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Why the Veda Has No Author: Language as Ritual in Early Mms and Post-Modern
Theology
Author(s): Francis X. Clooney
Source: Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter, 1987), pp. 659684
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1464680 .
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from the start;its ultimate concern had to do with the why of sacrifice
and with the intelligibility and predictability of a religious path
founded on the performance of particular actions according to certain
texts. Certainly, it was on the basis of its more general rules and metarules that Mimaimsainfluenced much of later Indian thinking.
The question of intelligibility demanded attention because
took shape in a world in which the traditionalintelJaimini's
Mimim.sa
ligibility undergirding Vedic orthodoxy had lost its power to convince.
It was no longer self-evident, for instance, that sacrificeswould please
deities and lead to rewards, that offering sacrificeswould hold the universe together, or that the Veda itself was a reliable source of information. The Buddhists and Jainas, as well as world-renunciants still
within the Vedic fold, de-mythologized the idea of sacrifice and contended that these actions were not qualitatively different from, and
would lead to results no more permanent than, other actions. Skeptics
of all sorts charged that the sacrificesdid not produce what they promised to produce, while those whom today we might label "Vedic fundamentalists" simply put aside questions of meaning and asserted that
sacrificeshad to be performed, no matter what one might think about
them. Called into question, it seems, was the notion that there could
be any perspective from which the whole of the ritual world could be
comprehended and hence kept intact. The pieces were all there-brahmin priests, fires, rice to be cooked, words to be chanted, gods to
be invoked, etc.-but they no longer cohered convincingly.
response to the whole range of criticisms was to
Mimairmsa's
rethink
its world without reliance on any single viewpoint, effectively
undercutting the possibility of a single perspective. It sought a justification for sacrifice that needed no external validation, either from
active gods or satisfiedhumans, and that required the positing neither
of any supernaturalrealities nor a reliable world order beyond that of
good Sanskrit texts, well-performed sacrifices, and a set of rules for
integrating the two.
:ncerned
Jaimini and his commentator Sabara primarily wel
with achieving a right understanding of the rules of sacrificialaction
and sacrificialtext so as to ensure that what one saw and heard at a
sacrifice would cohere--be intelligible-regardless of what anyone
might say about it from some particular perspective. In discovering
these rules they sought to replace the "laws of the cosmos" with the
"laws of language and ritual," and reliance on gods and humans (as
norms for meaning) with an appreciation for the harmony of text and
action (and everything accompanying them, even in orthodox society
as a whole) that underlay the well-wrought sacrifice.
Such rules were desirable, since rules are by nature humanly intelligible (so that they can be obeyed) and not dependent on the humans
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who observe them (so that they must be obeyed). When the rules are
known and obeyed, they depend on no particular opinion, any more
than do the rules of grammar. Because they govern the totality of
experience, they overcome fragmentation by making the location and
relation of any particular fragment-be it a god, a human, a wordmore important than the stability of the thing itself. In the course of
articulating these rules, the Mimamsakasmade the three claims cited
above, to which we will now turn, attending as well to their modern
analogues.
1. Religion includes meanings and values appropriate to human
beings, but the sum of its meaning necessarily exceeds the
human perspective.
It is central to the Mimamsaanalysis that sacrificesare not merely
the instruments of the sacrificerswho perform them, even if these sacrificers act only because they want the promised rewards of cows, sons,
heaven, etc. and wish to use the sacrifices to get those rewards. The
have no problem admitting that humans may think that
the
sacrificesexist strictly for their satisfaction,and it is reasonable that
Mim.msakas
the situation appear this way to performers. But the Mimamsakasalso
insist that this human perspective contributes to a more comprehensive primary goal: the enactment of the particular body of words and
actions that constitute a particular sacrifice and, ultimately, the whole
body of orthodox rites. The Veda states unequivocally that sacrifices
are to be performed, and human performers are obviously required if
any sacrifice is to be completed. No offering can actually be burnt in
the fire unless some potential sacrificer is sufficiently motivated to
expend the required effort and money. But, the Mimamsakasreason,
if the sacrificer'sgain were the "absolute"motivation of the sacrificial
performances, there would be no basis for the obligatory nature of the
command to sacrifice. If human satisfactionwere the only warrant for
the performances, there might eventually be a cessation of sacrifices
altogether.
The Mimamsakassituate the performer in a world rightly ordered
around the sacrifice, and this order is called dharma. When a sacrifice
is properly performed-with all the words uttered at just the right
point in the action, and all the actions performed in the right sequence
using the right materials, by performers from the right families who
have received the right education, etc.-this right performance
embodies dharma, the ultimate value to which all else is subordinate.
