G.R. No.

101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO
and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II
and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her
parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by
his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE
KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR
and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented
by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT,
minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI),
a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the
protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the
Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1The complaint 2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and
fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in
order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size
of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of
rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource

productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for
the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or
four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of
the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of
deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and
suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work
great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by
the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning
their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the
same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of

them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection
of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For
although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking
to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a
matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water
and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment
of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and
apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration
and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh
to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are
legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should
be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants
or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation
of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court,
says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even
the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs
prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting
of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law
could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and
not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private
right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal,
no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004]

Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally
inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the
Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision [2] and July 29, 2003
Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).[4]
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief [5] filed before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent
Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin,
Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the
resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a
candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or
spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x.[6]
Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a
Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion
for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:
x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are
violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress
from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take, is direct appeal under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court. [7]

The Antecedent Proceedings

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition) before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his
aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,[8] specifically on
the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:
x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao
Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano,
filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the
common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of
advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and

Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only
Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. x x x.
x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive
Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss x x x. [9]
After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the
Petition] has raised only a question of law.[10] It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation
of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a
quo opined at some point that the [e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the
separation clause.[11]
After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus,
Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.
Hence, this Petition for Review.[12]
This Court, in a Resolution[13] dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their
respective comments. In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents in the original case below
--the opportunity to comment, if they so desired.
On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.[14]

The Issues
In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:
1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;
2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief;
3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;
4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination;
5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,
6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent.[15]
During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows:
A. Procedural Issues
Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have
any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?
B. Substantive Issues
1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?
2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public
office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?

The Courts Ruling

The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.

Procedural Issues:
Requisites of Petitions
for Declaratory Relief
Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief, provides in part:
Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or
other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of
the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or
duties thereunder.[16] The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.[17]

Justiciable Controversy
Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish before the trial court, that there existed a
justiciable controversy or an adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated or threatened
to be violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere speculations, contingent events, and
hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into an actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that
is conjectural or merely anticipatory.[18] The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an
existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state
what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in
breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment, [19] what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? He
confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) yields nothing in
this respect. His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003, the election season
had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively involved in partisan politics.
An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts
on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x.[20] Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his corespondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or
threatened endorsement will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders,
enabling them to control the government[;][21] and pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the peoples faith in the
electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections, [22] which would then be
violative of the separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable
controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to
champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored
rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation
that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable [23] cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a
legal right.
All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved. [24] In other words, it
merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political
offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and
duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from
rendering an advisory opinion.[25]

Cause of Action
Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause of action need not be alleged or
proven. Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual wrong committed by
one party against the other.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, a contract
(or other written instrument), a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the subject matter of the SJS Petition is the
constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or to urge or require the
members of the flock to vote for a specified candidate. [26] According to petitioner, this subject matter is beyond the realm of an action for
declaratory relief.[27] Petitioner avers that in the absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence,
should have been dismissed outright by the court a quo.
A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter.
Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.[29]
[28]

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal. [30] However, in special civil actions for
declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is
that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder.[31]Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.
A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor
that it sought to protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it has thousands of members
who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the
partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x
x x.[32]
Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not
personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain. [33]The Rules require that the interest must be material to
the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question
raised.[34]
To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that the [p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment action does
not seek to enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the parties for the purpose of
guiding [their] future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that no actual
wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no
uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded.[35]

SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference that there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that
the asserted rights will be invaded. Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-respondents
below) might actively participate in partisan politics, use the awesome voting strength of its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to
public office x x x, enabling [it] to control the government.[36]
During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-respondents below all strongly asserted that they had not in any
way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics. They all firmly assured this Court that they had not done anything to trigger
the issue raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought.
Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief
from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was
nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to
the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be
jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

Legal Standing
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. [37] Interestmeans a material interest in issue that is affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.[38]
Petitioner alleges that [i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse, or require
the members of the religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy; [39] it
has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show not only that the law [or act] is
invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way.[40] They must demonstrate that they have been, or are
about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.[41]
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
money raised by taxation.[42] A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.[43] In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers money is being illegally
disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered
voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was
no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege
that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking.
Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters is too general [44] and
beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.[45]

Transcendental Importance
In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal standing, considering that the issues raised
are of paramount public interest.
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental
significance or paramount importance to the people.[46] Recently, after holding that the IBP had no locus standi to bring the suit, the
Court in IBP v. Zamora[47] nevertheless entertained the Petition therein. It noted that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.[48]
Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition to be of paramount interest to the
Filipino people. The issue did not simply concern a delineation of the separation between church and state, but ran smack into the
governance of our country. The issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in nature, since it had never been decided
before.
The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve the constitutional issue despite the
barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels
for the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply the deficiencies
hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort
would be futile because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

Proper Proceedings Before

the Trial Court
To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court
reiterates the elementary procedure[49] that must be followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil cases.[50]
Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss a complaint [51] (or petition, in a special
civil action) that does not allege the plaintiffs (or petitioners) cause or causes of action. [52] A complaint or petition should contain a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense. [53] It should likewise clearly
specify the relief sought.[54]

Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding summons to the defendants or the respondents, with a directive that the defendant answer [55] within 15 days, unless a
different period is fixed by the court.[56] The summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners
shall take a judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for. [57] The court, however, may -- upon such terms as may be
just -- allow an answer to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules.[58]
If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered within ten (10) days from service. [59] A reply may be
filed within ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded to.[60]
When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal
separation).[61] Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief -may, at any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a summary judgment in its favor. [62] Similarly, a party against whom
a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in
its favor.[63] After the motion is heard, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to the amount
of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[64]
Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss based
on any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit
their arguments on the questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact. [65] After the hearing, the court may dismiss the
action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason
that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.[66]
If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the period originally prescribed to file an answer, but
not less than five (5) days in any event, computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended,
the defendant shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides
a longer period.[67]
After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for pretrial, [68] which is a mandatory proceeding.[69] A
plaintiffs/ petitioners (or its duly authorized representatives) non-appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the
dismissal of the action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be a cause
for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte, and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.[70]
The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial.
Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the conference; the action taken
on them, the amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by the parties regarding any of the
matters considered.[72] The parties may further avail themselves of any of the modes of discovery,[73] if they so wish.
[71]

Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial, [74] in which the parties shall adduce their respective evidence in support of their claims
and/or defenses. By their written consent or upon the application of either party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or
all of the issues to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the parties. [75] The trial or hearing
before the commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.[76]
Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with the court a written report on the matters referred by the
parties.[77] The report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in
part; or recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the court.[78]
Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally
and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.[79]
Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before the trial court in the instant case.
First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petition immediately reveals its gross
inadequacy. It contained no statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner relied for its claim. Furthermore, it did not specify the
relief it sought from the court, but merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.
Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the rights of a
plaintiff or a petitioner.[80] As already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial court had no allegations of fact [81] or of any specific
violation of the petitioners rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency amounted to a failure to state a cause of
action; hence, no coercive relief could be sought and adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we
repeat, should have been dismissed at the outset.
Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to file their respective answers to the SJS Petition,
Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a priorly granted extended
period, an Answer in which he likewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. [82] SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of Velarde, who
subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were several scheduled settings, in which the [c]ourt was apprised of the
respective positions of the parties.[83] The nature of such settings -- whether pretrial or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in the
records. Before ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order [84] dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit
their memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was another Order[85] dated May 14, 2003, denying all the Motions to Dismiss.
In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:
The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the memoranda are submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as submitted for
resolution.[86]
Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Motions were not heard. Worse, the
Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the
said Rule 16. There was not even any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the legal findings and
conclusions of the trial court.
Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of these Motions for Reconsideration,
Villanueva filed a Motion to suspend the filing of the parties memoranda. But instead of separately resolving the pending Motions fairly
and squarely, the trial court again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to issue its Decision, even before
tackling the issues raised in those Motions.

