.Butpainreportsreportfeelingpain.Thusfeelingpainisanotaformofgenuine
perception.Letuscallthistheargumentfromfocusagainstperceptualtheories.
Thereisanobvioussenseinwhichtheperceptualtheoristisboundtoconcedethatreportingpainis
notacaseofreportingtheobtainingofaperceptualrelationbetweentheperceiverandthe
extramentalperceivedobject.Fortotheextenttowhichreportingpainisreportingaconscious
experienceandonlythat,tothatextentitisanintrospectivereport,reportofintramentalactivity.
Nevertheless,aperceptualtheoristwouldinsistthatthisreportedexperienceisaperceptual
experience.Butwhyreporttheexperience,themessenger,ratherthanitsobject,themessage?Why
arewefixatedonthemessengerhere?
Anaturalexplanationthataperceptualtheoristmightgiveisthatunlikeotherperceptualmodalities,
theactsofsensingtissuedamageinvolvedinfeelingpain(i.e.,theexperience)haveavery
pronouncednegativeaffectivequality:painsareunpleasant,awful,hurtful,painful(seePitcher1970,
p.379ffandArmstrong1962,p.125ff1968,p.310ff).Itisthisnegativeaffectthatexplainswhywe
arefixatedontheexperienceitself,ratherthanwhatitisaperceptionof,i.e.,traumatizedbodyparts.
Inotherwords,itisthisnegativequalitythatturnstherecognitionalfocusontoitself,andwithit,onto
theexperienceitattachesto.Ifthisiscorrect,then,ofcourse,painsareequallyunpleasantevenwhen
theymisrepresent.Thisiswhywepickoutouractsofsensing(i.e.,theexperiencesthemselves)rather
thantheirexternalobjectsirrespectiveoftheirinformationaletiology:whetherornottheyare
veridical,theyequallyhurt.

Thisseemstobeaplausibleexplanationonafirstpass.Indeed,aperceptualtheoristcanevengive,
plausibly,anevolutionarystoryaboutwhytheseperceptualexperiencesshouldfeelunpleasant:they
representorsignalapropertyofbodypartsthattendstohindersurvival.However,canthesamesort
ofexplanationbegivenforotherintransitivebodilysensationslikeitches,tickles,tingles,and
orgasms?Perhapsitcanbedoneforexperiencingorgasms,whichareusuallyintenselypleasurable
andhasobviousevolutionarybenefits.Butwhataboutothers?Itcheshaveanunpleasantqualityto
themwhichnormallymakesonewanttoscratchthespotwhereoneitches.Butticklesandtinglescan
bepleasantattimesandunpleasantatothers,aswellasaffectivelyneutralatstillothertimes.Still,the
conceptofatickleortingleisliketheconceptofapaininthattheyapplytotheactsofsensingor
experiencing,ratherthantowhatexternalconditionstheseactsmayberepresentingifthey
representanything.[16]Further,gustatoryandolfactoryexperiencescanbepleasant,unpleasantor
affectivelyneutral,yettheactsofsensinginvolvedintheexerciseofthesesensorymodalitiesseemto
belargelytransparentinthatweapplytherelevantconceptslikeSWEET,BITTER,etc.tothe
externalobjectsoftheseexperiencesinthefirstinstance,andonlyderivativelyorincidentallytothe
actsofsensingortotheexperiencesthemselves.
Theseobservationscastdoubtontheplausibilityoftheexplanationofferedbytheperceptualtheorist
fortheasymmetryinfocus.However,theperceptualtheoristcanstillclaimthatwhateverthe
explanationmightbeinthecaseofotherintransitivebodilysensations,theexplanationofferedfor
painisessentiallycorrect,andsuchatheoristmaythusconcludethatshehasdischargedtheburdenof
proofinclaimingthatexperiencingpainisengagingingenuineexteroception.Thisreplyhassome
initialplausibilitysincepainexperienceshavealmostalwaysapronouncednegativeaffect.
Nevertheless,ifonesuspectsasoneshouldthattheintransitivityofcertainkindsofbodily
sensationsasawholemusthaveaunifiedexplanation,onewouldbewisetoconcludethattheoffered
explanationisprobablynotthewholestory,andthusmightnotbeadequateallbyitself.
Thereisalsoquitesubstantialscientificevidencethatthereareabnormalpainphenomenawherethe
sensoryandaffectiveaspectsofpainexperiencesaredissociatedfromeachotherseeSection6.1
below.Themosttypicalcaseisknownasthepainasymboliasyndrome,wherepeoplewhosuffer
fromithavepainexperienceswithoutthenegativeaffect.Interestingly,thesepeoplestillidentifytheir
experienceaspain,butshownobodily,emotional,andbehavioralsignstypicallyassociatedwiththe
unpleasantaspectofpains.Theyarefeelingapainthatdoesn'thurt!Ifpainsarenotnecessarily
unpleasant,asthissyndromeseemstoshow,itisaninterestingandopenquestionwhetherfeeling
painswithoutitsnegativeaffectwouldstillretainitsintransitivenature.(Forconsiderationsthatit
would,seeAydedeandGzeldere2005.)
Buttherealproblemforthisresponsethatappealstonegativeaffectisthateveniftheprovided
explanationwerecorrect,itwouldnotsaveaperceptualtheory.Theexplanandum(namely,thatthe
semanticfocusofspontaneousconceptapplicationinreportingpainsistheexperienceratherthanthe
extramentalobjectofthisexperience)canplausiblybeinterpretedasadmissionthatfeelingpainina
bodypartisnotperceivingsomethingextramentalthere.Whatjustifiesthisinterpretationisa
reasonableconditionongenuineperception:anexperiencekindisgenuinelyperceptualonlyifit
generallygivesrisetoproprietaryconceptapplicationswhosesemanticfocusistheproperobjectof
thiskindofexperience.Inotherwords,somecognitiveuptakeofacertainsortisnecessaryfora
sensoryprocesstobecomegenuinelyperceptual.Generally,conceptsofsecondaryqualitiesaretaken
tobeproprietaryforeachsensorymodality.Indeedtheseconceptsprimarilyapplytoobjectsof
experiencestypicallygeneratedbythesemodalities,ratherthantotheexperiencesthemselves(orif
theydo,onlyderivatively).Butinthecaseofpain,wedon'tseemtosemanticallyapplyPAIN,or
painforthatmatter,totissuedamage.Againthisisevidencedbythetruthconditionsofpain
attributingsentences,aswe'veseenbefore.Sotheexplanansmaybecorrect,butitseemstomissits
target,theexplanandum:itturnsouttobeanexplanationofwhyfeelingpainisnotgenuinely
perceptual.(SeeAydede,forthcoming,foranextendedelaborationofthiskindofargumentagainst
perceptualistaswellasstrongrepresentationalisttheories.)

