UNDERGRADUATE AWARDS LAW SUBMISSION

When would it be appropriate for a court in a common-law jurisdiction to freeze

assets within its own jurisdiction in support of litigation proceeding in another
jurisdiction?

ABSTRACT
A legal judgement is of minimal worth to a claimant if they are unable to enforce a judicial
finding in their favour. Such an inherently anti-climactic result is the very dilemma an
asset-freezing order seeks to obviate. However, although the asset-freezing order is a
device which has been developed with unpredicted speed and variety, various decisions in
different jurisdictions regarding the appropriateness of its deployment remain antithetical.
Specifically, there are intense jurisdictional differences in response to pleas to freeze assets
in one common-law jurisdiction in support of litigation proceeding in another. The
intention behind this paper is to dispel reasons against the granting of an order in this
scenario and to illustrate precisely why those submissions are unfounded and, more
importantly, unhelpful to successful claimants.

An analysis of how the order has evolved and been adapted in order to overcome
theoretical and procedural difficulties in this jurisdiction will reveal the strength of the
device in its present form. Exposition of the delicate balance achieved by the structure of
asset-freezing orders between ensuring effective remedy enforcement for claimants without
sacrificing due protection for defendants will galvanise the argument for its use. In order to
guarantee that jurisdiction-hopping cannot aid a devious defendant committed to robbing
the claimant of a viable remedy, it is submitted that there is a spectrum of change required.
At one end of the spectrum jurisdictions requiring minor legal updates are identified, at the
other end jurisdictions in need of substantial modification are highlighted.

The potential impact of approximating the laws of different jurisdictions on this question is
prodigious. The power of an asset-freezing order is presently undermined by the fact that it
can be avoided. To eliminate safe-haven regions where assets can be placed and remain
untouchable consequent to present jurisdictional disparities would cement the credibility
of the asset-freezing order and charge it with the global reach it requires in order to secure
faith in judicial remedy enforcement, and indeed faith in the entire legal system.

Undergraduate Awards 2012: Law

When would it be appropriate for a court in a common-law jurisdiction to freeze
assets within its own jurisdiction in support of litigation proceeding in another
jurisdiction?
INTRODUCTION
An asset-freezing order (AFO) is the name given to what, until rebranded by the
Civil Procedure Rules 1998,1 was known as a Mareva injunction. The first business of
this essay is to encapsulate the life of the Mareva by charting its growth over the past
thirty-seven years in a brief biography. A dissection of the anatomy of an AFO will
follow. Subsequently, consideration will be given to the importance of interjurisdictional litigation. Whether the AFO needs to be adapted in order to transcend
jurisdictional borders in the way posed by this question will then be discussed,
before a conclusion is reached.

MAREVA: THIS IS YOUR LIFE

Dastardly defendants prior to 1975 benefitted from a serious gap in the law. In order
to avoid the enforcement of judgements against them, said defendants were able to
whisk their assets away to a different jurisdiction beyond the reach of any claimants
who might wage a successful claim against them. This loophole endured due to the
conventional wisdom2 of the time grounded in Lister v Stubbs3 which was said to
prevent restraining defendants from dealing with their assets until judgement was
entered against them. This seeming barrier has long since been dismissed as
nonsensical because the injunction sought then required money to be paid into court,
converting the claimant into a secured creditor.4 As will be explained hereafter, the
interim relief design of a Mareva never envisaged preferential treatment to claimants
in this way and was not intended to be proprietary in nature, thus Lister was a
pernicious authority precluding the revolutionary development to come.

CPR 25.1(1)(f)
Philip Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts (11th edn, OUP 2009) 625
3 (1890) 45 Ch D 1 (CA)
4 David Capper, Mareva Injunctions (SLS Publications (NI) 1988) 17
1
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Then, in Nippon Yusen5 the loophole was reduced without reference to Lister; the
court basing its power on the predecessor6 to s 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, as
the court held it was just and convenient to grant a freezing order on the facts.