Furthermore, the RTC issued its Decision without allowing the parties to file their answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of
the issues. If only it had allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed, that the
petitioner and his co-respondents below had not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -the act that was supposedly the factual basis of the suit.
Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition to the OSG, which was entitled to be heard upon
questions involving the constitutionality or validity of statutes and other measures.[87]
Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the trial court was utterly wanting in the requirements
prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with total
ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with grave abuse of discretion.
Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must still follow the process described
above -- the petition must state a cause of action; the proceedings must undergo the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court; and the
decision must adhere to constitutional and legal requirements.

First Substantive Issue:

Fundamental Requirements
of a Decision
The Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the basis therefor.[88]
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides:
Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court.
In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based.
x x x x x x x x x.
Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all judges to
make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions
are deduced.
In many cases,[89] this Court has time and time again reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of Appeals,[90] discussed at length the implications of
this provision and strongly exhorted thus:
Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair
play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor
of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he
may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party,
who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign
prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for
sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.
In People v. Bugarin,[91] the Court also explained:
The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they
are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of
them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. x x x.
Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as
well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.[92]
In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,[93] this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their decisions would present a
comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties.
In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts -- much less an assessment or
analysis thereof -- or of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the
action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the
Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a
full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she
has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.

What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the distinct facts that gave rise to the
question sought to be resolved by SJS? More important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its
legal findings and conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express
clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling
to similar circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown?Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the
future, if there is no point of factual comparison?
Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called Decision. The importance of such
portion was explained in the early case Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards,[94] from which we quote:
The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that
determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the
body of said order that may be confusing.
The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition. To recall, the original
Petition was for declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny?What rights of the parties did it conclusively
declare? Its final statement says, SO ORDERED. But what exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to label its issuance a
Decision, when nothing was in fact decided.
Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body of the assailed Decision. It claims that the issue is
disposed of and the Petition finally resolved by the statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page Decision, which reads:
Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.[95]
We cannot agree.
In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,[96] the obligation of the party imposed by the Court was allegedly contained in the text of the
original Decision. The Court, however, held:
x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is
settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the
dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. (Italics in the original)
Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page
10 of the assailed 14-page Decision. If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the
opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant
any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down
as void.[97]

Parts of a Decision
In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3)
issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5)
dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in
which controversial or novel issues are involved.[98]
An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some
cases -- particularly those concerning public interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject
matters -- a longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific nature of the controversy and the issues
involved. An epilogue may be a summation of the important principles applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public
interest or significance. It may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law or guiding principle.
Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good decision.
1. Statement of the Case
The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. At the first instance, this part states whether
the action is a civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a criminal case, this part
describes the specific charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information -- and the plea of the accused. Also
mentioned here are whether the case is being decided on appeal or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in
the trial court, and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision.
In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide in determining the nature and the
gravity of the offense for which the accused may be found culpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime different
from or graver than that charged.
Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a question on the sufficiency of the charge,
or on whether qualifying and modifying circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.
To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of the proceedings regarding the plea of the
accused. Absence of an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the
appellate court would be futile. In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be useful to mention the fact of the
appellants detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary query -- whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or
jumping bail.
Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in facilitating the consolidation of the records of the
case in both the trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.

Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the reader of how the appealed case was decided
by the court a quo.
2. Statement of Facts
There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the objective or reportorial method, the judge summarizes -without comment -- the testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the synthesis method, the factual
theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized according to the judges best light. Third,
in the subjective method, the version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining what the parties versions
are. Finally, through a combination of objective and subjective means, the testimony of each witness is reported and the judge then
formulates his or her own version of the facts.
In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense, in the interest of fairness and
due process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow. The resolution of most criminal cases, unlike civil and
other cases, depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence. The plausibility or the implausibility of
each version can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings
and conclusions should be explained.
On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly resolved all factual and legal issues
involved may partly explain why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the former. Conversely,
the lower courts patent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a better understanding of why its ruling is
reversed or modified.
In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for resolution usually involve questions
of law, grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by the parties. With few
exceptions, factual issues are not entertained in non-criminal cases. Consequently, the narration of facts by the lower court, if
exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced; otherwise, the material factual antecedents should be restated in the words of the reviewing
magistrate.
In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should be laid out, in order that the parties
may clearly understand why the lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds no reason to reverse it or
concludes otherwise.
3. Issues or Assignment of Errors
Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors, as mentioned in the appellants brief, may be
reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on the ground that the court
failed to consider all assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But when the appellant presents repetitive issues or
when the assigned errors do not strike at the main issue, these may be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.
Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial
justice to be rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are given de novoreview, in contrast to noncriminal cases in which the
reviewing court is generally limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are errors of jurisdiction; questions not
raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision on the case; or unassigned errors that are closely related to those properly assigned,
or upon which depends the determination of the question properly raised.
4. The Courts Ruling
This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition or appeal, as the case may be;
as well as of other issues the court deems essential to a just disposition of the case. Where there are several issues, each one of them
should be separately addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the parties should also be mentioned here.
When procedural questions are raised in addition to substantive ones, it is better to resolve the former preliminarily.
5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion
In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty
imposed, the participation of the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In case an acquittal is
decreed, the court must order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held for another cause) and
order the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from
notice, the exact date when the accused were set free.
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or
denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs. The following test of completeness may be applied. First, the parties should know their
rights and obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies. Third, there should be
no need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated by according the proper relief. The
proper relief usually depends upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their rights and duties, command the
performance of positive prestations, or order them to abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.
The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they should all be present and plainly identifiable in the
decision. Depending on the writers character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and free-flowing, not necessarily
stereotyped or in a fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious. At all times, however, the decision must be clear,
concise, complete and correct.

Second Substantive Issue:

Religious Leaders Endorsement
of Candidates for Public Office
The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be
of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious
procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that
there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.

Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the
paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting
the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral
Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were
there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it
merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.[99]
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final
disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or
even just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional
principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is
directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.[100]
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29,
2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are herebyDECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS
Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and recommend whether the trial judge
may, after observing due process, be held administratively liable for rendering a decision violative of the Constitution, the Rules of Court
and relevant circulars of this Court. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Petitioner,
-

versus -

CONRADO CRUZ, SANTIAGO P. GO, RENATO F.

BORBON, LEVVINO CHING, CARLOS C.
FLORENTINO, RUBEN G. BALLEGA, LOIDA ALCEDO,
MARIO M. CAJUCOM, EMMANUEL M. CALMA,
MANUEL A. RAYOS, WILMA L. CHUA, EUFEMIO S.
ALFONSO, JESUS M. LACANILAO, BONIFACIO N.
ALCAPA, JOSE H. SILVERIO, RODRIGO DEVELLES,
NIDA R. PAUNAN, MARIANO B. ESTUYE, JR., RAFAEL
C. AREVALO, ARTURO T. MANABAT, RICARDO O.
LIZARONDO, LETICIA C. MATURAN, RODRIGO A.
ALAYAN, LEONILO N. MIRANDA, DESEDERIO O.
MONREAL, FRANCISCO M. BAHIA, NESTOR R.
FORONDA, VICENTE B. QUE, JR., AURELIO A.
BILUAN, DANILO R. GATCHALIAN, LOURDES R. DEL
MUNDO, EMMA O. CALZADO, FELIMON DE LEON,
TANY V. CATACUTAN, AND CONCEPCION P. JAO,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 186616

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,I**
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,***
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
November 20, 2009
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128
(RTC), against the following highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):
Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of
this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided,
however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.Voluntary renunciation of office for any

length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
was elected.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The present petition, filed by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC decision.[1]

THE ANTECEDENTS

Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of
several barangays of Caloocan City[2] filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-highlighted
proviso, based on the following arguments:
I.
II.

The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of

the law.
III.

Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

The RTC agreed with the respondents contention that the challenged proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit
for barangay officials under the following reasoning:
When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect abrogating all other laws inconsistent therewith, a different term
was ordained. Here, this Court agrees with the position of the petitioners that Section 43 of the Code specifically
exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule considering that the provision
applicable to these (sic) class of elective officials was significantly separated from the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b)
thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed intended to qualify paragraph (a) of Section 43 as regards to (sic) all local elective officials
except barangayofficials. Had the intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to include barangay elective officials, then no
excepting proviso should have been expressly made in paragraph (a) thereof or, by implication, the contents of paragraph (c)
should have been stated ahead of the contents of paragraph (b).
xxxx
Clearly, the intent of the framers of the constitution (sic) is to exempt the barangay officials from the three (3) term limits (sic)
which are otherwise applicable to other elected public officials from the Members of the House of Representatives down to the
members of the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for the Congress whether the three (3) term limit should be applied by
enacting a law for the purpose.
The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 merely increased the term of office of barangay elective officials from three (3)
years to five (5) years. Like the Local Government Code, it can be noted that no consecutive term limit for the election
of barangay elective officials was fixed therein.
The advent of R.A. 9164 marked the revival of the consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials
after the Local Government Code took effect. Under the assailed provision of this Act, the term of office of barangay elective
officials reverted back to three (3) years from five (5) years, and, this time, the legislators expressly declared that
no barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. The petitioners are very
clear that they are not assailing the validity of such provision fixing the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for the election
of barangay elective officials to the same position. The particular provision the constitutionality of which is under attack is that
portion providing for the reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit of barangay elective officials beginning from the
1994 barangay elections.
xxx
Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A. 9164 is not a mere restatement of Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code. As
discussed above, Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code does not provide for the consecutive term limit rule
of barangay elective officials. Such specific provision of the Code has in fact amended the previous enactments (R.A. 6653 and
R.A. 6679) providing for the consecutive term limit rule ofbarangay elective officials. But, such specific provision of the Local
Government Code was amended by R.A. 9164, which reverted back to the previous policy of fixing consecutive term limits
of barangay elective officials. [3]

In declaring this retroactive application unconstitutional, the RTC explained that:

By giving a retroactive reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for barangay officials to the
1994 barangay elections, Congress has violated not only the principle of prospective application of statutes but also the equal
protection clause of the Constitution inasmuch as the barangay elective officials were singled out that their consecutive term
limit shall be counted retroactively. There is no rhyme or reason why the consecutive limit for these barangay officials shall be
counted retroactively while the consecutive limit for other local and national elective officials are counted prospectively. For if
the purpose of Congress is [sic] to classify elective barangay officials as belonging to the same class of public officers whose
term of office are limited to three (3) consecutive terms, then to discriminate them by applying the proviso retroactively violates
the constitutionally enshrined principle of equal protection of the laws.

Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to determine such successive term limit of barangay elective officials, the
exercise of the authority granted shall not otherwise transgress other constitutional and statutory privileges.
This Court cannot subscribe to the position of the respondent that the legislature clearly intended that the provision of RA No.
9164 be made effective in 1994 and that such provision is valid and constitutional. If we allow such premise, then the term of
office for those officials elected in the 1997 barangay elections should have ended in year 2000 and not year 2002 considering
that RA No. 9164 provides for a three-year term ofbarangay elective officials. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524
would be rendered nugatory in view of such retroactive application. This is absurd and illusory.
True, no person has a vested right to a public office, the same not being property within the contemplation of constitutional
guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the petition would show that the petitioners are not claiming vested right to their office
but their right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by the assailed provision of the law that, in effect,
rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Such right to run for office and be voted for by the electorate is the
right being sought to be protected by assailing the otherwise unconstitutional provision.
Moreover, the Court likewise agrees with the petitioners that the law violated the one-act-one subject rule embodied in the
Constitution.
x
x
x
x
The
challenged
laws
title
is
AN
ACT
PROVIDING
FOR
THE
SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT 7160
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. x x x x
xxxx
To this court, the non-inclusion in the title of the act on the retroactivity of the reckoning of the term limits posed a serious
constitutional breach, particularly on the provision of the constitution [sic] that every bill must embrace only one subject to be
expressed in the title thereof.
x x x the Court is of the view that the affected barangay officials were not sufficiently given notice that they were already
disqualified by a new act, when under the previous enactments no such restrictions were imposed.
Even if this Court would apply the usual test in determining the sufficiency of the title of the bill, the challenged law would still
be insufficient for how can a retroactivity of the term limits be germane to the synchronization of an election x x x x. [4]

The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law.

The Petition

The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local
Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the
COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws
which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no
vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.

The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves the wisdom of the law the aspect of the law
that the RTC has no right to inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers principle. The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no
violation of the one subject-one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is actually embraced within the
title of the law.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition meritorious. The RTC legally erred when it declared the challenged proviso unconstitutional.

