G.R. No.

L-23815 June 28, 1974

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I,
Silay City, respondent.

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by
petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his
allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a
position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It
was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de
parte, his designation in the former category being precisely to protect him in his new position without
prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio
counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is,
however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into
consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily
discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the
counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is
likely to be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a
member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without
merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he
was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for
the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on
the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration
having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de
oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962,
with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge
spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue
appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to
the prosecution there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would
rest, the motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election
Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today.
Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby
designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13,
1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964
July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964:
"Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is
hereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this
case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way
from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty
of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the
Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr.
Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel
de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It
could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio
is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of

eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession
dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity
to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7
"There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that
membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a
profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one
of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in
the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his
services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary.
This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his
practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live;
certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as
counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the
opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates
the most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of
those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases ...." 10 Justice Sanchez in People
v. Estebia 11 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do
say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by
defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional
ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant
expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in
the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that
considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was
rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can
be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason
that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it
is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his
right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14 The
present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a
consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he
did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did
point though to his responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be
availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It
may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself
sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as
to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those
enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and
to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993

VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the
disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the parties and their witnesses
who were residing in the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province was
authorized to conduct the investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes
and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog
City; that when she was still a teenager and first year in college she came to know
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a
friend of her sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew the respondent
as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General
Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and
subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at
Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to be one of the
usherettes in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30,
1973 and, she told respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which respondent
did, and her father consented; that for three whole days she served as usherette in the
convention and respondent picked her up from her residence every morning and took
her home from the convention site at the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and
invited her for a joy ride with the permission of her mother who was a former classmate
of respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then they strolled
along the beach, and in the course of which respondent proposed his love to her; that
respondent told her that if she would accept him, he would marry her within six (6)
months from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that she would think it over
first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in their house almost every night,
and he kept on courting her and pressed her to make her decision on respondent's
proposal; that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and
respondent continued his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to
get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with the consent of her
father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched
her from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but before taking
her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and took her to the airport at Sicayab,
Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep by the beach where there were no houses
around; that in the course of their conversation inside the jeep, respondent reiterated his
promise to marry her and then started caressing her downward and his hand kept on
moving to her panty and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then
said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry
you" and reminded her also that "anyway, December is very near, the month we have
been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not
be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his promise and assurances, at the same time

pulling down her panty; that she told him that she was afraid because they were not yet
married, but because she loved him she finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with
him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the intercourse she wept and respondent again
reiterated his promises and assurances not to worry because anyway he would marry
her;
and
at
about
12:00
midnight
they
went
home
(pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside usually at the
Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about twice or three times a week, after which
he would take her to the airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that they
had this sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at the frequency of two or
three times a week, and she consented to all these things because she loved him and
believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed that her
menstruation which usually occurred during the second week of each month did not
come; she waited until the end of the month and still there was no menstruation; she
submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed respondent and
respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but she objected and respondent did not
insist; respondent then told her not to worry because they would get married within one
month and he would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and talked to her parents
about their marriage; it was agreed that the marriage would be celebrated in Manila so
as not to create a scandal as complainant was already pregnant; complainant and her
mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while respondent would follow by
plane; and they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the house of complainant's
sister Delia who is married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and her mother at
Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that he could not marry complainant because
he was already married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said:
"Trans, so you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p.
138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent reassured complainant not to worry
because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16 years and he would work
for the annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant (p. 139, tsn,
id.); respondent told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a
monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and
actually sent the promised support; he came back to Manila in January 1974 and went
to see complainant; when asked about the annulment of his previous marriage, he told
complainant that it would soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in
February and in March 1974 and told complainant the same thing (p. 142, tsn, id.);
complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila when she delivers the child, but her
mother answered her that she cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in
Dipolog and instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma took her to the
Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at
the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza
Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and tried to contact
respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as she was ashamed she just
stayed in their house; she got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for
medical treatment; she came back after two weeks but still respondent did not come to
see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative case
against respondent with the National Electrification Administration; the case was
referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was
dismissed and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent

The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth
certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent declared substantially as follows: that he
was born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda
Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years old; that because of
incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that in 1953 he was
baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father since 1952
because he was his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's mother because they were
former classmates in high school; that he became acquainted with complainant when he
used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually became friends and often
talked with each other, and even talked about their personal problems; that he
mentioned to her his being estranged from his wife; that with the consent of her parents
he invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab,
Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement was
for him to fetch her from her residence and take her home from the convention site; that
it was during this occasion that they became close to each other and after the
convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a week of courtship,
she accepted his proposal and since then he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant to be his
partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening after the affair, complainant complained to him of a
headache, so he decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to have a
joy ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the airport; that when they were
at the airport, only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they were carried by
their passion; they forgot themselves and they made love; that before midnight he took
her home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they
went on joy riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was the only place
they
could
be
alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant told him of her
pregnancy; that they agreed that the child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and
respondent would take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the parents
of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was married but
estranged from his wife; that when complainant was already in Manila, she asked him if
he was willing to marry her, he answered he could not marry again, otherwise, he
would be charged with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of his marriage as
he had been separated from his wife for 16 years; that complainant consented to have
sexual intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force,
trickery, deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was filed against him by
complainant because of his failure to give the money to support complainant while in
Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's medical
expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn,
id.).
FINDING OF FACTS

relationship with complainant;

3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime,
having been a former student of complainant's father in 1952 and, a former classmate of
complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually with her other
sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her
residence; that he also befriended complainant and who became a close friend when he
invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her
at her residence in the morning and took her home from the convention site after each
day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant
accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973,
complainant with her parents' permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber
of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00
o'clock that evening, they left the place but before going home, they went to the airport
at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, where there were no houses
around; that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the sexual act and at about
midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to have joy
ride with complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to make love
twice or three times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant
became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's parents, it
was agreed that complainant would deliver her child in Manila, where she went with
her mother on October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed
with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited
her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in February and March
1974; that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be
nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her sister took her to the
Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she
delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her
"Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog
City; that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed
some of her expenses; that she filed an administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; which complaint, however, was dismissed; and
then she instituted the present disbarment proceedings against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after hearing,
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of the Solicitor General.

1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was about
20 years and 7 months old during the time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with
respondent, having been born on December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and
41 years old at the time of the said relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;

From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by respondent attorney of his
real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after
the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry
for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that
he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said marriage. More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere
fact of separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to
contract another marriage.

2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that
the marriage ceremony was solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga
del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that
said respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his

Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was also studying in
Dipolog City, lived separately from him. He never introduced his son and went around with friends as though
he was never married much less had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's
claim that complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the very start of his courtship.

From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not disputed:

The Court is therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual
desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in accordance with the nature of the educated,
cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is, her father being the Assistant Principal of the local
public high school, to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.

then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity. Respondent then
succeeded in having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion,
breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's moral values when he said
that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13, 1977;
Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that
we cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental
and moral fitness. Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon
him the most severe disciplinary action disbarment.

(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and
their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into
multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant ( Rollo, p. 15). As records
indicate, however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that
of his self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the Office of the Solicitor
General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not because he was
already married and would open him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13,
1977). If he were a moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming,
why did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by respondent himself. He
said while he was a moslem, but, having been married in a civil ceremony, he could no
longer validly enter into another civil ceremony without committing bigamy because
the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977). Consequently, if
respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he cannot marry
complainant, then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with
complainant because he knew the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent may
not, therefore, escape responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has embraced the
Islam
religion.
(Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply
demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the
grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral
character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not
dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess
(People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer
may either be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360,
30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the court retains the power to
discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a lawyer who convinced a
woman that her prior marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and she was still legally single and
free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her,
abandoned her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3,
1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to complainant,

The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality. The
members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit or
unqualified because deficient either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan
vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be
of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such a manner as
to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs.
Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7
SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be allowed continued
membership in the ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of
being a member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent Daarol.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be
friends.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and
May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing
loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18,
1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief,
Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question,
again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by
"the scheming sales agent." b

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions
on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back
of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26." 1 In that complaint, she accused
Alauya of:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to

terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated
by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in
bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound
in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence
the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by
the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree
for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state
on record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any
legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went
through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description
of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby
annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract"
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending
circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there
was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales
agent who concealed the real facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a
bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as
irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the
plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established usage that
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in
this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of
Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or
the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms.
Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was
envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District
Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, 5
Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. 6
He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that
Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a
housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who
had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He
declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely
acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus
transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words:
"Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and

attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use
of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the
court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial,"
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced
and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He
was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to
him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still
does not know where the property subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa &
Co. is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised
to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with
his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding
the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever
saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant
Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being
apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April
19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 all of which he
signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges
(against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue
injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter
alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his) rights
and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the
real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights,
and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental
anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia
enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the
rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the

conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice,
from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum
so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect
for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed however sincerely to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone
his
due,
and
observe
honesty
and
good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a
standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his
every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation
from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction
that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law
before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted
to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his region, there
are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The
ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record contains no
evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the
title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

B. M. No. 1154

June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN

THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has
been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and
Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people.
Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the
Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have
been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts R E S O L U T I O
OBC.

N2

dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding
with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three
cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated."
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of nondisclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take
the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken
lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them
which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good

reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied
by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable
under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection
with his application for admission to the bar."5
As regards Melings use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is
not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed
as "attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is
signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled
thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation
"attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll
of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings
membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003
Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him
as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.8 The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or
regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by
any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or
charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three
pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would
aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By
concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are
ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack
of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a
member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title
"Attorney" by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The
respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the
title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him

in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence,
may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar,
and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney."
The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction.12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of
administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest
official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the
virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the
Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent
grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further
orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron
S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the
Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take
effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.

July 30, 1979

IN RE: SYCIP

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,

SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO.
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE
V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE
FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J.
ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS
S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander
Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died
on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the
names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions
were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: t.hqw
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership
name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make
the individual property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by
such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature has authorized
the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a
deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy
a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in
the relationship of attorney and client to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there
is no fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm
name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the
characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective deceased
partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries
now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased
partners were connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law
directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's
name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which
recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships has been
consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal profession of most
countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in 1953 when a
law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased
partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from
including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled
Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile
moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15,
1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although
Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins
and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners,
prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile
and Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins,
the Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when
it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from
including in their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The
Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of
professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree
could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon,
Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of the names of deceased
partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: t.hqw
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may
not include the name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those
of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to
liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the
firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law
firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are nonlawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment
to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received
from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such division
are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of
the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered
into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no
corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms of the names
of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue

advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections
will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old
firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first
factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and
Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased
partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than
of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only
in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9t.
hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the
succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old
name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a
commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the
firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the individual
skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good
win to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically
valuable such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no provision
in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals
or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 t.hqw
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship
or association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the
purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has
been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law
practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a
profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the
spirit of public service, no less a public service because it may incidentally be a
means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which
one may attain the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing
and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature
of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association" in
support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is permissible by local
custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced
through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use of a
deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our
custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at
the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm
names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. t.
hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the
propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that
of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S. Drinker,
op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a deceased
partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided
by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners
Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm
name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because
the practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy
and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: t.hqw
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no
statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar
Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner, when permissible by local custom is not unethical, but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use."
There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of

deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the
courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter
and reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question.
The use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement
between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice. Custom has been
defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be
proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not
mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical
custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be
applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal system. 22 When
the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist
from including the names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule
against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of
our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23
Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and should not
be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service.
A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to
acquire as much of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law. But
the member of a profession does not regard himself as in competition with his
professional brethren. He is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor
exchanging the products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service
of the professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling
equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession
even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public service in which
the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession,
namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that
they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public must bow to
legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the names
"SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may, however, be included in
the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years during which they
served as such.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 389

February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs. ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno,
a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all
the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein
do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules
of Court.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that
on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however,
admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November,
1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice
law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor
Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent,
as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified.
He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958,
disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned
Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo,
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with
immorality. The complaint recites:

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as
"Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and
Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando
Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a
movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before
going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo,
Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel,
respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her
that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered
by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced,
and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as
'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant
inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from
outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged
respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to
marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of
love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will
marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and
then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when
respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit
to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until
7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party
together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly
proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until
they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she
was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with
his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959,
complainant gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a
promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present
constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the
Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a
letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and
she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in
November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry
her.1wph1.t
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in
Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which
was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital.
This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's
Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter
testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by
the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3,
1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to
discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant
were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in
1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.);
respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own
testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of

marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion.
(Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old
Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez,
44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the
Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence
to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland,
speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State
the very means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court,
it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is
not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The
inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme
Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith
[1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel
vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly
immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act
and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important
that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance
with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession
and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

G.R. No. L-19450

May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having
entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice.
The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for
the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position
of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of
City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued
an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from
Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City
Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of
Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This
Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered
judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by
him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear
that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity.
As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible
conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo
and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the
offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to
protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may
appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in
this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which
we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of
Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City
Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..

A.M. No. P-99-1287

January 26, 2001

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati
City, respondent.
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in
Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of Public
Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40. 1 While
respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting
for a certification with regard to respondent's authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said
criminal case.2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to
respondent for comment.3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal
Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances
surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have
enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private
complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore,
he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of
the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were
covered by leave applications approved by the presiding judge.1wphi1.nt
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for authorization to
appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him
for appearing in court without the required authorization from the Court. 5 On January 25, 1999, the
Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec.
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees," which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:
x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized

by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who belong to
a "powerless family" from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until
he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her
as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's help
and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private
complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to "seek

vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the
latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the
course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate
of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that
since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her
counsel since she not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed
out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on
Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and
that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping
hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took
advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that
during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications
attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred the administrative
matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his
cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification
of Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance
of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared
as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence.
Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was
handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His
cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not receive a
single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the
family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for
a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the
purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his
appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in
government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his
cousin without first securing permission from the Court, and considering that this is his first
time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the
knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with
more severely.6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section
reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or other official or employee of the

superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in
this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a
lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice"
prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of
the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer
and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647).
The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General
is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source
of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission
by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case
at bar, who is a relative.8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law
profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law,
he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court
as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government;
Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities,
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will
not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That
no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee,
which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties,
or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the
management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. 9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May
4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is
true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed
to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby

REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget
and Management, respondents.
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to bean attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients
in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. ( Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a

representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their

rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. ( State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law
within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the
provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the
Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of
the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the
COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on
Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications
as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at
least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by
a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice
that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it
will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with
not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined
as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting
Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. ( Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. ( Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members
of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business
counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." ( Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly
different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private
law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter
alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary
(in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities
which require an ability to deal with the law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary

transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups,
in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation
law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research
function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us
the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting
and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use
of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis,
automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably,
an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of
futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multivariable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require
the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that
arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business
issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and
with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of
his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune
to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however,
the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance.
To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad
lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role.
For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including

the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple
levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new
role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and
operations of governance through participation on boards and other decisionmaking roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer visa-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is
seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and
rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and
minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be
used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including

hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international

joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a
major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as
firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The
practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the
legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with
public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense
of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he
must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960

with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer
(such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down
the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining
their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may
work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation
of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a

mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed
only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of
Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of
quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers
in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3
and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct
the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment
on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to
the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public
Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which
modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a
habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly,
this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that
is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that
he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant
case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a
grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may
the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that
the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on
the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38974 March 25, 1975

OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and FREDERICK G. WEBBER,
petitioners,
vs. JUDGE AMADOR T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his capacity as City Sheriff of
Manila, respondents.
Original petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to set aside the orders
and judgment rendered by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. N-1963 (Alfredo Catolico v. Omico
Mining and Industrial Corporation, et al.) as having been made without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion.
I
FACTS
On June 1, 1973, Alfredo Catolico (herein private respondent), then a judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, filed with said court a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. N-1963 and assigned
to Branch II presided by respondent Judge Amador T. Vallejos, against Omico Mining and Industrial
Corporation and Frederick G. Webber, the latter in his personal capacity and as President and Chairman
of the Board of Directors of said corporation, alleging two (2) causes of action. The first, for the return
of ten (10) certificates of stock of the corporation borrowed from him by the defendants, and the
second, for the payment of his services as legal counsel for the corporation. Under the first cause of
action, plaintiff Catolico alleged among others that he is a resident of Cavite City where he is a judge
of the Court of First Instance and stockholder of the defendant Omico Mining and Industrial
Corporation holding thirty (30) certificates of stock duly paid up bearing Nos. 13437 to 13466, the
same having been issued to him way back in August, 1969; that defendant corporation, through its codefendant Frederick G. Webber, pleaded with him that ten (10) certificates of stock, Nos. 13437 to
13446, be allowed to remain with them under their responsibility, jointly and severally, for the specific
purpose of using said certificates as part collateral for a loan in the amount of P10,000,000.00, the
defendants were then negotiating with the Development Bank of the Philippines, and that both
defendants, jointly and severally, promised to return said certificates of stock upon the approval or
disapproval of the loan application; that when disapproval of said loan application appeared imminent,
the defendants again pleaded with him for the retention of the same ten (10) certificates of stock
because they were negotiating for the purchase of the Bunning and Company of Tuguegarao for
P2,000,000,00, and that they needed said certificates as part collateral for the transaction; that when
those two transactions failed, he demanded several times of the defendants for the return to him of the
ten (10) certificates aforementioned so that he could use them, but said demands were of no avail; that
in view of the failure of the defendants to comply with his demands, he is forced to file the complaint
seeking the return to him of said ten (10) certificates of stock. Under the second cause of action,
plaintiff after reproducing the pertinent averments in the first cause of action, among which is the
averment that he is a judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, further alleged that on October 13,
1968, both defendants entered into a contract of personal and professional services with him under the
terms of which he was to head defendant corporation's legal department with the condition that he
should render such services only after his office hours, "even into the dead wee hours of the night and
wherever such services would not run in conflict with his duties as Judge"; that in consideration of such
services, the defendants undertook to pay him a yearly salary of P35,000.00 from the date of the
contract, but where a case shall have been settled in and out of court, and defendants shall have won or
saved money because of such settlement, he shall be paid by way of commission ten percent (10%) of
the amount involved in the litigation and/or settlement; that, pursuant to said contract, he has rendered
legal services as head of the legal department of defendant Omico and has attended to the personal
consultation of defendant Frederick G. Webber until the filing of the complaint, when, by reason
thereof, their official relations were severed; that the defendants should render the corresponding
accounting of his unpaid commission and salaries, taking into consideration the partial payments and
advances given to him as salary; that a more detailed specification of the services rendered by him in
favor of the defendants were made in a letter to the defendants, mailed on May 28, 1973 from his

official residence in Cavite City; that the defendants refused and failed to render such accounting and
to pay his emoluments, in spite of his repeated demands to that effect. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed that,
on the first cause of action, defendants be ordered to return to him the ten (10) certificates of stock, or,
in case the return thereof cannot be done, to issue in his favor the same number and amount of
certificates of stock as replacement or to pay him the par value thereof; and, on the second cause of
action, defendants be ordered to render the corresponding accounting of the amounts due him in
accordance with the averments in the complaint, and to pay him the balance as reflected in the
accounting as approved by the court; to pay him moral, exemplary, punitive and afflictive damages, in
such amounts as assessed by the court; to pay him attorney's fees and costs; and to grant him such other
reliefs available in the premises. 1
Served with the corresponding summons and copies of the complaint, the petitioners, as defendants
therein, on June 10, 1973 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: namely (1) improper
venue, in that the case was filed in Cavite where plaintiff is not a resident, the truth being that he is a
resident of Quezon City where he has his permanent family home; and, as to the second cause of
action, the contract of personal and professional services between plaintiff and defendants was entered
into in the City of Manila, and, therefore, the case should have been filed in Manila in accordance with
Section I of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court; and (2) lack of cause of action, in that with regard to
the stock certificates the same are in the name of Vicente Resonda; and, with respect to the contract of
personal and professional services wherein it was agreed that the plaintiff shall head the legal
department of defendant Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation, the same is illegal, void and
unenforceable, plaintiff being a judge of the Court of First Instance who is prohibited by Section 35 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court from engaging in private practice as a member of the Bar. The
motion to dismiss contains the following notice of hearing: t.hqw
The
Clerk
of
Court of First Instance of Cavite City Branch II

Court

Greetings:
Please include the foregoing motion in the calendar of the Honorable Court on
Saturday, June 16, 1973, and have the same submitted for resolution without
further arguments on the part of the defendants.
(Sgd.) JOSE F. PEREZ
COPY
FURNISHED:
(By
registered
Mail)
Atty.
Jaime
B.
Lumasag,
Counsel
for
the
5-C Banawe, Quezon City

Plaintiff,

Attached to the motion is Registry Receipt No. 45297 issued by Manila Central Post Office on June 9,
1973. 2
On June 16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion to dismiss, neither the parties nor their
respective counsels appeared in court. But the court, noting that there was no clear showing in the
record that notice of hearing of said motion had been served upon counsel for the plaintiff, issued on
June 18, 1973 an Order postponing consideration of the motion "until counsel for the defendants shall
have shown to the satisfaction of the Court that a copy of his motion to dismiss has been furnished
counsel for the plaintiff." The Order adds that "in said event, the Clerk of Court shall calendar anew the
hearing of the motion to dismiss furnishing a copy of the date of the bearing to counsels for the
plaintiff and for the defendants." 3 Copies of said Order were sent to the respective counsels of the
parties on June 10, 1973 by registered mail. 4
While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution by the court because defendants had not yet
presented to the court the required proof of service, plaintiff, on January 11, 1974, filed a petition to
declare the defendants in default and to allow him to present his evidence ex parte. In said petition,
plaintiff alleged, in substance, that defendants had been served with summons and copies of the

complaint on June 8, 1973; that as of January 11, 1974, or after a lapse of seven (7) months from the
service of summons, defendants had not filed their answer to the complaint; that the defendants had
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on June 10, 1973, the hearing of which had been set to June 16,
1973 but the notice of said hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court, not to Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag,
counsel for plaintiff; that the Revised Rules of Court provides that petitions and motions should be sent
to opposing parties who should be notified of the date of the hearing thereof; that the notice of hearing
in defendants' motion to dismiss is fatally defective, it being addressed to the Clerk of Court; and that
because of that defect, defendants' motion to dismiss is a "useless piece of paper", citing Philippine
Advertising Counselors, Inc. v. Hon. Pedro A. Revilla, G.R. No. L-31869, promulgated on August 8,
1973. 5 By Order of January 15, 1974, the court granted the petition 6 and, consequently, it received ex
parte the evidence of the plaintiff and rendered judgment thereon on January 29, 1974, the dispositive
portion of which reads: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants directing the latter:
1. To return to the plaintiff ten (10) certificates of stock corresponding to 100,000
shares of the Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation in the name of Vicente
Resonda bearing Nos. 13437 up to and including 13446 or in lieu thereof, to
deliver to said plaintiff new certificates of the above-named corporation of
equivalent value;
2. To pay to the plaintiff the total amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty-six
Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-five Pesos and Eleven centavos (P1,186,435.11) at
the legal rate of interest until said amount is fully paid;
3. To pay to the plaintiff by way of attorney's fees the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00);
4. To pay the costs." 7
On March 5, 1974, defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, advancing the arguments (1) that the
judgment is contrary to law and the liberal interpretation of the Revised Rules of Court, in that they
have complied with the provisions of Section 10 of Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, by stating in the
motion to dismiss that a copy thereof was furnished by registered mail to Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag,
counsel for the plaintiff, and attaching thereto the registry receipt therefor issued by the Manila Central
Post Office; that the purpose of the notice has been served because as per certification of the post office
of Quezon City, said Atty. Jaime B. Lumasag received the copy of the Motion to Dismiss before June
16, 1973, the date set for the hearing of the motion; and that, with respect to the return card, they have
not received the same, hence, they could not comply with the submission thereof; (2) that the
circumstances obtaining in the case do not warrant the default order which finally paved the way for
the rendering of judgment in favor of the plaintiff, because counsel for the plaintiff had received a copy
of the motion to dismiss one day before the hearing thereof; that said motion should have been acted
upon, considering that it contains contentious issues which when resolved would show the complaint to
be "nothing but empty claims"; and that the ruling in Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. cannot
apply, because the facts therein are at variance with those of the present case; and (3) that the
defendants have a valid defense and strong evidence to rebut and/or controvert the claims of the
plaintiff as shown by the affidavits of Jose F. Perez and Hilarion P. Dugenio, legal counsel and
corporate secretary, respectively, of Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation. The motion contains a
notice to counsel for plaintiff that the hearing thereof has been set for March 15, 1974. 8
On March 15,1974, plaintiff Catolico, on his own behalf, filed a motion to postpone hearing of the
motion for reconsideration to April 29, 1974, to enable him to prepare an intelligible opposition thereto.
The motion does not contain a notice of hearing. It merely states at the foot thereof that a copy of said
motion was furnished Pio R. Marcos and Guillermo Bandonil, counsel for defendants, without stating
how delivery was effected. 9 But notwithstanding absence of notice of hearing, the court, considering
the absence, of objection thereto on the part of the defendants, granted the motion for postponement,

with the condition that the defendants be furnished with a copy of the opposition; that defendants may
file their reply to the opposition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof; and that
thereafter the matter be deemed submitted for resolution. 10
On May 31, 1974, while defendants' motion for reconsideration was still pending before the court
because the defendants had not filed yet their reply to the opposition as they had not received a copy
thereof, 11 plaintiff Catolico filed a motion for immediate execution of judgment, alleging, among other
things, that said judgment had already become final and executory because the defendants failed to
have the order of default lifted; that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time; that there was
a "manifest attempt on the part of the defendants to delay the proceedings to afford them an
opportunity to have all their assets and shares dissipated by continuous sale of the same to the
prejudice" not only of respondent Catolico but also of "some forty to fifty creditors who filed
complaints against the defendants for estafa and civil suits for collection amounting to hundreds of
thousands of pesos"; that some 80% of defendants' assets and properties had already been sold at
fantastically low prices to defraud creditors who had been deceitfully assured by the management that
they are well protected; that the judgment might become ineffective "due to the notoriously deceptive
movements" (sic) to which the defendants "daily and continuously expose themselves"; and that
immediate execution of the judgment is the only protection that can be rendered to plaintiff under the
premises. 12
On June 18, 1974, the Court issued simultaneously two (2) Orders, one denying defendants' motion for
reconsideration, 13 and the other directing the issuance of a writ of execution of its decision of January
29, 1974. In the latter Order, the court appointed the City Sheriff of Manila, herein respondent
Leonardo Alcid, to execute said writ of execution. 14
On June 19, 1974, defendants filed their notice of appeal to this Court, an appeal bond and a record on
appeal. The record on appeal was approved on August 27, 1974 only because of the absence of the
respondent Judge from his station, he being then a participant in the seminar of Judges of Court of First
Instance in the Development Academy of the Philippines at Tagaytay City. 15
On the same date, June 19, 1974, in the afternoon, respondent Sheriff of Manila, through his Senior
Legal Assistant and Acting Executive Sheriff Dominador Q. Cacpal served a notice of garnishment to
the defendants, together with a writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge. On July 22, Pio R.
Marcos, as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant Omico Mining and
Industrial Corporation, wrote a letter to respondent Sheriff asking that the defendants be given a little
chance to exhaust the legal remedies available to hold in abeyance the execution and garnishment.
Among the reasons presented by Marcos are that defendants were not given a chance to have their day
in court in the motion for immediate execution of judgment and that they have already appealed from
the lower court's decision and order of immediate execution. 16
Because of the impending execution of the judgment by default which they believe to be illegal,
defendants, on July 25, 1974, filed with this Court the instant petition praying, among other things, that
respondent Judge be restrained from commanding the City Sheriff of Manila, or his duly authorized
representative, to execute the decision of January 29, 1974. The petition assails mainly the Order of
respondent Judge, declaring the defendants in default, the consequent reception of the evidence of the
plaintiff ex parte and the judgment by default rendered thereon, as having been made without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion because said respondent Judge failed to resolve
first the defendants' motion to dismiss. In a resolution dated July 24, 1974, We required, without giving
due course to the petition, respondents to comment on said petition within ten (10) days from notice
thereof, and, as prayed for, issued a temporary restraining order. Respondent Judge and private
respondent Catolico filed separate comments. Per resolution dated August 20, 1974, We resolved to
consider their comments as their Answer to the petition.
In his answer, respondent Judge justifies his failure to act on the aforesaid motion to dismiss the
complaint in this wise: t.hqw

In insisting in their petition that it was obligatory for this respondent to grant or
deny said motion to dismiss, counsels who filed this petition seem to be feigning
ignorance as to reasons why this respondent chose to ignore their motion to
dismiss and considered it a mere scrap of paper. It is humbly submitted that said
reasons have been amply set forth and discussed in the Decision rendered in Civil
Case No. N-1963 (Annex F to the petition) in accordance with the decision of this
Honorable Tribunal in the case of Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc., versus
Hon. Pedro Revilla, et al., G.R. No. L-31869), to this effect: t.hqw
'Finally, Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides
that notice of a motion shall be served by the applicant to all
parties concerned, at least three days before the hearing
thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any
affidavits and other papers accompanying it, and Section 5 of
the same rule requires the motion to be directed to the parties
concerned and to state the time and place for the hearing of
the motion. A motion which fails to comply with these
requirements is nothing but a useless piece of paper ...'
(Emphasis supplied).
Counsels who filed the instant petition know more than anybody else that their
motion to dismiss did not comply with the standards required in the decision
above quoted for it was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the party
concerned. As such, said motion to dismiss was but 'a useless piece of paper'
without any legal standing, and, therefore, could neither be granted nor denied, by
this respondent ....
Subsequently, or on September 6, 1974, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss said petition on
the ground that the remedy of certiorari and prohibition is no longer available to the herein petitioners,
inasmuch as they had already perfected their appeal. 17 Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss on
the ground that their appeal is inadequate to protect their rights for, without the restraining order issued
by this Court, the respondents could have executed the decision and orders in question. 18
II.
ISSUES
The first issue to be resolved here is whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the defendants in default, in receiving
plaintiff's evidence ex parte and in rendering judgment thereon.
The second is whether ordinary appeal, not certiorari and prohibition, is the proper remedy available to
petitioners.
III
1. With regard to the first issue, respondents contend that the motion to dismiss the complaint is a
"useless piece of paper" because the notice of hearing incorporated therein is addressed to the Clerk of
Court, not to the party concerned, that is, the plaintiff or his counsel, as required by the rules. We do
not agree. As copied verbatim above, the notice of hearing states the time and place of hearing, and a
copy thereof was sent through registered mail seven (7) days before the date set for the hearing of the
motion but actually received by plaintiff's counsel one (1) day before said date, as per certification of
the Quezon City Post Office.
To Our mind, what is decisive here is that plaintiff had sufficient notice of the time and place of the
hearing of the motion to dismiss. We have said in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Bath
Construction and Company, 19 "unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the court would
have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to
hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file

his reply or opposition." In the Matusa case, We said that granting that the notice is defective for failure
to specify the exact date when the motion to dismiss should be heard, the Court, in taking cognizance
of the motion on the date set for the hearing thereof, cured whatever iota of defect such a pleading may
have had, especially if it is taken into account that upon receipt of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff was
properly notified of the existence of said pleading. 20 Indeed, We declared that there may be cases
where the attendance of certain circumstances "may be considered substantive enough to truncate the
adverse literal application of the pertinent rules violated." 21 The case at bar is such an instance,
because private respondent had sufficient notice of the place, time and date when the motion to dismiss
was to be heard. It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he declared the petitioners in default. The motion to dismiss was pending
before the court when such declaration was made, and it is generally irregular to enter an order of
default while a motion to dismiss remains pending and undisposed of. 22 The irregularity of the order
of default is evident from the fact that when the petitioners were declared in default, their time for
filing an answer had not yet commenced to run anew because on said date, their counsel had not yet
received any notice of the action taken by the court on their motion to dismiss. Under Section 4 of Rule
16 of the Revised Rules of Court, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the determination thereof is
deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the
time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period. In other
words, the period for filing responsive pleading commences to run all over again from the time the
defendant receives notice of the denial or deferment of his motion to dismiss. Inasmuch as petitioners
were declared in default while their motion to dismiss was still pending resolution, they were,
therefore, incorrectly declared in default, and the holding of the trial of the case on the merits, in their
absence, without due notice to them of the date of hearing, was a denial of due process. 23
Consequently, the order of default, the judgment and the order of execution are patent nullities.
In connection with the foregoing, We notice the ambivalence with which the respondent Judge applied
the rules. Thus, while he was unduly strict regarding the requirements of notice of hearing to the
defendants, he was, at the same time, unduly liberal with respect to the plaintiff. For instance, plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration did not contain any notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, or even
the address of the plaintiff who signed personally said motion. Notwithstanding the absence of these
data, respondent Judge readily granted the motion. Then there is plaintiff's motion for immediate
execution of judgment pending appeal. Although it was apparent that a copy of said motion could not
have been received by the counsel for the defendants at their office in Baguio City prior to the date of
the hearing on June 3, 1974, considering that it was only on May 29, 1974 when a copy of said motion
was allegedly posted by registered mail at the Manila Post Office, respondent Judge did not require, as
he did with respect to defendants' motion to dismiss, proof of service of the notice thereof. Such
conduct falls short of the requirement that the official conduct of a judge should not only be free from
impropriety, but also from the appearance of impropriety..
2. There is, moreover, the consideration that the challenged judgment seeks to enforce a contract which
is patently void because it is contrary to law and public policy. The contract of professional services
entered into between private respondent and the petitioners, while the former was still a judge of the
Court of First Instance, constituted private practice of law and in contravention of the express provision
of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The aforecited Rule was promulgated by this
Court, pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound reasons
of public policy, for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of
an attorney-at-law are so inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretions and privileges of a judge of the Court of First Instance. 24 This inhibitory rule makes it
obligatory upon the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public
of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of
moral decency and the desire to promote the public interest.
Private respondent should have known or ought to know, that when he was elevated to the Bench of the
Court of First Instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an attorney was suspended and

continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position. 25

It is evident, therefore, that the aforesaid contract is void because a contract, whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is considered inexistent
and void from the beginning. 26
3. On the question of the remedy availed of by petitioners, respondents maintain that where appeal is
available, as it has been shown to be available to the petitioners when they perfected their appeal in
Civil Case No. N-1963, the remedy of certiorari and/or prohibition cannot be resorted to. In resolving
this question, We advert to Our ruling in Matute v. Court of Appeals, supra, where We stated: t.
hqw
In opposing the instant petition, the plaintiff-respondent contends that the remedy
of the defendant petitioner is not a petition for certiorari but an ordinary appeal
pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph 3 which reads: t.hqw
'A party who has been declared in default may likewise
appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to
the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set
aside the order of default has been presented by him in
accordance with Rule 38.' .
We do not agree. The remedy provided for in the above-quoted rule is properly,
though not exclusively, available to a defendant who has been validly declared in
default. It does not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default
from pursuing a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari
to have the judgment by default set aside as a nullity.
It should be emphasized that a defendant who is properly declared in default is
differently situated from one who is improvidently declared in default. The former
irreparably loses his right to participate in the trial, while the latter retains such a
right and may exercise the same after having the order of default and the
subsequent judgment by default annulled and the case remanded to the court of
origin. Moreover the former is limited to the remedy set forth in section 2,
paragraph 3 of Rule 41 by virtue of which he can contest only the judgment by
default on the designated ground that it is contrary to the evidence or the law; the
latter, however, has the option to avail of the same remedy or to forthwith
interpose a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the order of default
even before the promulgation of a judgment by default, or in the event that the
latter has been rendered, to have both court decrees the order of default and the
judgment by default declared void. The defendant-petitioner's choice of the
latter course of action is correct for he controverts the judgment by default not on
the ground that it is not supported by evidence or it is contrary to law, but on the
ground that it is intrinsically void for having been rendered pursuant to a patently
invalid order of default..
Granting, however, that an appeal is open to the defendant-petitioner, the same is
no longer an adequate and speedy remedy considering that the court a quo had
already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and the carrying out of such
writ loomed as a great probability. This is in consonance with the doctrine
enunciated in Vda. de Saludes v. Pajarillo and Bautista (78 Phil. 754) wherein this
Court held that an 'appeal under the circumstances was not an adequate remedy
there being an order or execution issued by the municipal court.' Hence, the rule
that certiorari does not lie when there is an appeal is relaxed where, as in the
instant case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
The above ruling applies with cogent force in the present case..

WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the default order, judgment and writ of execution rendered by
the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. N-1963 are hereby set aside, and the respondent Judge is
ordered to hear and decide the motion to dismiss the complaint, taking into account Our foregoing
opinion. The temporary restraining order is made permanent, with costs against private respondent.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish
the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common
sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence gathering,
assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services
should
be
allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said
bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this
Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the
effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's
act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all,
to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a
name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term
medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that
it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a
picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this

practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service
or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer
actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a
distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the
minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts
contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question
are only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it.
Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a
foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .

for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in
question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts
are
being
encouraged
or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because
the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent
offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements
in question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the

publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least,
from offering such services to the public in general.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic
data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession
and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of
such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law,
there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union

between a man and woman entered into accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message
being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of
profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason
of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the
exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from
"encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in
skill.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities

aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the
Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that
shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning
a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the
"special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is
how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not
legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be

prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that
certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions
for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should
be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such
practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in
giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2
and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out
itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to
say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's
own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve
of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions,
and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and
such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of
its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the
public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted
as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its
business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage

in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right
limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the
persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading
and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public
as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law
practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly
on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law,
the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon
and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of
law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of
study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the

Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures
to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified
to do so.

seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by
our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should
be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise
legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation
for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give

the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President
and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for
the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal
and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit
cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal
but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency
and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage
is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to
obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve.
The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about
having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not,
perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can
render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear
that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of
that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he
shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It
is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact
that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law
accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when
we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the architect, who
must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire
tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure
that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion,
they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his
land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be considered to
be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted

by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of

the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it
has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter,
and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so, or that the technical education
given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees,
to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the
fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice
or information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as
a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program,
he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of
the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations
and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an exception where the business
turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of
the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal
role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment.

Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows

from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it
is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need
not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of
New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before the agency
by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National
Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in
person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions
purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling
(which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law
provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a
whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing
a marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not
constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby ConcepcionRichard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If
a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to
that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information,
the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law
is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the
forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large.
There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client.
THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated
or readily identified person in a particular situation in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did
not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being
no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for
the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular problems which
might arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to)
enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and should be
affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving
legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par.

6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary
for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression
(or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq.,
Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph
thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal
services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice
of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down
general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now
take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.
15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.

Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it

has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction
of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services
from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications,
obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration
to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of
clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software
for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts
and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting
and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue
of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where
an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its
own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with
offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila.
No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the CunetaConcepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like
doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc.
has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of
the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by

analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you
contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for
the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has
been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of
these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient,
hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains
Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly.
"If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to
inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation.
There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order,
and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property,
and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then
you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically
so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and
study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling
them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with
respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding
from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by

incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States
of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools
and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in
the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval
of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered
as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or
have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics
had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment,
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held
to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things

that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises
his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way
of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for
an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain
from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of
the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this
matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present
state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of
law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be
subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number
and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law
firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience
of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory
but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the
Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment
of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the
putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for
such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation
for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

G.R. No. L-12426

February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and
the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the
said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar
examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently,
the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and
pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to
practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases
before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent
Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests
or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the
Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so,
specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And
we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the

preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside
of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations
and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In
re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs.
Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation
of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law,
as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in
accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides
that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or
welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or
used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed
publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a
patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year
before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the
true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to
connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent;
that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is
authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a
petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for
cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under
Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any
person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the

Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a
commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an
adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a
new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or
medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of
laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience
for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding
to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in
the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and
extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of
the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees.
(40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the
granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and
whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is
a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not only
questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or
sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to
hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the
Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar
practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of
the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States
Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to
that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following
provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are
kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled
to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of

applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules
shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any
United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who
fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register
unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested information and material; and shall
establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of
good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary
to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to
advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their application before the
Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person seeking to
have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory
proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and
technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time
must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any
person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may
prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his office, and may require of such
persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or
other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are
possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before
the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his
office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of
gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall,
with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other
person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter,
or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded.
The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused
recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District of
Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its
rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions
of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said
Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United

States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner
of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take
the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent
on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law,
giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms
and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and
efficient administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to
matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions
of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as
amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for
the Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern
the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus
specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or
less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments
exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of
goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs,
may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with
them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass
the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
Integration 1

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar

submitted its Report dated November 30,
1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received
from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment
of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the
petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties
were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter
of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act
6397. This law provides as follows:

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will
suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3
to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to
do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the
recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and
the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through
their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of
the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of
any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the
purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and
contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of
the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public,
and publish information relating thereto;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective

law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its
own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent
legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in
many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the
country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and
duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement
of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict
the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of
its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act
6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges
on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and
freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue,
the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover,
clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of
justice, as an officer of the court.

Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and
just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action;
but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized
body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and
just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized
body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is
by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay
annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay
dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled
financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other
aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of
the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of
legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme
Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program
without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied
powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the

integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a

member that might result from his required payment of annual dues.

professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.

3. Freedom of Speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very
purposes for which it was established.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in
the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of
Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are noncommital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on
the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All
these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free
speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry
us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance
of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral.
The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced
in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in
the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the
Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the
Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge
their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to
do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of
regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young
and old, at the time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation
in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual
lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official
status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar
of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these
salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and
politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have
failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court,
respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971
Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for
disciplinary action for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and
re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in
the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively
invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law)
of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released
this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil
Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo.
He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to the release of
the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar
candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion,
there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It
would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and
unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by
its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter,
Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations
and found that the grades in five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar candidate with office code
No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the
respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office
code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964,
1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark
for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio
D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter,
with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his
reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or

re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case
No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in
the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys"
(Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer
filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the
Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,)
rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who reevaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public
International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number
of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a
respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law
also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out
to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation
resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of
Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office
Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg
and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of
Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case.
(Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this
fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2,
1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo,
Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where
he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis
for their cross-examination.

the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always

followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the
rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect
to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his words;

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under
which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

b) That considering this relationship and considering his

misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to
get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from
all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman
of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a
bar examiner;

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals)
Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is
the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a
review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate
obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation
and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me
an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him
the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to
75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such reevaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were
based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others;
thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No.
5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit
with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is
no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and
9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I
did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I
am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo,
based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October
16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had
developed to the point that with respect to the correction of

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original
correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me
the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my
residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court,
with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's
notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me
if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar
Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook
as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to
do so because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the
particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number
decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the
name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been
identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and
as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said
notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in
accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66.
After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades,
and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had
not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in
the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the
same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the
two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him
the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis
supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P.
Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to
know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now
knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I
have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such
review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's
assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of
express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and
the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman
lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or
suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the
Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was
usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as
when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code
numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to
make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to
have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971,
considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was
84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual
that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know
and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee
with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9
points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the
subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to
it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know
the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and
did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him

before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination
books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law
saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of,
if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also
the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar
Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question
who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal
benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at
No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him.
He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the
said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively
low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I
might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can
recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo
however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously
given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every
item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I
increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and
maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the
total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in
my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn
statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total
grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not
having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the
legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however,
pleads in attenuation of such omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he
was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it
was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered.
He had every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary
nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request
was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned,
herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer
written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria
laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that
it was only in that particular subject that the said examine
failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given
to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It
should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers,
herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer
written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the
Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to reevaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook
(No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the
grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I reevaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a reevaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned
re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this
time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum
circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should
then be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for reevaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them
would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now,
we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission
to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and
irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to
bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his
hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he
does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a
matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but
with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove

the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought
the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade
thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee
concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such
serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all
good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the
fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so
merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as
Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was
circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part
of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar
Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket.
I have always made it a point that the moment I think of so
buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number
that comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I
buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954"
boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing
along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the
Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and
almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to
which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta.
Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number.
Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last
three digits corresponded to "954". This number became
doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits
of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant
to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link
or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even
in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees
from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as
Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number
"27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is
identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27"

at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master

List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning
of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as
Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of
these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941
while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and
was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a
result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on
December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital,
our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then
on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new
life for me having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to
get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on
February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot
children the youngest of whom was born on February 27,
1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the
ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the
checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon
the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the
number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity
prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks.
Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the
apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in
all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that
they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took
them back to the respective examiners for possible review
recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but
leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either
of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the
meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines,
namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile
Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No.
110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No.
951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after reevaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general
average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one
subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out

that the subject was Political and International Law under

Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and
marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with
the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after reevaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political
and International Law is precisely the same notebook
mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were reevaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if
not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations
resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having
caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To
assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the
members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the
bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything.
All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution,
and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or
consideration.

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only
one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile
Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the
facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which
the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or recheck some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that
there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation,
unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries
the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and
the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954
on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang
"bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio
Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary
course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution
dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent
utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in
the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this

Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some
conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied
and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties
and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly
initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been
submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for
and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas
day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process
of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant,
he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a
candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will
bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondentexaminer Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondentexaminer Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from
64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with
Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent
Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs.
1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4,
rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil

Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal,
with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and
graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly
and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to
Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify
of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration
was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo,
as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in
order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an
increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in
the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier
mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1
& 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade
due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver
to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political
Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in
Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.),
informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have
passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the
bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar
Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in
just one subject respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just
leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency.
After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent
Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the
charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter,
who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he
had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject Criminal Law

that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction
of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the
examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent
Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also
revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code
Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61,
rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the
latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him
that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter
of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject.
He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long
before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the
examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade
because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his
quite ingenious scheme by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted
the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p.
16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information
was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated
together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The
next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole
paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was
not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& BMontecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the reevaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was
only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change
the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code
Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondentexaminer Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence
of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two
companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972,
after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that
occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the
usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook
because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with

respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers
of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has
number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II

in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25%
which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only
in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred
back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual
grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,

alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a
total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It
is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such
steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in
their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify
his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs.
1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.)
distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith
and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers
and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination
papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only
presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164)
and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the
cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that
respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and
the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed
in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five
subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied
and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed

BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased
to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of
the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz.
But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public
International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation
or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by
the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken
and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data
showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the
Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average,
whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the
examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any
request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the

Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself
to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70%
to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly
claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good
faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against
the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of
the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in
trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the
other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And
the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the
inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not
yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22,
29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol.
V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the
original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the
cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner
Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela
Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the
initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp.
23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in
evidence.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case
of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better
situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and
one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela
Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried
into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately
clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the
first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on
March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an
after-thought.

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging
to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613
was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW
TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE
IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two
cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp.
50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with
respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI,
pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were
contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI,
pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by
respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees
and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as,
according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken
up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61,
rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that
involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the
Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in
whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh.
2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to
Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law
are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points

Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation

Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo
to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo
can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at
the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4)
subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5%
in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in
five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and
Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for
Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has
obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice
Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in
the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between
the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the
other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act
of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always
be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the
Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as
Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess
any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with
authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or
whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the
rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127).
Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any
criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme
Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal
record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still
pending becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided
by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases
involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of
which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang
when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the

applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory
evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in
any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his
moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a
better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or
applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar.
In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the
application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare
under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any
offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By
1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the
Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving
moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that
"he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or
accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude;
nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang
continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical
injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly
omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969
and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966,
1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under
oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no
criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he
had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to
practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom
he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate
of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of
Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and
his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such
explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having
been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very
name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself,
who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name
in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty,
probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession
of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him
to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as
early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he
did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed
to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no
other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an
officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then
to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing
American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not
without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico
from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their
report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good
moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations
[People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People
vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found
that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of
the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without
knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same
without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of
the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or recorrecion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the
Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and
caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who

would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have
required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the
examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned
was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations
could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that
the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law.
With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of
Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo.
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this
particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot
remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I
agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.;
see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And
respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject
except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at
least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being
done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are
failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will
try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as
lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be
more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a
total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the
changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades
they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the
misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the reevaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord
in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that
time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2,
3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo;
allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. AMontecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75%
the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the

grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I
am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio
Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in
that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein
examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the reevaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the
said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find
their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondentsexaminers that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the
highest consideration of public interest absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to
exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p.
9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in
his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia

"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the
grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho,
who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose
of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised
Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned
in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the
release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly
expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by
resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo
to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of
the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for
the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo
and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of
BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80,
Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April
20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument
April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.].
Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00,
which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price
of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00
was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from
his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement
of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in
the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under
Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the
P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount
of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed
under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein
involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent
Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married

sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000
(P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed
on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from
his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent
during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no
mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address
of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the
records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of
her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give
to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was
either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August
14, 1972 date of instrument; August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On
February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914,
was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973,
Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of
BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence,
only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's
house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the
GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to
pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house
and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however,
as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in
the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW
car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January,
1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any
car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years
previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding
receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of
November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot
was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link
or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to
show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above
properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the
serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and
in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as
ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13,
1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show
cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,

respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973,
obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the
investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII,
pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation
to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation
or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it
is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of
the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol.
V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila,
although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94,
rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely
across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated
claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he
does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came
across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the
father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at
Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the
Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications
with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are
part of the records of this Court.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine
Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed
and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated
August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang
and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the
Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at
the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans
Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver
July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his prelaw at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19
years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy
(Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the
private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy
of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational
Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ
Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed
and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV,

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16,
1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps,
US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and
with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the
enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit
of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.
LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON
E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against
his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by
men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client
"in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court,"
and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He
ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said
motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of
proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion
for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiffappellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed
by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby
dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July
5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time
and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support
of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R.
No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8,
1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on
November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued
it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main
decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the
issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and

Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in

issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his
petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him
after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until
he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November
17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise,
oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court
has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to
file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it
with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his

petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly
motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our
client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our
pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest
of JUSTICE, what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all
its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our
pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular
case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify
their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that
even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its
truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is
used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally
that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what
measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why
dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to
thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and
behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first
cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We
attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were
compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of
the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never
interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after
seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client
and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you

also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in
thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong
public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was
spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement.
We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As
the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as
to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have
been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We
have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a
first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role
of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to
decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons

for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order
that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has
placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion.
During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively,
on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260,
1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work
it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these
cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as
already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the
Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099),
this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII
of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should
not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his
appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court
in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought
to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by
Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice
shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same
Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice.
Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece
of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing
Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is
obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would
have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion,
and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not
fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness,
he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in
offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting
his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for
his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, 4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit.
Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of
public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. 9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The
reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him
in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of
the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well
as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F
Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that
flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief
Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account
and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom
he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely
to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation
of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W.
212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly.
"Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but
as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind
him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first
canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express

declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely
to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions
of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. ( In
Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is
his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.
That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed
to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice
Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of
his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding
that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence
in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations
then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial
error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the
control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND,
but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not
hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension
of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-

election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a
statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the
court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of
the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney
capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17
LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40
Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous
publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer,
could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the
disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character
than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that
which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law
the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness,
especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in
the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the
courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who
had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the
judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall
be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground
for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit
his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which
tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence
in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly
an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions,
and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday
papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the
public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that
the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere
with the administration of justice. ...

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an
article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court
of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The
Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which
he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases
that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court,
is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive
of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty,
to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove
judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a
violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or
has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to
the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person
making
them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions
of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the
proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to
subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as
my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie
case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this
court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court
as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of

prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking
man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well
as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would
be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right
does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the
public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth
and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The
health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than
is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public,
through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of
the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and
money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of
the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in
a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer
wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the
court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of
morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee
chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court,
or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision,
which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct
in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we

have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this
court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts
done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so
made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be
to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional
right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion,
could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due
regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods
sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any
action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous
matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the
accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts
charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was
immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent
his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as
an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the
contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and
judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules
of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from
all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their
official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there
appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and
a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge
in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It
was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has
been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in
actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his
rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed,
has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote
a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon
his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the
court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held
in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter

case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice
of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision:
"It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80."
And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state,
the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has
power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law
are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or
accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may
redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad
repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much
the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a
letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his
home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the
conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys.
For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully
failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in
support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte
Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;
Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3
Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained
as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him
and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a
gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred
for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved
such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered,
even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements
is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and
their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds
of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert
public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary
sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted
guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence
of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation
or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted
the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to,
the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the
source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is
once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed
during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of
the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a
far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in
then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the
press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices
from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo
case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in
order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass
or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the
Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in
many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member
of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful
in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office
or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It
speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the
law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court,
blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and
analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court
as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring
into question the capability of the members and some former members of this
Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm
which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases
need not now be reviewed in detail.