Mareva v International Bulkcarriers Ltd 7 was the second case to grant an order to freeze
assets in anticipation of dissipation, and became the eponym of the doctrine which
evolved rapidly thereafter. Lister was referred to the court but was not fatal (neither
was it settled as bad authority as Roskill J was concerned it may have had greater
influence at an inter partes hearing, however the doctrine survived an inter partes
hearing in the Rasu Maritime8 case). Lord Denning again based the courts power to
grant the order on its inherent jurisdiction under s 37(1), limiting its reach to foreign
based defendants. Although this limitation appears curious, it has been suggested
that a broader rule would have risked rejection by higher authorities. 9

The next hurdle to jump was the procedural point deployed in The Siskina10 which
established that a Mareva injunction could only be granted where there was a cause
of action within the jurisdiction. Whilst relief was not granted in the case, the
survival of the principal generally was an achievement nonetheless.

Further expansion of the principle occurred when it was decided that it was possible
to grant a Mareva injunction against both a foreign based defendant and a defendant
within the jurisdiction.11 The latter was included to prevent the possibility of
defendants collaborating with others within a jurisdiction who could transfer their
assets to another jurisdiction to stultify judgement.12

[1975] 1 WLR 1093

Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, s 45(1)
7 [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep 509
8 [1978] QB 644 (CA)
9 David Capper, The Mareva Injunction From Birth to Adulthood in E. ODell (ed), The Leading
Cases of the Twentieth Century (Round Hall, 2000) 260
10 [1979] AC 210 (CA and HL)
11 Chartered Bank v Daklouche [1980] 1 All ER 205 (CA); Barclay-Johnson v Yuill [1980] 3 All ER 190 (Ch
D); Rahman v Abu-Taha [1980] 1 WLR 1268 (CA)
12 See n 9, 263
5
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The survival of the principal was then endorsed by (what is now called) the Senior
Courts Act 1981, s 37(3). This eradicated the need to prove that a defendant would
dispose of his assets outside the jurisdiction as the words otherwise dealing with
were interpreted as being inclusive of this category of locally-dissipating defendant,
along with the previous categories.

The reach of the Mareva was next augmented by four significant cases.13 Their effect
was to allow the grant of a freezing order to preserve assets overseas. Neill LJ stated
unequivocally that in an appropriate case the court has power to grant an
interlocutory injunction even on a world-wide basis ... so as to prevent ... frustrating
a future judgement of the court.14 Power to grant was again said to be located in s
37(1) of the Senior Courts Act, together with s 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgements Act 1982.15 Worldwide freezing orders (WFOs) were thought to be a
necessary development given the increasing mobility of assets and the
interchangeability of modern international companies. 16 Thus, many of the cases
where WFOs have been granted involve financial institutions for which movement
of assets globally are logistically comparatively straightforward.17

However, the expansion was not implemented without regard to the obvious risk of
oppression to defendants and the potential difficulty in binding third-parties.

With respect to protecting the defendant, Parker LJ established that any order should
avoid exposing them to a multiplicity of proceedings and protect against the misuse
of information gained from usual ancillary orders of disclosure. 18 The circumstances
in which a courts discretion to permit the enforcement of a WFO in another

Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] Ch. 13 (CA); Republic of Haiti v Duvalier [1990] QB 202
(CA); Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 1) [1990] Ch. 48 (CA); Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (Nos 3 & 4) [1990]
Ch. 65 (CA)
14 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (Nos 3 & 4) [1990] Ch. 65 (CA), 93
15 David Capper, Worldwide Mareva Injunctions (1991) 54 MLR 329, 334
16 ibid
17 Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (6th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2010) 1090
18 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 1) [1990] Ch 48
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jurisdiction will be guided by the principles laid down by Arden LJ in Dadourian
Group International Inc v Simms.19 An attempt to paraphrase her ladyships guidance
is bound to misrepresent20 and it is outside the scope of this section.