Preliminary Considerations

We find it appropriate, as a preliminary matter, to hark back to the pre-1987 Constitution history of the barangay political system as
outlined by this Court in David v. COMELEC,[5] and we quote:
As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. The word barangay is
derived from the Malay balangay, a boat which transported them (the Malays) to these shores. Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a
Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Benitez wrote that the barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised absolute
powers of government. While the Spaniards kept thebarangay as the basic structure of government, they stripped
the dato or rajah of his powers. Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general and locally in
the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de
barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a
mere government employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter how low, accepted the post.
After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as barrios. For some time, the laws
governing barrio governments were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised Administrative

Code of 1917. Barrios were granted autonomy by the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasimunicipal corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were declared or
renamed barangays -- a reversion really to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No. 557. Their basic organization
and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly adopted as the Barangay Charter, were retained. However, the titles of the
officials were changed to barangay captain, barangay councilman, barangay secretary and barangay treasurer.
Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and
six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer and members of
the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six years
which began on June 7, 1982.
The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of office of local elective officials at six years. Under this
Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the punong barangay, six electivesangguniang barangay members,
the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.
B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated that barangay officials shall hold office for six years, and stated
that their election was to be held on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six
years thereafter. [Emphasis supplied.]

The 1987 Philippine Constitution extended constitutional recognition to barangays under Article X, Section 1 by specifying barangays as
one of the territorial and political subdivisions of the country, supplemented by Section 8 of the same Article X, which provides:
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected. [Emphasis supplied.]

The Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 8 show that the authority of Congress to legislate relates not only to the fixing of the term
of office of barangay officials, but also to the application of the three-term limit. The following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission are
particularly instructive on this point:
MR. NOLLEDO: One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office
of barangay officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE: As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO: As provided for in the Local Government Code?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to this proposed new section as submitted by
Commissioner Davide and accepted by the Committee?
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more than three consecutive terms apply
to barangay officials?
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office did not include
the barangay officials because it was then the stand of the Chairman of the
Committee on Local Governments that the term of barangay officials must be
determined by law. So it is now for the law to determine whether the restriction on
the number of reelections will be included in the Local Government Code.
MR. RODRIGO: So that is up to Congress to decide.
MR. DAVIDE: Yes.
MR. RODRIGO: I just wanted that clear in the record.[6] [Emphasis supplied.]

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the barangay election originally scheduled by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881[7] on the second
Monday of May 1988 was reset to the second Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter by RA No. 6653.[8] Section 2 of RA No.
6653 changed the term of office of barangay officials and introduced a term limitation as follows:
SEC. 2. The term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years from the first day of January following their
election. Provided, however, That no kagawad shall serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms . [Emphasis supplied]

Under Section 5 of RA No. 6653, the punong barangay was to be chosen by seven kagawads from among themselves, and they in turn, were to be
elected at large by the barangay electorate. Thepunong barangay, under Section 6 of the law, may be recalled for loss of confidence by an absolute
majority vote of the Sangguniang Barangay, embodied in a resolution that shall necessarily include the punong barangays successor.

The election date set by RA No. 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was postponed yet again to March 28, 1989 by RA No.
6679 whose pertinent provision states:
SEC. 1. The elections of barangay officials set on the second Monday of November 1988 by Republic Act No. 6653
are hereby postponed and reset to March 28, 1989. They shall serve a term which shall begin on the first day of May 1989
and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994.
There shall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the same day
every five (5) years thereafter. Their term shall be for five (5) years which shall begin on the first day of June following the
election and until their successors shall have been elected and qualified: Provided, That no barangay official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms.
The barangay elections shall be nonpartisan and shall be conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.

Significantly, the manner of election of the punong barangay was changed

Section 5 of the law provided that while the seven kagawads were to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay, (t)he candidate who obtains
the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the supervision of the
Commission on Elections.

More than two (2) years after the 1989 barangay elections, RA No. 7160 (the LGC) introduced the following changes in the law:
SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong barangay shall be elected at large x x x by the qualified voters
therein.
SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code
shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that of
elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years,
which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven
(7) sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and abarangay treasurer.
xxxxxxxxx
SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of
the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sanguniang barangaymembers elected at large and
the sanguniang kabataan chairman as members. [Emphasis supplied.]

This law started the direct and separate election of the punong barangay by the qualified voters in the barangay and not by the seven
(7) kagawads from among themselves.[9]

Subsequently or on February 14, 1998, RA No. 8524 changed the three-year term of office of barangay officials under Section 43 of the
LGC to five (5) years. On March 19, 2002, RA No. 9164 introduced the following significant changes: (1) the term of office of barangay officials
was again fixed at three years on the reasoning that the barangay officials should not serve a longer term than their supervisors; [10] and (2) the
challenged proviso, which states that the 1994 election shall be the reckoning point for the application of the three-term limit, was
introduced.Yet another change was introduced three years after or on July 25, 2005 when RA No. 9340 extended the term of the then
incumbent barangay officials due to expire at noon of November 30, 2005 under RA No. 9164 to noon of November 30, 2007. The three-year term
limitation provision survived all these changes.

Congress Plenary Power to

Legislate Term Limits for Barangay Officials and Judicial Power

In passing upon the issues posed to us, we clarify at the outset the parameters of our powers.

As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine
by legislation not only the duration of the term ofbarangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term limit. Congress invariably
exercised this authority when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.

Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of the term of office of barangay officials
and their term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine the term
duration and limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these
matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny,[11] subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution. [12]

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. [13] These questions, previously impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be inquired
into under the limited window provided by Section 1, Article VIII. Estrada v. Desierto[14] best describes this constitutional development, and we
quote:
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government.Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution
directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync
and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. xxxx

Thus, we can inquire into a congressional enactment despite the political question doctrine, although the window provided us is narrow; the challenge
must show grave abuse of discretion to justify our intervention.

Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any provision of the Constitution. This
requires the appraisal of the challenged law against the legal standards provided by the Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the
enactment. To justify its nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or equivocal one, as every law
enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality.[15] These are the hurdles that those challenging the constitutional validity of a law must overcome.

The present case, as framed by the respondents, poses no challenge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion. The legal issues posed relate
strictly to compliance with constitutional standards.It is from this prism that we shall therefore resolve this case.
The Retroactive Application Issue

a. Interpretative / Historical Consideration

The respondents first objection to the challenged provisos constitutionality is its purported retroactive application of the three-term limit
when it set the 1994 barangay elections as a reckoning point in the application of the three-term limit.

The respondents argued that the term limit, although present in the previous laws, was not in RA No. 7160 when it amended all
previous barangay election laws. Hence, it was re-introduced for the first time by RA No. 9164 (signed into law on March 19, 2002) and was applied
retroactively when it made the term limitation effective from the 1994 barangay elections. As the appealed ruling quoted above shows, the RTC fully
agreed with the respondents position.

Our first point of disagreement with the respondents and with the RTC is on their position that a retroactive application of the term
limitation was made under RA No. 9164. Our own reading shows that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been
there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC
and can still be found in the current law. We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law.

