Extract from: Extracted from: DeGeorges, P.A.& Reilly, B.K. 2008.

A critical evaluation
of conservation and development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Edwin Mellen Press: Lewiston,
New York, NY, USA. 3,572p.
5.9.4.6 Deforestation in afromontane forests
To compensate for the falling yields caused by soil erosion, farmers in the
highlands of Sub-Saharan Africa have cleared forests on steeper slopes,
accelerating land degradation in the process. With population growing at
around 3% a year, and the population density in some of the most vulnerable
rural areas increasing even faster, the dangers posed by this cycle of increasing
poverty, deforestation, and accelerating land degradation are readily apparent
(Nana-Sinkam, 1995).
The afromontane forests [e.g., Rwanda, Burundi, eastern DRC and western Uganda
(Albertine Rift); Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the highlands of Cameroon] are also being
impacted by agricultural expansion. However, much of this deforestation occurred prior to
the arrival of the Europeans (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4.2, Traditional irrigated agriculture).
By the time the first Europeans arrived in Rwanda and Burundi, 90% of the forests were
already gone, while in the highlands of Cameroon (e.g., Bamileke Plateau and Adamoua
Plateau) grass fields had largely replaced forests 2,000 to 3,000 years ago (BP) (1,000 BC to
0 A.D.), one of the reasons for the Bantu migrations (Chapter 1, Section 1.7, BANTU
AFRICA). Today in the uplands of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda no more than 5% of the
original forest cover remains and no tract exceeds 100,000 ha, yet they manage to preserve
90% of the original biodiversity (Vande weghe, 2004).
Rwanda, Over-Population and Land Degradation Linked to Deforestation for
Agriculture and Fuelwood Spawning Political Destabilization
In 1950, Rwandas population was 1.9 million. By 1994, it was nearly 8
million, making it the most densely populated country in Africa. As
populations grew, so did the demand for firewood. By 1989, almost half of
Rwandas cultivated land was on slopes of 10 to 35 degrees, land that is
universally considered uncultivable. By 1991, the (fuelwood) demand was
more than double the sustainable yield of local forests. As a result, trees
disappeared, forcing people to use straw and other crop residues for cooking
fuel. With less organic matter in the soil, land fertility declined (Brown,
2003a).
Mair (1977) came to similar conclusions, namely that

one reason for the revolution in Rwanda seems to be that the Hutu were short
of land for cultivation because so much was taken for grazing of Tusi (Tutsi)
cattle. It may be that Tusi have suffered less than the peoples of Uganda from
epidemics of rinderpest which have decimated the herds from time to time.
Ninety-five percent (95%) of the land was under cultivation with the average family of eight
living as subsistence farmers on less than 0.02 ha (0.05 acres) (Gourevitch, 1998).
As the health of the land deteriorated, so did that of the people dependent on
it. Eventually there was simply not enough food to go around. A quiet
desperation developed among the people. Like a drought-afflicted countryside,
it could be ignited with a single match. That match was the crash of a plane on
April 6, 1994, shot down as it approached the capital of Kigali, killing
President Juvnal Habyarimana. The crash unleashed an organized attack by
Hutus, leading to an estimated 800,000 deaths, mostly of Tutsis. In the
villages, whole families were slaughtered lest there be survivors to claim the
family plot of land. Deaths were concentrated in communities where caloric
intake was the lowest (Brown, 2003a).
Population pressure contributed to the tensions and the slaughter, although it was by no
means the only factor (Brown, 2003a). Gasana (2002, In: Matthew, Halle & Switzer, 2002)
goes into great detail in explaining how population pressures and environmental scarcities
(e.g., land and firewood) combined with drought, famine and civil war fueled the 1994
genocide. As Rwandas population increased, inherited land became increasingly fragmented
as each generation subdivided that which was passed on from the previous generation to the
point that a family landholding was incapable of supporting a family unit (husband, wife and
children), resulting in near-landless or landless farmers. Based on a 1984 survey (Gasana,
2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002):

43% of the poorer families, abakene, owned only 15% of the cultivated land,
averaging 0.25-0.75 ha/family;

50% of rural families had to rent land to meet subsistence needs;

16% of land-rich families, abakire, owned 40% of the cultivated land, a family
landholding averaging 1 ha; and

By 1989, 50% of the cultivated soils were on slopes greater than 18% that
experienced continual soil erosion and thus decreasing production.

The other

movement was movement onto good pasture lands that became marginal agricultural
lands, reducing available grazing lands from 34% of the territory in 1965 to 16% by

1987, increasing livestock densities and over-grazing on the remaining pasture. These
abatindi were basically landless, with no education skills or jobs, and were pushed to
cultivating marginal, rocky and often acidic soils, best managed as natural forest or
cultivated in tea, as opposed to intensive cropping. Similar to the tapades in GuineaConakry (Section 5.9.3.2, Loss of fallow turning wildlife into a short-term resource,
Fouta Djallon Mountains, Guinea-Conakry), only highly manured gardens around the
homesteads were productive.

By 1984, approximately 15% of the land-owners owned half of the land, tending to be urban
elite in commerce, government, or the aid industry, rather than full-time agriculture. By 1990,
25% of the rural population was landless, increasing to 50% in some districts. Also land
was/is highly fragmented, the average Rwandan household possessing 5 plots, increasing to
as many as 10 plots/household in Ruhengeri (Musahara & Huggins, 2005 In: ACTS, 2005).

As a result, 66% of the population was unable to meet the minimum energy requirements of
2,100 calories/person/day1 and rural unemployment among adults reached 30%.

This

unequal access to the best land had been linked to political power and nepotism since the
1970s. These political elites, both Hutu and Tutsi, known as abary (eaters) initially caused
the issue to be seen as rich versus poor, along with an agriculturally richer
north/agriculturally poorer south highlands divide, and not Hutu versus Tutsi. These elites
even used poverty as a resource, capturing foreign aid and directing it to their region and/or
putting people from their group in charge (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002). All of
this was compounded by a shortage of firewood resulting in an estimated 8,000 ha (80 km2)
of forest/year disappearing, which in turn forced farmers to use crop residues for fuelwood
resulting in a loss of 1.7 tons of organic matter/ha/year. This greatly contributed to the loss of
soil fertility, an equivalent loss of 65,000 tons/year of cereals (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et.
al., 2002).
By 1994, with a population of 7.5 million people, there were 290 inhabitants/km2 and 843
inhabitants/km2 of arable land (11,250 km2 or 43% of the territory) (Gasana, 2002 In:
Matthew, et. al., 2002). In 2005, there are 350 inhabitants/km2 (Musahara & Huggins, 2005
In: ACTS, 2005). Diamond (2005a) places Rwandas population density at 293/km2
1

Other references use from 1,730-1,900 calories/person/day or less as indicating undernourishment in SubSaharan Africa

(760/mi2), higher than the United Kingdom of 236 inhabitants/km 2 and approaching that of
Holland at 367 inhabitants/km2.

