Professional Documents
Culture Documents
very sloppy definition but its the only case that defines Tort
Why SC gave definition of Tort? They had to determine the liability of
the officers (Naguiat) for the tortious act.
Is it part of the ratio of the case? NO. Obiter. They already found CFTI
liable under the Labor Code so SC did not need to establish liability
through tort
VINZON-CHATO v FORTUNE
FACTS: Vinzons-Chato, in her capacity as Commisioner of the Internal
Revenue, imposed a 55% ad valorem tax on Fortune. The latter sue for
damages based on Article 32 for alleged violation of its constitutional
right against deprivation of property without due process of law and
the right to equal proetection of law. SC found for Fortune.
The Court defined tort in this case as a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by
one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. Presence of good motive,
or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
Definition is too broad. It may cover criminal acts, but not all
criminal acts give rise to damages.
a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is subject
to civil liability
Concept of damages:
Damages: the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as
pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
done or a wrong sustained as a consequence of a breach of a
contractual obligation or a tortious act
-pecuniary consequences which law imposes for breach of some duty
or violation of some right.
CUSTODIO v CA
FACTS: Custodio et al built an adobe fence making the passageway to
Mabasas apartment narrower. Mabasa filed a civil action for the grant
of easement of right of way against them. CA, aside from granting right
of way, awarded damages to Mabasa.
ISSUE: WON award of damages was proper. NO
HELD: In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no
legal injury. Custodio et als act of constructing a fence within their lot
is a valid exercise of their right as owners.
PEOPLE v BALLESTEROS
FACTS: Ballesteros et al were convicted of murder. They were ordered
to pay actual, compensatory, and moral damages to the heirs of the
deceased.
ISSUE: WON damages were correctly awarded. YES
HELD: Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise
expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Damage is the loss, hurt
or harm, which results from the injury.
Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded fro the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of
a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone.
Damnum absque injuria
AQUINO (pp. 843-845)
-There is no liability even if there is damage because there was no
injury. Mere damage without injury does not result in liability.
-A related maxim is qui jure suo utitir nullum damnum facit one who
exercises a right does no injury.
CUSTODIO v CA (supra)
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
B. History and Development
AQUINO (pp.1-5)
Tort provisions in our NCC were derived from Spanish, French and
Anglo-American Law. Therefore, RP SC borrows heavily from decisions
of the Court in other countries especially Spain and US and relies from
annotation of foreign author.
Roman Law served as main inspiration of NCC, as quite evident in the
field of QD: it added 4 new category of obligations that arise quasi ex
Sir: This is a poorly crafted decision. The SC did not even cite
the basis for the elements.
Quasi-delict
private concern
CC repairs the damage by
indemnification
include all acts in which "any kind
of fault or negligence intervenes."
solidary liability of employer
defense is that accused observed
due diligence of a good father of a
family
ANDAMO v CA
FACTS: The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette caused the
construction of waterpaths and contrivances in its compound. This
allegedly caused flooding and damage to the adjacent lot, property of
the Andamo spouses. The Andamos filed a criminal case for
destruction by means of inundation, and later also filed a civil action
for damages against respondent corporation. The civil case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the crim case was field ahead of it.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper.
HELD: NO. The civil action was based on QD and may proceed
independently of the criminal case. All the elements of QD are present
in the complaint, to wit:
(1) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
NOTES:
1.
liability
of
Under QD
Presumptive liability
Under BoC
Direct and immediate
3.
vinculum
(legal tie)
juris
4. what a plaintiff
needs to prove
Rebut
presumption
through proof of the
exercise of due care
in
selection
and
supervision
Created
by
the
wrongful or negligent
act/omission itself
Defendants fault or
negligence
Prove performance of
contract or contributory
negligence
Independent the breach
of the duty assumed by
the parties
The contract and its
nonperformance.
The
negligence need not be
proven
NOTES:
Cangco did not pay for his fare so why is a contract of carriage
at issue? It should be a contract of employment.
MERALCO was held liable for breach of contract. What was the
breach? Failure to exercise due diligence
So Cangco doesnt say that the two are mutually exclusive and
therefore Cangco is consistent with Air France
which failed to heed the claim. FGU filed case for damages and breach
of contract of carriage.
SC: In culpa contractual, uppon which the action of FGU rests as being
the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, the mere proof of the existence
of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief. A breach of contract confers upon the
injured party a valis cause for recovering that which may have been
lost or suffered
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract
of carriage between it and petitioner's assured, and admits that the
cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in
its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance
with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and
corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden
on him to establish otherwise.
As to liability of driver: a contract can only bind the parties who have
entered into it or their successors and can neither favor nor prejudice a
thrid person. The action against the driver can only be based on
culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require
the calimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the
part of the defendant.
CALALAS v CA
FACTS: Eliza Sunga, a passenger of a jeepney owned by Calalas, was
injured when a truck hit the rear end of the jeepney. The jeepeney was
filled to the capacity. When the truck hit the jeepney Sunga was giving
way to passengers who were alighting the jeepney. Sunga filed
complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the latter in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas on the other hand filed
3rd-party complaint against the owner of the truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against the owner of the truck,
holding that it was the driver of said truck that was responsible for the
accident. It also absolved Calalas.
CA reversed the ruling on the ground that Sunga's cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that
the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the
Civil Code.
SC: Quasi-delict has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor.
Breach of contract is premised on the negligence in the performance of
a contractual obligation.
In QD, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it
is the basis of the action. In BoC, the action can be prosecuted merely
by proving the existence of the contract an the fact that the obligor, in
1. moral damages
2. defendant carriers
defense
Under BoC
3.
what
plaintiff
needs to prove
Recoverable
only
if
passenger dies or there
is malice or bad faith
(proof of due diligence
not available)
Injury to passenger. No
need to prove it was
carriers
Fault
NOTES:
Does not say that when there is a contract, you cant sue for
QD.
be liable not for a QD but for a BoC under A1170. They exercised the
due diligence of a GFP in preventing the accumulation of water in the
vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth in the grave.
LRT v. NAVIDAD (2003)
Navidad (then drunk) entered the LRT after purchasing a token. An
altercation between him and Escartin (security guard) ensued which
resulted in a fist fight. Navidad fell in the tracks and was struck and
killed by the train. The trial court held Escartin and his agency liable
and absolved LRTA and the trains driver. CA absolved Escartin and his
agency and held LRTA and the driver liable.
HELD: LRTAs liability is founded on the contract of carriage and its
obligation arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its
failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier.
The negligence of Escartin is not proven thus the agency is not liable.
The driver is also absolved.
The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death or
injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees or (b) an account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees though
the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission.
CONSOLIDATED BANK v. CA (2003)
LC Diaz has an account with Solidbank. It entrusted the passbook to
their messenger to make a deposit. The messenger left the passbook
to the teller but when he came back the teller said that somebody else
took it. That same day there was an unauthorized withdrawal by a
certain Tamayo of 300k from the savings account. LC Diaz then filed a
criminal complaint against another messenger and a certain Verdazola
for estafa but the case was dismissed. LC Diaz filed this complaint for
damages against Solidbank.
HELD: Solidbank is liable for BoC due to negligence (A1980 deposits in
bank is governed by provisions concerning simple loan, RA 8791 sec.2.
the State recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high
standard of integrity and performance). Solidbank breached its
contractual obligation to return the passbook only to authorized
representative of LC Diaz. There is a presumption of negligence and
Solidbank must prove otherwise. (There is although contributory
negligence on the part LC Diaz for allowing a withdrawal slip to get into
the hands of an impostor.)
Note: In BoC ones last clear chance or contributory negligence will not
exonerate the defendants liability but will only reduce damage.
DE LEON (pp.157-160)
1. Requisites of QD:
1. Definition
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of
a family shall be required. (1104a)
PICART TEST: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man
would have used in the same situation?
and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care requires by the
circumstances.
The diligence which the law requires the individual at all times to
govern his conduct varies with the nature if the situation in which he us
placed and the importance if the act which he is to perform. (Cruz vs.
Gangan)
over 9 but under 15 years of age is rebuttable, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that the child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
DOCTRINE: A child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
YLARDE vs. AQUINO (1988)
Edgardo Aquino ordered his students to dig beside a 1 ton concrete
block in order to make a hole to bury huge stones. He left four of them
to level the loose soil around the open hole but told them not to touch
the stone. They, however, playfully jumped into the pit and caused
the top of the concrete block to fall towards the opening. Ylarde wasnt
able to climb out and he died after 3 days because of the injuries
sustained.