It was also held that third-parties holding a defendants assets cannot be forced to
breach legal obligations owed in the country where they are situated, and thus a
Babanaft proviso will be suitably included in WFOs when appropriate. Such
injunctions would be binding only on the defendants personally. 21

The life of the AFO does not end here, but has reached a convenient stopping point.
Our dastardly defendant is no longer capable of effortlessly smuggling his assets out
of a judgements reach as he might have done prior to the legal developments which
began in 1975. Indeed, curtailing that practice has been described by Lord Denning
as the greatest piece of judicial law reform in [his] time,22 by Lord Hoffman as a
remarkable example of judicial creativity23 and by Donaldson LJ as one of the
laws two nuclear weapons.24

However, there remains one species of AFO which has been developed in English
courts but whose global future is in some domains speculative. It is this variety of
AFO on which the answer to the question posed turns, and therefore one will
reserve discussion of the matter until after the exposition of several procedural and
theoretical matters relating to both AFOs and inter-jurisdictional comity.

AN ANATOMY OF THE ASSET-FREEZING ORDER

Discussion thus far has focused on development of the legal basis and reach of
AFOs. As a precursor to the analysis of one particular species, it is important to
elucidate the procedure used generally, which is divided into five limbs below.
[2006] 1 WLR 2499
R Pearce et al, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations (5th edn, OUP 2010) 155
21 See n 15, 335
22 Lord Denning, The Due Process of Law (Butterworths 1980) 134
23 Steven Gee, Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller Relief (4th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1998) xiii
24 Bank Mellat v Nikpour [1985] FSR 87 (CA) 92
19
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1. Application
AFOs are prohibitory interlocutory injunctions obtainable ex parte (due to
considerations of urgency and secrecy25) which operate in personam
(restraining the defendant without giving the plaintiff any proprietary rights).
Given the potential oppression of granting an AFO which is later proved to
have been without justification, guidelines have been established26 which aim
to strike a balance between protecting an applicants claim and avoiding its
use as a weapon of oppression.27

Applicants are required to make full and frank disclosure of all matters which
are material for the judge to know. Failure to do so may result in the court
refusing, modifying of discharging the order.28 The obligation of disclosure is
thus used in a disciplinary manner if breached.

Given the ex parte nature of the application, claimants are required to state the
particulars of their claim as well as any responses which they believe may
have been advanced if the defendant were present. The applicant must have a
good arguable case before the order will be granted, which connotes a higher
standard than merely a prima facie case.29 Unlike Cyanamid guidelines for
interim injunctions generally,30 the court necessarily engages with the
strength of the claimants case.31

The claimant must show that the defendant has assets against which a
judgement can be enforced (precise information is not expected, but some
evidential indication is). 32 Furthermore, grounds must be given showing some
risk that the assets will be dissipated prior to the satisfaction of judgement.
Hilary Delaney, Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland (5th edn, Thomson Reuters 2011) 620
Chandris Shipping Corp v Unimarine SA [1979] 2 All ER 972
27 M Haley and L McMurtry, Equity & Trusts (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 646
28 Charles Russell LLP v Rehman [2010] EWHC 202 (Ch)
29 See n 17, 1089
30 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396
31 See n 26
32 ibid
25
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Crucially, the court has offered no succour to claimants seeking to secure their
award over that of other creditors. The order cannot be manipulated to ensure
a preferential guarantee (this design was alluded to earlier as the distinction
which was confused in the Lister case).

Finally, the applicant must give an undertaking to the court to pay any
damages that any defendants or third parties sustain which the court
considers the applicant should pay.33

2. Terms
AFOs are usually limited to assets not exceeding the value of the claim. 34
Allowance is made for legal fees to enable the defence of claims, but beyond
this the defendant is only entitled to draw upon his assets to pay for
legitimate expenses.35 Legitimate expenses include costs required in ongoing
business buttressing the ideology mentioned regarding the avoidance of
preferential guarantees.