A big difference between Rwanda and the United Kingdom/Holland is that most of Rwandas
population lives a rural subsistence lifestyle, while those of the United Kingdom and Holland
are highly urbanized and industrialized. The biophysical carrying capacity of Rwanda was
estimated at 5,240,000 people with 2,360,000 of its nearly 8 million people living in a
situation of permanent food insecurity. This was resulting in reduced fallow and people
moving up mountainous slopes on increasingly marginal land (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et.
al., 2002 & Musahara & Huggins, 2005 In: ACTS, 2005). The resulting degradation of the
ecological capital forced rural inhabitants into a vicious cycle of poverty and thus caused
friction between the haves and have-nots (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002). Diamond
(2005a) estimates that all arable land outside national parks was being cultivated, the entire
country looking like a garden and banana plantation, with little or no soil conservation
measures being implemented (e.g., terracing, plowing along contour lines instead of straight
up and down, fallow cover vegetation between fields instead of bare fields). Farmers could
wake up in the morning and find their entire field of top soil and crops washed away or their
neighbors field and rocks being washed down on their fields. Deforestation resulted in waterholding capacity declining and streams drying up.
Given the current major problem of land scarcity in Rwanda, strong and
urgent programs for population growth control, off-farm activities, and
agriculture intensification should be introduced, nationwide, so that even the
elite can learn to look for other opportunities of gaining wealth other than just
grabbing and purchasing land Kairaba-Kyambadde, 2005 In: ACTS, 2005).
The 2001 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) addresses the land issue recommending
1) households consolidate plots so each holding is not less than 1 ha, 2) ceiling of 50 ha on
land ownership, 3) all land registered to improve tenure security; 4) land titles tradable, but
not in a way that fragments plots below 1 ha, and 5) communities involved in the process of
allocating title (Musahara & Huggins, 2005 In: ACTS, 2005).

How the political elite used resource scarcity, poverty and unemployment to fuel the
Rwandan genocide, which in turn played into the geopolitical power struggle between France

and the United States, is discussed in Chapter 13, Section 13.8.6, Former Cold War allies
vying for power in the Great Lakes Region.

Neighboring Kivu Province, DRC

This province was mainly settled by Tutsi and Hutu collectively called Banyarwanda, who
arrived before the colonial era (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002).

Prior to

colonialism, land was regulated by a hierarchical administration based on communal

territorial ownership. The Belgian colonial power pushed indigenous systems of land tenure
into a new regime of customary law that containerized the local population. This involved
the rigidification and in some cases a re-definition of ethnic identities and a codification of
customs in addition to creating a double system of property rights; customary for local people
and a modern system of private ownership by white settlers that enabled them to establish
their plantations, through application to the central state. Vacant land was declared the
property of the colonial state and expropriated for settler-owned concessions with
compensation being paid to the customary leaders (mwami), rather than to the people. By
about 1910, colonialism defined and accentuated differences between ethnic groups and their
rights of access to land (e.g., Kinyarwanda speaking people considered indigenous and given
customary authority over land, disputed by Banyarwanda immigrants that were mainly of
Tutsi-origin (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2005 In: ACTS, 2005).

Even prior to the 1994 exodus, this province was fertile but densely populated. By the end of
the 1980s, 49% of the population in Kivu lived in areas with a density higher than 100
people/km2, this density of people covering no more than 13.4% of DRCs territory as a
whole (Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2005 In: ACTS, 2005). Land tenure was a major issue.

The land rich and politically powerful Banyarwanda were pitted against an alliance of Hunde,
Nande and Nyanga ethnic groups. Vlassenroot & Huggins (2005 In: ACTS, 2005) attribute
this problem to conflict between customary law and modern law based upon individual
ownership introduced in 1973 by the independent Zairian state (todays DRC).
Banyaranwanda, who had purchased land with a title deed from traditional authorities refused
to pay tribute to Hunde chiefs for the use of the land, while customary rules no longer had
legal status. Meanwhile the average peasant became insecure over his rights of access to
customary land. In North Kivu, poor Hutu farmers from Masisi had lost their land from sale

by local customary chiefs to rural capitalists of Banyarwanda origin (Vlassenroot & Huggins,
2005 In: ACTS, 2005). By 1993, inequitable land distribution led to ethnic clashes targeting
the Banyarwanda resulting in more than 6,000 deaths and the displacement of 250,000 people
(Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002).

When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) of Paul Kagame defeated the Rwandese Armed
Forces/Forces Armes Rwandaises (RAF/FAR) on July 19, 1994, 2 million Hutu refugees
fled to neighboring countries; between 1.2 million (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002)
and 1.5 million (Chrtien, 2003) Hutu fleeing to northern Kivu Province, DRC.

The 1994 Hutu refugees allied themselves against the Banyarwanda Tutsi. Eventually the
Hunde feared this massive number of Hutu could result in their taking political control and in
the creation of a Hutu state. Competition for political influence in Kinshasa fomented
animosity between indigenous groups and the Banyarwanda, resulting in thousands of deaths
and the displacement of 200,000 people. Eventually under Laurent Kabila, there was a new
reshuffling of alliances between the Hunde, Nande, Nyanga and Hutu, forcing the Tutsi to
flee to the town of Goma and to Rwanda (see Chapter 13, Section 13.8.6.9, the French
connection). More recently, land disputes developed between pastoralist Hema and Lendu
peasants. Land resource conflicts in the eastern DRC, help sustain conflict in the region
(Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002). Conflict rages on in the southern Kivu Province
and will likely not cease anytime soon.
There are four lessons that can be learned from this tragic chapter in Africas history:
1) rapid population growth is the major driving force behind the vicious
circle of environmental scarcities and rural poverty (and conflict), 2)
conserving the environment is essential for long-term poverty reduction, 3) to
break the links between environmental scarcities and conflict, win-win
solutionsproviding all sociological groups with access to natural
resourcesare essential, and 4) preventing conflicts of the kind that ravaged
Rwanda in 1994 will require a rethinking of what national security really
means (Brown, 2003a).
These same four points are also made in Gasana (2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002). The
authors believe that a combination of introducing modern intensive farming and soil
conservation measures combined with alternative livelihoods mainly in urban centers as a

means of taking pressure off the land and resource base are keys to future stability and food
security in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Meanwhile, what little forest is left, will continue to

disappear at an accelerated pace.

13.8.6 Former Cold War allies vying for power in the Great Lakes Region
If there is one thing sure in this world, it is certainly that it will not happen a
second time (Primo Levi, 1958, Auschwitz Survivor In: Gourevitch, 1998).
13.8.6.1 Colonial origins of ethnicity in Rwanda

As discussed in Chapter 1, European biases of a superior white-in-origin race, the Tutsi,

ruling over an inferior Bantu race, the Hutu, institutionalized and legitimized a growing
cleavage between these socio-economic groups. Traditionally, the lines between the cattleowning aristocratic Tutsi or market dominant minority and the Hutu majority were
permeable, both speaking the same language, inter-marrying and with economic mobility,
where a successful Hutu could become a Tutsi. (Gourevitch, 1998; Chrtien, 2003; Chua
2003).
There is now ample evidence of what has been called the invention of
ethnicity by which is meant the ways in which it was constructed and
instrumentalized during the colonial periodthe invention of modern
ethnicity was coincidental in time with the imposition on the continent of the
colonial political structure itself modeled on the European state. So it was
the colonial state which formalized the ethnic map and conspired to define the
relationship between ethnicity and politicsWhat has happened since
independence, has been the working through of the practical consequences of
the colonial politicization of invented ethnicities (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).
Racial identity cards were issued based on physical characteristics (Gourevitch, 1998;
Chrtien, 2003; Chua, 2003), which helped to cement any differences between Tutsi and
Hutu, creating ethnic divides and eventually a brewing hatred that could only end in one way,
destruction. Gourevitch, (1998) calls this a joint venture between the Belgian government
and the Catholic Church to radically re-engineer Rwandan Society along so-called ethnic
lines. They went so far as to send in scientists to take cranial, lip and nose measurements as a
basis for issuing ethnic identity cards. The Tutsi were provided with a superior education

and favored positions in government, while the Hutu served as a labor pool (Gourevitch,
1998; Chrtien, 2003).
In pre-genocide Rwanda, development assistance reinforced ethnic tensions.
Individual projects and programs have also caused trouble by reinforcing or
exacerbating existing inequalities at local level (Commission for Africa,
2005).
In the mid-1900s, average family revenues for both Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi were almost the
same.