HELD: Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence. The
degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of
the person engendered to care for himself. A minor should not be held
to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be
judged according to the average conduct of persons of his own age
and experience. Aquino is negligent for he should have foreseen that
bringing children to excavation site and leaving them there may result
in an accident.
DOCTRINE: The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for
his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by
children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and
experience under the same or similar circumstances.
SANGCO (pp. 70-74)
UNDER 9 YEARS conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment and is exempt from criminal liability
OVER 9 BUT UNDER 15 may or may not be guilty of contributory
negligence, depending upon his mental development and other
circumstances (rebuttable presumption)
OVER 15 YEARS
and was told that his condition needs lifetime med and follow ups.
Lucas underwent two operations (1990 and 1991) of laser
trabeculoplasty. He said that what he had is steroid-induced glaucoma
and sued Tuano. Tuano says that Lucas glaucoma is not steroid induced
for if it were, it would disappear with the discontinue of the use of
maxitrol.
HELD: No expert testimony was presented. Absent a definitive
standard of care or diligence required of the Dr. Tuano under the
circumstances, the Court cant determine whether he was able to
comply with the same in his diagnosis and treatment of Lucas. There is
no causation between use of maxitrol and glaucoma. Lucas failed to
prove by preponderance of evidence that Tuani failed to exercise that
degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other persons in the
same profession; and that as a proximate result if such failure, the
patient or his heirs suffered damages. The mere fact that the patient
does not get well or that a bad result is not determinative of the
performance of the physician and he is not required to be infallible.
When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physicianpatient relationship is generated. And in accepting a case, the
physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training,
care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his
patient, a physician is under a duty to [the former] to exercise that
degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same
general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice
ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Stated otherwise, the
physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition
under similar circumstances.
This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best
addressed by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care
in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the
knowledge of experts in the field.
d. Corporate Negligence
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs. AGANA (Jan. 31, 2007)
HELD: The failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses report, to
investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes
amounts to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to
oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls,
it also failed to take an active step in fixing the negligence committed.
This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr.
Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its
own negligence under Article 2176.
DOCTRINE: A patient who enters a hospital does so with the
reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital
accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and
Art 2185 CC
Art. 2188
There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the
defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison,
except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
Art 2188
Art. 1734
Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
common carriers
Art. 1735
In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as required in Article 1733.
NOTES:
Art 2184 CC (Driver)
disputable presumption:
Rebuttable
o Will not ordinarily have happened
o PROVE/SHOW (Burden of Proof)
1.
2.
3.
CAN ARGUE: pre-op procedure; RTC did not know about it but
the SC said it was common knowledge
RIL applicable:
No expert testimony
CANTRE v GO
FACTS: Mrs. Go gave birth to her 4th child. There were some parts of
the placenta that were not completely expelled from her womb after
delivery. This caused Mrs. Go to suffer hypovolemic shock resulting in
the drop of her blood pressure. Dr. Cantre performed numerous
medical procedures to stop the bleeding. After the procedure, Mrs. Go
had a wound on her which looked like a burn mark from the droplight.
Dr. Cantre claims the wound was from the blood pressure cuff which
was used to monitor the heartbeat of Mrs. Go during the procedure.
ISSUE: WON Dr. Cantre is liable for the injuries suffered by Mrs. Go.
HELD: YES. The Hippocratic method mandates physicians to give
primordial concern to the well-being of their patients.
In cases involving MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a
presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instruments causing the injury.
Requisites:
a. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of someones negligence the wound on
Noras arm is not an ordinary occurrence in the act of
delivering a baby.
b. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant or defendants Both a droplight
and a blood pressure apparatus are deemed to be within
the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the
captain ship doctrine.
c. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make
the plaintiff responsible is eliminated the wound on
Noras arm could only be caused by something external to
her.
Even if petitioners contentions are true, that the wound was not
caused by a droplight but by the blood pressure cuff, petitioner is not
exempt from liability.
BATIGUIN v CA
Positive Testimony v Negative Testimony
FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation on a patient.
Afterwards, she was found to be feverish. When the patient submitted
herself to another surgery, she was found to have an ovarian cyst on
the left and right side of the ovaries and a piece of rubber material was
embedded on the right side of the uterus.
HELD: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
Theoretical basis for RIL: The proof should come from the
defendant (RIL is the bridge which allows the plaintiff to
reach the defendant).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to Dr. Fuentes .
Requisites: (1) occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control and management of the
defendant; (3) in the ordinary course of things the injury wouldnt
have happened if the person in control used proper care; and (4)
absence of explanation by the person at fault. The 2nd requirement
is wanting because Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes was the lead
surgeon (Captain of the Ship rule).
DM CONSUNJI v CA
FACTS: A construction worker fell from the 14th floor when the platform
assembly he was standing on fell down.
HELD: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that
the necessary evidence is not available. The defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of
the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the
plaintiff has no such knowledge. It furnishes a bridge by which the
plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant
who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care
exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the
plaintiff complains. It is a rule of necessity.
RULE: The theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity.
NOTES:
RIL applies
theoretical basis:
o proof is in exclusive control of defendant
o bridge that connects plaintiff to the proof
Prof. Casis thinks that it is the victims fault for falling off the
platform.
a) Picart Test
b) Standard Care
4) PROXIMATE CAUSE
5) PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE
a) PROXIMATE CAUSE Cannot recover
b) CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE can recover but mitigated
Art. 2179, NCC
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but
the court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
NOTES:
* The son could have sued stepbrother of his father for building
the house so close to the wire*
BERNARDO v LEGASPI
(If both negligent cannot recover from each other)
FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained by plaintiffs automobile by reason of
defendants negligence in causing a collision. Court also dismissed a
cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages on the
unexplained and abrupt swerving of the jeep. Court also found that the
jeep was running too fast. The negligence of Antonio was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife, but goes to the very
cause of the occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes their
right to recover damages.
NOTES:
Cause/Condition
2. Contributory Negligence
NPC v HEIRS OFCASIONAN
FACTS: Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at
Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was
18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried
one pole horizontally on his shoulder. As Noble was going uphill and
turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying
touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was
walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when
the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about one or two
seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed
to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Their coworkers heard Melchors shout for help and together they brought the
body of Noble to their camp.
ISSUE: WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the
victim?
HELD: Yes
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he
is required to conform for his own protection.
No contributory negligence
NPC v MERALCO
o SIR agrees more with NPC = contributory negligence
no
3. Fortuitous Event
Art. 1174, NCC
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
NOTES:
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE v CA
FACTS: During a typhoon, schools roof was partly ripped off and
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of
respondents house.
A team of engineers conducted an ocular
inspection and found that the causes may have been the U-shaped
formation of the building and the improper anchorage of the trusses to
the roof beams.
HELD: Court found that other than the report submitted by the
engineers, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause
of the incident. Respondents did not even show that the plans, specs
and design of the school building were defective. On the other hand,
city building official testified that the school obtained both building
permit and certificate of occupancy; same official gave go signal for
repairs of damage of typhoon and subsequently authorized the use of
the entire 4th floor of the building; annual maintenance inspection and
repair of the school building was regularly undertaken; and that no
complaints have been lodged in the past. Therefore, petitioner has not
been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of the school building. Typhoon was the proximate cause.
CASO FORTUITO event which takes place by accident and
could not have been reasonably foreseen, it is an unexpected
event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor
resisted.
2 GENERAL CAUSES:
1. By nature- earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.
2. By the act of man- armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental
prohibition, etc.
NOTES:
flying roof is FE
*they could have used RIL*: might have done better? But there
is evidence of diligence.
SICAM v JORGE
FACTS: Lulu Jorge pawned her jewelry with Agencia de R.C. Sicam, a
pawnshop in Paraaque, in October 1987 to secure a loan in the
amount of P59,500.00. On October 19, 1987, armed men entered the
pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found in the
vault. On the same day, Sicam notified Jorge of the robbery incident
and that consequently all here jewelry is gone. Jorge did not believe
him.