Anotherkindofresponsetotheproblemoffocusmightbetotreatitasapseudoproblemthatstems
fromourlinguisticpracticeswithoutaffectingthephenomena.Itmightbearguedinthefollowing
way(Chalmersincorrespondencecf.Hill2006).Wecaninventatermsee2suchthatonecansee2
evenwhentheperceptualobjectisnotpresent(sosee2appliestothevisualexperience,unlikethe
ordinarysee1).Wecanalsoinventatermfeel1suchthatfeeling1requiresthepresenceofthe
perceptualobject,tissuedamage(sofeel1isunliketheordinaryfeel2).Asithappens,inour
languageseeexpressessee1andfeelexpressesfeel2,butthat'sjustterminology.Atthelevel
ofphenomena,thetwocasesareonapar.
Buttheproblemwon'tgoawaywiththismaneuver.Foronething,itdoesn'treallyaddresstheanti
perceptualistargumentfromfocusgivenabove.Foranother,thequestionisn'twhetherwecanor
cannotinventnewtermsorformnewconceptssothatthetwophenomenaturnouttobetype
identical.Linguisticpracticesreflectourconceptualpractices,howwethinkandconceptuallyrespond
toincomingperceptualinformation.Asamatteroffact,ourconceptualpracticestreatseeingand
otherstandardexteroceptiondifferentlythantheytreatfeelingpain,despitethefactthatthetypesof
informationflowseemidenticalinbothcases.Thequestioniswhy?Forthesepracticesareshapedby
ourepistemicneedsandpsychologicalpreferencesthatshowupinourbehavior.Theyarenot
arbitrary.Ifperceptionisapsychologicalprocessbywhichwegatherinformationaboutthe
extramentalworldandalignourconceptualandbehavioralresponsesonthisbasisinacertainway,it
isafairquestiontoaskwhetherapsychologicalprocessthatdeviatesfromthisisperception,
especiallywhenthedeviationseemstoreflectthatourepistemicneedsandpsychologicalpreferences
aremarkedlydifferentthanthoseinvolvedinexteroception.Thequestionofwhetherfeelingpainis
perceptionisnotapurelymetaphysicalorphilosophicalquestion,butitisalsopartlyandimportantly
anempirical(psychological)question.

4.3Theproblemofaffectivequalia
Painsarenotonlysensoryorperceptualexperiences,theyarealsoaffectiveemotionalexperiences,or
atleasttheyseemtohaveanaffectiveaspect.Feelingpainisnormallyhavinganawful,hurtful,
painful,experience.Sowemaysaythatpainshaveanegativehedonicoraffectivevalue.
Strongrepresentationalistsarecommittedtoclaimingthatallqualiaarerepresentational.Soifthis
negativeaffectiveaspectofpain(i.e.,thehurting,painfulqualityofpains)isaproperpartofpain's
overallqualitativephenomenology,thenitmustalsoberepresentational.Butwhatdoesitrepresent?
Painphenomenologyseemscomplexinthatitseemstoconsistofatleasttwodimensions,affective
emotionalandsensorydiscriminative.Representationalists,alongwithearlierperceptualtheorists,
claimthatthesensoryaspectofpainisrepresentational:itrepresentstissuedamage.Butwhatdoes
theaffectiveaspectrepresent?Theredoesn'tseemtobeaplausiblecandidate.
Theearlyperceptualtheorists,especiallydirectrealists,werecognitivistaboutpain'snegativeaffect.
Theyclaimed,roughly,thatitconsistsoftheexperiencer'sspontaneouscognitive/conativereactionsto
theirownpainexperiences.Thesereactionswereconceivedasformingconativepropositional
attitudes.Inotherwords,thepainfulnessofpainswasconstitutedbytheirpowertoimmediately
evokein[one]theperemptorydesirethatthe[pain]perceptionshouldcease(Armstrong1968,pp.
31416).(Seealso,StephensandGraham1985,1987Nelkin1986,1994Hall1989.Parfit1984.
AccordingtoChisholm's1987presentation,Brentanoalsoheldthatpainsandpleasuresarepartly
conativereactionstosensoryelements.)
Eventhoughtheoreticallycognitivismisanoptionforrepresentationalism,adoptingitwouldseemto
violatethespiritofstrongrepresentationalism.Italldependshowonewouldliketodevelopthe
cognitivistline.Oneoptionistosaythattheaffectiveaspectofpainisnotqualitativeor
phenomenological.Weareundertheillusionthatitisbecausewearehardwiredtocognitivelyand
behaviorallyreacttothesensorycontentofpaininacertainway.Thisoptionhastheadvantageof

