Crimpro Case Batch 1

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS.
MACABABBAD
GIVEN ON JUNE 23, 2015
JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
In an information dated January 21, 1987, petitioner Jorge Salazar
was charged with estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code. The information reads:
That on or about the 10th date of January 1986 in the Municipality
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the Vice
President and Treasurer of Aurora/Uni-Group, Inc., received from
Olivier Philippines and Skiva International, Inc. as represented by
Teresita M. Tujan the amount of $41,300.00 for the sole purpose of
meeting the cost of textile and labor in the manufacture of seven
hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is duty bound
to deliver to said complainant, and the accused once in possession
of the same, far from complying from his obligation, with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence and to defraud said
complainant, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same for his
own personal use and benefit despite repeated demands to return the
said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the
aforementioned amount of $41,300.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.[1]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
It appears that Skiva International, Inc. (Skiva) is a New Yorkbased corporation which imports clothes from the Philippines
through its buying agent, Olivier (Philippines) Inc. (Olivier).Aurora
Manufacturing & Development Corporation (Aurora) and UniGroup Inc. (Uni-Group) are domestic corporations which supply
finished clothes to Skiva. Mr. Werner Lettmayr is the President of
both Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner, Jorge Salazar, is

the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group and a consultant of
Aurora.
Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been purchasing
finished clothes from Aurora and Uni-Group. When an order is
procured for the delivery of clothes, Olivier, issues to the local
supplier, Aurora/Uni-Group, a Purchase Contract and Olivier issues
to Skiva a Sales Contract. In these transactions, payment is usually
made by way of a letter of credit wherein the supplier is paid only
upon the presentation of the proper shipping documents to the
designated bank.[2]
In December 1985, Skiva informed Olivier that it needs ladies
jeans to be delivered sometime in January 1986. Olivier, in turn,
through its Officer-in-Charge, Ms. Teresita Tujan, contacted Aurora
and Uni-Group to supply the jeans. [3] Thus, a Purchase Contract
dated December 18, 1985 was issued by Olivier to Uni-Group
wherein Uni-Group was to supply 700 dozens of three (3) different
designs of Ladies Basic 5 Pockets Stretch Twill Jeans payable by
means of a letter of credit at sight.[4] The Purchase Contract was
confirmed by Mr. Lettmayr on December 30, 1985 .[5] A Sales
Contract was also issued by Olivier to Skiva containing the same
terms and conditions as the Purchase Contract and was confirmed
by Mr. Jack Chehebar of Skiva.[6]
On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will advance
to Aurora/Uni-Group the amount of US$41,300.00 (then equivalent
to P850,370.00 at the exchange rate of P20.59 to US$1.00) as
Aurora/Uni-Group did not have sufficient funds to secure raw
materials to manufacture the jeans.[7] It was also agreed that the
amount advanced by Skiva represents advance payment of its order
of 700 dozens of ladies jeans. [8] Skiva then issued a check in the
said amount payable to Uni-Group. [9] However, due to the length of
time needed for the check to be cleared, the parties made
arrangements to remit the funds instead by way of telegraphic
transfer. [10] Thus, the check issued by Skiva was returned by Mr.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

Lettmayr[11] and as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva from

its bank in New York, the Israel Discount Bank, to the joint account
of Mr. and Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. and Mrs. Werner Lettmayr at
Citibank N.A.[12]
On January 16, 1986, petitioner, who had possession and
control of the passbook of the said joint account, withdrew the
amount of US$21,675.21[13] and on January 22, 1986, petitioner
withdrew the amount of US$20,000.00.[14] The prosecution also
presented evidence that subsequent to said withdrawals, the
amounts of US$71.70 and US$63.99 were deducted from the joint
account as telegraphic transfer fee and commission for the
remittance of the funds to another account.[15]
In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-Group to
follow up on the production of the jeans. She learned that only
3,000 meters out of the 10,000 meters of Litton fabrics required for
the order were purchased from Litton Mills by the
petitioner.[16] 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics are enough to produce
only 200 dozens of ladies jeans - an amount insufficient to satisfy
the order of Skiva of 700 dozens of ladies twill jeans.[17] Upon
inquiry with Mr. Lettmayr, the latter advised Ms. Tujan that the
query be directed to petitioner as petitioner is in charge of securing
the materials. [18] However, Ms. Tujan could not locate the
petitioner.[19]
Consequently, in a letter dated March 13, 1986, demand was
made upon Aurora/Uni-Group through its President, Mr. Lettmayr,
to return the money advanced in the amount of US$41,300.00.[20]
For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies jeans or to
account for the US$41,300.00 despite demand, Skiva, through its
local agent represented by Ms. Tujan, filed a criminal complaint for
estafa against Mr. Lettmayr and petitioner. After preliminary
investigation, the Public Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against
Mr. Lettmayr and an information was filed against petitioner.[21]
After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa

under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code,
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as the maximum and to pay Uni-Group and Aurora the
amount of P595,259.00. [22] On March 13, 1997, the lower court
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [23] On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[24]
Aggrieved by the aforementioned rulings, petitioner files the
instant petition for review.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The following are the elements of estafa under Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code: a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
by the offender; or denial on his part of such receipt; c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and d) there is demand made by the offended party to the
offender.[25]
We agree with the trial courts finding that the contract between
Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale.[26] Thus, upon
remittance by Skiva of its advance payment in the amount of
US$41,300.00, ownership thereof was transferred to Aurora/UniGroup and Aurora/Uni-Group had no obligation to account or
deliver the money to Skiva, its only obligation under the contract of
sale being to deliver the 700 dozens of ladies jeans. However,
petitioner, as an employee of Aurora/Uni-Group who was aware of
the specific purpose of the remittance, upon receipt of the amount,

had the obligation to account for the proceeds thereof to

Aurora/Uni-Group.
The records establish that: 1) the amount of US$41,300.00 was
remitted by telegraphic transfer to the joint account of the petitioner
and his wife and Mr. and Mrs. Werner Lettmayr;[27]2) the said
amount was remitted as advance payment by Skiva for the jeans it
ordered;[28] and 3) the amount of US$21,675.21 was withdrawn by
petitioner on January 16, 1986 and the amount of US$20,000.00
was withdrawn by petitioner on January 22, 1986.[29] In fact,
petitioner himself admits having withdrawn from the joint account
on two occasions after the remittance was made.[30] Petitioner
further admits having made such withdrawal for the purpose of
purchasing materials to be used for the jeans ordered by Skiva and a
portion thereof to be given to Aurora.[31] Thus, upon withdrawal by
petitioner of the amounts advanced by Skiva, petitioner received the
same in trust with an obligation to return the funds or account for
the proceeds thereof.
With respect to the element of conversion or misappropriation
of the amount received, petitioner claims that a portion of the
amount was used to purchase 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics and the
balance was returned to Aurora.[32] However, upon crossexamination, petitioner was unable to recall the amount paid for the
purchase of the fabrics or the amount given to Aurora nor was
petitioner able to identify whether payment for the purchase of
fabric or the return of funds to Aurora was made in cash or in
check.[33]
In fact, except for his bare testimony, petitioner failed to
present evidence to support his defense that payment for the
purchase of fabrics had been made or that the balance of the amount
received by petitioner was given to Aurora. The only reason why
the Court is inclined to believe that 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics
were purchased for the manufacture of the jeans is because the
witness for the prosecution, Ms. Tujan, independently verified the
purchase of the said materials from Litton Mills.[34]
To support petitioners claim that the remainder of the amount

withdrawn was returned to Aurora, petitioner presents a letter dated
October 15, 1986 from the Philippine Veterans Investment
Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC) addressed to Mr. Werner
Lettmayr, President of Aurora, regarding the financial audit of
Aurora, wherein the amount of P850,780.00 is indicated as an
amount due to Uni-Group.[35] Atty. Cesar Singson, witness for the
defense, testified that the amount of P850,780.00 indicated in the
said letter represents the peso equivalent of the advance payment of
US$41,300.00 made by Skiva to Uni-Group.[36]
We agree with the trial court that the probative value of the said
letter is nil. The trial court correctly ruled:
The court doubts the probative value of the contents of [the letter]
because the person who testified thereon, a certain Atty. Cesar
Singson, was not the one who prepared the document. He was only
one [of] those who was furnished a copy thereof. Moreover, when
said piece of evidence was presented, there were inconsistencies in
the testimony of the [petitioner] as to how he was able to procure
said documents. In a hearing he testified that he personally procured
said letter from the records of PHIVIDEC and the person who
certified said copy signed the same in his presence. On cross
examination, he testified that he did not personally obtain said letter
and he was not there when the person who authenticated said letter
signed it and that it was only given to him by his former counsel.
This is further muddled when Atty. Singson testified that he was the
one who authenticated said document on December 7, 1987 from
his copy upon the request of the accused. Atty. Singson has already
severed his ties with PHIVIDEC on the latter part of the year
1986. This means that Atty. Singson was no longer connected with
PHIVIDEC when he authenticated said document based on his copy
which implies that the document was not obtained from the records
of PHIVIDEC.[37]

Further, even assuming that the letter may be given credence,

we are unable to see any indication that the amount of P850,780.00
or at least a portion thereof (assuming that the said amount
represents the advance payment made by Skiva) has been received
by Aurora and/or Uni-Group from petitioner. At most, what said
letter indicates is that Aurora acknowledges liability to Uni-Group
in the said amount or that said amount has been received by UniGroup from Skiva as advance payment which Uni-Group may have,
in turn, assigned to Aurora. The glaring fact remains that nowhere
can it be seen from the said letter that there was actual receipt by
Aurora from petitioner of the amount indicated therein, or at least a
portion thereof, after deduction of the cost of the materials
purchased to manufacture the jeans ordered.
Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that upon
withdrawal of the said amounts, petitioner caused the telegraphic
transfer of the amount to another account prior to petitioners receipt
of the amount in pesos.[38] In fact, upon being confronted by the
prosecution with Exhibits R and T which are account debit forms
showing that certain amounts were deducted by Citibank N.A. from
the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee for the amounts
withdrawn by petitioner, petitioner admitted that upon withdrawal,
the dollars was converted by the bank, remitted abroad, and given
to me in pesos.[39] The act committed by petitioner of remitting the
funds abroad constitutes an act of conversion or misappropriation.
This Court has previously held that even a temporary disturbance of
property rights constitutes misappropriation.[40] The words convert
and misappropriate as used in Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, connote an act of using or disposing of
anothers property as if it were ones own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate a
thing of value for ones own use includes, not only conversion to
ones personal advantage but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right.[41]Thus, when petitioner caused
the remittance of the amount withdrawn to another account, such
act constituted conversion or misappropriation or unauthorized
disposition of the property, contrary to the purpose for which the

property was devoted.
Petitioner also claims that the third element of estafa is not
present as the party prejudiced, in accordance with the findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is Skiva, when petitioner
had no obligation to account to Skiva the proceeds of the amount
withdrawn. Petitioner argues that consistent with the ruling of the
lower court that Aurora is the owner of the sum remitted as advance
payment, petitioner had the obligation to account for the proceeds
thereof to Aurora and not to Skiva. [42] Thus, petitioner maintains
that a conviction for estafa will not hold as no damage to Aurora
was alleged in the information nor did the prosecution present any
proof of damage to Aurora.
We are not persuaded.
As held in the case of First Producers Holdings Corporation
v. Co,[43] in estafa, the person prejudiced or the immediate victim of
the fraud need not be the owner of the goods misappropriated.
Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that any
person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned [in
Article 315] may be held liable for estafa.The use by the law of the
word another instead of the word owner means that as an element of
the offense, loss should have fallen upon someone other than the
perpetrator of the crime.[44] Thus, the finding of the trial court that
Skiva, the party prejudiced, is not the owner of the sum
misappropriated will not nullify the conviction of the petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the element of demand is absent as no
demand was made by Skiva on petitioner. Petitioner argues that
although demand was made by Skiva to Aurora/Uni-Group and/or
Mr. Lettmayr, no demand was shown to have been made on
petitioner himself.
We hold that the element of demand was satisfied when
demand was made upon Aurora/Uni-Group. To require Skiva to
make a demand on petitioner himself would be superfluous and

would serve no other additional purpose. We note that at the time

when Ms. Tujan was following up on the delivery of the jeans,
except for the advice of Mr. Lettmayr to direct her queries to
petitioner who was in charge of procuring the materials for the
jeans, Ms. Tujan could not have known that petitioner may be
primarily responsible for the non-delivery of the jeans. As far as
Skiva/Olivier was concerned, it was the obligation of Aurora/UniGroup to deliver the jeans, which at the time of demand, was not
complied with. Thus, Skiva/Olivier acted appropriately when it
demanded from Aurora/Uni-Group the return of the amount
advanced.
To require that demand should have been made by
Skiva/Olivier upon petitioner himself to uphold the conviction of
the trial court is to sustain a blind application of the law. In the case
of United States v. Ramirez,[45] this Court held:
The consummation of the crime of estafa does not depend on the
fact that a request for the return of the money is first made and
refused in order that the author of the crime should comply with the
obligation to return the sum misapplied. The appropriation or
conversion of money received to the prejudice of the owner thereof
are the sole essential facts which constitute the crime of estafa, and
thereupon the author thereof incurs the penalty imposed by the
Penal Code.
Further, in Tubbs v. People and Court of Appeals[46] this
Court ruled that the law does not require a demand as a condition
precedent to the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that
failure to account, upon demand for funds and property held in
trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
In Benito Sy y Ong v. People and Court of Appeals,[47] we
also held that in a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary
when there is evidence of misappropriation.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no authority to

institute the present action as estafa was not committed against
Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-Group on the basis of the finding that
the transaction between Skiva and Aurora/Uni-Group was one of
sale. Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure,[48] the complaint should not have
been instituted by Skiva as it is not the offended party contemplated
by the Rules and petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva
the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the joint account.[49]
The complaint referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is
filed in court to commence a criminal action in those cases where a
complaint of the offended party is required by law, instead of an
information which is generally filed by a fiscal.[50] It is not
necessary that the proper offended party file a complaint for
purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is that
unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for
preliminary investigation.[51]
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a
complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. If a
complaint is filed directly in court, the same must be filed by the
offended party and in case of an information, the same must be filed
by the fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a
judicial action may be filed by any person.[52] Thus, in the case at
bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of
the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
appealed judgment of the court a quo finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P.

DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 11, HON. AMADO B. BAJARIAS, SR.,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 7, and
VIVIAN G. GINETE, respondents.
The key issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is whether the filing with the Office
of the Ombudsman of a complaint against a government official for
grave oral defamation interrupts the period of prescription of such
offense.
We find this issue to be important enough to merit our
attention. We thus resolved to give due course to the petition,
consider the private respondent's comment on the petition[1] as the
answer thereto, and decide it on the basis of the pleadings which
have sufficiently discussed the issue.
The factual and procedural antecedents are not disputed.
On 13 October 1993, private respondent Vivian G. Ginete, then
officer-in-charge of the Physical Education and School Sports
(PESS) Division of the Regional Office of Region VII in Cebu City
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), filed
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
(hereinafter Ombudsman-Visayas) a complaint for grave oral
defamation[2] allegedly committed on 23 September 1993 by
petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the same
Regional Office.
The petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit pursuant
to Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, but
she failed to do so.
In his resolution of 15 March 1994,[3] Antonio B. Yap, Graft
Investigation Officer I of the said office, recommended that the case
be indorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City for the
filing of the necessary information against the petitioner. This

resolution was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas.
On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cebu City an information[4] for
grave oral defamation against the petitioner. This was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 35684-R and assigned to Branch 7 thereof.
On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to quash[5] the
information on the ground that the "criminal action or liability" has
been extinguished. She contended that under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offense of grave oral defamation
prescribes in months and that since the information was filed only
on 28 March 1994, or 186 days or 6 months and 6 days after its
alleged commission, the crime had then already prescribed. In
support thereof, she cited the decision in "Zalderia[6] vs. Reyes, Jr.,
G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277," wherein this Court
ruled that the filing of an information at the fiscal's office will not
stop the running of the prescriptive period for crimes.
In her opposition,[7] the private respondent cited Section 1, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that for
offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special
cases and which fall within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the filing of the
complaint directly with the said court or with the fiscal's office
interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. The
filing of the complaint by the private respondent with the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas was equivalent to the filing of a
complaint with the fiscal's (now prosecutor's) office under said
Section 1 pursuant to its powers under Section 15(1) of R.A. No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The
private respondent further claimed that Zaldivia is inapplicable
because it involves an offense covered by the rule on summary
procedure and it explicitly stated that Section 1 of Rule 110
excludes cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Municipal Trial Court, per public respondent Judge

Bajarias, denied the motion to quash in the order of 18 July
1994.[8] It fully agreed with the stand of the private respondent.
Her motion to reconsider[9] the above order having been denied
on 29 November 1994,[10] the petitioner filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a special civil action
forcertiorari,[11] which was docketed therein as Civil Case No.
CEB-16988. The case was assigned to Branch 11.
In its decision of 3 July 1995,[12] the RTC, per public
respondent Judge Isaias P. Dicdican, affirmed the challenged orders
of Judge Bajarias of 18 July 1994 and 29 November 1994. It ruled
that the order denying the motion to quash is interlocutory and that
the petitioner's remedy, per Acharon vs. Purisima,[13] reiterated
in People vs. Bans,[14] was to go to trial without prejudice on her
part to reiterate the special defense she had invoked in her motion to
quash and, if after trial on the merits an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
Besides, the petitioner has not satisfactorily and convincingly
shown that Judge Bajarias has acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the orders considering that the ground invoked by her
does not appear to be indubitable. And even assuming that the MTC
erred in venturing an opinion that the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman is equivalent to the filing of a
complaint with the fiscal's office, such error is merely one of
judgment. For, there is no decided case on the matter, and the
substantive laws have not clearly stated as to what bodies or
agencies of government should complaints or informations be filed
in order that the period of prescription of crimes or offenses should
be considered interrupted. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
simply states that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the
"filing of the complaint or information" and has not specified
further where such complaint or information should be filed.
Since the Regional Trial Court denied her motion to
reconsider[15] the decision in the order of 23 August 1995,[16] the
petitioner filed this special civil action wherein she reiterates the
arguments she adduced before the two courts below. The private
respondent likewise did nothing more in her responsive pleading
than reiterate what she had raised before the said courts.
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses are
Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for offenses punished
thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended, for those penalized by
special laws. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime
of grave oral defamation, which is the subject of the information in
Criminal Case No. 35684-R of the MTC of Cebu, prescribes in 6
months. Since Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the
law speaks of months it shall be understood to be of 30 days, then
grave oral defamation prescribes in 180 days.[17] Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine Archipelago.
In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words were directly
uttered in the presence of the offended party on 23 September 1993.
Hence, the prescriptive period for the offense started to run on that
date.
The matter of interruption of the prescriptive period due to the
filing of the complaint or information had been the subject of
conflicting
decisions
of
this
Court.
In People
vs.

