The dispute regarding the South China Sea initially came into public attention in the national

news through the conflict between China and the Philippines over the Spratlys Islands,
specifically the Ayungin Shoal. However, the problem spreads far beyond that scope. Five
other countries, namely Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia, are also involved
in the territorial disputes. Beyond the obvious issue of authority over nautical territory and
the islands and reefs that comprise the land area, its value lies in the rich reserves of crude oil
and natural gas that purportedly lies beneath the otherwise unassuming piece of land and
control over an area that is increasingly becoming a key point, a center of gravity, in global
politics and economics.
One of the factors that make these particular issues hard to see through to a resolution is the
different bases on which each sovereign state holds its claim or stake on a particular area. The
Philippines, for example, claims its territory based on the UNCLOS, or the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which all the mentioned countries have signed and
ratified. However, the problem with using the UNCLOS as the basis for delineating the lines
of control is the fact that the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) declared by the countries
would overlap, which delivers more contention regarding the conflict. Other countries base
their claims on historical sovereignty, such as China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Yet others declare
their power virtually through force, specifically naval power. Given the rapid developments
in transportation and communication technologies, we can see that holding key access points
located in nautical territory would mean a significant shift in the influence of whoever holds
power.
Specifying and declaring which states hold which territories is significant because one of the
biggest issues in political economics today is the problem of sovereign security. Another
factor that affects the negotiations regarding territory lies in the fact that ASEAN does not
want to be a supranational institution, which makes it hard to implement and enforce the set
jurisdictions. Despite the fact that global politics is becoming a less state-centric and
institutions are starting to gain more control in international affairs, we can see that there still
remain traces of realist theory in that countries would, of course, consider their interests as
their priority. For example, Chinas increasingly aggressive actions suggest that they are only
inching towards their goal, which is ownership of the islands, shoals, and cays that make up
the land territory in the South China Sea. While it does not mean that they would dare openly
declare a war on other states, it still maintains its position of superiority over them through its
resources and capabilities--through military, economic, or political means. It sees that
keeping the peace between itself and other countries would be more beneficial because the
fact that institutionalism has overtaken realism as the paradigm in global political economy
means that its economy has become dependent on other economies, and vice-versa. National
security, for now, means keeping the balance of power between the countries.
On this point, yet another significant player in the landscape is the United States. Even
though China is gaining economic and military superiority, it still remains that American
power holds the most weight in global affairs. There lies contention in the fact that the US is
not even part of the region, and that intervention from its government complicates the
situation, it holds economic interests in the states allied to it, especially our country.
References
Himmelman, J. (n.d.). A Game of Shark and Minnow - Who Will Win Control of the Sounth
China Sea? - NYTimes.com.NYTimes.com. Retrieved February 4, 2014, from
http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/

UNCLOS and Agreement on Part XI - Preamble and frame index. UN News Center.
Retrieved February 4, 2014, from
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm