Professional Documents
Culture Documents
within which to file her Petition for Review does not serve the
same purpose as the Petition for Review itself. Such a Motion
merely presents the important dates and the justification for the
additional time requested for, but it does
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
379
37
9
80
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Judges; That the trial court judge who decided a case is not
the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence is of
little consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs) are complete and available for consideration by the
former.What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there
exists a disputable presumption that the RTC Decision was
rendered by the judge in the regular performance of his official
duties. While the said presumption is only disputable, it is
satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other evidence.
Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the presumption
that the RTC judge, in resolving the case and drafting his
Decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on
record. That the said RTC judge is not the same judge who heard
the case and received the evidence is of little consequence when
the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are
complete and available for consideration by the former.
Evidence; Admissions; Documentary
Evidence; Promissory
Notes; By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an
instrument is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits
that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority, that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures
exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying on it, that the
document was delivered, and that any formal requisites required by
law, are waived by him; The effect of an admission is such that in
the case of a promissory note a prima facie case is made for the
plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of evidence on his part
and entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a special
defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the
defendant.Petitioner Citibank did not deny the existence nor
questioned the authenticity of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 it issued
in favor of respondent for her money market placements. In fact, it
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the said PNs, but
qualified that they were no longer outstanding. In Hibberd v.
Rohde and McMillian, 32 Phil. 476, this
2
381
38
1
82
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano
PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are uncontested, respondent was
able to establish prima facie that petitioner Citibank is liable to
her for the amounts stated therein. The assertion of petitioner
Citibank of payment of the said PNs is an affirmative allegation of
a new matter, the burden of proof as to such resting on petitioner
Citibank. Respondent having proved the existence of the
obligation, the burden of proof was upon petitioner Citibank to
show that it had been discharged. It has already been established
by this Court thatAs a general rule, one who pleads payment has
the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove
non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
3
38
3
Sabeniano
numerous transactions during their tenure, this Court is
reluctant to give much weight to the testimonies of Mr. Pujeda and
Mr. Tan regarding the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and
the use by respondent of the proceeds thereof for opening TD
accounts. This Court finds it implausible that they should
remember, after all these years, this particular transaction with
respondent involving her PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and TD
accounts. Both witnesses did not give any reason as to why, from
among all the clients they had dealt with and all the transactions
they had processed as officers of petitioner Citibank, they specially
remembered respondent and her PNs No. 23356 and 23357. Their
testimonies likewise lacked details on the circumstances
surrounding the payment of the two PNs and the opening of the
time deposit accounts by respondent, such as the date of payment
of the two PNs, mode of payment, and the manner and context by
which respondent relayed her instructions to the officers of
petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of her two PNs in opening
the TD accounts.
Same; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and Phrases;
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence
adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.After
going through the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by both sides to this case, it is this Courts assessment
that respondent did indeed have outstanding loans with petitioner
Citibank at the time it effected the off-set or compensation on 25
July 1979 (using respondents savings deposit with petitioner
Citibank), 5 September 1979 (using the proceeds of respondents
money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance) and 26
October 1979 (using respondents dollar accounts remitted from
Citibank-Geneva). The totality of petitioners evidence as to the
existence of the said loans preponderates over respondents.
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence
adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.
4
84
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano
as the money it represents. Moreover, the MCs were crossed
checks, with the words Payees Account Only.
Same; Same; Crossed Checks; A crossed check cannot be
presented to the drawee bank for payment in cashthe check can
only be deposited with the payees bank which, in turn, must
present it for payment against the drawee bank in the course of
normal banking hours; The crossed check can only be deposited and
the drawee bank may only pay to another bank in the payees or
indorsers account.In general, a crossed check cannot be
presented to the drawee bank for payment in cash. Instead, the
check can only be deposited with the payees bank which, in turn,
must present it for payment against the drawee bank in the course
of normal banking hours. The crossed check cannot be presented
for payment, but it can only be deposited and the drawee bank
may only pay to another bank in the payees or indorsers account.
The effect of crossing a check was described by this Court
in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals,
350 SCRA 446 (2001)[T]he crossing of a check with the phrase
Payees Account Only is a warning that the check should be
deposited in the account of the payee. Thus, it is the duty of the
collecting bank PCI Bank to ascertain that the check be deposited
38
5
and regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been
followed. There is no question that the loan transaction between
petitioner Citibank and the respondent is a private transaction.
The transactions revolving around the crossed MCsfrom their
issuance by petitioner Citibank to respondent as payment of the
proceeds of her loans; to its deposit in respondents accounts with
several different banks; to the clearing of the MCs by an
independent clearing house; and finally, to the payment of the
MCs by petitioner Citibank as the drawee bank of the said
checksare all private transactions which shall be presumed to
have been fair and regular to all the parties concerned. In addition,
the banks involved in the foregoing transactions are also presumed
to have followed the ordinary course of business in the acceptance
of the crossed MCs for deposit in respondents accounts, submitting
them for clearing, and their eventual payment and cancellation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where checks crossed for payees
account only were actually deposited, cleared, and paid, then the
presumption would be that the said checks were properly deposited
to the account of the payee, who was clearly named as such in the
checks; The mere fact that the Managers Checks (MCs) do not bear
the payees signature at the back does not negate deposit thereof in
her account.Respondent denied ever receiving MCs No. 220701
and 226467. However, considering that the said checks were
crossed for payees account only, and that they were actually
deposited, cleared, and paid, then the presumption would be that
the said checks were properly deposited to the account of
respondent, who was clearly named the payee in the checks.
Respondents bare allegations that she did not receive the two
checks fail to convince this Court, for to sustain her, would be for
this Court to conclude that an irregularity had occurred
somewhere from the time of the issuance of the said checks, to
their deposit, clearance, and payment, and which would
386
86
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano
have involved not only petitioner Citibank, but also BPI,
which accepted the checks for deposit, and the Central Bank of the
Philippines, which cleared the checks. It falls upon the respondent
to overcome or dispute the presumption that the crossed checks
were issued, accepted for deposit, cleared, and paid for by the
banks involved following the ordinary course of their business. The
mere fact that MCs No. 220701 and 226467 do not bear
respondents signature at the back does not negate deposit thereof
in her account. The liability for the lack of indorsement on the
MCs no longer fall on petitioner Citibank, but on the bank who
received the same for deposit, in this case, BPI Cubao Branch.
Once again, it must be noted that the MCs were crossed, for
payees account only, and the payee named in both checks was
none other than respondent. The crossing of the MCs was already
a warning to BPI to receive said checks for deposit only in
respondents account. It was up to BPI to verify whether it was
receiving the crossed MCs in accordance with the instructions on
the face thereof. If, indeed, the MCs were deposited in accounts
other than respondents, then the respondent would have a cause
of action against BPI.
Same; Same; Same; A check, whether a managers check or
ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be
refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.Mr. Tan, in his
deposition, further explained that provisional receipts were issued
when payment to the bank was made using checks, since the
checks would still be subject to clearing. The purpose for the
provisional receipts was merely to acknowledge the delivery of the
checks to the possession of the bank, but not yet of payment. This
bank practice finds legitimacy in the pronouncement of this Court
6
38
7
88
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano
state of facts. For instance, one or two witnesses may testify
to a given state of facts, and six or seven witnesses of equal candor,
7
38
9
90
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano
different way. Besides, if evidence of similar acts are to be
invariably admitted, they will give rise to a multiplicity of
collateral issues and will subject the defendant to surprise as well
as confuse the court and prolong the trial.
Banks and Banking; Compensation; Compensation takes place
by operation of law.There is little controversy when it comes to
the right of petitioner Citibank to compensate respondents
391
39
1
92
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano
to Article 2118 of the Civil CodeART. 2118. If a credit has
been pledged becomes due before it is redeemed, the pledgee may
collect and receive the amount due. He shall apply the same to the
payment of his claim, and deliver the surplus, should there be any,
to the pledgor.
Same; Same; Conflict
of
Laws; Processual
Presumptions;Words and Phrases; In the absence of any allegation
and evidence presented of the specific rules and laws governing the
constitution of a pledge in Geneva, Switzerland, they will be
presumed to be the same as Philippine local or domestic lawsthis
is known as processual presumption.Certain principles of private
international law should be considered herein because the
property pledged was in the possession of an entity in a foreign
country, namely, Citibank-Geneva. In the absence of any
10
393
39
3
11
94
Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) vs.
Sabeniano
ered, this Court has also recognized exceptions to the general
rule, wherein it authorized the review of matters, even those not
assigned as errors in the appeal, if the consideration thereof is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case, and there is a
close interrelation between the omitted assignment of error and
those actually assigned and discussed by the appellant. Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err in awarding the damages when it
already made findings that would justify and support the said
award.
Banks and Banking; Banking is impressed with public interest
and its fiduciary character requires high standards of integrity and
performancea bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts
of its depositors with meticulous care whether such accounts consist
only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos.Although this
Court appreciates the right of petitioner Citibank to effect legal
compensation of respondents local deposits, as well as its right to
the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 by virtue of the
notarized Deeds of Assignment, to partly extinguish respondents
outstanding loans, it finds that petitioner Citibank did commit
wrong when it failed to pay and properly account for the proceeds
39
5
_______________
1
396
396
of a merger, doing business as part of its successor-ininterest, BPI Card Finance Corporation. However, so as to
_______________
4
13
_______________
11
397
10
11
Civil Case No. 11336 was raffled and re-reffled to four different Judges
of the Makati RTC before it was finally resolved. It was originally raffled to
Makati RTC, Branch 140, presided by Judge Ansberto P. Paredes. On 4
February 1987, before the termination of the re-direct examination of herein
respondent (plaintiff before the
398
398
400
400
14
15
17
13
14
The filing of a motion for extension does not automatically suspend the
running of the period for appeal, since the purpose of such motion is to
merely ask the court to grant an enlargement of the time fixed by law. The
movant, therefore, has no right to assume that his motion would be granted,
and should check with the court as to the outcome of his motion, so that if the
same is denied, he can still perfect his appeal. (Hon. Bello and Ferrer v.
Fernando, 114 Phil. 101, 104; 4 SCRA 135, 138 [1962]).
15
18
_______________
402
402
16
Rollo, p. 374.
17
18
403
404
20
Firestone
Tire
and
Rubber
Company
of
the
Philippines
v.
Tempongko,137 Phil. 239, 244; 27 SCRA 418, 422 (1969); Singh v. Liberty
Insurance Corp., 118 Phil. 532, 535; 8 SCRA 517, 519-520 (1963).
20
405
18
See the case of Borromeo v. Court of Appeals (162 Phil. 430, 438; 70
SCRA 329 [1976]) wherein this Court pronounced that a partys right to
appeal shall not be affected by the perfection of another appeal from the same
decision; otherwise, it would lead to the absurd proposition that one party
may be deprived of the right to appeal from the portion of a decision against
him just because the other party who had been notified of the decision ahead
had already perfected his appeal in so far as the said decision adversely
affects him. If the perfection of an appeal by one party would not bar the
right of the other party to appeal from the same decision, then an unperfected
appeal, as in the case at bar, would have far less effect.
406
406
23
The Executive Secretary v. Gordon, 359 Phil. 266, 271; 298 SCRA 736,
740 (1998).
23
Young v. John Keng Seng, 446 Phil. 823, 833; 398 SCRA 629, 638 (2003).
407
408
25
_______________
24
Sps. Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283; 285 SCRA
The Court of Appeals modified the trial courts findings and conclusions,
410
27
27
411
signed. What is more, there was not an iota of proof save the
plaintiffs bare testimony that she had indeed applied for loan with
the Development Bank of the Philippines.
More importantly, the two deeds of assignment were notarized,
hence they partake the nature of a public document. It makes
more than preponderant proof to overturn the effect of a notarial
attestation. Copies of the deeds of assignments were actually filed
with the Records Management and Archives Office.
Finally, there were sufficient evidence wherein the plaintiff had
admitted the existence of her loans with the defendant Bank in the
total amount of P1,920,000.00 exclusive of interests and penalty
charges (Exhibits 28, 31, 32, and 33).
In fine, this Court hereby finds that the defendants had
established the genuineness and due execution of the various
promissory notes heretofore identified as well as the two deeds of
assignments of the plaintiffs money market placements with
defendant FNCB Finance, on the strength of which the said money
market placements were applied to partially pay the plaintiffs
past due obligation with the defendant Bank. Thus, the total sum
of P1,053,995.80 of the plaintiffs past due obligation was partially
offset by the said money market placement leaving a balance of
P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979 (Exhibit 34).
_______________
22
28
_______________
412
412
30
It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had
not heard the controversy at all, the trial having been
conducted by then Judge Emilio L. Polig, who was
indefinitely suspended by this Court. Nonetheless, the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial were
29
413
the truth and falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the
trial cannot render a valid and just decision since the latter can
also rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the
trial as the basis of his decision.
(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56, 63 [1992])
At any rate, the test to determine the value of the testimony of
the witness is whether or not such is in conformity with knowledge
and consistent with the experience of mankind (People vs.
Morre, 217 SCRA 219 [1993]). Further, the credibility of witnesses
can also be assessed on the basis of the substance of their
testimony and the surrounding circumstances (People v.
Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44 [1992]). A critical evaluation of the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses reveals that their
testimony accords with the aforementioned tests, and carries with
it the ring of truth end perforce, must be given full weight and
credit.
414
14.5%
interest per annum (p.a.)
Money market placement with Citibank,
evidenced by
PN No. 23357 (which cancels and
supersedes PN No. 22528),
earning 14.5% interest p.a.
Money market placement with FNCB
Finance, evidenced
by PN No. 5757 (which cancels and
supersedes PN No. 4952),
earning 17% interest p.a.
Money market placement with FNCB
Finance, evidenced
by PN No. 5758 (which cancels and
supersedes PN No. 2962),
earning 17% interest p.a.
Sabeniano
P
203,150.00
P
500,000.00
P
500,000.00
416
Date
(mm/dd/
yyyy)
12/06/1976
01/14/1977
02/09/1977
03/17/1977
Amount
(P)
Interest
(p.a.)
500,000.00
508,444.44
313,952.59
200,000.00
318,897.34
203,150.00
16%
15%
15-3/4%
15-3/4%
14-1/2%
14-1/2%
32
_______________
25
31
32
417
418
_______________
33
34
Mr. Herminio Pujeda, at the time he testified before the RTC in 1990,
37
Atty. Mabasa:
Okey [sic]. Now Mr. Witness, you were asked to testify in
this case and this case is [sic] consist [sic] of several
Mr. Francisco Tan, at the time of his deposition in 1990, was already
420
420
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
421
28
Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 84 Phil. 330, 346 (1949).
422
422
from among all the clients they had dealt with and all the
transactions they had processed as officers of petitioner
Citibank, they specially remembered respondent and her
PNs No. 23356 and 23357. Their testimonies likewise lacked
details on the circumstances surrounding the payment of the
two PNs and the opening of the time deposit accounts by
respondent, such as the date of payment of the two PNs,
mode of payment, and the manner and context by which
respondent relayed her instructions to the officers of
petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of her two PNs in
opening the TD accounts.
Moreover, while there are documentary evidences to
support and trace respondents money market placements
with petitioner Citibank, from the original PN No. 20773,
rolled-over several times to, finally, PNs No. 23356 and
23357, there is an evident absence of any documentary
evidence on the payment of these last two PNs and the use of
the proceeds thereof by respondent for opening TD accounts.
The paper trail seems to have ended with the copies of PNs
No. 23356 and 23357. Although both Mr. Pujeda and Mr. Tan
said that they based their testimonies, not just on their
memories but also on the documents on file, the supposed
documents on which they based those portions of their
testimony on the payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and
_______________
39
423
424
42
43
_______________
40
41
42
43
425
Date
(mm/dd/
yyyy)
04/29/1977
PN
No.
4952
4962
06/02/1977 5757
5758
8167
08/31/1977
8169
Cancels
PN No.
None
None
4952
4962
5757
5752
Maturity
Date
(mm/dd/yyyy)
06/01/1977
06/01/1977
08/31/1977
08/31/1977
08/25/1978
08/25/1978
Amount
(P)
500,000.00
600,000.00
500,000.00
500,000.00
500,000.00
500,000.00
Interest
(p.a.)
17%
17%
17%
17%
14%
14%
45
46
_______________
44
45
46
426
426
Date of
Check Amount
Notation
Issuance
No.
(P)
(mm/dd/yyyy)
09/01/1978
76962 12,833.34 Interest payment on
PN#08167
09/01/1978
76961 12,833.34 Interest payment on
PN#08169
09/05/1978
77035 500,000.00 Full payment of principal
on PN#08167 which is
hereby cancelled
09/05/ 1978
77034 500,000.00 Full payment of principal
on PN#08169 which is
hereby cancelled
Then again, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were later returned
to petitioner FNCB Finance together with a memo, dated 6
September 1978, from Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, to a
Mr. Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance. According
to the memo, the two checks, in the total amount of
P1,000,000.00, were to be returned to respondents account
with instructions to book the said amount in money market
placements for one more year. Pursuant to the said memo,
Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were invested by petitioner
47
31
427
49
49
428
428
32
52
53
_______________
50
51
52
53
429
US$
+
US$
US$
US$
market
US$
+
US$
US$
US$ 115317.33 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
US$ 145561.39 Total proceeds of both placements on
25.10.1979
+ 11381.31 total of both current accounts
US$
US$ 156942.70 Total funds available
- 149632.99
US$
Transfer to Citibank Manila on 26.10.1979
(counter value of Pesos 1102944.78)
US$
7309.71 Balance in current accounts
6998.84 Transfer to Citibank Zuerichac no.
US$
121359 on March 13, 1980
US$
310.87 various charges including closing charges
According to the foregoing computation, by 25 October 1979,
respondent had a total of US$156,942.70, from which,
US$149,632.99 was transferred by Citibank-Geneva to
petitioner Citibank in Manila, and was used by the latter to
offset respondents outstanding loans. The balance of
respondents accounts with Citibank-Geneva, after the
remittance to petitioner Citibank in Manila, amounted to
US$7,309.71,
430
430
Description
Principal and interests of PNs No. 20138 and
20139
(money market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance)
Savings account with petitioner Citibank
Dollar remittance from Citibank-Geneva
Amount
P
1,022,916.66
31,079.14
431
Of US$149,632.99)
Total
1,102,944.78
P 2,156,940.58
55
PN
No.
32935
33751
33798
34025
34079
34192
34402
34534
34609
34740
Total
Date of
Issuance
(mm/dd/yyyy)
07/20/1978
10/13/1978
10/19/1978
11/15/1978
11/21/1978
12/04/1978
12/26/1978
01/09/1979
01/17/1979
01/30/1979
Date of
Maturity
(mm/dd/yyyy)
09/18/1978
12/12/1978
11/03/1978
01/15/1979
01/19/1979
01/18/1979
02/23/1979
03/09/1979
03/19/1979
03/30/1979
Principal
Amount
P 400,000.00
100,000.00
100,000.00
150,000.00
250,000.00
100,000.00
300,000.00
150,000.00
150,000.00
220,000.00
P1,920,000.00
Date of
Release
(mm/dd/yyy
07/20/1978
Unrecovered
10/19/1978
11/16/1978
11/21/1978
12/05/1978
12/26/1978
01/09/1979
01/17/1979
01/30/1979
_______________
54
55
432
34
432
_______________
When respondent was unable to pay the first set of PNs upon
their maturity, these were rolled-over or renewed several
times, necessitating the execution by respondent of new PNs
in favor of petitioner Citibank. As of 5 April 1979, respondent
had the following outstanding PNs (second set), the
principal amount of which remained at P1,920,000.00
56
56
57
433
59
60
61
35
59
60
61
434
434
63
_______________
62
63
64
435
66
_______________
65
66
436
436
Re:
Re:
S/A
No.
25-225928
and C/A No. 484-946
This letter serves as an authority to debit whatever the
outstanding balance from my captioned accounts and credit the
amount to my loan outstanding account with you.
_______________
67
68
437
P
2,123,843.20
(1,022,916.66)
_______________
69
(31,079.14)
P
1,069,847.40
438
438
38
_______________
70
71
75
439
73
74
73
74
75
440
440
by PN No. 34079), and pointed out that the checks did not
bear her indorsements. She did not deny receiving all other
checks but she interposed that she received these checks, not
as proceeds of loans, but as payment of the principal amounts
and/or interests from her money market placements with
petitioner Citibank. She also raised doubts as to the notation
on each of the checks that reads RE: Proceeds of
PN#[corresponding PN No.], saying that such notation did
not appear on the MCs when she originally received them
and that the notation appears to have been written by a
typewriter different from that used in writing all other
information on the checks (i.e., date, payee, and
amount). She even testified that MCs were not supposed to
bear notations indicating the purpose for which they were
issued.
As to the second set of PNs, respondent acknowledged
having signed them all. However, she asserted that she only
executed these PNs as part of the simulated loans she and
Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank concocted. Respondent
explained that she had a pending loan application for a big
amount with the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), and when Mr. Tan found out about this, he suggested
that they could make it appear that the respondent had
outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank and the latter
was already demanding payment thereof; this might
persuade DBP to approve respondents loan application. Mr.
Tan made the respondent sign the second set of PNs, so that
he may have something to show the DBP investigator who
might
76
_______________
76
441
441
78
_______________
40
77
TSN, 7 May 1986, Vol. II, pp. 42-52; TSN, 19 May 1986, Vol. II, pp. 3-28.
78
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 613, 621; 305 SCRA 138, 146
(1999).
_______________
442
442
80
81
79
553; 326 SCRA 641, 656 (2000), with reference to Tan v. Court of Appeals,239
SCRA 310, 322 (1994).
80
443
83
84
41
_______________
82
Moran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105836, 7 March 1994, 230 SCRA
799, 311-312.
83
84
85
Id., Section 3.
444
444
87
88
89
_______________
86
87
88
89
445
91
_______________
90
Corporation, G.R. No. 74917, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 188, 199.
446
446
93
43
Section 65.
93
Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 677, 697; 252 SCRA 620,
630-631 (1996); Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89802, 7 May
1992, 208 SCRA 465, 472.
447
448
44
97
_______________
95
Exhibits GGG and JJJ, plaintiffs folder of exhibits, pp. 109, 113.
96
97
449
_______________
45
98
450
450
100
46
99
100
102
103
104
452
452
102
103
104
453
454
106
107
_______________
105
48
106
107
TSN, 7 March 1991, Vol. IX, pp. 15-19; TSN, 13 March 1991, Vol. X, pp.