Ethic obsession took hold in a small stratum of elite evolus educated by the

European/Catholic Church complex, resulting in a majority-educated Tutsi elite (a minority

of Rwandas population) favored by French-speaking priests and a minority-educated Hutu
counter-elite (making up the majority of Rwandas population) favored by Flemish-speaking
priests; maybe several thousand people (Madsen, 1999; Chrtien, 2003), this transition
beginning in the late 1930s. Some called these elite the fourth ethnic group; Hutu, Tutsi,
Batwa Pygmies and the educated elite minority. In 1957, with support from the White
Fathers, a Catholic order, nine Hutu intellectuals from the seminary issued the Manifesto of
the Bahutu, raising the issue of the indigenous racial problem and the monopoly over access
to the best education and leadership roles by Tutsi and denounced them as beneficiaries of
Hamitic domination.

By 1958, Tutsi notables published documents attributing the

founding of Rwanda to the Tutsi and denying any relationship to the Hutu.

With

independence around the corner, the Tutsi created the Rwandan National Union/Union
Nationale

Rwandaise

(UNAR)

and

the

Hutu

Rwandan

(Assembly)/Rassemblement Dmocratique Rwandaise (RADER).

Democratic

Rally

By 1959, ethnic-based

slaughter occurred on both sides in the north and center of the country (Chrtien, 2003).
Some 300 people died in the violence, known as the Muyaga Massacres, as these two
ethnically divided parties vied for power. With the Winds of Change fueling the fire, the
Belge wanted out (Madsen, 1999).

13.8.6.2 Independence, control by an impoverished majority

Belgian paratroopers from the Congo moved in and Belgium reversed traditional Tutsi/Hutu
relationships, which it helped formalize, De-UNARizing the country by replacing half the
Tutsi chiefs and 300 of 500 sub-chiefs with Hutu, followed by communal elections giving the
Hutu the majority. This was called a revolution under trusteeship or an assisted one, with

the ruling party Party of the Movement of Emancipation of the Bahutu /Parti du Mouvement
et de lEmmancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU) being racist to the point that other Hutu parties
denounced it in vain. PARMEHUTU claimed to restore Rwanda to its owners and invited the
Tutsi to return to Abyssinia. The 1959-61 social revolution would shape Rwandas politics
for the next three decades (Chrtien, 2003).

The 1960 elections, resulting in the Hutu winning 90% of the political posts, gave an
impoverished majority political control over an economically powerful minority (Chabal &
Daloz, 1999), which Chua (2003) has shown is a recipe for disaster (see Chapter 11, Section
11.6.3, Neo-Patrimonial Clientelism, The Big Man and Cosmetic Democracy) that was
exasperated by scarce resources land (see Chapter 5, Section 5.9.4.6, Deforestation in
afromontane forests, Rwanda, Over-Population and Land Degradation Linked to
Deforestation for Agriculture and Political Destabilization). At a stroke of the pen, the Tutsi
monarch was deposed (Madsen, 1999). Dallaire (2003) places independence as 1962, run by
a Hutu dominated government and the charismatic leader, Gregoire Kayibanda. In essence,
Belgium reversed traditional relationships between these two groups along democratic
Western principles where the majority rule. This failed, as rule was along ethnic as opposed
to ideological lines, which tends to define party politics in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the
majority of populations are uneducated and define their allegiances to extended family, ethnic
group, village chief and king/marabou, with the spirit of nationalism and citizenry being far
down the line (Chabal & Daloz, 1999).

The way forward of fitting Western ideals of democracy within these cultural differences
must be found by the 21st century generation of educated Africans. As discussed, President
Museveni of Uganda was the first to break the Cookie Cutter Mold imposed on Africa of
One Man One Vote Multi-Party Elections, which to date have proven less than successful
in creating representative governments (see Chapter 11, Section 11.6.6.2, Uganda,
democracy, civil war and attempts to find an African solution).

Tutsi were forced to flee by the politically dominant Hutu majority, which by the 1980s
resulted in 700,000 refugees in Uganda, Zaire and Tanzania. By 1964, Tutsi manhunt
massacres of up to 10,000 people were beginning. Leading Tutsi party politicians were
executed and by 1966 the Party of the Movement of Emancipation of the Bahutu /Parti du
Mouvement et de lEmmancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU) became the only party, with

blessing from the Catholic hierarchy. Hutu suspected of being closely tied to Tutsi were
considered as hybrids or those who had switched ethnic groups. Regional in-fighting within
the Hutu political structure resulted in a 1973 coup detat moving the Hutu power from the
center to the northern part of the country, putting in power General Habyarimana and
eventually a new party of power, the National Revolutionary Movement for
Development/Mouvement Rvolutionnaire National pour le Dveloppement (MRND)
(Chrtien, 2003). Initially, this occurred at the height of the Cold War, with the West backing
the Hutu, while the Tutsi refugees were backed by the communists (Gasana, 2002 In:
Matthew, Halle & Switzer, 2002). Eventually, with the end of the Cold War, the French
would back the Hutu and the Americans the Tutsi, only this time not for ideological reasons,
but for wealth and greed as usual at the expense of Africa and its people. Habyarimanas
Second Republic represented northern elite, but was rapidly undermined by numerous
dualities: 1) Rural poverty, 2) The north/south divide, 3) The Hutu/Tutsi Divide and 4) Rich
versus Poor. As an insurance policy, Habyarimana allied himself with Jacques Foccart,
Monsieur Afrique, who pretty much determined Frances African policy from the 1960s
through to the mid-1990s (Madsen, 1999). Habyarimana used gorilla conservation politically
to obtain Western financial and military aid, which, along with his being given conservation
awards, led many Rwandans to believe that Westerners cared more about gorillas than the
wellbeing of those being massacred nearby (Vande weghe, 2004) (see Chapter 3, Section
3.6.1, Separation of Maasai from Ngorongoro Crater and Chapter 11, Section 11.11.6.3,
Failure to integrate Baka into managed bushmeat harvests).