ISSUE: WON the robbery is a fortuituous event which can absolve
Sicam from liabilty.
HELD: NO
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events
not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough
that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same. 22
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event
rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to
exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous
event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on
the part of herein petitioners
NOTES:
cause him any embarrassment. There was also no evidence that she
was driven by animosity against Reyes. At most she may only be guilty
of bad judgment, done with good intentions, thus not amounting to bad
faith.
SANGCO (pp.81-84)
NOTES:
VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA: applies to non-contractual
relations;
3 requisites:
(1) plaintiff had actual knowledge of the damage;
(2) he understood an appreciated the risk from danger;
(3) he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.
5. Prescription
KRAMER v CA
FACTS: 1976: 2 vessels collided
- 1981: Phil Coast Guard concluded that the collision was due to M/V
Asias negligence
-1982: Coast Guard suspended 2nd mate of M/V Asia.
-1985: Petitioners instituted complaint for damages against
respondent. Motion to dismiss was filed on the basis of prescription.
HELD: SC dismissed the case, saying that according to Art. 1146,
action based on quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 yrs.
Prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict was
committed.
IV CAUSATION
A. Proximate cause
NOTES:
Usually its the shorter definition thats being cited in the other cases.
So for our purpose-shorter version
The longer version can be shortened by removing sufficient
intervening cause
*memorize definition of proximate cause*
1. Definition
BATACLAN v MEDINA
FACTS: A bus speeding on its way to Pasay City at 2am when one of
its front tires burst, as a result of which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into
a canal or ditch, and turned turtle. 4 passengers were unable to get
out of the bus.
Calls and shouts for help were made in the
neighborhood. At 2:30am, 10 men came, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick fueled with petroleum.
When they approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the bus
and the 4 passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, the
In this case, the car accident could not have happened if the saleslady
carefullly and correctly read Dr. Sys prescription since it was unlikley
that Baking would fall asleep while driving.
NOTES:
SIR: the court attributed a high degree of diligence to pharmacists
PILIPINAS BANKING v CA
FACTS: Florencio Reyes issued two post-dated checks. To cover the
face value of the checks, he requested PCIB to effect a withdrawal from
his savings account there and have it deposited with his current
account with Pilipinas Bank. Santos, who made the deposit, wrote the
wrong account number on the deposit slip, but wrote the name of
Florencio Reyes as the depositors name. The Current Account
Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, seeing that the account number
coincided with the name Florencio, deposited the amount in the
account of Florencio Amador.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the injury to Reyes?
HELD: The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of Pilipinas
Banks employee in erroneously positing the cash deposit of Reyes in
the name of another depositor who had a similar first name. The
employee should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption.
Proximate cause is any cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
result complained of and without which would not have occurred and
from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated
by a person of ordinary care that the injury complained of or some
similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable cause.
Note: Different definition of PC from Bataclan case. This case adds the
element of foreseeability.
Prof. Casiss opinion: Theres no basis for this additional element.
Under Art. 2202, foreseeability should not be a factor.Sir said that there
is a problem with foreseeability as an element. So as a solution, if
theres a case similar to Pilipinas Bank, apply Pilipinas Bank definition*
NOTES:
If the concurrent act was the proximate cause, the degree of
participation does not matter.
The house is the condition which made the injury possible but
not the cuase
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javiers death with which Urbano had nothing to do.
What could have been the IC now becomes the remote cause
TEAGUE v FERNANDEZ
FACTS: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture had only one
stairway, in violation of an ordinance requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke
out in a nearby store and the students panicked and caused a
stampede. Four students died.
ISSUE: WON there was an independent intervening cause NO.
HELD: the violation of a stature or ordinance is not rendered remote as
the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was
the very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended to prevent.
In the present case, the violation was a continuing violation in that the
ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent the specific
situation of undue crowding in case of evacuation.
NOTE: The PC of the deaths is the overcrowding brought about by the
violation. However, the court did not specifically identify the violation
itself as the PC.
Prof. Casis thinks that this case should not be cited for the
substantial factor test because the SC did not apply the
test; only the CA did.
Elements:
o Both parties must be negligent
o Appreciable interval of time
o When it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident
FACTS: Picart riding his pony was on the wrong side of the road.
Smith driving his car stayed on his right lane and so both Picart and
Smith were on the same lane. Smith stayed on his lane and swerved to
the other lane quickly, thereby almost hitting the pony. Pony became
frightened and lost control and Picart was thrown out of the pony and
got
injured.
Picart
then
filed
a
case
against
Smith
RATIO: The negligent acts of both parties were NOT contemporaneous.
Negligence of Smith succeeded the negligence of Picart by an
appreciable interval. th saw the pony when he was still far and he had
control of the situation. was his duty to avoid the threatened harm by
bringing the car to a stop or taking the other lane to avoid the collision.
t take into consideration the NATURE OF HORSES and the ANIMAL NOT
BEING ACQUAINTED TO CARS. ligence of Smith: when it exposed Picart
and pony to danger. This negligence of Smith was the immediate and
determining cause of the accident and the antecedent negligence of
Picart was a more remote factor
-Applied the LCCD and made the defendant liable
NOTES:
NOTES:
Does the last clear chance doctrine still stand? Yes, because it
was still used in later cases
o HOWEVER, Phoenix says that purpose behind
contributory negligence no longer exists therefore
A2179 which is irreconcilable with LCC
o But in subsequent cases, the SC stil used LCC
cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line in the road
was wrongly painted
case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died as a result of
the collision
RATIO:
- The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance also cannot apply
because there is no negligence of the other party
- Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the doctrine of
Last Clear Chance would still absolve him from any actionable
responsibility for the accident because both drivers had full view of
each others vehicle.
The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by this time, the
jeep should have stopped or swerved
Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident
It was the jeeps driver who had the duty to seize the opportunity of
avoidance and not merely rely on a supposed right to expect that the
truck would swerve and leave him a clear path
- The doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides a valid and complete
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied
in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of
facts
- Thus, this ruling would clearly apply to exonerate truck driver
- did not apply the doctrine of last clear chance because the other
party was not negligent
NOTES:
Chance
CANLAS v CA
Doctrine can [was]
apply
in
commercial
FACTS:
2 parcels of land owned by Canlas were sold to Manosca
Manosca issued 2 check that bounced
Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings Bank with the 2
parcels of land as security
2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas
mortgage was foreclosed
Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the mortgage of
Manosca of the 2 properties without their consent
Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of real estate
mortgage against ASB
RATIO:
ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify the identity of
the sps Canlas
The Bank should have required additional proof of the true identity of
the impostor aside from their residence certificate
Applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance which states that:
Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciable later in a point of time that that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do
so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom
In this case, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent fraud, by
simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements of
banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them
FACTS:
RATIO:
The last clear chance doctrine may only be applied when the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other,
or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the loss.
NOTES:
LAPANDAY v ANGALA
FACTS:
Angala instituted an action for damages alleging that his pickup was slowing down to about five to ten kph and was making
a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped
from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to
70 kph.
The facts are ambivalent enough that Angala could have been
declared as the party at fault. Proximate cause is where the
court exercises the greatest latitude. So if facts are similar to a
case that was already decided, cite the case!
SANGCO, (pp. 74-81)
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Facts required:
o
That the plaintiff was in a position of danger and by his
own negligence became unable to escape from such position
by the use of ordinary care, either because it became
physically impossible for him to do so or because he was
totally unaware of the danger.
o
The defendant knew that the plaintiff was in a position
of danger and further knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known that the plaintiff was unable to escape
therefrom
o
That thereafter the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care but failed
to exercise such last clear chance and the accident occurred as
a proximate result of such failure
Many courts take the view that the doctrine of last clear
chance is not available to defendant. LCC can only be invoked in
favor of the person injured, since it implies contributory negligence
on his part, and is, generally speaking, only operative in those
Plaintiff
WON
applied the
LCCD
YES
Bustamante
Picart v Smith
Passengers
Picart (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
collision)
NO
Yes
Bustamante v CA
Passengers of the
bus
No
Phoenix v IAC
Phoenix (one of
the parties who
caused
the
collision)
RMC (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
accident)
No
No
Ong v Metropolitan
Parents
of
deceased
the
No
Anuran v Buno
Heirs
of
the
passengers
of
jeep
(with
contract)
Canals (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
incident) for the
annulment of the
deed
No
No
Philippine Bank of
Commerce v CA
Glan v IAC
Pantranco v Baesa
Why?