preservingstrongrepresentationalism:ifaffectisnotqualitative,thereisnopressuretotreatitas
representationalcf.Tye(1996,pp.11116and134361997,p.3323).Butifitisadmittedthat
affectiveaspectofpainisasqualitativeasitssensorycontent,thencognitivismcomesasa
compromiseforstrongrepresentationalistbecauseitadmitsthatnotallqualiaarerepresentational.
Thislatteroptionmayleadtorepresentationalcumfunctionalistapproachestopainsandother
affectivelynonneutralexperiencesinthatthesensorycontentofanexperiencemaybegivenapurely
representationalaccountwhileitsaffectivedimensionmaybeamatteroffunctionallyprocessingthis
contentforsettingmotivationalparameters(ontheassumptionthatcognitiveattitudescanbecaptured
functionally)seebelow.
Theproblemwithcognitivismingeneralisthatitsuffersfromintuitiveimplausibility:itcertainly
doesn'tappearthatthehurtingaspectofpainexperiencesisjustamatterofourcognitivereactionsto
themasordinarilyunderstood.Cognitivereactionsintheformofpropositionalattitudesdon'tseemto
haveanyqualitativephenomenologytothem.Butmoreimportantly,thismoveappearstomislocate
theproblem.Thequestionis:inwhatdoesthepainfulness,thehurtingquality,ofpainsconsist?The
answerofferedseemstobe:inourcognitive/conativereactiontotheexperience,somethinglike
havingadesireforittostop,forinstance.Butonewouldliketothinkthatitisbecausetheexperience
ispainfulthatonedesiresittostop,nottheotherwayround.
Themoststraightforwardwaytodealwiththeaffectivequaliaforarepresentationalististosaythat
theytooarerepresentational,justlikethesensoryqualia.Inarecentwork,Tyeseemstoproposesuch
aview:
Peopleinpaintrytogetridofitortodiminishit.Why?Theanswersurelyisbecause
painfeelsunpleasantorbad,becauseitisexperiencedassuch.Butwhatexactlyis
experiencedasunpleasant?One'sattention,whenonefeelspain,goestoaplacedifferent
fromtheoneinwhichtheexperienceofpainislocated.Thequalitiesthatareexperienced
asunpleasantarelocatedinthebodilylocationtowhichoneattends(innormal
circumstances).Peoplewhosepainslacktheaffectivedimensionundergopurelysensory,
nonevaluativerepresentationsoftissuedamageofonesortoranotherinalocalized
bodilyregion.Thosewhosepainsarenormalexperiencethesamequalities,butnow
thosequalitiesareexperiencedbythemasunpleasant.Itispreciselybecausethequalities
areexperiencedasunpleasantorbadthatpeoplehavethecognitivereactionstothemthey
do,reactionssuchasdesiringtostopthepain.Toexperiencetissuedamageasbadisto
undergoanexperiencewhichrepresentsthatdamageasbad.Accordingly,inmyview,
theaffectivedimensionofpainisasmuchapartoftherepresentationalcontentofpainas
thesensorydimensionis.(Tye2006a)
SotheexperienceIundergowhenIfeelasharppaininthebackofmyhandfeelsthewayitdoes
becauseitrepresentstissuedamageinmyhandanditrepresentsitasbad.Inotherwords,itrepresents
tissuedamageashavingthequalityofbeingbad.
Ofcourse,normallyhavingone'stissuedamagedisbad.Wealsonormallythink/judgethatitisbad.
Notonlythat,experiencingtissuedamage(i.e.,feelingpain)isbad.Wethink/judgesotoo.Butit
doesn'tfollowfromthesetruisms(withoutadditionalpremises)thattheexperiencerepresentsthe
damageasbad.Thesetruismsshouldnotbeconfusedwiththislastclaim,whichisasubstantive
metaphysicalclaim.Butwhatdoesitmeanforone'sexperiencetorepresenttissuedamageasbad?
Thisisanontrivialquestionforastrongrepresentationalistwhoaspirestobeanaturalist.Recallthat
strongrepresentationalismusuallycomeswithanaturalisticstoryabouthowexperiencesacquiretheir
representationalcontent.Soitisimportantthatrepresentingtissuedamageasbadcanbecashedoutin
termsofwhatevernaturalisticstoryarepresentationalisthasinhisdisposal.Manyrepresentationalists
includingTyedefend(oratleaststartwith)aninformationaltheory.Butwhatisthenaturalproperty
ofthetissuedamageitselfthatisdetectedortrackedbytheexperiencesothatwecansaythe
experiencecarriesinformationaboutit?Thepropertyofbeingbaddoesn'tseemtobethekindof