3. Ancillary Orders
A disclosure order can be granted against defendants requiring them to
reveal the nature, value and whereabouts of its assets within and without the
jurisdiction.36 The defendants position is protected by requiring the claimant
not to use information obtained via the order to start civil or criminal
proceedings in different jurisdictions.37 Moreover, a defendant is entitled to
refuse to provide information on the grounds that it would infringe their
privilege against self-incrimination.38

CPR 25.1(1)
Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL [1982] QB 558
35 Fitzgerald v Williams [1996] 2 All ER 171
36 See n 13, [1990] Ch 48
37 Practice Direction [1994] 4 All ER 52
38 Den Norske Bank ASA v Antonatos [1998] 3 All ER 74
33
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An order restraining defendants from leaving the jurisdiction can also be
granted if circumstances indicate that they plan to evade execution of the
order.39

4. Service
Formal service of a granted order may be slow, therefore claimants notify
defendants of their obligations via telephone or e-mail.

It is often vital to serve notice of an AFO on third parties, for instance banks
or building societies, who hold a defendants assets in order to make the order
effectively stick;40 thus enjoining them from permitting disposal. Failure to
do so will result in contempt of court; however no duty of care is owed in
tort.41 It will be remembered that a Babanaft proviso excuses third parties
from fulfilling this obligation where it would require them to breach the law
of a foreign jurisdiction.

5. Discharge or Variation
Defendants and third parties can apply to have an AFO discharged entirely
(in which case the claimants undertaking in damages will be used to
compensate oppression), or varied to allow for payments to be made in the
ordinary course of business (where the original allowance in the application
hasnt been fair).

INTER-JURISDICTIONAL NECESSITY
Having captured an essence of the origin and working of AFOs, it is now prudent to
note the significance that allowing orders of the variety posed by this question carry.

Bayer v Winter [1986] 1 WLR 497

David Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions Reconsidered (2005) 73 FLR 2161, 2164
41 Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank [2006] UKHL 28
39
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Despite the legal activism in this jurisdiction it remains the case that assets, like the
Cheshire cat, may disappear unexpectedly.42 As such, the process of locating and
freezing them is complicated by jurisdictions promoting trusting and stable
environments to conduct business which face the difficult quandary of balancing the
need to attract commercial business with concern not to provide a cloak for abuse of
legal entitlements.43 Regions with such ambiguity naturally magnetize defendants
determined to dodge their obligations.

Many issues stand in the way of harmonizing the transnational law of obligations, 44
and a particularly relevant source of division are matters of state sovereignty such as
jurisdiction to prescribe in an extraterritorial sense. 45 However, the mere fact that
an order operates in personam is not necessarily contrary to international law or
comity46 therefore remedy-based jurisdiction47 should be discussed openmindedly. Conflicts of law in this area cannot be allowed to avert claimants from
effective remedy enforcement!

In the ensuing section it will be explained how English law has chosen to determine
when an order freezing assets within its own jurisdiction in support of litigation
proceeding in another jurisdiction shall be granted, and objections to this system will
be explored. If objections can be allayed, there will be greater hope of this remedy
monopolizing legal systems so as to leave nowhere to conceal Cheshire cats.

EXTRATERRITORIAL ORDERS: TO FREEZE OR NOT TO FREEZE?

To freeze or not to freeze assets in one common-law jurisdiction in support of
litigation proceeding in another is currently a question at the discretion of courts
only in jurisdictions where the Siskina principle explained above is no longer

See n 14, 95
Pepin Aslett, Cross-border asset protection: an offshore perspective [2003] 10 JFC 229
44 Geoffrey Samuels, The Law of Obligations (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2010) 312-333
45 Trevor Hartley, Jurisdiction in conflict of laws disclosure, third-party debt and freezing orders
(2010) 126 LQR 194
46 Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No. 2) [2009] 2 WLR 621, 35, as cited in ibid
47 See n 45, 198
42
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adhered to. That principle demands that a cause of action must exist within the
jurisdiction where relief is sought. It denied the freezing of insurance cover in
London to litigants pursuing proceedings in Genoa;48 a tragedy in terms of interjurisdictional remedy enforcement.