Tayco,[18]People vs. Del Rosario,[19] and People vs. Coquia,[20] this

Court held that it is the filing of the complaint or information with
the proper court, viz., the court having jurisdiction over the crime,
which interrupts the running of the period of prescription. On the
other hand, in the first case of People vs. Olarte,[21] a case for libel,
this Court held that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the
peace court even for preliminary investigation purposes only
interrupts the running of the statute of limitations.
However, the decision of 28 February 1967 of this Court in the
second case of People vs. Olarte[22] resolved once and for all what
should be the doctrine, viz., that the filing of the complaint with the
municipal trial court even for purposes of preliminary investigation
only suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Thus:
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that
there are two lines of decisions following differing criteria in
determining whether prescription of crimes has been interrupted.
One line of precedents holds that the filing of the complaint with
the justice of the peace (now municipal judge) does interrupt the
course of the prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte, L-13027, June 30,
1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16,
1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. Another series of
decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint or
information must have been filed in the proper court that has
jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia, L-15456, June 29,
1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide
guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question
and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that
the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the
decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where

the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its
merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: First, the text of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed
in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or
for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate
the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the
injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the
interrupted prescription "shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted," thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint
or information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the
accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in
conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court
conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may
terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should
discharge the accused because no prima faciecase has been shown.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the
doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140,
December 29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated
June 29, 1963.
Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs. Court of
Appeals,[23] this Court not only reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also
broadened its scope by holding that the filing of the complaint in

the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation also suspends the

running of the prescriptive period. Thus:
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that . . . .
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco
held that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is
that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or
accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This
is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so
provided that the period shall commence to run again when the
proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding
that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in
the acquittal or conviction of the accused.
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was
disregarded by this Court in the Olarte case, cited by the Solicitor
General. It should be recalled that before the Olarte case, there was
diversity of precedents on the issue of prescription. One view
declares that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace
(or municipal judge) does interrupt the course of prescriptive term.
This view is found-in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and
cases cited therein; People v. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959;
People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other pronouncement is
that to produce interruption, the complainant or information must
have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the
case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L15140, December 29, 1960; People v.Coquia, L-15456, June 29,
1963.
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the
doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor General. The reasons for the
doctrine which We find applicable to the case at bar read:
xxx xxx xxx

As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court
conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's
Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force,
for the express overruling also of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco,
73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or denuncia by
the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by
law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the
period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution is
generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia with
the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial
fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct
preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of
municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of First
Instance x x x.
Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or complaint for
intriguing against honor by the offended party, later changed by the
Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's
Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks were
committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of
prescription. (Italics supplied)
This Court reiterated Francisco in its resolution of 1 October
1993 in Calderon-Bargas vs. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila.[24]
The procedural law articulating Francisco is the last paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Rules of
Court. We quote the entire Section for a better understanding of the
last paragraph:

SEC. 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on

summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal
actions shall be as follows:
(a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts, by filing the complaint with
the
appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting
the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
(b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, by filing the complaint or
information directly with the said courts, or a
complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in
Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the
fiscal.
In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of
prescription of the offense charged. (Italics supplied)
The rule, however, is entirely different under Act No. 3326, as
amended, whose Section 2 explicitly provides that the period of
prescription shall be interrupted by the institution of judicial
proceedings, i.e., the filing of the complaint or information with the
court. The said section reads:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double

jeopardy.(Italics supplied)
And so, in Zaldivia vs. Reyes,[25] this Court held that the
proceedings referred to in said Section 2 are "judicial proceedings,"
which means the filing of the complaint or information with the
proper court.
Zaldivia, however, provides no safe refuge to the petitioner, and
her invocation thereof is misplaced. In the first place, it involved a
violation of an ordinance, which is covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. By its express mandate, Section 1, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court does not apply to cases covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. Second, since the ordinance in question
partakes of a special penal statute Act No. 3326 is then applicable;
hence, it is the filing in the proper court of the complaint or
information which suspends the running of the period of
prescription. In Zaldivia, this Court categorically interpreted
Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure to mean that "the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the
case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that,"
which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
What is then left to be determined is whether the filing of
private respondent's complaint for grave oral defamation with
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is equivalent to filing
complaint in the prosecutor's office such that it interrupted
prescriptive period for grave oral defamation.
the
the
the
the
Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution provide:

SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or
any subdivision or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases,
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
Corollarily, Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which Congress
enacted pursuant to paragraph 8[26] of the aforementioned Section
13, Article XI of the Constitution, provide as follows:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors
of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage from any investigatory

agency of the Government, the investigation of
such cases.
SEC. 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been
committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13
hereof, during his tenure in office.
Needless to state, these broad constitutional and statutory
provisions vest upon the Ombudsman and his Deputies the power to
initiate or conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases filed
against public officers or employees, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Thus, in Deloso vs. Domingo,[27] this
Court held:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the
power, function and duty "to act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to
"investigate x x x any act or omission of any public official x x x
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." (Sec. 13[1]) The Ombudsman is also empowered to
"direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor,
"to take appropriate action against a public official x x x and to
recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is
broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official.
The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of
the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may
investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to
or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty.
Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the

Ombudsman to investigate any illegal act or omission of any public
officer is not an exclusive authority; rather, it is a "shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."[28]
A public officer, as distinguished from a government
"employee," is a person whose duties involve the exercise of
discretion in the performance of the functions of
government.[29] The petitioner, being an Education Supervisor II of
the Regional Office of Region VII of the DECS, is a public officer.
The Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of the private respondent's complaint against the
petitioner for grave oral defamation. Undoubtedly, the rationale of
the first Olarte case, reiterated as the controlling doctrine in the
second Olarte case, which was broadened in Francisco and
reiterated in Calderon-Bargas, must apply to complaints filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman against public officers and employees
for purposes of preliminary investigation. Accordingly, the filing of
the private respondent's complaint for grave oral defamation against
the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of
the period of prescription of the said offense. Since the complaint
was filed on 13 October 1993, or barely twenty days from the
commission of the crime charged, the filing then of the information
on 28 March 1994 was very well within the six-month prescriptive
period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want
of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 116259-60
February 20, 1996
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-xx-x-x-x
G.R. Nos. 118896-97
February 20, 1996
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated original actions for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the
orders and resolution issued by respondent Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028, both entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates." In G.R. Nos. 116259-60,
petitioner assails the legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994
denying petitioner's Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash
the Informations; 1 (b) the order dated May 24, 1994 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; 2 and (c) the
order dated July 20, 1994 denying the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994. 3 On the other hand,
in G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner seeks the annulment of the
Resolution dated December 23, 1994 4 ordering the preventive
suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a
period of ninety (90) days, and to enjoin respondent court from

enforcing the same.
The antecedent facts, as may be culled from the Comment filed by
the Solicitor General in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, are as follows:
Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was
first elected governor of the said province in 1968 and was
again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he
was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez
as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in
February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez
ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter
emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and
local elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial
post; and this time, it was petitioner who won.
Meanwhile, at the time Rodriguez was still the OIC
Governor of the province, the Provincial Government of
Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial
Board Members of Palawan, filed before the Office of the
Tanodbayan two (2) complaints both dated December 5,
1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The first
complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second charged
petitioner, together with several other provincial officers,
with violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law
(Annexes "A" & "A-1", respectively, Petition).
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as directed, petitioner
filed a Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation dated
September 3, 1987 on the ground that upon the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, the present Tanodbayan has been
transformed into the Office of the Special Prosecutor and

has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary

investigation (Annex "C", ibid.).
In a letter to the Honorable Tanodbayan dated June 23, 1988,
however, Nelia Yap-Fernandez, the Deputized Tanodbayan
Prosecutor from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto
Princesa City, requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself
from handling the preliminary investigation of the present
case considering that petitioner appears to be her coprincipal sponsor in a wedding ceremony held last May 28,
1988 (Annex "C-3", ibid.).
On January 16, 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman received
a letter from Rodriguez, who was then the incumbent
governor of the province, inquiring about the present status
of TBP No. 86-01119 (Annex "D",ibid.). In its 4th
Indorsement dated February 7, 1989, the Ombudsman
referred the matter of continuing and terminating the
investigation of the present case to the newly deputized
Tanodbayan Prosecutor, Sesinio Belen from the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (Annex "D-1", ibid.). However, the
latter, in his 5th Indorsement dated February 27, 1989 to the
Ombudsman, requested that the present case be reassigned to
another Prosecutor considering that he is a long time close
friend and "compadre" of petitioner and that one of the
complainants therein Eustaquio Gacott, Jr., who was
formerly a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is now
the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan, his present superior
(Annex "D-2", ibid.).
On April 25, 1989, petitioner was directed by the
Ombudsman to comment on the letter-manifestation dated
April 4, 1989 filed by Rodriguez requesting that an
amendment be effected on certain portions of the present
complaint (Annexes "E" & "E-2", ibid.). No comment
having been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24,

1989, petitioner, on an even date, was again directed to
comment thereon (Annex "E-1", ibid.). Finally, petitioner
filed his required comment dated June 2, 1989 (Annex "E3", ibid.).
Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special
Prosecution Officer I Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Annex "F2", ibid.), which affirmed the Resolution dated February 21,
1992 rendered by Ombudsman Investigator Ernesto Nocos
recommending the filing of appropriate charges against
petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on
September 16, 1992 with the respondent Court two (2)
Informations against petitioner, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section
3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second for violation
of Section 3(e) of the same law (Annexes "F" & "F-1",ibid.).
Before his arraignment could be set, petitioner initially filed
an "Urgent Motion for Quashal of Information and/or
Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening Facts."
However, when the said motion was subsequently called for
hearing, petitioner's counsel was made to choose which of
the aforesaid two (2) conflicting motions he preferred to take
up with respondent Court. Thus, on January 18, 1993,
petitioner filed an "Amended and Consolidated Motion to
Quash the Information in the Above-entitled Cases." After
an Opposition and a Reply were filed by the prosecution and
petitioner, respectively, respondent court issued its first
assailed Resolution on February 9, 1994, denying the same
(Annex "G", ibid.).
On March 15, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation, which was
subsequently denied by respondent court in its second

assailed Resolution issued on May 24, 1992 (Annex "H1", ibid.). 5

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 116259-60, challenging the aforementioned
orders of the Sandiganbayan for allegedly having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It was likewise prayed that respondent court be
enjoined from taking cognizance of and from proceeding with the
arraignment of petitioner and the trial and hearing of Criminal
Cases Nos. 18027-28 pending before it. Respondents thereafter
filed their Comment to which a Reply was submitted by petitioner.
In the meantime, no temporary restraining order having been issued
by this Court in G.R. Nos. 116259-60, respondent court proceeded
with the arraignment of herein petitioner on October 5, 1994
wherein a plea of not guilty was entered for him by the court after
he refused to do so. Thereafter, with the denial of petitioner's
motion to quash the informations, the prosecution filed on October
11, 1994 before respondent court a Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite 6 pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 3019. Petitioner opposed said motion on the ground that the
validity of the informations filed against him is still pending review
before the Supreme Court. He further contended therein that
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, on which the motion to
suspend is based, is unconstitutional in that it constitutes an undue
delegation of executive power and is arbitrary and discriminatory.
In view of the filing of the motion for his suspension, petitioner
filed on October 14, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 a Supplemental
Petition 7 questioning the veracity of and seeking to restrain
respondent court from acting on said motion to suspend pendente
lite, the hearing of which was scheduled on October 17, 1994.
However, before respondents could file their comment thereto as
required by this Court, petitioner, who initially sought the holding
in abeyance of further action on his supplemental petition until after

respondent court shall have resolved the motion to
suspend pendente lite, eventually decided to withdraw the same
purportedly in order not to delay the disposition of the main
petition. Hence, on January 16, 1995, this Court issued a
resolution 8 granting the motion to withdraw the supplemental
petition and considering the petition in G.R. Nos. 116259-60 as
submitted for resolution.
In the interim, petitioner filed before respondent court on November
28, 1994 an amended motion to include as co-principals: (a) in
Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who authorized the purchase and repair of the vessel
in question; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 18027, the Board of
Directors of ERA Technology and Resources Corporation which
entered into a contract with the Province of Palawan. 9 Petitioner
argued that the non-inclusion of these co-principals violates his
right to due process and equal protection of the laws which thus
rendered the informations null and void. It appears that the
prosecution did not oppose nor object to this amended motion.
On December 23, 1994, respondent court, without ruling on
petitioner's motion to include co-principals, issued its questioned
resolution granting the motion to suspend pendente lite and
ordering the suspension of petitioner as Provincial Governor of
Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days from notice.
His motion for the reconsideration thereof having been denied,
another petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
restraining order was filed by petitioner on February 20, 1995
against the same respondents, docketed as G.R. Nos. 118896-97,
and which seeks to annul as well as to enjoin respondent court from
enforcing its resolution dated December 23, 1994 ordering his
suspension pendente lite. On March 8, 1995, the Court resolved to
consolidate this second petition with G.R. Nos. 116259-60.

From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents

interjected therein, the following pattern of contentious issues has
emerged:
directors of ERA Technology and Resource Corporation which

entered into a contract with the Province of Palawan.
I. G.R. Nos. 116259-60
In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in

Criminal Cases Nos. 18027-28 is being contested on three
grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of six (6) years
between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
subsequent filing of the informations against petitioner constitutes a
violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the
case and due process of law pursuant to the Tatad doctrine; (2) the
facts charged do not constitute an offense; and (3) since the acts
charged in the complaints filed before the Tanodbayan are different
from the charges contained in the informations, another preliminary
investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of which
there is a denial of due process.
In G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner questions the validity of the
suspension order in that: (1) he may not be suspended while the
issue on the validity of the informations filed against him is still
pending review before the Supreme Court; and (2) Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, which forms the basis of the order of
suspension, is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes an
undue delegation of the authority to suspend which is essentially an
executive power. Petitioner contends that the jurisprudential
doctrines relied upon by respondent court in upholding the
constitutionality of Section 13 are not applicable to the cases at bar
which involve an issue not yet passed upon by this Court. In
addition, petitioner again attacks the legality of the subject
informations for having been filed in violation of the due process
and equal protection clauses by reason of the non-inclusion therein,
as co-principals, of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
who approved the purchase of the vessel, as well as the board of
1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial

by reason of the unreasonable delay of six (6) years between the
conduct of the preliminary investigation and the filing of the
informations, petitioner invokes the doctrine laid down in the
leading case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 10 In said case, all
the affidavits and counter-affidavits had already been filed with the
Tanodbayan for final disposition as of October 25, 1982 but it was
only on June 12, 1985, or three (3) years thereafter, that the
informations accusing Tatad of a violation of Republic Act No.
3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Court held there
that an inordinate delay of three (3) years in the conduct and
termination of the preliminary investigation is violative of the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and speedy
disposition of his case, by reason of which the informations filed
against the accused therein were ordered dismissed. It must be
emphasized, however, that in the Tatad case, no explanation or
ratiocination was advanced by the prosecution therein as to the
cause of the delay.
In the present case, as distinguished from the factual milieu
obtaining in Tatad, respondent court found that the six-year delay in
the termination of the preliminary investigation was caused by
petitioner's own acts. Thus:
In the cases at bar, the record shows that delay in the filing
of the Informations in these cases was caused, not by
inaction of the prosecution, but by the following actuations
of the accused:

(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was

filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of the City of Puerto
Princesa, preliminary investigation was held in abeyance on
account of the motion of accused Salvador P. Socrates,
entitled "Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation"
Suspension was prayed for until an Ombudsman, as provided
in Executive Order No. 243, shall have been appointed;
(2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when private
complainant, then Governor Victoriano J. Rodriguez, filed
on April 24, 1989, a letter-manifestation correcting the
complaint;
(3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in these
cases file with the Office of the Ombudsman a reply to
complainant's manifestation;
(4) In view of the foregoing actuations of the parties,
preliminary investigation of these cases was started in
earnest only on June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including
the accused herein, were required to submit counteraffidavits;
(5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again, accused
Governor Salvador P. Socrates, on August 13, 1990, filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds:
(a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over the person of respondent; and
(b) That the complaint does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form.
The private complainant was, as a matter of right, granted a
period of time within which to oppose the motion. The
prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the motion after

protracted deliberations;
(6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an
"Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appropriate Pleading." Counsel prayed that "respondents be
granted an extension of twenty (20) days within which to
comply with the order of March 11, 1991";
(7) The accused Governor Salvador P. Socrates, through
counsel, filed a motion to quash/dismiss on December 17,
1991. This pleading was received by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman only on January 13, 1992. It took some
time for the prosecution to resolve the motion and there
never was any intimation on the part of the accused that the
accused was invoking his right to a speedy disposition of the
complaint against him. The motion to quash/dismiss was in
fact denied by the prosecution in an order dated January 20,
1990;
(8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed thereafter,
the Informations in these cases were after all filed on
September 16, 1992, but only after the ruling of the
prosecution on the motion to quash/dismiss. 11
Petitioner, in a futile attempt to refute the foregoing factual findings
of respondent court, could only raise the defense that the motion to
suspend the preliminary investigation did not affect the proceedings
therein; that the preliminary investigation really started on February
18, 1987 when the Tanodbayan issued subpoenas to the
respondents; that the motion to dismiss/ quash the complaints was
purposely for the early termination of the preliminary investigation;
that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated, as may be
gleaned from the affidavit of complainant Rodriguez; and that
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the case

should have been resolved within ten (10) days from the time the
investigation was concluded.
Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are diametrically opposed to the
factual situation in Tatad because the obviously delaying tactics
resorted to by herein petitioner were not present in the latter case.
Furthermore, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was
politically motivated does not serve to justify the nullification of the
informations where the existence of such motive has not been
sufficiently established nor substantial evidence presented in
support thereof. The situation in Tatad was quite to the contrary
since the accused therein successfully proved that the charges were
filed against him only after it became widely known that he actually
had a falling out with the late President Marcos.
That scenario impelled the Court to make the admonition therein
that "prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the
impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted,
wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien
to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of serving
the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any
and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty." Such an exigency apparently does not obtain
in the case at bar. There is nothing in the records from which it can
be conclusively inferred, expressly or impliedly, that the
investigating prosecutors were politically motivated or even
coerced into filing these criminal charges against petitioner.
We likewise do not adhere to petitioner's asseveration that the
orders issued by Branches 51 and 52 of the Regional Trial Court of
Puerto Princesa City quashing the informations for technical
malversation filed against herein petitioner, on the ground that the
inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation
constitutes a violation of petitioner's right to due process and speedy
disposition of his case which thereby ousted said courts of
jurisdiction thereover, have become final and conclusive by reason

of the prosecution's' failure to file an appeal therefrom. We have
carefully scrutinized the orders adverted to and we find and so hold
that the same cannot effectively deter the prosecution herein from
proceeding with the trial before the Sandiganbayan.
First, the criminal cases for technical malversation filed before said
Regional Trial Court are different from the charges for violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 filed with the Sandiganbayan. The former is
covered by a general law while the latter involves a special law,
with variant elements of the offenses being required, hence double
jeopardy cannot set in. Second, and more importantly, it will be
noted that the trial court in the malversation case hastily concluded
that there was an inordinate delay of six (6) years in the termination
of the preliminary investigation through the mere expedient of
counting the number of years that had elapsed from the institution
of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the filing of the
informations in court, without bothering to inquire into the pertinent
factual considerations and procedural technicalities involved.
In arriving at such a self-serving conclusion, the trial court confined
itself strictly to a mathematical reckoning of the time involved,
instead of undertaking a more substantive appreciation of the
circumstances and particulars which could have possibly caused the
delay. On the contrary, herein respondent court has convincingly
shown that the preliminary investigation dragged on for several
years owing, ironically, to petitioner's evident propensity to resort
to dilatory tactics. In the cases now before us, it cannot be
successfully and validly contended that petitioner's right to speedy
trial has been violated.
We have only to reiterate the declaration made in Tatad to the effect
that in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It is palpably

clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should not be made
to rely solely on the length of time that has passed but equal
concern should likewise be accorded to the factual ambiance and
considerations. It can easily be deduced from a complete reading of
the adjudicatory discourse in Tatad that the three-year delay was
specifically considered vis-a-vis all the facts and circumstances
which obtained therein. Perforce, even on this ground alone, the
instant petition for certiorari should be dismissed.
A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal
procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an accused by
delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. 12 In
the cases at bar, while there may have been some delay, it was
petitioner himself who brought about the situation of which he now
complains.
2. Petitioner then questions the sufficiency of the allegations in the
informations in that the same do not constitute an offense
supposedly because (a) in Criminal Case No. 18027, there is no
statement that herein petitioner actually intervened and participated,
as a board member of ERA Technology and Resources Corporation,
in the latter's contract with the Province of Palawan, which is
allegedly an element necessary to constitute a violation of Section
3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019; and (b) in Criminal Case No.
18028, the information failed to show a causal relation between the
act done by the accused and the undue injury caused to the
provincial government of Palawan.
With respect to the alleged defects in the information filed in
Criminal Case No. 18027 for violation of Section 3(h) of the antigraft law, petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Trieste,
Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan 13 where it was held that "what is
contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual
intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or

pecuniary interest in order that liability may attach." In the cited
case, however, the Court found that the petitioner therein did not, in
any way, intervene in making the awards and payment of the
purchases in question since he signed the voucher only after all the
purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the
municipal treasurer.
The purchases involved therein were previously ordered by the
municipal treasurer without the knowledge and consent of the
accused municipal mayor, were subsequently delivered by the
supplier, and were thereafter paid by the treasurer again without the
knowledge and consent of the mayor. The only participation of the
accused mayor in the transaction involved the mechanical act of
signing the disbursement vouchers for record purposes only. Thus,
the Court did not consider the act therein of the accused mayor to
be covered by the prohibition under Section 3(h) of the law.
Contrariwise, in the present cases, petitioner Socrates stands
charged with a violation of Section 3(h) for intervening in his
official capacity as Governor of Palawan in reviewing and
approving the disbursement voucher dated August 2, 1982 for
payment in favor of ERA Technology Resources Corporation where
he was one of the incorporators and members of the board of
directors. Such allegation clearly indicates the nature and extent of
petitioner's participation in the questioned transaction. Without
petitioner's approval, payment could not possibly have been
effected.
We likewise do not find any flaw in the information filed in
Criminal Case No. 18028, for violation of Section 3(e), which
would warrant the dismissal thereof. Evidentiary facts need not be
alleged in the information because these are matters of defense.
Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor
could be proved during the trial. 14 Hence, there is no need to state

facts in the information which would prove the causal relation

between the act done by the accused and the undue injury caused to
the Province of Palawan. Antipodal to petitioner's contention, a
reading of the information in Criminal Case No. 18028 will readily
disclose that the essential elements of the offense charged have
been sufficiently alleged therein. It is not proper, therefore, to
resolve the charges right at the outset without the benefit of a fullblown trial. The issues require a fuller ventilation and examination.
Given all the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be
unwarranted to cut off the prosecutory process at this stage of the
proceedings and to dismiss the information. 15
3. It is likewise asserted by petitioner that the elements of the
offenses charged in the complaints are different from those stated in
the informations which were filed before the Sandiganbayan, and
that since there was no preliminary investigation conducted with
respect to the latter, such informations should be declared null and
void for lack of due process.
The first complaint for violation of Section 3(b) became the basis
for the filing of an information in Criminal Case No. 18027 for a
violation of Section 3(h). In both, petitioner is accused of
intervening in his official capacity as Provincial Governor in the
contracts for the installation and construction of waterwork
projects, with the ERA Technology and Resources Corporation,
where he was an incorporator and a member of the board of
directors, thereby directly or indirectly benefiting from said
transactions. In Criminal Case No. 18028, petitioner was charged
with a violation of Section 3(e) as a result of the complaint filed
against him and several others for a violation of Section 3(a) and
(g). In both instances, petitioner is charged with the disbursement of
public funds for the purchase of a motor launch which was grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the provincial government of
Palawan because the same broke down only after its maiden
voyage.
It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the informations

are based on substantially the same factual settings, except that the
respective designations are different. Axiomatic is the rule that what
controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in
the complaint or information. 16 The real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. It is not
the technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the
information that determines the character of the crime but the facts
alleged in the body of the information. 17
This Court has repeatedly held that when the facts, acts and
circumstances are set forth in the body of an information with
sufficient certainty to constitute an offense and to apprise the
defendant of the nature of the charge against him, a misnomer or
innocuous designation of a crime in the caption or other parts of the
information will not vitiate it. In such a case, the facts set forth in
the charge controls the erroneous designation of the offense and the
accused stands indicted for the offense charged in the statement of
facts. The erroneous designation may be disregarded as
surplusage. 18
Furthermore, it will be observed that it is the same section of the
law which is involved in the present case, that is, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019, albeit it defines several modes of
committing the same offense. It is an old and well-settled rule in the
appreciation of indictments that where an offense may be
committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any
particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or
more of the modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense
committed through any one of them, provided that it be such as to
constitute the substantive offense. Thereafter, a judgment of
conviction must be sustained if it appears from the evidence in the

record that the accused was guilty as charged of any one of these
modes of the offense.19
Neither will the absence of a preliminary investigation, assuming
that it is necessary to conduct a new one, affect the validity of the
informations filed against petitioner. It has been consistently held
that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the criminal information or render it defective. Dismissal
of the case is not the remedy. 20 It is not a ground for the quashal of
a complaint or information. The proper course of action that should
be taken is for the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the
proceedings upon such information and to remand the case to the
office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation 21 if the accused actually makes
out a case justifying such relief.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we rule and
so hold that the informations filed against petitioner are valid and
legal.
insists that this is what respondent court should have done. Under
this particular issue, petitioner is in effect seeking a review of the
order issued by the Sandiganbayan, dated February 9, 1994,
denying his amended and consolidated motion to quash the
information.
We have but to reiterate the fundamental rule that an order denying
a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor
can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only
be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the
judgment after trial. 23 In other words, it cannot be the subject of
appeal until the judgment or a final order is rendered. The ordinary
procedure to be followed in that event is to enter a plea, go to trial
and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment. 24Although the special civil action
for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction, that vitiating error is not attendant
in the present case.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides that:
II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97

The main issue submitted herein for resolution is the legality of the
petitioner's preventive suspension, which is premised on several
grounds.
1. Initially, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed a
grave abuse of discretion in ordering his suspension despite the fact
that the validity of the informations filed against him is still pending
review before the Supreme Court. In support thereof, he invokes the
rule laid down in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
vs. Court of appeals, et al. 22 that even if no temporary restraining
order was issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals could
have refrained from taking any action while the petition
for certiorari was pending with the Supreme Court. Petitioner
Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent

public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under
a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property whether as a
simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him. 25

This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the
suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the validity of the
information has been upheld in a pre-suspension hearing conducted
for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to
determine basically the validity of the information, from which the
court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed
with the trial on the merits of the case, or correct any part of the
proceeding which impairs its validity. The hearing may be treated
in the same -manner as a challenge to the validity of the information
by way of a motion to quash. 26
In the leading case of Luciano, et al. vs. Mariano, et al. 27 we have
set out the guidelines to be followed by the lower courts in the
exercise of the power of suspension under Section 13 of the law, to
wit:
(c) By way of broad guidelines for the lower courts in the
exercise of the power of suspension from office of public
officers charged under a valid information under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery, pursuant to Section 13
of said Act, it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of
such information, the trial court should issue an order with
proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory
provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution
seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the
accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or
challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the
trial court would no longer be necessary. What is
indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a
hearing held for determining the validity of the information,
and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order or suspension should it uphold the
validity of the information or withhold such suspension in

the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such presuspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should
be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g., that he
has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do
not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal
Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from
office under Section 13 of the Act; or he may present a
motion to quash the information on any of the grounds
provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The mandatory
suspension decreed by the Act upon determination of the
pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for violation of
the Anti-Graft Act or for bribery under a valid information
requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and
not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt
suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court,
say, finds the ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be
indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the
suspension order upon its upholding the validity of the
information and setting the same for trial on the merits.
With the aforequoted jurisprudential authority as the basis, it is
evident that upon a proper determination of the validity of the
information, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately
issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and
categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the
court's discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused
officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is
pending review before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only
during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain

whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary
investigation prior to the filing of the information against him, (2)
the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations against
him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section
2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 28
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a
matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because
a preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is not imposed as a result
of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter
provision, the accused elective public officer does not stand to be
prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in
the event that the information is subsequently declared null and
void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into
consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending
a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of
public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private
interest of the accused. 29
To further emphasize the ministerial duty of the court under Section
13 of Republic Act No. 3019, it is said that the court trying a case
has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether or not a
preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using
his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that
unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that
upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof,
the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether
the accused is likely to escape or evade the jurisdiction of the
court. 30
Applying now the procedure outlined in Luciano, the records of the
instant case do not show that the proceedings leading to the filing of
the informations against petitioner were tainted with any
irregularity so as to invalidate the same. Likewise, the informations
show that the allegations contained therein meet the essential
elements of the offense as defined by the substantive law. The
record is also bereft of undisputed facts to warrant the quashal of
the informations under any of the grounds provided in Section 2,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. 31 Finally, a cursory reading of the
order dated February 9, 1994 issued by respondent court will show
that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard on his motion
to quash. Veritably, the Sandiganbayan did not commit a grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash and ordering the
preventive suspension of herein petitioner.
2. Additionally, petitioner avers that the informations filed against
him on which the order of suspension was based, are null and void
in view of the non-inclusion of his co-principals which thus
constitutes a violation of petitioner's right to due process and equal
protection of the law and, therefore, ousted respondent court of its
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner alleges that in Criminal Case
No. 18027, the board of directors of ERA Technology Corporation
should have been included as principals by indispensable
cooperation because without them he could not possibly have
committed the offense.
Also, he claims that in Criminal Case No. 18028, the members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who issued the resolutions
authorizing the purchase and repair of the motor launch should
likewise have been included as principals by inducement or
indispensable cooperation, considering that petitioner was allegedly

merely implementing their resolutions. Hence, according to him,

since the informations are null and void, the suspension order which
is based thereon should necessarily also be declared null and void.
We find no merit in petitioner's arguments.
First, the rule under Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as
reformulated in Section 2, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is that all criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information in the name of the People of the
Philippines "against all persons who appear to be responsible for
the offense involved." The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting
officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may
show to be responsible for an offense. This does not mean,
however, that they shall have no discretion at all; their discretion
lies in determining whether the evidence submitted justify a
reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. What the
rule demands is that all persons who appear responsible shall be
charged in the information, which conversely implies that those
against whom no sufficient evidence of guilt exists are not required
to be included.32
This notwithstanding, it has equally been ruled that the failure of
the fiscal to include the other public officials who appear to be
responsible for the offense charged as co-accused in the information
filed against the accused does not in any way vitiate the validity of
the information under the Rules.33
Second, a failure to include other persons who appear to be
responsible for the crime charged is not one of the grounds
provided under Section 3, Rule 117 for which a motion to quash the
information against the accused may be filed, most especially in the
case at bar where there is prima facie proof that petitioner is
probably guilty of the offense charged, aside from the fact that there
is no allegation of conspiracy in the informations. Besides, such an
infirmity would neither have the effect of extinguishing or
mitigating petitioner's liability if he is subsequently found guilty of

the offense charged. No one would contend that if for lack of
knowledge of the facts, by mistake or for any other reason the
prosecuting officer fails to include the names of one or more
persons in an information filed by him, who were in fact guilty
participants in the commission of the crime charged therein, such
persons will be relieved of criminal liability; or that those accused
who have been charged with the offense, brought to trial, and found
guilty will be permitted to escape punishment merely because it
develops in the course of the trial, or after the trial, that there were
other guilty participants in the crime.34
Granting arguendo that this plaint of petitioner may be invoked as a
ground for the quashal of the informations, the motion to quash
must still be denied for having been filed only after petitioner had
been arraigned. Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that "(t)he failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver
of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no
offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,
extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy." The failure to
include a co-accused is not covered by the exception; hence, the
same is deemed waived.
Third, where the government prosecutor unreasonably refuses to
file an information or to include a person as an accused therein
despite the fact that the evidence clearly warrants such action, the
offended party has the following remedies: (1) in case of grave
abuse of discretion, he may file an action for mandamus to compel
the prosecutor to file such information; (2) he may lodge a new
complaint against the offenders before the Ombudsman and have a
new examination conducted as required by law; (3) he may institute
administrative charges against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal

complaint under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code, or a civil

action for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code; (4) he may
secure the appointment of another prosecutor; or (5) he may
institute another criminal action if no double jeopardy is involved.
Fourth, it is significant and demonstrative of petitioner's strategy
that from the inception of the criminal complaint before the
Ombudsman and during the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, until the filing of the informations before the
Sandiganbayan and up to the denial of his amended and
consolidated motion to quash, herein petitioner has not been heard
to complain about the alleged non-inclusion of the other supposed
offenders. Indeed, it is now much too late for petitioner to invoke
and exploit this particular unfounded issue.
Prescinding from the averments raised in the complaint and
information, from the facts and evidence of record, we do not deem
it necessary to include the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan and the board members of the ERA
Technology and Resources Corporation as co-accused in the
informations filed against herein petitioner. Insofar as the board
members of said corporation are concerned, they may be prosecuted
only under Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides
that "(i)t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or
cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in
Section 3 thereof." In the information filed in Criminal Case No.
18027, petitioner stands charged with a violation of Section 3(h). It
does not contain any allegation to the effect that the board members
knowingly induced or caused herein petitioner to commit the
offense defined therein, which is an essential element of the crime
in Section 4(b). Indubitably, therefore, the board members cannot
be included as co-principals in Criminal Case No. 18027.
On the other hand, the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
cannot likewise be included in the information for violation of
Section 3(e) filed in Criminal Case No. 18028, for the simple
reason that it is not the validity of their resolution which is in issue
here. While it is true that said sanggunian passed a resolution
authorizing the allocation of funds for the purchase of a motor
launch, and that petitioner merely acted on the strength thereof, it is
not the fact of such authorization which is the subject of the charges
against petitioner but rather the manner by which that resolution
was implemented by the latter. There is nothing in the averments in
the information from which it could be inferentially deduced that
the members of the sanggunian participated, directly or indirectly,
in the purchase of the vessel, and which fact could be the basis for
their indictment.
3. Lastly, petitioner questions the legality of his suspension on the
ground that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which is the basis
thereof, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
executive power to the Sandiganbayan. He postulates that the power
of suspension, which is an incident of the power of removal, is
basically administrative and executive in nature. He further submits
that the power of removal vested in the court under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 3019 is an incident of conviction, that is, it can
only be exercised after a conviction has been handed down. Hence,
according to petitioner, since the power to suspend is merely
incidental to the power of removal, the former can only be
exercised as an incident to conviction. Also, considering that
Section 13 authorizes the court to exercise the power of suspension
even prior to conviction of the accused, it cannot be considered as
an exercise of judicial power because it is not within the ambit of
the court's power of removal. In addition, petitioner avers that
Section 13 is arbitrary and discriminatory because it serves no
purpose at all, in that it does not require a proceeding to determine
if there is sufficient ground to suspend, except for the fact that it is
required by law.

Although presented differently, the issue on the court's power of

suspension under Section 13 has been squarely and directly raised
and adjudicated in the case of Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, et
al.,35 the pronouncements wherein we quote in extenso:
3. Proceeding from our holding that suspension is not
automatic, who should exercise the mandatory act of
suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act?
Three theories have been advanced. One is that the power of
suspension where a criminal case has already been filed in
court still is with the Provincial Governor, relying on Section
2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. Another is that,
following the ruling in Sarcos vs. Castillo . . ., because the
main respondents are elective municipal officials, that power
of suspension must be held to repose in the Provincial Board,
under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967
(Republic Act 5185). The third is that, by Section 13 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, solely the court in
which the criminal case has been filed shall wield the power
of suspension.
We opt for the third. Common sense and the scheme of the
law so dictate.
It is true that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act grants with specificity upon the Court
of First Instance the power to suspend an official charged
with a violation thereof. It would seem to us though that
suspensions by virtue of criminal proceedings are separate
and distinct from suspensions in administrative cases. An
accurate reading of Section 13 yields two methods of
investigation, one separate from the other: one criminal
before the courts of justice, and the other administrative.
This is the plain import of the last sentence of Section 13,

which says that if acquitted, defendant in an Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices case "shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him." Our interpretation
but preserves, as it should, the substantial symmetry between
the first part of Section 13 and the last part thereof just
quoted.
And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that
once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the
discharge of court functions which here include suspension
should be left to the Court of First Instance.
Not that this view finds no statutory support. By Section 9 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the court is
empowered to punish any public official committing any of
the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5
and 6 of the law, amongst others, to "perpetual
disqualification from public office." Here, the Makati
elective officials heretofore named have been charged with
and found guilty of a violation of Section 3(8) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act and were sentenced by the
court below, amongst others, to be "perpetually disqualified
to hold office." Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code
declares that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification entails "(t)he deprivation of the public
offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election." No stretch of the
imagination is necessary to show that perpetual absolute
disqualification which, in effect, is encompassed in the
punishment set forth in Section 9 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act covers that. of removal from the office
which each of the respondent municipal official holds.

Since removal from office then is within the power of the

court, no amount of judicial legerdemain would deprive the
court of the power to suspend. Reason for this is that
suspension necessarily is included in the greater power of
removal. It is without doubt that Congress has power to
authorize courts to suspend public officers pending court
proceedings for removal and that the congressional grant is
not violative of the separation of powers. For, our
Constitution being silent, we are not to say that from
Congress is withheld the power to decide the mode or
procedure of suspension and removal of public officers.
A look into the legislative intent, along with the legislative
scheme, convinces us the more that the power of suspension
should be lodged with the court. While the law may not be a
model of precise verbal structure, the intent is there. Section
13 requires as a pre-condition of the power to suspend that
there be a valid information. Validity of information, of
course, is determined by the Court of First Instance where
the criminal case is pending. That is essentially a judicial
function. Suspension is a sequel to that finding, an incident
to the criminal proceedings before the court. Indeed, who can
suspend except one who knows the facts upon which
suspension is based? We draw support from Lacson
vs. Roque, supra, at page 469: "We are certain that no
authority or good reason can be found in support of a
proposition that the Chief Executive can suspend an officer
facing criminal charges for the sole purpose of aiding the
court in the administration of justice. Independent of the
other branches of the Government, the courts can well take
care of their own administration of the law.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, an important
legislation, should not be artificially construed so as to
exclude the courts from the power to suspend a prime tool
designed by Congress to prevent the power which an official

wields from frustrating the purity and certainty of the
administration of justice. Surely, we should not be
pedantically exacting in reading its provisions. We should
rather say that if the court's power of suspension incident to
the court proceedings is to be withheld of narrowed by
construction, Congress should have spelled it out in no
uncertain terms. . . .
The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not be
taken as an encroachment upon the power of suspension given other
officials, reiterating in the process that a line should be drawn
between administrative proceedings and criminal actions in court,
that one is apart from the other. Elucidating further on the possible
danger which may arise if the power of suspension, in consequence
of a criminal action under Republic Act No. 3019 is vested in any
authority other than the court, it declared that:
There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did
really apprehend danger should the power of suspension in
consequence of a criminal case under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act be lodged in any authority other than
the court. Quite apart from the fact that the court has a better
grasp of the situation, there is one other factor, and that is,
the rights of the person accused. The court could very well
serve as a lever to balance in one equation the public
interests involved and the interests of the defendant. And
then, there is the danger that partisan politics may creep in.
The hand of political oppression cannot just be ignored
especially if the majority members of the Provincial Board
and the defendant public local elective officer are on
opposite sides of the political fence. Power may be abused.
Conversely, if both are of the same political persuasion, the
suspending authority will display reluctance in exercising the
power of suspension. It is thus that the statute should catch

up with the realities of political life. There is indeed the

dispiriting lesson that in a clash between political
considerations and conscience it is the latter that quite often
gets dented. . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and

should proceed from one who should logically do so, and
considering that in the operation of a given statute fairness
must have been in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside
needless refinements, and rule that under Section 13 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid
information upon the provisions thereof is lodged with the
Court of First Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to
suspend the public official indicted thereunder.
These cases have long been on the line, unduly stretched beyond
their logical parameters and the permissible time frame. Indeed, it is
high time, ironically in fairness to petitioner himself, that the same
be now calcined in the judicial crucible into their ultimate
configuration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
116259-60 and 118896-97 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SPO4
EDUARDO ALONZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE

CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12,
Province of Bulacan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
The zeal to uphold justice, albeit an admirable and desirable
trait, must never be allowed to blind judges to the limits of judicial
power or to obscure the boundaries set by the law.
The facts are as follows:
On May 10, 2003, in the municipality of Paombong, Bulacan, a
wedding party was being celebrated behind the house of the newlymarried couple. At the party and drinking together at the same table
were SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo (SPO4 Alonzo), Jun Rances (Rances),
Zoilo Salamat (Salamat) and Rey Santos (Santos). While waiting to
be seated, Pedrito Alonzo (Pedrito) was introduced by SPO4
Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as the son of ex-Captain
Alonzo. SPO4 Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat. Pedrito and
his companions took their seats and started drinking at the table
across SPO4 Alonzos table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to
urinate at the back of the house. Santos passed a bag to Salamat,
and they followed Pedrito. Rances likewise followed them. A shot
rang out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the bag as he
hurriedly left. The wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him
and Rances board a vehicle being driven by Santos. Pedritos uncle,
Jose Alonzo, sought the help of SPO4 Alonzo to chase the culprits.
He refused and even disavowed any knowledge as to their identity.
Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat,
Rances, Santos, SPO4 Alonzo and a certain Isidro Atienza. A
preliminary investigation1 was conducted by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor where Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses
testified. Upon review of the records of the case by the 3rd Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, it was recommended that Salamat be charged
with murder as principal, and Santos and Rances as accessories.
With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro Atienza, the prosecutor
found that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish their
conspiracy with Salamat.2 Thereafter, under the direction of the
Officer-in-Charge,3 an Information4 was prepared, charging
Salamat as principal, and Rances and Santos as accessories, for the
murder of Pedrito. No bail was recommended. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4767-M-2003 with Branch 12 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, under presiding
judge Crisanto C. Concepcion. On December 17, 2003, Judge
Concepcion issued an Order,5 where he stated:
The assassination of the victim has all the color of a planned
liquidation. Zoilo Salamat, not known in that place, appears to be a
hired killer with Rey Santos as the supplier of the death gun. SPO4
Alonzo appears to be the brain or mastermind, pointing Pedrito to
the assassin as the target of the planned killing. Jun Rances appears
to be the back-up of Salamat in executing and gunslaying. A
conspiracy clearly appears among them with the common design to
kill the victim. Their respective actions were concerted to attest to
that. Jun Rances and Rey Santos are not merely accessories-afterthe[-] fact, but as principals themselves who should be charged as
such along with gunman Zoilo Salamat and mastermind SPO4
Eduardo Alonzo. This is very apparent from the facts on record as
borned [sic] out by the statements of witnesses given to the police.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice that should be given the
victim in this case and prosecute all the persons against whom
probable cause exists as principals in this case of murder, the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan is hereby directed to amend
the information, so as to include all the aforenamed persons as
accused in this case, all as principals, within five (5) days from
notice hereof.6

On January 5, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed his Motion for

Reconsideration7 to the Order, on the ground that the court had no
authority to review and reverse the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a respondent
for the purpose of amending the Information. SPO4 Alonzo averred
that the prosecutors resolution can only be reviewed by the
Department of Justice, by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme
Court, when a case for certiorari is filed.
On January 12, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed an Urgent Motion for
Inhibitation [sic], 8 alleging that by issuing the aforementioned
Order, Judge Concepcion has shown his prejudice against him and
bias in favor of private complainant Jose Alonzo. He prayed that the
case be re-raffled to another judge.
On January 13, 2004, Judge Concepcion issued an
Order9 denying the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion for
Inhibition. Judge Concepcion stated that SPO4 Alonzo had no
personality to file the said motions as he was not an accused in that
case. Respondent held that only the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor could question the first Order.
On January 16, 2004, SPO4 Alonzo filed a verified affidavitcomplaint10 against Judge Concepcion for rendering the December
17, 2003 Order. Complainant averred that respondent x x x clearly
acted without any authority of law as the same clearly violated
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 constitution [sic] and Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which only
authorizes him to determine if probable cause exist [sic] against
those accused impleaded in the information before issuing a warrant
of arrest against them. He accused respondent judge of: a) gross
ignorance of the law; b) violation of Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution;11 c) abuse of authority under Section 6, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court;12 d) knowingly rendering an unjust order; e)
conduct unbecoming of a judge; and f) oppression and partiality.13
On February 26, 2004, respondent received the First

Indorsement14 from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
requiring him to file his comment to the complaint within ten days
from receipt thereof. On March 4, 2004, respondent filed his
Comment.15 Respondent attached copies of the sworn statements of
the prosecution witnesses.16 He claimed that while evaluating the
records of the case, his curiosity was piqued as to why no bail was
recommended for the three accused. He noticed that the five
witnesses17 who testified during the preliminary investigation had
consistent accounts of the incidents leading to the death of Pedrito.
From these accounts, respondent concluded that SPO4 Alonzo and
all the accused conspired to kill Pedrito, thus the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor erred when it merely charged Salamat as
principal, and Rances and Santos as accessories, while complainant
was exonerated. Respondent averred that [c]ourts speak thru order
issuances [sic].18 Hence, on December 17, 2003, he issued the
Order, directing the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to amend
the Information to include complainant, Rances and Santos as
principal participants in the murder of Pedrito. Respondent stressed
that he bade the prosecution to amend the Information xxx without
any sanction even hinted, should it fail to do so.19 After respondent
issued the Order, the prosecution stood pat on its position that there
was no compelling reason to disturb its original resolution or to
amend the Information.
The OCA recommended that the complaint be dismissed on the
ground that the Order and the acts complained of were done by
respondent in his judicial capacity and were not actuated by bad
faith, dishonesty or similar motive. In addition, the proper remedy
of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and not an
administrative complaint.
The Court cannot follow the recommendation of the OCA.
Respondent clearly erred when he rendered the assailed Order. The
rules set the proper procedure20 for the investigation of complaints

and designate the prosecutor to conduct the preliminary

investigation.21 The function of a preliminary investigation is to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.22 It is
through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the
prosecutor determines the existence of a prima facie case that
would warrant the prosecution of a case. As a rule, courts cannot
interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and control of the criminal
prosecution.23 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under
the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons.24 However, while
prosecuting officers have the authority to prosecute persons shown
to be guilty of a crime,25 they have equally the legal duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.26 Judges should not
unduly interfere with the exercise of the power to prosecute on the
part of fiscals.
It is not a sufficient excuse for respondent to aver that he did
not impose any sanction for non-compliance with his Order. In
itself, his Order does violence to the principle of separation of
powers enshrined in our Constitution. In a clash of views between
the judge who did not investigate and the prosecutor who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of the
prosecutor's should normally prevail.27 Thus, we held in People vs.
Pineda,28 viz.:
x x x A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or
that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is
not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the
part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a
prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work
against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the
benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being

unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a
criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play
may be transgressed. x x x
The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to
be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what
crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal
charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating
Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be
supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It
stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the
judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the
fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be
subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that
criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A
relief in equity may be availed of to stop a purported enforcement
of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly
administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of
the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid
multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute
relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid.
We understand respondents zeal in trying to uphold the ends of
justice. However, respondent overlooked the fact that there is a
remedy where a prosecutor errs in not charging a person in an
Information. The recourse is to appeal to the Secretary of
Justice.29 By ordering the prosecutor to include complainant,
Rances and Santos as principals in the Information, respondent
arrogated unto himself the executive power of supervision and
control over public prosecutors. His conduct is not only
unbecoming of a judge; more importantly, it transgresses our
Constitution.

Yet, this is not all. Respondent judge also erred when he issued
warrants of arrest for Rances and Santos without bail. As the
Information has not yet been amended charging these two accused
as principals to the crime of murder, they are still entitled, as mere
accessories, to bail under Rule 114, Section 4 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.30 The Court notes with approval that
respondent corrected this error by allowing Rances and Santos, with
the recommendation of the prosecution, to post bail.
For lack of evidence, respondent is exonerated of the other
charges brought against him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Judge Crisanto C.
Concepcion is found liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and
is REPRIMANDED. He is sternly warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered upon his record.
SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO

CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and
MAXIMO ADLAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO
LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR,
CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all
in the nature of prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019)
and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code, commenced by
the respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc.
On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we issued
temporary restraining orders directing the respondents (in both
petitions) to desist from further proceedings in the cases in question
until further orders from the Court. At the same time, we gave due
course to the petitions and accordingly, required the respondents to
answer.
No. L-34162 December 29, 1987

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG,
ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS ACEBES, IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY
FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE
PROSECUTORS, ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., and ARTEMIO
ROMANILLOS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and
a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks
injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the then Circuit Criminal Court
sitting in Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71,
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are hence,
undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft League
of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with the respondent City
Fiscal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of
the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SPECIFICATION NO. I
That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named
respondents, conspiring and confabulating together,
allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply of gravel
and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur: that
it was made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking
Company won the bidding; that, thereafter, the award
and contract pursuant to the said simulated bidding
were effected and executed in favor of Tabiliran
Trucking Company; that, in truth and in fact, the said

bidding was really simulated and the papers on the

same were falsified to favor Tabiliran Trucking
Company, represented by the private secretary of
respondent Bienvenido Ebarle, formerly confidential
secretary of the latter; that said awardee was given
wholly unwarranted advantage and preference by
means of manifest partiality; that respondent officials
are hereby also charged with interest for personal gain
for approving said award which was manifestly
irregular and grossly unlawful because the same was
facilitated and committed by means of falsification of
official documents.
SPECIFICATION NO. II
That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran
Trucking Company, represented by respondent Cesar
Tabiliran, attempted to collect advances under his
trucking contract in the under his trucking contract in
the amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that
the same was not passed in audit by the Provincial
Auditor in view of the then subsisting contract with
Tecson Trucking Company; which was to expire on
November 2, 1969; that nevertheless the said amount
was paid and it was made to appear that it was
collected by Tecson Trucking Company, although
there was nothing due from tile latter and the voucher
was never indorsed or signed by the operator of
Tecson Trucking; and that in facilitating and
consummating the aforecited collection, respondent
officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and connived
to the great prejudice and damage of the Provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On the same date, the private respondent commenced Criminal

Case No. 2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal, another proceeding for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. The complaint reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for
the construction of the right wing portion of the
Capitol Building of the Province of Zamboanga del
Sur, by the Bidding Committee composed of
respondents cited hereinabove; that the said building
was maliciously manipulated so as to give wholly
unwarranted advantage and preference in favor of the,
supposed winning bidder, Codeniera Construction,
allegedly owned and managed by Wenceslao
Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of respondent
Bienvenido Ebarle; that respondent official is
interested for personal gain because he is responsible
for the approval of the manifestly irregular and
unlawful award and contract aforecited; and that,
furthermore, respondent, being a Member of the
Bidding Committee, also violated Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, by making it appear in the very
abstract of bids that another interested bidder, was not
interested in the bidding, when in truth and in fact, it
was not so. 2
xxx xxx xxx
On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71
of the respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for violation of Articles 182,
183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said

respondent testified falsely under oath in Cadastral
Case No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468, for
registration of title to Lot No. 2545 in particular;
1. That on June 16, 1970, without

publication, respondents conducted the
so-called "bidding" for the supply of
gravel and sand for the province of
Zamboanga del Sur; that said
respondents, without any valid or legal
ground, did not include or even open the
bid of one Jesus Teoson that was
seasonably submitted, despite the fact
that he is a registered duly qualified
operator of "Teoson Trucking Service,"
and notwithstanding his compliance
with all the rules and requirements on
public bidding; that, instead, aforecited
respondents illegally and irregularly
awarded said contract to Cesar
Tabiliran, an associate of respondent
Governor Bienvenido Ebarle; and
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified

falsely under oath during the hearing and reception of
evidence that he acquired said lot by purchase from a
certain Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner,
when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been
previously acquired and is owned by the provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur, where the
provincial jail building is now located.
2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and
untruthful statement of respondent in said Cadastral
case were made knowingly to the great damage and
prejudice of the Provincial Government of
Zamboanga del Sur in violation of aforecited
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. 3
2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid

"bidding" was really simulated and
papers were falsified or otherwise
"doctored" to favor respondent Cesar
Tabiliran thereby giving him wholly
unwarranted advantage, preference and
benefits by means of manifest partiality;
and that there is a statutory presumption
of interest for personal gain because the
transaction and award were manifestly
irregular and contrary to applicable law,
rules and regulations. 4
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a

complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the respondent Fiscal, an
action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171 and
213 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
We hereby respectfully charge the above-named
respondents for violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Articles 171 and 213, Revised Penal
Code and the rules and regulations of public bidding,
committed as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary

investigations, but the same having been denied, he went to the
respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the
Honorable Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and
mandamus (Special Case No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further proceedings therein.
The court granted preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order)
for which the Anti-Graft League filed a motion to have the
restraining order lifted and to have the petition itself dismissed.
within the third degree, and appointment as Private

Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the
latter is related with him within the third degree by
consanguinity.
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down

the first of the two challenged orders, granting Anti-Graft League's
motion and dismissing Special Case No. 1000.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari

with prayer for a temporary restraining order (G.R. No. 33628). As
we said, we issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1971.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal
prosecutions, the private respondent, on April 26, 1971, filed three
complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC
XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pagadian City for violation of various provisions
of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the Revised
Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave
ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS,
daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
xxx xxx xxx

Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there
unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful
statements in a narration of facts by accomplishing
and issuing a certificate, to wit: ,
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion,
seniority and nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the
appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLEMONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office
of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
although he well know that the latter is related with
him within the third degree of consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx


Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there
statements in a narration of facts by accomplishing
and issuing a certificate, to wit:
third degree, an appointment as SECURITY GUARD

in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur although he well knew that the
latter is related with him in the third degree by
consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil
Service Law.