The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After
only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679(1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent
imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the
LGC followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials. We differ with the
RTC analysis of this issue.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide range
of subject matters, all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession (Chapter
II), c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III).

These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary application
is provided with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply
to barangay officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a general rule,
the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce
include barangay officials.

An alternative perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as independently standing and self-contained
provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials,
except barangay officials whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by its express terms, relates to all local elective
officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification.

Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section 43 in the context in which
it is found in Title II of the LGC.

To be sure, it may be argued, as the respondents and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 43 are the general law for elective
officials (other than barangay officials); and paragraph (c) is the specific law on barangay officials, such that the silence of paragraph (c) on term
limitation for barangay officials indicates the legislative intent to exclude barangay officials from the application of the three-term limit. This
reading, however, is flawed for two reasons.

First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the exclusion of Section 43(c), is not justified by the plain texts of these provisions. Section
43(a) plainly refers to local elective officials, except elective barangay officials. In comparison, Section 43(b) refers to all local elective officials
without exclusions or exceptions. Their respective coverages therefore vary so that one cannot be said to be of the same kind as the other. Their
separate topics additionally strengthen their distinction; Section 43(a) refers to the term of office while Section 43(b) refers to the three-term
limit. These differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be read together as one organic whole in the way the RTC suggested.
Significantly, these same distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c).

Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of its total disregard of the historical background of Section 43(c) a backdrop that we
painstakingly outlined above.

From a historical perspective of the law, the inclusion of Section 43(c) in the LGC is an absolute necessity to clarify the length of term
of barangay officials. Recall that under RA No. 6679, the term of office of barangay officials was five (5) years. The real concern was how Section
43 would interface with RA No. 6679. Without a categorical statement on the length of the term of office of barangay officials, a general three-year
term for all local elective officials under Section 43(a), standing alone, may not readily and completely erase doubts on the intended abrogation of the
5-year term for barangay officials under RA No. 6679. Thus, Congress added Section 43(c) which provided a categorical three-year term for these

officials. History tells us, of course, that the unequivocal provision of Section 43(c) notwithstanding, an issue on what is the exact term of office
of barangay officials was still brought to us via a petition filed by no less than the President of theLiga ng Mga Barangay in 1997. We fully resolved
the issue in the cited David v. Comelec.

Section 43(c) should therefore be understood in this context and not in the sense that it intended to provide the complete rule for the
election of barangay officials, so that in the absence of any term limitation proviso under this subsection, no term limitation applies
to barangay officials. That Congress had the LGCs three-term limit in mind when it enacted RA No. 9164 is clear from the following deliberations in
the House of Representatives (House) on House Bill No. 4456 which later became RA No. 9164:
MARCH 5, 2002:
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Majority Leader.
REP. ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker, next to interpellate is the Gentleman from Zamboanga City. I ask that the Honorable Lobregat
be recognized.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). The Honorable Lobregat is recognized.
REP. LOBREGAT. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker, this is just
REP. MACIAS. Willingly to the Gentleman from Zamboanga City.
REP. LOBREGAT. points of clarification, Mr. Speaker, the term of office. It says in Section 4, The term of office of all Barangay
and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three years. Then it says, No Barangay elective
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Mr. Speaker, I think it is the position of the committee that the first term should be reckoned from election of what year, Mr.
Speaker?
REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of the Local Government Code, Your Honor. So that the first election is to be reckoned on,
would be May 8, 1994, as far as the Barangay election is concerned.
REP. LOBREGAT. Yes, Mr. Speaker. So there was an election in 1994.
REP. MACIAS. Then an election in 1997.
REP. LOBREGAT. There was an election in 1997. And there will be an election this year
REP. LOBREGAT. election this year.
REP. MACIAS. That is correct. This will be the third.
xxx xxx
REP. SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.) The Honorable Sumulong is recognized.
REP. SUMULONG. Again, with the permission of my Chairman, I would like to address the question of Congressman Lobregat.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Please proceed.
REP. SUMULONG. With respect to the three-year consecutive term limits of Barangay Captains that is not provided for in
the Constitution and that is why the election prior to 1991 during the enactment of the Local Government Code is not
counted because it is not in the Constitution but in the Local Government Code where the three consecutive term limits
has been placed. [Emphasis supplied.]
which led to the following exchanges in the House Committee on Amendments:
March 6, 2002
COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS
REP. GONZALES. May we now proceed to committee amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Gonzalez). The Chair recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms.
REP. SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 2, line 7, after the word position, substitute the period (.) and add the following:
PROVIDED HOWEVER THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE 1994 BARANGAY
ELECTIONS. So that the amended Section 4 now reads as follows:
SEC. 4. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the
effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective local official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position COLON (:) PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM
THE 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The House therefore clearly operated on the premise that the LGC imposed a three-term limit for barangay officials, and the challenged proviso is its
way of addressing any confusion that may arise from the numerous changes in the law.

All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the application of the
three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming up with
the challenged proviso.

With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the proviso based on retroactivity must fail.
b. No Involvement of Any
Constitutional Standard

Separately from the above reason, the constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental reason the respondents retroactivity
objection does not involve a violation of any constitutional standard.

Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code, [16] not the
Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. The application of the
Civil Code is of course self-explanatory laws enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil Code
established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.

The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application will impair vested
rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue may
arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones that may be considered protected by the
due process clause of the Constitution.

In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the respondents themselves
concede that there is no vested right to public office. [17]As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in
view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises.

Aware of this legal reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had a right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened
by a law that effectively rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Again, the RTC agreed with this contention.

We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such right under the Constitution; if at all, this claimed right is merely a restatement of a
claim of vested right to a public office. What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for elective
local posts;[18] thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress, not for the courts, to decide. We dealt with a
strikingly similar issue in Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections[19] where we ruled that SK membership which was claimed as a property right
within the meaning of the Constitution is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Montesclaros instructively tells us:
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified
because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who
qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in
the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right
conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust. No one
has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,
decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to
consider an office a property. It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the
sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic

idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents
and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an
office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a
trust for the people he represents.
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary
right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council, the law
does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The
constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy
directing equal access to opportunities for public service cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a
proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to those
who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the
SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth
cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot
invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age for
membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership. [Emphasis supplied.]
To recapitulate, we find no merit in the respondents retroactivity arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not provide for the
retroactive application to barangay officials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply continued what had been there before;
and (2) the constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm.

The Equal Protection Clause Issue

The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of
substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated
differently in law.[20]

Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present case
for an equal protection challenge. The law can treatbarangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution itself
provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in
the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of
term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this
disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal
protection violation can exist under these conditions.

From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not result
in any differential treatment between barangayofficials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity
issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application.
Violation of the Constitutional
One Subject- One Title Rule

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Farias v. Executive
Secretary

[21]

provides the reasons for this constitutional requirement and the test for its application, as follows:

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding
expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if
the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

xxxx
x x x This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
xxxx
x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which
have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule.
First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections, amending Republic
Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states the laws general subject matter the amendment of the
LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the
reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term is
term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates
that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.

Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they represent were fully informed of the
purposes, nature and scope of the laws provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators
and the public.

Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt
with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of the challenged proviso
under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA
C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA
MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG,
CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA
L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA,
NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M.
NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO,
ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA
M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO,
MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A.
SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA,
FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA,
EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G.
MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA
ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI,
ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C.
GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS,
CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A.
GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ,
FERMIN B. DELA PEA, MARIA DELA
PAZ B. CULALA, ESPERANZA
MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES,
VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA
ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA
R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA,
PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A.
CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG,
ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C.
DELA PEA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN,
FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C.
GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA
CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ,
ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON
M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA,
LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M.
BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO,
LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA
LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA
A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT,
VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA
S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN,
MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA

G.R. No. 162230

Present:
PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA,

MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G.
GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA,
CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T.
SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of the
Malaya Lolas Organization,
Petitioners,

Promulgated:
April 28, 2010

- versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGOALBERT, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ,
and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR
GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions, exchanged full
compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiffs'
hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable
bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful world services the debt.[1]

There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary.
One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of
foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to
lay down general guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter.

Factual Antecedents

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second
World War.

Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of
the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers
forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of
their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering.[2]
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied
by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Issues

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Petitioners arguments

Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the
comfort women system established by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against humanity, [3] sexual slavery,[4] and torture.
[5]

They allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina

comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes
against humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine governments acceptance of the apologies made by Japan as well as funds from the Asian Womens Fund
(AWF) were contrary to international law.

Respondents Arguments

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.[6]
Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace[7] provides:
Article 14. Claims and Property
a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless
it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make
complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the present time meet its other obligations.
b)

Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers,
other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of
the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan[8] have been satisfactory, and that Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women
through the atonement money paid by the Asian Womens Fund.
Historical Background

The comfort women system was the tragic legacy of the Rape of Nanking. In December 1937, Japanese military forces captured the city of Nanking in China and
began a barbaric campaign of terror known as the Rape of Nanking, which included the rapes and murders of an estimated 20,000 to 80,000 Chinese women, including
young girls, pregnant mothers, and elderly women.[9]

In reaction to international outcry over the incident, the Japanese government sought ways to end international condemnation [10] by establishing the comfort
women system. Under this system, the military could simultaneously appease soldiers' sexual appetites and contain soldiers' activities within a regulated environment.
[11]

Comfort stations would also prevent the spread of venereal disease among soldiers and discourage soldiers from raping inhabitants of occupied territories.[12]

Daily life as a comfort woman was unmitigated misery.[13] The military forced victims into barracks-style stations divided into tiny cubicles where they were
forced to live, sleep, and have sex with as many 30 soldiers per day.[14] The 30 minutes allotted for sexual relations with each soldier were 30-minute increments of
unimaginable horror for the women.[15] Disease was rampant.[16] Military doctors regularly examined the women, but these checks were carried out to prevent the
spread of venereal diseases; little notice was taken of the frequent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even broken bones inflicted on the women by soldiers.

Fewer than 30% of the women survived the war.[17] Their agony continued in having to suffer with the residual physical, psychological, and emotional scars from their
former lives. Some returned home and were ostracized by their families. Some committed suicide. Others, out of shame, never returned home.[18]

Efforts to Secure Reparation

The most prominent attempts to compel the Japanese government to accept legal responsibility and pay compensatory damages for the comfort women
system were through a series of lawsuits, discussion at the United Nations (UN), resolutions by various nations, and the Womens International Criminal Tribunal. The
Japanese government, in turn, responded through a series of public apologies and the creation of the AWF.[19]

Lawsuits

In December 1991, Kim Hak-Sun and two other survivors filed the first lawsuit in Japan by former comfort women against the Japanese government. The
Tokyo District Court however dismissed their case.[20] Other suits followed,[21] but the Japanese government has, thus far, successfully caused the dismissal of every
case.[22]

Undoubtedly frustrated by the failure of litigation before Japanese courts, victims of the comfort women system brought their claims before the United
States (US). On September 18, 2000, 15 comfort women filed a class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia [23] "seeking money damages
for [allegedly] having been subjected to sexual slavery and torture before and during World War II," in violation of "both positive and customary international law." The
case was filed pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), [24] which allowed the plaintiffs to sue the Japanese government in a USfederal district court.[25] On
October 4, 2001, the district court dismissed the lawsuit due to lack of jurisdiction over Japan, stating that [t]here is no question that this court is not the appropriate
forum in which plaintiffs may seek to reopen x x x discussions nearly half a century later x x x [E]ven if Japan did not enjoy sovereign immunity, plaintiffs' claims are
non-justiciable and must be dismissed.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case. [26] On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted the womens
petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and remanded the case.[27] On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed
its prior decision, noting that much as we may feel for the plight of the appellants, the courts of theUS simply are not authorized to hear their case.[28] The women again
brought their case to the US Supreme Court which denied their petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2006.

Efforts at the United Nations

In 1992, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (KCWS), submitted a petition to the UN Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC), asking for assistance in investigating crimes committed by Japan against Korean women and seeking reparations for former comfort women.
[29]

The UNHRC placed the issue on its agenda and appointed Radhika Coomaraswamy as the issue's special investigator. In 1996, Coomaraswamy issued a Report

reaffirming Japan's responsibility in forcing Korean women to act as sex slaves for the imperial army, and made the followingrecommendations:
A. At the national level
137. The Government of Japan should:
(a) Acknowledge that the system of comfort stations set up by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War was a violation of its
obligations under international law and accept legal responsibility for that violation;
(b) Pay compensation to individual victims of Japanese military sexual slavery according to principles outlined by the Special Rapporteur of the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the right to restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A special administrative tribunal for this
purpose should be set up with a limited time-frame since many of the victims are of a very advanced age;
(c) Make a full disclosure of documents and materials in its possession with regard to comfort stations and other related activities of the Japanese
Imperial Army during the Second World War;
(d) Make a public apology in writing to individual women who have come forward and can be substantiated as women victims of Japanese
military sexual slavery;
(e) Raise awareness of these issues by amending educational curricula to reflect historical realities;
(f) Identify and punish, as far as possible, perpetrators involved in the recruitment and institutionalization of comfort stations during the Second
World War.