18

which, in the interest of brevity,

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the

protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to
his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted
to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for
publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical
manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case
closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in
Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been
terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts
in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to
bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and
is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be
shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of
the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second
kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts
from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action
pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this
Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or nonpendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to
preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct
has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the
office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and

incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly

discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state
that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy
of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the
right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him
the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is
almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are
judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an
attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object
of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as
a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with
vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated
acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members
as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks
for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite
of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and
its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a

critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of
last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed
-by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or
a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended
to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the
Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this
Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call
for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in
one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do

disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to
decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting
support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the
practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can
be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown
by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that
suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court
of Appeals for their information and guidance.

A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of
Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and
executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December
1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari
when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari
under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the
Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry,
with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before
14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of
jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16
February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of
P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment
for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which
had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due
time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court
explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00
in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case
No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case
No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of
the decision read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar,
and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is
hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must
be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her
"to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful
penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accusedappellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has
always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense
charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did
not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

xxx xxx xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against
public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest. 3 (Italics supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the

purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes

malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section,
and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of
her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to
"obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the
instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such
offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent
shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this
Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
spread on the record of respondent.

G.R. No. 31012

September 10, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.
This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of public
and official documents, committed, according to the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public
functions as secretary to the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices
of the Supreme Court, and by reason of said duty had under her care the
compositions and other papers and documents having reference to the
examinations for the admission of candidates to the bar held in the months of
August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the archives of the said
court, confabulating with her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common
accord with him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar
Examinations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives
of the Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the
compositions, which were written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis
Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of the same, the said accused
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay, conspiring together and acting in common
accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%)
given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in
Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and
in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased the grade of sixty-three (63%)
given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to the composition
in Civil Law written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place
wrote seventy-three (73%), and by means of these alterations the said accused
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change the relative merits of
those compositions, thereby attributing to the said correctors, statements and
declarations contrary to what they really made, and the accused Estela Romualdez
and Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in the
aforesaid public and official documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay
obtained the general average required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and in
securing the latter's admission to the practice of law, as in fact he was admitted, to
the great prejudice of the public.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.
Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and
documentary, the presentation of which consumed considerable of the court's time.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either by the
prosecution or by the defense:
The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice Norberto
Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on November 1, 1921,
and continued as such until September 15, 1928.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar examinations held
in 1926.
The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office on July 11,

1912, acts every year as the secretary ex oficio of the examination committee for admission to the
bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as chairman
of the examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926, and upon recommendation
of Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as members of the examination committee,
with their respective subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas, Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno,
Mercantile Law; Attorney Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law;
Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General Delfin Jaranilla, Political Law; and
Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors was
appointed, composed of the following attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of Civil
Service, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in Civil Law;
Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of Justice Malcolm,
as correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and Remo, of the Bureau
of Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits and Alfonso
Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of the Executive Bureau,
and the accused Estela Romualdez, as correctors in Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the Executive
Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as correctors in International Law; and
Anatalio Maalac, of the Bureau of Lands, and Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On
account of illness, Mr. Remo was substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All
said correctors were designated by clerk of court Albert with the approval of the chairman of the
examination committee.
The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation of the
questions in their respective subjects and of a memorandum or note of the articles, legal provisions
and jurisprudence showing the sources from which the questions were taken. The work of
reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to the correctors designated for each
subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note or memorandum, and a set of rules, patterned
after those of the Civil Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the
correctors in grading the examination papers.
The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject assigned to
them, noting the grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but in a separate note book,
which were later checked with the grades given by the other corrector in the same subject, for the
purpose of determining the general average to be given to the composition.
The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for the year
1926 was submitted, under date of March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court and was published on the
fifth of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared the name of
candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. The grades of Mabunay in each subject,
according to the list Exhibit C-2, which was prepared after the publication of the result of the
examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in Political Law, 86
in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises. However, a
later revision of the composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy-three (73 in
Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2) had been written on
the first page of said compositions after striking out the grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given
to the composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) theretofore given to the
composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation of this irregularity by the City Fiscal
of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case.
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez
Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show the identity
of the person who altered the grades appearing on the first pages of the compositions Exhibits-B-1
and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with the conformity of her attorneys
made of record an admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.):
"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in parenthesis are
in my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words sixty-four and the figures 64%

inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said composition are also in my regular

handwriting."
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades
In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the person who
wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the words and figures alleged to have been
falsified, it now appears that the burden of establishing the authority under which said changes and
alterations were made is on the accused. On this point the evidence for the defense tended to show
that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in her capacity as private secretary of the chairman of the
examination committee and as corrector and at the same time supervisor of the correctors, was
authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions already reviewed by the other correctors
and to change the grades given by them.
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered the accused
Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as supervisors of the correctors; and explaining the
powers of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):
"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to understand that in
order to do justice to the compositions, she could review the compositions already
graded by the other correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new revision was done
in order to do justice to the compositions and before the names of the candidates were
known."
Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given by the
corresponding correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified that
said alterations were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said accused (pages 723,
726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said that the
chairman of the examining committee, gave her to understand that she "was authorized to correct
any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of the year 1926 and that she had never
corrected any composition after the name of the corresponding candidate was identified (pages
782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known Luis Mabunay, and said that the first time she saw him
was on the first day of the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).
Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela Romualdez may be
summarized in two following propositions: 1st that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the
examination committee, did not have authority to delegate to his secretary, the accused Estela
Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects in which she was not a corrector and
which had already been graded by the other correctors, and much less the power to alter or change
the grades given to and written on said compositions; 2nd that granting that the chairman of the
examination committee had such authority, the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the
same in the manner prescribed by said chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the compositions
and on the condition that the revision and the changes of grades should be made before the names
of the candidates, to whom the compositions belonged, were known.
In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice Romualdez was
appointed by the Supreme Court as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926,
so that he would supervise the examinations in accordance with law and the rules, and that
precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman can not by himself exercise the individual
powers of the committee, among which were the powers to review, and to change or alter the
grades given to the compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, specially the testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the accused Estela
Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1
and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom she knew said compositions
belonged, thus violating the conditions imposed upon her by the chairman of the examination
committee when she was given said authority.

As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the evidence for the
prosecution shows that he was in connivance with the accused Estela Romualdez in the alteration
by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of raising to 75% the
general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.
Theory of the Defense
In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the power of
supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is not
contrary to law, rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said Justice that the
appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance with section 2 of the rules had not been
followed by the Supreme Court for a number of years prior to 1926, and that when said court
designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee without designating the
examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and conferred upon him ample powers to do what
in his judgment was most in line with justice and the law, and that no Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality of the procedure employed by the chairman of
the examination committee, or of the powers conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as
said chairman was responsible only to the Supreme Court for his acts.
The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to whom
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at the time of making the alteration of the grades
appearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the testimony of said accused,
corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those who helped in the preparation of the
list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes containing the names and the identification numbers
of the candidates were opened just one day before the publication of the result of the examination,
and that in order to finish this work and to place the names of the candidates on said list, they had
to work continuously from 8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior
to the publication of the result of the examinations.
Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the defense, the
court finds that the accused Estela Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of the examination
committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were considered by said
chairman not only as correctors in the subjects assigned to them but also as supervisors of the
correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them with equal powers and authority so that neither could
consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears, however, that while the
chairman of the committee gave his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, to understand that
she "was authorized to revise the compositions already graded by the other correctors provided the
new revisions were made for the purpose of doing justice to the compositions and that the same
were mad before the names of the candidates were known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do
the same with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo Samson, to whom he said nothing about this
matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the accused Estela Romualdez had never informed the
chairman of the committee about the corrections or alterations made by her in compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said compositions to determine whether or not
their merits justified the changes so made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of the
information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part, she made no report to the
chairman of the examination committee of any error or injustice committed by any corrector, and
she only told him during the progress of the work of grading the papers that they were being
graded very strictly and that "she feared that some injustice might be committed" (page 729, s. n.),
and for that reason Justice Romualdez told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of
the kind come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in order to do justice,"
that is to say, if any person should bring to her attention any such case in which, in her opinion,
some injustice had been committed, she was authorized to put things in order (page 781, s. n.), and
the revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary (page 780, s. n.).
The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of the
examination committee upon his secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample a discretionary
power of supervision that in its exercise she should act independently, not only of the correctors
and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examination committee. Now, granting

that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the committee appointed by the Supreme Court to
conduct the bar examinations of 1926, was authorized to confer such power of supervision upon
his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did she exercise that power when she made the
changes in the compositions in question?

Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan Villaflor,
which, according to the defense is not worthy of credit because of the contradictions and
inconsistencies therein noted, the record contains other evidence establishing certain facts from
which such knowledge can be inferred.

The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the alterations of the
grades originally given by the correctors to compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is the only
person who could give an account of and explain the circumstances under which said alterations
were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was not able to explain
how and under what circumstances she made those alterations. When pressed by the fiscal during
the cross-examination to state the circumstances under which she came across those compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez said: "If I were to make any statement with
reference to the circumstances under which I came across these compositions, you would compel
me to tell a lie, because I do not really remember" (page 823, s. n.). Neither does the accused
remember why she did not put her initials under or at the side of those alterations she made on
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say, when she saw the other compositions
(Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her initials which were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that
she placed her initials on said compositions because she graded them as corrector, and she did not
put her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she revised them in her capacity as
supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said, that, as corrector, she had instructions to put her
initials when writing the original grade on any composition, but as supervisor "she was under no
obligation" to put her initials (page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman of the examination committee
"has not gone into such minor details" (page 831, s. n.). Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to
why she wrote the altered grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same line and immediately
before the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on that occasion it pleased me to do so"
(page 836, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory
authority with respect to the other five compositions forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1
and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and when asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase
given by her to the grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the
general average of the compositions of the same candidate to 75%, the accused answered that "the
fiscal ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.). With these
answers and others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a satisfactory
explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the encouragement given by Justice
Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the compositions was left to her discretion (page
780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the bar examinations of 1926 were such
that she could revise any composition in any subject already graded and increase or decrease the
grades given by the correctors; in other words, that she could, at her pleasure, do or undo the work
done by the correctors without the necessity of accounting to anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of
keeping a note or memorandum of the compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.

It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions numbering over
8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil. This list was prepared with the intervention of
the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor and the
accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the preparation of this list, sometime during the first
day of February, 1927, the sealed envelopes containing the identification numbers attached to each
composition were opened. Said numbers were written either on the upper part of each envelope or
on the first page of the composition, and that work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In
the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to the
compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.), and then the grades in each subject, followed by
the general average (pages 71, 184, s. n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for the names
(page 166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on an adding machine the grades in each
composition as they were read out by one of the helpers, and then the corresponding general
average as computed by him (page 71, s. n.), and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote said
grades in the space corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by
Deputy Clerk Samson on the adding machine was presented as Exhibit C-6.

The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity as
chairman of the examination committee, the compositions of the candidates who filed motions for
reconsideration of the grades given them, after the publication of the result of the examinations,
performed his work with such diligence and zeal that he noted in a memorandum book (Exhibit F)
not only the grades given to each answer of the candidate, but also the total grade obtained by the
candidate in the revision, together with such other data which would explain the increase of the
grades of this or that candidate.

Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2 was
prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from the compositions; while
one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the adding machine and
computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of paper used by Deputy Samson on this
occasion was also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.

The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to understand that she
had such unlimited powers, or that the Supreme Court in designating said Justice as chairman of
the bar examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer such powers upon his
secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that his designation was made so that he should conduct
the examinations in accordance with law and the rules.
But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given by the
correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she acted in the exercise of the powers conferred
upon her by the chairman of the examination committee, is there any ground in support of her
claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to the compositions, and without knowing
the name of the candidate to whom they belonged?

After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general average of each
candidate, who was theretofore known by his identification number only, was prepared, the
envelopes containing the names corresponding to the identification numbers written on said list
were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and the names of the candidates were inserted
in said list by those who assisted in the preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.) among whom
was the accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examination, having written many
of the names appearing on several pages of said list (pages 859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit
C-1 was prepared the examination committee submitted to the Supreme Court a report
recommending the admission to the bar and not only for those candidates with a general average of
75% or more, but also of those who had obtained a general average of 70 or more but below 75%,
and said automatic increase was ordered noted on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this
recommendation was not approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that said automatic
increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.), and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert,
instructed his deputy, Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the names of the
candidates who had originally obtained a general average of 75% without having obtained less
than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance thereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared
(page 77, s. n.), which was approved by the Supreme Court and published on March 5, 1927. In
this list Luis Mabunay is included with an average of 75%.

Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in the office
of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out when the investigation of the irregularities in the
examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the course of that investigation
it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay, identified with number 898 in roll
Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1, which had been prepared simultaneously, did not agree,
because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Law of candidate No. 898 is 63, the
list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows
that the grade of candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is
64 (in the same subject), a difference also being noted between the general average of candidate
No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%, and his general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75%
(pages 73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to the revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the
examinations of 1926, which were united to his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed that
the grades given to, and written by the respective correctors on the compositions of said candidate
in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and further, that the

grades that appeared on said compositions before the alterations were identical with those that
appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of said Exhibit C-1 shows at
first glance that the numbers 73, 64, and 75 in the columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial
Law and General Average, respectively, were written after erasing with rubber what was there
originally written. It may also be noted, upon an examination of the alterations appearing on the
first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written by the
correctors, authenticated by their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to
make out said original grades, leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the grades written by
the correctors on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to make it appear
that said alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second, that said alterations were
made after the grades written by the correctors had been noted on the adding machine in roll
Exhibit C-6 and on the list Exhibit C-1 which were prepared simultaneously; third, that after said
alterations had been made, and in order that the grades so altered should agree with the grades
already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law were erased
with rubber, and in place thereof were written the grades now appearing in said compositions. The
accused Estela Romualdez having admitted that she was the author of such alterations, the only
logical inference from her admission and the facts above set out, is that she was also the person
who erased not only the grades originally written by the correctors on the compositions Exhibits
B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial
Law on the list Exhibit C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades now appearing in said
columns, and which agree with those written by her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now,
if the accused Estela Romualdez erased in the manner stated the grades originally written, and
substituted for them the grades now appearing in said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as well
as in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot
be doubted that in making such erasures and alterations she not only acted with the intent of
concealing her identity, but she also knew the number and the name of the candidate to whom said
composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the names of the candidates were
already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and that list was kept in the office of Justice Romualdez
(page 83, s. n.), were she had complete and absolute control as private secretary and supervisor of
the examinations.
Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunay called
up the accused Estela Romualdez on the telephone a few days before the publication of the results
of the examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing the participation of the
accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other evidence for the prosecution establishing certain
facts which show strong indications that he operated in the act before or at the time of its execution
by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay
was one of the candidates who took the bar examinations in 1926; that the general average
obtained by him, according to the computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding
machine and that originally written in the list Exhibit C-1 was 72.8%; that after the Supreme Court
denied the recommendation of the examination committee that all grades from and between 70%
and 75% be automatically raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of successful
candidates which was published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due
to the increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2), which
was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades theretofore given by the correctors.
It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no motive
whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay, testified that she did not know him and that
the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in view of her
inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis Mabunay had been benefited by
the revision, and in view of the admission of Justice Romualdez that the power to revise conferred
upon Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the compositions already graded by the
correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her knowledge, or which might be brought to her
attention (page 781, s. n.), her testimony lacks foundation, because it is absurd to believe that her
revision of the compositions of her coaccused Luis Mabunay was due only and solely to a happy
coincidence.

Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the prosecution
with reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings account in the Philippine
Trust Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before the publication of the
result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400
made by the accused Estela Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H) with the Bank of the
Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps, give an explanation of
the motive of said accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with just the necessary points to
reach the lowest passing general average. It is also true that Estela Romualdez testified that said
amount had been sent to her by her cousin named Prisca Magpayo Redona from the province for
the purchase of merchandise for sale at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that
respect was not corroborated either by her said cousin, or by any other persons mentioned by her
as the bearers of said amount, or by the corresponding check or postal money order, as she had
done when referring other deposits in the bank.