Smith had a
clear
opportunity
to avoid the
accident
No
Smith
had
clear
opportunity
to avoid the
accident
No negligent
plaintiff
because the
plaintiff in the
case are the
Canlas v CA
Consolidated Bank
v CA
Yes
No
Yes
passengers of
the bus who
are asking for
damages
Doctrine was
not
carried
over to the
CC
Just to know
if PBC was
negligent but
damages
were divided
40-60
Truck driver
(other party
in
the
collision) was
not negligent
There was no
opportunity
to avoid the
accident and
driver
was
not aware of
the peril
Defendant
was
not
negligent
There
was
contractual
relation
Defendant
bank had the
last
clear
chance
to
prevent
the
fraud
Note:
there
was
no
contractual
relation
between
Canlas
and
the bank
Liability
of
bank
arose
from
culpa
Engada v CA
Inured
party
(owner
of
the
Tamaraw)
PNR v BRUNTY
LAPANDAY
ANGALA
Brunty (mother of
passenger
who
died)
Lapanday (driver
of one of the cars
involved in the
accident)
No
No
Yes
contractual
and
so
doctrine
cannot
be
applied
There was no
clear chance
in
avoiding
the accident
because
it
was
an
emergency
situation
Last
clear
chance
was
inapplicable
because
PNRs
negligence
was already
established
as
the
proximate
cause
Last
clear
chance
was
applied
because both
parties were
found to be
negligent.
Decision was
based
on
circumstance
s of incident
NOTES:
There can be more than one tortfeasor and they are called
JOINT TORTFEASORS
Are you suppose to sue all of them? NO because you can get
relief from one of them.
The court however may make findings as to which of the alleged joint
tortfeasors are liable and which are not, even if they are charged
jointly and severally.
Art. 2184*. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by
the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.
*this was drafted with Chapman v. Underwood in mind.
NOTES:
The Case defines a joint totfeasor which is taken from the point
of view of the actor.
CHAPMAN v UNDERWOOD
March 28, 1914
FACTS: J.H. Chapman was trying to board a San Marcelino car trough
the rear platform when he was struck by Mr. James Underwoords
automobile, which was at that time driven by his chauffer.
Underwoods driver was guilty of negligence because he was
passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side when he ran over
Chapman. Chapman, was not obliged for his own protection to observe
whether a car was coming upon him from where he was because
according to the law, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his
left should pass upon his side of the car.
TC: In favor of Underwood
ISSUE: WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver.
HELD: No. TC affirmed. The interval between unlawful act and the
accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge Underwood with
the negligence of the driver.
The driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. 1903 (now
2180) for whose acts Underwood would be responsible.
This rule applies even if the owner of the vehicle was present
at the time of the accident, unless THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE DRIVER
ARE CONTINUED FOR SUCH A LENGTH OF TIME AS TO GIVE THE OWNER A
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AND TO DIRECT HIS DRIVER TO
DESIST THEREFROM.
When will the owner be liable?- An owner who sits in his vehicle,
and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
DRIVER
CEASE
When will the owner be NOT liable?-if the driver by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the vehicle, present therein at the time the
act was committed, is not responsible, etiher civilly or criminally,
therefor.
The act complained of must be continued in the presence of
the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own.
RULE: Underwood is not liable for his drivers act even if he was inside
the car at the time of the accident (unless he let the negligence
continue for a long time without correcting it) because the driver is not
listed in 1903 (now 2180) as one of the persons whose acts Underwood
would be responsible for.
NOTES:
There is no one standard of care for owners who are riding with
their drivers since there are different reasons why hired the
driver in the first place
How does the FC affect 2180? Is the person below 21 still liable?
For those above 15 but below 18 who acted with discernment
basis to use is 2180
B. Vicarious Liability aka Imputed Negligence
NOTES:
Family Code
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
A child above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
NOTES:
Laws applicable
o Civil Code,2180
Age of emancipation: 18
Are the parents still liable for if above 18 but below 21? Yes.
Legal basis: PD 603
1. Parents (see table after cases)
EXCONDE v CAPUNO
June 29, 1957
FACTS: Dante Capuno, 15 years old, a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School, was instructed by the city schools supervisor to
attend a parade in honor of Rizal in San Pablo City. From the school,
the students boarded a jeep, and when it started to run, Dante took
hold of the wheel, while the driver sat on his left side (remember that
the steering wheel is at the LEFT side). The jeep turned turtle and 2
passengers died.
Delfin Capuno, the father, was not with Dante at the time of the
accident, nor did he know that Dante was going to attend a parade. He
only found out after the accident when Dante told him about it.
Criminal case:
TC: Dante was convicted for Double homicide through reckless
imprudence.
CA: affirmed
ISSUE: WON Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son for damages.
HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Delfin and Dante are jointly and severally
liable for the damages.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
DISSENT: Reyes
He wants TC affirmed (relieving Delfin of liability): There is no sound
reason for limiting Art. 1903 to teachers of arts and trades and not to
academic institutions.
The phrase teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
does not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments.
If the basis of presumption of negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority, hence, when the parent
places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the
teacher, and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody.
Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If there
is no authority, there can be no responsibility.
Hence, Delfin should not be made liable for a tort that he was in no
way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the
school authorities would.
He rebutted the presumption of negligence under 1903 when
he proved that he entrusted custody of Dante to the school authorities.
RULES:
Majority:
Liability of teachers or directors are limited to institutions of arts and
trades.
Dissent:
1. Art. 1903 interpretation too limited. Teacher, master, or in the
absence of, school authorities should be liable for the negligence.
2. Once the parent entrusts custody to the school
authorities,
presumption is rebutted and burden of proof is shifted to claimant to
show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him
liable.
NOTES: This case is cited as basis of liability arising from parental
authority.
SALEN AND SALBANERA v BALCE
April 27, 1960.
FACTS: Carlos Salen (single) died due to wounds caused by
Gumersindo Balce, 18, single and living with Jose Balce, his father.
Gumersindo was convicted of homicide and was sentenced to
imprisonment and to pay Carlos heirs indemnity. But Gumersindo was
insolvent, hence Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera (Salens), the
parents (and heirs) of Carlos, demanded from Jose to pay but he
refused. Hence the suit.
LIBI v IAC
September 18, 1992
FACTS: Julie and Wendell were sweethearts for 2 years when Julie
broke it off due to Wendells sadistic and irresponsible nature. A month
after their break-up, Julie and Wendell died each from a single gunshot
wound traced to the gun licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi, the
father of Wendell. There were 2 versions of the story:
Libis: another man shot the 2
Gotiong: Wendell shot Julie and then committed suicide.
The Gotiongs (julies parents) fiuled for damages against the Livis
under Art. 2180.
TC: dismissed for insufficiency of evidence
IAC: Set aside TC and found the Libis subsidiarily liable.
ISSUE: WON Art. 2180 was correctly applied to hold the Libis liable.
HELD: Yes. Libis are primarily liable CA affirmed.
The Libis were grossly negligent from preventing Wendell from having
access to the key to the safety deposit box where the gun was stored.
Diligence required is that of instruction and supervision of the kid.
BUT, liability is not subsidiary, it is PRIMARY
2 Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with
his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
xxx
TAMARGO v CA
June 3, 1992
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Adelbertos
natural parents for damages. Adelberto was living with his natural
parents at the time of the accident but a petition for his adoption has
already been filed by the Rapisura spouses. This petition was granted
after the shooting of Jennifer.
The Tamargos filed:
criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence
but Adelberto was acquitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
civil complaint against the Bundocs, the natural parents of
Adelberto.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such
person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law.
The Bundocs claimed that the Rapisuras should be held liable instead,
that they are indispensable parties because parental authority had
already shifter to them the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
Action
for
Civil
action for
damages
(father
Who held
liable
TC: only son
liable
SC: Pa and son
jointly and
and son
impleaded
)
Salen and
Salbanera
vs. Balce
(son above
15 but below
18 killed 18
yr old)
Fuellas vs.
Cadano
(stole pencil
and had the
nerve to be
mad by
breaking
classmates
arm!)
Criminal
case with
civil
liability
arising
from it
Guitierrez
vs.