7-9.
455
TSN, 19 March 1991, Vol. X, pp. 17-21; TSN, 8 April 1991, Vol. X, pp.
31-34.
456
456
110
109
110
111
_______________
111
_______________
457
113
114
112
113
ed., 2000).
458
458
The best evidence rule has been made part of the revised
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 3, which reads
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
50
Sabeniano
Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is allowed
(Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil 565). x x x
115
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy
of the Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however,
violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence,
states that:
Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does
not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production.24
x x x x
In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability
has been abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no
real dispute arised. This measure is a sensible and progressive one
and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential
feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent
has been given an opportunity to inspect it. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it
considered and weighed in evidence the photocopies and
microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by
the petitioners to establish the existence of respondents
loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never
the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was
respondents position that the PNs in the first set (with the
exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in
the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely
executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the
MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent
51
F.D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II, 571 (8th ed.,
2000).
116
460
460
_______________
117
461
52
462
462
_______________
119
464
The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and judicial
convenience. The fact that a person has committed the same or
similar acts at some prior time affords, as a general rule, no logical
guaranty that he committed the act in question. This is so because,
subjectively, a mans mind and even his modes of life may change;
and, objectively, the conditions under which he may find himself at
a given time may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a
different way. Besides, if evidence of similar acts are to be
54
121
466
123
55
467
468
126
_______________
124
125
469
128
129
_______________
127
129
Cuizon v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 456, 482; 260 SCRA 645, 662
(1996).
470
470
_______________
130
_______________
131
472
133
_______________
132
133
473
Sabeniano
dated. Since it is undeniable that respondent was out of the
country on 24 September 1979, then she could not have
executed the pledge on the said date.
Third, the Declaration of Pledge was irregularly filled-out.
The pledge was in a standard printed form. It was
constituted in favor of Citibank, N.A., otherwise referred to
therein as the Bank. It should be noted, however, that in the
space which should have named the pledgor, the name of
petitioner Citibank was typewritten, to wit
134
474
474
60
Records, Vol. I, p. 310; Order, dated 2 September 1988, Id. and penned by
Judge Francisco X. Velez, Records, Vol. I, p. 449; Order, dated 24 November
1988, penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez, Records, Vol. I, p. 458; Order,
dated 25 April 1989, penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez, Records, Vol. I, pp.
476-477.
475
_______________
137
Corporation, 361 Phil. 463, 477; 301 SCRA 537, 550 (1999).
138
476
476
V
The parties shall be liable for interests on their monetary
obligations to each other, as determined herein.
In summary, petitioner Citibank is ordered by this Court to
pay respondent the proceeds of her money market
placements, represented by PNs No. 23356 and 23357,
amounting to P318,897.34 and P203,150.00, respectively,
earning an interest of 14.5% per annum as stipulated in the
PNs, beginning 17 March 1977, the date of the placements.
Petitioner Citibank is also ordered to refund to respondent
the amount of US$149,632.99, or its equivalent in Philippine
currency, which had been remitted from her CitibankGeneva accounts. These dollar accounts, consisting of two
fiduciary placements and current accounts with CitibankGeneva shall continue earning their respective stipulated
interests from 26 October 1979, the date of their remittance
by Citibank-Geneva to petitioner Citibank in Manila and
applied against respondents outstanding loans.
139
_______________
139
Note, however, that the legal interest has been increased from six percent
to twelve percent per annum by virtue of Central Bank Circulars No. 416,
dated 29 July 1974, and No. 905, dated 10 December 1982.
477
_______________
140
Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 101181-84, 22 June 1992, 210 SCRA 222,
226-227; Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, G.R. No. L-28773, 30
June 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 633-634; Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 209-210
(1947).
62
478
478
142
143
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69162, 21 February 1992, 206 SCRA
408, 412-413.
144
143
141
479
142
_______________
Simex International (Manila), Inc, vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013,
19 March 1990, 183 SCRA 360, 367; Bank of Philippine Islands vs.
141
144
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
480
480
A
Q
A
A
A
Q
happened to this?
I won by voting but when election comes on [sic] the
counting I lost and I protested this, it is still pending and
because I dont have financial resources I was not able to
push through the case. I just have it pending in the
Comelec.
Now, do these things also affect your social and civic
activities?
Yes sir, definitely.
How?
I was embarrassed because being a businesswoman I
would like to inform the Honorable Court that I was
awarded as the most outstanding businesswoman of the
year in 1976 but when this money was not given back to
me I was not able to comply with the commitments that I
have promised to these associations that I am engaged
into [sic], sir.
Q
A
Q
A
146
147
64
149
150
_______________
145
Tiongco v. Atty. Deguma, 375 Phil. 978, 994-995; 317 SCRA 527, 541
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated
or compensatory damages.
147
149
Ching Sen Ben vs. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 544, 555; 314 SCRA 762,
772-773 (1999).
150
531-532; 301 SCRA 572, 604 (1999); Tierra International Construction Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
482
482
483
SECOND DIVISION.
205
2
05
206
2
06
207
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 28,
1999 decision and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 affirming the trial courts
judgment finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise known
as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and
adopted by the Court of Appeals follow.
1
[petitioner] had left the place. So, [Cenizal] referred the matter to
a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three days from
receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. [Petitioner] still
failed to make good the amount of the check. As a consequence,
[Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992 before the office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted documents
in support of his complaint for [e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22]
against [petitioner].
_______________
1
208
After due investigation, this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed
against [petitioner] on March 27, 1992. The check in question and
the return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire
that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal]
executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in
question and the return slip.
3
209
209
210
210
70
_______________
_______________
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PACIFICO B.
That on or about the 15th day of April 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue in
Tan v. Mendez, Jr., 432 Phil. 760; 383 SCRA 202 (2002).
favor of JOSEFINO CENIZAL a check no. 163255 drawn against the Bank of
211
211
Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 187; 298 SCRA 656 (1998).
212
212
_______________
9
Section 2 of BP 22 provides:
213
213
11
_______________
10
Tan v. Mendez, Jr., supra; Lim v. People, 420 Phil. 506; 368 SCRA
436 (2001).
11
Miranda v. Besa, G.R. No. 146513, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 532.
Inc. v. Sy, 474 SCRA 427 (2005), the Court held that in
determining whether an initiatory pleading states a
_______________
*
Evidence; Ancient
Documents; Requisites.An
ancient
document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the
proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It must on its face appear to be genuine.
FIRST DIVISION.
608
08
Aldemita vs. Heirs of Melquiades Silva
cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of
the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer? To be taken into account are only the
material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and
circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. Stated
otherwise, the test is whether the material allegations, assuming
these to be true, state ultimate facts which constitute plaintiffs
cause of action, such that plaintiff is entitled to a favorable
judgment as a matter of law. The general rule is that inquiry is
confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.
Same; Same; Same; Exceptions to the Rule that Allegations are
Hypothetically Admitted as True and Inquiry is Confined to the
Face of the Complaint.There are well-recognized exceptions to
the rule that the allegations are hypothetically admitted as true
and inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint. Examples are
whenever there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of
allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such
allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts which
are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document
included in the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also,
inquiry is not confined to the complaint if there is evidence which
has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties, or in
the course of hearings related to the case. However, none of the
exceptions are present in the instant case.
609
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision dated
November 22, 2004 promulgated by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 72445, which affirmed in toto the
Decision dated August 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 11, Cebu City, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-23011.
This case originated from a Complaint for Quieting of
Title filed with the RTC by the Heirs of Melquiades Silva,
represented by Ramon G. Villordon, Jr., (respondents) on
November 18, 1998 against the Heirs of Dionisia Vda. De
Zabate (Heirs of Vda. De Zabate), represented by Emelia
Deiparine and Benzon O. Aldemita (petitioner).
The antecedent facts of the case, as found by the RTC and
upheld by the CA, are as follows:
1
Rollo, p. 82.
610
610
granted by the public respondent court per Order dated April 30,
1999 by declaring Roger Deiparine and Josephine Deiparine in
default and setting the case for Pre-trial.
On August 12, 1999, a Pre-trial was conducted by the trial court
wherein the parties made the following stipulations of facts and/or
admissions, to wit:
1) [Petitioner] Benzon O. Aldemita admitted that Lot 11330 of Pcs-945
located in Minglanilla, Cebu has been registered in the name of
Melquiades Silva as shown by Transfer Certificate No. T-18993 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu (Exhibit A) and has been
covered by Tax Declaration No. 25845-R also in the name of Melquiades
Silva (Exhibit B);
2)
[Petitioner]
Benzon
O.
Aldemita
also
admitted
that
the
611
On February 10, 2000, a Questioned Document Report No. 0132000 by the Document Examiner Romeo Oliva Varona was
submitted to the court.
On March 6, 2000 an Order of even date was issued by the court
giving respondent Aldemita fifteen (15) days to submit his
comment on the Questioned Document Report No. 013-2000 which
he did by submitting to the court his Comment, etc. dated April 3,
2000.
3
75
612
612
Records, p. 142.
613
613
ity, the heirs of Melquiades Silva are certainly the real parties in
interest who could institute an action for quieting of title. It is
therefore surprising why the defendant Benzon O. Aldemita is now
contending very much belatedly that the plaintiffs are not real
parties in interest in the case at bench. The invoking by the said
defendantmovant of the ruling in Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, 304 SCRA 18, is misplaced. Here in
this case, the heirs of Melquiades Silva are significantly
suing through the administrator of the estate of their
decedent. In other words, there is already an on-going
special proceeding wherein the declaration of heirship of
the plaintiffs is being sought. So, the defendant Benzon O.
Aldemita should not insist that the plaintiffs should first be
declared as heirs of Melquiades Silva before they can be
considered as real parties in interest to institute the action
in this case. Things have already been placed in their
proper perspectives. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court
hereby denies the aforementioned motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
6
Rollo, p. 79.
614
614
77
11
_______________
7
Id., at p. 85.
10
11
615
615
I.
In declaring the [respondents] as the rightful and absolute owners
of Lot No. 11330 of Pcs-945 (Talisay-Minglanilla Estate) located in
Vito, Minglanilla, Cebu, Philippines;
II.
In declaring as null and void and without force and effect the
documents denominated as Kalig-onan sa Panag-palit nga Dayon
(Deed of Absolute Sale), which was purportedly executed by
Melquiades Silva on March 15, 1949 in favor of Dionisia Vda. de
Zabate (Exhibit 1), Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of
Sale which was purportedly executed by Porferia Silva and
Emiliana Zabate Paran on February 20, 1979 (Exhibit 2) and the
Deed of Absolute Sale Executed by Emilia Deiparine on April 26,
1996 in favor of [petitioner] Benzon O. Aldemita (Exhibit 3);
III.
In ordering [petitioner] Aldemita to respect and not disturb the
[respondents] title to and ownership of Lot No. 11330 of Pcs-945;
IV.
In ordering [petitioner] Aldemita to vacate the premises of Lot
No. 11330 of Pcs-945.
12
13
Id., at p. 30.
78
II.
616
616
617
filed in the RTC after the case has been submitted for
decision.
Petitioner must have relied on the former Section 2, Rule
9 of the Rules of Court which reads:
15
17
14
Id., at p. 130.
15
1997.
18
_______________
618
618
16
(1999).
17
18
619
619
80
In the case of Goodyear Phil., Inc. v. Sy, the Court held that
in determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause
of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the
facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer? To be taken into account are
only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous
facts and circumstances or other mattersaliunde are not
considered. Stated otherwise, the test is whether the
material allegations, assuming these to be true, state
ultimate facts which constitute plaintiffs cause of action,
such that plaintiff is entitled to a favorable judgment as a
matter of law. The general rule is that inquiry is confined to
the four corners of the complaint, and no other.
As the Court has ruled, the Petition for Quieting of Title
sufficiently states a cause of action. Respondents alleged that
they are the heirs of the late Melquiades Silva who died on
20
21
22
23
24
_______________
19
2005,474 SCRA 427, 435, citing Jimenez Jr. v. Jordana, G.R. No. 152526,
November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 250, 259.
20
21
Id., at p. 435, citing Jimenez Jr. v. Jordana, supra note 19, at p. 260.
22
23
Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 939, 949; 322 SCRA 853, 862-863
(2000), citing Suyom v. Collantes, G.R. No. L-40337, February 27, 1976, 69
SCRA 514, 520.
24
Cooperative Marketing Association, 126 Phil. 896, 901; 20 SCRA 526, 531
(1967); De Jesus v. Santos Belarmino, 50 O.G. 30043068; Verzosa v.
Rigonan, 94 Phil. 794, 796 (1954); Dimayuga v. Dimayuga, 51 O.G. 23972400.
July 3, 1961 and are thus the true owners of a parcel of land
registered in the name of the latter (first and second
elements); that the private documents allegedly executed by
the late Melquiades Silva in favor of the predecessors-ininterest of the petitioner are forged documents (third
element); and that the existence of these documents casts a
cloud over the title of the respondents as owners of the
property (fourth element).
There are well-recognized exceptions to the rule that the
allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is
confined to the face of the complaint. Examples are whenever
there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of
allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if
such allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to
facts which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record
or document included in the pleading these allegations
appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to the
complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to
the court by stipulation of the parties, or in the course of
hearings related to the case. However, none of the
exceptions are present in the instant case.
The petitioner insists that the 54 respondents claiming to
be the heirs of the deceased Melquiades Silva must first
establish their status as legal heirs through a special
proceeding in order to prosecute the instant case as real
parties-ininterest. Without a declaration of heirship and a
court order appointing an administrator of the estate, the
petitioner argues, the respondents have failed to establish
that they are real parties-in-interest, and therefore, the case
must be dismissed for lack of cause of action, citing theHeirs
of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario. As aptly held by the RTC, the
invocation of petitioner of the ruling in said case is
misplaced. In the Heirs of Yaptinchay, the motion to dismiss
was filed immedi25
26
620
620
81
_______________
25
26
30
621
621
28
29
_______________
27
Rollo, p. 28.
28
29
Records, p. 95.
30
622
622
32
33
34
35
82
33
Cequea v. Bolante, 386 Phil. 419, 427; 330 SCRA 216, 223 (2000).
34
35
623
623
per Order dated October 25, 1999 is not genuine and is a product
of forgery. Hence, [the petitioner] should have presented evidence
to prove the due execution and authenticity of the said document
which he failed to do so but instead together with the
[respondents] have manifested that they would submit the case for
decision without the need of undergoing trial and having failed to
present and offered any evidence of the due execution and
authenticity of this document, [petitioner] has only himself to be
blamed if the trial court has declared it null and void.
Furthermore, the Deed of Confirmation of Previous Deed of
Sale purportedly executed by Porferia Silva and Emiliana Zabate
Paran having likewise reported by the commissioner document
examiner Romeo Varona, that the signature of Porferia Silva was
forged, said document has no legal effect and has not confirmed
anything.
Due to the foregoing, the trial court did not err when it declared
the documents marked as Exhibits 1 and 2 to be null and void
and no legal effect and as such have not transmitted any rights to
the property in litigation to the Heirs of Dionisia Vda. de Zabate.
Consequently, the Deed of Sale dated April 26, 1996 executed by
Emilia Deiparine has no legal basis and cannot transfer any legal
right to the property in question considering that the documents
on
624
624
which it is based are null and void and can never be the
source ofany rights and title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J.,
Chairperson), YnaresSantiago,Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
36
83
84
THIRD DIVISION.
413
41
3
4
14
415
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 40-
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
49.
Civil Case No. CEB-18662, penned by Judge Ramon G. Codilla, Jr.; Id.,
at pp. 153-160.
416
416
417
87
418
418
issuing the assailed order, dated November 16, 2004, in Civil Case
No. CEB-18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces of petitioners documentary
evidence which were denied admission by the respondent judge
were not properly identified by any competent witness. As pointed
out by the respondent Bangpai Shipping Company in its comment
on the petition filed in this case which reproduces some excerpts of
the testimonies in the court a quo of Atty. Marianito De Los
Santos, Engr. Nestor Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I. Pagaling,
the said witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and
participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of
documentary evidence denied admission by respondent judge x x x.
In other words, there was lack of proper identification of said
pieces of documentary evidence. x x x.
Then another ground for denying admission of petitioners
Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, and S by the
respondent judge is that said pieces of documentary evidence were
merely photocopies of purported documents or papers. There is no
gainsaying the fact that the respondent judge acted within the
pale of his
419
419
x x x The record shows that the plaintiff (petitioner herein) has been
given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced said originals.
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent
judges denial of admission of its aforementioned documentary
evidence.
Of course, the petitioner tries to contend that the photocopies of
documents offered by it are equivalent to the original documents
that it sought to offer in evidence, based on the Rules on Electronic
Evidence which were in force and effect since August 1, 2001.
However, such a contention is devoid of merit. The pieces of
documentary evidence offered by the petitioner in Civil Case CEB18662 which were denied admission by the respondent judge do
not actually constitute as electronic evidence as defined in the
Rules on Electronic Evidence. The informations therein were not
received, retrieved or produced electronically. The petitioner has
not adequately established that its documentary evidence were
electronic evidence. it has not properly authenticated such
evidence as electronic documents, assuming arguendo that they
are. Lastly, the petitioner has not properly established by affidavit
pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence the
admissibility and evidentiary weight of said documentary
evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that the respondent
judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
admission of the aforementioned documentary evidence of
petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of argument that the
respondent judge committed an error in denying the
aforementioned documentary evidence of the petitioner, still the
petition for certiorari filed in this case must fail. Such error would
at most be only an
420
420
error of law and not an error of jurisdiction. In Lee vs. People, 393
SCRA 397, the Supreme Court of the Philippines said that
certiorari will not lie in case of an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the assailed orders issued by respondent judge
in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.
4
_______________
4
421
421
422
422
_______________
5
Id.
423
423
91
Lee v. People, G.R. No. 159288, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA 662, 683.
424
424
10
10
425
425
12
13
92
_______________
Id., citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 5.
11
12
Id., citing United States v. Balzano, 687 Fed. 6; Wright v. Farmers Co-
13
426
426
Atty. Samson, which filed both MCCs and Chans Brief and Reply
Brief. Apparently, the arrangement between the two counsels was
for the collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal
brief and subsequent pleadings in the CA. This explains why it
was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed the motion for the
reconsideration of the CA decision, and they did so on October 5,
2005, well within the 15-day period from September 29, 2005,
when they received their copy of the CA decision. This could also
be the reason why the CA did not find it necessary to resolve the
question of the timeliness of petitioners motion for
reconsideration, even as the CA denied the same.
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; It
should be remembered that the Rules were promulgated to set
guidelines in the orderly administration of justice, not to shackle
the hand that dispenses it.It should be remembered that the
Rules were promulgated to set guidelines in the orderly
administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it.
Otherwise, the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to
technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion. Technicalities
must take a backseat to substantive rights. After all, it is
circumspect leniency in this respect that will give the parties the
fullest opportunity to ventilate the merits of their respective
causes, rather than have them lose life, liberty, honor or property
on sheer technicalities.
THIRD DIVISION.
409
4
09
10
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong
Corporation
Same; Same; The Supreme Court has ample authority to go
beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the
promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own findings
in order to support its conclusions.The second issue poses a novel
question that the Court welcomes. It provides the occasion for this
Court to pronounce a definitive interpretation of the equally
innovative provisions of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A.
No. 8792) vis-vis the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Although the
parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile
transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic
documents within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the
petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies
of the said facsimile transmissions), we deem it appropriate to
determine first whether the said fax transmissions are indeed
within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the
photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this Court
has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when, in the
interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy, there is a
need to make its own findings in order to support its conclusions.
Electronic
Commerce
Act
of
2000
(R.A.
No.
8792); Evidence;Rules on Electronic Evidence; Best Evidence
Rule; Words and Phrases; To be admissible in evidence as an
4
11
12
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong
Corporation
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A construction should be
rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that
does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted,
and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by
the enactment.Congress deleted the phrase, but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy, and replaced the term data message (as found in the
UNCITRAL Model Law) with electronic data message. This
legislative divergence from what is assumed as the terms
international origin has bred uncertainty and now impels the
Court to make an inquiry into the true intent of the framers of the
law. Indeed, in the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the
intent and spirit of the law. A construction should be rejected that
gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not
accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and
that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by
the enactment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Facsimile
Transmissions;There is no question that when Congress formulated
the term electronic data message, it intended the same meaning as
the term electronic record in the Canada law, which construction
of the term electronic data message, excludes telexes or faxes,
except computergenerated faxes, in harmony with the Electronic
Commerce Laws focus on paperless communications and the
functional equivalent approach that it espouses; Facsimile
transmissions are not paperless but verily are paper-based.
When the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term electronic
data message, it was consonant with the explanation of Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply to telexes or
faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations
96
4
13
14
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong
Corporation
paper-based facsimile copy as received; While Congress
anticipated future developments in communications and computer
97
4
15
16
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong
Corporation
Actions; Contracts; Breach of Contract; Requisites.Despite
the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, this Court
finds that respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence the
existence of a perfected contract of sale. In an action for damages
due to a breach of a contract, it is essential that the claimant
proves (1) the existence of a perfected contract, (2) the breach
thereof by the other contracting party and (3) the damages which
he/she sustained due to such breach. Actori incumbit onus
probandi. The burden of proof rests on the party who advances a
417
4
17
18
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong
Corporation
the terms of their contract, without necessarily novating it, to
the effect that the original order was reduced to 200MT, split into
two deliveries, and the price discounted to US$1,700 per MT.
Petitioner, however, paid only half of its obligation and failed to
open an L/C for the other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of both
parties sufficiently established the existence of a contract of sale,
even if the writings of the parties, because of their contested
admissibility, were not as explicit in establishing a contract.
Appropriate conduct by the parties may be sufficient to establish
an agreement, and while there may be instances where the
exchange of correspondence does not disclose the exact point at
which the deal was closed, the actions of the parties may indicate
that a binding obligation has been undertaken.