That humans contribute to dharma is what matters, whether or not
they are aware of their role in it. In fact, if humans act out of selfinterest, they are likely to play their parts better than if they do not,
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according to how they directly or indirectly contribute to the satisfaction of human desires (4.3-4).4 These further determinations of "purpose" guide both the reading of texts and the performance of actions.5
In its treatment of the human perspective and meaning, the
Mimramsaanticipated by millennia the current debate over the meaningfulness of ritual. By noting the comparable structures of the perspective of the performer of ritual and the speaker of language and
placing them firmly within a ritual whole--the meaning of which
extends beyond both perspectives-the Mimams.kas defend the variety of meanings a human being may give ritual and text, but they deny
any such perspective the privilege of being the meaning. A ritual can
appear meaningful and meaningless at the same time, from different
perspectives, because meaning depends on where one is standing. It
can appear to be solely one or the other, if one forgets that there are
the other perspectives. Ritual is "for its own sake" (sva-artha), from
the performer'sviewpoint, when participationis interpreted as strictly
instrumental toward the accomplishment of the larger goal; in this
case the performer is "for the other" (para-artha),for the ritual. Conversely, when the performer interprets ritual as ordered exclusively to
the satisfactionof personal interests, he acts "for his own sake" and the
ritual is "for the other."
The necessary appreciation of multiple perspectives recalls the
parallel position proposed by S.J. Tambiah, who suggests that rituals
are not static but dynamic and embody both a conservative tendency
toward the loss of their semantic component and a revivalist tendency
toward the infusion of new, purified meaning. The two tendencies are
in tension, and the interpretation of ritual has to take into account the
continuing movement from one extreme to the other and back. When
Mimamsdallows the multiple perspectives on artha to remain in operation without further simplification, it invites a similarly "dynamic"
reading.
To say then that ritual is meaningless because it is "for itself"
(Staal, 1979; 1986) is according to
partially true but needsensational.
the
that
"what the Mimunms
Mima.msa
claim
lessly
Notwithstanding
in fact ended up teaching is that the rituals have to be performed for
their own sake" (Staal, 1979:7),it is evident that even the most general
Mimamsakanotion of sacrificialdharma never excludes the satisfac4 For a fuller examinationof the meaning of artha in the Sutras,see my 1984 University
of Chicago Ph.D. dissertation, "Retrieving the Pfirva Mima.msuof Jaimini", due to
appear as Volume 17 in the series, Publicationsof the De Nobili ResearchLibrary, Indological Institute, University of Vienna--especially Chapter IV, and the briefer 1986
exposition.
5 In commenting on 12.4.37 Sabaraasserts that in cases of conflict the "inherent cohesion" of the ritual takes precedence over "meaningfulness."
667
tion of human desires and needs, including the demand for intelligibility. The sacrifice does serve its performer's interests, even if it does
not have that as its sole or primary purpose. Penner (13) is correct in
his criticism of Staal's strained effort to interpret as meaningless what
is evidently meaningful to the ritualistswho performed and described
the elaborate rites. Semiotics aside, one can simply point to the
Mima-msaelaboration of the complex structure of meanings within and
around the sacrifice to see that we have-at least as far as the Indian
ritual theorists themselves are concerned-not a lack of meaning but a
lack of an exclusive determination of meaning by self-interested
performers.
2. The sacred Sanskrit-language Scripture known as the Veda is not
a "book"to be read, not a source of information about a
world outside itself
We have seen that the Mima~sa systematically implicates the
human perspective within the ritual whole of word and action and
subordinatesit to that whole. The early Mimrmsaalso elected to make
language inseparable from ritual. It stated that the Veda is not a book
or text that can be considered in isolation from the performance of the
sacrifices it refers to. There are all kinds of intelligible statements
made in the Veda, but none of them is meant to be understood "for its
own sake," as providing neutral information about its future use. Of
course, many religions similarly argue that their sacred texts have a
specific religious usefulness and command a certain kind of behavior in
response, but Mimrnmsaworks out the details of this position more
thoroughly than any other school.