Guitierrez
(bus
collision,
family except
pa in the car
driven by
minor)
RodriguezLuna vs.
IAC
(go-cart vs.
Toyota)
Criminal
action vs.
Rico for
Serious
Physical
Injuries
Civil
action vs
Agapito
(the
father)
only
Civil
action vs.
Manuel
Guitierrez
(the
father)
only (+
bus driver
and
owner)
Civil
action vs.
pa and
son
Civil
action vs.
parents
severally liable
-not the school
because not a
school of arts
and trades
SC: Father
liable
subsidiarily
-child above 15,
below 18
necessary consequence
of parental authority
they exercise over their
MINOR children
SC: Pa liable
SC: Pa made
primarily liable
for the injury
caused by son
(son already of
age, said to be
insolvent but in
Madrid!)
SC: Libis are
primarily and
directly liable
Tamargo
vs. CA
(adopted
child still
with parents
at time of
incident)
Criminal
complaint
Civil
complaint
vs. Natural
parents of
child
SC: Bundocs
(natural
parents) are
indispensable
parties
-the adopting
parents had no
actual custody
yet
Elcano v
Hill
(married
child who
still lives
with
parents at
time of
incident
Civil
action for
damages
against
the father
2. Guardians
Art 221, FC; Art 2180,
NCC; Art 101, RPC
Why primarily liable:
1. If liability of the
parents for crimes or
QDs of their minor
children is subsidiary,
Family Code
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the
following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the
child in the order indicated:
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified.
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified; and
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
4 Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the
preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
CA
control or the influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would
pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil.
CONTEMPLATES A SITUATION WHERE THE PUPIL LIVES AND BOARDS WITH THE
TEACHER, SUCH THAT THE CONTROL DIRECTION AND INFLUENCE ON THE
PUPIL SUPERSEDES THOSE OF THE PARENTS. In these circumstances the
Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar. The pupils
go to school during school hours and go back home to their parents
after.
The situated contemplated in the last par. of art. 2180 (I think
he meant 2nd to the last par) does not apply, nor does par 2 5 which
makes the father or mother responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children.
Hence, the claim of Mercado that responsibility should pass to
the school, must be held to be without merit.
Anent the MD:
Only possible circumstance in which MD may be granted is if a felony
or QD has been committed.
1.
no criminal action for physical injuries has been presented
2. even if this is a QD within the meaning of Art. - Art. 2219, par
26, the facts show that Augustos act was occasioned by the fact that
Manuel Jr. tired to intervene or interfere with Augustos attempt to
5 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
6Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Under 2180, the president and instructor are liable solidarily for
damages.
Brillantes is not liable because he is a mere member of the
board (he could have been liable if not for the incorporation of the
school, making a corporation the owner of the school and not him
anymore).
The school cannot be held liable as it was not impleaded as a
party defendant.
The TC based its decision on Mercado v. CA, which in turn was based
on a dictum in Exconde v. Capuno. The case here was instituted
directly against the defendants (as against the cited cases where the
father was the defendant). The parents here are not involved since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the incident. MTI is
unquestionably a non-academic school.
1. custody
The TC erred in absolving the defendants on the ground that they can
only be held liable if they lived and boarded with his teacher or the
other defendants-school officials.
The phrase so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means THE PROTECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY CUSTODY THAT THE
SCHOOL AND ITS HEADS AND TEACHERS EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS AND STUDENTS
FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING RECESS
TIME. (MEMORIZE)
Dissent: Makalintal
Wants Mercado sustained. Its unfair to hold teachers and/or
administrative heads responsible for tortuous acts of their students
considering the high number of enrollment. It would demand
responsibility without the commensurate authority.
Moreover, since the responsibility stems from loco parentis, then it
follows that
1. custody= live in company (like for parents and guardians)
and
2. responsibility limited to minors only (like for parents and
guardians)
Concurring: Reyes
Concurs with majority but dissents with the dissent. Makalintals
interpretation not in accord with the law.
1.
Only the guardians and parents are exempt once the child
reaches majority
2.
The authority and custodial supervision (of the teachers and
heads) over the pupil exists regardless of the pupils age.
RULE:
1. Mercado doctrine abandoned/overturned
2. Wants to overturn Exconde (to include academic institutions
in the scope of 2180) but has no chance because MTI is anonacademic institution.
3. Definition of custody= the protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time. (MEMORIZE)
AMADORA v CA
April 15, 1988
Unlike the parent who will be liable only for his minor child, the
teacher is answerable for torts of his students regardless of the
students age.
Hence:
1. Alfredo Amadora was still in the schools custody when the
incident happened
There is no substantial distinction between an academic and a nonacademic school insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school he is teaching.
2. rector, high school principal and dean of boys NOT liable because
none of them were the teacher-in charge (they only exercised a
general authority and not the direct control and influence exerted by
the teacher-in-charge)
Dean of boys not liable although he earlier confiscated a gun
because it was not shown that the gun he confiscated and the gun that
was used in the shooting were the same.
SALVOSA v. IAC
October 5, 1988
FACTS: Jimmy Abon, was a student of the BCF and an employee of AFP
(as an armorer for the BCF-ROTC unit) with work premises inside the
BCF. Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a commerce student of BCF with an
unlicensed gun from the ROTC armory, at the BCF parking lot at
around 8pm. He was convicted of Homicide. Napoleons heirs (Castros)
sued for damages impleading Abon, The ROTC Commandant, B.
Salvosa-president and chairman of BCF board, J. Salvosa-the EVP of
BCF, the dean and BCF.
TC: Solidary liability of Abon, B. Salvosa and BCF
Absolved other defendants
IAC: Affirmed but modified award
ISSUE: WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily liable with Abon
for damages under 2180.
HELD: No. Abon was not in the custody of BCF at the time of the
incident. IAC Reversed in so far as it holds Salvosa and BCF solidarily
liable with Abon.
1. Rationale for liability
Reiterated Palisoc: The rationale of the liability of school heads and
teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
2. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot
Napoleon
DEFINITION OF CUSTODY (MEMORIZE!)-- THE PROTECTIVE AND
SUPERVISORY CUSTODY THAT THE SCHOOL AND ITS HEADS AND TEACHERS
EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS AND STUDENTS FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT
ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING RECESS TIME.
Qualifying custody
In line with Palisoc, RECESS IS A TEMPORARY ADJOURNMENT EMBRACED IN
THE CONCEPT OF AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL. IT IS A SITUATION WHERE THE
STUDENT STILL REMAINS WITHIN THE CALL OF HIS MENTOR AND IS NOT PERMITTED
TO LEAVE THE SCHOOL PREMISES OR THE AREA WITHIN WHICH THE SCHOOL ACTIVITY
IS CONDUCTED.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity
or institution. (349a)
for
But, for St. Marys to be held liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered a s negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal
connection to the accident.
a. The proximate cause of the accident was not the negligence
nor the reckless driving of James, but the mechanical defect of the
jeep. The steering wheel guide was detached while the jeep was
running.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. (n)
For damages
caused by
Liability
FC
A218: school, its
administrators and
teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution
engaged in child
have special parental
authority and responsibility
to all authorized activities
whether inside or
outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution
Minor child while under
their supervision,
instruction or custody
A219: unemancipated
minor
Principally and solidarily
liable schools
Subsidiarily liable parents,
judicial guardians, persons
exercising substitute
parental authority
NCC
A2180, par7: teachers or
heads of establishments
of arts and trades
*In St. Francis Case,
activity should be inside
school premises
ISSUE:
WON
Balingit
is
liable
under
2180.
(WON
employers/owners/managers of an establishment/enterprise
includes managers of corporations)
HELD: No.
1. Balingit is not the manager contemplated in 2180
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
The terms employers and owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise DOES NOT INCLUDE THE MANAGER OF A
CORPORATION.
THE TERM MANAGER (DIRECTOR IN SPANISH VERSION) IS USED IN THE SENSE OF
EMPLOYER WHICH IS NOT EQUAL TO A MANAGER OF A CORPORATION WHO IS ALSO
AN EMPLOYEE (DEPENDIENTE) OF THE CORPORATION.