propertythatcanbeinformationallydetectedortransduced.Arguably,aninformationtheoretic
versionofrepresentationalismseemsnotquiteappropriateforaffectivequalia(butseeTye2006bfor
aresponse).
Butperhapsafunctionalrolesemanticsmightworkbetterforcashingoutwhatitmeansforpain
experiencestorepresenttissuedamageasbad.Theideaisthatpainexperiencesplayacertain
functional/causalroleinthebehavioralandmentaleconomyoftheirowners.Inparticular,giventhat
theynormallysignalinjury,suchexperiencesaretypicallycausallyassociatedwithacertainbattery
ofcognitiveandbehavioraleffects.Itmightbeclaimedthatthiscausalorfunctionalprofileasa
whole(ratherthanamereinformationallink)iswhatmakespainexperiencesrepresenttissuedamage
asbad.
Itisnotclear,however,whetherrepresentationalismisdoinganyworkinthisproposalonceanappeal
tofunctionalismismade.Foronething,ittransformsstrongrepresentationalismintoapartly
internalisttheory.Foranother,whynotsimplysaythatthefunctionalroleitselfconstitutespain's
affectivephenomenology?Indeed,functionalism(orbetter:psychofunctionalism)inthephilosophyof
mindhasalwaystreatedpainsasparadigmaticexamplesofqualitativementalstateswhose
phenomenologycanplausiblybecapturedbyfunctionalistproposals.Whatmadethisprimafacie
plausiblewaspain'saffectivephenomenology(asopposedtoitssensoryphenomenology),whichis
essentiallyconnectedwithpain'sbeinganintrinsicmotivator.Butoncefunctionalismisallowed,we
don'tneedtomakeadetourviarepresentationalism.Infact,itishardtoseehowanexperience's
representingsomethingasbadcanbeanintrinsicmotivatorallbyitself.Toexplainhow,a
representationalisthastoadverttoadditional(learning?)mechanismstoconnectrepresentational
contentwithdriveandmotivation.

5.Evaluativeandmotivationaltheories
Althoughafunctionalisttreatmentofaffectivequaliaseemsproblematicforpurestrong
representationalists,itmaybewelcomedbyperceptualtheoristsingeneralwhoareseekingtogivea
naturalisticaccountofpainasaperception.Alltheyneedtodotoaccommodatepain'saffective
phenomenologyistosaythatfeelingpaininvolvesperceptionalthoughperceptiondoesn'texhaustits
nature:feelingpainisalsoanaffective/emotionalexperiencethatcanbeexplainedintermsofthe
functionalroleofpain'ssensory/representationalcontent.(See,forexample,Lycan1987a,pp.6061,
Aydede2000,andClark2006,forproposalsroughlyalongthisline.)Thisview,aswemayrecall,is
whattheIASPdefinitionofpainseemstorecommend.Itseemsalsoembeddedinthecommonsense
conceptionofpain.
Indeedanumberoftheoristsembracedthissortofapproachthatmaybeusefullycalledmixed
theoriesofpain.Thesecomeinavarietyofforms,sometimesmotivatedbydifferentsetsof
concerns,andaccordingly,emphasizingdifferentaspectsofpain.Butthebasicideaisthatthenature
ofpainiscomplexconsistingofatleasttwomentalelements.Generallyoneelementischaracterized
byusingoneormoreofthefollowinggroupofterms:sensory,perceptual,representational,
discriminating,descriptive,orinformational.Theotherischaracterizedbyoneormoreofthe
following:affective,emotional,motivational,evaluative,orimperative.Sofarwehavebeenfocusing
onthosetheoriesthathaveemphasizedtheformeraspect.Indeedthishasbeentheoverwhelmingly
dominantstyleoftheorizingatleastinthephilosophicaltradition.Butthereisanincreasing
recognitionofthefactthatpainhasanaffectiveandmotivationalaspectwhichseemsatleastprima
faciedistinctfromitssensoryorperceptualaspect(seenextsectionforscientificevidence).As
observed,mostperceptualtheoristsandweakrepresentationalistscould,andasamatterofhistorical
fact,didaccommodatetheaffectiveaspectofpaintovariousofdegreesofsuccessmostly,by
goingcognitivistasdescribedabove.
Nevertheless,anumberofsuchtheoristshavefocusedmoreontheaffectiveaspectofpain
experiencesratherthanontheirsensory/perceptualaspect,perhapsfeelingthatitisthisaspectthat