100
4
19
420
_______________
20
MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong
Corporation
Attorneys Fees; In the instant case, the Court finds the award
of attorneys fees proper considering that the defendants unjustified
refusal to pay has compelled the plaintiff to litigate and to incur
expenses to protect its rights.As to the award of attorneys fees, it
is well-settled that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate and not every winning party is entitled to an automatic
grant of attorneys fees. The party must show that he falls under
one of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
In the instant case, however, the Court finds the award of
attorneys fees proper, considering that petitioner MCCs
unjustified refusal to pay has compelled respondent Ssangyong to
litigate and to incur expenses to protect its rights.
Records, p. 2.
421
421
10
NACHURA, J.:
102
10
Records, p. 49.
11
12
_______________
11
12
13
14
_______________
6
CA Rollo, p. 97.
15
16
17
18
19
20
15
contents.
16
17
13
14
transmittal.
18
422
422
transmittal.
19
103
423
423
22
23
24
25
26
21
22
23
26
21
_______________
25
24
424
424
29
30
31
32
33
104
original letter.
38
29
30
31
Id., at p. 232.
32
August 15, 2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed
to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to
MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract
under ST2-POSTS0401-1/ST2-POSTS0401-2,
and
demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses,
warehousing expenses, interests and charges.
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action
for damages due to breach of contract against defendants
MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong
39
_______________
Id., at p. 321; Exhibit 2-C. The document was certified as the true copy
34
Id., at pp. 318-320; Exhibits 2, 2-A and 2-B. These documents were
425
425
35
36
37
35
36
38
39
426
426
105
the civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003,
the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary
evidence presented had already been admitted in the
December 16, 2002 Order and their admissibility finds
support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both
testimonial and documentary evidence tended to
substantiate the material allegations in the complaint,
Ssangyongs evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima
facie case.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision on
March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled
that when plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to
buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1,860 per
MT, the contract was perfected. The subject transaction was
evidenced by Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS04011 and ST2-POSTS0401-2, which were later amended only in
terms of reduction of volume as well as the price per MT,
following Pro
Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0801 and ST2POSTS080-2. The RTC, however, excluded Sanyo
Seiki from liability for lack of competent evidence.
The fallo of the decision reads:
427
41
42
43
41
Id., at p. 254.
42
Id., at p. 275.
43
427
46
SO ORDERED.
_______________
44
45
Id., at p. 444.
46
50
52
428
428
53
_______________
47
Id., at p. 36.
48
Supra note 1.
49
50
Id., at p. 131.
51
Id., at p. 160.
52
The firms name was later changed to Zamora Poblador Vasquez &
Bretaa.
53
CA Rollo, p. 161.
48
429
429
107
55
56
_______________
54
55
Supra note 2.
56
57
Id., at p. 15.
430
430
_______________
58
59
431
it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed the motion for
the reconsideration of the CA decision, and they did so on
October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period from
September 29, 2005, when they received their copy of the CA
decision. This could also be the reason why the CA did not
find it necessary to resolve the question of the timeliness of
petitioners motion for reconsideration, even as the CA
denied the same.
Independent of this consideration though, this Court
assiduously reviewed the records and found that strong
concerns of substantial justice warrant the relaxation of this
rule.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction
and Development Corporation, we ruled that:
431
432
432
109
orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are issued to be obeyed,
nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the circumstances
attending the case may warrant. What should guide judicial action is the
principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to
lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure and not override
or frustrate justice. A six-day delay in the perfection of the appeal,
as in this case, does not warrant the outright dismissal of the
appeal. In Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, we gave due course to the petitioners appeal despite the
late filing of its brief in the appellate court because such appeal
involved public interest. We stated in the said case that the Court
may exempt a particular case from a strict application of the rules
of procedure where the appellant failed to perfect its appeal within
the reglementary period, resulting in the appellate courts failure
to obtain jurisdiction over the case. In Republic vs. Imperial, Jr.,
we also held that there is more leeway to exempt a case from the
strictness of procedural rules when the appellate court has already
obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. We emphasize that:
[T]he rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the
attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid
application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert
the rules primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting
justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive
rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities.
60
_______________
60
433
62
_______________
110
61
434
434
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the
original facsimile transmissions are electronic data
messages or electronic documents within the context of the
Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as
inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile
transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first
whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the
coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the
photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this
Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when,
in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy,
there is a need to make its own findings in order to support
its conclusions.
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro
forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove
the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are
inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of
R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best
evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand,
respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile
transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence
since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best
evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further
claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals
(specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are
admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
63
435
111
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by
an electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and
of
these
Rules,
the
term
electronic
document
may
be
used
that
1. (i)The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from
the addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change
which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display;
and
2. (ii)The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it
was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
64
_______________
64
Unlawful Use Thereof and For Other Purposes. Approved on June 14, 2000.
436
436
_______________
65
the time when it was first generated in its final form; and
2. (ii)That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to
be presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any
and all
437
437
purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that
_______________
66
112
68
_______________
1. (a)The integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated
RULE 3
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS
SECTION 1. Electronic Documents as functional equivalent of paperbased documents.Whenever a rule of evidence refers to the term writing,
document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing,
such term shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in
these Rules.
SEC. 2. Admissibility.An electronic document is admissible in evidence
if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court
and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these
Rules.
68
66
438
438
113
69
439
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides, in its Section 34, that
439
_______________
1. (a)a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
National
Telecommunications
Commission,
National
440
_______________
70
On June 12, 1996, the Commission, after consideration of the text of the
draft Model Law as revised by the drafting group, decided to adopt the said
law and to recommend that all States give favorable consideration to the said
Model Law on Electronic Commerce when they enact or revise their laws, in
73
74
view of the need for uniformity of the law applicable to alternatives of paperbased forms of communication and storage of information (UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996 with addi
York, 1999).
441
441
Record of the Senate, Vol. III, No. 61, February 16, 2000, p. 405.
72
R.A. No. 8792 is a consolidation of Senate Bill 1902 and House Bill 9971
442
442
2007).
443
443
search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A
construction should be rejected that gives to the language
used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to
defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the
enactment.
77
78
_______________
76
People v. Purisima, 176 Phil. 186, 204; 86 SCRA 542, 559 (1978).
78
444
III
RECORD,SENATE
11TH
CONGRESS
2ND
SESSION
399
79
x x x x
Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President. I will furnish a copy
together with the explanation of this proposed amendment.
445
445
446
xxxx
Senator Santiago. Mr. President, I have proposed all the
amendments that I desire to, including the amendment on the
effect of error or change. I will provide the language of the
amendment together with the explanation supporting that
amendment to the distinguished sponsor and then he can feel free
to take it up in any session without any further intervention.
447
447
Senate Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. II, No. 88, April 3, 2000, pp. 32-
37.
448
448
_______________
81
15. The Model Law is based on the recognition that legal requirements
prescribing the use of traditional paper-based documentation constitute the
main obstacle to the development of modern means of communication. In the
preparation of the Model Law, consideration was given to the possibility of
dealing with impediments to the use of electronic commerce posed by such
requirements in national laws by way of extension of the scope of such
notions as writing, signature and original, with a view to encompassing
computer-based techniques. Such an approach is used in a number of existing
legal instruments, e.g., article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration and article 13 of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. It was observed
that the Model Law should permit States to adapt their domestic legislation
to developments in communications technology applicable to trade law
without necessitating the wholesale removal of the paper-based requirements
themselves or disturbing the legal concepts and approaches underlying those
requirements. At the same time, it was said that electronic fulfillment of
writing requirements might in some cases necessitates the development of
new rules. This was due to one of many distinctions between EDI messages
human eye, while the former were not so readable unless reduced to paper or
displayed on a screen.
16. The Model Law thus relies on a new approach, sometimes referred to
as the functional equivalent approach, which is based on an analysis of the
purposes and functions of the traditional paper-based requirement with a
view to determining how those purposes or functions could be fulfilled
449
_______________
and paper-based documents, namely, that the latter were readable by the
449
120
equivalent approach has been taken in articles 6 to 8 of the Model Law with
respect to the concepts of writing, signature and original but not with
450
450
respect to other legal concepts dealt with in the Model Law. For example,
article 10 does not attempt to create a functional equivalent of existing
storage requirements. (UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with
Guide to Enactment 1996 with additional article 5 bis as adopted in 1998,
United Nations publication, New York, 1999.)
451
451
84
85
86
<http://inventors.about.com/od/bstartinventors/a/fax_machine.htm>
<http://inventors.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=invent
86
88
89
_______________
87
452
452
Lourdes Sabanpan v. Comorposa, 456 Phil. 161; 408 SCRA 692 (2003),
concerning
facsimile
signature;
and Cathay
Pacific
Airways
v.
Fuentebella, G.R. No. 142541, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 97, which
involves a facsimile transmission of a notice of hearing.
88
453
453
122
92
_______________
90
III
454
454
_______________
RECORD,SENATE
11TH
CONGRESS
2ND
SESSION
437
93
The Philippine Statistical System (PSS), through the NSCB, created the
91
Nasipit
Lumber
Co.
v.
National
follows: the Department of Trade and Industry as Chair; the NSCB as Vice
Chair; and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Commission on Audit, the
Wages
and
Productivity
123
Transportation
and
Communications/National
Telecommunications
455
_______________
94
Commerce,
November
22,
2006,
p.
<http://www.nscb.
456
456
97
98
99
124
Exhibit
100
101
E-1
_______________
96
98
Appeals, G.R. No. 105387, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 717, 721.
99
101
at p. 113.
E-2
457
457
Exhibit
Description
E
Pro forma Invoice dated 17
April 2000 with Contract
No. ST2-POSTS04011, photocopy
Purpose
To show that
defendants
contracted with
plaintiff for the
delivery of 110 MT
Description
Purpose
of stainless steel
from Korea payable
by way of an
irrevocable letter of
credit in favor of
plaintiff, among
other conditions.
Pro forma Invoice dated 17
To show that
April 2000 with Contract
defendants sent
No. ST2their confirmation
POSTS0401, contained in
of the (i) delivery to
facsimile/thermal paper faxed it of the specified
by defendants to plaintiff
stainless steel
showing the printed
products, (ii)
transmission details on the
defendants
upper portion of said paper as payment thereof by
coming from defendant MCC on way of an
26 Apr 00 08:41AM
irrevocable letter of
credit in favor of
plaintiff, among
other conditions.
Conforme signature of Mr.
To show that
Gregory Chan, contained in
defendants sent
facsimile/thermal paper faxed their confirmation
by defendants to plaintiff
of the (i) delivery to
showing the printed
it of the total of
transmission details on the
220MT specified
upper portion of said paper as stainless steel
coming from defendant MCC on products, (ii)
26 Apr 00 08:41AM
defendants
payment thereof by
way of an
irrevocable letter of
credit in favor of
125
Exhibit
Description
Purpose
plaintiff, among
other conditions.
To show that
defendants
contracted with
plaintiff for delivery
of
defendants dated
22 June
2000,original
Letter to
defendants dated
26 June
2000,original
Letter to
defendants dated
26 June
2000,original
Letter to
defendants dated
27 June
2000,original
Facsimile
message to
defendants dated
28 June
2000,photocopy
Letter from
defendants dated
29 June
2000,contained in
facsimile/thermal
paper faxed by
defendants to
458
458
459
459
126
M-1
printed transmission
details on the upper
portion of said paper
as coming from
defendant MCC on 29
June 00 11:12 AM
Signature of defendant
Gregory
Chan,contained in
facsimile/thermal
paper faxed by
defendants to plaintiff
showing the printed
transmission details on
the upper portion of
said paper as coming
from defendant MCC
on June 00 11:12 AM
Letter to defendants
dated 29 June
2000,original
Letter to defendants
dated 30 June
2000,photocopy
Letter to defendants
dated 06 July
2000,original
of Credit, and
begging for favorable
understanding and
consideration.
Demand letter to
defendants dated 15
Aug 2000, original
460
460
W-1
W-2
To prove that
defendants, acting
through Gregory
Chan, agreed to the
sale and purchase of
220 metric tons of
steel products at the
price of US$1,860/ton.
To prove that
defendants sent their
conformity to the sale
and
X-2
X-3
461
DD
462
463
463
_______________
103
Lee v. People, G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 662, 683-
684.
464
464
105
_______________
104
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, G.R. No. 86062, June 6, 1990, 186
465
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half
of the transaction if there was no first half to speak of?
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence
of both parties, started with the petitioner and the
respondent agreeing on the sale and purchase of 220MT of
stainless steel at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial contract
was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked for several
extensions to pay, adjustments in the delivery dates, and
discounts in the price as originally agreed, the parties
slightly varied the terms of their contract, without
necessarily novating it, to the effect that the original order
was reduced to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and the price
discounted to US$1,700 per MT. Petitioner, however, paid
only half of its obligation and failed to open an L/C for the
other 100MT. Notably, the conduct of both parties
sufficiently established the existence of a contract of sale,
even if the writings of the parties, because of their contested
admissibility, were not as explicit in establishing a contract.
107
_______________
106
Records, p. 411.
107
109
110
111
_______________
108
SCRA 553, 565 (1986), quoting American Jurisprudence 2d., Section 73 (pp.
186-187).
466
466
109
131
110
467
467
112
468
468
114
2.8MM X 1,219MM X C
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C
5.0MM X 1,219MM X C
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
TOTAL:
8.193MT
7.736MT
7.885MT
8.629MT
7.307MT
7.247MT
8.450MT
8.870MT
8.391MT
6.589MT
7.878MT
8.397MT
95.562MT
115
114
Records, p. 245.
115
117
469
469
_______________
116
Id., at p. 338.
117
Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., 405 Phil. 741, 751; 353 SCRA 261, 267-268
(2001).
470
470
_______________
118
THIRD DIVISION.
656
56
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations
134
Commission
conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great
weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed
binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. This Court finds no basis for deviating from said doctrine
without any clear showing that the findings of the Labor Arbiter,
as affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation. Particularly
when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are
binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and will not
normally be disturbed.
Same; Dismissals; Past infractions for which an employee had
been duly penalized cannot be taken collectively as a justification
for the dismissal from service of the employee.We find no basis for
deviating from the oft-espoused legal tenet that findings of facts
and conclusion of the labor arbiter are generally accorded not only
great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and
deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, without any clear showing that such findings
of fact, as affirmed by the NLRC, are bereft of substantiation.
More so, when passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals,
they are binding and conclusive upon us and will not normally be
disturbed; accordingly, the finding that the alleged absences and
incidences of tardiness of private respondent are but past
infractions for which petitioners had already imposed several
sanctions and for which private respondent had been duly
penalized. And being past infractions, they cannot be taken
collectively as a justification for the dismissal from service of the
employee.
Same; Same; Gross Negligence; To warrant removal from
service, the negligence of an employee should not merely be gross
but also habitual; Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or
failure to exercise even slight care or diligence, or the entire absence
of careit evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.But even assuming for the sake
of argument that the past infractions could still validly be the
65
7
58
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations
Commission
the allegations. The purpose of the rule requiring the
production of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because
if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it, and
seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place (or none at all save
for mere allegation), the presumption naturally arises that the
better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its
production would expose and defeat.
659
65
9
660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The Law Firm of Chan, Robles and Associates for
petitioners.
Rodolfo R. Ranion for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
For Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, is the Decision, dated 16 May 2001, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59471, and
itsResolution dated 19 September 2001, denying the Motion
for Reconsideration of said decision. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari, filed by herein
petitioners Acebedo Optical (Corporation) and Miguel
Acebedo
III
(Acebedo)
and
affirmed in
toto the Resolution, dated 17 November 1999, of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)-First Division in NLRC
NCR Case No. 00-01-00651-97, which, in turn, sustained
the Decisiondated 22 May 1998, of Labor Arbiter Emerson C.
Tumanon directing herein petitioners to reinstate private
respondent Melencia B. Asegurado to her former or
1
137
Justice of this Court) with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Perlita
Tria-Tirona, concurring; Id., at pp. 60-71.
3
661
TO
: MELENCIA BUTIL
FROM
: THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT
: WRITTEN WARNING on . . . . . . .
DATE
: September 7, 1991
--------------------------------------------------------------------As per report of the Personnel Department on the Absences and
Tardiness for the month of August, you were found to have 1 hr. &
34 mins. late (sic).
_______________
4
Rollo, p. 152.
662
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Be informed that habitual absences/tardiness is a grave violation
of company policy.
This serves as your written warning.
[Signed]
MIGUEL R. ACEBEDO III
Operations Manager
138
TO
: MELENCIA BUTIL
FROM
: THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT
: AS STATED
DATE
: October 15, 1992
--------------------------------------------------------------------Be reminded that habitual tardiness is considered a grave
violation of Company Policy and is subject to strict
disciplinary action.
This will serve as your first written warning.
[Signed]
THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
On 22 April 1994, a three-day suspension from work was
imposed on private respondent on the ground of her being
_______________
6
Id., at p. 153.
Id.
663
TO
: MELENCIA ASEGURADO
FROM
: THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT
: TARDINESS, Suspension notice on
DATE
: APRIL 22, 1994
--------------------------------------------------------------------The report on tardiness for the period January to March 1994,
showed that you incurred lates (sic) twenty six (26) times (11, 7, 8)
the said numbers exceeded the maximum limit of four times each
month.
It is one of the fundamental duties of any employee to follow
rules and regulations of the company, and (sic) one of the most
basic is the observance of official time. Your 201 file kept two (2)
written warnings on tardiness.
This time, you are given a three (3) days suspension without
pay effective May 10, 11 & 12, 1994.
Please be advised to manage your time very well to avoid future
offenses.
[Signed]
LUTZ PENAFLORIDA
Acting HeadPersonnel
_______________
10
CA Rollo, p. 84.
Rollo, p. 155.
664
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
of tardiness for the months of [unreadable] to December
1994, the latter was meted another suspension, this time for
seven days, or four days longer than the first. More
specifically, it provides:
TO
: MELENCIA ASEGURADO
FROM
: THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT
: TARDINESS, Suspension notice of
DATE
: February 28, 1995
--------------------------------------------------------------------The report on tardiness for the period of [unreadable] to December
1994, (sic) showed that you incurred lates (sic) twenty-one (21)
times (3, 9, 9), the said number exceeded the maximum limit of
four times each month.
Despite of (sic) previous notices and suspension, you still failed
to meet the companys policy on attendance. Since the company is
implementing [unreadable] Disciplinary Measures for this kind of
infraction, you are hereby given seven (7) days suspension which
will [unreadable] effective on March 6, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23 & 27, 1995.
Please adhere to the policy [unreadable] failure to improve on
this aspect will result in severe penalties.
For your guidance.
[Signed]
LUTZ PENAFLORIDA
Personnel Manager
TO
FROM
SUBJECT
: MELENCIA B. ASEGURADO
: THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
: STATEMENT OF CHARGE
_______________
11
Id., at p. 157.
665
[Signed]
LUTZ PENAFLORIDA
PersonnelHead
TO
Id., at p. 156.
666
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
As per company policy, Head Office employees are limited only to
four (4) lates per month or a total of twelve (12) per quarter.
The said policy is being implemented to control excessive
lateness and to prevent time being wasted for non-performance.
Despite of (sic) previous warnings and/or suspension given,
(March 1995) you still failed to meet the company policy on
Tardiness.
You are hereby given a (sic) 13 days suspension which will take
effect on Sept. 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26 & 27, 1995.
TO
: MELY ASEGURADO
FROM
: THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT
: NOTICE OF TERMINATION
DATE
: December 08, 1996
--------------------------------------------------------------------_______________
13
Id., at p. 182.
667
_______________
14
Id.
668
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
The foregoing state of affairs prompted private respondent to
file a case for illegal dismissal with the NLRC the very next
day.
In a Decision dated 22 May 1998, Labor Arbiter Emerson
C. Tumanon rendered judgment declaring private respondent
illegally dismissed from service. The Labor Arbiter held that
petitioners failed to accord said employee due process of law;
and found that private respondents dismissal from service
was anchored on past infractions for which she had already
been penalized. Accordingly, the dispositve of the decision
states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
dismissal of complainant unlawful and unjustified and ordering
the respondents jointly and severally to reinstate said complainant
to her former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights
with full backwages which as of the date of this Decision has
ballooned to the amount of P79,716.00 plus other benefits such as
13th month pay in the amount of P6,643.00 and service incentive
leave pay in the amount of P2,628.00.
Respondents are also ordered to pay complainants counsel ten
(10%) percent of the total award recovered as attorneys fees
pursuant to law.
15
_______________
15
CA Rollo, p. 76.
16
Id., at p. 43.
669
along with the labor arbiter and the NLRC, was unable to
make a categorical finding on the issue of whether or not the
private respondents accumulated absences and/or tardiness
were, indeed, in violation of petitioner companys rules and
regulations. Further, as to the allegation of chronic
absenteeism and/or tardiness for the period of 1991 to 1995,
the appellate court likewise held that the non-presentation of
the Daily Time Records (DTRs) for said period was a grave
error. It held that the numerous memoranda issued to
private re_______________
17
17
18
Rollo, p. 70.
670
670
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
spondent were mere self-serving evidence and made the
following observations
Petitioners stance is even incongruent with the evidence on
record. Thus, the Private Respondent was employed, (sic) on a
probationary basis or status x x x [she] incurred tardiness in the
accumulated time of one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes for the
month of August, 1991, and yet, the Private Respondent was
promoted and made a permanent employee on March 1, 1992.
[A]fter her one (1) hour and thirtyfour (34) minute tardiness
in September 1991, nothing on record reveals that she had been
tardy for the year 1992. The Memorandum reminding the
Private Respondent about her tardiness did not establish that
Private Respondent again incurred any tardiness. It is noted that
Private Respondent was not tardy in the year 1993. Although she
was tardy during the period from January to March 1994,
however, she was ordered suspended on May 10 to 12, 1994.
Thereafter, Private Respondent did not report late for the rest of
143
671
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, COMMITTED PALPABLE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DECLARED RESPONDENT TO
HAVE
BEEN
ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED
DESPITE
OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE
SHOWING
THAT
SHE
INCURRED EXCESSIVE TARDINESS AND ABSENTEEISM IN
VIOLATION OF THE COMPANYS RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHICH WARRANTED HER TERMINATION FROM WORK;
[and]
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, COMMITTED PALPABLE AND REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT ORDERED RESPONDENT
REINSTATED TO HER FORMER POSITION OR TO
REINSTATE HER TO HER FOREMER OR EQUIVALENT
POSITION WITH FULL BACKWAGES PLUS OTHER
BENEFITS[,] SUCH AS 13TH MONTH PAY AND SERVICE
INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY.