Second Count.

appointment he extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece Elizabeth
Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although
he well knew that the latter is related with him within
the third degree affinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov.

BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE replaced JOHNNY
ABABONwho was then the incumbent Motor Pool
Dispatcher in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur with his nephew-in-law
TERESITO MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity
within the third Civil degree, in violation of the Civil
Service Law, this knowingly causing undue injury in
the discharge of his administrative function through
manifest partiality against said complaining
employee.
xxx xxx xxx

Third Count:
Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent brought
I.S. No. 6-71 of the respondent Pagadian City Fiscal against the
petitioner, still another proceeding for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 and Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City,
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and
feloniously extended and gave MARIO EBARLE, son
of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the

City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave
ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS,
daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity
within the third degree, an appointment as Private
Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the
latter is related with him within the third degree of
consanguinity, and said appointment is in violation of
the Civil Service Law.

Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City,
feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS UGSOD,
JR., son of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his
relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an
appointment as Architectural Draftsman in the Office
of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur
although he well know that the latter is related with
him in the third degree of consanguinity.
advantage of his position caused, persuaded, induced,

or influence the Presiding Judge to perform irregular
and felonious act in violation of applicable law or
constituting an offense into awarding and decreeing
Lot 2645 of the Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to
him who, according to the records of the case, failed
to establish his rights of ownership pursuant to the
provisions of the Land Registration law and the
Public Land Act, it appearing that the Provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur as and is a
claimant and in adverse possession of Lot 2545
whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon still
stands.
Fifth Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City,
feloniously extended and gave TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece
ELIZABETH EBARLE, his relative by affinity within
the third degree, an appointment as Motor Pool
Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew then that
the latter was not qualified to such appointment as it
was in violation of the Civil Service Law, thereby
knowingly granting and giving unwarranted
advantage and preference in the discharge of his
administrative function through manifest partiality.
II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019
That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO
A. EBARLE, Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, taking
III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF

ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE
First Count.
City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there
unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statement
in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a
certificate, to wit:
appointment he extended to TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece
ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor Pool Dispatcher,
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he wen knew that the latter is related

with him within the third degree of affinity and is in

violation of the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there
statements a certificate, to wit:
feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and

privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother
Bertuldo Ebarle, the former being his relative by
affinity within the second civil degree, an
appointment as LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in
Pagadian City, although he well knew that the latter is
related to him in the second degree by affinity and is
not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
c. That the provisions of the law and rules on

promotion, seniority and nepotism have been
observed.
appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLEMONTESCLAROS as Private Secretary in the Office
of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur,
although he well knew that the latter is related with
him within the third degree of consanguinity, and is in
violation of the Civil Service Law. CONTRARY to
aforecited laws. 8
That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City,

BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of
privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said
respondent, an appointment as DRIVER of the
Provincial Engineer's Office, Pagadian City, although
he well knew that Jesus Ebarle is related to him
within the third civil degree by consanguinity and is
not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Third Count.
xxx xxx xxx

On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 771 of the said City Fiscal, again charging the petitioner with further
violations of Republic Act No. 3019 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City,
That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City,

privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-in-law of
said respondent, an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL
ASSISTANT in the Office of the Provincial
Governor, Pagadian City, although he well knew that
Phenina Codinera is related to him in the second civil
degree of consanguinity and is not qualified under the
Civil Service Law.

ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.

Please give due course to the above complaint and
please set the case for immediate preliminary
investigation pursuant to the First Indorsement dated
August 27, 1971 of the Secretary of Justice, and in the
paramount interest of good government. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani
presiding, on a special civil action (Special Civil Case No. 1048)
for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The
respondent Court issued a restraining order. The respondent AntiGraft League moved to have the same lifted and the case itself
dismissed.
GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their criminal recourses. At the same

time, he assails the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft League to
commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He
likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal (in G.R. No. 34162), in
giving due course to the complaints notwithstanding the restraining
order we had issued (in G.R. No. 33628), which he claims applies
as well thereto, committed a grave abuse of discretion.
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are politically
motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as we said, a candidate
for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur.
We dismiss these petitions.
The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order
No. 264 has no merit. We reproduce the Order in toto:
MALACAANG
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order, dismissing

the case.
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this
Court, a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction. As earlier noted, we on October 8, 1971, stayed the
implementation of dismissal order.
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT

OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and considered the

same submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the failure of
the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply
with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING
THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH
COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264

OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH
COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD
BE GUIDED.

WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be

duly informed or reminded of the procedure provided
by law and regulations by which complaints against
public officials and employees should be presented
and prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times
delayed because of the failure to observe the form.91
requisites therefor, to indicate with sufficient
clearness and particularity the charges or offenses
being aired or denounced, and to file the complaint
with the proper office or authority;
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, the
Administration believes that many complaints or
grievances could be resolved at the lower levels of
government if only the provisions of law and
regulations on the matter are duly observed by the
parties concerned; and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct
should be eliminated and punished, it is equally
compelling that public officials and employees be
given opportunity afforded them by the constitution
and law to defend themselves in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law and regulations;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order:
1. Complaints against public officials and employees
shall be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the
complainants, describing in sufficient detail and
particularity the acts or conduct complained of,

instead of generalizations.
2. Complaints against presidential appointees shag be
filed with the Office of the President or the
Department Head having direct supervision or control
over the official involved.
3. Those against subordinate officials and employees
shall be lodged with the proper department or agency
head.
4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed
with the Office of the President in case of provincial
and city officials, with the provincial governor or
board secretary in case of municipal officials, and
with the municipal or city mayor or secretary in case
of barrio officials.
5. Those against members of police forces shall be
filed with the corresponding local board of
investigators headed by the city or municipal
treasurer, except in the case of those appointed by the
President which should be filed with the Office of the
President.
6. Complaints against public officials and employees
shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the
officials or authorities concerned in accordance with
pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring
officials or employees can be soonest removed or
otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or
vindicated in like manner, and to the end also that
other remedies, including court action, may be

pursued forthwith by the interested parties after

administrative remedies shall have been exhausted.
bureau or office" 14 to investigate and decide on matters involving

disciplinary action.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in

the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local

officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the Decentralization Act of
1967, providing that "charges against any elective provincial and
1
city officials
shall be preferred before the President of the
Philippines; against any elective municipal official before the
provincial governor or the secretary of the provincial board
concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the
municipal or secretary concerned. 15
It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive
application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The Order
itself shows why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES."
There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal
"offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to
"irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred
to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable
thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for informing the
public "of the procedure provided by law and regulations by which
complaints against public officials and employees should be
presented and prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided
by law and regulations" referred to pertains to existing procedural
rules with respect to the presentation of administrative charges
against erring government officials. And in fact, the aforequoted
paragraphs are but restatements thereof. That presidential
appointees are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President, for instance, is a reecho of the long-standing doctrine that
the President exercises the power of control over his
appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the other hand, regarding
subordinate officials, is a mere reiteration of Section 33 of Republic
Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act (of 1959) then in force, placing
jurisdiction upon "the proper Head of Department, the chief of a
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the

Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a "Board of Investigators" 16 the
jurisdiction to try and decide complaints against members of the
Philippine police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing
rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of
complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that
there is no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a
preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not
because it makes such a resort a secondary measure, but because it
does not intend to serve as a condition precedent to, much less
supplant, such a court resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being]
pursued forthwith by the interested parties, " 17 but that does not,
so we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do
not require a prior administrative course of action. It will indeed be
noted that the term is closely shadowed by the qualification, "after
administrative remedies shall have been exhausted," 18 which
suggests civil suits subject to previous administrative action.

It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question

makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees ...
removed or otherwise vindicated. 19 If it were intended to apply to
criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms
as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not
necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material
in construing the intent of the measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional implications if
the petitioner's arguments were accepted. For Executive Order No.
264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in which
legislative power was vested exclusively in Congress. The regime
of Presidential lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years
later. If we were to consider the Executive Order law, we would be
forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act No. 5180, the
law on preliminary investigations then in effect, a situation that
would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly. We cannot accordingly
countenace such a view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the
Anti-Graft League of the Philippines to bring suit is equally without
merit. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within
the meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now
Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate
the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal
need not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that,
unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary
investigation purposes, by any competent person. 20 The
"complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in
court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be
started by the aggrieved party himself. 21
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint

or information, both of which are filed in court. In case of a
complaint, it must be filed by the offended party; with respect to an
information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with
the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary restraining order
we issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced as well the complaint
subject of G.R. No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the petitioner
whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162 refer invariably to
violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code. That
does not, however, make such charges Identical to one another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general,
nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019;
exerting influence upon the presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur to award a certain parcel of land in
his favor, over which the provincial government itself lays claims,
contrary to the provisions of Section 4(b) of Republic Act No.
3019; and making untruthful statements in the certificates of
appointment of certain employees in his office. On the other hand,
the complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628 involve charges of
simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand for certain public
works projects, in breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute;
manipulating bids with respect to the construction of the capitol
building; testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case No.
N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged that he
was the owner of a piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183,
and 318 of the Revised Penal Code; and simulating bids for the
supply of gravel and sand in connection with another public works
project.

It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are characterized by major

differences. When, therefore, we restrained further proceedings in
I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71, subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did
not consequently stay the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC
XVI-6-ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the
same proceedings we did restrain in G.R. No. 34162.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the complaints in
question are tainted with a political color.
It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition of which
belongs to another agency, in this case, the respondent Fiscal. But
more than that, and as a general rule, injunction does not lie to
enjoin criminal prosecutions. 22 The rule is subject to exceptions, to
wit: (1) for the orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner; (3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights; and (5) because the statute relied
on is constitutionally infirm or otherwise void.23 We cannot
perceive any of the exceptions applicable here. The petitioner cries
foul, in a manner of speaking, with respect to the deluge of
complaints commenced by the private respondent below, but
whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes is a question
we are not in a position to decide. The proper venue, we believe, for
the petitioner's complaint is precisely in the preliminary
investigations he wishes blocked here.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the
petitioners.
It is so ORDERED.

VISITACION L. ESTODILLO, ET AL., complainants,

vs. JUDGE TEOFILO D. BALUMA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified complaint dated December 26, 2002, Jovelyn
Estudillo (Jovelyn) assisted by her mother, Visitacion L. Estodillo,
charges Judge Teofilo D. Baluma with Gross and Inexcusable
Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleges that her administrative complaint arose
from the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11627 for Other Acts of
Child Abuse[1] entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Fredie
Cirilo Nocos y Urot by respondent Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol, Branch 1, a Family Court.
The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary
investigation with the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of TubigonClarin, Bohol. After the requisite preliminary investigation, Judge
James Stewart E. Himalaloan found that there was sufficient ground
to hold the herein accused for trial for the offense of Other Acts of
Child Abuse defined in Sec. 10 (1), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610.[2] The record of the case was transmitted to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor where, after a review by Third Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, Macario I. Delusa, he failed an Information
dated October 28, 2002[3].
Respondent dismissed the Information in an Order dated
November 21, 2002[4] ratiocinating, thus:
EXAMINING the Information, the two (2) copies of the same
forming parts of the Records in this case appearing in pages 28 and
30, the court finds that the same is not subscribed and sworn to by
the prosecutor.
...
A CAREFUL EXAMINATION on the four corners of the
Information will readily show that the information had not been
subscribed by the prosecutor and this will militate against the
validity of the information and towards nullity and total
worthlessness of the same. Since the Information is defective, the
Court is left without any alternative except to dismiss this case. Any
other act by the Court will tantamount to validating the defective
information. The Court can act in this case only when a correct
information is filed, which is beyond procedure for the Court to
order.
The prosecution through Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Revival[5] on December 12, 2002 alleging that
there was no necessity for the Information to be under oath since he
merely concurred with the resolution of the investigating judge and
that he has properly subscribed and signed the Information with the
approval of the Provincial Prosecutor.
On January 10, 2003, respondent issued an Order[6] granting the
motion for reconsideration, reinstating and reviving the case but at
the same time requiring the public prosecutor to file a new
information incorporating the formalities called for under Rule 112,
Section 4 and the circular of its department implementing the
pertinent laws on the matter, within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.
On January 30, 2003, the prosecution filed an ex parte motion
to increase the bail bond of the accused[7] but respondent refused to
act on it because the prosecution had not yet complied with his
order to file a new information.[8]
On January 31, 2003, the prosecution filed a
Manifestation[9] stating that it will not file a new information as
ordered, the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence and is
unprocedural.

Complainant, therefore, seeks the assistance of the Court to

investigate this impasse considering that the bond of the accused
had been cancelled earlier.
Complainant also alleges that previously, respondent judge had
dismissed Criminal Case No. 11514 against a certain Eduardo
Vedra for Unjust Vexation on the same ground. The prosecution, in
a motion for reconsideration, explained that what is required to be
under oath is a complaint, not an information where the Rules
merely require that it be subscribed.Respondent granted the motion
and revived the case without requiring the filing of a new
information.
Complainant wonders why respondent did not require the filing
of a new information in the Vedra case, but insisted on the filing of
such new information in the present case. This, according to the
complainant, is clearly gross ignorance of the law.
In his Comment, respondent avers: The complaint did not
comply with Rule 7, Section 5, Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which required a certification of non-forum shopping. He
denies that he stood pat on his original order because he had already
issued an Order dated 27 February 2003 which found probable
cause to warrant the placing of the accused, Fredie Cirilo Nocos,
under custody in order to stand trial and fixed his bond
at P60,000.00. The complainant, including Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat,
the trial prosecutor who instigated the filing of herein
administrative complaint and Atty. Esther Gertrude Biliran, who
notarized and obviously prepared the complaint, were mentally
dishonest for not mentioning the fact that before herein complaint
was filed on March 8, 2003, he had already issued the aforecited
Order dated February 27, 2003. Prosecutor Ucat and Atty. Biliran
had evil motives when they instigated the filing of the complaint
against him even before he had issued the new order and for
continuing with it after he issued the Order of 27 February 2003.
Respondent maintains that he had efficiently discharged his

duties as judge although his Branch is one of the most heavily
burdened branches in the Tagbilaran City area and that to cope with
this heavy load, he works even at night and on Sundays and
holidays, writing decisions and drafting orders.
Respondent included in his Comment a Counter-complaint
against Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D.
Biliran an administrative case for disbarment or for disciplinary
sanction for gross violation of the canons under the Code of
Professional conduct and for deceit, dishonesty, failure to exercise
candor, fairness, good faith, doing falsehood or consenting to its
doing and abuse of procedures.
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat filed a Rejoinder[10] stating that he is in
quandary why the respondent tagged him as the trial prosecutor
when in fact the record shows that Prosecutor Helen T. Cabatos was
the one who handled the subject criminal case (Criminal Case No.
11627) and Prosecutor Macario I. Delusa was the one who filed the
Information. He asserts that the only thing he did was to administer
the oath of the complainant in the original letter-complaint subject
matter of the herein administrative case. He points out that it was in
another case, Criminal Case No. 11514 for Unjust Vexation entitled
The People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Vedra, a.k.a. Eddie that
he acted as the prosecutor. That case was dismissed by respondent
in an Order dated November 25, 2002 on the same ground that the
Information was not subscribed by the prosecutor. Upon a Motion
for Reconsideration with Prayer For Revival of the Case,
respondent granted it in an Order[11] dated January 2, 2003. He
likewise answered point by point all the accusations hurled by
respondent in the latters counter-complaint.
Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran also filed a
Rejoinder[12] wherein she denied having participated in the filing of
the complaint except to take the oath of the complainant. She avers
that at the time herein administrative case was filed on March 8,
2003, complainants have not yet received the February 27, 2003

Order issued by respondent judge which found probable cause to

warrant the placing of the accused, Fredie Cirilo Nocos under
custody in order to stand trial and fixed his bond
at P60,000.00. Likewise, she denied the accusations of the
respondent judge and proferred her defenses against it.
Court Administrator Presbitero
that: 1) this case be re-docketed as a
and 2) respondent be reprimanded
repetition of the offense will merit
Court.
J. Velasco, Jr. recommends

regular administrative matter;
with a stern warning that a
a more drastic action of the
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:
Sec. 4. Information defined. An information is an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court.
There is no requirement that the information be sworn
to. Otherwise, the rules would have so provided as it does in a
complaint which is defined as a sworn written statement charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace
officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the
law violated.[13] In a case, we ruled that the information need not be
under oath, the reason therefore being principally that the
prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the special duty in
regard thereto and is acting under the special responsibility of his
oath of office.[14] Clearly, respondent had confused an information
from a complaint.
A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was
subscribed or signed by Prosecutor Macario I. Delusa. It is thus
clear that respondent erred in dismissing the subject Information on
the ground that it was not under oath.
As aptly observed by the Court Administrator in the evaluation

submitted by him:
It is clear that respondent erred in dismissing the information filed
by Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat on the ground that it was not sworn
to. The Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly defines an information
as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court (Section 4,
Rule 110). The Rules do not require that it be under oath for
otherwise, it would have provided so. On the other hand, a
complaint is defined as a sworn statement charging a person with an
offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law
violated (Section 5, Rule 110).
Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that both a
complaint and an information need to be under oath. But the oath is
not required when it is a public prosecutor who files the information
because he does so under the oath he took when he qualified for his
position. The position of the public prosecutor was that the
preliminary investigation had been conducted by the municipal
circuit trial judge of Tubigon-Clarin and the latters resolution was
concurred in by the prosecutors.
It appears from the record that the respondent corrected himself by
issuing his Order of 27 February 2003 where he found that the
complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estudillo, father of the victim,
the affidavit of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the victim executed with the
assistance of Visitacion Estudillo, her mother, the medico-legal
certificate issued by Isidro Fermites, Jr., on Jovelyn Estudillo, the
certification of the facts of birth of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the records
of the proceedings during the preliminary examination at the First
Level Court, its Order dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution
dated September 19, 2002, this court finds probable cause to

warrant that the accused be placed in the custody of the law to stand
trial.
The error of the respondent is not a serious one. He, however, must
be reminded that as judge he must be conversant with the rules and
laws that it is his office of apply. He deserves a reprimand for his
failure to understand an elementary rule of law.[15]
We agree with Court Administrator Velasco.
The records disclose that respondent, in effect, apparently
rectified his error when he issued an Order dated February 27,
2003, portions of which read as follows:
EXAMINING the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estodillo,
father of the victim, the affidavit of Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the victim
executed with the assistance of Visitacion-Estodillo her mother, the
medico legal certificate issued by Isidro Permites, Jr., M.D., on
Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the certification on the facts of birth of
Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the records of the proceedings during the
preliminary examination at the First Level Court, its Order dated
September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated September 19, 2002,
this Court finds probable cause to warrant that the accused be
placed in the custody of the law to stand trial.[16]
However, it is noted that said Order did not have any reference
at all nor did it attempt to reconcile the previous Orders he issued
on which bases the herein administrative complaint was based,
namely: the Order dated November 21, 2002 dismissing the
Information, the Order dated January 10, 2003 reinstating and
reviving the case but requiring the prosecution to file a new
information, and the Order dated January 30, 2003 refusing to act
on the prosecutions ex-parte motion to increase amount of bail until
the filing of a new information, thus resulting in the grievance
submitted by complainant which could have been easily averted had
respondent been more meticulous in the performance of his duties

as presiding judge of a regional trial court.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges
to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. It is
imperative that judges must be conversant with basic legal
principles[17]. Judges are called to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws.[18] They are not
common men and women, whose errors, men and women forgive
and time forgets[19]. Judges sit as the embodiment of the peoples
sense of justice, their last recourse where all other institutions have
failed.[20]
As to the counter-complaint of respondent Judge against
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran, the
same should be dismissed for failure of respondent to refute their
respective rejoinders, dated June 11, 2003 and June 6, 2003.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Teofilo D. Baluma is found
guilty of violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct
and REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The counter-complaint of Judge Teofilo D. Baluma against
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran is
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALYNN PLEZETTE