Conclusion
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the
information are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that the accused, Estela
Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as principal
and the latter as accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents with which
they are charged and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing Estela Romualdez, who
was a Government employee at the time of the commission of the crime, to suffer, in
accordance with article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six
years and one day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of
1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of the penalty, and also
to suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis
Mabunay, who was a private individual with respect to said examination, to suffer, under the
provisions of article 301 as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal
Code, the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties
of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the costs.
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of
"falsification of public and official documents" and in sentencing her to suffer imprisonment
without due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
entitled "An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the future
Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous
Government for those Islands".
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully
authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the composition papers of Luis
Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the
uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining
committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair and
impartial trial.
The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez
with reference to his authority as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year
1926, to confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon
her, in connection with said examination.
II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as to the
fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, really and truly

conferred upon the accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that
examination.
III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the powers
conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, within the
limits fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of the compositions
be made in order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the corresponding candidates
were known.
IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the general
average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial law on the list
Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo
Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the opinion of said
lawyers as to the grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly
entitled.
VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers exercised by
the accused in the bar examination of 1926.
VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded them, the
court erred in concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the information.
VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee of
1926, was not authorized by the Supreme Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers
which she exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she altered the
grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.
IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to conceal her
identity when she revised and regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers as
supervisor of the correctors in said bar examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 only, in order to regrade them.
XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay
the sum of P400.
XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification with
which she is charged, the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in
its commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a joint
memorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the People of the
Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.
The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was disqualified to
sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case on its merits, four justices were in favor of affirming
the decision of the trial court and the same number were in favor of acquitting the defendants. The
court being unable to reach a decision in the usual course, an attempt was made on February 11, 1930
to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the following resolution:
The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No.
31012, those participating being all the members of the court, except Mr. Justice Romualdez,
who was disqualified, it was moved that following precedents elsewhere, particularly in the
United States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an equal division in the court
and there is no prospect of a change in the vote the judgment appealed from stand affirmed,

and in accordance with the action taken in the case of Nacionalista Party vs. Municipal
Board of Manila, No. 21265 the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice
Avancea and Messrs. Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in favor of the motion.
Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real voted against the motion. Mr.
Justice Johnson based his dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in the
Philippine Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.
The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the further order
of the court.
On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be considered
separately and he be absolved from the complaint. This motion was denied by the court. He renewed
his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the ground that no severance had been
asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason that there was a prospect that the membership of
the court would soon be increased.
The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or retirement of
three justices only six of the former members remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney as
attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case be set for a rehearing before the
court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for the
dismissal of the information, alleging that because of the inability of the court to reach a determination
from the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she had been
denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional memorandum, to
which the Attorney-General filed a reply.
Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even if the lower
court's findings of fact be justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to sustain that any criminal
offense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has been committed." They contend that
the appointment of the committee of attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and grade the examination
papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the defendant Estela Romualdez,
under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in question did not constitute a crime.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes this
contention. He testified that the bar examining committee was composed of two groups of attorneys:
Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that were appointed to grade the papers.
He further testified that the court was informed of the way in which the examination was conducted
and that it approved thereof. There were more than a thousand candidates and some eight thousand
papers. According to the contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys appointed to
prepare the questions or the court itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly
untenable. The attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in the grading of the papers, but
they prepared a key to the questions, which served the other group of attorneys, the readers or
"correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of the "correctors" was just as legal as
that of the attorneys that prepared the questions, and the intervention of the two groups of attorneys
was perfectly regular and valid.
It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered were
not public or official documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As stated by her attorneys,
the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be
maintained with any show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in the course of the
examination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration, under the circumstances
alleged in the information, of the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. ( In
re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as
"falsification of public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of
Castro for the falsification of his examination papers was affirmed.)
In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each year make all

the necessary arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief Justice in 1926 designated Justice
Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed one group of attorneys to prepare
the questions and another group to grade the papers. If any of these attorneys were designated by the
clerk of the court, it was with the advice and consent and on the authority of Justice Romualdez.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code in the
ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to article 300 may be
committed in the following eight ways:
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.
2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other
than those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement contrary
to, or different from, that of the genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry or official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in the grades in
such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated therein, because she blotted out
the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials, without
indicating by her own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way attributed to the
"correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only explanation of why she altered
the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do so.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in the
American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the Massachusetts
Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants for admission to the bar by any
person not a member of the board of bar examiners. The Senate wished to know whether such a bill, if
enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with the functions of the Judicial Department, and
asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. They replied that such a law
would be unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides
that the marking of the written examinations may be performed by competent persons not members of
the board but acting under the direction of such members, that pertains directly to the ascertainment of
the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of the judicial department and not an immaterial
incident." It was also stated that the plan of employing assistants to aid the bar examiners in marking
the papers had been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial court erred
in not finding that she was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the examination
papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted
testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926,
concerning the authority granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the
authority which she claims to have received; and in the second place, even if it be assumed that he gave
her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance with the terms thereof.

The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela Romualdez,
and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as supervisors of the other
"correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any grade to correct an injustice,
without consulting or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the "correctors' who had graded the
paper, without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make any record thereof or any report to him
or to anybody else.
Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance with
the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have given his
secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance with the law, and it is
inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt to give his secretary the
unlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade or
any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement of such a
claim shows that it is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded by him as a
supervisor of equal rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he was regarded as a
supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused Estela
Romualdez.
It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive statement. Justice
Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave his secretary to understand that
if a case should be brought to her attention she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so long
as she did not know the name of the candidate to whom the paper belonged. When asked where she
was when the pretended authority was given to her, the accused could not remember.
There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising the revision
of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes made by her, and he was supposed to be a
supervisor of equal rank.
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the authority
which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades now in
question, because when she made the changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her
coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that conclusion is carefully set forth by the
trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effect
that the accused acted within the authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a mere
expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused Estela
Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the grades of her
coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75 per cent. She did not
confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question. She di not attempt to explain how
she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to revise the grades in question, how she
happened to pick these two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that
had been altered by her.
Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that she freely and
voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of her case that the alterations had been made by her, and
concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree either with the statement of fact or
the conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were made by her until
after the prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred and fifty pages of testimony and announced
his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in the handwriting of the
accused. The evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney from the fiscal's office a
photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a specimen of defendant's handwriting
and that of the altered grades. The fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez made the alterations under
the circumstances which we have mentioned, when she already knew that the papers belonged to
Mabunay, disproves any contention that she acted in good faith.

In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:
When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent evidence,
criminal intent may be and will be presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by the
introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily
disclosing the absence of such criminal intent.
The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court erred in
failing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much time on this assignment of
error, which is utterly without merit. The record itself completely refutes any such contention. If the
learned trial judge erred, it was in permitting the attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in
arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the stenographic
record of the evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal and
a persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.
The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most part embraced
in the assignments of error of his coaccused which we have already considered. These remain only his
fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth assignment of error it is alleged that the
lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria,
and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion of said attorneys as
to the correct grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.
The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three attorneys on
the ground that it was not the best evidence, and suggested that the defense might call the members of
the examining committee that prepared the questions in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key
thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see fit to adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not true
therefore that the lower court deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that the examination
papers in question deserved the increased grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez gave them.
The attorneys that prepared the questions and the key to the answers were certainly the persons best
qualified to decide whether or not the questions were correctly answered. The opinion of other
attorneys, who had nothing to do with the examination, would only lead to confusion. We find no merit
in this assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive of the
accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2
was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.
The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez committed
the crime of falsification imputed to her in the information, the court erred in concluding that the
accused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.
In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez ever
reviewed the examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she merely raised his
grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her own words, a passing
mark. She could not or would not enlighten the court as to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay
so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the record does not show that she raised
the grades of any other candidate.
The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that he failed in
the examination in question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar examining committee
recommended that not only those having the required general average of 75 per cent be admitted, but
also that those who had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in the record as "an
automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by the Supreme Court,
and the committee was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein only those who had
obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list
submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general average of only 72.8

per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised the grades now in question so
that he appeared to have obtained the general average required for admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine Trust
Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any evidence to show for what purpose he
withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the first list was disapproved.
In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the court said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State
the very means by which it may assist him.
In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice Shaw laid
down the following rule:
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge, and
it is apparent that the accused is so situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts and
circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious
circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and he fails to offer such
proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would tend
to sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is
manifest that proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the prosecution.
Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and only P10 by
her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from. She said it was
sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she could not name
the person that brought the money to her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. She did not
attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of goods for her cousin.
She did not call her cousin as a witness.
An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to produce
evidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce evidence is explained away, is that the
tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support the party's case. (U. S. vs.
Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)
In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean Wigmore in
his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to
inference against a party accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties. Here
the effect of the burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is
on the prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law to produce
evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from nonproduction. This seeming
paradox, which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the general principle, has
misled a few courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.
The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and benefit of her
coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court had
rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore made
after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his coaccused
that he had failed. It was under those circumstances incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to present
evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank. As this court said
in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):

When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power to
offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the
circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural
conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences
against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.

to twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same, and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of the crime, the penalty should be
imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten years. The penalty
imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one day of prision
mayor.

The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the third
time in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for the revision of his grades, based on an
alleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he was admitted to the bar. It was
subsequently found that alterations had been made in his examination papers, and he and Juan Villaflor
were prosecuted for the falsification of a public document. Villaflor assumed full responsibility for the
commission of the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not know anything about the making of the
alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the case for the purpose of taking
disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in banc, said:

The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article 301 of the
Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance of his duties as an employee of the
Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, and the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.

It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of
public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.
The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.
In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the falsification
of a public document. The evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys the name of an attorney
had been erased, and that the accused had written his own name in that space, although he had not
admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he wrote his name in the register under the direction of
an employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith. He was convicted, and on appeal the decision
was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The trial court suggests in the opinion that the offense
committed required the participation of some unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact, as the
court found, did not lessen the criminal responsibility of the appellant."
It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common accord in the
commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved except by
circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the acts of all. (U.
S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)
The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some
complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of actual participation,
rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of acquiescence in, or consent to,
the actions of others is relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party, and
generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words of
one against the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by the
evidence.
As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the crime, the
trial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712,
and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor, and the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any
public office.
The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and one day

We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He was a
conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of the Penal
Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum degree, but that has been
changed by the Revised Penal Code to prision correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and
the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months, and twenty-one days to four years,
nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased to three years,
six months, and twenty- one days of prision correccional.
The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is affirmed, with
the costs against the appellants.

A.C. No. 7204

March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
complaint 1

Before Us is a
for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto
M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of
the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As
promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the
concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the
possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their
accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to
step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very
tightly.

4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry.
Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt. 2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he
met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative
to the case which complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours
for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where
he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of
Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming
with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of
Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she
remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage
was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a man not her husband; and 4) the
complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who always paid for
their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.

Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee
shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the
meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way,
complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few
hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic)
her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of
shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out
of the car.

A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.

In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to
refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The
communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of
Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with
a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. 5

Sent by complainant
At 5:33:46 pm

- forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer

replied by respondent
at 6:16:11 pm

- "does this mean I can not c u anymore"

(Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)

sent by complainant
at 6:17:59 pm

- I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage of the situation.

Follow-up message
Sent by complainant
At 6:29:30 pm

- wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you dont have

relationship with her.

Replied by respondent
At 6:32:43 pm

- "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it
rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sri" (Im very sorry. Its not
taking advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is an expression
of feeling)

Follow up message
by respondent
at 6:42:25 pm

- Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my

sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do it again. Will you still see me so I
can show you my sincerity)

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm
saying "I dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know what
to do so you may forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at

On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on
respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and
adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or
which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations shall
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the

legal profession.

ATTY. MACABATA:

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and
Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the
corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said
she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And
she said yes, okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we
discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic)
order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her
case, so I said its about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so
I stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So
I told her where to? She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last
meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down,
I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my
right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me and when shes already facing me I lightly kissed her
on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, thats it.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing
condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good
moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law. 6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte,
Jr.,7 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the
Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of
the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of
the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. 8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9
that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154, 11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely:
(1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients;
and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek
and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on
the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and
with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips.
There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was
done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual
harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue,
Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:

COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went
inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went
down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a
little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.)

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. 15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not
simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful
wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her
and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with

the documentary evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her
under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and
three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor"
so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal
remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines
the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our
children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities,
and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits
respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant
with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral
conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession,"
warranting respondents disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their
marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character
required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter
satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity
which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of
law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere
gestures of friendship and camaraderie, 27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered
grossly immoral.
Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer
to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on
the complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of
its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove." 30 As a
basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei incumbit
probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. 31 In the
case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not
motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her

annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent
immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange
of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity
considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place
where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of
misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors. 33 When deciding upon the appropriate
sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect
the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to
deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. 34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the
administration of justice by requiring those who carry out this important function to be competent,
honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 35 While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice,
but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and
independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to
his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases
of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should
only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well
as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before
suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the
commission of the offense should also be considered.36
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also
imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter of
Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and
raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which
adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first
offense, reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her
honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer
of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and
partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more
prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
RE S OLUTIO N

ANTONIO, J.:
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for
contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in
this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for postponement. These
motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing
before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case
No. 35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro
D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of
"Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he
had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos",
and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but
an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.
This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is
"Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other
than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in
the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1
Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This has to
be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself
to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his
solemn oath.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These injunctions
circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I
nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to
deception or permits his client to do so." 2
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration
in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED
and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from the
practice of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is
directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request of
complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is
hereby granted.
SO ORDERED

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law filed against
respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as
member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all of which
were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after
considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several testimonials
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier Resolution and
finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall
strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest
standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia
each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were
acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant
Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our
Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent had
deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That,
of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988,
respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant Benjamin
Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had
passed away so that they are in no position to submit their respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent to
take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated
29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality and has
been careful in his actuations in the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the then

President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles,
without authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty.
Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's
parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's
Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February 1989, signed
by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas,
stating that "the present Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had
not issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic
consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states that
the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that signed by
the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles,
addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that he himself had
not submitted to the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present Board
of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or
not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral
character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor.
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is
likewise required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral fitness to be a
member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August
1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent, is not
aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from admission to
the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747
entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands,
Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and
Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of Title
and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said respondent, per complaint
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is alleged to have secured a free patent
and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned
out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and
which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was
later foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not
redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed
by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the Clerk
of CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr.
Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending
derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does
not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him from admission to
the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to Executive
Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.

On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants Tan (in BM
44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989,
that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to
DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to
inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending
before his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by
complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and surreptitious. This
comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44,
informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked
forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing her case against
him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar
as he had shown sincere repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to
become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly
recommend him for admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his
oath-taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990,
which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November 1990,
stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal disposition
which raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough basis to
exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain the
importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these
cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any party to
change or amend said final resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in
the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these cases therefore
should not in the least be considered as anything which is subject and subservient
to the changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any permanency
or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics and strategy could not
improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court
Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having
availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy
of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines
v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was
already considered closed and terminated.

Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our Resolution of 29
January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to
comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive judge Jesus
Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his
Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the
Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8
June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending
compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to comment on
the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a Comment, dated
29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere
reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and that
"there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24
September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to take the
Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years having
elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his
show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several testimonials
attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not received the
objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the
civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was
instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement of a
certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as security for
a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands.
He did not submit any defense and was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November
1986. The controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the
bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall
further expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The
Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement
and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may
amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the
time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had already been denied on
29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his
good moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.

Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been reached between
the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural
Bank of Pinan.

In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court now
entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.

Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free Patent in
Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the
surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass
of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal
refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over said land; caused the defendant
Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the

It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said
employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he could not but
have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral
character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased
by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or
innocence was made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had
pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he

could not but have known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by
securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage
and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case
filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair
dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him
during the period that he was submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his
lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to lack of
knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against
him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack of
good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619)
have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already
expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection
to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it
does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good
moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training
as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers
themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways
of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In
re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as
"including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA
859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore
City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this Court's
Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1892 July 29, 1988

ATTY. LUIS V. ARTIAGA JR., complainant,
vs. ATTY. ENRIQUE C. VILLANUEVA, respondent.
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on April 2, 1978, Atty. Luis V. Artiaga Jr. sought the
disbarment of Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva for alleged unethical practices.
By a resolution dated May 24, 1978, this Court required respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva to
answer the complaint. To the answer of respondent dated July 5, 1978, complainant Atty. Luis V.
Artiaga Jr. filed his reply of July 31, 1978.
After considering the answer of respondent, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. The solicitor General forwarded to the Court his
Report and Recommendation dated May 4, 1988 with the finding that respondent was guilty of
misconduct and with the recommendation that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
at least six (6) months.
The complaint for disbarment arose from four (4) separate cases and several incidental cases with
Juliano Estolano, client of complainant Atty. Artiaga, Jr. and Glicerio Aquino and/or Florentina
Guanzon, clients of respondent Atty. Villanueva, as adversaries in all of these cases involving the same
property.
The factual background of these cases is summed up in the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. SP06600 dated November 16, 1977, a petition for certiorari and prohibition, an offshoot of
Civil Case No. 183-C for Recovery of Possession filed by Estolano against Aquino and Guanzon
before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI on June 11, 1974. Quoted hereunder are
pertinent portions of the Court's decision:
There were three parcels of land involved herein. All continuos and adjoining to
each other and located in Bambang, Los Banos, Laguna. The first covered an area
of 2.6793 hectares; the second, an area of one hectare; and the third, an area of
one-half hectare. On July 20,1950, petitioner Juliano Estolano was issued original
Certificate of Title No. P-286 in his name over the first parcel. There is no
controversy, therefore, in respect of this first parcel, the dispute being confined to
the second and third parcels.
The second and third parcels were the object of Revocable Permit Applications by
Paciano Malabayabas and Canuto Suyo, both filed on March 31, 1951. On June
12, 1956, Canuto transferred his right over the third parcel to petitioner. On March
4, 1958, Malabayabas also sold his rights over the second parcel to petitioner. On
May 15, 1958, petitioner filed Insular Government Property Sales Application No.
1772 (New) covering the second and third parcels.
On November 7, 1958, Glicerio Aquino, private respondent, filed his Revocable
Permit Application over an area of 8,000 square meters, which was later found to
cover a part of the first parcel already titled in favor of petitioner and of the third
parcel transferred to him by Suyo. On December 29, 1958, private respondent
Florentina Guanzon, Aquino's sister-in-law, also filed Revocable Permit
Application over the second parcel.
Eventually, the conflicts were taken cognizance of by the Bureau of Lands (B.L.
Conflict No. 3-953, and B.L.O. Conflict No. 236). On May 21, 1962, the Director
of Lands rendered a Decision against private respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the Revocable Permit
Application No. V-14105 of Glicerio Aquino be, as hereby it
is, rejected, forfeiting in favor of the Government whatever
amount has been paid on account thereof. The Revocable