Id., at p. 66.
21
672
672
23
24
25
26
_______________
22
Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 310, 317; 363 SCRA 799, 806
24
Filipino Workers v. San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation, Inc., G.R. No.
143341, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 193, 205.
25
26
Progressive
Development
Corp.
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission, 398 Phil. 433, 439-440; 344 SCRA 512, 516 (2000).
673
(2001).
145
674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was unjustified; and, therefore, illegal.
In the present petition, the labor arbiter evaluated the
evidence presented by herein parties and concluded that
private respondent Asegurado was not afforded the due
process guaranteed by law and jurisprudence. Moreover, the
alluded incidences of absenteeism and tardiness which
constituted the charge of habitual neglect of duty amounting
to gross negligence were past infractions that have already
been penalized.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the finding of illegal
dismissal.
In agreement with the assailed decisions, the Court of
Appeals, heedful of the legal principle that it is the employer
which has the onus probandi to prove that private
respondents dismissal was based on valid ground, ruled that
the Commission committed no grave abuse of discretion
_______________
28
Id.
675
146
31
_______________
29
Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 250, 263; 331 SCRA 237, 247 (2000).
676
676
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
leave would be approved by the personnel department of
petitioner corporation. The penalty of dismissal is too harsh,
_______________
32
IBM, Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 365 Phil. 137,
147
677
33
34
35
_______________
Commission, 334 Phil. 84, 92; 266 SCRA 97, 105-106 (1997).
34
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 90, 97-98; 324 SCRA 85, 93
(2000).
35
678
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acebedo Optical vs. National Labor Relations Commission
missal was for a justifiable cause. Having failed to satisfy
this burden of proof, we find that petitioners dismissed
private respondent without just cause. Consequently, the
termination of her employment was illegal.
To finish, as a final nail to the coffin that is the
petitioners recourse to this Court, we find that private
respondent was not accorded due process by petitioners prior
to being dismissed from service. Despite the fact that private
respondent was repeatedly warned through the numerous
memoranda sent to her for coming in late or not reporting at
all to the office, she was never asked to defend her position,
much less voice an objection to the charges leveled at her.
Law and jurisprudence require an employer to furnish the
employee two written notices before termination of his
employment may be ordered. The first notice must inform
him of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought; the second, of the employers decision to
dismiss the employee after he has been given the opportunity
to be heard and defend himself. With regard to private
respondent, prior to the Notice of Termination, no occasion
was given to her to explain her side on why she should not be
terminated. There is no evidence that there was
an exchange of communication between petitioners and
private respondent regarding the latters supposed
infractions. Lest it be forgotten, every opportunity and
36
37
148
_______________
36
37
Rule
XIV,
Code;National
Book
Service
V,
Omnibus
Corporation
Rules
v.
Implementing
National
Labor
the
Labor
Relations
18
Marquez vs. Espejo
always and necessarily mean that the appealed decision is
correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellants
inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even procedural
lapses.This Court dismissed Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.
(RBBI)s earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it failed to
convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision. The bank did not point out the
inadequacies and errors in the appellate courts decision but
simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the
respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the identity of
the properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not
tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to
court with clean hands. These arguments were ineffectual in
convincing the Court to review the appellate courts Decision. It is
the appellants responsibility to point out the perceived errors in
the appealed decision. When a party merely raises equitable
considerations such as the clean hands doctrine without a clearcut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there
should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its
appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed outright. The
dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily mean that
the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of
the appellants inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or
even procedural lapses.
150
11
9
20
Marquez vs. Espejo
look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected
any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of
the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence
Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol
Evidence Rule instead, which provides: When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement. The
Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which
a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms
of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the
CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look
beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not
the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the
literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other
evidence that would contradict such terms.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The parol evidence rule may not be
invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or
a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not
base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument.Even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is
improper in the case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not
parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they
are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9
specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The parol
evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties
to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written
document in question, and does not base his claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol
Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130,
12
1
122
123
124
dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property.
It contained the following description:
Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W.
1656.31 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K27,
154
125
126
Voluntary
Land
Transfer.Landowners
of
agricultural lands subject to acquisition under this Act may enter into a
155
17 TCT No. CLOA-395 (DARAB records, p. 84). Registered with the Land
Registration Authority on September 5, 1991.
agreed upon by both parties, which shall be binding upon them, upon
127
127
an area of TEN THOUSAND (10,000 sq. m.) square meters, more or less,
which is now more particularly bounded and described at the back hereof.
xxxx
Reference: This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-62836.
(Id., at pp. 84-85).
128
128
based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to
TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong property.
Petitioners filed their Answer21 and insisted that they
bought the Murong property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof.
They maintained that they have always displayed good faith,
paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the owner of the
Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the
honest belief that they were buying the Murong property,
and occupied and exercised acts of ownership over the
Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what
respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was
actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their
continued occupation and possession of the Lantap property
through respondent Nemi.
RBBI answered22 that it was the Lantap property which
was the subject of the buy-back transaction with respondents
Espejos. It denied committing a grave mistake in the
transaction and maintained its good faith in the disposition
of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking
rules and regulations.
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 1-8. Docketed as DARAB Case No. II-162-NV-97.
21 Id., at pp. 21-25.
22 Id., at pp. 11-13.
129
129
OIC-RARAD Decision23
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers
appearing on the Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No.
T-62096 appeared on respondents Deed of Sale and the said
title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD
concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong
130
131
132
132
133
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Petition
Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review
raises factual issues which are beyond the province of Rule
45.34
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual.
Petitioners assail the appellate courts rejection of their
evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under
the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the
admissibility of
_______________
32 Id., at p. 108.
33 Upon petitioners motion, the Court issued a Resolution on July 20,
2005 granting petitioners a thirty-(30) day extension to file the Petition for
Review on Certiorari. (Rollo of G.R. No. 168387, p. 8)
34 Respondents Memorandum, p. 9; id., at p. 127.
_______________
35 See People v. Exala, G.R. No. 76005, April 23, 1993, 221 SCRA 494,
499; People v. Judge Seneris, 187 Phil. 558, 560; 99 SCRA 92 (1980);People v.
Alarcon, 78 Phil. 732, 737 (1947).
134
134
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.36
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the
exceptions to the general rule because the appellate court
misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous
application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be discussed
below. Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing
bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its
jurisdiction under Rule 45.
135
First Issue
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal
Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of
RBBIs petition for review of the same CA Decision is
eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the
appellate courts decision in favor of the respondents.37
We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs
earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it failed to
convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA
Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and
160
136
136
38 See Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 162 Phil. 430, 438; 70 SCRA 329,
334 (1976).
39 See Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano,
G.R. No. 156132, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 378, 403-405.
40 RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, Section 47 (b).
41 See De Leon v. De Leon, 98 Phil. 589, 591-592 (1956).
161
137
purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the
137
138
162
139
140
141
Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts
We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale
between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap property,
and not the Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of
the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts of
ownership that could show that they indeed knew and
believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They
did not take possession of the Murong property. As admitted
by the parties, the Murong property was in the possession of
the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any
objection from the respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid
leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not
to the respondents.
Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership
rights over the Murong property, there is one other
circumstance that convinces us that what respondents really
repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi
(husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling
the Lantap property, without turning over the supposed
landowners share to RBBI. This strongly indicates that the
respondents considered themselves (and not RBBI) as the
owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents
(particularly spouses Elenita and Nemi) truly believed that
RBBI retained ownership of the Lantap property, how come
they never complied with their obligations as supposed
tenants of RBBIs land? The factual circumstances of the case
simply do not support the theory propounded by the
respondents.
We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of
Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners was
the Murong property, and not the Lantap property. When the
142
164
142
143
Development
Corporation
v.
Makati
Tuscany
Condominium Corporation, G.R. No. 146726, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 9, 3031, citing Tormon v. Cutanda, 119 Phil. 84, 87-88; 9 SCRA 698, 701 (1963).
144
144
the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
January 17, 2001 Decision of the DARAB Central Office is
REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985
between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.
covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while
the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of
Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary corrections
to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this
Decision. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
Castro and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set
aside.
Notes.It is a cardinal rule of evidence that the written
document is the best evidence of its own contents, though a
party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
166
FIRST DIVISION.
29
2
9
30
31
________________
1
Exhibit "D."
32
32
Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to
another who is a total stranger until the seller is certain of
the identity of the buyer."
The conjecture must be rejected.
In People v. Paco, this Court observed:
5
33
33
marijuana leaves."
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant
invokes the best evidence rule and questions the admission
by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00
bill.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted
that contention thus:
6
34
34
decision AFFIRMED in
accusedappellant.
SO ORDERED.
toto, with
costs
against
the
170
SECOND DIVISION.
553
5
53
5
54
555
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15
February 2006, affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 dated 15
October 1997 finding Rufino Umanito (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, sentencing him
1
Jr.
2
Id., at p. 34.
Records, p. 1.
Id.
556
556
It was around 9:00 oclock in the evening of July 15, 1989, while
on her way to her grandmothers home, when private complainant
[AAA] was accosted by a young male. It was only later when she
learned the name of accused-appellant UMANITO. She recounted
that accused-appellant UMANITO waited for her by the creek, and
then with a knife pointed at [AAA]s left side of the [sic] abdomen,
he forced her to give in to his kisses, to his holding her breasts and
stomach, and to his pulling her by the arm to be dragged to the
Home Economics Building inside the premises of the
Daramuangan Elementary School where accused-appellant
UMANITO first undressed her [AAA] and himself with his right
hand while he still clutched the knife menacingly on his left hand.
Private complainant [AAA] recounted that she could not shout
because she was afraid. She further recounted that accusedappellant UMANITO laid her down on a bench, 4 meters long and
24 inches wide, set the knife down, then mounted her, inserting
his penis into her [AAAs] vagina and shortly thereafter, accusedappellant UMANITO dressed up and threatened [AAA] while
poking the knife at her neck, not to report the incident to the police
or else he said he would kill her. Accusedappellant UMANITO
then left, while the victim [AAA] went on to her grandmothers
house and she noticed that it was already around 1:00 oclock in
the morning when she reached there.
In January 1990, 6 months after the incident, private
complainant [AAAs] mother, [BBB], noticed the prominence on
[AAA]s stomach. It was only then when the victim, private
complainant [AAA], divulged to her mother the alleged rape and
told her the details of what had happened in July, [sic] 1989. After
hearing private complainant [AAA]s story, her mother brought her
to the police station.
6
The real name of the victim is withheld per R.A. No. 7610 and R.A. No.
9262. See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502
SCRA 419.
7
The real name of the victims mother is likewise withheld to protect her
557
557
home the whole day, helping his family complete rush work
on picture frames ordered from Baguio. He did not step out of
their house on the evening in question, he added. Concerning
his relationship with AAA, appellant admitted that he had
courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured, though,
that AAA had a crush on him since she frequently visited
him at his house.
Finding that the prosecution had proven appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify AAA in the sum of
P50,000.00. In so doing, the court a quo held that the
discrepancies in AAAs testimony did not impair her
credibility. Despite some inconsistencies in her statement,
the RTC observed that AAAs demeanor on the witness stand
did not indicate any falsehood in her narration.
The trial court likewise rejected appellants defense of
alibi, ruling that he did not prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime given the
testimonies that he and complainant were residing in the
same barrio.
Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, appellants
appeal before us was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review. On 15 February 2006, the appellate
court affirmed the challenged decision. Finding AAA to be a
9
10
11
12
13
14
174
_______________
9
10
Id., at p. 10.
11
12
CA Rollo, p. 31.
13
Id.
14
15
558
558
17
18
16
CA Rollo, p. 58.
17
18
19
Records, p. 392.
559
559
19
175
22
23
_______________
25
20
Id., at 3; TSN, 29 March 1995, p. 4; TSN, 13 March 1996, pp. 2-3, 20-24.
21
See In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for De Villa, 442 SCRA
706 (2004).
22
characterized
DNA
testing
as
synonymous
to
DNA
typing,
DNA
560
560
People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504, 514.
25
26
Id., at p. 515.
27
561
176
561
the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in
future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution
of parentage and identity issues.
28
the human body, the DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his
or her skin
_______________
28
Id., at p. 461.
29
G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005, 460 SCRA 197. See also Agustin v. Court of
562
562
cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or
other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known
as A (adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T(thymine). The order in
which the four bases appear in an individuals DNA determines his or her
physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is
composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These
are called genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in
a particular sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code.
Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ.
They are known as polymorphic loci, which are the areas analyzed in
DNA
typing
(profiling,
tests,
fingerprinting,
or
analysis/DNA
177
563
match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations
between people. In each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic
types called allele, one inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test,
the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an
individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of
the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs
DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then
examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which
match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not
match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA
types match, then he isnot excluded as the father (Emphasis in the
original).
xxxx
564
178
32
33
_______________
30
31
32
Id., at p. 345.
33
565
565
34
566
566
36
SEC. 5. DNA Testing Order.If the court finds that the requirements in
36
Among the current known institutions offering DNA testing are the
567
indirect contempt of the court wherein such DNA evidence was offered,
presented or sought to be offered and presented.
Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a
written verified request to the court that allowed the DNA testing for the
disclosure of his DNA profile and all results or other information obtained
from the DNA testing, the same may be disclosed to the persons named in the
written verified request.
38
the DNA evidence, in its totality, including all biological samples, DNA
profiles and results or other genetic information obtained from DNA testing.
For this purpose, the court may order the appropriate government agency to
568
568
1. i.for not less than the period of time that any person is under trial for
_______________
2. ii.in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the
37
an offense; or,
38
569
order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other information obtained
from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such
terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court:
1. (1)Person from whom the sample was taken;
2. (2)Lawyers representing parties in the case or action where the DNA
evidence is offered and presented or sought to be offered and
presented;
3. (3)Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
4. (4)Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
5. (5)Other persons as determined by the court.
Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information
concerning a DNA profile without the proper court order shall be liable for
569
181
People v. Vallejo, 431 Phil. 798, 817; 382 SCRA 192, 209 (2002).
570
570
6
35
36
People vs. Erguiza
the exact date of the commission of the crime of rape is
extraneous to and is not an element of the offense, such that any
183
6
37
No. 04-10-11-SC, known as, Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
_______________
G.R. No. 176633, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 411, citing the case of People
Children effective November 15, 2004. Hence, inPeople v. San Antonio, Jr.,
v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, this
Court resolved to withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and to use
638
638
When
arraigned,
appellant
pleaded
not
guilty.5Thereafter trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private
complainant (AAA), her mother BBB and father CCC, and
Dr. James Sison. The defense presented five witnesses,
namely:
_______________
3 The Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on the utmost
confidentiality of proceedings involving violence against women and children
set forth in Sec. 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as, AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M.
such victims, and their immediate family members other than the accused,
shall appear as AAA, BBB, CCC, and so on. Addresses shall appear as
xxx as in No. xxx Street, xxx District, City of xxx.
4 CA Rollo, p. 6.
5 Records, p. 30.
639
639
PROSECUTIONS VERSION:
On January 5, 2000, at around 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon,AAA, a thirteen-year old first year high school
student, together with her friends, siblings Joy and Ricky
Agbuya, went to the mango orchard located at the back of ZZZ
Elementary School to gather fallen mangoes.7 When they were
bound for home at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon,
AAAs short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA asked Joy
and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her.8
While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry
suddenly grabbed and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck,
Larry threatened to hurt her if she would make a noise.9
Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a
tamarind tree and other thorny plants grow. Then Larry removed
_______________
6 CA Rollo, p. 69.
7 TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 3-5.
8 TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 6-7; TSN, July, 13, 2000, p. 14.
9 TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 8-9; TSN, July 13, 2000, pp. 14-15.
640
640
AAA lingered for a while at the place and kept crying. Having
spent her tears, she wore her panty and short pants and proceeded
to the adjacent store of her Aunt Beth who was asleep. After
staying for some time at the store, AAA decided to come (sic) home.
Upon reaching home, she directly went to bed. Fearing Larrys
threat, AAA kept mum on the incident.12
On April 7, 2000, BBB brought her daughter AAA to her
grandmother (BBBs mother), a hilot residing in XXX, Tarlac, to
consult her on the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of AAAs
throat and the absence of her monthly period.13 After examining
AAA, her grandmother told BBB that her daughter was pregnant.
BBB asked AAA who was the father of her unborn child but
AAA refused to talk. After much prodding, and in the presence of
her Uncle, Rudy Domingo, AAA finally revealed that she was
raped by accused-appellant.14
On April 8, 2000, AAA, accompanied by her mother and uncle,
went to the police headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the
incident.15 Then the police brought her to YYY District
Hospital16 where Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said
hospital conducted the examination on Michelle. Dr. Sison made
the following findings:
_______________
his maong pants and forced AAA to lie down on the grassy ground.
Thereafter, he removed her short pants and panty, mounted
himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her private parts
and made push and pull movements. He likewise raised AAAs
sando and mashed her breast. AAA felt pain when accusedappellant entered her and she felt something sticky in her private
part after Larry made the push and pull movements.10
Larry told AAA not to tell anybody about the incident otherwise
he would kill her and all the members of her family and then he
ran away.11
10 TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 9-11; TSN, July 19, 2000, pp. 4-5.
11 TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 11-12.
12 TSN, July 12, 2000, p. 13.
13 TSN, July 26, 2000, p. 5
14 TSN, July 12, 2000, p. 15
15 TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 16-17.
16 TSN, July 12, 2000, p. 18.
641
641
186
642
to Spouses CCC and BBB to talk about the charge of rape against
her son; that Spouses CCC and BBB were asking for P1,000,000.00
which was later reduced to P250,000.00 and that she made a
counter-offer of P5,000.00.21
Joy Agbuya testified that she and AAA were at the
mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg on January 5,
2000;that she never left AAA when her short pants got
hooked; that they went together to the store of Auntie Beth
where they parted.22
Juanito Macaraeg, the mango orchard caretaker, testified that
the house of Larry was a walking distance of about three minutes
from the mango orchard; that if one runs fast, it would only take a
minute to reach his house; and that he could not recall having seen
Larry in the orchard.23 (Emphasis supplied)
In its Decision dated November 18, 2005, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC, but modified the amount of the award of
exemplary damages and costs as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing circumstances, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos (Pangasinan),
Branch 57 dated November 27, 2000 in Criminal Case No. SCC3282 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant
Larry Erguiza is held GUILTY of Rape and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the victim
AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages,
187
21 TSN, August 3, 2000, pp. 4-5; TSN, August 22, 2000, pp. 3-15.
22 TSN, August 1, 2000, p. 9.
23 TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 8 and 11.
24 Rollo, p. 18.
25 CA Rollo, pp. 43-62.
643
643
_______________
26 CA Rollo, p. 45.
27 People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 102, 108.
644
644
the accused. This being so, the trial court did not err in giving full
credence to AAAs testimony.28
31 People v. Medel, G.R. No. 123803, February 26, 1998, 286 SCRA 567.
32 People v. Banela, G.R. No. 124973, January 18, 1999, 301 SCRA 84, 87.
_______________
_______________
28 Rollo, pp. 15.
29 People v. Palma, G.R. Nos. 130206-08, June 17, 1999, 308 SCRA 466.
30 People v. Domogoy, G.R. No. 116738, March 22, 1999, 305 SCRA 75.
645
645
646
647
_______________
46 TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.
What happened when you went to the house of BBB and CCC talking
with them about their problem of the alleged rape on AAA, their
daughter?
A.
They were asking for a settlement price for one million pesos but we
What did you do when they were asking one million pesos from you?
_______________
648
648
And according to Larry Erguiza as well as his witnesses they told the
Honorable Court that you and your wife are demanding from Larry
that?
A.
Q.
A.
It was they who went to my house, they even knelt before me crying
and they were offering money, sir.56
We told them that we do not have that money until they reduced the
price to P250,000.00 but we have no money because we are poor, sir.
Q.
A.
Q.
Did you hear what BBB said that you were the one offering money?
A.
Q.
A.
That is not true, sir. She was saying that we were the ones offering
money for one million to them but she was telling a lie, it was they
Erguiza and his parents the amount of one million pesos so that you
will not file this case against the accused, what can you say about
649
What is your proof that is was they who are demanding the amount of
one million and reduced that to two hundred fifty thousand
(P250,000.00)?
A.
Q.
Aside from the fact that you do not have money, was there any reason
or what was your other reason in going there?
191
A.
Our reason in talking to them was that when Larry said that he did not
commit the alleged rape and so we went there to talk to them so that
we could preserve our relationship as in-laws even if it is for the sake
of peace we could try our best to cope up even P5,000.00 just for the
sake of peace because our intention in going to their house was to
extract the truth, sir.57
Before the filing of this case with this Honorable Court, your parents
and you were pleading to the parents of AAA not to continue anymore
the case, is it not?
_______________
650
61 People v. Bangcado, G.R. No. 132330, November 28, 2000, 346 SCRA
Yes, sir, so that the case will not be filed and our relationship will not
be destroyed, sir.
Q.
A.
No, sir. They were the ones who went to the house of AAA, sir.
Q.
But the family of AAA did not agree to the pleadings of your parents
that the case be not filed anymore, is it not?
A.
They will agree if we will pay then 1 million, but we do not have 1
million, sir.
Q.
A.
No, sir. They were the ones who told that to us.58 (Emphasis Supplied)
189.
651
651
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
No, sir.
Q.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
[sic] January 5, 2000 you were with your brother Ricky and
AAA in going to the mango orchard, what can you say about
that?
A.
What she is saying is not true. I was not with my brother, sir. I
did not tug him along with me.
Q.
It is also said by AAA that you left her behind in the mango
orchard when her pants was hooked, what can you say about
that?
A.
Q.
537; People v. Abendan, G.R. Nos. 132026-27, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 106.
A.
No, sir, I waited for her and both of us went home together, sir.
_______________
652
Joy and Ricky when her shorts got hooked to the fence and
that while she was unhooking her pants from the fence,
appellant grabbed her and raped her.67
This was however contradicted by Joy, to wit:
Q.
653
653
Going back to the occasion wherein you were with AAA, who
were with you in going back home?
How many times did you go to the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg?
193
A.
Q.
In your way home, where did you part or separate with each
Q.
Madam Witness, you said that you have a quarrel with the
private complainant, AAA, will you please tell this Honorable
other?