Gay J. McDougal, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, also presented a report to the
Sub-Committee on June 22, 1998 entitledContemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict. The
report included an appendix entitled An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the Government of Japan for 'Comfort Women Stations' established during the Second World
War,[30] which contained the following findings:

68. The present report concludes that the Japanese Government remains liable for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law,
violations that amount in their totality to crimes against humanity. The Japanese Governments arguments to the contrary, including arguments
that seek to attack the underlying humanitarian law prohibition of enslavement and rape, remain as unpersuasive today as they were when they
were first raised before the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal more than 50 years ago. In addition, the Japanese Governments argument
that Japan has already settled all claims from the Second World War through peace treaties and reparations agreements following the war
remains equally unpersuasive. This is due, in large part, to the failure until very recently of the Japanese Government to admit the extent of the
Japanese militarys direct involvement in the establishment and maintenance of these rape centres. The Japanese Governments silence on this
point during the period in which peace and reparations agreements between Japan and other Asian Governments were being negotiated
following the end of the war must, as a matter of law and justice, preclude Japan from relying today on these peace treaties to extinguish liability
in these cases.
69. The failure to settle these claims more than half a century after the cessation of hostilities is a testament to the degree to which the lives of
women continue to be undervalued. Sadly, this failure to address crimes of a sexual nature committed on a massive scale during the Second
World War has added to the level of impunity with which similar crimes are committed today. The Government of Japan has taken some steps to
apologize and atone for the rape and enslavement of over 200,000 women and girls who were brutalized in comfort stations during the Second
World War. However, anything less than full and unqualified acceptance by the Government of Japan of legal liability and the consequences that
flow from such liability is wholly inadequate. It must now fall to the Government of Japan to take the necessary final steps to provide adequate
redress.

The UN, since then, has not taken any official action directing Japan to provide the reparations sought.
Women's International War Crimes

Tribunal

The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT) was a people's tribunal established by a number of Asian women and human rights organizations,
supported by an international coalition of non-governmental organizations. [31] First proposed in 1998, the WIWCT convened in Tokyo in 2000 in order to
adjudicate Japan's military sexual violence, in particular the enslavement of comfort women, to bring those responsible for it to justice, and to end the ongoing cycle of
impunity for wartime sexual violence against women.

After examining the evidence for more than a year, the tribunal issued its verdict on December 4, 2001, finding the former Emperor Hirohito and the State
of Japan guilty of crimes against humanity for the rape and sexual slavery of women. [32] It bears stressing, however, that although the tribunal included prosecutors,
witnesses, and judges, its judgment was not legally binding since the tribunal itself was organized by private citizens.

Action by Individual Governments

On January 31, 2007, US Representative Michael Honda of California, along with six co-sponsor representatives, introduced House Resolution 121 which called for
Japanese action in light of the ongoing struggle for closure by former comfort women. The Resolution was formally passed on July 30, 2007,[33] and made four distinct
demands:
[I]t is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan (1) should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical
responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the
world as comfort women, during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of
World War II; (2) would help to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity and status of prior statements if the Prime Minister of Japan were
to make such an apology as a public statement in his official capacity; (3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual
enslavement and trafficking of the comfort women for the Japanese Imperial Army never occurred; and (4) should educate current and future
generations about this horrible crime while following the recommendations of the international community with respect to the comfort women.[34]
In December 2007, the European Parliament, the governing body of the European Union, drafted a resolution similar to House Resolution 121.
[35]

Entitled, Justice for Comfort Women, the resolution demanded: (1) a formal acknowledgment of responsibility by the Japanese government; (2) a removal of the

legal obstacles preventing compensation; and (3) unabridged education of the past. The resolution also stressed the urgency with which Japan should act on these
issues, stating: the right of individuals to claim reparations against the government should be expressly recognized in national law, and cases for reparations for the
survivors of sexual slavery, as a crime under international law, should be prioritized, taking into account the age of the survivors.

The Canadian and Dutch parliaments have each followed suit in drafting resolutions against Japan. Canada's resolution demands the Japanese government
to issue a formal apology, to admit that its Imperial Military coerced or forced hundreds of thousands of women into sexual slavery, and to restore references in
Japanese textbooks to its war crimes.[36] The Dutch parliament's resolution calls for the Japanese government to uphold the 1993 declaration of remorse made by Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdoms Parliament also produced a report in November, 2008 entitled, "Global Security: Japan and
Korea" which concluded that Japan should acknowledge the pain caused by the issue of comfort women in order to ensure cooperation between Japan and Korea.

Statements of Remorse made by representatives of the Japanese government

Various officials of the Government of Japan have issued the following public statements concerning the comfort system:

a) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in 1993:

The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime "comfort women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the
findings as a result of that study.
As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a
great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then
Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort
women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military.
The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at
times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive
atmosphere.
As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from
the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer,
control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.
Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many
women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those,
irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.
It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we
can express this sentiment.
We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby
reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and
teaching of history.
As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall
continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto.

b)

Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayamas Statement in 1994

On the issue of wartime comfort women, which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to take this opportunity
once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and apologies

c) Letters from the Prime Minister of Japan to Individual Comfort Women

The issue of comfort women, with the involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity
of a large number of women.
As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who endured immeasurable and
painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.
I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past
history and accurately convey it to future generations.

d) The Diet (Japanese Parliament) passed resolutions in 1995 and 2005

Solemnly reflecting upon the many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression that occurred in modern world history, and recognizing
that Japan carried out such acts in the past and inflicted suffering on the people of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House
hereby express deep remorse. (Resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on June 9, 1995)

e) Various Public Statements by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

I have talked about this matter in the Diet sessions last year, and recently as well, and to the press. I have been consistent. I will stand by the
Kono Statement. This is our consistent position. Further, we have been apologizing sincerely to those who suffered immeasurable pain and
incurable psychological wounds as comfort women. Former Prime Ministers, including Prime Ministers Koizumi and Hashimoto, have issued
letters to the comfort women. I would like to be clear that I carry the same feeling. This has not changed even slightly. (Excerpt from Remarks by
Prime Minister Abe at an Interview by NHK, March 11, 2007).
I am apologizing here and now. I am apologizing as the Prime Minister and it is as stated in the statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono.
(Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at the Budget Committee, the House of Councilors, the Diet of Japan, March 26, 2007).

I am deeply sympathetic to the former comfort women who suffered hardships, and I have expressed my apologies for the extremely agonizing
circumstances into which they were placed. (Excerpt from Telephone Conference by Prime Minister Abe to President George W. Bush, April 3,
2007).
I have to express sympathy from the bottom of my heart to those people who were taken as wartime comfort women. As a human being, I would
like to express my sympathies, and also as prime minister of Japan I need to apologize to them. My administration has been saying all along that
we continue to stand by the Kono Statement. We feel responsible for having forced these women to go through that hardship and pain as comfort
women under the circumstances at the time. (Excerpt from an interview article "A Conversation with Shinzo Abe" by the Washington Post, April
22, 2007).
x x x both personally and as Prime Minister of Japan, my heart goes out in sympathy to all those who suffered extreme hardships as comfort
women; and I expressed my apologies for the fact that they were forced to endure such extreme and harsh conditions. Human rights are violated
in many parts of the world during the 20th Century; therefore we must work to make the 21st Century a wonderful century in which no human
rights are violated. And the Government of Japan and I wish to make significant contributions to that end. (Excerpt from Prime Minister Abe's
remarks at the Joint Press Availability after the summit meeting at Camp David between Prime Minister Abe and President Bush, April 27,
2007).