The truck hit a minor, Marvin C Jayme, who was crossing the highway
who died. Complaint for damages was filed. Apostol and Simbulan (the
registered owner and possessor) claimed that Lozano took pick up
truck without consent. Mayor Miguel, Lozano ( passenger and driver),
and the Municipality of Korondal said that Marvins sudden sprint was
impossible to avoid. Miguel also said he wasnt in the car at the time.
ISSUES:
WON Miguel as an employer should be solidarily liable with the driver
Lozano?
WON Municipality of Korondal as employer is liable?
HELD/RULES:
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees
under Art 2180, the following requisites must be established:
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or
through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance
with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times;
(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him
(4) injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee
was performing his functions
AN EM-ER relationship must first be established by plaintiff through the
ff: (1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment of wages or
other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of
doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal
APPLICATION:
(1) NO, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the
vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal relationship
between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make
him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere
passenger at the time of the accident. Drivers duty is not one
that may be delegated to others.
(2) YES, municipality is the employer but it cannot be sued.
Municipality of Korondal is the employer since an employeremployee relationship still exists even if the employee was
loaned by the employer to another person or entity because
control over the employee subsists
However, the municipality cannot be sued because it is an
agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and,
hence, immune from suit. A municipality may only be liable if it
can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity.
NOTES:
-
SALUDAGA v FEU
April 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of
respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by
Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the
school premises.
Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against FEU on the ground
that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and
secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. FEU, in
turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation, the agency contracted by respondent FEU to
provide security services within its premises and Mariano D. Imperial,
Galaxy's President, to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged
in favor of Saludaga
ISSUES:
(1) WON FEU is Liable under contractual obligation?
(2) WON FEU is liable as the employer of the guards?
(3) WON FEUs president is solidarily liable with FEU?
HELD:
(1) YES, liable under Art 1170. As held in PSBA v CA, there is a
contract between the school and student for the school to provide an
environment conducive to studying and for the student to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Applied in this case, it was proven that a contractual obligation existed
between Saludaga and FEU, Saludaga being a 2nd year law student.
He was shot by the security guard hired to maintain peace and secure
the premises, a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply
with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment to its
students. FEU failed to show it exercised the required diligence of
ascertaining whether the security guards are actually capable of
providing the services they required and merely relied on the agency.
(2) NO, the security guard was employed by Galaxy. The instructions
issued by respondents' Security Consultant to Galaxy and its
security guards are requests commonly envisaged in the contract
for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They
cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat
respondents as the employers of the security guard.
(3) NO, A corporate director may only be liable if: (1) he assents to a
patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a
conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its
stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of
watered down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not
forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection
thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily
liable with the corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific provision
of law personally answerable for his corporate action.
NOTES:
-
CASTILEX vVASQUEZ
FACTS: Abad, a production manager of Castilex, was driving his
company-issued vehicle after office hours. He took a short cut in the
rotunda and went against the flow of traffic. As a result, he hit Vasquez,
who had a students permit, and on a motorcycle. Abad brought him to
5th paragraph
Employers, in general, WON
engaged in a business or industry
Encompasses negligent acts of
employees as long
as they were acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks
Notes:
Whats the rule if we combine 2180 (4) and (5) as regards the
liability of employer for the acts or omissions of employees?
Requisites to hold the employer liable for torts under 2180:
1. ER-EE relationship
2. Employee must be acting within the scope of his
assigned task
FILAMER v IAC
FACTS: Funtecha is a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer. Having a
drivers license, he requested Masa, driver and son of school president,
to let him drive them home where Funtecha also lives. Masa yielded
and on the way they hit a pedestrian, Kapunan, because Funtecha
swerved right to avoid a fast-moving truck. It appears that Agustin
Masa, school president, knew of the license.
ISSUE: WON Filamer is liable
HELD: YES. The clause within the scope of their by assigned
tasks for the purpose of raising the presumption of liability of an
employer includes any act done by the employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury. It is applicable even if the employee
derives some benefit from the act. In this case, Funtecha drove the
jeep not for his enjoyment but for the service of Filamer. The fact that
he was not the school driver is insignificant. Besides, Filamer did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family.
Presumptive liability of employer (when employee is driving a
company vehicle) is determined by answering
The question Does the servant at the time of the accident performing
any act in furtherance of his masters business?
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code,
provides guidelines on the exclusion of working scholars from the
employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned. It is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive
law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular
accident against a working student of a school and against the school
itself. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
muscle connected to the rest of her body) and had to be fitted with a
prosthetic leg.
ISSUE: WON Alexander was liable
HELD: YES. The relationship between Li and Alexander is Pater
familias not Respondeat superior, in which the ultimate liability falls
upon the employer. In this case, the Court averred the privilege of
using a company car serves 2 purposes: 1) Image of success; and 2)
Practical and utilitarian reasons (to reach clients conveniently). Thus,
the use of the car principally serves the business, the private purposes
and the goodwill of the company and only incidentally the private
purposes of the employee who uses the car. Li, an Asst. Manager of the
company, uses the car to facilitate meetings with clients. At the time of
the accident, he came from a co-employees place. The presumption is
they came from a company function or discussed work-related matters.
NOTES:
6. State
-not liable for acts of its officers, agents and employees (unless special
agent; and except when state acts as a juridical person capable of
acquiring rights and contracting obligations)
MERRIT v GOVERNMENT
FACTS: Plaintiff Merritt suffered severe injuries as his motorcycle
collided with a PGH ambulance due to the
negligence of the latters vehicles driver. The Government passed an
Act authorizing Merritt to sue
the Government.
ISSUE: WON the State is liable for damages
HELD: NO. Though the State waived its immunity from suit, it did not
concede liability to Merritt. The State is not liable for torts, except
when it acts through a special agent. In this case, the driver is not a
special agent within the contemplation of the law. Although the
accident was caused by a government employee, the State did not
undertake to guarantee to third persons the acts of all its employees
for that would subject the State to countless suits, which is subversive
to public interest. The State is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of the acts performed
by its employees pertaining to their office because neither fault nor
negligence can be presumed on the part of the State in the
organization of branches of public service and appointment of its
agents.
MEMORIZE:
Short version: A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if
he is a special official.
Long version: A special agent is one duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim
is based o n acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged
with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility.
NOTES:
In this case the chauffeur still was acting within his duty as a
driver when he hit Merritt
There must be another law to hold the state liable and in this
case, it is 1903 (2180)
Sir would take the case to not overturn the doctrine on bad
faith
SANGCO 228-233
According to Sir, the point of this case is that one may file a
criminal complaint and a civil one in one court and both could
proceed independently of each other.
Criminal case and civil case (for the same act) may proceed
independently of each other
CAPUNO v PEPSI
FACTS: A Pepsi delivery truck driven by Elordi collided with a private
car driven by Capuno. Capuno and his passengers, Buan spouses, died.
Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence.
While the case was pending, the estate and heirs of the Buan spouses
filed a separate complaint for damages against Pepsi and Elordi. The
parties in the latter case compromised so the case was dismissed.
Later, Capuno heirs filed a similar complaint.
ISSUE: WON the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations
HELD: YES. The case for recovery under a quasi-delict must be
instituted within 4 years from the accrual of the right of action.
Contrary to the Capunos assertion, the prescriptive period was not
interrupted by the filing of the criminal action inasmuch as they never
waived nor reserved to file the civil action separately. Anent Art. 33,
The Court said that it included bodily injury resulting in death.
NOTES:
BONITE v ZOSA
FACTS: Bonite, a caminero of the Bureau of Public Highways was hit by
a truck driven by Abamonga. Heirs filed a criminal complaint for
Homicide thru Recless Imprudence where Abamonga was subsequently
acquitted. The heirs then filed an action for recovery of damages but it
was dismissed because they did not reserve the right to file an
independent civil action.
ISSUE: WON the heirs may file a separate civil action
HELD: YES. The action was based on a quasi-delict. Art 29 does not
include any requirement that there must be an express reservation to
file a separate civil action.
Case Title
(Year)
Jervoso v. People
(1990)
Facts
(1) Pamaus saw Marcelo Jervoso, in the
presence of his spouse and co-appellant
Norma Closa, stab victim Rogelio Jervoso,
with a pisao while the latter's back was
turned on the assailant.
(2) Marcelo and Norma pleaded selfdefense which was not given credence
(3) The courts found Marcelo guilty and
ordered him to pay P30,000 civil
indemnity to the heirs of Rogelio.