Permit Application No. V-14142 of Florentina Guanzon shall

remain, as it is, rejected. Glicerio Aquino and Florentina
Guanzon shall vacate the land within sixty (60) days from
their receipt of a copy hereof The new Insular Government
Property Sales Application of Julian Estolano shall be given
due course after the survey of the land covered thereby.'
Private respondents moved for the reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision,
and the Director of Lands, in an Order of August 13, 1962, amended his previous
Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, our decision of May 21, 1962, is hereby
modified by awarding to protesting Glicerio Aquino
preferential right to that area actually occupied and cultivated
by him, indicated as portion "K" in the sketch drawn on the
back hereof, and amending the Insular Government Property
Sales Application (New) of Juliano Estolano so as to exclude
therefrom the said portion. With this modification, the
decision stands confirmed.
Petitioner and private respondents appealed the amended Decision of the Director
of Lands to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who, in a Decision
dated September 9, 1963, dismissed the appeals of private respondents, set aside
the Order of the Director of Lands dated August 13, 1962, and affirmed the latter's
Decision of May 21, 1962. Respondent Guanzon moved for the reconsideration of
the Secretary's Decision but said Motion was denied.
Respondent Aquino appealed the Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to the Office of the President of the Philippines, which likewise
affirmed the Decision appealed from.
The Decision of the Director of Lands having become final, an order of Execution
thereof was issued on January 4, 1967, but this notwithstanding, private
respondents remained in possession of the subject property. For failure to obtain
possession thereof, petitioner filed, on June 15, 1974, the principal case, (Civil
Case No. 183-C) in the lower court which eventually gave rise to the proceedings
now challenged in this Petition." (pp. 3-7, Decision in CA-G.R. No. Sp-06600)
The restraining order issued in Civil Case No. 183-C on October 27, 1976 enjoining the Director of
Lands from enforcing the Order of Execution was set aside by the Court of Appeals and the writ of
prohibition prayed for by petitioner Estolano was granted.
Meanwhile, on April 13, 1974, respondent's clients, Aquino and Guanzon, filed a complaint for forcible
entry against complainant's client, Estolano, in the Municipal Court of Los Banos Laguna docketed as
Civil Case No. 192. This case was dismissed by the Municipal Court on January 5, 1977. On appeal to
the Court of First Instance (CFI), the order of dismissal was affirmed on November 4, 1979 in Civil
Case No. 386-C. No appeal was interposed from this decision, thus it became final.
The third case for annulment of Estolano's title over the same land was filed by respondent's client,
Aquino, with the CFI on May 15, 1974 docketed as Civil Case No. 179-C which was dismissed on
April 23, 1976. On appeal to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62576-R, the
dismissal by the trial court was affirmed on June 25, 1981. On October 21, 1981, the case was
remanded to the trial court for execution.
Finally, while their petition for certiorari and prohibition over Civil Case No. 183-C was pending
before the Court of Appeals, respondent's clients, Aquino, filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) at San Pablo City docketed as CAR Case No. 7043 against Estolano and the Director
of Lands on July 1, 1977. On July 2, 1977, the CAR issued an order requiring Estolano to respect

Aquino's possession. On May 18, 1979, the CAR dismissed the case and on appeal, its dismissal was
affirmed in a decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 5, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR.
Respondent Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva is charged with the following unethical practices: (1) That
respondent had caused his client to perjure himself; (2) That he lacks candor and respect toward his
adversary and the courts; and (3) That he had been abusive of the right of recourse to the courts.
We find respondent Atty. Villanueva guilty as above charged.
Anent the first charge, the complaint and amended complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 192
filed by respondent's client are clear proofs that respondent had indeed caused his client Glicerio
Aquino to perjure himself as to the date he lost possession of the subject property so as to place the
case within the jurisdiction of the court.
Paragraph 5 of the original complaint filed on April 18, 1974 reads:
5. That sometime in the early part of 1960, defendant Julian Estolano was able to
dispossess plaintiffs spouses Glicerio Aquino and Lorenzo Magpantay of a portion
of the above-described parcel of land ... (Emphasis supplied.) 1
Paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint dated June 19, 1974 reads:
5. That sometime in the early part of June, 1973, defendant Julian Estolano and
Segundo de los Santos unlawfully dispossessed and/or deprived or turned out
plaintiffs Sps. Aquino and Magpantay thru stealth, strategy, force and intimidation
of and/or possession over a certain portion (now caused by defendant Segundo de
los Santos to be planted to bananas now of less than a year old as of the filing of
the original complaint) located on the southern portion of their above-described
landholding . .... (Emphasis supplied. ) 2
In the original complaint, respondent's client alleged that he was dispossessed of the subject land in
1960, while in the amended complaint, he alleged it was in June, 1973. Clearly, this was a ploy
concocted by respondent to enable the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case since a forcible entry
case must be filed within one year from the accrual of the cause of action under Rule 70, Section 1.
Such action of respondent counsel is a clear violation of his oath that "he will do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court." 3 A legal counsel is of course expected to defend his client's cause
with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth. 4 The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the
purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor
cannot be overemphasized. 5 His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the
facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violated his oath
of office when he resorted to deception. 6 Worse, he had caused his client to perjure himself thus
subjecting the latter to criminal prosecution for perjury brought before the Municipal Court of Los
Banos, Laguna. 7 Instead of safeguarding the interests of his client as his responsibility dictates, he did
exactly the opposite by causing his client to commit a felony.
From the foregoing, the lack of candor of respondent counsel towards the court is evident. This lack of
candor and honesty to the courts and his adversary is further demonstrated by other acts of respondent.
In Civil Case No. 192, respondent's clients were restored to the possession of the 2-1/2 hectares of the
untitled portion of subject property by virtue of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
the court on May 21, 1974 upon filing of a property bond by respondent. Upon the dismissal of the
case on January 5, 1977, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was dissolved and respondent's
clients were ordered to restore possession of subject property to complainant's client Estolano.
However, respondent blocked the order by filing an urgent ex-parte motion seeking clarification as to
whether the dispositive portion of the order of January 5, 1977 was immediately executory and asking
the court to allow his clients to remain in the meantime in the premises. Before the court could even
resolve the motion, respondent perfected his appeal from the order of January 5, 1977 on January 25,

1977. Thus, when the court's order affirming its previous order came out on January 26,1977, the
Provincial Sheriff of Laguna refused to implement the orders of January 5 and 26, 1977 until the appeal
has been finally disposed of. On appeal, the CFI of Laguna, affirmed the questioned orders of the
Municipal Court. When the decision of the CFI became final because respondent failed to appeal, his
clients refused to abide by the Order of Execution issued by the Municipal Court.
Consequently, Estolano filed an ex-parte motion asking that the Provincial Sheriff be authorized to
forcibly evict respondent's clients. On the date set for the hearing of the motion, respondent did not
appear and instead filed his "Opposition/ Manifestation" informing the court of a petition for certiorari
filed against the presiding judge before the Court of First Instance of Laguna. In deference to this
petition, the Municipal Court resolved to hold in abeyance the ex-parte motion of Estolano until
resolution of said petition.
Indeed, the manner in which respondent counsel handled the forcible entry case filed against the client
of complainant shows his total lack of candor and respect for the courts and the rights of his adversary.
He had employed every step necessary to forestall complainant's client from taking rightful possession
of subject property. He has shown utter disregard of the proper rules of procedure to suit his purpose.
While he filed his urgent ex-parte motion for clarification, he chose not to wait for its resolution and
instead perfected his appeal to the Court of First Instance. When finally the decision became executory
because of his failure to appeal to the Court of Appeals, he filed a petition for certiorari against the
decision of the CFI which petition is obviously frivolous and a mere tactic to delay enforcement of the
court's decision. In the meantime, the clients of respondents refused to obey the order of execution.
A lawyer should obey all lawful orders and rulings of the court. 8 He should have counseled his clients
to submit to the order of the court instead of encouraging them to resist such order. The actuations of
respondent of employing dilatory tactics by filing a clearly frivolous case amounts to obstruction of the
administration of justice which constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. 9
Respondents counsel further demonstrated his questionable motive by filing another case, this time for
annulment of the title of complainant's client to the other 2-1/2 hectares of subject land with the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI. This case was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and
prescription. Respondent appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals where it was pending resolution
at the time the instant complaint for disbarment was filed. The decision of the trial court was affirmed
and remanded to the lower court for execution.
Not satisfied with the above-mentioned appeal, respondent counsel brought another case against
complainant's client this time before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR Case No. 7043) for
determination allegedly of who had a better right over the subject property when he was well aware e
of the absence of any tenancy relationship between the parties.
An examination of the records shows that respondent did not disclose before the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) prior law suits and decisions rendered relative to the subject land. As a result,
respondent was able to secure ex-parte from the CAR a restraining order against the Director of Lands
and Estolano on July 2, 1977. So when the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Civil
Case No. 386-C affirming the decision of the trial court in the forcible entry case No. 192 was rendered
on November 4, 1977 ordering the immediate restoration of subject land to Estolano, because of the
restraining order issued by the agrarian court, the execution of the said decision cannot be fully
satisfied, To make matters worse, respondent even filed a criminal complaint against complainant and
his client, among others, for alleged violation of P.D. 316 and the restraining order issued by the Court
of Agrarian Relations in CAR Case No. 7043. 10 The CAR dismissed this case and on appeal, the
dismissal was affirmed.
We also note that after respondent filed the case with the CAR on July 1, 1 977, he filed on July 5,
1977 in Civil Case No. 179-C before the CFI of Laguna, a motion to dismiss the present action without
prejudice to his clients' right to prosecute their present action with the Court of Agrarian Relations. The
lower court denied the motion since it had already dismissed the case on some other ground and their
appeal was already perfected without plaintiffs' manifesting that they are abandoning their appeal.

Thus, respondent was able to elevate two (2) separate appeals--CA-G.R. No. 62576-R re: annulment of
title (Civil Case No. 179-C) and CA-G.R. No. 11635-CAR arising from the CAR Case No. 7043,
before the Court of Appeals over the same issues involving the same subject property titled to Estolano.
The cause of respondent's clients is obviously bereft of merit. Respondent was aware of this fact so he
resorted to forum shopping, continuously seeking the court where he may possibly obtain favorable
judgment, thereby adding to the already clogged dockets of the courts with the unmeritorious cases he
filed. He grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing multiple petitions or complaints for
a cause that had been previously rejected in the false hope of getting some favorable action, somehow,
thus, obstructing the administration of justice. 11 He was derelict in his duty as counsel to maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appears to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. 12 He had thus prostituted his office at the expense of justice.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain standards of mental
and moral fitness. 13 For a counsel who has been sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to
uphold the rule of law, respondent has miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a
member of the Bar. Instead of assisting in the speedy disposition of cases, he made a mockery of our
system of justice, thus deserving to be censured and penalized by this Court. No doubt, respondent is
guilty of gross misconduct in office.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law from
date of notice until such time that he can demonstrate to the court that he has rehabilitated himself and
deserves to resume the practice of law. Let this decision be noted in the bar records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution
to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the ByLaws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board
shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the
Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the
member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions
of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in
Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12
of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice
of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3

SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body

to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons
whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court.

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in

the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr.
Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it
did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),
and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration
vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of
the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of
the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did
not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed
the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment
of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the
respondent acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay
a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It
is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and

qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration
of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or
accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less
real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the
Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only
with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the
public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will
not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to
the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness
of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the
Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent
Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary
Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I
love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You"
on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of
his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that
you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is
it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you.
And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent
together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL
BE!"2
Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11 th Street,
New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He
also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with
respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted
letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS
RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the
third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can"
promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City.
Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September
2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as
Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting
their adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene
as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their
relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their
respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was
still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent
abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making
him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing
the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his
love for her "until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding
his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby
making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his
relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife]
Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of
Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his abovequoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece
of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract .7 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the
family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he,
as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke
up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal
profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely
personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and
Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the
Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth 13 bearing Irene's signature and naming
respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS 14 dated January 10,
2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainant's Reply." 15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the
pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal
complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer
were adopted as his testimony on direct examination. 16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent
sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended 19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
(Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated
January 28, 2006 briefly reading:

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of
the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition 21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
13922 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted
33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment 23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no
evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove
that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are
other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against
respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel
made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever]
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint,
the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the
allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances
the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a
"special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken
together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent
and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live
Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the
respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that
Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It
should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father
of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void." 26
(Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it
was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

under scandalous circumstances.34

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to
which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed
at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a
denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a
fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances
alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a
"lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the
desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature
attributed to Irene in the certificate 28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate 29 shows that they
were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner
noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years
old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven
by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other 32
which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant
evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or
other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any
of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied),

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling,
or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not
his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage
should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." 35
The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his
wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair
with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order
to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,
it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of
extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 37
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate
the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e.,
that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental
ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.39
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's
petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed
against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was
pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on
motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for
review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No.
70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the
petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the
appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis
supplied by complainant)

apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11 th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows
with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle
and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the
said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it
was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both
had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a
residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from
complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was
carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the
indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that
Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature
of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of
the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje
have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus
leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But
even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery
were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court,
in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void. 43 As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 44 In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly
omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition
for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the
dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing
the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of
his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation
of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the
part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that
she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala
never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala)
himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to
confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28,
2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent
in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

own act and I am justly punished for it.

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Br. 79, Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and
AGUEDO EUGENIO, respondents.

Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have
a wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been
withdrawn from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for
relief . . . .
Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the
law profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by
admitting me back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its
canons . . . . 8

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.

On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari,
thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading
this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from the
practice of law. 1
On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re
Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that
the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the
petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the
latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he
was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for
appointment as regional trial judge. 2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the motion for want of
a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution. 3
On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already
62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and in
all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the legal
profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso Fernando,
Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar, OAR, Rector,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center for Housing and
Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law, San Sebastian
College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City; Judge Teodoro P.
Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon City; and Judge
Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City. 4 However, on 11 August 1994 the Court denied the
motion. 5

On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement

It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been
struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children.
Please give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will
henceforth do nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession. 9
On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter. 10
On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court
I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was
justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.
I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it
is my wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although
innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment. 11
The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and
prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal
profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show that he is
ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its practitioners.
Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he should be sternly
warned that
[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the
rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality
and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions
required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession,
has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its
members is not only a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect
and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members . . . 12

On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among others
that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community work,
especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of his
incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an
unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for what
he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart." 6
His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did
not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second look
into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his disbarment. 7
On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus
I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full
responsibility for it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my
secretary who was merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED
and he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This
resolution is effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.

August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs. ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of Gross
Immoral Conduct and imposed upon him the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. 1 Respondent, who was
already married with three children, had an affair with complainant between 1996 to 1997, while he
was reviewing for the bar until before the release of the results thereof. Complainant got pregnant and
respondent, who was then already a lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit acknowledging the child as
his with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the child, however, respondent started to
refuse recognizing the child and from giving her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking compassion and forgiveness
from this Court. He submitted certificates from government and civic organizations appreciating his
services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance from religious groups, and certificates of good moral
character from judges and lawyers in Occidental Mindoro.2
On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment thereon. 3
On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution (No. 01-2003)
recommending the exoneration of respondent from administrative liability. It stated that the suspension
of respondent, who has served as Clerk of Court, Public Attorney and 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, would cause a great loss to the community; that respondent has shown integrity and moral
uprightness in the performance of his official functions; that the acts imputed to him may be attributed
to his "youthful indiscretion period"; and that respondent has mended his ways after taking his oath as
member of the bar.4
The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its Comment dated August 15,
2003, stating that the motion for reconsideration should be denied until respondent admits the paternity
of the child and agrees to support her.5
On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that respondents motion for
reconsideration should be denied since respondent has not truly repented as he is still not supporting his
child.6
On August 25, 2003, respondents wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a handwritten letter stating that
respondent is loving and "maasikaso" and while it is true that respondent had an affair with
complainant, such was only
because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file the present case after
respondent ended their illicit affair. Complainant also used threat to compel respondent to sign the
affidavit of acknowledgement and support. Livelyn further avers that respondent is the sole
breadwinner of the family and that their family will be gravely affected by his suspension. 7
On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP stating that if the acts
acknowledging and giving support to the child of the complainant are the proofs of his remorse, then he
shall comply unconditionally.8
On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on Livelyns letter.9
On January 13, 2004, complainants counsel said that while he sympathizes with Livelyn and her
children, respondent has not taken any move to support complainant and her child to repair the damage
done to them.10

On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainants Comment, reiterated his willingness to
support the child if only to show his
remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed to complainant for the months of
March to December 2005 in the amount of P2,000.00 each.11
On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that it is unfair for her
and her three children that respondent had to support complainants daughter when it is not clear who
the childs father is. Livelyn argues that complainant should have filed a case for support where the
paternity of the child could be determined and not use the present administrative case to get support
from respondent.12
On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Occidental Mindoro, asking whether or not respondent is still connected with said office despite having
been indefinitely suspended by this Court. It replied on May 10, 2005 that respondent is still connected
with their office; that he has been regularly receiving his salary and benefits; and that this was the first
time that they received communication concerning respondents administrative case. 13
Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued to discharge his duties and
received salary and benefits in connection therewith since he filed a timely motion for reconsideration
thus the case has not yet attained finality.14
In view of respondents show of repentance and active service to the community, the Court deems it
just and reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite period of two years
suspension.
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The indefinite suspension
imposed on him by the Court in its Decision dated March 6, 2003 is REDUCED to TWO YEARS
suspension effective from date of receipt of herein Resolution.
Complainants further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper
case.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillos record in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP, all courts throughout the country and the Department of
Justice including the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4369 November 28, 1997

residence certificates.

PIKE P. ARRIETA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA, respondent.