makespainexperiencesandothersimilarbodilysensationsuniqueanddistinctive.Therearehistorical
precedentstothiskindofapproach(e.g.,Marshall1892,1894a,1894bDuncker1941),butIwill
focusoncontemporarydevelopmentsoftheview.
AgoodexampleisNelkin1994.Nelkincallshistheory,theevaluativetheoryofpain,accordingto
whichpainconsistsoftwocomponents,oneofwhichisanoccurrentphenomenalstaterepresenting
varioustroublesinbodyparts.Thesecondcomponentisasimultaneousandnoninferential
evaluationofthisphenomenalstate.Nelkinconceivesofthisevaluationasaformofspontaneousde
rejudgmentaboutthephenomenalstateasrepresentingharmtothebody.Hethinksthatboth
elementsarenecessaryforpainexperience.Surprisingly,however,Nelkinclaimsthattheevaluative
componentshouldnotbeequatedwithaffectandmotivationinvolvedinexperiencingpain.
AccordingtoNelkin,thesetwoareonlycontingentlyrelatedtopainexperiences.(Asimilarviewis
presentedinHall1989.)
AnotherevaluativetheoryisofferedbyHelm(2002)whodevelopstheviewinamoreintegrated
fashion.AccordingtoHelm,bodilypainsandpleasuresarejustfeltevaluations,spontaneous
evaluationsofwhatishappeninginone'sbodyasgoodorbad.AccordingtoHelm,theseevaluations
aren'tjudgmentsunderstoodordinarily.Nevertheless,theyhaveintentionalcontentsrationally
responsivetoabroaderrangeofbackgroundconativeandcognitivestatesoftheexperiencer.Thusas
feltevaluationstheyintrinsicallymotivateandrationalizebehaviortypicallyassociatedwithpainand
pleasure.Therefore,theyarenotaseparateorseparablecomponentofpain.Painsandpleasurejust
arefeltevaluations.Helm'saccountisnuancedinmanywaysasitdependsonhisfairlywell
elaboratedtheoryofemotions(Helm2001).
Hall(2008)andKlein(2007)alsoofferaccountsofpainthatbelongtothisclassofevaluative
theories.Theycalltheirviewsimperativetheories,accordingtowhichpainsareexperienceswith
purelyintentionalcontent.AccordingtoHall,painshavecompoundintentionalcontentpartly
consistingofdescriptivecontent,andpartlyofimperativecontent.Onhisview,painexperiencesboth
representactualorpotentialdamageinbodypartsandcommandcertainactionsinvolvingthoseparts
suchas:Stop!Stopdoingwhatyou'redoingwiththisbodilypart(Hall2008:534).
Klein(2007)furtherdevelopsthisimperativeaccountofpaininamoreradicalway:heproposesthat
painexperiencesareexhaustedbytheirimperativecontentalone.Heclaimsthattheyhaveno
descriptive(inhiswords,representational)contentatall.Heintendshisaccountinthesame
metaphysicalspiritinwhichstrongrepresentationalistspresenttheiraccount:thedifferencebeingin
thekindofintentionalcontentpainshave.Accordingtostrongrepresentationalists(inKlein's
terminology,intentionalists),thiscontentispurelydescriptive.AccordingtoKlein,itispurely
imperative:aproscriptionagainstactingwithbodilypartswherepainisfelt.
Gustafson(2006)developsanextendedandmultistageargumentagainstunderstandingpainasa
sensoryexperience.Onhisview,painsareessentiallyemotions.
Whenthenaturalisticunderpinningsoftheseevaluativetheoriesareexplored,functionalistor
psychofunctionalistreductionsoftheaffective/evaluativedimensionofpainmightturnouttobethe
mostnaturaloptionforthesetheorists.

6.Eliminativismaboutpain
6.1Theargumentfromreactivedissociationforeliminatingpain
DanielDennett,inhisinfluentialarticle,WhyYouCan'tMakeaComputerthatFeelsPain(1978),
arguedthattheordinaryconceptofpainisirremediablyincoherentandshouldbeabandoned.His
argumentreliedonsomeclinicalpainsyndromeswhichhedubbedthereactivedissociationofpain
affectfromitssensoryaspect.