Colonial-era-like social engineering began in which the Tutsi minority could occupy only 9%
of the school and job positions, extending ethnic consciousness to new generations thereby
creating an ethno-racial democracy. The Hamitic myth under which it was born, came out of
colonialism (Chrtien, 2003), but was supported by foreign aid through Western donors.
Habyarimanas corrupt totalitarian rule would last two decades, while the majority lived in
poverty (Chua, 2003). Habyarimana was a master, using development to milk the European
and American donors. By law, every citizen was a member of the party (Gourevitch, 1998).

13.8.6.3 Overpopulation and SAP impacting agriculture

Since 95% of Rwanda was under cultivation (see Chapter 5, Section 5.9.4.6, Deforestation in
afromontane forests, Rwanda, Over-Population and Land Degradation Linked to

Deforestation for Agriculture and Political Destabilization) and there was little room for
expansion, Habyarimana declared Rwanda full, excluding the idea of Tutsi refugees being
repatriated to their homeland (Gourevitch, 1998). By 1990, there was an estimated 174
persons/km2 (450 inhabitants/mi2) (Rosenblum & Williamson, 1990). Gasana (2002, In:
Matthew, et al., 2002) estimated 290 inhabitants/km2 territory and 843 inhabitants/km2 of
arable land in 1994. Habyarimana also alienated southern-based Hutu, favoring Hutu from his
home in the northwestern section of the country (Gourevitch, 1998; Gasana, 2002 In:
Matthew, et. al., 2002). In a classical pattern of neo-paternalism, the omnipotent President
and his cronies grew rich at the expense of both downtrodden Hutu and Tutsi. Every hill had
its chief and, in descending order under the chief, deputies and sub-bosses in a classical
patron-client relationship that kept Habyarimana in power, who became the chief of chiefs or
Mwami. These northwesterners controlled the government parastatals, as well as the military.
Rwanda appeared Edenic to foreign donors, the rest of the continent being covered by client
dictators of the Cold War ruling by pillage and murder (Gourevitch, 1998).
If you were a bureaucrat with a foreign-aid budget to unload, and your
professional success was to be measured by your ability not to lie or gloss too
much when you filed happy statistical reports at the end of each fiscal year,
Rwanda was the ticketThe hills were thick with young whites working
albeit unwittingly, for the glory of Habyarimana (Gourevitch, 1998).
By 1986, Rwandas chief exports, coffee and tea, crashed on the world market (see Chapter
12, Section 12.2.5, ILO Demands an End to Subsidies and Trade Barriers), with the only easy
profit left being scammed foreign-aid projects, with competition for the spoils among
Habyarimanas northwesterners being particularly intense. Sogge (2002) blames the crash in
coffee prices (drop of -64% price between 1980 and 2000), that heightened or exacerbated
ethnic tension, on USAID and the World Bank, who vigorously promoted coffee farming
among poor smallholders, not only in Rwanda, but many other countries, until there was a
glut on the world market. Structural adjustment austerity programs (SAP) added to the
collapse of world prices for coffee and tea (Diamond, 2005). This impoverished tens of
thousands of Rwandan farmers. Meanwhile, the International Finance Institutions (IFIs)
praised both Rwanda and Burundi as good performers in free-market fundamentalism (SAP)
right up until the genocide (Sogge, 2002).

Madsen (1999) believes that the structural

adjustment program of the World Bank/IMF resulted in a return to famine, something not

seen for 20 years, accentuating the hostility between Hutus and Tutsis that led to later acts of
genocide.
By 1988, Western aid underwrote about 60% of Rwandas annual budget (see Chapter 11,
Section 11.6.7, Foreign Aid and Puppet Governments Donor Democracy). The economic
collapse of the late 1980s left tens of thousands of young men without any hope for work,
ripe for recruitment into the Hutu Interahamwe, those who attack together (Gourevitch,
1998). These masses of disenfranchised, poor, under-educated and frustrated youth are a key
component for much of the turbulence across Sub-Saharan Africa.
13.8.6.4 Franco-American competition begins, 1990
On October 1, 1990, several thousand Anglophone Tutsi soldiers from the Ugandan National
Resistance Army (NRA), who formed the armed wing of the Tutsi dominated (with some
Hutu) Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), with support from President Museveni of Uganda
attacked northeast Rwanda. These Tutsi, comprising 20% of Musevenis army, had helped
Yoweri Museveni, a Hima, liberate Uganda from Milton Obote in 1986 (Gourevitch, 1998;
Chrtien, 2003). Museveni was considered the linchpin in an Anglo-Saxon plot to seize
control of Central Africa and its natural resources (Madsen, 1999). The RPF was against
Tutsi backed Rwandan National Union/Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR)s monarchist
tradition and was supported by several key Hutu leaders who were disgusted by the
corruption and nepotism of the Habyarimana regime. This initial incursion was put down by
the Rwandese Armed Forces/Forces Armes Rwandaises (RAF/FAR) with backing by
French, Belgian and Zairian contingents (Gourevitch, 1998; Chrtien, 2003) under Operation
Noiroit, as the result of a 1975 defense pact sighed between Habyarimana and the thenPresident Valery Giscard dEstaing (Madsen, 1999).

This may have been the beginning of a period of defensive action in which France began
aggressively maintaining its sphere of influence over its former French colonies and other
Francophone countries from Anglophone influence, especially the Americans, who have
provided strong backing to Museveni since he took power in 1986 and eventually Paul
Kagame in Rwanda (Madsen, 1999). Paul Kagame of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
continued the guerilla war in the north with support from Uganda (Gourevitch, 1998;
Chrtien, 2003). The Americans provided military training to the RPF (Madsen, 1999;
OBrien, 2000; Pech, 2000 both In: Musah & Fayemi, 2000) and Uganda (OBrien, 2000 In:

Musah & Fayemi, 2000), while France provided military training to Rwandas Hutu army, a
proxy war fought by Africans for control of natural resources in Central Africa by the
superpowers (Madsen, 1999), these resources being mostly next door in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. France funneled huge shipments of armaments to Rwanda right through
the killings in 1994 (Gourevitch, 1998).

In desperation, by April 1992, Habyarimana was obliged to move towards a multi-party

power sharing system with four opposition parties in creating a coalition government that
would move towards a democratic transition. It is believed that this multi-party system
was given birth in Habyarimanas attempt to retain control under tensions caused by
environmental scarcities, war, ethnicity and regional factions. However, this resulted in a
loss of state control and the rapid empowerment of radical factions, creating tri-polar politics
of Habyarimanas party National Revolutionary Movement for Development/Mouvement
Rvolutionnaire National pour le Dveloppement (MRND), opposition parties and the RPF,
with undertones of landless rural youth whose membership was courted by various political
parties (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002).

There was a total of four major incursions by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), each one
pushing Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), mainly Hutu further south, crowding them into
already resource scarce areas, heightening the tension between rural people, while creating
the beginning of ethnic hatred as Hutu were pushed off their land by a Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) comprised primarily of Tutsi (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002):

October-December, 1990, 30,000 inhabitants of Muvumba and Ngarama fled their

homes;

By end of 1991, it rose to 350,000 IDPs;

By July 1992, 500,000 IDPs; and

By February 1993 >1 million IDPs as RPF violates cease-fire and resumes war,
followed by another 350,000 Hutu refugees coming out of Burundi after the
assassination of President Ndadaye.