The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act 1982 s 25 took the necessary step of
melting the Siskina principle here by providing statutory jurisdiction to grant AFOs
without a cause of action within the jurisdiction, but where the subject-matter of the
litigation in question was, and also providing discretion to refuse such relief where it
would be inexpedient for the court to grant it. It originally applied only to
signatory states of the Brussels Convention (now the European Union).49

The residue of the Siskina principle (applying to non-member states) was vaporized
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements
Act 1982 (Relief Order) 1997, which has been interpreted as providing unlimited
jurisdiction to grant AFOs if litigation is ongoing in any other jurisdiction in the
world.50 However this development still did not justify the granting of an AFO in
every jurisdiction of every variety.

The problem was that if the power to grant an AFO under s 25 was justified only
because it was ancillary to future proceedings to enforce the foreign judgement in
this jurisdiction, a worldwide order (which, it is remembered, would preclude
defendants from dissipating assets in this jurisdiction and abroad) could not be
reasonably regarded as ancillary and some other basis of jurisdiction had to be
established.51

It was initially thought that to grant a WFO with extraterritorial effect (WFOE)
should best be avoided as it was regarded inappropriate. The Privy Council rejected
See n 10
EU Regulation 44/2001
50 Motorola Credit Corp v Uzan (No. 2) [2004] 1 WLR 113, 114
51 See n 45, 217
48
49

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such an order in Mercedes Benz AG v Leiduck52 (where the foreign jurisdiction had no
power to grant relief comparable to that under s 25), its reasoning founded by an
absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Consequently, an AFO was
refused over assets in Hong Kong given that the only conceived connection with that
state was the presence of the defendants assets.

This approach was controversial, confusing and criticized.53 WFOEs were later
deemed appropriate if the person on whom the order acted was domiciled or
resident in the English jurisdiction.54 Subsequently, they were also deemed
appropriate in the case of non-residents with assets abroad.55 Thereafter, a WFOE
was granted (although lifted shortly after) against a company which seemingly had
no connection whatsoever with England.56 Regarding this case, it has been alleged
that the reason the order was sought could have been to create pressure to increase a
compensation offer in the jurisdiction where litigation was commencing. For this
reason, it has been suggested by Hartley that England has become not only the
policeman of the world, but its hired gun as well 57 and therefore allowing WFOEs
to go this far is ill-considered and should be abandoned.

In terms of interfering with the present laws of another jurisdiction to an

unreasonable extent, given the present underdevelopment of this area of the law in
other jurisdictions it is conceded this may be true. However, it also follows from this
that non-English jurisdictions require urgent updating if these are the lengths that
litigants must travel in order to ensure they can obtain effective remedies. It cannot
be accepted that to grant an order of this variety is inappropriate prima facie, instead
blame must be attributed to the disturbingly complacent view of the reality of
modern civil litigation58 adopted by many non-English jurisdictions. It is

[1996] AC 284
See n 43, 231
54 Crdit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818 (CA)
55 See n 49
56 Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd v Petroleos de Venezeula SA [2008] 2 All ER 1034
57 See n 45, 220
58 See n 40, 2165
52
53

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inappropriate to stultify the evolution of this indispensable doctrine and, by
extension, stultify judgements of court. The extensive safeguards preventing
oppression to defendants explored earlier in this essay cannot be forgotten when this
dilemma is being considered. In addition, in setting aside the order granted by Teare
J in the Mobil Cerro case, Walker J clarified that orders of this variety will only be
granted if there is a sufficient connection to the jurisdiction.59 In brief, these orders
are exigent yet they remain exceptional.

The stance taken by different jurisdictions regarding this important progress has
been explored in detail, and arguments for the dissenting judgement of Lord
Nicholls in Leiduck offering sounder reasoning to be followed by jurisdictions which
are some generations behind Englands development of the WFOE have been set
out.60 Three elements of that opinion have been submitted as argumenta a fortiori;
personal jurisdiction ought to follow from substantive jurisdiction, orders should be
granted because the objective of such litigation is the enforcement of the right (ie.
talking of a cause of action as a requirement is a circular argument 61), and that
failure to provide such orders would provide a black hole into which defendants
could escape.62 This analysis reinforces the argument developed in this essay.