DY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BILLY
CERBO and JONATHAN CERBO, respondents.
DECISION
The case below arose from the fatal shooting of Petitioner Dys
mother, Rosalinda Dy, in which the primary suspect was Private
Respondent Jonathan Cerbo, son of Private Respondent Billy
Cerbo.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The procedural and factual antecedents of the case were

summarized in the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor has the

quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court. Courts must respect the exercise of such
discretion when the information filed against the accused is valid on
its face, and no manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or
prejudice can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
On August 30, 1993, Rosalinda Dy, according to the petition, was

shot at pointblank range by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo in
the presence and at the office of his father, private respondent Billy
Cerbo at Purok 9, Poblacion, Nabunturan, Davao.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to

reverse the June 28, 1996 Decision and the August 27, 1996
Resolution if the Court of Appeals[1] in CA- GR SP No.
36018.[2] The assailed Decision dismissed the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the petitioners, which sought to annul and set
aside two Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Nabunturan,
Davao: the June 28, 1994 Order dismissing the Information for
murder filed against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and the
August 18, 1994 Order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed August 27, 1996 Court of Appeals (CA)
Resolution likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On September 2, 1993, eyewitness Elsa B. Gumban executed an

affidavit positively identifying private respondent Jonathan Cerbo
as the assailant. (Annex C, Rollo, p. 34).
On September 20, 1993, private respondents Jonathan Cerbo
executed a counter-affidavit interposing the defense that the
shooting was accidental (Annex D: Rollo, pp. 35-36).
On October 6, 1993, the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after a preliminary investigation,
found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime of murder has been committed by private respondent
Jonathan Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire records of the
case to the provincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao (Annex E, Rollo,
pp. 37-38).
After [an] information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo,
petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, daughter of the victim Rosalinda Dy,
executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy
Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing (Annex F, Rollo, p. 39),
supported by a supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban, alleging
in addition to her previous statement that:

3. In addition to my said sworn statement, I voluntarily and freely

aver as follows:
a) I vividly recall that while my mistress Rosalinda Go and I were
in the office of Billy Cerbo at about 11:45 a.m. on August 30, 1993,
Mr. Cerbo personally instructed me to fetch the food from the
kitchen [and to bring it] to the office instead of the dining room.
b) While bringing the food, Mr. Cerbo again instructed me to place
the food [o]n a corner table and commanded me to sit behind the
entrance door and at the same time Mr. Cerbo positioned Rosalinda
[on] a chair facing the entrance door for an easy target.
c) Immediately after Rosalinda was shot, Mr. Billy Cerbo called his
son Jonathan who was running, but did not and ha[s] never bothered
to bring Rosalinda to a hospital or even apply first aid.
d) To my surprise, Mr. Billy Cerbo, instead of bringing Rosalinda
to the hospital, brought her to the funeral parlor and immediately
ordered her to be embalmed without even informing her children or
any of her immediate relatives xxx. Annex G, Rollo, p. 40.)
Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information

including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest
was later issued on May 27, 1994 (Rollo, p. 27).
Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash warrant
of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause
(Rollo, p. 27).
On June 28, 1994, respondent Judge issued the first assailed order
dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant
for his arrest[;] the dispositive portion of [the order] reads:
'IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, [an] order is hereby
issued DISMISSING the case as against Billy Cerbo only.
Let, therefore, the warrant of arrest, dated may 27, 1994, be
RECALLED.
The prosecution is hereby ordered to withdraw its Amended
Information and file a new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
Private respondent Billy Cerbo Submitted a counter-affidavit

denying the allegations of both petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy and
Elsa B. Gumban (Annex H, Rollo, pp. 41-42).
Private Prosecutor Romeo Tagra filed a motion for reconsideration

which was denied by the respondent judge in his second assailed
order dated August 18, 1994 (Annex B, Rollo, pp. 31-33).[3]
On or about April 8, 1994, Prosecutor Protacio Lumangtad filed a

Motion for leave of court to reinvestigate the case (Annex I. Rollo,
pp43-44) which was granted by the respondent judge in an order
dated April 28, 1994 (Annex J, Rollo, p. 45).
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his resolution dated May 5, 1994, Prosecutor Lumangtad

recommended the filing of an amended information including Billy
Cerbo xxx as one of the accused in the murder case xxx (Annex K:
rollo, pp. 46-49).
In its 10-page Decision, the Court of Appeals debunked

petitioners assertion that the trial judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in recalling the warrant of arrest and subsequently
dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo, Citing jurisprudence,[4] the
appellate court held as follows:

The ruling is explicit. If upon the filing of the information in court,

the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents
attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exist must either call
for the complainant and the witnesses or simply dismiss the case.
Petitioners question the applicability of the doctrine laid down in
the above[-]mentioned case, alleging that the facts therein are
different from the instant case. We rule that the disparity of facts
does not prevent the application of the principle.
We have gone over the supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban
and taking into account the additional facts and circumstance
alleged therein, we cannot say that respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion in dismissing the case as against private respondent
Billy Cerbo for lack of probable cause
xxx xxx xxx
"The prosecution, if it really believed that Billy Cerbo is probably
guilty by conspiracy, should have presented additional evidence
sufficiently and credibly demonstrating the existence of probable
cause.
xxx xxx xxx[5]
In sum, the Court of Appeals held that Judge Eugenio Valles
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in recalling the warrant of
arrest issued against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and
subsequently dismissing the Information for murder filed against
the private respondent, because the evidence presented thus far did
not substantiate such charge.
Petitioner Dy avers:
1) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the
Regional Trial Court Judge had the authority to reverse [the
public prosecutors] finding of probable cause to prosecute
accused xxx and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter on the
basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest.
2) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in fully and
unqualifiedly applying the case of Allado, et. al. vs. PACC, et.
al. G.R. No. 113630, [to] the case at bench despite [the] clear
difference in their respective factual backdrop[s] and the
contrary earlier jurisprudence on the matter.[7]
On the other hand, the solicitor general posits this sole issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable
cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private
respondents Billy Cerbo.[8]
Essentially, the petitioners are questioning the propriety of the
trial courts dismissal, for want of evidence, of the Information for
murder against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo.
In resolving this petition, the discussion of the Court will
revolve two points: first, the determination of probable cause as an
executive and judicial function and, second, the applicability
of Allado andSalonga to the case at bar.
The Courts Ruling
Hence, this petition.[6]

The petition is meritorious. The trial court erred in dismissing
the Information filed against the private respondent. Consequently,
The Assigned Errors

the Court of Appeals was likewise in error when it upheld such

ruling.
Executive Determination of Probable Cause
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary

investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is
an executive function,[9] the correctness of the exercise of which is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled
to pass upon. The Separate (Concurring) Opinion of former Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts v. Court of
Appeals[10] succinctly elucidates such point in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
In this special civil action, this Court is being asked to assume the
function of a public prosecutor. It is being asked to determine
whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners. More
concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess such
evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the
basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it suffices to
engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.
It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to
perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional
Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an
adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said
executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a function
that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be
performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal
commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a
public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially

preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and
authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons
charged with a felony or crime.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor i. e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled
to pass upon. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon
the filing of the information against him by the public prosecutor, to
preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court praying for the
quashal or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the
evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it
permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth
inadequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before
the Court praying that the public prosecutor be compelled to file the
corresponding information against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exist and to charge those whom be or she
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.[11] Thus,
in Crespo v. Mogul,[12] we ruled:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced
by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal
action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or
may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that
presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence
, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the

criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is

to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons.
xxx Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not
only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons
who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are
shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of
their office. They have equally the duty not to prosecute when the
evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
This broad prosecutorial power is however not unfettered,
because just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth before
the law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to
be circumspect in filing criminal charges against the
innocent. Thus, for crimes cognizable by regional trial courts
preliminary investigations are usually conducted. In Ledesma v.
Court of Appeals,[13] we discussed the purposes and nature of a
preliminary investigation in this manner:
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free
respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress
of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the
reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary
proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that
purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the
state from the burden of the unnecessary expense an effort in
prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false,
frivolous or groundless charges.
"Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties evidence is not required, but only such as
may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. By
reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a
dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a
judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy

attaches.
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial

must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest, which is judicial function. The judicial
determination of probable cause in the issuance of arrest warrants
has been emphasized in numerous cases. In Ho v. People,[14] the
Court summarized the pertinent rulings on the subject, as follows:
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated
in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause
means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the
judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the
judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he
personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable
cause. In Webb v. De Leon, we stressed that the judge merely
determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused
and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply
personally reviews the prosecutors initial determination finding
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx

In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification

cannot be upheld. Lest we be too repetitive, we only emphasize
three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for the
purpose different from that which is to be made by the
judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial
is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the
same proceedings or evidence, there should be no confusion as to
their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely
solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to
justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will support
his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an
offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other
than the prosecutors bare report upon which to legally sustain his
own findings on the existence or non-existence of probable cause to
issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally
and independently the existence of non-existence of probable cause
is lodge in him by no less than the most basic law of the
land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the
judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter
not only the information and his bare resolution, but also so much
of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to
make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue
a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the

case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and
examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial
courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every
case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of
the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he
cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation,
as the Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties and functions which in turn gives his report the presumption
of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to
personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of
arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of
the investigating officer.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest
if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing
so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the
public prosecutors determination of probable cause to hold an
accused for trial, on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant insufficient, as in the
present case.
Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the prosecution to present
all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused
upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is
found in the nature and the objective of a preliminary
investigation. Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether

there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person

charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime x x x has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial.[15]Evidentiary matters must be presented
and heard during the trial.[16] Therefore, if the information is valid
on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse
of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, the trial
court should respect such determination.
basis of the judges ruling, failed to establish probable cause against

them that would justify the issuance of the warrants for their arrest.
Inapplicability of Allado and Salonga
In categorically stating that the evidence so far presented did

not meet the standard of probable cause and subsequently granting
the
petition,
the
Court
noted
the
following
circumstances: first, the corpus delicti was not established, and
there was serious doubt as to the alleged victims death; second, the
extrajudicial statement of the principal witness, who had priorly
confessed his participation in the crime, was full of material
inconsistencies; and third, the PACC operatives who investigated
the case never implicated the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the pronouncement

made in Allado v. Diokno: xxx [I]f, upon the filing of the
information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information
and the documents attached thereto, must either call for the
complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the
case. there is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further
expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no
probable cause exists.[17]
In Allado, Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L.
Mendoza, practicing lawyers, were accused by the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) of kidnapping with murder and
ordered by Judge Roberto C. Diokno to be arrested without
bail. The petitioners questioned the issuance of the warrants for
their arrest, contending that the respondents judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction in holding that
there was probable cause against them. They contended that the
trial court relied merely on the resolution of the investigating panel
and its certification that probable cause existed, without personally
determining the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence for
such finding and without stating the basis thereof. they maintained
that the records of the preliminary investigation, which was the sole
The Court declared that Judge Diokno had indeed committed

grave abuse of discretion in issuing the arrest warrants. Contrary to
the constitutional mandate and establish jurisprudence, he merely
relied on the certification of the prosecutors as to the existence of
probable cause, instead of personally examining the evidence, the
complainant and his witnesses. For otherwise, the Court said, he
would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was
utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of the petitioners.[18]
Citing Salonga v. Cruz-Pao, the Court of Appeals pointed out

that when there was no prima facie case against a person sought to
be charged with a crime, the judge or fiscal, therefore, should not
go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn out during trial, for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold.[19]
In the aforecited case, Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga sought to
bar the filing of an Information for violation of the Revised AntiSubversion Act, which Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano had ordered to be
filed against him. In sustaining the petitioner, the Court held that
the evidence upon which the Information was based was not
sufficient to charge him for a violation of the Revised AntiSubversion Act.

In all, the Court decreed in both cases that there was no basis in
law and in fact for the judicial and executive determination of
probable cause. The Court also held that the government, while
vested with the right and the duty to protect itself and its people
against transgressors of the law, must perform the same in a manner
that would not infringe the perceived violators rights as guaranteed
by the constitution.
However, the present case is not at all fours
with Allado and Salonga. First, Elsa Gumban, the principal
eyewitness to the killing of Rosalinda Dy, was not a participant or
conspirator
in
the
commission
of
said
crime. In Allado and Salonga, however, the main witness were the
confessed perpetrators of the crimes, whose testimonies the Court
deemed tainted.[20] Second, in the case at bar the private respondent
was accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias during
the investigation of the case can be imputed to the public
prosecutor. On the other hand, the Court noted in Allado the "undue
haste in the filing of the Information and the inordinate interest of
the government in pursuing the case;[21] and in Salonga, xxx
the failure of the prosecution to show that the petitioner was
probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial
disregard of petitioners constitutional rights [and] the massive and
damaging publicity made against him.[22] In other words, while the
respective
sets
of
evidence
before
the
prosecutors
in Allado and Salonga were utterly insufficient to support a finding
of probable cause, the same cannot be said of the present case.
We stress that Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the
general rule and may be invoke only if similar circumstances are
clearly shown to exist. But as the foregoing comparisons show,
such similarities are absent in the instant case. Hence, the rulings in
the two aforementioned cases cannot apply to it.
Motion Without Requisite Notice
One more thing. Petitioners aver that Private Respondents

Cerbo did not give them a copy of the motion to Quash the Warrant
of Arrest, which had been issued against him, or a notice of the
schedule hearing. Thus, they contend, Judge Valles should not have
entertained such motion.
It is settled that every written motion in a trial court must be set
for hearing by the applicant and served with the notice of hearing
thereof, in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party. The provisions on this matter in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court,[23] are categorical and mandatory in
character.[24] Under Section 6 of the said rule, no motion shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. The
rationale for this is simple: unless the movants set the time and the
place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the
adverse parties agree or object to the motions, since the rules
themselves do not fix any period within which they may file their
replies or oppositions.[25]
The motion to quash the warrant of arrest in the present case
being pro forma, inasmusch as the requisite copy and notice were
not duly served upon the adverse party, the trial court had no
authority to act on it.
Epilogue
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal

case or guilt or innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo. We
are simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is valid
on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of
discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts
should not dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary
matters should be presented and heard during the trial. The
functions and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor

in the proper scheme of things in our criminal justice system should

be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an
oppressive exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need to
be protected when circumstance so require. But just as we
recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must
likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing
of nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a
public prosecutors duties, courts ought to refrain from interfering
with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion in the public prosecutors finding of probable cause, the
accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary[26] and
move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such
appeal is resolved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Nabunturan, Davao, which is ordered to reinstate the amended
Information against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and to proceed
with judicious speed in hearing the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44723 August 31, 1987

STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY, petitioner
vs.
ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, in
his capacity as OFFICER-IN-CHARGE of the Provincial
Fiscal's OFFICE of Camarines Norte, and GIL ALAPAN et.
al., respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case
No. 821 of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until
the same is terminated.
The facts of the case are not disputed. On March 21, 1974,
petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap
iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo
Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes
for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said
investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26, 1974
recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed
against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which
resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
Private respondents sought reconsideration of the resolution but the
same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated October 14,
1974.
On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte an Information dated October 17, 1987
docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging private respondents

with the crime of Attempted Theft.
In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested
the Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and October 14,
1974.
On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the
Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "Please elevate entire records PFO
Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all
proceedings pending review."
The letter-request for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to
the Secretary of Justice dated November 23, 1974 alleging, among
other things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already
been filed against private respondents for which reason the request
for review has become a moot question as the Provincial Fiscal has
lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted theft.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the
records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move
for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the
latter denied the same in a letter dated June 11, 1975.
A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by
the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground
that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents
and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.
Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but
in an Order dated February 13, 1976, the motion filed for said

purpose was likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to April 23,
1976.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First
Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-incharge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to
Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the
trial court in an order dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent
fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, this
petition for mandamus.
In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus "commanding respondent fiscal or any other person who
may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead to
prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the Court of First instance of
Camarines Norte" (Petition, Rollo, p. 27).
There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is
addresses to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may
or he may not file the information according to whether the
evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs. Court of First
Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides not to file the
information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be
compelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However,
after the case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not
clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to dismiss
or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending
further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested
solely in the court" (U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales
vs. Court of First Instance, supra).
However, the matter of instituting an information

should be distinguished from a motion by the fiscal
for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The
judge may properly deny the motion where, judging
from the record of the preliminary investigation, there
appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain the
prosecution. This is, as it should be, because the case
is already in court and, therefore, within its discretion
and control (Abela vs. Golez, 131 SCRA 12).
This ruling is just being consistent with the principle first laid down
in U.S. vs. Valencia (1 Phil. 642) where it was held that "after the
complaint has been presented, and certainly after the trial has been
commenced, the court and not the fiscal has full control of it. The
complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of
the court." It is discretionary on the court where the case is pending
to grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same (Asst. Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914).
In the case at bar, the court below denied the fiscal's motion to
dismiss on the ground that there was a prima faciecase against
private respondents. The question presented for determination now
is-after a case has been filed in court, can a fiscal be compelled to
prosecute the same, after his motion to dismiss it has been denied?
This court is of the view that the writ prayed for should issue.
Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal
must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to
enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the
culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his
responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the
hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall
be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rule 110,
Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings wig be null and
void (People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361).