Except for Edelina T. Bonilla whose alleged death was not evidenced by a death certificate, respondent
certified in the acknowledgment that Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano personally appeared
before him. Respondent's acts require the presence of the vendors to be able to verify the authenticity
of their signatures, the identities of the signatories and the voluntariness of the execution of the Deed. It
defies imagination and belief how these could have happened. It would have been impossible, both
physically and legally, for Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano to have personally subscribed and
sworn before respondent as to the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Sale as they had already
passed on to the Great Beyond prior to the execution of the said documents.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:
Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prays for the disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Llosa for certifying under oath a
Deed of Absolute Sale.
Particularly, complainant avers that respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 24,
1993 1 making it appear that some of the vendors in said Deed namely, Edelina T. Bonilla, Jesus T.
Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano were parties and signatories thereto when in truth and in fact, all
three were already dead prior to the execution of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. Jesus T. Bonilla died
on August 22, 1992 2 while Leonardo P. Toledano died on November 1, 1992. 3 Edelina T. Bonilla
allegedly died on or about June 11, 1992.
In answer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But before affixing his
notarial seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the signatures, verified the identities of the
signatories, and determined the voluntariness of its execution. Satisfied with all of the above, it was
only then that he certified the document.
Curiously, on September 9, 1996, complainant had a complete turn-around and moved for the dismissal
of his complaint. He alleged that the instant case is only a product of misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of some facts and is now convinced that everything is in order.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the
dismissal of the instant case. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted
the above recommendation and resolved to dismiss the instant case after finding no compelling reason
to continue with the disbarment proceedings.
This Court cannot agree.
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgment of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or
any person authorized to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents. 4 Aside from being
required to appear before the Notary Public, it is similarly incumbent upon the person acknowledging
the instrument to declare before the same Notary Public that the execution of the instrument was done
by him of his own free will.
In the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Sale, respondent certified: "BEFORE ME, this 24th day of
March, 1993 at Dumaguete City, Philippines, personally appeared . . . Jesus Bonilla; . . . Leonardo
Toledano; . . . . " 5 Respondent claims that as a Notary Public, he asked the signatories whether the
signatures appearing above their respective names were theirs, and whether they voluntarily executed
the Deed of Absolute Sale. In order to ascertain their identities, respondent asked for their respective

Yet, respondent certified to this effect. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from being a private document into a public document. By certifying the Deed,
respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world (1) that all the parties therein personally appeared before
him; (2) that they are all personally known to him; (3) that they were the same persons who executed
the instruments; (4) that he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they
acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantial
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity. 6 A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity
of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 7
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties
which are dictated by public policy and, as such, impressed with public interest. Faithful observance
and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. 8
It is for the above reason that this Court is most concerned about the explanation given by complainant
for withdrawing his complaint against respondent. In his Motion to Dismiss dated September 9, 1996,
complainant declares:
xxx xxx xxx
That he is now fully convinced that everything was in order, and that nobody was
ever prejudiced by the acts of the respondent. Herein complainant has realized that
he himself, or any other legal practitioner, would have done similarly as the
respondent, if confronted with such an urgent voluntary transaction in an
emergency situation; . . . .
That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent situation is no
excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to
obey the laws of the land AT ALL TIMES, to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct AT ALL TIMES, to uphold the integrity of his profession AT ALL TIMES, to
promote respect to his profession AT ALL TIMES, and to act with justice AT ALL TIMES.
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly disregarded the requirements and solemnities of
the Notarial Law simply to accommodate his clients. Not only did he commit an illegal act but also did
so without thinking of the possible damage or prejudice that might result from non-observance of the
same.
As a lawyer, respondent breached his professional responsibility by certifying under oath an instrument
fully knowing that some of the signatories thereto were long dead. This Court cannot countenance this
practice, especially coming, as it does, from respondent who formerly served as president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Negros Oriental Chapter, President of the Dumaguete Lions Club and
City Councilor of Dumaguete. If indeed respondent had taken steps to verify the identities of the

signatories, he would have easily known that the signatures were fake as they purported to be those of
his former clients.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. 9 [M]embership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. There
being no lifetime guaranty, a lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good
behavior and can be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. 10
Pursuant to the foregoing, it is primarily required of lawyers to obey the Constitution and laws of the
land. 11 They must refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 12
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity. 13
Respondent's act of certifying under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors
were already dead, they being his former clients, constitutes misconduct. But this being his first
administrative offense, such should no warrant the supreme penalty of disbarment.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds respondent Atty. Joel A. Llosa guilty of misconduct. Consequently,
he is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a
warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6486

September 22, 2004

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the
jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has
"good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the
standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 1 to the practice
of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found
guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. 2
In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of
immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 01-851.
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit
relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the
time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their
children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their childrens needs. Complainant
pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyers oath and his moral and
legal obligation to be a role model to the community.
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order4 requiring respondent to
submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.
Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with
the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to
separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence
and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after
eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were
residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided
for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave
complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.

Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because
respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as
a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant
asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to
the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly
told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin,
Darling, and Christian Dave,12 all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his
paramour13 to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs
with two different women. Letters of complainants legitimate children likewise support the allegation
that respondent is a womanizer.14
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however,
submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainants Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to
Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings 15 on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mechanism. Respondents motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had
already presented her evidence.16 Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July
11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondents Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he
argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite18 filed
against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, 19 the instant
administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report20 and
Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851. 21 The IBP recommended that the
respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent
(70%) of his monthly salary to her.

"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."

Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant
presented her evidence, both oral and documentary, 6 to support the allegations in her AffidavitComplaint.

"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession."

From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979,
complainant and respondent were married 7 and lived with the latters mother in Balintawak. At that
time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the
buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondents mother.

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree 23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency.24

Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on
February 20, 1980,8 October 14, 19819 and August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated that
their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondents extra-marital affairs. 11

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of

good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and
attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character
is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely:
(i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective
clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 26
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. 27 They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.28
Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality.
Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law
profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.29
In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that
abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.
The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed. 34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in
the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the
Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5830

January 26, 2004

MARY D. MALECDAN, Complainant,

vs. ATTY. PERCIVAL L. PEKAS and ATTY. MATTHEW P. KOLLIN, Respondents.
The instant case arose when Mary D. Malecdan filed a verified Letter-Complaint dated January 19,
2001 addressed to Atty. Ceasar G. Oracion, then President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Baguio and Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty. Matthew P. Kollin,
with violation of the lawyers oath, as they "committed acts not only prejudicial to [the IBP] but are in
themselves in violation of the oath that they have sworn to uphold as [a] condition for their admission
to the bar."1
The undisputed facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On November 25, 1999, the complainant entered into a deed of sale with the Spouses Washington and
Eliza Fanged over a parcel of land located in Baguio City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-71030.2 The complainant paid P10,000 as earnest money, and P2,600,000 as the full and final
payment of the consideration of the sale. The money was received by Eliza Fanged and deposited in the
account of Atty. Artemio Bustamante, then counsel for the latter. The complainant later found out,
however, that the said lot was the subject of a controversy 3 between the former owners and the Fanged
Spouses.
When Atty. Bustamante refused to release the proceeds of the sale to Eliza Fanged, the latter, through
her new counsel respondent Atty. Kollin, filed a complaint for rescission of contract with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order with damages 4 against the complainant, Atty. Bustamante,
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and Washington Fanged on December 2, 1999. 5
Eliza Fanged and the respondents thereafter caused the filing of a Manifestation of Compromise
Settlement with Motion dated December 14, 1999. 6 It was prayed, among others, that an order be
issued directing defendant PCIB to transfer the amount of P30,000 from the account of Atty.
Bustamante to a joint account in the name of respondents Atty. Kollin and Atty. Pekas by way of
attorneys fees. The complainant was not a signatory to the compromise settlement, as she was in the
United States at the time. The money was then transferred to the respective accounts as prayed for in
the compromise settlement.
The Complainants Allegations
According to the complainant, respondent Atty. Kollin knew very well that the money entrusted to him did not belong to his
client, Eliza Fanged. Yet, when the complainants duly authorized representative Wilfreda Colorado requested that the money
be released to her, Atty. Kolin refused to do so, on the pretext that there was no written authorization from the latter. The
respondent, however, admitted that the money was in his possession.7 The complainant further averred that:
11. The said lawyers were aware that the money in the bank which was the subject of Civil Case No. 4580-R was
the consideration for a supposed sale between me and Eliza Fanged which did not materialize because it could
not be registered aside from the fact that it is void pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 4528-R. They knew
that the money is not owned by Eliza Fanged. Yet, despite this knowledge, they misled the court by making it
appear that all the parties agreed to the settlement by filing the manifestation of compromise settlement with
motion (Annex "G") knowing that I was abroad and could not have given my consent thereto.
12. Worse, they made it appear that I was copy furnished of the pleading when in truth and in fact I never
received the same as I was in the United States of America. My investigation of the matter reveals that the sister
of Eliza Fanged, Veronica Buking, received the pleading for me.
13. When confronted, Eliza Fanged admitted to me that the money was actually entrusted to respondent Atty.
Matthew Kollin.8

The complainant also alleged that she filed the complaint against the respondents because of the latters
connivance in causing the withdrawal of the money in the bank. She pointed out that while the
manifestation of compromise settlement does not bear the signature of Atty. Kollin, paragraph (b) of
the prayer clearly shows that the amount of P30,000 was appropriated to a joint account belonging to
the respondents by way of attorneys fees.

The complainant explained that respondent Atty. Kollin, as counsel for Eliza Fanged in Civil Case No.
4580-R, prayed that the sale of the property to her (the complainant) be declared null and void.
Proceeding from this premise, then, Eliza Fanged had no right to the money in the bank; the
respondents, likewise, had no right to withdraw the amount of P30,000 to answer for their attorneys
fees. She further averred that the respondents made it appear to the trial court that she (the
complainant) was duly notified of the purported settlement, when she was, in fact, not a party thereto as
evidenced by the records. Thus:
[T]he records reveal that the person who received the copy of the document purporting to cover the
settlement intended for me is the very sister of his client, Eliza Fanged, in the person of Veronica
Buking. Veronica Buking is not and was never a resident of Dagsian, Baguio City, the location of my
permanent residence. Eliza Fanged could not have thought of this scheme.
9. But lawyer as he is, Atty. Kollin must have anticipated possible legal repercussion[s] that would
ensue as a result of this scheme. In the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with Motion, he asked
his co-respondent, Atty. Pekas, to sign as counsel for Eliza Fanged. Atty. Pekas seem[ed] to be too
willing to extend assistance to Eliza Fanged if only to get the money from the bank. However, in the
actual release, and the partition of the money, the respondents reportedly actively participated to insure
their share of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. Atty. Pekas did not stop there. As counsel for Eliza Fanged,
he signed the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16, 1999 with a misleading statement that "the
parties have extrajudicially settled this case amicably among themselves", when in truth and in fact, I
was never consulted. 9
The Respondents Allegations
The respondents denied the foregoing allegations in their respective answers.
Respondent Atty. Kollin admitted that he knew that the money in the bank was the complainants
payment for the land purchased from the Fanged Spouses. He pointed out, however, that it was unfair
to state that his client Eliza Fanged was not entitled thereto, since in the first place, she appeared as the
vendor in the deed of sale executed between her and the complainant. Furthermore, although Civil
Case No. 4528-R had already been decided by the trial court, the same was appealed to the Court of
Appeals,10 and did not become final and executory as erroneously stated by the complainant. Atty.
Kollin also pointed out that he was not the original counsel of the Spouses Fanged in the said case, but
merely "inherited" the same from Atty. Artemio Bustamante. 11
The respondent further averred that because Atty. Bustamante and the Fangeds failed to settle the
problem, he filed a complaint for the rescission of the sale, and not for the release of the money in Atty.
Bustamantes possession. According to the respondent:
To me, this is the gist of the problem. Complainant Mary Malecdan strongly believes that she was
swindled because of the said decision. However, the only problem between Dato and Fanged is the
determination of the actual balance and the payment thereof. Settle the balance with Mrs. Dato and
everything would be settled likewise. As of this time, it is very safe to say that the issue is still "SUB
JUDICE" and complainant could not even be sure of the outcome of said case, although there is a
pending proposal for the eventual settlement of the case by the payment of the unpaid balance.
Moreover, the title of the subject land is in the possession of the Complainant and could transfer said
title in her name anytime. Perhaps, what the complainant is saying is that the title could be transferred
in her name, however, a "notice of lis pendens" was annotated therein due to the filing of the case
between O. Dato and the spouses Fanged.
For all intents and purposes, complainant could transfer the title in her name and take possession of the
property although the "notice of lis pendens" will be transferred or be likewise annotated in her title.
Complainant knows very well that the problem between O. Dato and Eliza Fanged is the actual balance
to be paid as per the first deed of sale; 12
Respondent Atty. Pekas, for his part, admitted that the amount of P30,000 was transferred by Atty.

Bustamante to their account, but averred that it was done voluntarily. He denied the allegation that they
misled the court by making it appear that the parties agreed to the compromise settlement with motion,
since, as can be gleaned from the compromise agreement itself, the complainant was not a party
thereto.13 The respondent further alleged that:
20. As best as the respondent can recall, on the late afternoon of December 12, 1999, Atty.
Matthew Kollin called up respondent on the telephone. He was requesting for respondent to attend
a hearing of his case the following day, December 13, 1999, for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order. This was on the pretext that he has another out of town case on the same date and
cannot attend the hearing. As it is a common practice among lawyers, respondent acceded to the
request;
21. As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a special
appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the matter but shall only manifest
submission of the matter for resolution;

27. That after Eliza Fanged and Wilfreda Colorado related the foregoing story, respondent asked
about the settlement being proposed by the Honorable Court. Eliza Fanged then expressed her
willingness to accept the counter-offer of Atty. Artemio Bustamante to settle the case in the amount
of Two Million;
28. With the new development, respondent contacted the office of Atty. Matthew Kollin to refer
the matter but was informed that the latter is still out of town. Respondent then advised that if
Eliza Fanged is willing, he can assist her in the settlement, to which advice Eliza Fanged acceded;
29. Respondent contacted Atty. Artemio Bustamante who likewise was willing to settle and the
details of the settlement were agreed upon. Afterwhich the proper manifestation and motion was
submitted to the Honorable Court for consideration and ultimately dismissal of the case;
31. That during the whole time that respondent participated in the resolution of the case, he never
committed any act involving deceit and machination. He acted in a way which he thinks is proper
14

Respondent Atty. Pekas prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of merit, averring that as a new and
young lawyer, there was no reason for him to risk his future for a measly sum, through dishonest
conduct.15
The Proceedings Before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline
On May 7, 2002, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan issued the following Order:
When this case was called for hearing, Atty. Percival Pekas appeared. Atty. Matthew P. Kollin failed to appear
despite the notice duly served on him.
Complainant Mary D. Malecdan appeared without counsel. She manifested that she is submitting her case for
resolution based on the pleadings on record.
The complainant was ordered to present certified true copies of Annex "A" attached to her complaint, the
Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex "B" of her complaint in favor of Mary
Malecdan and the Decision Annex "D." Complainant is given ten (10) days from today to present true copies
of her documentary evidence.
Atty. Percival Pekas is given ten (10) days from today to file his rejoinder. Atty. Pekas likewise manifested
that after he shall have filed his rejoinder he submits this case for resolution. 16
In his Rejoinder, respondent Atty. Pekas reiterated that he acted in good faith, and did not commit any act of
deceit or machination. He also averred that Atty. Artemio Bustamante would have been a great help in
determining the truth, but unfortunately, the complainant chose not to implead him.17
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-395, finding respondent

Atty. Kollin guilty of dishonesty to the court, while dismissing the complaint as to respondent Atty. Pekas,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A;" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Atty. Matthew P. Kollins dishonesty to the court
with resulting damage and prejudice to the complainant, Respondent Atty. Kollins (sic) is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years. The complaint against Atty. Pekas is DISMISSED
for there is no evidence on record to prove that he was aware of the defect in Eliza Fange[d]s right to claim
the sales proceeds with a WARNING that Atty. Pekas should be more circumspect with respect to taking over
other lawyers cases and handling sensitive matters such as the compromise settlement in Civil Case No.
4580-R.
According to IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juans Report dated May 30, 2002, the main issue to be
resolved in the case was factual in nature: whether or not the respondents knowingly caused the withdrawal
from the bank of the purchase price of the lot in question, despite their knowledge of a defect in their clients
right to claim the said amount. The Commission found that respondent Atty. Kollin knew that his clients title
was defective, having represented her in Civil Case No. 4528-R. He should have been mindful that his client
had no right over the purchase price as paid by the complainant.1wphi1 Respondent Atty. Pekas was,
however, exonerated of the charges against him, thus:
Insofar as respondent Atty. Pekas is concerned, it should be noted that there is no evidence on record to prove
that respondent Atty. Pekas was aware of the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to claim [t]he sales proceeds. It is
likely that respondent Atty. Pekas unwittingly played into the hands of respondent Atty. Kolin when he signed
said Manifestation of Compromise Settlement. 18
In his October 12, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing IBP Resolution, respondent Atty. Kollin
alleged that contrary to the finding of the Commission, he was unaware of the defect in his clients (Eliza
Fangeds) right to claim the sales proceeds. He filed the case for nullification of contract with prayer for the
rescission of the sale between the complainant and his client on the ground that the latter would be
disadvantaged if Atty. Bustamante succeeded in taking a huge chunk of the money deposited in his name.
According to the respondent, if he was, indeed, interested in the money, he could have filed a case to compel
Atty. Bustamante to release the money to his client, and not a complaint for rescission of contract. The
respondent also reiterated that the reason why he requested respondent Atty. Pekas to attend the hearing of the
case as collaborating counsel was that he attended a hearing in Bontoc, Mt. Province on December 14,
2002.19
According to the respondent, the complainant should have filed the instant case against Atty. Bustamante who
was "the real architect in the release of the money and the execution of the compromise settlement with
motion." The complainant should have also questioned the order of the RTC judge concerned as to why no
notice was issued to her before the money was released.