Ithasbeenwellknownthatcertainsurgicalprocedures,somedrugsandcertainpathological
conditionsreduceorremovetheunpleasantnessofpainwhilepreservingitssensorydiscriminative
aspects.Thesedatatypicallycomefrompatientswhohaveundergoneprefrontallobotomy(Freeman
etal.1942FreemanandWattz1946,1950Hardyetal.1952Barber1959Bouckoms1994)or
cingulotomy(FoltzandWhite1962a,1962bWhiteandSweet1969)asalastresortfortheir
intractablechronicpain(asfrequentlyinvolvedinphantomlimbpain,neuralgia,causalgia,severe
psychogenicandcancerpains),frompatientsundertheeffectsofhypnoticsuggestion(Barber1964
Rainvilleetal.1997,1999),nitrousoxide(laughinggas),andsomeopiumderivativeslikemorphine
(Barber1959).Thesepatientsbyandlargeagreethatwhentheyareinpain,theycanrecognizeand
identifyitassuch,butdonotfeelorseembotheredbyitordistressedinwayscharacteristictohaving
painexperiences.
Althoughitisusuallynotrecognizedintheliterature,thereare,however,importantdifferences
amongthephenomenaafflictingthesepatients,whicharemanifestedinpatients'reportsandbehavior.
Forinstance,painasymboliaalsotypicallyproducesakindofdissociationaratherstrongkind
sometimessimilartocingulotomypatients'butinterestinglydifferentfromlobotomypatients'(Rubins
andFriedman1948HurtandBallantyne1974Berthieretal.1988,1990Devinskyetal.1995
Weinsteinetal.1995).Infact,thereisevidencethatpainasymboliamaybetheonlyformofgenuine
dissociation(Grahek2007).Thesepatients,forinstance,don'treacttoevenmomentarypainslike
pinpricks,smallcuts,orburns.Experimentalpainstimulifailtoproduceanyrecognizableaffective
reactions.Nevertheless,thepatientsinsistthatthestimulicausepaintheyidentifytheirexperiences
aspain(RubinsandFriedman1948Berthieretal.1988,1990Dongetal.1994Weinsteinetal.
1995).Thelobotomyandmorphinepatients,ontheotherhand,doshowtheusualaffectivereactions
andsymptomswhentheyarestimulatedmomentarilybynormallypainfulstimuli.Buttheydon't
seemtocareorarebotheredbytheirstandingpersistentorchronicpains.Probably,theystillfeelthe
negativeaffectbutdon'tmindit,whereasthepainasymboliapatientsdon'tevenfeelthemomentary
negativeaffect.
Thesetwocasesalsoneedtobedistinguishedfromsocalledcongenitalinsensitivitytopain,a
conditionwherethepatientsdon'tevenreportanypainexperienceuponvariouskindsofnociception
thesepatientsdon'tlivelong(McMurray1955,1975BaxterandOlszewski1960Sternbach1963
BrandandYancey1993).[17]
Inhispaper,Dennettprimarilyreliesonthekindofdissociationinvolvedinlobotomyandmorphine
casesandtreatingthemasiftheyinvolvedthesamekindofstrongdissociationinvolvedinpain
asymbolia.Healsopresentscertainaspectsofthegatecontroltheoryofpaintransmissiondeveloped
byMelzackandWallwhichhadalreadystartedtorevolutionizethescientificpainresearch(Melzack
andWall1965Melzack1973).Inspiredbythistheory,hethenpresentsaspeculativesubpersonal
functionaltheoryofpainprocessing,accordingtowhichpainprocessingoccursinmanyfunctionally
(evenanatomically)differentcomponentsofthecentralnervoussystem,mostlyinparallel,suchthat
someofthemcanbeselectivelyimpaired.Thiskindofselectiveimpairment,hesays,canproducenot
onlydissociationofthekindwearefamiliarwith,butmanymorebizarrephenomenawecanexpect
tofindandimaginehappening.Hisinsightisthatourordinarynotionofpainwithitsessentialist
intuitionscannotwithstandtheimplicationsofsuchscientificdevelopmentsinpainresearch.
Accordingtothecommonsenseconceptofpain,Dennettargues,
(14)painexperiencesareessentiallypainful,awful,abhorrent,sothatitisalogical
impossibilitytohaveanaffectivelyneutralpainexperience.
Butitisalsopartofcommonsensethat
(15)asubject'saccesstoherpainexperiencesisessentiallyprivilegedorinfallibleor
incorrigible(1978,p.226).

Inthecaseofreactivedissociation(RD)patients,thesetwomainpillarsofourordinaryconceptof
paincomeintoirremediableconflictaccordingtoDennett.Atotallyalertandconceptuallycompetent
RDpatientsincerelybelievesthat(a)sheishavingapainexperience,andthat(b)herpainexperience
isnotpainfulatall.Given(14)and(a),we,aswellasthepatient,mayconcludethatsheishavinga
painfulpainexperience.Butthiscontradictsherbelief(b)thatisguaranteedtobetruegiven(15).So
wehaveacontradictoryconceptofpain,whichmeansthatnothingcanbeapainanobjectorevent
withessentiallycontradictorypropertiesdoesnotandcannotexist.Dennettalsoarguesthatthe
ordinarynotionofpainwillnotsurvivegivingupeither(14)or(15).Sopains,asordinarily
understood,donotexist.ThisisDennett'seliminativismaboutpain.
WeshouldalsonotethatthepainscientiststhemselveswhowroteuptheIASPdefinitionofpain
andtheaccompanyingnoteseemtosidewithDennettonthetruthof(14).Thisisquiteinteresting
becausetheymustknowalltoowellaboutthereactivedissociationcases.Today,almosttwentyyears
aftertheIASPdefinitionwasadopted,weknowthatthesecasesarerealandwehavegoodscientific
explanationsbroadlyinthespiritofDennett'sspeculations.But,strangely,thedefinitionhasnever
comeunderattackfromthesequartersasfarasIknow.Sothen,shouldwegiveup(15)?
OnewaytorespondtoDennett'schallengeistosaythatifthecommonsenseconceptionofpaindid
indeedrequire(14)and(15),thenitwassimplywrong(Kaufman1985).Sostrictlyspeakingnothing
correspondstotheordinarynotionofpain.Butgiventhatpainexperiencesarealmostalways
unpleasant(infact,alwaysunpleasantinnonpathologicalcases),wecaneasilyreplacethefaulty
conceptionwithanewonewhichiscloseenoughnottocausealarmbyitsbeingemptyread(14)
withnormallyinsteadofessentially.Asimilarlinecanberunfor(15).
Alternatively,onecanargueagainstDennettthat(14)and(15)arenotreallypartofthecommon
senseconceptofpain(Conee1984,Kaufman1985,Guirguis1998).Indeedwhenwearetoldthe
completedetailsofwhatisgoingoninRDcases,thereisnotendencytoconcludethatpainsturnout
nottoexist.Rather,insuchcaseswerealizethatpainphenomenologymaybecomplex:whatappears
tobeasimpleandhomogenousphenomenologyincasualintrospectionturnsouttohaveacomplex
structureincloseandtrainedinspection(challengingastrictreadingof(15)).ThenwhattheRDcases
showisthattheaffectiveaspectisnotessentialforanexperiencetobeclassifiedaspain.Indeedsuch
aconclusionwasurgedbyearlyintrospectionistpsychologistslongbeforethediscoveryofreactive
dissociation.Sowelearnthattheidentityofpaingoeswithitssensoryaspectratherthanitsaffective
aspect(as,indeed,Ploner's1999casestudyseemstoshow).Surprising,yes,butnothinglikeamajor
conceptualconfusion.ButpartofDennett'soverallpointshouldbegrantedinanycase:thelimitof
whatcanbeconceptuallyrevisedorabandonedasaresultofscientificdevelopmentsmaybemuch
closertohomethanweordinarilythink.