The war caused a major food crisis, both in local production and transport of food aid an
ecological and logistical disaster, resulting in the average available energy of 1,100

calories/person/day (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002), about half the minimal daily
requirement to subsist for an adult. In essence, by 1994 the war was causing 800,000 people
to starve to death, while political elites struggled for power and control of state resources.

Habyarimana let it be known that political disorder would lead to interethnic violence. On
the ground, there were no spontaneous reprisals against the Tutsi except for that which was
politically orchestrated. As new opposition parties emerged and propaganda in the form of
the Hutu Ten Commandments against the Tutsi cockroaches (inyenzi) and their Hutu
accomplishes (ibyitso), bloodbaths began by 1992 linked to the Hutu Interahamwe, a militia
of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development/Mouvement Rvolutionnaire
National pour le Dveloppement (MRND). The Interahamwe was largely made of landless,
uneducated youth from IDP camps and urban poor, who had no real ideological commitment,
but to serve those who paid them and fed them (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002) in
essence, young child soldiers mercenaries for hire. The Hutu Ten Commandments
included (Guest, 2004): 1) Hutu men should never marry or befriend Tutsi women, 2) Every
Tutsi was a cheat and any Hutu doing business with a Tutsi was a traitor, 3) All strategic
positions, including political, administrative, economic, military and security should be
occupied by a Hutu and 4) Hutus must stop having mercy on the Tutsi. In 1993, the Tutsi
RPF undertook reprisals, forcing one million people to flee the north towards Kigali.

The August 1993 Arusha peace accord with the RPF, provided the RPF with five key
government portfolios out of 21, with the military split 60% Rwandese Armed Forces/Forces
Armes Rwandaises (RAF/FAR) (mostly Hutu) and 40% RPF forces (mostly Tutsi), while
command at all levels would be equally shared. This accord did not last for long, being
broken before it could really be implemented (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002). By
November 1993, the UN Blue Hats had arrived as peace keeping forces. However, a Tutsidominated army takeover of Burundi in October 1993, cost the lives of elected President
Ndadaye and other Hutu officials and eventually, the lives of 100,000 people. The RPF
looked too much like the Tutsi dominated army of Burundi (Chrtien, 2003).

13.8.6.5

Next door Burundi

On the contrary, in neighboring Burundi, initially at the time of independence, politics

revolved around ideological differences of two princely Tutsi factions, one supporting

Burundi remaining friendly to Belgium, the other supporting independence. Racism was
not an issue. In fact, the party of independence, the Party of National Unity and
Progress/Unit Pour le Progrs National (UPRONA), was popular among Hutu, Tutsi,
Muslim and Christian and had a majority membership made of Hutu. The United Nations
supervised legislative elections in 1961 and handed control to UPRONA. Independence was
declared on July 1, 1962, with the political class of educated elites splitting into two factions
based on in which school they were educated. Elections in 1964 continued to give UPRONA
a majority. However, with 67% (2/3rds) of parliament being Hutu, with the appointment of a
Tutsi prime minister, the Hutu leader in collaboration with the gendarmerie, organized a coup
detat in October 1965 and Tutsi massacres began, with reprisals on the Hutu political class
from the Tutsi dominated military. From then on, a block formed among the Tutsi who were
determined to control the government and army with law-and-order anti-Hutu policies. The
monarchy was abolished, followed by a new politic of revenge. Hutu civilian and military
leaders were assassinated in 1969, followed by liberal Tutsi royalists in 1971. In April
1972, a Hutu rebellion scourge organized by exiled leaders in East Africa, resulted in
several thousand Tutsi in the south being killed, followed by a genocide of Hutu elites by
Tutsi in May and June, leaving 150,000 dead and 300,000 as refugees in Rwanda and
Tanzania (Chrtien, 2003). The break between Hutu and Tutsi became as acute as it was in
Rwanda, founded on omnipresent fear,
What is it to be Hutu or Tutsi? It is being neither Bantu or Hamite nor serf or
master! It is to remember who killed one of your close relations 15 years ago
or to wonder who will kill your child in 10 years, each time with a different
answer (Chrtien, 2003).
In Rwanda and Burundi in the late 1980s, two clichs were inescapable, democracy of the
Hutu majority in Kigali and national unity with strong Tutsi law-and-order in Bujumbura
(Chrtien, 2003). Chua (2003) believes it was political liberalization along with Belgium
racism and favoritism, as well as decades of corrupt dictatorship, that unleashed longsuppressed ethnic tensions and thus, laid the groundwork for genocide of what she calls a
deeply resented, disproportionately wealthy outsider minority, the Tutsi.

13.8.6.6

Let the genocide begin, America stops potential intervention through the
United Nations

The straw that finally broke the camels back in the lead up to genocide was on April 6, 1994,
with the shooting down of a plane as it landed at Kigali, Rwanda, returning from Dar es
Salaam, resulting in the deaths of both Presidents Juvnal Habyarimana of Rwanda and
Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi (Madsen, 1999; Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002;
Chrtien, 2003). This event took place at a moment of extreme ethnic tension in both Rwanda
and Burundi in which three Hutu Presidents (Habyarimana, Ntaryamira and Ndadaye) had
been assassinated within six months. Hutu elites in the presidential guard and militias used
this incident in order to maintain control of the Rwandan state by rallying the poor and
resource starved masses against the Tutsi and the Tutsi-dominated RPF. By July 19, 1994,
the RPF had taken power, but not before a million people were slaughtered (Gasana, 2002 In:
Matthew, et. al., 2002). While the RPF army was disciplined, it still undertook reprisal
killings of from 25,000 to 60,000 people (Diamond, 2005).

Some believe this plane crash was orchestrated by extremist Hutu from the north, who then
militarily seized power (Chrtien, 2003), while others believe that this was undertaken by
Kagame and his U.S. backed RPF forces, with American disinformation being used to lay the
blame on militant Hutus (Madsen, 1999). Hammond (1996) states that Belgium troops with
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) identified the missiles coming
from the Hutu Rwandese Armed Forces/Forces Armes Rwandaises (RAF/FAR) military
base at Konombe. Madsen (1999) implies that America may have not only been aware, but
was possibly behind this action. Meanwhile, in March 2004, the French newspaper LeMonde
published excerpts from a report by an anti-terrorist judge that is the outcome of a six year
investigation, accusing President Kagame as being responsible for the plane crash (Bryant,
2004).

The same night of the plane crash the genocide in Rwanda began with the military supporting
the Interahamwe. The first to die were on a pre-prepared list of enemies: politicians,
journalists, lawyers and businessmen, followed by roadblocks killing anyone without a Hutu
identity card, Hutus with ID cards, but who looked Tutsi in appearance, Hutus who
refused to take place in the slaughter and anyone looking educated and prosperous thus
assumed to be a Tutsi. This rapidly spread to the countryside, where neighbors who had lived

in peace and harmony were suddenly demonic; Bush clearing referred to hacking men to
death and pulling roots referred to killing women and children (Guest, 2004).