One common thread runs through AFOs of every variety: an endeavour to achieve
effective enforcement of relief for claimants without causing irreconcilable
oppression to defendants. Where there is potential for this to be achieved, it is
suggested that courts from any jurisdiction should have robust reasoning to deny it.
To deny WFOEs over questions of jurisdiction is a painfully infirm reason, as Lord
Nicholls seems to have acknowledged.

James Tumbridge, How far will the English court go in awarding worldwide freezing injunctions
in support of foreign arbitration? (2008) 19 ICCLR 290, 294
60 David Capper, Mareva Orders in Globalised Litigation, in J. Berryman and R. Bigwood (eds), The
Law of Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (2010, Irwin Publishing, Toronto) 589
61 See n 43, 232
62 See n 60, 591
59

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It is clearly believed that in response to the question posed, it should always be
considered appropriate to grant such an order where the common thread can be
established. This will involve a great deal of inter-jurisdictional co-operation which
will only become possible once the laws of non-English jurisdictions approximate
themselves with the necessary developments explained heretofore. This will entail
varying degrees of progress, as the following three examples illustrate.

America
The United States have chosen a path of isolationism. 63 The Supreme Court
in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo SA v Alliance Bond Fund Inc64 flatly declined to
recognize the AFO. Its reasoning has been described as sloppy, superficial,
intemperate, bombastic, unbalanced and downright insulting to judicial
colleagues in kindred legal traditions.65

Serious reconsideration of this decision is required before America can realign

itself with the necessary developments explained herein. Mammoth progress
is needed in order to avoid becoming a safe haven for dastardly defendants.

Offshore Financial Centres

States within this category share several characteristics. The unique selling
points of their laws are often to entice business, and to do this there is an
unfortunate focus on factors such as anonymity, confidentiality and control 66
(unfortunate for claimants seeking the protection of WFOEs that is). In the
absence of any legislative provisions akin to s 25, these states remain covered
by the common-law Siskina precedent of the Privy Council.

Some regions have refused to aberate from that decision, the Bahamas courts
for example insisting they would require reform from the Bahamian
See n 40, 2179
527 US 308 (1999)
65 See n 40, 2180
66 See n 43, 235
63
64

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Parliament before expanding their jurisdiction.67 However, given the
unfortunate

focus

factors

mentioned

above,

underlying

policy

considerations can be detected in this hesitance. These must be bravely

overcome if judicial progress is to be made.

Jersey has spearheaded slaying The Siskina68 for the Channel Islands in a
line of its decisions69 and this is to be commended as the correct approach.
The valuable reasoning developed by Lord Nicholls in Leiduck, inter alia, has
provided a useful springboard for the development of WFOEs in the absence
of legislative footings there, as it provides good persuasive authority.

It is submitted that either the legislature in regions where the necessary

principles remain undeveloped must statutorily denounce the Siskina
principle, or alternatively greater judicial confidence must be gained to do the
same under Lord Nicholls dissenting authority. Offshore centres must be
careful not to allow business reputation to take precedence over the
credibility of its legal enforcement.

Australia
Australia is farthest along the spectrum of advancement in this series of
examples, with regard to providing for the grant of AFOs. However, its
power to do so has been founded on a different base than the English
doctrine; to prevent its legal process being abused by defendants 70 (as
opposed to being part of its inherent jurisdiction). It has awarded relief in
circumstances closely analogous to the Leiduck scenario.71

Meespierson (Bahamas) Ltd v Grupo Torras SA [1999] ITELR 030

See n 43, 236
69 Solvalub Limited v Match Investments Limited and Others [1996] JLR 361; Krohn GmbH v Varna Shipyard
and Others (No. 2) [1997] JLR 194
70 Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 18
71 Davis v Turning Properties [2005] NSWSC 742, cited in 43, 597
67
68

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All the same, questions of legal basis and jurisdiction are precisely the kinds
of inconsequential matters many non-English jurisdictions claim to prevent
them from advancement. Australias independent ontogenesis of the doctrine
acknowledges that primacy of enforcement should be the determining
rationale behind decisions about whether or not to freeze assets in one
jurisdiction in support of litigation proceeding in another.