6.2Otherargumentsforeliminativism
Inherbook,TheMythofPain(1999),ValerieHardcastlealsoarguedforeliminatingthe
commonsenseunderstandingofpainandmuchoftheordinarypaintalk.Shearguesthatthe
commonsensenotionofpainconceivesofpainsassimplesubjectivesensationsdevoidofany
complexity.AccordingtoHardcastle,painisacomplexphenomenonconsistingofmanydissociable
dimensions.Tothetwocomponents(sensorydiscriminativeandaffectivemotivational)wediscussed
above,sheadds,followingMelzackandWall(1988)andothers,acognitivecomponent(involving
judgments,beliefs,memories,perceptionofenvironmentandpatient'sownhistory).Hardcastle
claimsthattotheextenttowhichthesecomponentsareignoredbythecommonsenseconceptionof
pain,tothatextentit'sinadequate.Moreover,onherview,itisafatalmistaketotakethissubjective
sensationofpainasthenatureofpainbecauseshethinksthatabiologicallymorerealisticobjective
understandingofpaininvolvingthevarioussystemsprocessingnociceptiveinformationwillserveour
scientificpurposesmuchbetterandthecommonsenseunderstandingofpainshouldfollowthat.
Thereareotherwaysofbeingeliminativistaboutpainshavingtodowiththenatureofqualiaorthe

allegedexistenceofapparentphenomenalobjects.Somephilosophers,feelingthatqualiaor
phenomenalobjectscannotbeaccommodatedbyanemergingscientificnaturalism,tendtoconclude
thattheysimplydon'texistaswephilosophicallyconceiveofthem(Dennett1988,Rey1997).Thisis
aparticularlyvividworryforintransitivebodilysensationsingeneralandforpaininparticular,
becausetheyseemtoimpressuponusasifinhavingthemwewereliterallyconfrontedwith
phenomenalobjectsthatcannotbepartofthenaturalworldorder.Ifonecomestotheconclusionthat
noneofthetheoriesofferedhasanychanceofsucceedinginhelpingusunderstandhowapurely
physicalworldcouldcontainpains,tickles,itches,orgasms,etc.,thenonewaytogoistosaythatthey
don'texistratherthangivinguponnaturalismorphysicalism.Buttheissuesherearemoregeneral,
pertainingtobroaderconcernsinthephilosophyofmind.