In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor

to appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the
sovereignty of the State." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "the prosecuting
officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer (Suarez vs.
Platon, 69 Phil. 556).
Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima
facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the
case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged
by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to
continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the
presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor
subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32
Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other
prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and
present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court
decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced
by both parties.
The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the
records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to
said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the
refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case. It is the court where the
case is filed and not the fiscal that has full control of it. Very
recently, this Court in Mario Fl. Crespo vs. Hon. Leodegario L.
Mogul (G.R. No. 53373, promulgated June 30, 1987) ruled:
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a

complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court,
he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within
its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion
to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby
the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when
the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the
determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby Granted. Public respondent or
any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his
place or stead, is hereby ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal
Case No. 821 until the same is terminated.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO
appellant.
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffDELA
CRUZ, accused-
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
A man descends into the depths of human debasement when he
inflicts his lechery upon a minor, and all the more when he imposes
such lasciviousness upon a woman whose capacity to give consent
to a sexual union is diminished, if not totally lacking. Such is the
case of Jonalyn Yumang (hereafter JONALYN).
Upon a complaint[1] dated 5 July 1996 signed by JONALYN
with the assistance of her aunt Carmelita Borja, two informations
were filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, charging Bienvenido
Dela Cruz (hereafter BIENVENIDO) with rape allegedly
committed on 3 and 4 July 1996. The informations were docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 1274-M-96 and 1275-M-96. The accusatory
portion of the information docketed as Criminal Case No. 1275-M96, which is the subject of this appellate review, reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of July 1996, in the Municipality of
Calumpit, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
[Bienvenido dela Cruz @ Jun] did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design have carnal knowledge
of one Jonalyn Yumang y Banag, a mentally deficient female
person, against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment on 14 October 1996, BIENVENIDO entered

a plea of not guilty.[3] The cases were consolidated, and joint trial
on the merits ensued thereafter.
When JONALYN was presented as its first witness, the
prosecution sought to obtain from the trial court an order for the
conduct of a psychiatric examination on her person to determine her
mental and psychological capability to testify in court. The purpose
was that should her mental capacity be found to be below normal,
the prosecution could propound leading questions to
JONALYN. The defense, through Atty. Jesus M. Pamintuan,
vigorously opposed the prosecutions manifestation. Nonetheless,
the trial court allowed the prosecutor to conduct direct examination
on JONALYN so that if in its perception she would appear to be
suffering from mental deficiency, the prosecutor could be permitted
to ask leading questions. JONALYN was then made to identify her
signature in her sworn statement and to identify the accused, and
was asked about her personal circumstances. Thereafter, noticing
that JONALYN had difficulty in expressing herself, the trial court
decided to suspend the proceedings to give the prosecution
sufficient time to confer with her.[4]
At the next hearing, the trial court allowed the prosecution to
put on the witness stand Dr. Cecilia Tuazon, Medical Officer III of
the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City.Dr.
Tuazon testified that she conducted a psychiatric examination on
JONALYN on 12 July 1996. She found that JONALYN was
suffering from a moderate level of mental retardation and that
although chronologically the latter was already 20 years of age (at
the time of the examination), she had the mental age of an 8-yearold child under the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Dr. Tuazon
also found that JONALYN could have attained a higher degree of
intelligence if not for the fact that she was unschooled and no
proper motivation was employed on her, and that she had the
capacity to make her perception known to others. She, however,
observed that she had to prompt JONALYN most of the time to

elicit information on the sexual harassment incident. She then

narrated that JONALYN was able to relate to her that she
(JONALYN) was approached by a tall man named Jun-Jun who led
her to a house that supposedly belonged to her cousin, and that JunJun disrobed JONALYN and raped her twice.[5]
After said testimony or on 11 March 1997, the trial court issued
an order[6] allowing leading questions to be propounded to
JONALYN in accordance with Section 10(c), Rule 132 of the Rules
on Evidence.[7] Thus, JONALYN took the witness stand. She again
identified her signature and that of her aunt on her Sinumpaang
Salaysay. She also identified BIENVENIDO as the person against
whom she filed a complaint for rape. She declared in open court
that BIENVENIDO raped her twice inside the house of a certain
Mhel located at Barangay Gatbuca, Calumpit, Bulacan. She stated
that BIENVENIDO placed himself on top of her and inserted his
private part into her womanhood.[8]
Dr. Edgardo Gueco, Chief and Medico-Legal Officer of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, testified that he examined JONALYN on 8 July 1996,
and the results of the examination were indicated in his MedicoLegal Report.[9] He found that she was in a non-virgin state
physically, as her hymen bore deep fresh and healing lacerations at
3, 8 and 11 oclock positions. He then opined that the hymenal
lacerations were sustained a week before the examination and,
therefore, compatible with the time the rapes were allegedly
committed.[10]
Carmelita Borja, aunt of JONALYN, testified that on 5 July
1996, she accompanied JONALYN to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Office in Calumpit, Bulacan, to lodge a complaint
against BIENVENIDO. With them were JONALYNs mother
Conchita Yuson and Barangay Councilman Roberto Dungo.
Carmelita testified that in instituting this case, their family incurred
expenses amounting to P30,000.[11]
After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its
exhibits, the defense filed a motion for leave of court to file a
demurrer to evidence, which was granted. Thus, the defense filed
on 5 December 1997 a Demurrer to Evidence[12] on the following
grounds:
(a) That the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
cases; and
(b) The presumption of accuseds innocence had not even [sic] been
overcome by the prosecution due to the insufficiency of its
evidence.
Expounding its theory, the defense first admitted that it could
have moved to quash the information but it did not because the
complaint on which the information was based was on its face
valid, it having been signed by JONALYN as the offended
party. However, the undeniable truth is that JONALYN had no
capacity to sign the same considering her mental deficiency or
abnormality. The assistance extended to JONALYN by her aunt
Carmelita Borja did not cure the defect, as the enumeration in
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code of the persons who could file
a complaint for rape is exclusive and successive and the mother of
JONALYN was still very much alive.
The defense also insisted on assailing the competency of
JONALYN as a witness. It claimed that JONALYNs testimony,
considering her mental state, was coached and rehearsed. Worse,
she was not only asked leading questions but was fed legal and
factual conclusions which she was made to admit as her own when
they were in fact those of the prosecution.
In its Order of 26 January 1998,[13] the trial court denied the
Demurrer to Evidence and set the dates for the presentation of the
evidence for the defense. However, BIENVENIDO filed a Motion
for Judgment, stating in part as follows:

[A]fter going over the Records and carefully analyzing the

proceedings as well as meticulously evaluating the evidence
presented and offered [by] the private complainant, in consultation
with his parents, and assisted by undersigned counsel, [he] had
decided to submit the cases for judgment without the need of
presenting any evidence to explain his terse PLEA OF NOT
GUILTY to the charges upon his arraignment.[14]
Noting this new development, the trial court, in its Order of 17
February 1998, considered the case submitted for decision.[15]
In its Joint Decision of 3 April 1998, [16] the trial court
convicted BIENVENIDO of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No.
1275-M-96, but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 for
insufficiency of evidence. While conceding that JONALYNs
narration of how she was sexually abused by BIENVENIDO was
not detailed, the trial court, nonetheless, concluded that it was
candidly related by one who had the mental age of an 8-year-old
child. The trial court was convinced that JONALYN was able to
show in her own peculiar way that she was indeed raped by
BIENVENIDO on 3 July 1996. Finally, the trial court ruled that
BIENVENIDOs culpability was further bolstered by his choice not
to offer any evidence for his defense despite ample opportunity to
do so. Accordingly, it sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay JONALYN the amount of P60,000
by way of civil indemnity.
In his Appellants Brief,[17] BIENVENIDO asserts that the trial
court committed the following errors:
1. ... in having taken the fatally defective criminal
complaint for a valid conferment upon it of jurisdiction
to try and dispose of said two (2) charges of rape.
2. ... in having accepted as competent the mentally deficient
private complainant even without first requiring any
evidence of her capacity as such a witness.
3. ... in having considered the narration read to the

complaining witness from prepared statements and asked
of her simply to confirm as true, as her own.
4. ... in having given full credence and weight to
complainants conclusions of facts merely put to her
mouth by leading questions of the prosecutor.
5. ... in having convicted the accused-appellant in Criminal
Case No. 1275-M-96, but acquitting in Criminal Case
No. 1274-M-96, on the basis of private complainants
purported sworn versions supposedly given in both
charges.
BIENVENIDO reiterates the issues he raised in his Demurrer to
Evidence. He assails the competency of JONALYN as signatory to
the complaint she filed. He adds that the defect in the complaint
was not cured by his failure to interpose a motion to quash nor by
the assistance lent by JONALYNs aunt, which contravened Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, BIENVENIDO
asserts that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case.
BIENVENIDO also stresses the incompetency of JONALYN
as a trial witness for the reason that the prosecution failed to prove
her competency. Further, JONALYN was merely asked to affirm
the legal and factual conclusions of the prosecution which evinced
quite clearly the girls lack of comprehension of the court
proceedings and the nature of her oath. Besides, her statements
concerning the alleged sexual penetration were elicited a month
after her initial offer as a witness, which reinforces the rehearsed
and coached nature of her testimony.
Finally, he wonders why he was convicted in Criminal Case
No. 1275-M-96 but acquitted in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96
when it was a joint trial and the evidence was the same. He insists
that he should also be acquitted in the case at bar.

In the Appellees Brief,[18] the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) counters that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case,
since the complaint and information filed were valid.JONALYNs
mental retardation does not render her incompetent for initiating the
prosecution of the crime committed against her and for testifying in
court. If minors are allowed not only to initiate the prosecution of
offenses under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and Section
5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, but also to
testify under the Rules on Evidence, JONALYN, who had the
mentality of an 8-year-old child, was competent to sign the criminal
complaint and to be a witness in court. JONALYNs competency as
a court witness was aptly proved when she was able to answer the
leading questions asked of her as allowed by Section 10(c), Rule
132 of the Rules on Evidence. Moreover, the OSG asseverates that
JONALYNs testimony on the fact of rape is corroborated by
medical and physical evidence. As to BIENVENIDOs quandary
that he should be acquitted also in this case, it is convinced that he
should have been convicted for two counts of rape, as JONALYN
expressly testified
that
she
was
raped
twice
by
BIENVENIDO. Finally, the OSG seeks an award of moral damages
in the amount of P50,000 for JONALYN, as well as a reduction of
the award of civil indemnity to P50,000 in conformity with current
jurisprudence.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I. Validity of the Complaint for Rape

We agree with the disputation of the OSG that the trial court
validly took cognizance of the complaint filed by JONALYN. The
pertinent laws existing at the time the crimes were committed were
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by
R.A. No. 8353[19] otherwise known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
which took effect on 22 October 1997[20]) and Section 5 of Rule 110
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Article 344 of the Revised

Penal Code provides:
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. -The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness,
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as the case may be.
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.All criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.However, in
Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when
there is no fiscal available, the offended party, any peace officer or
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may
prosecute the case. This authority ceases upon actual intervention of
the fiscal or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as the case may be. In case the offended party dies
or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and
has no known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall
initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to
initiate the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her

parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or

incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where
the offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her
parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same. The right to
file the action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardians
shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised
successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the
immediately preceding paragraph.
A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in
crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman
and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law
deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family
decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies
in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the
family.[21]
It has been held that [w]hen it is said that the requirement in
Article 344 (that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or
her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the
complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the
complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the
case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.[22]
The complaint in the instant case has complied with the
requirement under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JONALYN, as the offended
party, the right to institute the criminal action. As signed by
JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The
assistance of JONALYNs aunt, or even of her mother, was a
superfluity. JONALYNs signature alone suffices to validate the
complaint.
We agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court
can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents,
JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found to have the
mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint

independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully
considered filed by a minor.
The overriding intention of BIENVENIDO is to challenge the
validity of the complaint by assailing the competency of
JONALYN to file the complaint. But even he admits in his
Demurrer to Evidence that the complaint is proper and valid on its
face for which reason he did not move to quash the
information. Thus, even he admits and recognizes the futility of his
argument.
II. Competence of JONALYN to Testify
The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify
rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness
stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of
intelligence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an
oath.[23]
The prosecution has proved JONALYNs competency by the
testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial court, as supported
by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the
understanding of an 8-year-old child, does not obviate the fact of
her competency. Its only effect was to consider her testimony from
the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even a mental retardate is
not, per se, disqualified from being a witness.[24] JONALYN, who
may be considered as a mental retardate but with the ability to make
her perceptions known to others, is a competent witness under
Section 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.[25]
JONALYNs competency is also better established in the
answers she gave under direct examination relative to the harrowing
defilement she suffered in the hands of BIENVENIDO, thus:

Q And the nature of your complaint was that you were abused or
you were raped by the herein accused Bienvenido de la Cruz
y Santiago, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
...
Q And do you know in what place where you raped by the
accused, Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago?
you. My question is, when he went on top of you, what did

he do to you, if any?
A: Pumaloob sa akin.[29]
Q Now, when the accused, which you called Jun, pumaloob sa
iyo, what did you feel at that time?
A I felt a hard object, sir.
A Inside the house, sir.
Q Now since you said it [was] a hard object, you could now tell
the Court, what that hard object [was]?
Q Whose house?
A I cannot remember.[30]
A In the house of Mhel, sir.[26]
Public Prosecutor:
Q How many times were you raped by the herein accused

Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun Jun?
Q When you said the last time around, you were asked about,
what you mean by pumaloob siya sa akin and then you said
that there was a hard object inserted and after that, the
follow-up question was asked on you, you said you cannot
remember, what is that hard object, what do you mean when
you say I cannot remember?
A Twice, sir.
Court: Where?
Fiscal: Where?
Witness: On top of the wooden bed, sir.[27]
Q You said you were raped twice by the herein accused,
Bienvenido dela Cruz alias Jun-Jun on a papag inside the
house of Mhel at Barangay Gatbuca, Calumpit, Bulacan,
how did Jun Jun the herein accused rape[] you?
Court: On the first time?
A He layed [sic] me to bed, sir.
Q After you were layed [sic] on the bed what happened next?
A He went on top of me, sir.[28]
Q Last time, you stated that the herein accused whom you called
Jun laid you on top of a bed and after that, he went on top of
Atty. Pamintuan:
Leading.
Court:
Witness may answer, subject to your objection.
Witness:
His private part was inserted in my private part, sir.[31]
Court: But there was an answer a while ago. Witness may
answer.
Witness:
A Yes, sir.
Public Pros.:

Q And, when you say he did the same to you, he inserted his
penis to your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Public Pros.:
No further question, Your Honor.[32]
III. Credibility of JONALYN as a Witness
The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYNs
competency but also her credibility. Moreover, considering her
feeble mind, she could not have fabricated or concocted her charge
against BIENVENIDO. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact
that no improper motive was shown by the defense as to why
JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against
BIENVENIDO. A rape victims testimony as to who abused her is
credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and
testify against the accused.[33] It has been held that no woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit
herself to be subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated solely
by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[34]
We, therefore, affirm the trial courts decision to lend full
credence to the testimony of JONALYN on the circumstances of
the rape, thus:
In so few a word, complainant has made herself clear about the
sexual molestation she suffered in the hands of the accused. Plain
and simple her testimony may have been, unembellished, as it is,
with details, yet, it is in its simplicity that its credence is
enhanced. Certainly, we cannot expect complainant, in her present
state of mind, to come out with a full account of her misfortune
with all its lurid details. That, to this Court, is simply beyond the
reach of her enfeebled mind. She came to talk on her sad plight
from the viewpoint of an 8-year-old child, and she must, by all
means, be understood in that light.[35]
Absent any cogent reason warranting a disturbance of the
findings of the trial court on the credibility and competency of
JONALYN, this Court has to give these findings utmost respect, if
not complete affirmation. Settled is the rule that the trial courts
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is accorded the highest
respect, for it has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly
the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and, thus, to determine
whether they are telling the truth.[36]
IV. Propriety of Propounding Leading Questions to JONALYN
We likewise agree with the trial courts conclusion that
JONALYNs testimony should be taken and understood from the
point of view of an 8-year-old child. JONALYNs testimony is
consistent with the straightforward and innocent testimony of a
child. Thus, the prosecutions persistent, repetitious and painstaking
effort in asking leading questions was necessary and indispensable
in the interest of justice to draw out from JONALYNs lips the basic
details of the grave crime committed against her by BIENVENIDO.
The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be
propounded to JONALYN. It is usual and proper for the court to
permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness
who is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition;
uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings;
inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental
equipment; confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed
while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of questions asked or
slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or

understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar

therewith.[37]
The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely
put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which
she merely confirmed as true. The questions were indeed carefully
phrased and sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make
JONALYN understand the import of the questions. In the same
vein, the prosecutions referral to JONALYNs Sinumpaang
Salaysay to refresh her memory was also reasonable. The purpose
of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the
witness and her present testimony to be put fairly and in their
proper light before the court.[38]
Thus, JONALYNs behavior merely conformed to Dr. Tuazons
clinical and expert observation that JONALYN had to be
continuously and repetitiously prompted so that she could answer
and recount a terrible experience. JONALYNs constant eyeball
fixature towards her aunt and mother does not by itself indicate
coaching, in the face of a dearth of other evidentiary bases that the
latter did coach her. There was nothing in the behavior of
JONALYN which was indicative of her failure to understand the
import of the trial proceedings. Her identification of BIENVENIDO
as her assailant is quite telling on how simple, yet unassuming, her
grasp of the situation was. Thus:
Stenographer:
Reading back the question.
Q Because you understand that this was explained to you, I
would like to read to you particularly question number 3.
Tanong: Sino naman ang ibig mong idemanda?
Answer: Si Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias
Jun Jun po.
Was this explain[ed] to you?
Atty. Pamintuan:
I stand correct[sic].
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Fiscal:
(to the witness)
Q Now, this Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun Jun,
which was the person whom you are filing the complaint of
[sic], will you kindly look around to this Court and tell us
whether or not he is inside.
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you mind to point him?
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing orange T-shirt and when
asked his name answered Bienvenido dela Cruz.[39]
V. Sufficiency of Prosecutions Evidence
It is, therefore, beyond doubt that JONALYNs lone testimony,
which was found to be credible by the trial court, is enough to
sustain a conviction.[40] At any rate, medical and physical evidence
adequately corroborated JONALYNs testimony. Time and again we
have held that the laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable
and best physical evidence of forcible defloration.[41]
On the basis of the foregoing, we agree with the trial courts
conviction of BIENVENIDO under Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96.
His acquittal under Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 is, at this point,
beyond the review powers of this Court.