A.
xxxx
Q.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Since you said that AAA is your bestfriend was there an occasion
wherein she told you that she was raped?
A.
You said that the reason for your quarrel is that they wanted you to
change your statement, that you left behind AAA, who are those they,
Q.
In the year 2000, when was the last time that you talked to AAA?
Witness
A.
April, sir.
I, sir.
Q.
PROS. REINTAR
A.
No more, sir.
Q.
Q.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Will you please tell the Honorable Court why your friendship became
Q.
A.
A.
They, sir.
Q.
And because you quarreled, that is the reason why you are now
Q.
A.
severed?
Yes, sir.70
Who told you to change your statement that you left AAA
behind?
A.
You try to understand clearly the question, Madam Witness, and may I
repeat that, at the time of the rape when according to you, you were
_______________
654
654
194
655
655
They left ahead of me because my short pants was hooked at the fence
so I was left behind, sir.
Q.
A.
Q.
And who is this person you are referring to as the one who grabbed
you?
A.
_______________
73 TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 8-9.
74 TSN, August 1, 2000, p. 10.
75 TSN, August 1, 2000, p. 13.
656
656
657
657
658
So at 4:00 oclock you were at the house and you left and proceeded at
the back of the school to pick mangoes?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
_______________
83 TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 5-6.
659
659
So it is almost 5:00 p.m. When you went to the mango orchard with Joy
Agbuya and Ricky Agbuya?
A.
What I only know was that, it was already about 5:00 oclock then, sir.
Q.
A.
When we went there, we were not able to get some mango and
when I asked sir what was the time then and when I looked at
660
660
661
58
Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Wallem Phils.
Shipping Inc.
the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive
them.
60
Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Wallem Phils.
Shipping Inc.
Same; Same; Witnesses; The trial courts evaluation as to the
credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the
highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and
deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their
testimonies.On the credibility of Mr. Talens which is the fourth
issue, the general rule in assessing credibility of witnesses is wellsettled: x x x the trial courts evaluation as to the credibility of
witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect
because it is more competent to so conclude, having had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on
the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies.
The trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses
were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh
conflicting testimonies. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly
200
461
Hermogenes R. Liwag.
5 Gathered from the findings of fact of the RTC decision. Supra note 4.
6 Records, p. 93; Exhibit C.
7 Supra note 4 at p. 37.
462
462
464
of Appeals (G.R. No. 47004. March 8, 1989, 171 SCRA 61), the Court ruled
that the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act are merely suppletory
_______________
_______________
21 Commonwealth Act No. 65 (1936).
22 Commonwealth Act No. 65 (1936). Section 1. That the provisions of
Public Act No. 521 of the 74th Congress of the United States, approved on
April 16, 1936, be accepted, as it is hereby accepted to be made applicable to
all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea to and from Philippine ports in
foreign trade: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as
repealing any existing provision of the Code of Commerce which is now in
force or as limiting its application. Approved on April 22, 1936.
However, in American President Lines, Ltd. v. Klepper, et al., 110 Phil.
243, 248 (1960), reiterated in Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Court
to the Civil Code in view of Articles 1753 and 1756 of the Civil Code.
See also Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L75118, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 552.
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the
466
466
calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
(5)
467
468
468
case, no bill of lading shall be issued and that the terms agreed shall be
_______________
_______________
28 Civil Code, Art. 1736.
29 42 Phil. 256, 262 (1921).
30 This is subject to Section 6 thereof which provides the carrier and the
shipper are at liberty to enter into any agreement in any terms as to the
responsibility and liability of the carrier for such goods provided that in this
as such.
205
cargo from the time it is turned over to him until its delivery
at the port of unloading.
In a case decided by a U.S. Circuit Court, Nichimen
Company v. M./V. Farland,37 it was ruled that like the duty
of seaworthiness, the duty of care of the cargo is nondelegable,38
_______________
36 Supra note 14.
469
37 462 F.2d 319, 1972 AMC 1573 (2d Cir. 1972), as cited inSchoenbaum,
Thomas J., Admiralty and Maritime Law, Vol. I, 4th Ed. (2004), p. 687.
38 Schoenbaum, id., then cites another case, Sumitomo Corp. of America
v. M./V. Sie Kim, 632 F. Supp. 824, 1987 AMC 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
qualifying that the court ruled therein that a shipper and a carrier could
470
enter into a valid agreement placing the duty and expense of loading the
cargo on the shipper and, where damage
470
Atty. Repol:
Do you agree with me that Wallem Philippines is a shipping
[company]?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, who hired the services of the stevedores?
A The checker of the vessel of Wallem, sir.41
xxx
Q Mr. Witness, during the discharging operation of this cargo, where was
the master of the vessel?
A On board the vessel, supervising, sir.
Q And, observed the discharging operation?
A Yes, sir.
_______________
is caused by improper stowage performed by a stevedore who was engaged by the shipper and
over whom the carrier has no control, the carrier is not liable.
39 489, 70 Am Jur 2d, citing Kerry v Pacific Marine Co., 121 Cal 546, 54 P 89.
40 375, 70 Am Jur 2d, citing Standard Oil Co. v. Soderling, 112 Ind. App. 437, 42 N.E. 2d 373
(1942).
41 TSN, 5 December 1997, p. 12.
The records are replete with evidence which show that the
damage to the bags happened before and after their
discharge45 and it was caused by the stevedores of the
arrastre operator who were then under the supervision of
Wallem.
_______________
42 It is the head checker who manages the operations inside the vessel,
sir. TSN, 5 December 1997, pp. 13-14.
43 Id., at p. 14.
44 Records, p. 130; Exhibit I-f-3.
45 Id., at p. 132. In Exhibit 1-h there is a surveyors note which states:
the bad order torn bags was due to stevedores mishandling snatching of bags
at the inner cargo holds, before discharge and the forklift operator in
471
472
472
46 People of the Philippines v. Ramirez, 334 Phil. 305; 266 SCRA 335, 348,
citing People v. Gabris, G.R. No. 116221, 258 SCRA 663, 11 July 1996;
citingPeople v. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685, 1 June 1995.
473
209
30
9
10
People vs. Pagaduan
saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and value of the seized evidence had been preserved. In
other words, the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be
proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these grounds
are or that they even exist.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Definition
of Chain of Custody.Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165
defines Chain of Custody as follows: Chain of Custody means
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs
or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition[.]
210
31
1
312
J.:
211
313
313
around 4:30 p.m., and saw the appellant already waiting for
the informant. The informant approached the appellant and
introduced PO3 Almarez to him as a buyer. PO3 Almarez
told the appellant that he needed shabu worth P200, and
inquired from him (appellant) if he had a stock. The
appellant replied in the affirmative, and then handed one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance to PO3 Almarez. PO3 Almarez, in turn,
gave
the
two
pre-marked
P100
bills
to
the
9
appellant. Immediately after, PO3 Almarez made the prearranged signal to his companions, who then approached the
appellant. Captain de Vera took the marked money from the
appellants right pocket, and then arrested him.10 PO3
Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with his
initials.11Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought the appellant
to the Diadi Police Station for investigation.12
At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request
for laboratory examination (Exh. C).13 The appellant was
transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was
detained.14 Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3
Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory
examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, where they were received by PO2 Fernando
Dulnuan.15 Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero,
the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory,
conducted an examination on the specimen submitted, and
found it to be positive for the presence ofshabu (Exh. B).16
_______________
9 TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 6-8; TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 5-6; Records, p. 4.
10 TSN, July 5, 2004, p. 9; TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 16-17.
11 TSN, July 26, 2004, p. 5.
212
314
315
316
317
The
Comprehensive
Dangerous
Drugs
Act: A Brief Background
R.A. No. 9165 was enacted in 2002 to pursue the States
policy to safeguard the integrity of its territory and the wellbeing of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful
effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental wellbeing, and to defend the same against acts or omissions
detrimental to their development and preservation.
214
318
215
27 See People v. Denoman, G.R. No. 171732, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 257,
A:
267.
When we were already in Diadi Police Station, we first put him in jail
in the Municipal Jail of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.
_______________
319
After you handed this buy-bust money to the accused, what happened
next?
[PO3 ALMAREZ:]
A:
When the shabu was already with me and I gave him the money[,] I
signaled the two, Captain Jaime de Vera and SPO1 Balido, sir.
xxxx
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
What happened when you brought the accused to the Police Station in
Diadi?
28 People v. Kamad, G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010, 610 SCRA 295.
319
320
320
A:
xxxx
Q:
After making the request, what did you do next[,] if any[,] Mr.
Witness?
A:
_______________
_______________
29 TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 9-13.
30 TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 17-18.
321
321
322
323
324
sented in court was the very same specimen seized from the
appellant.
218
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two days. It was
not, there325
325
326
327
Judgment
reversed
and
set
FelimonPagaduan y Tamayo acquitted.
aside,
appellant
34
People vs. Habana
rarely that the prosecutor would present the informant
because of the need to hide his identity and preserve his invaluable
service to the police.
Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The chain of
custody rule requires that testimony be represented about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it
is offered in evidence.In all prosecutions for the violation of The
221
435
222
436
437
438
439
440
441
24
People vs. Nandi
procedure is necessary because of the illegal drugs unique
characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and
easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by
accident or otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To erase all doubts as to the
identity of the seized drugs, the prosecution should establish its
movement from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist,
and finally to the court.The prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the subject substance was the very same
object taken from the accused. To erase all doubts as to the
identity of the seized drugs, the prosecution should establish its
movement from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist,
and finally to the court. In Mallillin v. People, 553 SCRA 619
(2008), the Court had the occasion to explain the chain of custody
rule and what constitutes sufficient compliance with this rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Links that should be established in
the chain of custody of the confiscated item.The following links
should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated
item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer;second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
125
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the October 23, 2008 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed in toto the August
2, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
103, Quezon City, finding accused Rose Nandi guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of Violation
of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002,
and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
Accused Rose Nandi was arrested in a buy-bust operation
and was eventually indicted in an Information dated July 10,
2003, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of July 2003 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, or distribute any dangerous drug, did
227
126
127
128
128
_______________
3 Records, pp. 50-55.
OF
129
130
131
After you arrested the accused Rose Nandi, what happened next?
We brought her to our station.
_______________
7 People v. Robles, G.R. No. 177220, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 647.
132
132
How about the item, where was it when you proceeded to the station?
A:
231
Q:
A:
You testified that the item you confiscated from the accused was
turned over to the investigator, did you happen to know what is that
item?
A:
133
133
11 G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 633.
232
134
135
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
697
69
7
69
9
her dealings with the banks money were clearly reflected on the
records of the bank.
Same; Same; If theft of the money cannot be established, and
negligence is the only legal phenomenon that is evident on the
records, then the proximate cause of the loss of the banks cash is
the cash custodian who disregarded established procedures and
blindly signed the tellers cash transfer slips without counting the
money turned over to her.If petitioner bank had to attribute any
negligence on the part of its employees, then it should have set its
sights on the acts and/or omissions of Ms. Marinel Castro, the cash
Custodian, and Mr. Hanibal Jara, the security guard. If theft of
the money cannot be established, and negligence is the only legal
phenomenon that is evident on the records, then the proximate
cause of the loss of the banks PhP600,000 is Ms. Castro, who, as
cash custodian, disregarded established procedures and blindly
signed the tellers cash transfer slips without counting the money
turned over to her. Meanwhile, Mr. Jara failed to inspect
respondent Custodios belongings as she left the bank on that day
for lunch. Despite his own suspicions of respondent tellers
conduct, he ignored them and decided not to check the bags. This
omission can conceivably be considered as a grave omission of his
duties as a security guard.
Evidence; Witnesses; A fact elicited from a witness during
testimony cannot be considered in the disposition of the case if it
has been ordered stricken out, unless it is established by any other
evidence on record.During one of the hearings, Mr. Lucas, the
branch manager, explained that it was unusual for respondent
Custodio to
700
00
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Custodio
have requested a cash transfer, considering that she had
sufficient funds to cover the amount. However, as the appellate
court explained, the trial court should not have considered his
testimony in this respect, since the judge had ordered that
particular statement stricken out during the trial court
proceedings. A fact elicited from a witness during testimony cannot
be considered in the disposition of the case if it has been ordered
stricken out, unless it is established by any other evidence on
record.
Same; While the general evidentiary rule is that evidence that
one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible
to prove that one did or did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time, evidence of similar acts may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage and the like.The general evidentiary rule is that
evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is
not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or a
similar thing at another time. However, evidence of similar acts
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.
In Citibank N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v.
Sabeniano, 504 SCRA 378 (2006), the Court explained the
rationale for this rule: The rule is founded upon reason, public
policy, justice and judicial convenience. The fact that a person has
committed the same or similar acts at some prior time affords, as a
general rule, no logical guaranty that he committed the act in
question. This is so because, subjectively, a mans mind and even
his modes of life may change; and, objectively, the conditions under
which he may find himself at a given time may likewise change
and thus induce him to act in a different way. Besides, if evidence
of similar acts are to be invariably admitted, they will give rise to a
multiplicity of collateral issues and will subject the defendant to
surprise as well as confuse the court and prolong the trial.
Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant,
especially to actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds
light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person; it provides
236
701
701
SERENO, J.:
This civil case is essentially a demand by a bank for the
recovery of a sum of money from one of its tellers who
allegedly failed to account for funds entrusted to her,
amounting to six hundred thousand pesos (PhP600,000).
Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank) is a banking corporation. On the other hand,
respondent Marina Custodio is a bank teller employed at the
Laoag City branch of petitioner Metrobank.1
On 13 June 1995 at 8:18 a.m.,2 respondent Custodio
reported for work in petitioner banks branch in Laoag
City.3 At the start of the banking day, respondent Custodio
received loose money (picos)4 for the days business and was
assigned as Teller No. 3.5 In the course of performing her
duties, respondent Custodio handled several cash
transactions with the customers on behalf of petitioner bank.6
At 12:10 p.m., a cash transfer of two hundred thousand
pesos (PhP200,000) was made from Teller No. 1 to
respondent Custodio.7 Petitioner Metrobank explained that,
usually, a transfer of money from one teller to another occurs
if the latter needs money, maybe to pay for the
withdrawal.8 How_______________
1 RTC Pre-Trial Order dated 12 September 1995, RTC records at p. 60.
268.
6 RTC Pre-Trial Order dated 12 September 1995 (id., at p. 60); Exhibit
B-1 (id., at p. 268).
7 Exhibit B-2, id., at p. 270.
8 RTC Decision at 6; Rollo at p. 94.
702
702
[Rollo at pp. 94-95]; Exhibit B-3 [RTC records at p. 270]; TSN, 11 December
1995, at p. 15)
10 Exhibits A-5 and A-6, RTC records at p. 262.
17 On that day, there were four tellers who turned over cash to Castro: (1)
Virginia Asanon; (2) Eliza Piedad; (3) respondent Custodio; and (4) Mary
102).
14 Id.
20 Id.
703
21 Id.
22 RTC Decision at p. 13; Rollo at p. 101.
23 RTC Decision at 10 (id., at p. 98); TSN, 11 December 1995, at p. 8.
24 RTC Decision at 13; id., at p. 101.
25 Brief for the Appellant, at 7 (id., at p. 116); TSN, 28 February 2000, at
pp. 97-98.
704
704
the cash bundles and signed the Cash Transfer Slip for the
funds turned over by respondent Custodio.34
On 16 June 1995, employees of the Laoag City branch of
petitioner Metrobankincluding the new accounts clerk, the
remittance clerk and all the other tellerswere made to take
polygraph tests at the National Bureau of Investigation,
except for respondent Custodio.35Respondent was eight
months pregnant at that time and, thus, was not required to
take the lie detector test.36
On 22 June 1995, petitioner Metrobank filed a Complaint
for a sum of money with ex-parte application for a writ of
preliminary attachment, praying that respondent Custodio
pay the amount of PhP600,000, including attorneys fees and
costs of suit.37 The trial court subsequently granted the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of respondent Custodio.38
On 23 June 1995 at around 1:30 p.m., while respondent
Custodio was performing her duties as a teller, she was
served the trial courts summons39 and a copy of petitioner
Metrobanks Complaint, including the attachment writ.40
After she was served the summons, respondent Custodio
was supposedly caught bringing out a tellers copy of the
journal print transactions with the related cash transfer slips
for that particular banking day (23 June 1995).41These bank
records were confiscated from respondent Custodio, when
_______________
705
705
239
706
707
240
_______________
56 Id., at p. 11-16.
hereby directed to pay the plaintiff-bank the amount of six hundred thousand
pesos
annum beginning June 13, 1995 until fully paid. (RTC Decision at pp. 18-
the trial court deemed the case submitted for decision. Respondent Custodio
(P600,000.00)
plus
interest
at
the
legal
rate
of
12% per
708
708
709
_______________
_______________
74 New Rural Bank Guimba (N.E.), Inc. v. Abad, G.R. No. 161818, 20
August 2008, 562 SCRA 503; Rules of Court Rule 45, Sec. 1.
75 Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Yokohama Employees Union, G.R.
76 A question of fact can be entertained in a Rule 45 petition for the
Comment)
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the
pp. 299-311).
case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
(Serrano v. People, G.R. No. 175023, 05 July 2010, 623 SCRA 322 [footnote
710
710
13] citing Pelonia v. People, G.R. No. 168997, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 207)
77 Tabujara III v. People, G.R. No. 175162, 29 October 2008, 570 SCRA
229.
78 Marphomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No. 169918, 27 February 2008, 547 SCRA
98.
711
711
712
712
82 Encinares v. Achero, G.R. No. 161419, 25 August 2009, 597 SCRA 34.
243
Commercial
Banking
Corporation
v.
Marcopper
Mining
Corporation, G.R. No. 170738, 12 September 2008, 565 SCRA 125, citingJison
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124853, 24 February 1998, 286 SCRA 495, 532.
713
713
714
_______________
_______________
89 But the cash custodian was negligent in not following the standard
operating procedure of the bank. Her negligence was the root cause why the
cash shortage was not discovered earlier because, had she counted first the
money bills delivered to her before signing the cash transfer, the shortage
could have been detected. (CA Decision at p. 9; Id., at p. 53)
715
715
fidelity to trust and must exercise utmost diligence and care in handling
cash. A teller cannot afford to relax vigilance in the performance of his
duties. (Fuentes v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75955, 28
October 1988, 166 SCRA 752, citing Galsim v. PNB, G.R. No. 23921, 24
August 1969, 29 SCRA 293; Allied Banking Corporation v. Castro, et al., G.R.
No. L-70608, 22 December 1987, 156 SCRA 789)
716
716
guard, Jara should have checked and inspected the things of all
the bank employees, especially those who were in charge of
handling money before going out of the premises. Upon seeing a
teller going out for lunch with an expandable shoulder bag
and paper bag, prudence dictates that the security guard
should have inspected and checked the tellers bags. But
the security guard failed to do so. It should be noted that the
security guards testimony reveals that the said shoulder bag had
been used by appellant even prior to June 13, 1995, and on said
days, there were no shortages.
xxx
The signature of the cash custodian in the transfer slip means
that the amount reflected therein corresponds to the bills turned
over to her. The cash transfer slip is the best evidence that
appellant turned over the amount of P2,113,500.00 on June 13,
1995. The cash transfer slip signed by the cash custodian was not
presented despite the written requires of appellant. However, the
existence of the signed transfer slip was admitted by the cash
custodian. She even admitted that she did not follow the
banks standard operating procedure to count the money
delivered by the teller to her before signing the cash
transfer slip, x x x.
xxx
In her testimony, the cash custodian, attested that it was not
only the cash transfer slip of appellant which she signed without
counting the money submitted to her, but also those of the other
tellers. Under the circumstance, it cannot be determined at what
point of the transactions the shortage occurred. But the cash
custodian was negligent in not following the standard
operating procedure of the bank. Her negligence was the
root cause why the cash shortage was not discovered
earlier because, had she counted first the money bills
delivered to her before
717
717
signing the cash transfer slip, the shortage could have been
detected. x x x (Emphasis supplied)94
246
_______________
the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall
718
718
sustain the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the
record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers
which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (Rule 132, Sec. 39)
719
719
Madam witness, going over Exhibit G, you claim that these bill
wrappers belong to defendant Marina Custodio because all these bill
wrappers are stamped PEPT-3?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Despite
the
fact
that
Marina
Custodio did
not
affix
her
signature on these hill wrappers, you claim that these belong to her
Yes, sir.
_______________
98 Exhibit 4 (RTC records at pp. 311-312); TSN 03 August 1998, at pp. 78-80.
investigators from their Regional Office and from their head office, the
Department of Internal Affairs conducted an investigation on the shortage
720
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Custodio
Q:
Is it not a fact, madam witness, that the date when these ball
wrappers are turned over to you is supposed to be reflected?
A:
721
_______________
_______________
102 4.
account and/or turn over the said sum of P600,00[0].00 but the latter refused
and failed and still refuses and fails to honor plaintiffs demand. (Complaint
at p. 2, RTC records at p. 2)
722
prove that one did or did not do the same or a similar thing
at another time.106 However, evidence of similar acts may be
AND
109 Tanzo v. Drilon, G.R. No. 106671, 30 March 2000, 329 SCRA 147,
citing Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239, 255 (1998).
723
249
723
724
counting the money submitted to her, but also those of the other tellers of the
_______________
_______________
110 In her testimony, the cash custodian, attested that it was not only
the cash transfer slip of appellant (Custodio) which she signed without
112 Q:
Is it not a fact that on said date after all the bundles were
turned over to you, when you made a bundle count before you placed these
725
725
bundles of cash inside the vault, there were also bundles missing from other
tellers in the person of Mary Paula Castro?
A:
726
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales
(Chairperson),
Bersamin andVillarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Brion,
SECOND DIVISION.
119
1
19
with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to convict an accused.No inflexible rule has
been formulated as to the exact quantity of circumstantial
evidence which will suffice for conviction. All that the case law
requires is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilty. In accord with the constitutional presumption of
innocence, jurisprudence also holds that where the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt,
the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to convict an accused.
Same; Same; Same; Paraffin
Test; Paraffin
test
is
inconclusivethe presence of nitrates should be taken only as an
indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of
infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also
admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.In a
recent case, we reiterated the rule that paraffin test is
inconclusive. We held: Scientific experts concur in the view that
the paraffin test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The
only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or
absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established
from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was
the discharge of firearm. The person may have handled one or
more of a number of substances which give the same positive
reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, Pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants
120
20
People vs. De Guzman
252
121
121
253
122
122
Dr. Garcia concluded that more than one (1) person attacked
the victim. Dr. Bandonill shared the same opinion.
