Grace San Diego y Trinidad Vs.

The People of the

Philippines
G.R. No. 176114. April 8, 2015
FACTS:
1) Petitioner was the accountant of the cooperative. She had custody of the cooperative's checks
which were pre-signed by its Manager and Chairman of the Board of Directors. She was likewise
in charge of cash in bank. She had custody of the documents pertaining to the withdrawal of the
cooperative's deposits with its depository banks.
2) Petitioner completed said checks by filling in all the details inclusive of the date, name of payee
and the amount of the check in words and in figures but exclusive of the signatures.
3) From November 18, 1996 to January 6, 1997, she acted as cashier when Teresita Gonzales was
on maternity leave and acted as teller from Januay
13-30, 1997 when Flordeliza Ocampo went into her honeymoon. She then, on both occasions,
had complete access to the cash vaults and filing cabinets of the cooperative where its documents
were kept.
4) Petitioner prepared a certification that the amount of Php9,653,527.06 represented the total cash
balance of the cooperative its depository banks as of March 11, 1997. Upon actual verification, it
was shown that the total cash balance was only Php3,637,442. 80, indicating that there was a
difference of Php 6,016,084.25 and the loss of which were unexplained.
5) Petitioner admitted in a letter to her father that she withdrew Php200,000 from his account and
Php20,000 from her sister-in-law's account in the cooperative.
6) Petitioner deposited Php1,050,000 and Php250,000 to her account with PCI Bank on August 13,
1996 and May 28, 1996, respectively.
7) Petitioner stopped reporting for work since March 12, 1997
8)

ISSUE 1: As such, petitioner asserts that it is essential for a successful prosecution for theft that
the existence of the personality stolen be established by qualitative evidence, so the prosecution
must fail if no such proof of good quality was adduced
HOLDING: NO. it ruled that the proof adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to prove
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution presented the testimony of its expert
witness. Records are bereft of any showing that the audit report made by the independent
auditor is erroneous and unsupported by documents and bank statements.
ISSUE 2: Petitioner also asserts that the People did not present any witness who categorically
testified that petitioner ran away with the supposed missing funds.THUS only proved her
incompetence in the performance of her assigned task and not necessarily criminal authorship.
HOLDING: NO. People v. Ragon that resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable
when there are no eyewitnesses to a crime. The courts are allowed to rule on the bases of
circumstantial evidence if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
ISSUE 3: Petitioner then insists that the proof adduced plausibly indicates commission of estafa
and not qualified theft.
HOLDING: NO. in estafa there must reciept of property either in trust, commission or
for administration. possession of the petitioner was akin to that of a receiving teller of funds
received from third persons paid to the bank. Payment by third persons to the teller is payment
to the bank itself. Hence, there the receipt of petitioner here does not constitute juridical
possession.

Modified rule on legal interest effective July 1, 2013 - August 2013

Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Commercial Law | LEXOTERICA: A
PHILIPPINE BLAWG
see - August 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Commercial Law | LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

"x x x.

Interest; legal rate beginning July 1, 2013. The guidelines laid down in the case of
Eastern Shipping Lines are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as
follows:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasicontracts, delicts
or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The
provisions under Title XVIII on Damages of the Civil Code govern in determining the
measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may
have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. And, in

addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1,
2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of
interest fixed therein.
x x x."
See - Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., G.R. No.
189871, August 13, 2013.
http://attylaserna.blogspot.com/2013/09/modified-rule-on-legal-interest.html