This

genocide was not an anarchic effect of popular anger provoked by the death of the father of
the nation or an interethnic quarrel, but a deliberate choice by a moderate elite (Chrtien,
2003; Guest, 2004) who played on the fears and the frustrations of a poor, uneducated, overpopulated rural populace.
Well dressed assassins (e.g., Hutu Bourgeoisie) let the peasants dirty their hands, but they
were behind the lines coordinating events.

Thousands of youth without a future were

transformed into killers caught up in war hysteria. The misuse of lost disenfranchised youth
will be discussed again in the case studies on the Niger Delta (see Section 13.10.1.3, Oil and
Repression in the Niger Delta Nigeria) and Sierra Leone (see Section 13.10.2.1, Sierra
Leone, war and diamonds) and has already been raised earlier in concerns over the danger of
such youth being recruited into global terrorism. Chrtien (2003) also believes the spiral of
ethnization was accelerated by the Cold War, with Burundi as a base for the Chinese to aid
the Kivu based Lumumbist of Zaire (the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Rwanda a base
for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), each instrumentalizing ethnicity (e.g., CIA
working with Tutsi refugee nationalists) (Chrtien, 2003). This will be discussed in some
detail below, showing how the Western industrial-military complex is helping to continue
fueling anarchy in the Great Lakes region, aligning itself with various rebel and national
factions, while compartmentalizing the region as a means of accessing cheap natural
resources (Madsen, 1999).

In Rwanda, 800,000 people were killed in 100 days, mostly Tutsi, but also liberal Hutu,
amounting to 75% (3/4) of the resident Tutsi population in Rwanda (Chrtien, 2003;
Diamond, 2005) and 10% of the total population (Guest, 2004). This amounted to 333.333
people killed per hour or 5.5 people per minute losing their lives (Gourevitch, 1998). The
Twa, a Pygmy group making up only 1% of the population and at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale, were also massacred in the 1994 killings (Diamond, 2005).

13.8.6.7 Ultimate and proximate causes of Rwanda genocide

Diamond (2005) concludes that reprisals were not entirely ethnic, but also over scarce
resources, especially land (see Chapter 5, Section 5.9.4.6, Deforestation in afromontane

forests, Rwanda, Over-Population and Land Degradation Linked to Deforestation for

Agriculture and Political Destabilization). The ultimate causes of the Rwandan genocide were
population pressure, human environmental impacts and drought forming the powder inside
the keg; with the proximate causes - the match that lit the keg being ethnic hatred whipped up
by politicians and the downing of the airplane. In addition to population pressures, other
factors contributing to this genocide include (Diamond, 2005):

Tutsi domination of the Hutu;

Tutsi large-scale killings of Hutu in Burundi and small-scale ones in Rwanda;

Tutsi invasions of Rwanda;

Rwandas economic crisis;

Drought;

World Factors, including falling coffee prices and World Bank austerity measures
(SAP policies);

Hundreds of thousands of desperate young Rwandan men displaced as refugees in

resettlement camps, ripe for recruitment into militias; and

Competition among rival political groups willing to take power at all costs

Diamond (2005) fails to mention the American/French geo-political issues that came into
play.

An example is given in the northwestern Kanama commune where 99% or more of the
population is Hutu and land, not ethnicity, was the cause of killings. With population
densities in 1993 of 788 inhabitants/km 2, the median farm size in 1993 was 0.29 ha (0.72
acres) on average, broken into ten small partials of 0.03 ha each. Young people were unable
to acquire land, making it difficult to marry. A very big farm was about 1 ha and a very small
farm 0.24 ha. The percentage of very big farms and very small farms both increased between
1988 and 1993 from 5% to 8% for very big farms and from 36% to 45% for very small farms;
relatively speaking, a divide developing between the rich haves and the poor have-nots.
With more people living at home, the number of people per farm household increased from
4.9 to 5.3 between 1988 and 1993, resulting in the average household meeting only 77% of
its caloric needs from the farm, relying on off-farm income (e.g., brick making, carpentry,
sawing wood, trade). As all over Rwanda, these landless youth, averaging between 21 and 25

years old, without off-farm income, were resorting to violence and theft. Unfortunately, the
larger land owners also earned the largest off-farm incomes, increasing disparities. Between
1982 and 1990, the percentage of the population in the Kanama commune consuming less
than 1,600 calories/day, considered below famine level, increased from 9% to 40%. Land
disputes began to undermine the cohesion of traditional society; richer land owners expected
to help poor relatives, even though the richer landowners were still poor. Disputes increased
between fathers and sons over inheritance of land, as traditionally the oldest son was
expected to manage the land for the whole family, parceling out pieces to his younger
brothers. Now fathers were dividing the land among all sons to avoid conflicts after their
passing. The 1994 genocide created a unique opportunity to reshuffle land properties all over
Rwanda, in this case with Hutu killing Hutu (Diamond, 2005). Ultimately,
people whose children had to walk barefoot to school killed the people who
could buy shoes for theirs (Diamond, 2005).
13.8.6.8 United Nation fails to take action

The West, including the United Nations, buried its face in its hands, only reacting after the
fact with the Rwanda Tribunals in Arusha, which do not solve the problem and cost the
worlds taxpayers millions of dollars. The current Head of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,
then Chief of UN peacekeeping, refused to allow General Romo Dallaire and his 3,000
Blue Hats from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to take
action, seeing this as beyond the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR (Gourevitch, 1998). This
statement about Annan is reinforced by both Madsen (1999) and Dallaire (2003). This was
even though the General Assembly of the UN declared genocide a crime under international
law in the 1940s. The William (Bill) Jefferson Clinton Administrations UN ambassador,
and eventual Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, opposed UN intervention (Gourevitch,
1998; Madsen, 1999; Dallaire, 2003) even though Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary
General, pleaded to allow this intervention and condemned Americas inaction.

This

eventually resulted in his being dumped and replaced by a more docile Kofi Annan
(Madsen, 1999). Similarly, the Commission for Africa (2005) concludes that
just 5,000 troops with robust peace enforcement capabilities could have
saved half a million lives in Rwanda.

Dallaire (2003), though admitting Annan prevented him from intervening in the genocide, is
not so harsh a critic of Annan, nor does he garnish too much praise on Boutros-Ghali.
However, Dallaire (2003) does admonish the UN as an organization and the superpowers that
control this body for sending too little too late:

On April 22, 1994, about 16 days after the genocide started, UN Security Council
Resolution 912 voted for a skeleton UNAMIR force, actually forcing Dallaire to
withdraw about 1,000 troops to Nairobi with the idea of maybe getting them back if a
cease-fire was agreed on in Arusha.

On May 17, UN Security Council Resolution 918 authorized 5,500 troops, but was
vague on the genocide and the role that the UNAMIR force should play in stopping it,
the U.S. gutting the resolution.

By June 19, 1994, when he should have had 4,500 troops on the ground there were
only 503 men.

Not until July 1, 1994, did the UN Security Council pass Resolution 935 that
requested the secretary-general to establish a committee of experts to investigate
possible acts of genocide in Rwanda.
Ultimately, led by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, this
world body (United Nations) aided and abetted genocide in Rwanda. No
amount of cash and aid will ever wash its hands clean of Rwandan blood
(Dallaire, 2003).