5
______________
5
TSN, January 21, 1994, p. 14; TSN, January 26, 1994, pp. 43-44.
123
123
254
10
11
12
10
11
12
124
124
14
15
16
17
255
______________
13
14
15
16
17
18
125
125
126
20
21
(PROS. DUMLAO)
Q While you and that person beside you were riding in that
tricycle being driven by Wilfredo de Guzman . . ., what
happened next. . .?
(WITNESS)
A The person who rode in the tricycle gave greeting to
Wilfredo de Guzman, sir.
Q And what did Wilfredo de Guzman say, if he said
anything?
________________
19
People vs. Adolfma, G.R. No. 109778, December 8, 1994, 239 SCRA
67; People vs. Macatana, No. L-57061, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 235, 240.
20
People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 102880, April 25, 1994, 231 SCRA 759, 771-
772.
21
127
128
24
________________
22
Later on, however, Ico and De Vera were charged with Murder in the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City. The case against them, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 00704, is still pending before Branch 43.
23
24
See
Criminalities, Bankcroft
Whitney
Co.,
1915
ed.,
p.
141;
258
o0o
129
______________
THIRD DIVISION.
with evident premeditation, with the aid of armed men and with
the use of superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of MANUEL S. ANIBAN by then and
there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the left chest,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which would
have caused the death of said Manuel S. Aniban, thus performing
all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason or causes independent of their will, that is the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said Manuel S. Aniban which
prevented his death, to the damage and prejudice of said Manuel
S. Aniban.
Five armed men blocked the taxi and told the driver to stop.
Three of them stood in front of the cab while two others took
positions on each side of the same vehicle. Manuel, who was
near the left rear door of the taxicab, was shot. His brother
Marlon pulled him inside the cab but the man who shot
Manuel ordered all of them to get out after which they were
made to lie face down on the ground. As the man who shot
Manuel pointed his gun at him, Manuel said, Hindi ako
masamang tao, anak din ako ng police. (I am not a bad man,
I am also a son of a policeman).
When Manuel told them that he was wounded, two of the
armed men approached the cab. The one who came near the
left side of the cab was Araza. The other one, Guillermo,
went to the right side of the cab. Three of the armed men,
including Abrera and Cruz, remained in front of the cab.
Guillermo opened the door of the cab and told Aris to lie face
down on the ground. Araza was then talking with Marlon
who was pleading that his brother Manny be brought to a
hospital.
Meanwhile, Dennis Borbe was held by the collar by one of
the armed men and told to lie down on his belly, after which
the Aniban group was ordered to get back inside the cab
while Dennis was also told to sit in front beside the driver.
262
___________________
1
Exh. C.
Exh. N.
__________________
263
264
10
10
__________________
7
Decision, p. 10.
11
11
10
___________________
9
10
12
12
them had their backs towards him but one was facing him.
Aris later identified the latter as Araza. On crossexamination, Aris identified one of the two men whose backs
were turned to him as appellant Abrera.
Aris did not mention appellant Abrera in his statement
simply because nobody asked him about the latter. He was a
bit confused about the person who would answer to the name
of Abrera but Aris was sure that appellant Abrera was one of
the two whose back was turned toward him as they assaulted
the victim.
Damaso Borbe, the victims brother, testified that aside
from the man in blue who was later identified as Araza,
appellant Guillermo also pulled his brother out of the taxicab
and brought him in front of it. Because he was concentrating
on asking his companions where his brother would be
brought, Damaso failed to see who fired the first shot. When
he went near his brother as continuous and rapid firing was
taking place, Damaso identified Araza and appellant
Guillermo as two of the armed men he saw pointing their
guns at his brother immediately after the firing of successive
shots that snuffed out his brothers life.
Alexis Aguilar was more categorical in identifying
appellants Abrera and Guillermo as the perpetrators of the
crime.
All these testimonial evidence point to the culpability of
appellants. All witnesses were one in identifying Araza as
one of the three gunmen. Aris Catapang and Alexis Aguilar
11
12
13
14
15
16
266
while
that
This
that
__________________
11
12
13
Ibid., p. 24.
14
15
Ibid., p. 51.
16
13
13
_________________
17
18
14
__________________
19
People v. Bayani, G.R. No. 120894, October 3, 1996, 262 SCRA 660, 680.
15
15
21
22
23
____________________
268
20
People v. Hubilo, G.R. No. 101741, March 23, 1993, 220 SCRA 389, 399
citing People v. Pasiliao, G.R. Nos. 98152-53, October 26, 1992, 215 SCRA
163.
21
People v. Ducay, G.R. No. 86939, August 2, 1993, 225 SCRA 1, 18.
22
People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 95320, September 4, 1991, 201 SCRA 317,
329.
23
16
16
__________________
24
25
17
17
witnesses for the prosecution were the ones telling the truth.
(People vs. Tuson, 261 SCRA 711[1996])
o0o
18
18
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.
Chairman), Melo, Francisco andPanganiban, JJ., concur.
Appealed decision affirmed with modification.
Note.The congruence between the testimonial and the
physical evidence leads to the inevitable conclusion that the
270
THIRD DIVISION.
723
7
23
24
People vs. Abellanosa
Same; Same; Murder; The significance of physical evidence in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is
paramount.Quite apart from the fact that the prosecution
witnesses testimonies by their very nature are not deserving of
credence, the physical evidence introduced contradicted the import
of their testimony, particularly as to the place where the victim
was killed. This doubt is brought out by the observation of Rodolfo
271
substances other than gunpowder. In this case, the accusedappellants claim that the companion of officer
725
7
25
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Fundamental is the doctrine that the prosecution must rely
on the strength of its own evidence rather than on the
weakness of the defenses. And when faithful observance of
this principle is wanting, as in the instant case, the
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the
accused are entitled to an acquittal.
This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction for
murder dated February 10, 1995 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, against the accused
Enemesio Abellanosa and Crisanto Abellanosa, Jr.
The Information filed by Provincial Prosecutor Felix
Fajardo before the trial court on June 2, 1993 reads as
follows:
1
726
26
People vs. Abellanosa
Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
It is thus axiomatic that an accused under our law is entitled to
an acquittal unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In fact, unless the prosecution discharges the burden of proving
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt the latter need
not even offer evidence in his behalf. Clearly, the prosecution has
utterly failed to discharge its burden of proof. A review of the
decision and the evidence on record merely engenders more doubts
in our mind as to the guilt of the accused-appellants. We perforce
rule that Enemesio Abellanosa and Crisanto Abellanosa, Jr. are
entitled to a mandatory acquittal.
____________________________
1
Rollo, p. 27.
727
727
Record, p. 57.
728
728
his residence. His live-in worker was Crispulo Sanchez who has
been with him for two years. He also owned two tractors which he
hired out for plowing. At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of April
without noticing that Mr. Abadies was dead. Neither Crispulo nor
Victoriano told her. A few minutes later, Victoriano left telling
Crispulo that he will pasture his cow and the cow of Mr. Abadies.
Later, Tony Alestre arrived and discovered that Mr. Abadies was
lying dead on his bed. Several persons also arrived even as
Crispulo went home to the
729
729
house of the deceased. He met Mrs. Elena Abadies and told her
Mr. Abadies was dead but the latter already knew about it. He did
not tell her who killed her husband. Later that morning, the police
brought Crispulo and Victoriano to the Salvador Police Station
where they were investigated. They told the police that they did
not know who shot and killed the deceased.
On April 29, 1993, they were again brought to the Salvador
Police Station where they saw Angelito Bation, Pedro Bation,
Federico Bacus, Enemesio Abellanosa and Crisanto Abellanosa, Jr.
SPO3 Elmer Robas, a Crime Laboratory Technician of the PNP
Regional Unit 10, Cagayan de Oro City, took paraffin casts of the
hands of all seven of them upon the request of the Salvador Police
Station. Mr. Robas took the paraffin casts to the Crime Laboratory
in Cagayan de Oro City and submitted them to Sr. Inspector
Filipinas Francisco Papa, forensic analyst, for forensic
examination. Inspector Papa performed the required examination
and reduced his (sic) findings in writing under Chemistry Report
No. C-0007-93, Exh. N. The results revealed that the paraffin casts
of Enemesio Abellanosa, Crisanto Abellanosa, Jr. and Crispulo
Sanchez were positive for gunpowder contents or nitrates. She
concluded that the three fired firearms. The results for the other
four were negative. This report was transmitted to the Salvador
Police Station.
On May 4, 1993, Crispulo Sanchez was arrested at the house of
the victim on the basis of the results of the paraffin test. He was
730
731
731
police station, he heard two (2) gunshot from the outside. The
person who must have fired the shots entered with two (2) spent
shells on hand and ordered him to place his hands atop the table
palms down. The policeman then tapped Crisantos back hand and
rubbed it on with his own hands. After which Crisantos hands
were poured with melted wax over which a cotton was laid (pp. 1517), TSN, August 2, 1994). After a few moments, the wax softened
and Crisanto was told to pull out his hands. Next to undergo the
same process was his uncle appellant Enemesio (pp. 17-18, ibid.).
Meanwhile, appellant Enemesio Abellanosa, for his part,
testified that on the morning of April 26, 1993, after taking
breakfast, he, together with his wife, three children, a cousin,
Raul, a nephew (coappellant Crisanto Abellanosa) and some
laborers, went to his coconut plantation to extract copra meat from
gathered coconuts (pp. 4-6, TSN, August 3, 1994). They stopped
work that day between 4:00 to 5:00 P.M. after which they
proceeded home. Thereat, while the children and his wife attended
to some household chores, he viewed Betamax films. Then Enteng
Abadies, son of Memong (the victim, the then Barangay Captain),
fetched his wife, Patricia, she being the Barangay Treasurer.
Patricia left and came back about 6:30 P.M. After taking supper,
he returned to watch TV and about 9:00 P.M., he retired (pp. 711, ibid.).
Having dozed for sometime, he was awakened by gunshots. He
roused his wife, told her about the shots, then lighted a lamp.
Conscious of prevalent cattle rustling and livestock thieveries in
their area, he opened a window fronting their corral to see if the
animals were still there. Then, a certain Nang Ceria (Gleceria
Bacus) called for him and inquired about the shots which she also
heard. He advised Nang Ceria to just stay inside her house (which
was a mere 25 meters away from his) and told her to just listen
and observe for more developments. Nang Tasia (Anastacia
Borlaza) came and inquired about the reason for the shots as she
was anxious about her husband who at that time was still tending
to their cornfield. Together with the rest of the household,
appellant went back to sleep. He woke up about 5:00 or 6:00 A.M.
the next day. His cousin, Raul, arrived and informed him that Noy
Memong was dead (pp. 12-21, TSN, ibid.).
276
He and his wife immediately went to the death scene and there
saw the dead body of Memong lying on a folding bed. On board a
motorcycle thereafter, they left for the municipal hall of Salvador
as his wife was to attend a conference of all barangay treasurers of
the municipality. Upon reaching the municipal hall, he saw some
732
732
733
733
The Issues
In their brief, appellants assigned the following errors:
The
Courts
Ruling
First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
It is hornbook doctrine that ordinarily, conclusions and
findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight
on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and
valid reasons because the trial court is in a better position to
examine
the
demeanor
of
the
witnesses
while
testifying. However, after a thorough review of the evidence
presented,
____________________________
9
11
734
734
1. 1.Credibility of witnesses;
2. 2.Sufficiency of evidence;
3. 3.The defense of alibi; and
4. 4.Presumption of innocence.
As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the
pivotal question of whether the guilt of the accusedappellants had been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecutions evidence. Put differently, was the evidence
presented by the prosecution sufficient to overturn the
____________________________
10
11
735
13
14
____________________________
12
Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 695, 701, February 23, 1995.
13
14
736
736
279
15
16
737
A No, sir.
Q You walked in an ordinary manner?
A Yes, sir.
In connection with the above-quoted testimonies, the
accused-appellants aptly observe that:
17
Appellants Brief, p. 5.
738
738
their employer and companion. To remain rooted to the spot for six
(6) hours doing nothing is incredible. To fail to inform the
immediate members of the family of the deceased compounds the
incredibility of their testimony. Their failure to verify what
happened to Maximo Abadies after the alleged shooting together
with their failure to ask for help from nearby houses only adds
more to the incredibility of their testimonies.
280
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
Decision, p. 7.
739
739
for more than six (6) hours after the killing without giving a
curious look at the victim belie the conclusion of shocked
insensibility by the trial court. There was not even an iota of
consciousness lost and consciousness regained on the part of the
alleged eyewitnesses. The trial court should have noticed (sic) this
into serious consideration.
A
Q
A
____________________________
19
20
19
740
740
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
them?
They were husking corn.
And when you saw them husking corn, did you ask them
why they were still husking corn?
I asked them.
And what was their answer?
They answered, we are husking corn because we dont
feel sleepy. (italics supplied)
741
741
____________________________
21
22
742
742
Q
A
Q
A
23
743
743
24
25
744
744
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
27
____________________________
26
284
27
TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 12-13, 16-17. Crispulo Sanchez alleged in his
testimony that Enemesio Abellanosa had used his own garand rifle in
shooting the victim eight times and that Crisanto Abellanosa who had a
revolver tucked in his waist had picked up the victims garand rifle and fired
it four times in the air.
745
745
29
____________________________
28
29
Decision, p. 9.
746
746
285
32
____________________________
30
31
32
People vs. Escalante, supra, p. 571, citing People vs. Villacorte, 55 SCRA
35
36
37
____________________________
747
747
34
33
34
35
36
People vs. Bostre, 230 SCRA 139, 143, February 18, 1994.
37
People vs. Baclayon, 231 SCRA 578, 584, March 29, 1994, cit-
748
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.,
Jr., Melo andFrancisco, JJ., concur.
Chairman), Davide,
FIRST DIVISION.
246
46
Conde vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Sale; Purchaser in bad faith; Vendors who bought
property despite being put on notice of the condition in the title that
the property was subject to repurchase deemed purchasers in bad
faith.Private respondents Ramon Conde and Catalina Conde, to
whom Pio Altera sold the disputed property in 1965, assuming
that there was, indeed, such a sale, cannot be said to be purchasers
in good faith. OCT No. 534 in the name of the Alteras specifically
contained the condition that it was subject to the right of
287
247
248
249
PIO ALTERA
(Sgd.)ACIENTE CORDERO
WITNESSES:
1. (SGD.) TEODORO C. AGUILLON
250
251
Arcuino
vs.
Aparis, 22
SCRA
de
Lucas
vs.
252
291
agreement have been reduced to writing, and, therefore, there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms
of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the
following cases:
1. (a)Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is
put in issue by the pleadings;
2. (b)When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term agreement includes wills. (Lim Yhi Luya vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA
692 (1980).
6
253
253
292
254
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
102
102
103
103
294
xxx
xxx
_______________
3
104
104
105
105
_______________
6
106
106
296
107
107
nently enjoining defendants Allied Banking Corporation and theexofficio sheriff of Malabon and his deputies, agents and
representatives from proceeding with the foreclosure and auction
sale of the fishing vessel JEAN III; permanently enjoining the
defendants-bank and ex-officio sheriff of Pasig from proceeding
with the foreclosure and auction sale of the plaintiffs real property
covered by TCT No. (222143) 23843 including the building thereon
owned by Glee Chemicals Philippines, Inc.; ordering defendant
bank to pay plaintiffs the sum of Four Million Pesos
(P4,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for the loss of the
aforementioned vessel, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), Philippine Currency as moral and exemplary
damages, the further sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as attorneys fees; and the costs of the suit.
The motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint filed by
defendant is denied for lack of merit.
Finally, within three (3) days from the finality of this decision,
defendant bank is hereby compelled to execute the necessary
release or cancellation of mortgage covering the aforesaid parcels
of land, and deliver the two Torrens titles in its possession to
herein plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
108
For their part, the spouses Cheng filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration, disputing the appellate
courts pronouncement that the August 12, 1981 promissory
note and the deed of chattel mortgage over the fishing vessel
Jean III are valid and enforceable and that the loss of said
109
109
110
110
111
111
the rule that if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control (Article 1370, Civil Code; Honrado, Jr.
vs. CA, 198 SCRA 326).
This basic rule notwithstanding, the court a quo admitted in
evidence the alleged verbal stipulation made by [the spouses
Cheng] to the effect that the validity of the promissory note was
dependent upon its ratification by the management committee.
Such parol evidence should not have been allowed as it had the
effect of altering the provisions of the promissory note which are in
clear and unequivocal terms.
Under the parol evidence rule, the terms of a contract are
conclusive upon the parties and evidence which shall vary a
complete and enforceable agreement embodied in a document is
inadmissible (Magellan Manufacturing Corporation vs. CA, 201
SCRA 106). (Words in bracket ours).
10
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
1. (a)An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
2. (b)The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
3. (c)The validity of the written agreement; or
4. (d)The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
We agree.
The appellate court is correct in declaring that under the
parol evidence rule, when the parties have reduced their
agreement into writing, they are deemed to have intended
such written agreement to be the sole repository and
memorial of everything that they have agreed upon. All their
prior and contemporaneous agreements are deemed to be
merged in the written document so that, as between them
and their successors-in-interest, such writing becomes
exclusive evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal
agreement which tends to vary, alter or modify the same is
not admissible.
11
299
11
Ledesma, 227 Phil. 1; 143 SCRA 1 (1986); and Ortaez vs. Court of
Appeals, 334 Phil. 514; 266 SCRA 561 (1997).
112
112
We proceed to the third issue. Both the trial court and the
appellate court are unanimous in finding that the real estate
mortgage executed by the spouses Cheng over theirSan Juan
property to secure the loan of GCPI cannot be held to secure
the spouses obligation as co-makers of the promissory note
dated 12 August 1981. We see no reason to depart from the
findings of the two courts below.
Article 2126 of the Civil Code is explicit:
ART. 2126. The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the
property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be,
to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted.
113
301
5
27
528
Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was then holding in
escrow the amount of P50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid
against the total consideration or price of the property.
On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the
co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank to receive
the amount of P1,196,000 as partial payment of their total
commission. Also, respondents were instructed to return
after seven days to get the balance of the commission due
them.
On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank.
However, the check covering the balance of their commission
was already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R.
Raymundo, the representative of the petitioners.
Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners,
however, they were told that there is nothing more due them
by way of commission as they have already divided and
distributed the balance of the commissions among their
nephews and nieces.
For their part, petitioners counter that there was a
subsequent verbal agreement entered into by the parties
after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal
agreement provides that the 5% agents commission shall be
divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes
302
Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share given
to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the help
she would extend in the processing of documents of sale of
the property, the payment of the capital gains tax to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and in securing an order from
the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other
hand, will be used by him for the payment of realty taxes.
Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance
of their agents commission, they filed an action for the
collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela City, Branch 172. On January 22, 2002, the
trial court rendered a Decision5 in favor of the respondents.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
_______________
5 Rollo, pp. 54-60. Penned by Judge Floro P. Alejo.
529
529
530
II.
FURTHER, IT ERRED IN REQUIRING, ALBEIT IMPLICITLY,
THE
PETITIONERS
TO
ESTABLISH
THE
VERBAL
AGREEMENT
MODIFYING
THE
EARLIER
WRITTEN
AGREEMENT (THE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO SELL) BY
MORE THAN A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
(DECISION, PAGE 8). THIS IS PLAINLY CONTRARY TO LAW
303
Plainly stated, the issues for resolution are: Did the Court
of Appeals err (1) in applying the parol evidence rule; (2) in
requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a
preponderance of evidence; and (3) in holding petitioners
jointly and severally liable for the payment of the entire
brokers fees?
Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in applying the parol evidence rule to the facts
of the case because the verbal agreement was entered into
subsequent to the written agreement. Further, they aver that
there is no rule that requires an agreement modifying an
earlier agreement to be in the same form as the earlier
agreement in order for such modification or amendment to be
valid.
Conversely, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals
did not apply the parol evidence rule in this case. Although
the appellate court stated and emphasized the general legal
principle and rule on parol evidence, it did not apply the
parol evidence rule with regard to the evidence adduced by
the petitioners.
_______________
9 Rollo, p. 17.
531
531
532
533
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. (Lapulapu
Foundation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 421 SCRA 328 [2004])
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon by the parties and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
(Milwaukee Industries Corp. vs. Pampanga III Electric
Cooperative, Inc.,430 SCRA 389 [2004])
o0o
114
_______________
14 Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho, Adm. Case No. 6403,
August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 202, 206.
53
9
40
Pamintuan vs. People
instance (and in fact she continuously failed), despite
demands, to return at least the value of the ring, the crime
of estafa was consummated. The return after seven years of its
value only addressed the civil liability that the consummated
crime of estafacarried with it, as the RTC and the CA correctly
stated in their decisions.
307
541
541
_______________
_______________
542
542
4 Id., at p. 60.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
543
yer, sent two (2) formal demand letters7 for the petitioner to
comply with her obligations under the Katibayan. The
demand letters went unheeded. Thus, the petitioner failed to
comply with her obligations to Jeremias.8
As rebuttal evidence, Jeremias claimed that the petitioner
failed to return the diamond ring because she pawned it.
Jeremias also denied that he received any jewelry from the
petitioner in exchange for the diamond ring.9
The Defense Evidence
The petitioner testified in her behalf and admitted that
she received the diamond ring from Jeremias in exchange for
seven (7) pieces of jewelry valued at P350,000.00 that she
309
9 Id., at p. 62.
The CA Ruling
544
him on February 16, 1996, not to the petitioner, and that the
mortgage deed was constituted in consideration of Danilos
promise to return the diamond ring to Jeremias.
The RTCs Ruling
545
310
546
547
547
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 U.S. v. Rosario de Guzman, 1 Phil. 138, 139 (1902).
548
548
549
550
years of its value only addressed the civil liability that the
consummated crime of estafa carried with it, as the RTC and
the CA correctly stated in their decisions.