7.Conclusion
Whenwelookatthescienceofpain,especiallyatwhathashappenedsincethepublicationsof
MelzackandWall's(1965)andMelzackandCasey's(1968),whichrevolutionizedthescientific
researchonpain,weseethatthescienceofpainhasincreasinglyconceivedofpainaslesslike
perceptionofanobjectiverealityandmorelikeemotionsbyfirstdrawingthesensory/affective
distinctionandthenemphasizingmoreandmoreitsaffectiveaspect.(ForareviewseePrice1999and
Aydede2006.SeeGustafson2006forasustainedargumentthatpainisprimarilyanemotion.A.D.
Craig2003claimsonscientificgroundsthatpainsarehomeostaticemotions.SeealsoChapman&
Nakamura1999aswellasVogt2005forscientificgroundslinkingpaintoemotion.)Aswehave
seen,thetrendinphilosophy,ontheotherhand,hasbeenintheotherdirection:asnaturalismhas
startedtobecomeanorthodoxyinthesecondpartofthe20thcentury,philosophershaveincreasingly
soughtforwaysinwhichtheycouldassimilatepaintoordinaryperceptionlikevision,audition,etc.
Oneofthemainmotivationsbehindtheperceptual/representationalviewsofpaininphilosophyisthe
belief(orhope)thatperceptionasaspeciesofinformationgatheringcanbeaccountedforentirelyin
physicalisticterms.Ofcourse,thisisacontroversialclaim.Therearemanywhothinkthatperception
involvingasitdoesconsciousphenomenalexperiencecannotbeapurelyphysicalphenomenon.[18]
However,eventhesetheoristsmayagreethatitisaplausibletheoreticalstrategytopursuean
understandingofpainandotherintransitivebodilysensationsinperceptual/representationalterms.
Thisstrategy,ifitworks,minimizesthediversityofmentalphenomena,andthuspotentiallyoffersthe
prospectsofamoreunifiedtheoryofmind.Ifthistheoryturnsouttobeinharmonywiththerestof
oursciencesandtheirfundamentalmetaphysicalandmethodologicalassumptions,somuchthebetter.
Indeed,itwastheplausibilityofthisstrategyandthebeliefthatwewilleventuallysucceedin
understandingperceptioninpurelynaturalistictermsthathavepromptedmanyphilosophersto
advanceperceptual/representationaltheoriesofpain.Manyinfactbelievethatphilosophyhasmade
someprogressinthesecondhalfofthelastcenturyindevelopingtheconceptualtoolsforabetterand
morenaturalisticunderstandingofperceptionandthemindingenerale.g.,thenotionofamental
representationandits(broadly)computationalprocessing.
Butdoesthescientifictrendtowardsunderstandingpainasasubjectiveexperiencelesslikea
perceptionandmorelikeanemotionwithquiteavariablelinktoinjuriousstimuliunderminethe
philosophicalproject?Thereisnosimpleanswer.Wemaysay,yesitdoes,ifwetakethe
perceptual/representationaltheoriesasmakingthestrongclaimthatpainisstrictlynothingbuta
perceptionjustlikeotherstandardperceptions.Wemaysay,noitdoesn'tifwetaketheirclaimina
weakersensetotheeffectthatpaininvolvesperceptionunderstoodinacertainway(onthe
assumptionthattheperceptualistscananswerotherargumentsagainsttheirviews,suchasthe
argumentfromfocus).Nothinginthescientificunderstandingofpainitselfseemstoshowthatpain
involvesnoperceptionatall.Onthecontrary,asthescienceofpainhasunearthedinthelastforty
yearsorso,therearephysiologicallyspecializedsystemsthatprocessnociceptivestimulifromthe
momenttheyeffectperipheralreceptorstothecentralprocessingofthesesignalsinthespinalcord
andthebrain.Thisiswhathappensinallclassicalfivesensemodalities,includingtouch.Indeed,pain

maybeclassifiedasasubmodalityoftouch.
Ifwetaketheweakerclaimtotheeffectthatfeelingpaininvolvessensoryperceptionbutdoesn't
exhaustitsnatureduetoitsaffectivedimension,wemaystillpreserveanaturalisticviewofpainby
givingafunctionalist(or,psychofunctionalist)accountofitsaffectiveaspect.Accordingtothis
proposal,eventhoughthesensorydiscriminativeaspectofpaincanperhapsbehandled
representationally,[19]theaffectiveaspectreducestothewayinwhichthesensorydiscriminative
informationisprocessed,notforanalysistoextractinformationabouttheproximalordistalproperties
ofthestimuli,butratherforitssignificancefortheeffectorormotorsystems,tosetmotivational
parametersforactiononthebasisofstimuli'sinformationalcontent.Thereisinfactstrongsupporting
evidenceforsuchathesisintheevolutionarystoriesofdifferentorganismsatdifferentdevelopmental
hierarchies.Theneuroscientificevidenceabouttheaffectivebrainseemsalsotosupportthisideain
general.[20]
Thisisaviewthattreatspainasbotharepresentationalandafunctionalstate.Suchaviewstillneeds
toprovideagoodanswertotheproblemoffocusthatwehaveseenafflictsall
perceptual/representationalistviews.Whyisthereanasymmetryinconceptapplication,orinthe
focusofconceptualcategorization?Pointingoutthatpainhasadeeplypronouncednegativeaffect
seemsnotentirelyadequateevenwhenwehaveanadequateaccountofwhatthisaffectconsistsin.
Thesearethemajorquestionsthatanadequateperceptualaccountofpainoughttogivesatisfactory
answersto.Thus,despitesignificantadvancesinourphilosophicalandscientificunderstandingof
paininthelastfiftyyearsorso,thereisstillalotofworktobedonetodevelopafullysatisfactory
accountofpain.
Thereareotherphilosophicalaswellasscientificquestionsaboutpain.Doanimalsfeelpain?Ifthey
do,isitcomparabletothewaywefeelpain?Whatarethesocial,economical,ethicalandreligious
implicationsofaffirmativeanswerstothesequestions?Howcananimalpainbescientificallystudied?
Whatshouldbethemethodologyofscientificresearchonanimalsingeneralandofanimalpainin
particular?Howcanweprojecttheresultsobtainedbypainresearchonanimalsontohumans?
Parallelorsimilarquestionsariseinthecaseoffetusesandyounginfantsthatareevenmorepressing
andurgentforobviousreasons.Whatistherelationshipbetweenpainandpleasure,orpainand
emotionsingeneral?Whataretheethicalandreligiousstatusandimplicationsofpain?Theseand
manyotherquestionsremaintobethefocusofmanyresearchersinthefield.(Theliterature
addressingthesequestionsishugeandstillrapidlygrowingconsultthePainBibliographycitedinthe
OtherInternetResourcessectionbelowforrepresentativeworks.)

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