Darfur, Sudan in 2004/2005 seems to be a repeat of this nonsense, the UN failing take in the
seriousness of reports coming in from the field and only after the fact, likely to acknowledge
genocide; another bureaucratic snafu (see Chapter 5, Section 5.11.4, Darfur, Sudan,
overpopulation, desertification, ethnicity, conflict and politics & Chapter 13, Section
13.10.1.6, Oil-scorched earth Sudan).

America was reluctant to get involved, having already been embarrassed in Somalia by a
combined force of Iranian Pasdaran and HizbAllah fighters, Iraqi al-Saiqah Commandos,
Iranian trained Somalis and Arab Afghans (Muslims trained in Afghanistan as mujahideen Islamic holy warriors) who shot down two American Blackhawk helicopters, killed 18
Americans and dragged their bodies through the streets of Mogadishu, wounded 78 and
captured a chopper pilot whom they displayed on international television (Madsen, 1999;

Bodansky, 2001; Dallaire, 2003; DeCapua, 2004). In addition, President William (Bill)
Jefferson Clinton felt the United States was already stretched thin by committing troops in
South Korea and Europe, as well as the possibility of a greater commitment in Bosnia, along
with reviving a UN agreement in Haiti (DeCapua, 2004).

Recent U.S. government documents released to the National Security Archive of George
Washington University, under the Freedom of Information Act, show that the William (Bill)
Jefferson Clinton administration was aware in late April 1994 that genocide was taking place,
about two weeks after the start of the killings. However, it did not use the word publicly until
much later, even though the intelligence community was using genocide as a description of
the problem by April 26, 1994. The official position of the White House in early June was
that the word genocide should not be used, that it was still impossible to determine if it was
genocide. The U.S. was not being asked to send troops, but rather was asked to give its
political support in sending more UN troops (DeCapua, 2004).

A Presidential Decree came out stating that America would contribute to peace keeping
operations only if it was in their vital interests. However, it was not in the interest of the
United States to seek a negotiated settlement in this conflict with support from UN peace
keeping forces (Madsen, 1999). Rwanda was an important piece of the puzzle needed by
America in its hegemony over Sub-Saharan Africa, especially Francophone Africa.

While white-on-black violence would make the international press for days on end, even
when the victim was one person (e.g., Rodney King), it seemed that black-on-black genocide
was largely ignored until after the fact. Was this the shame of the White Mans Burden for
another failure in social-engineering, stemming from colonialism or outright racism where
the death of primitive Africans failed to touch Western consciences? At the same time,
wildlife in Akagera National Park was virtually wiped out. In 2006, attitudes are changing as
Westerners demonstrate against genocide in Darfur, Sudan, but by early 2008 there has been
little action on the ground.

13.8.6.9

The French connection

The French established the Zone Turquoise in southern Rwanda, which served as a safe
haven for the proponents of Hutu Power where the killing continued unabated (Gourevitch,

1998; Madsen, 1999; Dallaire, 2003). The French hoped somehow to keep the pro-French
Hutu government and its Rwandese Armed Forces/Forces Armes Rwandaises (RAF/FAR)
in power over the onslaught of the U.S. backed English speaking Tutsi RPF movement
(Madsen, 1999). President Kagame has accused the French government of not only training
Hutu troops and forces that carried out the massacres, but in having a direct hand in the
killing (Bryant, 2004).

13.8.6.10 Big business for NGOs

About 750,000 former exiles, mostly Tutsi, returned to Rwanda (Diamond, 2005). Between
1.2 (Gasana, 2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002) and 1.5 million (Chrtien, 2003) to 2 million
(Diamond, 2005) Hutu fled to Zaire (the Democratic Republic of Congo) to escape revenge
and to a lesser degree, to Tanzania and Burundi. The Hutu refugee camps in the Democratic
Republic of Congo were controlled by armed members of the Rwandese Armed
Forces/Forces Armes Rwandaises (RAF/FAR), who expropriated up to 10% of all foreign
aid to support their actions (Chrtien, 2003). Humanitarian aid NGOs with Western aid
money, knowingly fed these Hutu Power perpetrators of genocide. The business was too
good, as 70% of the money went right into the pockets of the aid teams and their outfitters in
the form of overhead, supplies, equipment, staff housing, salaries, other benefits and assorted
expenses, leaving 25 cents a day/refugee, nearly twice the per capita income of the average
Rwandan. The humanitarian NGOs were treated rather like the service staff at a seedy
mafia-occupied hotel, providing food, medicine, house wares and an aura of respectability,
becoming accessories to the Hutu Power syndicate. A political crisis was treated as a
humanitarian crisis, perpetuating the political crisis and the suffering, misery and deaths of
many people. Diverted humanitarian aid was used to purchase arms (Gourevitch, 1998) (see
Chapter 11, Section 11.7.2, Foreign Assistance Conditionalities Good Business for Donor
County Not Recipient/Host Country).

13.8.6.11 French and U.S. arm proxies for the takeover of the Democratic Republic of
Congo
France, with Mobutu Sese Sekos accord, was known to have been directly and indirectly
involved in supplying Hutu refugees with arms to continue their persecution of Tutsi, both
in Rwanda and in the North/South Kivu provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo

(Madsen, 1999). It is estimated that ex-Hutu Rwandese Armed Forces/Forces Armes

Rwandaises (RAF/FAR), (reassembled in the Democratic Republic of Congo), made up
about 7% of the 1.5 million refugees fleeing Rwanda. They continued to re-arm and train
with the Zairian Armed Forces/Forces Armes Zaroises (FAZ), while using refugee camps
as launching pads for FAR cross-border raids into Rwanda and Burundi (Pech, 2000 In:
Musah & Fayemi, 2000).

This forced the American-backed RPF (Tutsi under Kagame), with backing from Uganda, to
support Kabila under the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
/Alliance des Forces democratique pour la liberation du Congo (AFDL/ADFL) to overthrow the French-backed Mobutu Sese Seko government. Mabutu was what Museveni called
an agent of his Western puppeteers, while the Hutu Power genocidaires owed their
sustenance to the mindless dispensation of Western charity, with the false promises of
international protection followed by swift abandonment of hundreds of thousands of civilians
in the face of extreme violence (Gourevitch, 1998) (see Section 13.10.3.1, U.S. government
involvement in the DRC and Section 13.10.3.2, U.S. military aid).

13.8.6.12 The aftermath in Rwanda

On July 19, 1994, a Government of National Unity was created that was to conform to the
Arusha accords, with Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu member of the RPF as President, a Hutu
prime minister and Paul Kagame, Vice-President and Minister Of Defense and thus head of
the Rwandan Patriotic Army that grew out of the RPF (Chrtien, 2003; Dallaire, 2003). By
1996, Rwanda began its pursuit of military adventurism, as would Uganda, Zimbabwe,
Namibia and Angola among others, linked to resource booties as described below (Madsen,
1999) (see Section, 13.10.3, Congo-Kinshasa DRC, Sub-Saharan Africas world resource
war). It should be noted that in 1998, U.S. military trained Paul Kagame was elected
Chairman of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a partner in the Government of National
Unity. On April 17th, 2000, Paul Kagame was unanimously elected President of the Republic
of Rwanda by the Transitional National Assembly. He took the Oath of Office on April 22nd,
2000 (Kagame, 2005) and still holds the position in 2008.