If only to address the petitioners issue regarding the legal
significance of the un-offered mortgage deed, we observe that
it could not have raised any reasonable doubt about the
nature of the transaction between the parties. Under the
circumstances, the best evidence to ascertain the nature of
the parties diamond ring transaction is theKatibayan which
is the written evidence of their agreement that should be
deemed to contain all the terms they agreed upon.23 Under
the parol evidence rule, no additional or contradictory terms
to this written agreement can be admitted to show that, at or
before the signing of the document, other or different terms
were orally agreed upon by the parties.24 Thus, the terms of
the Katibayan should be the prevailing terms of the
transaction between the parties, not any oral or side
agreement the petitioner alleged. We consider, too, in this
regard that the post-Katibayan acts of the parties
strengthened, rather than negated, the Katibayan terms,
particularly the petitioners obligation to return the diamond
ring; otherwise, she would not have attempted to return the
value of the ring when the criminal complaint was filed
against her, nor secured the execution of the mortgage deed,
had no such obligation existed.
_______________
551
551
552
553
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum
penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and
it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence.
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the crime
ofestafa is prision
correccional maximum
to prision
mayorminimum, the penalty next lower would then
be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and two (2) months, while the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and
one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded
P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00.25
Under these norms, the penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as minimum term, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum term, is
correct. The RTC and the CA were correct in not awarding
civil liability since the execution of the mortgage deed
satisfied the value of the unreturned diamond ring.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of
merit, and consequently AFFIRM the decision dated January
315
12, 2006 and the resolution dated May 19, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28785, finding petitioner Dulce
Pamintuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
_______________
25 See People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574
SCRA 258, 301-304; and the seminal case of People v. Gabres, 335 Phil. 242,
256-257; 267 SCRA 581, 596 (1997).
554
554
EN BANC.
280
80
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court
ful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true
intent.It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of
the Court is to apply the law. When the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for
interpretation; there is only room for application (Cebu Portland
Cement Co. vs. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708 [1968]). x x x
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the
court interpret or construe its true intent. Ambiguity is a condition
of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more
than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same
time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more
possible meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to
exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law
according to its true intent.
Same; Same; A petition for rehabilitation does not always
result in the appointment of a receiver or the creation of a
management committee; Instances before a management committee
and receivers may be appointed.As relevantly pointed out in the
dissenting opinion, a petition for rehabilitation does not always
result in the appointment of a receiver or the creation of a
2
81
282
82
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court
creditor, prior to the appointment
committee or a rehabilitation receiver.
of
a management
284
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee
for BF Homes.
On RCBCs motion in the mandamus case, the trial court issued
on May 8, 1985 a judgment on the pleadings, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Judgment on the pleadings is
granted and judgement is hereby rendered ordering respondents to
execute and deliver to petitioner the Certificate of the Auction Sale of
January 29, 1985, involving the properties sold therein, more particularly
those described in Annex C of their Answer. (p. 87, Rollo.)
319
acquire jurisdiction over it, and it was deprived of its right to be heard.
(CA Decision, p. 88, Rollo).
(p. 5, Rollo.)
On November 12, 1986, the Court gave due course to the
petition. During the pendency of the case, RCBC brought to
the attention of the Court an order issued by the SEC on
October 16, 1986 in Case No. 002693, denying the
consolidated Motion to Annul the Auction Sale and to cite
RCBC and the Sheriff for Contempt, and ruling as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petitioners Consolidated Motion to Cite
Sheriff and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation for Contempt
and to Annul Proceedings and Sale, dated February 5, 1985,
should be as is, hereby DENIED.
While we cannot direct the Register of Deeds to allow the
consolidation of the titles subject of the Omnibus Motion dated
September 18, 1986 filed by the Rizal Commercial Banking Corpo
286
286
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
320
288
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed
corporations stand on equal footing with all other creditors
gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment
of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board,
or body. Insofar as petitioner RCBC is concerned, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are not yet
applicable and it may still be allowed to assert its preferred
status because it foreclosed on the mortgage prior to the
appointment of the management committee on March 18,
1985. The Court, therefore, grants the motion for
reconsideration on this score.
The law on the matter, Paragraph (c), Section 6 of
Presidential Decree 902-A, provides:
Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the
Commission shall possess the following powers:
c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and
personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the
Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary to preserve
the rights of the parties-litigants to and/or protect the interest of
the investing public and creditors; Provided, however, that the
Commission may, in appropriate cases, appoint a rehabilitation
receiver of corporations, partnerships or other associations not
290
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
shown to exist before a management committee may be
created or appointed, such as:
1. 1.when there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss,
wastage or destruction of assets or other properties; or
2. 2.when there is paralization of business operations of such
corporations or entities which may be prejudicial to the
interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or to the
general public.
292
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
assets. The sooner the SEC takes over and imposes a freeze on all
the assets, the better for all concerned.
(pp. 265-266, Rollo; also
p. 838, 213 SCRA 830 [1992].
Emphasis supplied.)
294
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
In other words, once a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed pursuant
to P.D. 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed
corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or body
shall be suspended accordingly.
This suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective
the status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally
unsecured creditor. P.D. 902-A does not state anything to
this effect. What it merely provides is that all actions for
claims against the corporation, partnership or association
shall be suspended. This should give the receiver a chance to
rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a
possibility for doing so. (This will be in consonance
325
_______________
1
Justice Medialdeas ponencia were Gutierrez, Jr., Nocon, and Melo, JJ.;
concurring
in
Bellosillo, JJ.;
the
result
dissenting
were
were
Padilla,
Regalado
Davide,
Jr.
and
and
Romero, JJ.; Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Campos, JJ., did not take part in the
voting.)
296
326
296
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
______________
xxx
xxx
Ibid., p. 838.
297
______________
3
298
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
______________
275
SCRA
497,
July
15,
1997.
(With
the
concurrence
of
Division)
5
299
300
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court
of the SEC to issue injunctive reliefs. Herein movant (RCBC)
raises the issue of the validity of the restraining order and
the writ of preliminary injunction later issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to the
appointment of the management committee. It contends that
the issuance of the injunctive reliefs effectively results in the
suspension of actions against the petitioning distressed
corporation.
Movant is thus saying that the SEC has no jurisdiction to
issue injunctive reliefs in favor of the distressed corporation
petitioning for suspension of payments prior to the
appointment of a management committee. I disagree.
Sec. 5(d) of PD 902-A clearly enumerates the cases over
which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide:
SEC. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of
the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations,
partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as
expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving:
xxx
xxx
xxx
d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be
declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases where the
corporation, partnership or association possesses sufficient
property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of
meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the
corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient assets to
cover its liabilities, but is under the management of a
Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee created
pursuant to this Decree.
301
ASCERTAINED
BUT
IT
IS
NECESSARY
THAT
SUCH
INTENTION
HAS
BEEN
EXPRESSED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
GIVE IT LEGAL EFFECT AND
VALIDITY.In the interpretation of a
legal document, especially a statute,
unlike in the interpretation of an
ordinary written document, it is not
enough to obtain information as to the
intention or meaning of the author or
authors, but also to see whether the
intention or meaning has been
expressed in such a way as to give it
legal effect and validity. In short, the
purpose of the inquiry, is not only to
know what the author meant by the
language he used, but also to see that
the
language
used
sufficiently
expresses that meaning'. The legal act,
so to speak, is made up of two
elementsan internal and an external
332
334
52 Sun
12 Sat
4 Satu
21 Sat
12 Sat
52 Sat
155
________________
158
158
339
Evidence.
159
341
342
then
Intermediate
Appellate
Court reversing the decision of the trial
court
1
_______________
SECOND DIVISION.
Rollo, pp. 13-16, Ponente: Justice Leonor Ines Luciano with the
333
VOL.215,NOVEMBER4,1992
Gurango vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
333
Id., at p. 17.
334
334
(SGD.)
MADS GURANGO
(SGD.)
EDWARD L. FERREIRA
335
VOL.215,NOVEMBER4,1992
335
346
(SGD.)
MADS GURANGO
(SGD.)
EDWARD L. FERREIRA
_______________
336
336
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gurango vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Id., at p. 24.
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between
Id., at p. 16.
337
VOL.215,NOVEMBER4,1992
Gurango vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
337
_______________
Co vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 198, 206, citing Raneses vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,187 SCRA 397, and Remolete vs. Tibe, 158
SCRA 138.
8
Magellan
Manufacturing
Marketing
Corporation
vs.
Court
of
338
338
351
Evidence; Parol
Evidence; Contracts; Under the general rule
in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, when the terms of an agreement were
reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain
all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of
such terms can be admitted other than the
contents thereof.The parol evidence herein
introduced is inadmissible. First, private
respondents oral testimony on the alleged
conditions, coming from a party who has an
interest in the outcome of the case,
depending exclusively on human memory, is
not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously
unreliable unlike a written contract which
THIRD DIVISION.
562
56
2
Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals
352
additional
contemporaneous
conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the
writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake. No such fraud or mistake exists in
this case.
Same; Same; Private respondents did not
expressly plead that the deeds of sale were
incomplete or that it did not reflect the
intention of the buyer and the seller.We
are not persuaded by private respondents
contention that they put in issue by the
pleadings the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent of the
parties. Record shows that private
respondents did not expressly plead that the
deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did
not reflect the intention of the buyer
(petitioner)
and
the
seller
(private
respondents). Such issue must be squarely
presented.
Private
respondents
merely alleged that the sale was subject to
four (4) conditions which they tried to prove
353
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with
the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner)
shows proof that all the following requirements have been met:
1. (i)Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way
amounting to 398 sq. m.;
_______________
564
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. x x x.
Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals
564
above
conditions, although
such
condition were not incorporated in the
deeds of sale. Despite petitioners
timely objections on the ground that
the introduction of said oral conditions
was barred by the parol evidence rule,
the lower court nonetheless, admitted
them and eventually dismissed the
complaint as well as the counterclaim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this
petition. We are tasked to resolve the
issue on the admissibility of parol
evidence to establish the alleged oral
conditions7
________________
565
VOL. 266, JANUARY 23, 1997
Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals
The title is with a certain Atty. Joson for the purpose of subdividing the
Records, p. 21.
Rollo, p. 26.
10
356
_______________
11
10
11
Siasat v. IAC, 139 SCRA 238; Enriquez vs. Ramos, 116 Phil. 525.
12
Cu vs. CA, 195 SCRA 647, citing Moran, Comments on the Rules of
12
405.
14
15
Exhibit L.
13
14
15
Manila Bay Club Corp. vs. CA, 245 SCRA 715; Gaw vs. IAC, 220 SCRA
566
566
16
17
16
Tupue vs. Urgel, 161 SCRA 417; Continental Airlines vs. Santiago, 172
Heirs of del Rosario vs. Santos, 194 Phil. 671; 108 SCRA 43.
18
Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank vs. CA, 226 SCRA 740, 744 (1993)
citing dela Rama vs. Ledesma, 143 SCRA 1 and Yu Tek vs. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384.
567
VOL. 266, JANUARY 23, 1997
Ortaez vs. Court of Appeals
be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of
the instrument.
19
358
21
22
23
25
_______________
19
Heirs of del Rosario vs. Santos, supra., (Phil.) at 687 citing Francisco,
Vicente J.; The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol. VII, pp. 161-162
(1973).
20
court does not mention nor refer to the parol evidence rule and the exceptions
therein. All that they pleaded were the alleged conditions for which petitioner
must first comply.
359
22
23
24
25
26
o0o
360
741
363
_______________
O.R. No. 1043, Exhibit E, Folder of Exhibits, p. 32; O.R. No. 1044,
743
364
_______________
SO ORDERED.
Decision, Civil Case No. 92-15, RTC, Branch 53, Lucena City, p. 14;
744
744
365
10
Left:
Rear:
_______________
366
10
11
12
13
11
12
13
368
oil mill[s] and so just enough, I had the policy prepared. In fact, two policies were prepared
cannot be understood from a
having the same date one for the old one and the other for the new oil mill and exactly the
same policy period, sir. (emphasis supplied)
reading of the instrument. Thus,
mere
while
It is thus clear that the source of the
the contract explicitly stipulated that it
discrepancy happened during the
was for the insurance of the new oil
preparation of the written contract.
mill, the boundary description written
These facts lead us to hold that the
on the policy concededly pertains to the
present case falls within one of the
first oil mill. This irreconcilable
recognized exceptions to the parole
difference can only be clarified by
evidence rule. Under the Rules of
admitting evidence aliunde, which will
Court, a party may present evidence to
explain the imperfection and clarify the
modify, explain or
intent of the parties.
Anent petitioners argument that the
_______________
respondent is barred by estoppel from
claiming that the description of the
TSN, Mach 31, 1993, pp. 31-32.
747
insured oil mill in the policy was wrong,
VOL. 366, OCTOBER 8, 2001
747
we
find
that
the same proceeds from a
American Home Assurance Company vs. Tantuco Enterprises, Inc.
wrong assumption. Evidence on record
add to the terms of the written
reveals that respondents operating
agreement if he puts in issue in his
manager, Mr. Edison Tantuco, notified
pleading, among others, its failure to
Mr. Borja (the petitioners agent with
express the true intent and agreement
whom respondent negotiated for the
of the parties thereto. Here, the
contract)
about
the
inaccurate
contractual intention of the parties
14
14
15
369
15
16
370
19
_______________
16
17
18
Sec. 77. An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the thing insured
is exposed to the peril insured against. Notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, no policy or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid
and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except in the case of
a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision applies.
19
749
750
750
372
PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS
INTERNAL HYDRANTS
EXTERNAL HYDRANTS
FIRE PUMP
24-HOUR SECURITY SERVICES
BREACH of this warranty shall render this policy null and void
and the Company shall no longer be liable for any loss which may
occur.
20
21
22
23
24
374
21
22
23
24
See Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., 98 Phil.
85 (1955).
375
SECOND DIVISION
696
69
6
San Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Ancheta
376
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Motion dated July 30, 1981 filed by
petitioners-appellants in
698
698
699
VOL. 108, OCTOBER 30, 1981
San Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Ancheta
383
COMPANY
in
favor
of
the
REHABILITATION
FINANCE
CORPORATION on August 10, 1951, under
faith of Notary Public Felipe Cuaderno, Jr.
of Manila and entered as Doc. No. 164; Page
No. 47; Book No. XIII, Series of 1951, of said
officers notarial register;
That for and in consideration of the
amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P200,000.00), Philippine Currency,
to be paid by the NATIONAL SHIPYARDS
AND STEEL CORPORATION, a corporation
organized and existing under and by virtue
of the laws of the Philippines, with office at
Engineer Island, Port Area, Manila, the
SAN MAURICIO MINING COMPANY,
convey unto the NATIONAL SHIPYARDS
AND STEEL CORPORATION, any and all
of its rights, participations, equities and
interests in and to those twenty (20) mining
claims located on the parcels of land
itemized and described in Annex A of this
386
the
amount
of
TWO
HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), the
REHABILITATION
FINANCE
CORPORATION will release the mining
claims located on those parcels of land
described in Annex A as well as the
improvements erected and existing thereon
itemized and described in Annex B hereof,
from the mortgage liability.
The
SAN
MAURICIO
MINING
COMPANY shall forthwith, after such
payment by the NATIONAL SHIPYARDS
AND STEEL CORPORATION and release
by the REHABILITATION FINANCE
CORPORATION, waive unto and in favor of
the NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL
CORPORATION any and all of its rights,
title and interests in and to those Twenty
(20) mining claims located on the parcels of
land described in Annex A as well as those
buildings and improvements recited in
703
Annex B hereof.
387
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
705
VOL. 108, OCTOBER 30, 1981
San Mauricio Mining Co. vs. Ancheta
conclusive evidence
matter in dispute.
regarding
the
706
706
motion
for
reconsideration
and
rejoinder
710
710
220
220
writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and,
therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of
the writing (Sec. 7, Rule 130, Rules of
Court; Legarda v. Zarate, 36 Phil.
68; De Guzman v. Calma, L-6800, Nov.
29, 1956). Exceptions to the Parole
Evidence Rule are: (1) where a mistake
or imperfection of the writing is put in
issue by the pleadings; (2) where the
writings fail to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties; (3) where
the validity of the agreement is put in
issue by the pleadings; (4) where there
is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing
(See Sec. 7, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
On reformation of a written contract,
see Articles 1359 and 1361 of the new
Civil Code.
406
SECOND DIVISION.
717
VOL. 220, MARCH 31, 1993
Mariano vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same.The
fallacy
of
the
argument is readily apparent. The first of
the two mortgages was executed on October
28, 1986, the second, on January 15, 1987.
The deed of sale was excecuted on
September 29, 1987. Both mortgage
accounts therefore were not yet due on the
date of the deed of sale, consequently the
407
408
On
the
other
hand,
private
respondents' story is that all they
wanted was to transform their small
_______________
piece of land, which they had inherited
from their parents, into a subdivision.
"Faustino vs. Mariano," CA-G.R. CV No.
They looked for financiers who would
25535,
May
15,
1991,
Camilon, J.,
be able to lend them money for their
ponente, Magsino and Luna, JJ., concurring;
project and petitioner expressed her
Rollo, pp. 43-47.
desire to help them.
Ibid., November 25, 1991, Camilon J.,
Being unschooled farmers, and
ponente, Magsino and Luna,JJ., concurring:
relying completely on the trust and
Rollo, p. 48.
confidence they have on petitioner, they
718
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
signed the prepared mortgage forms
Mariano vs. Court of Appeals
that petitioner told them to sign. They
additional P320,550.00 on September
first mortgaged their land on October
29, 1987. Thus, a deed of sale was
28, 1986 for P250,000.00 with the
drawn up on said date and a new TCT
condition that they were to construct a
No. 156493 issued in petitioner's name.
house on said lot so that they would be
However, the private respondents
able to secure another P250,000.00
refused to turn over possession of the
with the house and lot as security. They
land to her and instead sued her for
received, however, only P150,000.00 for
annulment of deed of sale and
the first mortgage. After the house was
damages.
1
409
"I
"X
X
X
IN
ANNULLING
THE
QUESTIONED
DEED
CONSIDERING
THAT THERE IS NEED FOR A MORE
CONVINCING PROOF, GREATER THAN
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE TO
ANNUL AND SET ASIDE THE EFFICACY
OF THE DULY EXECUTED AND
ATTESTED PUBLIC DOCUMENTS; and
"II
"I
Behind this flowery legalese is the
simple question adverted to at the start
of this decision: can parol evidence be
admitted to show that the Deed of Sale,
which
petitioner
claims
truly
represented the contract between the
_______________
3
Rollo, p. 138.
411
10
11
12
412
14
Ibid., p.
5;
respondent
Juanito
Faustino
on
direct
examination.
11
Juanito
Faustino
on
cross
examination.
12
13
respondent
examination.
Juanito
721
VOL. 220, MARCH 31, 1993
Mariano vs. Court of Appeals
16
respondent
respondent
Faustino on direct ex
14
_______________
private
Juanito
Faustino
on
direct
17
18
413
20
_______________
15
respondent
Juanito
Faustino
on
cross
examination.
17
Op. cit.
19
respondent
Juanito
Faustino
on
cross-
examination.
20
Ibid.
21
722
23
_______________
interest that is why you convinced them to
make a loan for which you told them you will
help them in getting that loan?
22
"x
x when a
negative
is
averred
in
"A. Yes, sir. At that time the economy of our country is down so I was unable
loan
Statesto secure
vs. aDenver
& Rio Grande Railroad
from the bank.
"Q. In your desire to help them in getting a loan, you showed them yourCompany,
capacity as a191 U.S. 84; 48 L. Ed 106, at US 91,
businesswoman so that you can immediately get a loan for them for92;
P1 Million
L. Ed.Pesos,
109; you
italics supplied)
showed them your business name, your auditor's certificate and your trucking business?
415
23
25
convincing
reason
for
nullifying
the
italics supplied)
24
25
724
724
DRED
TWENTY
HUNDRED
FIVE
FIFTY
THOUSAND
PESOS
FIVE
(P325,550.00),
encumbrances of
and January 15,
1987 not mentioned in the deed of
sale as pre-existing encumbrances,
although said encumbrances, by
417
Considering
these
unanswered
questions in relation to the deed of sale
and mortgage proviso above quoted, We
find that the appellate court's
ratiocinationon why this deed of sale
is, in reality, a sham transactionmore
in accord with business common sense
and ordinary experience of mankind,
which We quote with approval:
one
(1)
year. When
their
aggregate
419
Decision affirmed.
Notes.There is a presumption that
an instrument sets out the true
agreement of the parties thereto and
that it was executed for valuable
consideration (Gatmaitan vs. Court of
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible
Appeals, 200 SCRA 37).
error in the decision appealed from the
Failure of either party to demand
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
performance of the obligation of the
of merit. This is without prejudice to
other for an unreasonable length of
whatever action the petitioner
time renders a contract ineffective
(Villamor us. Court of Appeals, 202
726
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
SCRA 607).
Province of Pangasinan vs. Court of Appeals
"These circumstances taken together lead
to the conclusion espoused by the
appellants, that the deed of sale is a sham
transaction, not representing the true intent
of the parties and that no consideration
passed or was received. x x x.
o0o
420
421
THIRD DIVISION.
648
648
CONTRACT OF SALE
422
Exh. B.
649
VOL. 195, APRIL 2, 1991
Cu vs. Court of Appeals
649
Vendor
Vendee
425
OFFICE
and
all
other
letters
pertaining thereto for the VENDEE to
establish its rights over the registered
brand McGills; and promised to
make himself available should his
presence be required by the Patent
Office.
Camaro then used the trademark of
McGills
with
the
inscriptions
Formula Provided by: John Meek &
Associates, Chicago, Illinois and
Under
License
From:
Camaro
Enterprises 56 Eugenio Perez, St.,
Q.C. in advertising its paint and allied
products.
After the declaration of martial law,
all firms were required to prove foreign
tie-ups. Inasmuch as he had not
received from Cu any papers pertaining
to the registration of any tie-up with
Meek & Associates, on October 25,
1972, Abad wrote Cu a letter
4
_______________
3
Exh. 13.
Exh. 2.
651
VOL. 195, APRIL 2, 1991
Cu vs. Court of Appeals
651
10
Rollo, p. 69.
Exh. E, E-1.
10
Exh. A.
11
Exh. 8.
13
652
652
the
corporations
products
from
January 16, 1971 to December 31, 1974
and for the payment of the sum of
P33,000.62 allegedly the total amount
of the royalties due Cu as of December
31, 1974 as well as moral, nominal and
exemplary damages and attorneys
fees.