At the beginning of the Stitras, Jaimini gives the fundamental
tenet that underlies the Mimuamsa
contextualization of the Veda: "The
between
word
and
relationship
purpose (or meaning) is innate (autpatAt
issue
first
of all is how (or when) Vedic statetika, "original";1.1.5).
ments get their meanings. Jaimini'sview is that they are not assigned
meanings by a conventional, societal process; instead, the statementreferent relationship precedes any speaker's use of either the statement or the words comprising it. This point is defended by Jaimini in
a complex argument. First (1.1.6-23),he argues in favor of the position
that speech presumes a prior "always-there"relation of the individual
word and its referent. His position is elaborated by the later commentators, with increasingly complex linguistic arguments. Then (1.1.2445) he defends the view that the meaning of statements cannot be
learned from adding together the meanings of the words in the statement, but only by noting that to which the whole statement purposefully refers-usually an action rather than a thing, and usually a ritual
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ing the ritual. The priest told to recite a yajur (identified merely by its
starting words) may not be sure where the yajur ends or when he is to
stop reciting, since there is no necessary linguistic stopping point in a
prose passage.
This would not be the case with the other two kinds of texts, "rgs,"
which are poetic verses divided into metrical feet, and "sdmans,"
which are verses set to music and sung, most often some of the same
rgs. Hearing either of these, one would come to natural stopping
points without having to refer to meaning.
Jaimini'sdefinition of "statement" solves the problem by identifya
ing prose unit as a group of words with a complete meaning (artha),
which "lacks nothing." But this "meaning" is a ritual referent, some
aspect of the ritual referred to by the words in the prose passage, and
not a coherent syntactical meaning separable from the ritual context.
This ritually grounded "statement" can be comprised of two or more
grammatical sentences, however many are required to denote properly the ritual referent at hand. For example, in discussing the definition of "statement," (PMS 2.1.40) the commentator Sabaraintroduces
the following text from the Taittiriya
(1.1.4.2), one of the
Vedic collections of texts related to the Sam.hita
sacrifices:
On the impulse of the god Savitr,with the arms of the
Agvins,withthe handsof Pisan, I offerthee dearto Agni,to Agni
and Soma.8
Correct reading of the passage allows for repetition of the verb, "I
offer," with each phrase-"I offer on the impulse ... I offer with the
arms ... etc."-and there would then be no strictly grammatical reason that each should not be a separate sentence. But in the appropriate context of the Dariapfirnamisa sacrifice, it is clear that only one
offering is at issue, modified by the mentioned deities-Savitr, Aivins,
etc. This ritual location, not an independent reading of the words
themselves as a grammatical unit, determines the limits of the unit of
meaning. One cannot read properly without knowing the ritual
context.
The second term in this first pair is prakarana, often translated as
"context" or "leading subject matter." It too has a more than verbal
reference and is carefully distinguished by the Mimramsakasfrom
"place" (sthdna), which more closely refers to words or ideas placed
contiguously "on a page" or, better, placed together in the units to be
memorized in a particular school of Vedic practice.9 The notion of
prakarana comes into use for the following reason. Sacrificesare often
8 As translatedby A.B. Keith.
9 Sthdna too has a ritual meaning, referring to the location of things in the sacrificial
arena.
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the Veda is comprised only of texts used in the performance of sacrifices and texts about sacrificesl3provoked a sensible objection: What
about those parts of the Veda that give us information about this
world, the gods, creation, etc.? Can we not turn to the Veda for this
information? Jaimini is aware of this question. Soon after he has
defined the Veda as sacrificially-oriented(1.1.25-26), the thesis is proposed that since the sacrificially-orientedparts of the Veda have a purpose, guide action, and hence are "truly authoritative." The rest,
lacking this orientation, must be irrelevant, whatever the meaning of
the words may be. (1.2.1)
Jaimini knows that there apparently are purely informational
statements in the Veda and does not wish to concede that a large part
of the Veda is useless. But he insists equally that there are no texts that
merely give us information. He therefore introduces the category of
"supportive statements" (arthavdda):14 statements in the Veda
neither uttered in the performance nor helpful in organizing it. Such
statements, he says, are in "praise"of what is being done (1.2.7). They
assist the performance by encouraging the performer, describing the
results in glowing terms, explaining how the world is such that the
sacrifice works, etc. Such information found in the Veda is useful only
when identified as supportive of the ritual. Thus, for instance, after
potential performers have been urged to sacrifice an animal dedicated
to the god Vayu, a text says "For Vayu is the swiftest of all deities."
The point of this citation, Sabaraexplains (1.2.7), is not to give us information about Vayu, but rather to encourage us to sacrifice, since Vayu
is a god who will surely be swift in awarding the desired results.
3. The Veda has no author, no meaning beyond the words and the
sacrificial actions themselves; one cannot appeal to a preverbal intention to get beyond the words.
If we connect the ritual implication of language with the earlier
claim that in a sacrificethe sacrificeris only an instrument, and neither
the creator of the rites nor their finality, it should not come as a surprise that like the sacrifices themselves, the Veda has no creator, no
author. People do not invent their rituals, nor author their sacred
texts, says Mimfamsa.