The RPF control all important institutions in Rwanda; the army, police, bureaucracy,
judiciary, banks, universities and state-owned companies. Elections can be annulled if the

winner campaigns on a divisionist platform. Most Tutsis believe that the only way to
prevent another slaughter is for the RPF to remain in permanent power. Though efficient,
while maintaining peace, there are complaints of censorship and, as will discussed below (see
Section, 13.10.3 Congo-Kinshasa DRC, Sub-Saharan Africas world resource war), Kagame
and the RPF are ruthless, having been involved in the slaughter of Hutus just across the
border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Guest, 2004), with incursions occurring as late
as December 2004.

Ten years after the Rwanda genocide, while registering strong economic growth, the
Rwandan government is being accused as authoritarian and prejudiced against the Hutu as
80% of the 200 most important positions in government are Tutsi, even though they make up
only 15% of the population. The Tutsi in power were being accused of being elitist, just as
the Hutu are accused, not necessarily representing the true interests of the Tutsi population.
Hutu appointed to prominent positions have shadow Tutsi making key decisions (e.g.,
Permanent Secretary for a Minister, First Council for an Ambassador). The RPF claims that
it is all inclusive and although having 80% of the seats in parliament, they make up only 50%
of the cabinet. Some also say that there are Tutsi political elite divisions and rivalries within
the RPF that could destabilize the country, even resulting in a coup detat (Eagle, 2004).

Gasana (2002 In: Matthew, et. al., 2002) is concerned that there is still a winner-take-all
mentality rather than a win-win relationship between both ethnic groups. There is still a fear
by both ethnic groups that the one in power will dominate and oppress the one out of power,
with an ethnic-based military backing an ethno-political regime as opposed to security of
people and the environment. This threatens the survival of society, partitioning it into rival
ethnic groups united by enmity and fear.

13.8.6.13 Post-genocide Burundi

Meanwhile, in Burundi, Madsen (1999) indicates that Pierre Buyoya, as the Tutsi dictator
from 1988-1992, presided over the slaughter of thousands of Hutu. By 1992, there was a
democratic constitution where amnesty was offered to returning refugees and President
Buyoya, a Tutsi, expressed that (Madsen, 1999)

 Burundi is not exclusively a country of Bahutu where Batutsi are only

guests. It is no longer a country of Batutsi where Bahutu are only second-class
citizens.
A Hutu, Melchior Ndadaye, was elected the first civilian head of State in 1993 with a desire
to eradicate ethnic sickness, forming a government that was 33% (1/3rd) Tutsi. However, a
military takeover in 1993 threw much of this into question, resulting in the assassination of
Ndadaye (Chrtien, 2003). Buyoya was linked to this assassination and the slaying of
100,000 Hutus (Madsen, 1999). This was followed by a UN brokered election of Ntaryamira
as President (Chrtien, 2003), who died in the plane crash, followed by a coup (once again by
Buyoya) on June 25, 1996, against a democratically elected Hutu President, Sylvestre
Nitbantunganya (Madsen, 1999).

The Tutsis believed that Nitbantunganya was providing cover for militant Hutus. Within
three weeks after Buyoya seized power, 6,000 Hutu civilians were killed. Nitbantunganyas
government was also seen as pro-Mobutu Sese Seko and thus, pro-French. Buyoya fit into
the plans of the Clinton Administration, linked to the Tutsi allies in Rwanda, Uganda and
eastern Zaire that would be used to take Kinshasa, overthrowing Mobutu Sese Seko, while
placing Laurent Kabila in power as an American puppet. By August 1996, Burundian Tutsi
troops conducted joint operations with Rwandan RPF forces on Burundi Hutu refugee camps
in the South Kivu Province where the Burundian Hutu rebel group, Forces For the Defense of
Democracy/Forces de Defense de la Dmocratie (FDD), had its headquarters (Madsen 1999).

By 1998, there were two vice-presidents in Burundi, a Hutu and Tutsi (Chrtien, 2003). This
partnership is considered fragile and illusionary, with Burundi being trapped in two extremist
camps, 1) The Tutsi conglomerate that controls the army and 2) The Hutu conglomerate
hoping for a Rwandan model (Chrtien, 2003). Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu, succeeded
Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, as head of a three-year transitional government on 30 April 2003,
each serving for a period of 18 months. He had served as Vice-President during Mr. Buyoya's
18-month term. The government was set up in November 2001 as part of efforts to end ten
years of civil war between the Tutsi minority, which has traditionally ruled the country, and
the Hutu majority (BBC Monitoring, 2003). At the end of this three-year period, elections
will be held. The first ever African Union peace keeping force was established in April 2003,
consisting of South African, Mozambican and Ethiopian troops in attempts to arrange cease
fires between the government and various rebel groups (Africa Online, 2003) such as Forces

of National Liberation and Forces For the Defense of Democracy/Forces de Defense de la

Dmocratie (FDD) (Dougherty, 2003).

However, by December 2003, the UN Security

Council agreed to send in a peace keeping force, as the AU did not have sufficient funds to
continue the process (Africa Online, 2003).

Chrtien (2003) goes on to explain how the political-military elite from the hills of Rwanda
in 1959 to the forests of Zaire in 1997 and throughout the Great Lakes region today, exploit
the masses through a strategy of ethnic conscious raising and related tactics of excitement.
Some call this political tribalism, flowing down from high-political intrigue through
external competition, as opposed to politically constructive moral ethnicity that creates
communities from within through domestic controversy over civic virtue (Chabal and Daloz,
1999) (see Chapter 11, Section 11.3, NEO-IMPERIALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
and Section, 11.6.3, Neo-Patrimonial Clientelism, The Big Man and Cosmetic
Democracy). The misuse of ethnicity through political tribalism is not unique to SubSaharan Africa, being seen recently in the former Yugoslavia.

Diamond (2005) concludes,

overpopulation, environmental impact and climate change cannot persist
indefinitely: sooner or later they are likely to resolve themselves, whether in
the manner of Rwanda or in some other manner not of our devising, if we
dont succeed in solving them by our own actionssimilar motivesmay
operate again in Rwanda itself, where population today is growing 3%/year,
women are giving birth to their first child at age 15, the average family has
between 5-8 children and a visitor has the sense of being surrounded by a sea
of children.
Similarly, General Dallaire (2003) states,
Rwanda was a warning for all of us of what lies in store if we continue to
ignore human rights, human security and abject povertyBut many signs
point to the fact that the youth of the Third World will no longer tolerate living
in circumstances that give them no hope for the futurewe can no longer
afford to ignore themthe global village is deteriorating at a rapid pace and in
the children of the world the result is rageHuman beings who have no
rights, no security, no future, no hope and no means to survive are a desperate
group who will do desperate things to take what they believe they need and
deserveif we do not immediately address the underlying (even if misguided)
causes of those young terrorists rage (referring to 911 bombing of the World
Trade Center, New York), we will not win the warThe lack of hope in the

future is the root cause of rage. If we cannot provide hope for the untold
masses of the world, then the future will be nothing but a repeat of Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, The Congo and September 11this new century must become a
Century of HumanityPeux ce que veux. Allons-y.