Since the information charges BIENVENIDO with simple rape

only and no other modifying circumstances has been proved, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the lesser of the penalties
prescribed by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, was correctly imposed by the trial court.
We rectify the error of the trial court in granting JONALYN the
amount of P60,000 as civil indemnity. In conformity with current
jurisprudence, we hereby reduce it to P50,000.[42] An award of
moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is also just under the
circumstances.[43]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96
finding accused-appellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of
the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification
that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim JONALYN
YUMANG civil indemnity in the reduced amount of P50,000 and
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27923 November 18, 1991

MARCELA N. GONZALES, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
HON. GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, City Judge of Davao City
(Branch III), ALFREDO M. CELI, First Assistant City Fiscal
of Davao City, representing the People of the Philippines, and
FILIPINAS ORDOEZ,respondents-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
the presence and within the hearing of several persons

the following defamatory words, to wit: "MANGAAGAW NG ASAWA NG MAY ASAWA!
TIBIHON! PUTANG INA MO! WALANG HIYA!
PATAY GUTOM", which when translated to English
runs (sic) as follows: "Seducer of wives of other
husbands or adulteress. Consumptive. Your mother is
a prostitute. You do not have a sense of shame. You
are a glutton", to the dishonor, discredit and contempt
of said Filipinos Ordoez.
This is an appeal from the Decision dated 7 June 1967 Branch III of
the then Court of First Instance (now Region Trial Court) of Davao
in a petition for certiorari and prohibition (Special Civil Case No.
5270) which granted the petition and enjoined permanently both the
City Judge and City Fiscal from taking further cognizance of a
criminal case for slander (Criminal Case No. 2273-B) in the City
Court of Davao City because said case was not brought at the
instance and upon complaint of the offended party, respondent City
Fiscal had no authority to file the information, and the City Judge
had no jurisdiction over the case. 1
On 5 August 1966, the appellee moved to quash the information

asserting that the City Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged and that the Officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so. She claims therein that the alleged defamation
imputes the crime of adultery and thus cannot be prosecuted de
oficio. The other remarks, however, do not charge a crime, The
complaint must, therefore, be brought at the instance of the
offended party, which was not done in this case. Hence, the fiscal
did not have the authority to file the information and the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
The records do not show that the offended party filed a complaint in
the fiscal's office and that the Information was signed by her.
On 17 February 1966, an information for slander against accused

Marcela N. Gonzales (hereinafter referred to as the appellee) was
filed before the City Court of Davao by Assistant City Fiscal
Alfredo Celi. The information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1965, in the City of
Davao, Philippine, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused with
intent to cast dishonor, discredit and contempt upon
one Filipinas Ordoez, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and in the heat of anger uttered publicly in
The motion to quash was denied by respondent Judge, prompting

appellee to move for its reconsideration. This second motion was
likewise denied. Thus, appellee filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Davao a petition for certiorari and prohibition which
was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 5270.
Appellee reiterated in her petition the grounds in her motion to
quash and elaborated on her arguments in support thereto. On the
other hand, respondents maintained that the slanderous words
alleged in the "information contain imputations no only to (sic) one

crime but to (sic) other offenses like vice, defect and condition
which are distinct from and independent of each other; one,
admitted to be of adultery and others are public crimes which can
be prosecuted de oficio."
In deciding Civil Case No. 5270 against respondents, then Judge
Alfredo I. Gonzales opined that "the entire context of the
Information should be read together as a whole and not to pick up
(sic) particular words and phrases and then detach or isolate them
from the rest so as to give them different meaning (sic) that is
desired by the one who may use it for his own convenience" and
that "the entire defamation in question should be given an ordinary
and peculiar significance in order to render it effectual in the sense
that is most likely understood by the parties and which is in keeping
with the purpose and intent of the party who uttered them." He then
concluded and ruled that:
The first part of the defamation complained of,
quoted: "mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa" may
literally mean: "one who grabs another's husband,"
thereby imputing the commission of the crime of
adultery wherein the accused maintained an immoral
or illicit relations (sic) with another man who is not
her husband.
The prosecuting Fiscal has correctly construed in
English the significance of the first portion of the
defamation in question by imputing the commission
of the crime of adultery, in which case, it becomes
undisputed that the offended party has the exclusive
right to sign and file the complaint and not the Fiscal.
However, the City Fiscal did not interpret the correct
meaning of the succeeding group of clauses quoted:
"Putang ina mo, tibi-hon, walang hiya, patay gutom"
for he just gave them a strict, literal construction

which does not portray the real intent of the accused
and does not conform to the sense as it is ordinarily
understood by an average person. Expressions of this
kind and tenor are commonly used by many people
according to their custom specially those who are
unschooled and coming from the lower social strata.
They are usually uttered by the slip of the tongue and
are intended to describe, intensify, explain or
emphasize the other parts of the utterances which
accompany them or to which they cling or are
attached. They may be defamatory or not depending
upon the tenor and import conveyed by the
accompanying statements.
In the instant case, the above quoted combined
utterances expressed in the native dialect are mere
accompanying and supporting phrases and terms and
used to give more vivid color and importance to the
first portion, depicting the temper, emotion, demeanor
and the hatred of the petitioner (accused in the lower
Court) owing perhaps to a fit of jealousy arising from
her suspicion that the offended party is having
immoral relations with her husband.
It become (sic) clear and logical then to conclude that
the next group of words mentioned in the preceding
paragraph does not impute the commission of any
public offense that may be considered distinct and
independent from that conveyed in the first sentence,
but they are simply intended to give more spicy flavor
to the main thought expressed in the whole
statements. No other reasonable and logical
conclusion can be drawn from the premises except
that the correct imputation to the crime probably

committed in this case is that of adultery or a similar

offense, private in nature and that there is but one,
single and indivisible crime that is described by the
whole slanderous statements alleged in the
information.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court is convinced
and is of the opinion that only the crime of adultery or
a kindred offense is imputed to the accused (petitioner
herein) for uttering the alleged defamation in question
taken as a whole and no imputation to (sic) any other
public offense could be logically inferred from the
tenor and spirit conveyed therein.
Respondents-appellants challenge the above decision in their four
(4) assigned errors, to wit:
FIRST The lower court erred in holding that the
information alleges only one defamatory remark
imputing a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio.
SECOND The lower court erred in holding that the
other utterances alleged in the information are not
defamatory as to constitute the crime of slander which
can be prosecuted de oficio.
THIRD The lower court erred in holding that the
fiscal lacks authority to file the information and,
therefore, the City Court fails (sic) to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
FOURTH The lower court erred in permanently
enjoining the respondents from taking further
cognizance of the information. 2
In support thereof, they contend that:

(a) It is clear that the information alleges "many remarks or
utterances which are all defamatory" and not just one as ruled by
the court. Each may constitute a separate offense. However, since
they were made on one occasion, and the product of a single
criminal intent, there is only one offense of slander.
(b) One slanderous remark should not be given more emphasis than
the other. Neither should a single remark be considered to suit the
purpose of the accused. Rather, the rule is that all the slanderous
statements should be treated as one and taken as a single offense of
slander.
(c) The one remark held by the court to be slanderous as it imputed
the crime of adultery is "mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may
asawa." Standing by itself, it does not, contrary to the court's ruling,
impute the crime of adultery. At most, it implies that the one to
whom it is addressed is a flirt, a temptress, or one who indulges in
enticing other husbands. It imputes a vice, condition or act which
equally casts dishonor and contempt upon the person alluded to.
Flirtation is not adultery.
(d) All the defamatory statements alleged in the information
likewise only impute a vice, defect, act or condition not constituting
a crime. The fiscal, therefore, has the authority to file the
information and the City Court acquired jurisdiction over the case.
(e) Assuming for the sake of argument that the defamatory
statements alleged in the information include one imputing an
offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, still the case at bar is
one which can be instituted upon the instance of the fiscal on the
ground that what then is involved is a compound or complex crime,
one of the components of which is a public crime, in which case it

can be prosecuted de oficio under the theory that public interest is

paramount to private interest. 3
In her Brief, 4 appellee maintains that:
(a) when the slanderous remarks, uttered on one occasion with one
criminal intent, also imputes the commission of adultery, regardless
of the other imputations, the charge can only be brought at the
instance of and upon complaint subscribed and filed by the
offended party. Thus, in People vs. Padilla, 5 it was held:
... while said Article 364 penalizes any intrigue which
has for its purpose to blemish the honor or reputation
of a person, the information avers facts which do not
merely constitute an incriminatory machination or a
defamatory intrigue but go as far as accusing a
married woman of having illicit relations with a man
not her husband which in effect constitutes the crime
of adultery.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that under Article 360, paragraph 4, of
the Revised Penal Code, no criminal action for
defamation which consists in the imputation of a
crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio can be
brought except upon the complaint filed by the
offended party, and the crime of adultery is one that
cannot be prosecuted de oficio (Article 344, idem.), it
is obvious that the information filed in this case is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court of
origin. The trial court was therefore correct in
quashing the information.
(b) People vs. Yu, cited by appellants, is not applicable in this case
because it refers to a complex crime defined under the Revised
Penal Code which imposes only one (1) penalty. Appellants admit
that in this case there is only one offense, although it involves many
slanderous remarks.
Slander is oral defamation while libel is defamation in writing. 6 In
both, there is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredict, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead. 7
In determining whether the offense has been committed, the
defamatory words are to be construed in their entirety, and should
be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading or hearing them, unless
it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. 8 In
short, the language used must be understood "in its plain and
popular sense to read the sentences as would the man on the
street." 9 The intent or purpose then of the speaker or writer is not
relevant.
The issues in this case revolve on the correct appreciation of the
statements uttered by appellee and alleged in the information to be
slanderous. They read as follows:
Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa! Tibihon!
Putang Ina Mo! Walang Hiya! Patay Gutom!
The fiscal translated them as follows:
Seducer of wives of other husbands or adulteress.
Consumptive. Your mother is a prostitute. You do not
have a sense of shame. You are a glutton.

Judge Gonzales, after postulating the major premises that the entire
defamation in question should be given an ordinary and peculiar
significance in order to render it effectual in the sense most likely
understood by the parties and which is in keeping with the purpose
and intent of the party who uttered them, held that the controlling
slanderous utterance is the first part which literally means: "one
who grabs another's husband," thereby "imputing the commission
of the crime of adultery," while the rest are mere accompanying and
supporting phrases and terms used to give more vivid color and
importance to the first portion.
In the light of the above rule of determining whether the offense of
oral defamation or libel has been committed, it is evident that the
last part of Judge Gonzales' major premise focusing on the purpose
and intent of the speaker is erroneous.
Equally erroneous is his literal translation of the first portion of the
alleged defamatory utterance. We agree with appellants that "mangaagaw ng asawa ng may asawa," even if translated as "one who
grabs another's husband," does not necessarily mean an adulteress.
At most, it may imply that the person whom it is addressed is a
"flirt, a temptress, or one who is in enticing other husbands;" hence,
it is more of an imputation of a vice, condition or act not
constituting a crime.
If indeed it were the intention of the appellee to impute upon the
offended party the crime of adultery, then in the light of charge that
the remarks were made "in the heat of anger" that, as Judge
Gonzales described it, they were uttered in manner "depicting the
temper, emotion, demeanor and hatred of the petitioner (accused in
the lower court) owing perhaps to a fit of jealousy arising from her
suspicion that offended party is having immoral relations with her
husband," appellee should have used more dialect, pointed and
descriptive terms to convey the accusation that the offended party is
a adulteress. Under such circumstances, she would not have luxury
of time to choose less offensive or even harmless words to

camouflage a clear intent to defame the other and thus avoid
criminal or civil liability for the utterance. On its face, her statement
is merely suggestive of a doubt as to the kind relationship the
offended party would have with married men. It is thus an
imputation of some kind of moral depravity, immoral conduct or a
vice, but certainly not of a crime.
Neither do We agree with Judge Gonzalez' conclusion the other
portions of the alleged slanderous remarks "are me accompanying
and supporting phrases and terms used to give more vivid color and
importance to the first portion." The other remarks are by
themselves defamatory and are not at all related to the first portion.
They were uttered to impute a condition, defect, status or vice
intended to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the offended
party. "Tibihon" means a suffering from tuberculosis, and not
"consumptive" as translated by the fiscal."Putang Ina
Mo," although referring to a mother, was meant to suggest that the
offended party is not a legitimate daughter of her mother. "WalangHiya," which means "shameless," could relate to the offended
party's being a flirt, seducer, or a daughter of a prostitute. "PatayGutom" is derogatory remark connoting abject poverty entirely
unrelated to the first portion. In short, the other imputations did not
give color and importance to the first portion; they were uttered
merely to expose all the possible vices, defects, real or imaginary,
status, or condition of the offended party. None of these, however,
imputed any crime.
Accordingly, the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that:
No criminal action for defamation which consist in
the imputation of a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the

instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by

offended party.
which has specific reference to the crimes against chastity, 10 and
the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse. ...
are not applicable in this case since, as above discussed, alleged
slanderous utterances subject of the assailed information do not
impute any crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The foregoing considered, neither People vs. Yu, cited by appellant,
nor People vs. Padilla, cited by appellee, is applicable in this case.
The first refers to a prosecution "for rape murder" (included in the
generic term homicide) under 335 in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. A single act resulted in two (2) grave felonies.
Appellants admit that the instant case, the remarks were made in
one occasion that even granting for the sake of argument that one
portion imputes a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the
rest, however, can be, hence the applicability of People vs. Yu. The
argument is flawed by the wrong assumption that Article 48 the
Revised Penal Code applies in this case. Under said Article, there is
a complex crime when a single act constitutes two (2) more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense necessary means for
committing another. Appellants apparently forgot that it is their
thesis that the rest of the utterances did not impute any crime but
merely a "vice, defect, act, and condition not constituting a crime;"
otherwise stated, regardless of the number of defamatory utterances,
the appellee can only be prosecuted for a single offense.
Neither is People vs. Padilla applicable. In that case, the special

counsel of Pasay City accused Lydia Padilla of the offense of
intriguing against honor 11 in an information which alleges that
"with the principal purpose of blemishing the honor and reputation
of one Fausta Bravo, a married woman, (the accused did) circulate
and spread gossips, rumors or stories highly offensive and
defamatory to her honor, virtue and reputation, by then and there
telling some people in the neighborhood that said Fausta Bravo
was a paramour of one Sangalang , a mannot her husband." 12 The
lower court dismissed the case on the ground that it was not
initiated by a complaint filed by the offended party pursuant to
paragraph 4 of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, considering
that it involves an imputation of a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio. This Court sustained the dismissal for the
reason that the import of the allegation in the information cannot be
mistaken "[I]t charges Fausta Bravo with committing adultery
pure and simple." Contrary then to the pretension of appellee, only
one (1) crime was imputed adultery.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from in SP Civil Case No.
5270 of the court below dated 7 June 1967 is hereby REVERSED.
The Order of the City Court of Davao City of 27 July 1966 in
Criminal Case No. 2273-B denying the motion to quash is hereby
REINSTATED and said court is directed to proceed with the
arraignment, if one has not yet been had, and the trial of the case on
its merits.
Costs against petitioner-appellee.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS.

JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

both Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner, Jorge Salazar, is

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

Lettmayr[11] and as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva from

After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

had the obligation to account for the proceeds thereof to

To support petitioners claim that the remainder of the amount

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

Further, even assuming that the letter may be given credence,

disposition of the property, contrary to the purpose for which the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

would serve no other additional purpose. We note that at the time

Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no authority to

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P.

filing of the necessary information against the petitioner. This

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

The Municipal Trial Court, per public respondent Judge

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

Tayco,[18]People vs. Del Rosario,[19] and People vs. Coquia,[20] this

prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation also suspends the

xxx xxx xxx

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

SEC. 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the rule on

the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double

Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution provide:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

take over, at any stage from any investigatory

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

G.R. Nos. 116259-60

February 20, 1996

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,

February 20, 1996

SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner,

period of ninety (90) days, and to enjoin respondent court from

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

has, therefore, lost his power to conduct preliminary

having been received by the Ombudsman as of May 24,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

assailed Resolution issued on May 24, 1992 (Annex "H1", ibid.). 5

in abeyance of further action on his supplemental petition until after

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

From the mosaic of the foregoing events and the incidents

directors of ERA Technology and Resource Corporation which

In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in

1. In asserting that there was a violation of his right to a speedy trial

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

(1) Sometime after the complaint of private complainant was

prosecution necessarily had to ponder on the motion after

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

jurisdiction thereover, have become final and conclusive by reason

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

intervention in the transaction in which one has financial or

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

facts in the information which would prove the causal relation

It is thus clearly apparent that the complaints and the informations

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES | PROS. MACABABBAD

II. G.R. Nos. 118896-97