(4) Marcelo avers that the award against
him was not proper since Rogelio's heirs
reserved their right to file a separate
action against him.
Issue(s)/Hel
d
Was the
award of
damages
against
Marcelo was
proper? NO
Ratio
Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court ordain that the offended
party may reserve his right to
institute a civil action separately
from the criminal action, provided
that no double recovery of
damages from the same act or
omission of the accused may not
be had.
Doctrine
"Physical injuries" as
contemplated in CC33
includes homicide committed
in the consummated,
attempted or frustrated
degrees.
Also: Thou shalt not recover
damages more than once for the
same act or omission complained
of.
Will the
independent
civil action
against
Superguard
prosper? YES
Facts
(1) Commercial Air Lines (CALI)
purchased supplies from the Shell Co. of
the P.I. ever since the former began
operations.
(2) Shell Philippines believed CALI was
insolvent and will be unable to pay what
the latter has bought from the former.
Issue(s)/Hel
d
(1) Did Shell
Philippines
betray the
trust of CALI?
YES
(2) By reason
of this
betrayal, is
Shell
Philippines
liable to
answer for
damages?
YES
Ratio
Shell's transfer of its
aforementioned credit would have
been justified only if Mr. Fitzgerald
(of Shell) had declined to take
part in the Working Committee
and frankly and honestly informed
the other creditors present that he
had no authority to bind his
principal and that the latter was
to be left free to collect its credit
from CALI by whatever means his
principal deemed wise and were
available to it. Shell is liable for
damages under CC21 in relation
to CC19.
Doctrine
CC19's provision, while it may
only be a mere declaration of
principle, such is implemeted by
CC21. A moral wrong or injury,
even if it does not constitute a
violation of a statute law, should
be compensated by damages.
Moral damages (CC2217) may be
recovered (CC2219). In CC20, the
liability for damages arises from a
willful or negligent act contrary to
law. In this article, the act is
contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.
Was there an
abuse of
rights by
Hendry? YES
Was there an
abuse of
rights or
malicious
prosecution?
NEITHER
Albenson
Enterprises v.
Court of Appeals
(1993)
Is Amonoy
liable for
damages to
the
Gutierrezes?
YES
Can an
educational
institution
may be held
liable for
damages for
misleading a
student into
believing that
the latter had
satisfied all
the
requirements
for
graduation
when such is
not the case?
YES
(1) Was there
an abuse of
rights here
by Phelps?
NO
University of the
East v. Jader
(2000)
Barons Marketing
v. Court of
Appeals (1998)
(2) Is Barons
liable to pay
interest and
attorney's
fees? YES
Diaz v. Davao
Light & Power
Corp. (2007)
Is Diaz
entitled to
damages
under CC19,
20, 21 and
2217? NO
Wassmer v. Velez
(1964)
Is Velez liable
for the cost
of wedding
preparations
by Wassmer?
YES
Tanjanco v.
Santos (1966)
Does CC21
apply here?
Baksh v. Court of
Appeals (1993)
Pe v. Pe (1962)
NO
Does CC21
apply here?
YES
Can the
defendant be
held liable
under CC21?
YES
Was Que
guilty of
malicious
prosecution?
NO
Drilon v. Court of
Appeals (2001)
Magbanua v.
Junsay (2007)
Are damages
properly
awarded
against
Grand Union?
YES
Carpio v.
Valmonte (2004)
Are Carpio's
imputations
against
Valmonte
damna
absque
injuriaethat
would bar
Valmonte's
recovery for
damages?
NO
Quisaba v. Sta.
Ines-Melale
Veneer and
Plywood (1974)
Is Quisaba's
complaint
based on an
employeremployee
relationship
which brings
his case
under the
coverage of
the
jurisdiction of
the NLRC?
NO
Is Garcia
liable for
damages?
YES
Is St. Louis
Realty liable
for damages?
YES
Gregorio v. Court
of Appeals (2009)
Is Gregorio's
complaint
based on
quasi-delict
or malicious
prosecution?
Quasi-delict
Test: when the conditions provided in the law exist, you are
already liable
".
CC26.
A. Possessor of animals
Art. 2183, NCC
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
VESTIL v IAC
FACTS:
NOTES:
NOTES:
Who are they liable to? Anyone who consumed goods (even if
goods were stolen)
Consumer Act
market
Can RES IPSA LOQUITUR apply? Only if the defect in the items
is of such nature and character that do not change.
COCA-COLA v CA
FACTS: Geronimo sold food and softdrinks in a school canteen. A
group of parents complained that fibrous materials were found in the
softdrink bottles bought by their children. Upon inspection by the
DOH, the bottles were found to be adulterated. The sales of Geronimo
drastically dropped and she was forced to close shop. She brought an
action for damages against Coca-cola and the trial court ruled that the
complaint was based on a contract, not quasi-delict and should have
been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the softdrinks.
Geronimo argues that her case is based on quasi-delict and should
prescribe in 4 years.
HELD: The Court sided with Geronimo. The vendees remedies against
a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or
encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed
in A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract
upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable.
NOTES:
What if the person who consumed the goods did not buy them
but stole them? The manufacturer/processor may still be held
liable.
II SANGCO (p. 714-734)
Product Liability
If it falls under A2187, can you still sue for breach of contract?
Sangco says, yes.
E. Interference with contractual relations
Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
GILCHRIST v CUDDY
FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the
owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby
Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for
a week for P125.
-Days before the delivery date, Cuddy returned the money already paid
by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga
instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period.
-Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo
and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and
Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and
Cuddy.
ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga are liable for interfering with the
contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time
the identity of the parties
HELD: YES, Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the
contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts
and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist.
-ART 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged
to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which
requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that
he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No
such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover
for the damages suffered.
NOTES:
SO PING BUN v CA
FACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease agreement
with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially
for 1 year but were continued on month to month basis upon
expiration of the 1 yr. Tek Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek
Hua formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong as one of the
incorporators. However, the stalls were occupied by the grandson (So
Ping Bun) of one of the original incorporators of Tek Hua under
business name Trendsetter Marketing.
-new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to THE, although
not signed.
-THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the stalls so THE
would be able to go back to business BUT instead, SO PING BUN
SECURED A NEW LEASE AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN.
ISSUE: WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of
contract
HELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect
for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the
enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the case at bar,
petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in
its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latters
property right.
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered.
- One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory
invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset
if: a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the
use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the
defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is
either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under the general negligence rules.
- elements of tort interference:
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or
excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC
Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The
action of Trendsetter in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in
their favor was unlawful interference.
LAGON v. CA
FACTS: there was a contract of lease between Sepi and Lapuz where
latter is to construct commercial buildings, sublease it and pay the
lease via his collection. However, while said lease was in force, Sepi
sold the land to Lagon. Lapuz sued Lagon for interfering with his
leasehold rights.
HELD: Lagon is not liable. Elements of tortuous interference are
absent. Lagon had no knowledge of the renewed lease because the
owners did not tell him and the title had no indication of lease. There
was no inducement on the part of Lagon because the heirs sold in on
their own volition. There was also no malice because it was merely for
the advancement of Lagons financial interests, thus precluding
recovery of damages.
AQUINO, (pp. 795-801)
Interference with contracts:
A. Statutory provision and rationale: Under Article 1314 of the
Civil Code, a third party may sue a third party not for breach of
contract but for inducing another to commit such breach. This tort is
Can last clear chance apply? Wasnt it Guilatcos fault that she
was negligent in alighting a tricycle? No because it is under
strict liability.
Sir said it is wise to apply this to the case of PLDT and the
accident mound case (DACARA)
G. Liability of proprietors of buildings and engineers
and architects of collapsed building
NOTES:
Art. 2205 provides for the kinds of AD which the plaintiff may
recover
For actual damages, the party making claim must present best
evidence (original documents).
II. Kinds of Damages
A. Actual or compensatory
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be
adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones,
is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of
each case.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual
or compensatory damages.
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the
value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee
failed to obtain.
1. Kinds
PNOC v. CA
FACTS: The M/V Ma. Efigenia XV, owned by respondent Ma. Efigenia
Fishing Corp. collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was
owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Co. The Board of Marine Inquiry
rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault and thus the
respondent filed an action for damages against Luzon Stevedoring and
the Petroparcels captain. During the pendency of the case, petitioner
PNOC acquired the Petroparcel and was substituted in place of Luzon
Stevedoring in the complaint.