This authorlessnessis based on a homologization of the speaker or
text-performer to the sacrificial-performer.Because the Veda is insep13It is interesting to note in addition that the division of the Veda into three Vedas is a
ritual one, grouping texts to be used by the three active priests at major rites: texts for
the chanter (hotr)are in the Rg Veda, for the singer (udgatr)in the Sdma Veda, and for
the priest performing the actions (adhvaryu)in the YajurVeda.
14But without using this term until a subsequent discussionof the
meaningfulness of
mantras, in 1.2.43.
673
arable from the ritual, the "performer"of the Veda, the expounder or
reciter of its words, is likewise inseparable from it. His function with
regard to the text is subject to the same strictures governing the performer of sacrificial actions: he speaks it because it makes sense to
insist that the content of
him, either in its content (and Mimurmsakas
the Vedic texts should be understood) or because he hopes to attain
some goal, such as the reward accruing to the sacrifice,but he does not
determine the meaning. His participation is necessary, but he makes
no creative contribution; he utters them, he can understand them as
he wishes, but he cannot change them or "own" them. He "activates"
the text by making it audible, but has no role in its composition, which
is already set and inter-structuredwith the ritual. He is ever preceded
by the word.15
The position is presented without fanfare and briefly in the Stitras.
When, near the beginning of the Sttras, an opponent proposes the
argument that the Vedic scriptures cannot be a source of certain
knowledge because their authors may be fallible, Jaimini simply states
that the sacred text is prior to and, in regard to its composition,
independent of those who have taught it; i.e., it has speakers but no
authors: "It has been explained that word is prior (to its speakers)."
(1.1.29-30) Only later was the assertion formalized as the doctrine of
the "authorlessness"(apauruseyatva)of the text.16
The reduction of the author to speaker/expounder makes it
15As suggested above, this notion of subordinateagency, in speech as well as ritual, is
supported by the fundamental structures of the Sanskritlanguage, and later Mimamsakasnote this point. Thus Prabha.kara,an important eight-century Mim&imsaka,
offers
citationsfrom Panini'sgrammarin defense of Jaimini'stheory. But Jaiminirelies simply
on an understanding of how ritual uses its performers to indicate the limited role of
apparent authors.
16The idea of authorlessnessin ancient India can be analyzed from a variety of perspectives. For instance, one could look at the grammar of classical Sanskrititself, in
which most Indiantheological and philosophicaltexts were composed. Sanskritdoes not
understandthe structureof a sentence to be that of subject/predicate,but rather that of
a verb qualifiedby various relationships,including to agent and instrument, place, etc.
The "subject"of the sentence is, grammaticallyspeaking,only apparent. Edwin Gerow
has explored at length the relationship between certain grammaticalstructures in the
Sanskritlanguage and philosophicalstructuresin Vedanta philosophyin particular. His
observationson the impersonalstructure of Sanskritare pertinent for a comprehensive
understandingof the notion of "authorlessness."
Or, one might begin by attending to the general orthodox Brahmanicalnotion that
the originalseers (rsis)saw the Veda at the beginning of the age but did not compose it.
I have chosen to place the notion of authorlessnessagainst the specifically Mimamsa
background because it is in this school that the important connection of language to
ritual is most clearly explored, and the "theological"implicationsof authorlessnessmost
developed; also, because it is in response to this school'sformulationof the matter that
some of the most interesting theological responses are formed. I do not intend, however, to suggest that the Mim~msaviewpoint developed in isolation from grammatical
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REFERENCES
Carman,John B.
1974
Clooney, Francis X.
1986
"Jaimini'sContribution to the Theory of Sacrifice as the
Experience of Transcendence." History of Religions 25:
199-212.
Foucault, Michel
1984
Gerow, Edwin
1982
"Whatis An Author?" The Foucault Reader. Ed. P. Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books.
"What is Karma [Kim Karmeti]? An Exercise in Philosophical Semantics."Indologica Tauriensiax: 87-116.
KunjunniRaja,K.
1977
Indian Theoriesof Meaning. Madras: Adyar Library.
Keith, A.B., trans.
1914
The Veda of the Black Yajus School entitled Taittiriya
Sanhita. Harvard Oriental Series, Vols. 18-19. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lipner, Julius
1986
Murty, K. Satchidananda
1974
Reason and Revelation in Advaita Vedanta Delhi: 1974.
Penner, Hans H.
1985
Staal, Frits
1979
1986
Tambiah, S.J.
1979
Taylor, Mark C.
1984
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