In their answer, Abad and Camaro
alleged that the contract of February
11, 1971 which was hastily prepared by
Cu, failed to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties as it did
not
incorporate
the
following
representations and warranties of Cu:
(a) the sale included the right of tie-up
with Meek & Associates which Cu had
warranted as valid and existing at the
time of the sale, that the vendees could
advertise such connection and that they
would receive from time to time new or
improved formula for their acrylic paint
428
Exh. 9.
13
653
VOL. 195, APRIL 2, 1991
Cu vs. Court of Appeals
653
15
15
654
654
_______________
16
17
16
655
19
Cu
filed
a
motion
for
the
reconsideration of said resolution which
was duly opposed by Abad and Camaro.
On July 30, 1986, the appellate court
denied for lack of merit said motion for
reconsideration. It stated further that
(A)ll the matters therein were
squarely
presented,
exhaustively
ventilated and carefully considered
before it promulgated the resolution of
September 18, 1985. Justices Porfirio
V. Sison, Jorge R. Coquia and Ma.
Rosario Quetulio-Losa (who substituted
for the late Justice Marcelino Veloso)
voted for such denial while Justices
Desiderio P. Jurado and Abdulwahid A.
Bidin dissented in a separate opinion
penned by the former but which mainly
433
_______________
18
Rollo, p. 125.
19
656
656
23
434
_______________
21
46.
22
23
657
VOL. 195, APRIL 2, 1991
Cu vs. Court of Appeals
657
27
28
29
436
_______________
25
658
658
requirement.
While Abad and Camaro stated in
their answer to the complaint the
allegedly unincorporated stipulations in
the February 11, 1971 contract, they
had not backed up said allegations by
convincing evidence. Not one evidence
437
_______________
30
659
VOL. 195, APRIL 2, 1991
Amberti vs. Court of Appeals
659
1. 2.EVIDENCE; PAROL
EVIDENCE
AFFECTING WRITINGS.The rule
forbidding the admission of parol or
extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or
contradict a written instrument does
not apply so as to prohibit the
establishment
by
parol
of
an
agreement between the parties in
writing, entered into subsequent to the
time when the written instrument was
executed,
notwithstanding
such
agreement may have the effect of
adding to, changing, modifying, or
even
altogether
abrogating
the
contract of the parties as evidenced by
the writing; for the parol evidence does
not in any way deny that the original
agreement of the parties was that
which the writing purports to express,
but merely goes to show that the
parties have exercised their right to
change or abrogate the same, or to
440
make
a new
and
independent
contract. It makes no difference how
soon after the execution of the written
contract the parol one was made. If it
was in fact subsequent and is
otherwise unobjectionable it may be
proved and enforced.
1. 3.SALE
WITH
RIGHT
OF
REPURCHASE; TENDER
OF
PAYMENT.The settled rule. in this
jurisdiction is that abona fide offer
or tender of the price agreed upon for
the repurchase is sufficient to preserve
the rights of the party making it,
without the necessity of making
judicial deposit, if the offer or tender is
refused;
841
VOL. 37, MARCH .21, 1918
Canuto vs. Mariano.
844
844
applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
applicant
jurisdictional
domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
respondent complied with the requirements of the law for the court
must
strictly
comply
with
the
the initial hearing outside the 90-day period set forth under
that the setting of the initial hearing is the duty of the land
registration court and not the applicant.
Same; As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession
and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficientit must be
shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
* SECOND DIVISION.
731
73
1
delving into questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for
inference
or
why the realty taxes due on the subject property were only paid
evidence
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
appellee; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial
made
is
manifestly
mistaken,
absurd
of
ownership,
of
claim
of
also be shown that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
7
32
73
449
3
Republic vs. Hanover Worldwide Trading
Corporation
subject Certification is presumed duly issued and admissible in
evidence, it has no probative value in establishing that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Same; Same; The Community Environment and Natural
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal
and setting aside of the Decision dated
May 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70077, which
affirmed the August 7, 1997 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City, Branch 56, in LAND
REG. CASE NO. N-281. Petitioner also
assails the CA Resolution dated March
30, 2006, denying its Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
[1]
Thus,
the
CENRO
Certification should
have
been
[2]
_______________
[1]
Rollo, p. 48.
450
734
734
735
452
_______________
[3] Id., at pp. 125-131.
[4]
Id., at p. 23.
736
736
453
[6]
_______________
[5] G.R. No. 146527, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 247.
[6] G.R. No. 170724, January 29, 2007, 513 SCRA 294, 300-301.
737
VOL. 622, JULY 2, 2010
Republic vs. Hanover Worldwide Trading
Corporation
737
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the
land registration court. After an applicant has filed his application,
454
the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial
hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The
notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the
notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA [Land
Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which the
party-applicant absolutely has no participation. x x x
xxx
x x x a party to an action has no control over the Administrator
or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to
meddle unduly with the business of such official in the
performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in matters
within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within
its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or
omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor
control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.
Moreover, it is evident in Manna Properties, Inc. that what is
more important than the date on which the initial hearing is set is
the
giving
of
sufficient
notice
of
the
registration
following
described
citizens
of
the
representatives:
(1)
Likewise,
Section
48
(b)
of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
Section 4 of P.D. 1073, states:
for
confirmation
of
title
except
when
presumed
to
have
performed
all
the
456
739
VOL. 622, JULY 2, 2010
Republic vs. Hanover Worldwide Trading
Corporation
739
absurd or impossible;
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
_______________
[9]
Republic v. Tsai, G.R. No. 168184, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 423, 433.
[10] Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, March 12, 2008, 548 SCRA 160, 166.
740
740
(7)
(8)
_______________
[11] Manila Electric Company v. Vda. de Santiago, G.R. No. 170482,
741
VOL. 622, JULY 2, 2010
Republic vs. Hanover Worldwide Trading
Corporation
741
459
[15]
_______________
[13] Spouses Melchor and Saturnina Alde v. Ronald B. Bernal, et al., G.R.
[15] Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008,
742
742
460
743
VOL. 622, JULY 2, 2010
Republic vs. Hanover Worldwide Trading
Corporation
743
461
462
744
744
SO ORDERED.
Carpio
(Chairperson),
Bersamin,** Abad and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and
resolution set aside.
Notes.In cases of conveyance of the
land
subject
of
a
registration
proceeding by an instrument executed
between the time of filing of the
application for registration and the
issuance of the decree of title, the
application for registration need not be
amendedit is only required (a) that
the instrument be presented to the
court by the interested party together
with a motion that the same be
considered
in
relation
to
the
463
EN BANC.
439
VOL. 134, FEBRUARY 18, 1985
Salonga vs. Cruz Pao
40
Salonga vs. Cruz Pao
42
469
The
petitioner
invokes
the
constitutionally protected right to life
and liberty guaranteed by the due
process clause, alleging that no prima
facie case has been established to
warrant the filing of an information for
subversion against him. Petitioner asks
this Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of
the law to harass, oppress, and
persecute him, a member of the
democratic
opposition
in
the
Philippines.
The background of this case is a
matter of public knowledge.
A rash of bombings occurred in the
Metro Manila area in the months of
August, September and October of
443
1980. On
September 6, 1980, one Victor
Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born
American citizen from Los Angeles,
California, almost killed himself and
471
448
448
Infinitely
more
important
than
conventional adherence to general rules
of criminal procedure is respect for the
citizens right to be free not only from
arbitrary arrest and punishment but
also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution. The integrity of a
democratic society is corrupted if a
person is carelessly included in the trial
of around forty persons when on the
478
In
the Philippines
Francisco,
U.S.,
written
by
Spencer
_______________
**
Daily
Express, dated
481
attache case arrives, Il1 just call you. I gave him my number
second visit, Salonga said, Ill be very busy so just come bac
452
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
August at 4 P.M. On that date, I was with friends at Batulao R
Salonga vs. Cruz Pao
to hurry back to be at Salongas place for the appointment. I a
Salongas place at exactly 4 P.M.
Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella. After
39. Q. What happened then?
Lovelys testimony, the prosecution
A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after
452
37. Q.
A.
38. Q.
A.
453
rode in Atty. Nits Taadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown andasked Sen. Salonga if someone had given him an attache case for m
proceeded to Broadway Centrum where before I alighted, Atty. Taada
nobody. Afterw ards, I made three calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salon
handed me a Puma bag containing all the materials I needed.
call me again on the 31st of August. I did not call him, I just went
xxx xxx
xxx
the 31st of August at 4 P.M. A few minutes after my arrival, Atty. R
45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?
arrived. When he had a chance to be near me, he (Atty. Taada) wh
A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings, that
ten he had the attache case and the materials I needed in his car. T
(10) pieces electrical blasting caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non- were given to me by Atty. Taada when I alighted at the Broadway
electrical blasting caps 1" length, nine (9) pieces volts dry cell battery,
(Italics supplied)
two (2) improvised electrical testers, ten (10) plastic packs of high
During the cross-examination, counsel
explosive about 1 pound weight each.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?
Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what purpose?
A. Raul Daza, your Honor.
A. Before I left for the Philippines. Mr. Psinakis told me to check in atQ.
the Manila
Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party?
Hotel or the Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just deliver the materials
I
A I would
am really not quite sure, your Honor.
need. I disapproved of this, and I told him I would prefer a place that
Q.is familiar
Alright.toYou said initially it was social but then it became political.
me or who is close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the residence of Sen. Salonga.
any political action taken as a result of the party?
And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, I made a call to Sen.
Salonga,
A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69but he was out. The next day I made a call again. I was able to contact him. I made
an appointment to see him. I went to Sen. Salongas house the following day. I
485
456
COURT:
As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga o
witness coming to Manila already then the matter of . . . I have gone o
statement and there is no mention of Salonga insofar as activities in th
is concerned. I dont know why it concerns this cross-examination.
ATTY. YAP:
Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he
Manila.
456
SUPR
AN
Salonga vs. Cruz Pao
COURT:
According to him it was Aquino. Daza, and Psinakis who
asked him to come here, but Salonga was introduced only when
he (Lovely) came here. Now, the tendency of the question is also
to connect Salonga to the activities in the United States. It seems
to be the thrust of the questions.
COURT:
In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when
you asked him question, the focus on Salonga was only from the
time when he met Salonga at Greenhills. It was the first time that
the name of Salonga came up. There was no mention of Salonga
in the formulation of the destabilization plan as affirmed by him.
But you are bringing this up although you are only crossexamining for Salonga as if his (Lovelys) activities in the
United States affected Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, pp. 73-74).
486
457
VOL. 134, FEBRUARY 18, 1985
Salonga vs. Cruz Pao
487
492
WITNESS:
Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing agains
government. My bombing mission was directed against the particular fam
(referring to the Cabarrus family). [TSN, p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 1
461
VOL. 134, FEBRUARY 18, 1985
Salonga vs. Cruz Pao
COURT:
Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga
implicate Jovito Salonga?
A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.
493
501
HERACIO
R.
REVILLA,
petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS, FORTUNATO REVILLA,
LUZ REVILLA DAVID, LORETO
REVILLA GUTIERREZ, VENERANDA
REVILLA
MANIQUEZ,
NICASIO
REVILLA,
PERFECTA
REVILLA
BALACANIA, JUSTINA REVILLA
DEL ROSARIO and AGRI-PINA
REVILLA CHACON, respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Evidence is
negative when the witness states that he did
not see or know the occurrence of a fact and
positive when the witness affirms that a fact
did or did not occur.The peti-tioners
contention that Don Cayetanos denial
constitutes negative declaration which has
no probative value under the rules of evidence (p. 73, Rollo) is not correct. Don
Cayetanos assertion that he did not execute
another will, was not negative evidence.
503
585
VOL. 217, JANUARY 27, 1993
Revilla vs. Court of Appeals
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot No. 24 of Block No. 2565 of the Cadastral
Survey of the City of Manila, Cadastral Case No. 46, G.L.R.O. Cadastral
Record No. 229) with the buildings and improvements now found thereon,
situated on the SW. line of Calle Azcarraga; District of Quiapo. x x x
containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SQUARE METERS AND
SEVENTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (700.70), MORE OR LESS.
Assessed valueP3,297,150.00
BULACAN
Survey of the City of Manila, Cadastral Case No. 46, G.L.R.O. Cadastral
Record No. 229) with the buildings and other improvements now found
A parcel of land (Lot 1245-A-6 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd-177051, being
a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 700), situated in
504
Assessed valueP4,000.00
BULACAN
586
586
A parcel of land [Lot 1245-A-7 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd-177051, being
a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 700], situated in
the Barrio of Salacot, Mun. of San Miguel, Prov. of Bulacan, Island of
Luzon, x x x containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED NINETY (7,890) SQUARE METERS, more or less.
Assessed valueP3,790.00
A parcel of land (Lot No. 722 of the Cadastral Survey of San Miguel),
situated in the Municipality of San Miguel. x x x containing an area of
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND AND EIGHTY SIX (17,086) SQUARE
METERS, more or less.
Assessed valueP4,190.00
BULACAN
BULACAN
A parcel of land (Lot 1245-A-9 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd-177051, being
a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 700), situated in
the Barrio of Salacot, Municipality of San Miguel, Prov. of Bulacan, x x x
containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FOURTEEN
(1,514) SQUARE METERS, more or less.
Assessed valueP4,000.00
A parcel of land (Lot 108 of the Cad. Survey of San Miguel), situated in
the Municipality of San Miguel. x x x containing an area of FIVE
HUNDRED AND SEVENTY THREE SQUARE METERS more or less.
Assessed valueP8,600.00
exploitation; d) that the alleged will was executed with undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries
thereon or some other persons for their benefit; e) that the will is
void and ineffective for the reason that it was executed under
duress or the influence of fear or of threats; and f) that the
decedent acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will
were procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing (sic) his
signatures thereto (Opposition to Pro-bate of Alleged Will, pp. 7-8,
Records).
the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 10, allowed and
507
589
Rollo).
ATTY. DAVID
VOL. 217, JANUARY 27, 1993
589
Now that I have told you in the presence of your grand-son-in-law, At
Revilla vs. Court of Appeals
will and testament
Q When you were in the hospital you cannot sign because you were sick?
590
A No, I cannot sign.
590
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTAT
xxx xxx xxx.
Q Will you tell us Don Cayetano if you ever executed a last will and testament after this
Revilla vs. Court of Appeals
one has been probated by the Court?
which the court admitted and allowed to probate was burned, why
A None, sir. (pp. 20-30, tsn, November 27, 1982.)
envelope and you remember this is the envelope and you said you d
signatures appearing in this envelope are your signatures, now are y
He recognized the original will and
envelope opened?
acknowledged that he signed it.
A Yes, kung anong nandiyan, siyang ibigay sa husgado. (p. 122, (
ATTY. DAVID
Although the envelop containing a copy
x x x we were granted by the Court permission to come here to find out from you about
your will approved by the Court which was burned which needs to be
ofreconstituted
first which
will was sealed, with
Atty. Dacanay undertook as your counsel and I was included because your heirs requested
toonopen it after his funeral,
me, x x x. Since the documents were burned, we have here a browninstructions
envelope which states
its face Buksan ito pagkalibing kothen a signature Cayetano Revillathat one in the
509
A (After going over the document, page by page and looking at the
Cayetano Revilla in every page) Yes, these are all my signatures, t
Cayetano Revilla. (p. 131, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.)
ATTY. LATOSA
Dacanay, in the pictures that were
Can you please read what is written in that envelope which you allowed to be opened.
taken during the signing of his first
A Yes, buksan ito pagkalibing ko.
ATTY. DAVID
will.
Do you want to open this now?
Q Now, in this envelope there are pictures five pictures in all,will yo
A Yes.
us if you can remember any of those persons appearing in the pictur
Q Do you wish to open this envelope now?
A This one, (testator pointing to a person in the picture)is Mr. Daca
A Yes, I want to open it now. (p. 123, Rollo.)
ATTY. DAVID
Don Cayetano declared that he
May I request that this picture wherein Don Cayetano Revilla iden
marked as Exhibit D. There is a person in this picture, the one sec
understood that the document inside
you go over it and see if you remember that person?
A I am that person.
the
envelope
was
his
will
Q Now in this second picture, do you recognize anybody here?
[naiintindihan ko po iyon (p. 131,
A Yes, I can recognize myself when I was signing the will.
Q Who else do you know is present in that picture?
Rollo)].
one, heinis Mr. Dacanay
Q This envelope which contained the last will and testament which A
I tookThis
the contents
Q How
your presence and in the presence of the other representation here including
the about the other one?
A Unang
I dont
know the others. (p. 133, Rollo; Underlining supplied.)
representatives of the Court, the document contained therein is entitled,
Pahina,
Huling Habilin Ni Don Cayetano Revilla, consisting of fourteen pages,
title means that assured Attorney David
Donthe Cayetano
this is your last will and testament?
that his original will was his genuine
A Yes, Naiintindihan ko po iyon.
Q And you executed this on the 28 of January as appearing. . . 28th will
of January,
1978,
as
and
testament
and not changed (p.
appearing on the 13th page of this last will and testament?
134, Rollo).
A Yes.
Q And all the pages of this last will and testament were all signed by
ATTY.
you which
DAVID
reads
Cayetano Revilla, will you go over these fourteen pages and tell us if thexxx
signatures
xxxhere xxx.
We are doing this Mr. Revilla because in case there will be an opp
591
and testament we can prove that this is the genuine will and testame
VOL. 217, JANUARY 27, 1993
591
A Yes, that is true sir, that is the truth. (p. 134, Rollo.)
Revilla vs. Court of Appeals
592
reading Cayetano Revilla are your signatures?
510
592
Q Will you tell us Don Cayetano if you ever executed a last will andbelieved
testament
this one
by after
everybody.
If he denied having executed another will,
has been probated by the Court?
who are we to insist that he made another or second will after the
A None, sir. (p. 135, Rollo.)
probate of his will dated January 28, 1978? The testimonies of the
alleged notary public as well as the three instrumental witnesses
of the alleged second will of the late Cayetano Revilla cannot
outweigh the denial of the late Cayetano Revilla. x x x. (p. 95,
Rollo.)
inadmissible
because
petitioners
counsel, Attorney Layosa, had no
opportunity to cross-examine him (p.
146, Rollo), does not wash. The
opportunity was there all the time.
Attorney Layosa simply made no
attempt to exercise his right to crossexamine Don Cayetano.
Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was
could not speak English except to say word, yes, sir. x x x. (p. 33,
regards
notary
public
Atty.
Mendoza,
the
court a
Barredo that after talking with Atty. Mendoza at the phone he was asked
by the old man to fetch the 2 witnesses however when asked on direct
examination, he stated that he stayed all along with the old man and did
not leave him even after talking with Atty. Mendoza, which spells a
eight nephews and nieces in favor of Heracio, the operator of the bowling
truth. So also, his exaggerated demonstration of the ability of the old man
alley where witness Mendoza always play; x x x (p. 36, Decision; p. 179,
Records)
596
596
Witness Dr. Cos testimony that he did not charge the late
Cayetano Revilla for two services rendered by him and that he
only charged when a third service was made was also doubted by
SO ORDERED.
Cruz (Chairman), Padilla and Bel
losillo, JJ.,concur.
Petition denied
Note.As between the positive
declaration of prosecution witnesses
and the negative statement of accused,
the former deserve more credence and
weight (People vs. Mariano, 191 SCRA
136).
o0o
597
517
FIRST DIVISION
251
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979
25
1
520
25
3
255
257
________________
1
Leon.
258
258
________________
2
259
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
259
531
presumption
of
its
nonexistence. Where, under the provisions
of the statute, an adoption is effected by
a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such
adoption may be established.
2. Petitioners flow of evidence in the
case below does not lead us to any proof
of judicial adoption. We can not pluck
from his chain of evidence any link to
the real existence of a court decree of
adoption in his favor. Petitioners proofs
do not show or tend to show that at one
time or another a specific court of
competent jurisdiction rendered in an
adoption proceeding initiated by the
late spouses an order approving his
adoption as a child of the latter. No
judicial records of such adoption or
copies thereof are presented or
attempted to be presented. Petitioner
merely proceeds from a nebulous
7
of Ritchie, 53 NW 2d 753.
7
2 CJS 444.
532
260
260
________________
261
261
11
534
13
________________
10
11
535
12
Court.
13
14
17
536
15
29 Am Jur 2d 565.
16
seq.
17
18
18
19
________________
107.
19
263
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
263
21
538
24
20
Sept.
30,
1963, 9
SCRA
116;Sumilang
v.
25
539
23
SCRA 697.
24
22
138.
265
540
Substantially, the testimony of the abovenamed witnesses will be on the fact that
they had been informed by the deceased
spouses, Mariano and Margarita Lazatin
542
26
27
267
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979
Lazatin vs. Campos
267
Notes.Adoption
proceedings
being in rem, no court may entertain
them unless it has jurisdiction, not only
over the subject matter of the case and
over the parties, but also, over the res,
which is the personal status not only of
the person to be adopted, but also of the
adopting parents. (Ellis vs. Republic, 7
SCRA 962).
Adoption proceedings being in rem,
constructive notice by publication is
sufficient. (Santos vs. Aranzanso, 16
SCRA 344).
Relatives by blood or affinity are not
prohibited from adopting one another.
(Santos, Jr. vs. Republic,21 SCRA 379).
An individual who has already
adopted a child may still adopt another.
(Hofilea vs. Republic, 34 SCRA 545).
The acquisition, by the adopted
person, of the adopting parents
citizenship is not required. (Therkelsen
544
545
FIRST DIVISION.
651
VOL. 196, MAY 6, 1991
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals
2
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
653
VOL. 196, MAY 6, 1991
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals
551
Exhibits X and Y and their submarkings, which were the last will and
testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the
order of probate. It is not at all denied
that the list of exhibits does not include
Exhibits A, B and C. In fact, the
trial court categorically declared that
Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, C, and C1, were not among those documents or
exhibits formally offered for admission
by plaintiff-administratrix. This is a
clear contradiction of the finding of the
appellate court, which seems to have
confused Exhibits A, B and C with
Exhibits X and Y, the evidence
mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides in Section 35 thereof as
follows:
_______________
Ibid.,
pp.
27-29;
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.,
ponente, with
Bellosillo
and
655
VOL. 196, MAY 6, 1991
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record
554
Rollo, p. 25.
657
VOL. 196, MAY 6, 1991
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals
10
11
10
11
658
556
658
13
14
15
557
12
Rollo, p. 64.
13
Exh. 7.
14
15
659
VOL. 196, MAY 6, 1991
Tabuena vs. Court of Appeals
559