HELD: ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE THOSE AWARDED IN
SATISFACTION OF, OR IN RECOMPENSE FOR LOSS OR INJURY SUSTAINED.
THEY PROCEED FROM A SENSE OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND ARE DESIGNED TO
REPAIR THE WRONG THAT HAS BEEN DONE, TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INJURY
INFLICTED AND NOT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY.
In actions based on QD-AD include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of.
2 kinds of AD or CD:
1. The loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente)
2. the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have
pertained to him (lucro cesante)
On Nominal Damages:
When awarded: in the absence of competent proof on the AD
suffered-entitled to ND, which the law says is adjudicated in order that
a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
-awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasicontracts, acts or omissions punished by law and QDs, or in every case
where property right has been invaded.
Art. 2201 lays down the distinction between good faith and bad
faith (in bad faithwhatever damage happens)
Forseeability:
In elements: may be required
In damages: not required
3. Certainty
-possible that the exact value (peso) is not known.
PNOC v. CA
FACTS: Collision of 2 vessels
Certainty: to enable an injured party to recover AD or CD, he is
required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree
of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence available.
Burden of Proof: on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
would be presented on either side.
Evidence Required: He must establish his evidence by
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, which means that the evidence, as
a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
Damages are not presumed: damages cannot be presumed and
courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever CD or AD are borne.
NOTES:
Civil Indemnity for Death is normally P75k and for Rape, P50k
PEOPLE v. ASTROLOGO
HELD: Civil indemnity due to a crime (rape) is in the nature of actual
damages and is mandatorily granted to upon proving of the fact of the
crime. It is granted without any need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.
NOTES:
AS regards the gen rule and exception, sir said it can be BOTH
PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the same was not given due
course because it was supposedly filed out of time. The trial court
thereafter issued a writ of execution.
A petition was filed before the IAC to compel the trial court to give due
course to the appeal. However, the petition was dismissed and so the
case was elevated to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Dr.
Casasola died leaving his widow and several children.
After Casasolas death, Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the
confirmation of his attorneys fees alleging that there was an oral
agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to the
said fees and allegedly confirmed by his widow in writing.
The trial court granted the motion despite opposition thereto hence the
instant petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the attorneys fees being claimed are the same
attorneys fees contemplated in article 2208 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. What is being claimed here as attorneys fees is different
from attorneys fees as an item of damages provided under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the
litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the
judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorneys fees
by execution.
His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified
that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was
affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to
make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in
awarding moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the
accident show that no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing
attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly
scornful reference" was given her.
The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may
be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was
subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge
of his or her social and financial standing.
Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to Petitioner
Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the
scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo
several corrective operations and treatments. Despite treatment and
surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that she has not
fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo a second
operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleepless
nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident.
RULES:
When social & financial standing may be considered in
awarding MD: only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous
conduct despite the offenders knowledge of his or her social and
financial standing.
On Exemplary Damages:
-designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public
policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot
be recovered as a matter of rightit is based entirely on the discretion
of the court.
Requirements before ED may be awarded:
1. by way of example or correction in addition to CD
2. claimant must 1st establish his right to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages; &
3. the wrongful act must be accompanied by BF, and the
award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
On Moral Damages:
NOTES:
Sir: Only refers to QD and it does not apply to delict and culpacontractual
EXPERTRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. v. CA
June 25, 1999
FACTS: Expertravel issued to respondent Ricardo Lo (Ricky Lo!
Showbiz!) four round-trip plane tickets to Hong Kong, together with
hotel accommodations and transfers for a total cost of P39, 677.20.
Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused
several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo,
Expertravel filed a complaint for recovery of the amount.
Respondent Lo answered that his account with Expertravel had already
been fully paid. The account had been remitted to Expertravel through
its then Chairperson Ma. Rocio de Vega who was theretofore authorized
to deal with the respondents clients.
The trial court found for the respondent and held that the amount
claimed by Expertravel had already been paid.
ISSUE: WON damages can be recovered by reason of a clearly
unfounded suit.
2.
HELD: Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can
at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney's fees
(Enervida vs. Dela Torre), such filing, however, has almost invariably
been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages.
*Rationale for the rule: THE LAW COULD NOT HAVE MEANT TO IMPOSE A
PENALTY ON THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE. THE ANGUISH SUFFERED BY A PERSON FOR
HAVING BEEN MADE A DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL SUIT WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM
THE USUAL WORRY AND ANXIETY SUFFERED BY ANYONE WHO IS HALED TO COURT, A
SITUATION THAT CANNOT BY ITSELF BE A COGENT REASON FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES.
If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be
awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful
plaintiff.
Nature of MD: not punitive, but are designed to compensate and
alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a
person.
Amount of MD: though incapable of pecuniary estimation, must be
PROPORTIONAL TO AND IN APPROXIMATION OF THE SUFFERING INFLICTED.
*REQUISITES OF MD:
1. THERE MUST
2.
3.
4.
must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should
exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid
suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the
part of the trial court.
-The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a
corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence
only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses,
It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish,
which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The
statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that
a corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation
that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On
this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is
a corporation.
-It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not
based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the
claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles
19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA G.R. NO. 148246. FEBRUARY 16, 2007
-The claimant in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, a juridical
person. We explained in Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical &
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM):
-GENERAL RULE: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral
damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience
physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious
anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
-the Court's statement in Mambulao that "a corporation may have a
good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the
award of moral damages" is an obiter dictum.
-EXCEPTION: Nevertheless, AMEC's claim for moral damages falls under
item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly
authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether
the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical
person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or
any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
- GENERAL RULE: A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages
under Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
-EXCEPTION: It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases
listed in Article 2219, such as for libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Suffice it to say that the action at bar does not involve any
of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed upon an
intelligent reading of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the Republic
could sustain any of the injuries contemplated therein.
SPS VALENZUELA VS SPS MANO JULY 9, 2010
-person claiming moral damages must prove bad faith
-willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive
-allege and prove 2217+ bad faith
only if the injured party has shown that he is entitled to recover moral,
temperate or compensatory damages."
-4% is not a penal clause because under 2209 he is still entitled to a
legal interest which is 6% per annum
FRANCISCO V. FERRER GR. NO. 142029
- wedding cake ordered was not delivered; delivered a two layered
cake instead.
-To warrant the award of exemplary damages, "[t]he wrongful act must
be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be
allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless
or malevolent manner."
-REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: (1) they
may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory
damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been
established; (2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right,
their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
or malevolent manner."
- "Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced
no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a
breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown.'"27
-Nominal damages may be awarded "to a plaintiff whose right has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of
vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered."28
GONZALES V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 159950. FEBRUARY 12, 2007
-Gonzales set fire on a building. He was charged with arson
-no proof of actual damages by each witness; however, nominal and
temperate damages were awarded
-The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the
trial court according to the circumstances of the case.
-Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by
the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured
party. However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a
substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such a
case, the law presumes damage although actual or compensatory
damages are not proven. In truth, nominal damages are damages in
name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of
wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical
injury.14
-Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the
nature of the case be proved with certainty
-only temperate damages were awarded
ratified the act of their employees and such act also shows bad faith.
Hence, Id corporation is able to pay exemplary damages.
RAMOS V. CA, SUPRA
-wrong intubation, commatose
-temperate damages were awarded on top of actual damages
- the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to
adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one
which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the
time of trial (ACTUAL DAMAGES); and one which would meet pecuniary
loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the
case, be made with certainty (TEMPERATE).
In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And
because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility
arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct
phases.
-As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best interests
of the administration of justice for the victim in such cases to
constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking
adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded
temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate
damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into
account the cost of proper care.
-Value awarded for temperate damages should allow petitioners to
provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally
specializes in such care. -They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of
professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate.
-Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of
the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY, SUPRA
-car was hit by a train, Brunty died
- Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages;
hence, the award of actual damages cannot be sustained. However,
as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses
for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to
award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual
damages as it would be unfair for the victims heirs to get
nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone
that they cannot produce receipts.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA, SUPRA