REMEDIAL LAW

2010
PCI LEASING and FINANCE, INC., vs. ANTONIO C. MILAN [G.R. No. 151215 April 5, 2010]
Civil Procedure
DOCTRINE: If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his
evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
FACTS: The instant case was commenced upon the filing of a Complaint for Sum of Money by
petitioner PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing) against respondents Antonio C. Milan
(Antonio) and Laura M. Milan. PCI Leasing alleged that it extended loans to respondents for
which Deeds of Assignment were duly executed by respondents. Under the terms of the Deeds,
respondents sold, assigned and transferred to PCI Leasing the formers rights to various checks
for and in consideration of the amounts obtained. Subsequently, when PCI Leasing presented
the checks for payment, the same were dishonored. Despite repeated demands, respondents
failed to settle their obligation, which amounted to P2,327,833.33. PCI Leasing was then
compelled to litigate to enforce payment of the total loan obligation.
The RTC issued summons to respondents however the summons and the copy of the complaint
were returned unserved for the reason that when the process server went to the respondents
residence, he was told by the neighbors that the respondents had already transferred to an
unknown location.
PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons, which the RTC scheduled for
hearing. During the hearing of the motion, there was no appearance from both counsels of PCI
Leasing and respondents. Accordingly, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the case. PCI
Leasing sought a reconsideration of the above Order but was denied.
PCI Leasing filed a Notice of Appeal in an attempt to challenge the Order of the RTC. The RTC
rendered a Resolution dismissing the Notice of Appeal, on the ground that the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, PCI Leasing assailed the above Resolution before
the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The
appellate court dismissed outright the petition holding that the petition for certiorari was filed
out of time.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition filed by petitioner, depriving
petitioner of its right to recover the sums it had loaned to the private respondents,
for being filed out of time. YES
HELD:
The Court held that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed.
In the instant case, the crux of the controversy involves the property of PCI Leasing, i.e., the
sum of money supposedly owed to it by the respondents. It will not serve the ends of
substantial justice if the RTCs dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would
be automatically upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the
procedural lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with bad faith or tantamount to
abuse or misuse of court processes.

In this instance, PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse to collect the amount of
P2,327,833.33 it loaned to the respondents. Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred
from collecting the aforesaid amount, respondent Antonio stands to be unjustly enriched at the
expense of PCI Leasing.
REMEDIAL LAW
2011
F.A.T. KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC. vs. ONLINE NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
[G.R. No. 171238 February 2, 2011]
Civil Procedure
DOCTRINE: One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the
representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and
circumspection. A lack of diligence by a party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. If the party conducts
himself with careless indifference to means of information reasonably at hand, or ignores highly suspicious
circumstances, he may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel.
FACTS: Petitioner F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. (FAT KEE) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of selling computer equipment and conducting maintenance services for the units it sold. ONLINE
is also a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of selling computer units, parts and
software.
ONLINE sold computer printers to FAT KEE. However, FAT KEE failed to pay its obligations to ONLINE
without any valid reason. ONLINE filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against FAT KEE.
During the trial FAT KEE insisted that the conversion rate they agreed upon was P34: US$1 and not P40 as
insisted by ONLINE.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of ONLINE for the latters failure to establish its claim. The appellate
court reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that even granting that FAT KEE was of
the impression that P34: $1 was the applicable rate for its obligation; ONLINE cannot be put in estoppel as
this was immediately rectified by ONLINE.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN renders the petition of FAT
KEE fatally defective. NO
2. Whether or not ONLINE is estopped as to the conversion rate used. NO
HELD:
1. Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court indeed requires the attachment to the petition for review on
certiorari such material portions of the record as would support the petition. However, such a
requirement was not meant to be an ironclad rule such that the failure to follow the same would
merit the outright dismissal of the petition.
2. One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on the ground that he has been misled by the
representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and
circumspection. A lack of diligence by a party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. Thus, after
participating in the meeting on January 15, 1998, submitting its own proposals and further
negotiating for the lowering of the exchange rate, FAT KEE cannot anymore insist that it was
completely under the impression that the applicable exchange rate was P34: US$1.

REMEDIAL LAW
2014
HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL vs. HEIRS OF ANGEL MIGUEL [GR NO. 158916 MARCH 19,
2014]
Civil Procedure
DOCTRINE: Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then
res judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity
of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment
applies.
FACTS: The petitioners are the surviving children of the deceased Cornelio Miguel, while the respondents
are the widow and the children of the petitioners own brother, Angel Miguel.
Cornelio Miguel was the registered owner under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. S-14 of a 93,844
sq.m. parcel of land situated at Barrio Calero, Puerto Princesa City in Palawan. He had the property
subdivided into ten smaller lots which were designated as Lots A to J of Psd-146880. Cornelio sold nine of
the lots to his children, with Lot G going to his son Angel, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents in this
case. The remaining lot, Lot J, Cornelio kept for himself and his wife, Nieves.
The spouses Cornelio and Nieves were the registered owners of another property in Calero, Puerto Princesa
City with an area of 172,485 sq.m. It was designated as Lot 2 of Psd-146879 and covered by OCT No. G- 211.
The land was subsequently subdivided into nineteen smaller lots.
Several cases were filed even though there was already a judgment on the prior cases
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petition is barred by res judicata? YES
HELD:
Identity of parties is a requisite in the application of conclusiveness of judgment. So long as the parties or
their privies are identical, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of judgment as explained in Section 47(c)
of the same Rule. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases,
then res judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as conclusiveness of
judgment applies.

REMEDIAL LAW
2012
FELIMON MANGUIOB vs. JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, RTC, BRANCH 12, DAVAO CITY and
ALEJANDRA VELASCO [GR NO. 152262 February 15, 2012]
Civil Procedure
DOCTRINE: A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
FACTS: The petitioner filed a petition under Rule 45 but he raised an issue that is not purely a question of
law.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court may grant the said petition? NO.
HELD:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set
of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed
is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a
question of fact.

REMEDIAL LAW
2012
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(DLSUEA-NAFTEU)
Civil Procedure
DOCTRINE: The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
FACTS: This petition involves one of the three notices of strike filed by respondent De La Salle University
Employees Association (DLSUEA- NAFTEU) against petitioner De La Salle University due to its refusal to
bargain collectively with it in light of the intra-union dispute between respondents two opposing factions.
This petition seek only one relief, that is, to absolve petitioner from respondents charge of committing an
unfair labor practice, or specifically, a violation of Article 248(g) in relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the assailed decision can be petitioned under rule 45 on the questions of law. NO
HELD:
Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that as early as November 2003 it had already released the
escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the latter. The fact remains that from its
receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until its receipt of the
November 17, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner failed in its duty to
collectively bargain with respondent union without valid reason. At most, such subsequent acts of
compliance with the issuances in OS-AJ-0015-2003 and OS-AJ-0033-2003 merely rendered moot and
academic the Secretary of Labors directives for petitioner to commence collective bargaining negotiations
within the period provided.
To conclude, we hold that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Labor and the Court of Appeals, as well as
the conclusions derived therefrom, were amply supported by evidence on record. Thus, in line with
jurisprudence that such findings are binding on this Court, we see no reason to disturb the same.