The Asian Women's Fund

Established by the Japanese government in 1995, the AWF represented the government's concrete attempt to address its moral responsibility by offering
monetary compensation to victims of the comfort women system.[37] The purpose of the AWF was to show atonement of the Japanese people through expressions of
apology and remorse to the former wartime comfort women, to restore their honor, and to demonstrate Japans strong respect for women.[38]

The AWF announced three programs for former comfort women who applied for assistance: (1) an atonement fund paying 2 million (approximately $20,000) to each
woman; (2) medical and welfare support programs, paying 2.5-3 million ($25,000-$30,000) for each woman; and (3) a letter of apology from the Japanese Prime
Minister to each woman. Funding for the program came from the Japanese government and private donations from the Japanese people. As of March 2006, the AWF
provided 700 million (approximately $7 million) for these programs in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; 380 million (approximately $3.8 million)
in Indonesia; and 242 million (approximately $2.4 million) in the Netherlands.

On January 15, 1997, the AWF and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

Our Ruling

Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

The petition lacks merit.

From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to
determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.

Baker v. Carr[39] remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court explained that:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on question.

In Taada v. Cuenco,[40] we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions.[41] One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and

the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." [42] The US Supreme Court has further cautioned
that decisions relating to foreign policy
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility.[43]

To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements.[44] However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition
for certiorari.

In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,[45] the US Supreme Court held that [t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign relations.
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps serious embarrassment -- is to be avoided
and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible
where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic,
consular and other officials. x x x

This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v.

Executive Secretary[46] and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary;[47] its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief) Justice Punos dissent
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion:[48]
x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation
especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available information
and can decide with decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information
about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also
unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is
traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under
less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of
confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Philippine government was without authority to negotiate the Treaty of Peace with Japan. And it is equally true
that, since time immemorial, when negotiating peace accords and settling international claims:
x x x [g]overnments have dealt with x x x private claims as their own, treating them as national assets, and as counters, `chips', in international
bargaining. Settlement agreements have lumped, or linked, claims deriving from private debts with others that were intergovernmental in origin,
and concessions in regard to one category of claims might be set off against concessions in the other, or against larger political considerations
unrelated to debts.[49]

Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby terminating any recourse
under domestic law. In Ware v. Hylton,[50] a case brought by a British subject to recover a debt confiscated by the Commonwealth of Virginia during the war, Justice
Chase wrote:
I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the matter in dispute, nor the
conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or brought into contest again. All violences, injuries, or damages sustained by the
government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore
not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution of, or compensation for, British property confiscated, or extinguished, during
the war, by any of the United States, could only be provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these

subjects, in the treaty, they could not be agitated after the treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects in courts of justice.
(Emphasis supplied).

This practice of settling claims by means of a peace treaty is certainly

nothing new. For instance, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,[51] the US Supreme Court held:
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the government of another country are sources
of friction between the two sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225, 62 S.Ct. 552, 563, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942). To resolve these
difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international
agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the government of another are established international practice reflecting traditional
international theory. L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly
exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. x x x Under such agreements, the President has
agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum payments or the
establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants themselves, since
a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it
is also undisputed that the United States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without consultation
with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a whole. Henkin, supra, at 262-263.
Accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 213 (1965) (President may waive or settle a claim against a foreign
state x x x [even] without the consent of the [injured] national). It is clear that the practice of settling claims continues today.

Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan not necessarily for the complete atonement of the suffering caused by Japanese
aggression during the war, not for the payment of adequate reparations, but for security purposes. The treaty sought to prevent the spread of communism in Japan,
which occupied a strategic position in the Far East. Thus, the Peace Treaty compromised individual claims in the collective interest of the free world.

This was also the finding in a similar case involving American victims of Japanese slave labor during the war.[52] In a consolidated case in the Northern District of
California,[53] the court dismissed the lawsuits filed, relying on the 1951 peace treaty with Japan,[54] because of the following policy considerations:
The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a fundamental goal of the agreement was to settle the reparations issue once and for all.
As the statement of the chief United States negotiator, John Foster Dulles, makes clear, it was well understood that leaving open the possibility
of future claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace:
Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking. The present peace is no exception.
On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering.
On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to
produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. x x x
The policy of the United States that Japanese liability for reparations should be sharply limited was informed by the experience of six years of
United States-led occupation of Japan. During the occupation the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the region, General
Douglas MacArthur, confiscated Japanese assets in conjunction with the task of managing the economic affairs of the vanquished nation and
with a view to reparations payments. It soon became clear that Japan's financial condition would render any aggressive reparations plan
an exercise in futility. Meanwhile, the importance of a stable, democratic Japan as a bulwark to communism in the region increased. At
the end of 1948, MacArthur expressed the view that [t]he use of reparations as a weapon to retard the reconstruction of a viable economy in
Japan should be combated with all possible means and recommended that the reparations issue be settled finally and without delay.
That this policy was embodied in the treaty is clear not only from the negotiations history but also from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
report recommending approval of the treaty by the Senate. The committee noted, for example:
Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured
countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the
initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In
short, [it] would be contrary to the basic purposes and policy of x x x the United States x x x.
We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time
has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a
claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient,
and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners claims.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is
able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf.[55] Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own
rights. Nowhere is this position more clearly reflected than in the dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions Case:

By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in
reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. The question, therefore, whether the
present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this
standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is
sole claimant.[56]
Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states, and the decision whether to
exercise the discretion may invariably be influenced by political considerations other than the legal merits of the particular claim.[57] As clearly stated by the ICJ in
Barcelona Traction:
The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose
behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is
resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The municipal legislator may lay upon the
State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and
clothe the right with corresponding sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the
position internationally.[58] (Emphasis supplied)

The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this
respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.

The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this traditional view. They (i) state that "the right of
diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State, [59] (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the
State;[60] and (iii) stress that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection
on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so."[61]

It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured. [62] However, at
present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad.
[63]

Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty,

and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment.[64]

We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law.
[65]

However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation

to prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations
from the state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute
proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states reluctance to directly prosecute claims against another state, recent developments support
the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in suits against perpetrators of international crimes. [66] Nonetheless, notwithstanding an
array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of
states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes. [67]Of course a customary duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot
find enough evidence to reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties,
immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity.[68]

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed
in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was
signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnesobligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community
of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction:
x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those
arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from
the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the

corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law others are conferred by international instruments of a
universal or quasi-universal character.

The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order.
However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential
remains to be realized in practice.[69]
The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not
admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.[70]

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,[71] but peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred
von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.[72] The recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with
the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). [73]Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status
of jus cogens,[74] the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms.
After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by
which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens.[75] In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated
that the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.
[76]

Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance,[77] beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.[78]

Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend the unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of
the Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, the petitioners appear to be without a remedy to
challenge those that have offended them before appropriate fora. Needless to say, our government should take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of their
fundamental human rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power
to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.