HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.G.R. No.

162243, December 3,
2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No.
43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the
IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the
automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP
Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trial court is clear: the government is
bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an
Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Issue:
Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which the
government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked. The
Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking
assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an
interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in favor of PICOP of
the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development
and utilization of the natural resources in the area.
Amodia vda de Melencion vs. Court of Appeals (534 SCRA 62) Registration Under Art. 1544 of
the New Civil Code; Registration of Sale of Titled Land Under Act 3344
The registration under Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code refers to registration under the torrens system
which considers the act of registration as the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates
a lien upon the land.
If a parcel of land is registered under the Land Registration Act and has a torrens certificate of title
and is sold and the sale is registered not under Land Registration Act but under Act 3344, such sale is
not considered registered as the term is used under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
The loss of a certificate of title of a titled land does not convert the land into unregistered land.

REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO

G.R. No. 171571, March 24, 2008
FACTS: 2 were adjudicated by the then Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the following in
four equal shares:
a) Francisca Dignos, married to Blas Sorono
share in the two lots;
b) Tito Dignos share in the two lots;
c) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents
share in the two lots;
and
d) predecessors-in-interest of the respondents
share in the two lots
It appears that the two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share in the two lots, sold
the entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument
entitled Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale without the knowledge of respondents whose
predecessors-in-interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two lots.
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA),
erected a security fence one of the lot and relocated a number of families, who had built their
dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations of the 2 lots.
Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the
lots but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City. Respondents
further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold, alienated or disposed of their
shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous peaceful possession. Respondents
furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest had given them any written
notice of its acquisition of the share of Tito Dignos.
The Republic, represented by the MCIAA in its Answer with Counterclaim, maintained that from the
time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive prescription, it had acquired valid title to the
lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value; and assuming arguendo that it did not have
just title, it had, by possession for over 30 years, acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary
prescription. At all events, petitioner contended that respondents action was barred by estoppel and
laches.
The trial court found for respondents. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
1. WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by the heirs of Tito binding to the respondents
2. WON estoppel and laches should work against respondents

HELD: the petition is denied

1. NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Apropos is the following pertinent portion of this Courts decision in Bailon-Casilao v. CA:
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale
will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to thesale.This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other
disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is NOT null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-heirs of
Tito Dignos, which is only undivided share of the two lots.
2. NO. Registered lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners insistence that
it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then extraordinary, does not
lie. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and
Tito Dignos heirs the following material portions thereof validate the claim of respondents that
the two lots were registered: x x x x
That since the OCT of Title of the above-mentioned property/ies has/have been lost and/or
destroyed and the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute said title/s at its own expense and
that the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the
reconstitution of title so that the said lot/s may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in
accordance with law x x x x
NOTES:
As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the prevailing market value, not
of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, (1) the respondents received just compensation for
the property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and, (2) the property, due to
improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several hundreds of millions of
pesos, the law is not on its side.
Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the coheirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the

sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing
of the sale by the vendor. The Court may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots.
As mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify respondents about the sale. At
any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus:
That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake and agree to warrant and
defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies herein sold against any and all just claims of
all persons whomsoever and should the VENDEE be disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and
defend the same in the Courts of Justice.
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to petitioners right
to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest.
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT
G. R. No.144057January 17, 2005Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her
imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessorsin-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from
any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC
rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to
appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General,
representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that
the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit
could not have maintained a bonafide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as
alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the
land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject
land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered asalready alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and
disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or
proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property,
thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed
that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the possession of the land no
matter how long would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription. To follow the

Solicitor Generals argument in the construction of Section 14 (1)would render the paragraph 1 of the
said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared
as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government
from enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable anddisposable.The land
in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty
years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her
and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.
Business Organization Corporation Law Corporations are not Filipino Citizens
Registration of Public Lands
In 1978, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) purchased a parcel of land from one Carmen Racimo in Ilocos Norte.
In 1979, INC sought to register said land under its name pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Law. The Director of Lands opposed the application as it averred that the said parcel of land is
part of the alienable public land; that INC cannot register said land because it is not a Filipino citizen.
INC argues that it is a private land because Racimo, its predecessor-in-interest has been in possession
thereof for more than 30 years; that the Constitutional prohibition does not apply to INC, a
corporation sole (solely incorporated by one man, Erao Manalo, a Filipino citizen), hence it can
acquire said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not INC can register said parcel of land under its name.
HELD: No.
The disputed land has never lost its public character. Racimo, though occupying said land for more
than 30 years, never applied for confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title over said land. Under
the law, all lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. As exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law allows the registration of alienable public lands but only by
Filipino citizens. INC is not a Filipino citizen. There is no basis on the contention that as a
corporation sole, INC is not prohibited from holding said land. The benefit only applies to Filipino
citizens not to a corporation sole which has citizenship.
NOTE: 60% rule: Corporations and Partnerships of which at least 60% of their capital belong to
Filipinos may acquire real property.