CONCLUSION
The key variables, at present, are the jurisdictions involved in the litigation.
Appropriateness is subjective, which complicates the question. Whilst the writer has
ventured to show that upon analysis there is a dearth of reasons to deny relief of the
variety posed if the carefully evolved anatomy of the AFO is applied, many states
require further convincing. If it is said to be inappropriate because the legislature
should prescribe the answer, if it is said to be inappropriate because precedent
forbids it, or if it is said to be inappropriate for any other procedural reason, the
cynic should perhaps take the advice considered by Lord Denning MR who correctly
anticipated a rocky road for the Mareva to travel in 1979: fresh courage take.72

72

[1979] AC 210, 236, as cited in n 9, 261

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
_______________________________
TABLE OF CASES
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396
Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] Ch. 13 (CA)
Bank Mellat v Nikpour [1985] FSR 87 (CA) 92
Barclay-Johnson v Yuill [1980] 3 All ER 190 (Ch D)
Bayer v Winter [1986] 1 WLR 497
Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 18
Chandris Shipping Corp v Unimarine SA [1979] 2 All ER 972
Charles Russell LLP v Rehman [2010] EWHC 202 (Ch)
Chartered Bank v Daklouche [1980] 1 All ER 205 (CA)
Crdit Suisse Fides Trust SA v Cuoghi [1998] QB 818 (CA)
Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank [2006] UKHL 28
Dadourian Group International Inc v Simms [2006] EWCA Civ 399, [2006] 1 WLR 2499
Davis v Turning Properties [2005] NSWSC 742
Den Norske Bank ASA v Antonatos [1998] 3 All ER 74
Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 1) [1990] Ch. 48 (CA)
Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (Nos 3 & 4) [1990] Ch. 65 (CA)
Fitzgerald v Williams [1996] 2 All ER 171
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo SA v Alliance Bond Fund Inc 527 US 308 (1999)
Krohn GmbH v Varna Shipyard and Others (No. 2) [1997] JLR 194
Lister v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1 (CA)
Mareva v International Bulkcarriers Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyds Rep 509
Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No. 2) [2009] 2 WLR 621
Meespierson (Bahamas) Ltd v Grupo Torras SA [1999] ITELR 030
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Mercedes Benz v Leiduck [1996] AC 284

Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd v Petroleos de Venezeula SA [2008] 2 All ER 1034
Motorola Credit Corp v Uzan (No. 2) [2004] 1 WLR 113
Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Karageorgis [1975] 1 WLR 1093
Practice Direction [1994] 4 All ER 52
Rahman v Abu-Taha [1980] 1 WLR 1268 (CA)
Rasu Maritime S.A. v Perusahaan Pertambangan (The Pertamina) [1978] QB 644 (CA)
Republic of Haiti v Duvalier [1990] QB 202 (CA)
Siskina (Cargo Owners) v Distos Compania Naviera (The Siskina) [1979] AC 210 (CA
and HL)
Solvalub Limited v Match Investments Limited and Others [1996] JLR 361
Z Ltd v A-Z and AA-LL [1982] QB 558
TABLE OF LEGISLATION
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act 1982
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act 1982 (Relief Order) 1997
Civil Procedure Rules 1998
EU Regulation 44/2001
Senior Courts Act 1981
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925
SECONDARY SOURCES
Aslett P, Cross-border asset protection: an offshore perspective [2003] 10 JFC 229
Biscoe P, Transnational Freezing Orders (Oxford Paper, 15 July 2011)
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lec/ll_lec.nsf/vwFiles/Paper_15Jul2011
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Undergraduate Awards 2012: Law

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