The Ruling of the Court

It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of the practice
of law, the primary purpose of which is to render public service. 20 The practice of law is a profession
and not a money-making trade.21 As they are an indispensable part of the system of administering
justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics a
duty more than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled
at the practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act of
openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a
lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of
public interest. 22
Respondent Atty. Kollin knew that the money did not belong to his client, Eliza Fanged. He admitted this much in the
complaint he himself prepared in Civil Case No. 4580-R, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:
I. BEFORE HEARING:

1. That it orders (sic) the issuance of a temporary restraining order directing the manager of the
PCIBank Session Rd., Baguio City branch, through its branch manager, Oscar Aquino, to cease and
desist from allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the amount of P2,450,000.00 deposit in his
account;
II. DURING HEARING:
1. That it orders the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendant PCIBank
or its agents from disbursing or allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the amount of
P2,450,000.00 deposited in his account;
III. AFTER HEARING:
1. To order defendants Atty. Artemio Bustamante and the PCIBank, Session Rd., Baguio City
branch, to release the amount of P2,450,000.00 in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic);
2. To order defendant Atty. Artemio Bustamante to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
3. To order that the deed of sale executed between the Spouses Washington Fanged and Eliza
Fanged in favor of Mary Malicdan (sic) be declared null and void;
4. To order Atty. Artemio Bustamante to release the original owners copy of title no. T-71030 of the
registry of deeds of Baguio City to the complainant;23

Respondent Atty. Kollin cannot now assert that the reason why the prayer in the complaint included the
release of the money in favor of the complainant was that "his client realized that P600,000 would be
too much to be given to Atty. Bustamante as attorneys fees." The respondent is bound by this assertion
in his pleading,24 which, as can reasonably be inferred, was made because he himself believed that his
client was not entitled to the money in question. The respondent cannot, likewise, find refuge in the
fact that his signature did not appear in the compromise agreement executed between the parties. As
found by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
[A]lthough it was respondent Atty. Pekas who signed the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement
with Motion as counsel for Eliza Fanged, it is unbelievable that respondent Atty. Pekas would dare to
sign said Manifestation without the approval or consent of respondent Atty. Kollin, the counsel of
record of Eliza Fanged. As respondent Atty. Pekas himself stated his authority with respect to Civil
Case No. 4580-R was limited as follows: "As agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin,
respondent shall enter a special appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on the
matter but shall only manifest submission of the matter for resolution." If as respondent Atty. Pekas
claims he was only authorized by respondent Atty. Kollin to attend one hearing of Civil Case No. 4580R, why did he exceed such authority by executing the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on
behalf of Eliza Fanged, respondent Atty. Kollins client?

was no valid compromise agreement, as one of the parties in the case was absent at the time it was
entered into. He knew that no valid notice was given to the complainant, since the signatory to the
notice of the manifestation of compromise agreement was a certain Veronica Buking. 26
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that "a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." 27 A lawyer is expected, at all
times, to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. Whenever it is made to appear that a lawyer is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the
Court which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar to
withdraw the privilege.28
A lawyer may legally apply a clients funds in his possession to satisfy professional fees which the
client owes him, in the absence of any dispute as to the legality of the amount thereof. 29 However, the
fact that a lawyer has a lien for his fees on the clients money in his possession or the circumstance that
the client owes him more than the clients funds in his hands may not excuse him from making an
accounting nor entitle him to unilaterally apply the clients money to satisfy his disputed claims. 30 In
this case, the amount of P30,000 which the respondents took for themselves as attorneys fees belonged
to a third person, not their client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the owner was, in fact, an
adverse party. It was the possession of the money, its entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the
complaint for rescission of contract, and, if respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted the
filing of the complaint itself. Thus, the respondents could not, without a claiming partys knowledge,
apply the amount of P30,000 for themselves as attorneys fees. If there was someone liable for the
respondents attorneys fees, it was their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said that there was a real
"compromise" as to the manner in which the amount of P2,600,000 was to be applied, since the
complainant was not present when the said agreement was made.1wphi1
In the recent case of Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Atty. Michael
Dioneda,31 we had the occasion to state, thus:
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and
the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyers oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in
them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. 32

The most plausible explanation in this matter is that respondent Atty. Kollin in fact authorized
respondent Atty. Pekas to execute the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement on behalf of his
(respondent Atty. Kollin) client Eliza Fanged in order to pave the way for the release of the sales
proceeds. This maneuver was resorted to by the respondent Atty. Kollin in order to avoid any
responsibility for securing the release of the sales proceeds to his client despite his knowledge that his
client Eliza Fanged had no right thereto. By having respondent Atty. Pekas sign the Manifestation of
Compromise Settlement, it was the intention of respondent Atty. Kollin to distance himself from such
pleading and claim no responsibility or participation therein so that the same would not be tainted by
his apparent knowledge of the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to claim the sales proceeds. In this respect,
respondent Atty. Kollin and his client Eliza [F]anged have succeeded as they have secured the release
of the sales proceeds to the detriment and prejudice of herein complainant. 25

An attorneys only safe guide is high moral principle, as the torch to light his way; his best shield is a
clear conscience and an unblemished personal record; and his just reward is to find his highest honor in
a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic
and loyal citizen.33 The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a
unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and
confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only on the individual lawyer but also in the legal
profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to, at all times,
maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their
profession.34

Contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondent Atty. Pekas cannot validly claim that he acted in good
faith as his superior, respondent Atty. Kollin, merely authorized him to attend the December 2, 1999
hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R. Atty. Pekas, in entering into a compromise agreement, overstepped
the authority he was purportedly given. He was only authorized "to manifest submission of the matter
for resolution." Furthermore, respondent Atty. Pekas himself claimed that the complainant could not
question the compromise agreement as she was not a party thereto. Atty. Pekas, thus, knew that there

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Matthew P. Kollin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years. Atty. Percival L. Pekas is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months.

SO ORDERED.

AC No. 99-634

Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"

June 10, 2002

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,

vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.

xxx

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if
the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn
Statement alleging the following:
"x x x

xxx

xxx

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,

sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at
21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a
money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter
and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I
failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary
complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee
whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999,
deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as
Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already
been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta
but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he
would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked;
and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet
acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at
Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at
the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he personally follows up the processes with
the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court
was absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of
the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of
my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta
at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit
that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his
own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks,
postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively,
copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain

xxx

x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 2
respondent filed his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally
outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's
law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill
Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business
partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this time
addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without
informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former's law office to deliver the
letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted
a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a
compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files
pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to
draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by
complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees
amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay
on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her
that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance
and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid
was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the
complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures,
Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on
for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint.
Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the
complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When respondent
refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his
own personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and
their office personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed
by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone
had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was
for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was
to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client, the complainant.
The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of
part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for
his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense,
it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year."4

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the
Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing
fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence,
the former's failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by
complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the
defense of the client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect
the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain
the respect of the community for the legal profession. 5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the
profession.6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to
obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the
consultation, then the professional employment is established. 7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between
the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. 8 Hence, despite the fact that
complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice
to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he
had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the
client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not
neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they
owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. 9
They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of
the client's rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken
or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied. 10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to
complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if
indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should
have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued another
receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
capital that necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a
secondary consideration.13 Duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the highest
eminence may be attained without making much money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt
issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be
scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. 15 Rule 16.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their
clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be true that they have a lien
upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that
they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply
such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not
relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so
constitutes professional misconduct.17 In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their
client's interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with
it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to
him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of
law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES,
respondents.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for petitioner.
Arturo A. Alafriz & Associates for and in their own behalf.

On May 28,1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit,
which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner
manifested that it had fully paid private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of
P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance,
including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears that private
respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a
compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
Finally, on October 15,1984, the court a quo issued the order assailed on appeal before respondent
court, granting payment of attorney's fees to private respondent, under the following dispositive
portion:

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos.
08265-08268 1 affirming the order of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, in Civil Cases Nos. 19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's fees and directing herein
petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank, for brevity), as defendant in said civil
cases, to pay its attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Associates, movant therein, the
amount of P936,000.00 as attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.
The records show that from March, 1974 to September, 1983, private respondent handled the abovementioned civil cases before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig (Branches I, II, VI, X, XIII, XIX,
XX AND XXIV) in behalf of petitioner. 2 The civil cases were all for the declaration of nullity of
certain deeds of sale, with damages.
The antecedental facts 3 which spawned the filing of said actions are undisputed and are hereinunder
set forth as found by the trial court and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court. A
certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a
total area of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the
petitioner to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel
Corporation. The obligors having defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates
of sale were issued by the provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser thereof Subsequently, Alejandro,
alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale of the parcels
of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion is hereby granted and the Metropolitan

Bank and Trust Company (METROBANK) and Herby Commercial and
Construction Corporation 4 are hereby ordered to pay the movant Arturo Alafriz
and Associates the amount of P936,000.00 as its proper, just and reasonable
attorney's fees in these cases. 5
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its decision promulgated on
February 11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration, dated March 3, 1988, was filed by petitioner but the
same was denied in a resolution promulgated on November 19, 1988, hence the present recourse.
The issues raised and submitted for determination in the present petition may be formulated thus: (1)
whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its
attorney's fees; (2) whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien and
(3) whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market
values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging lien in
the civil cases before the court below because the dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in the
words of Section 37, Rule 138, judgments for the payment of money or executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments. 6
We agree with petitioner.
On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:

It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister
corporation, Service Leasing Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00.
On the same day, the properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction
Corporation for the purported price of P2,500,000.00. Three months later, or on June 7, 1983, Herby
mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro for P9,200,000.00. The lower court found that
private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed
an urgent motion for substitution of party on July 28, 1983. Private respondent, on its part, filed on
August 16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien,
pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the
actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice,
petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the
same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of
title of the parcels of land.
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs Alejandro, et al. in the aforesaid civil cases, which had been consolidated and
were pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, filed a motion to dismiss their complaints
therein, which motion the lower court granted with prejudice in its order dated September 5, 1983. On
December 29, 1983, the same court ordered the Register of Deeds to annotate the attorney's liens of
private respondent on the derivative titles which cancelled Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 453093 to
453099 of the original seven (7) parcels of land hereinbefore adverted to.

. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which
he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of
the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party;
and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as
his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees
and disbursements.
Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of
attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance
of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may
enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his
services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid.
7

In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of
the frill satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment
nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant
therein. This being so, private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal

basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same
manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.
In point is Morente vs. Firmalino, 9 cited by petitioner in support of its position. In that case, movantappellant attorney sought the payment of his fees from his client who was the defendant in a complaint
for injunction which was dismissed by the trial court after the approval of an agreement entered into by
the litigants. This Court held:
. . . The defendant having suffered no actual damage by virtue of the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, it follows that no sum can be awarded the defendant for
damages. It becomes apparent, too, that no amount having been awarded the
defendant, herein appellant's lien could not be enforced. The appellant, could, by
appropriate action, collect his fees as attorney.
Private respondent would nevertheless insist that the lien attaches to the "proceeds of a judgment of
whatever nature," 10 relying on the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. vs. Henares 11 and some
American cases holding that the lien attaches to the judgment recovered by an attorney and the
proceeds in whatever form they may be. 12
The contention is without merit just as its reliance is misplaced. It is true that there are some American
cases holding that the lien attaches even to properties in litigation. However, the statutory rules on
which they are based and the factual situations involved therein are neither explained nor may it be said
that they are of continuing validity as to be applicable in this jurisdiction. It cannot be gainsaid that
legal concepts of foreign origin undergo a number of variegations or nuances upon adoption by other
jurisdictions, especially those with variant legal systems.
In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the American cases it cited expressly
declares that "in the absence of a statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise, the general rule
is that an attorney has no lien on the land of his client, notwithstanding such attorney has, with respect
to the land in question, successfully prosecuted a suit to establish the title of his client thereto,
recovered title or possession in a suit prosecuted by such client, or defended successfully such client's
right and title against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack," 13 as is the situation in the case at bar.
This is an inescapable recognition that a contrary rule obtains in other jurisdictions thereby resulting in
doctrinal rulings of converse or modulated import.
To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a charging lien attaches only to
judgments for money and executions in pursuance of such judgment, then it must be taken in haec
verba. The language of the law is clear and unequivocal and, therefore, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says, barring any necessity for elaborate interpretation. 14
Notably, the interpretation, literal as it may appear to be, is not without support in Philippine case law
despite the dearth of cases on all fours with the present case. In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al., 15 the
Court had the occasion to rule that "the lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the
property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution." In Ampil vs.
Juliano-Agrava, et al., 16 the Court once again declared that a charging lien "presupposes that the
attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client . . ." Further, in Director of Lands vs.
Ababa, et al., 17 we held that "(a) charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited only to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for
delivery of real property as in the instant case."
Even in the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted as cited by private respondent,
there was an express declaration that "in this jurisdiction, the lien does not attach to the property in
litigation."
Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client from the
adverse party in any action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not
extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation. 18 More specifically, an attorney merely

defeating recovery against his client as a defendant is not entitled to a lien on the property involved in
litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the client's title to
property
already
in
the
client's
possession. 19
While a client cannot defeat an attorney's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case, terminating
the services of his counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or compromising
his action, 20 this rule cannot find application here as the termination of the cases below was not at the
instance of private respondent's client but of the opposing party.
The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the preceding discussion which amply
demonstrates that private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien.
Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within
the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. 21
There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot pass upon a petition to determine attorney's
fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be activated. 22 These decisional rules, however, apply
only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable under the rules.
On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or interfere with the
authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper
proceeding which may be brought by private respondent.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main
action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The
persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney's fees have the right to be heard upon the question
of their propriety or amount. 23 Hence, the obvious necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of
quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in
controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. 24
These are aside from the several other considerations laid down by this Court in a number of decisions
as pointed out by respondent court. 25 A determination of all these factors would indispensably require
nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can adduce evidence to establish its right
to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.
Nothing in this decision should, however, be misconstrued as imposing an unnecessary burden on
private respondent in collecting the fees to which it may rightfully be entitled. But, as in the exercise of
any other right conferred by law, the proper legal remedy should be availed of and the procedural rules
duly observed to forestall and obviate the possibility of abuse or prejudice, or what may be
misunderstood to be such, often to the undeserved discredit of the legal profession.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a
greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation. 26
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private
respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988

PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often than
not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on pure
questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy,
wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased
into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised
by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its merits
as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R
Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he
executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979,
and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following
his failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R Corporation,
to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive
relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation
in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the
private respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of P600,000.00,
with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be
entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the court 3 approved the
compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits a fact the petitioner himself
concede 4 for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone
the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the
petitioner moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution,
although it does not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with
respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on the
other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said
properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance
the money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over the
properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are
inclined to agree with the private respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral
ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner, first, to
redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private respondent

alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet
market project upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay, the properties
already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and
Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon
City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I,
FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto
TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of the real
properties and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my
mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of
Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I,
FRANCISCO HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto
TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of
redemption and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my
mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the Sheriff of
Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in Civil
Case No. Q30679. . . 10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the
respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The court
granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary restraining
order and later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced
disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various criminal
complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On
December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation of document, 13
praying that the certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed
of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ... be
reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage." 14
He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter would lend the
money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet
market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner moved
for dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration complained
of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's] rights" 16 "to
protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly,
that the petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on
the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b),
of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his own
right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure to
redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the petitioner cannot
be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their clients
pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had
attained finality. The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a
character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of Judgment

18

in the respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting execution
over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the petitioner
P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining order
directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On
December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged resolutions,
denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure.
Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING
AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING
AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING
AC G. R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT
RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE
PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari," 22 disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces
alleged legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the
assailed orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming
annulment of judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two
orders being in the nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we
have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is
explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been
regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one
the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining,
not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there
is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers
to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented

from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court
reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner Canlas
correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely implementing it.
Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the
proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court
will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely
oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the
former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent
designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to
him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner
would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R.
Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno
R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from being
plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to extrinsic fraud
as the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of an
appeal 26 and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular
implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule,
"irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision executed. 28
In the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his
motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted
hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for
issuance of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for
irregular execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to his
lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is uneasy
about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him and his
lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation,
undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article
1330 of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose,
gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become
final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure for the enlightenment solely of
the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we
cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his
mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural
rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." 31 If procedure were to be an impediment to such an

objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled
and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the
other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays
before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the a
rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing
entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged
properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a
development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his
interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ...
with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is
not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a
matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a
shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his
fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a
commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at
the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37 Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule
138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount
to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not
believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had rendered
in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of
such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law
that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his
demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market
should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not likewise
persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that

vested upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in
satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on
compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the
properties themselves, much less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation
were purportedly provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not
named one in the amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil
Case No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and
transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R
Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39 Whatever right he had, it was,
arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the " just fees and
disbursements" 40 due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement and
subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of the
issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it. We
find this perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds. There
can indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the private
respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have
us beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own money
he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did not get anything
out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the properties have been issued to the
new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic] petition for annulment." 41 To say that he
did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is
not prepared to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent
sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a preprepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption
over the properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier
averred, the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's
moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private respondent who
"earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep
his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact
that the latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of the
opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to forestall
the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall acquire the
same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and
conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption"in
order that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise
Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties in
their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a gesture
of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he cannot
dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the conveyance
document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as originally drafted,
provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption and/or redeem" 45
the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of Deeds purported to
transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor. He admits
having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the registration of
the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning of the paper,

for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court is at a
loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the
deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any rate, the agreement is
clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification this is not the proper occasion for it
we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is subject
to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7),
of the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that
the prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after
judgment, so that the property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract not one in pursuance of what had been agreed
upon on compromise in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights
over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a
subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation."
Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession
unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has
possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is noteworthy that in this
case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the
private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of
execution on the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same
enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.) The

writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier
detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear
tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties
have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the
petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of
properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty.
Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his hability
for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said
respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other.
To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the
private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00
representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for
attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of
P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper
adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the
petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases and in
the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets
of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of
general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the
outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have
likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the
decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have done
so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier
upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and
counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise
cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what
convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco Herrera,
the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him
for violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be
consolidated with AC No. 2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for
execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-4663

May 30, 1951

FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-4671

May 30, 1951

MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
Petitioners in their own behalf.
Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against the
respondents General Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers of the Philippine
Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners
from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals,
to which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the
Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the
Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows:
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or indirectly
be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Congress
during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel before the Electoral Tribunals or
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an offer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office. . . ..
The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether the prohibition contained in
the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the petitioners.
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court" includes
the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above
quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel
"in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a CourtMartial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are
used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted
unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is
intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, * 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not
hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what
we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death
or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to
Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of

Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the
following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power
having no relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is
yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and
justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the
fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special provision of the subject in the
military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as adopted in the common-law
courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to
adjudicate between the U.S. an the accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and
according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its
sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the
Attorney General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's
Military Law and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by
the same authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as
any other, and it differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it
applies to officers and soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and
that it is limited to breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the
United States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter
courts have in controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited
sphere are entitled to as untrammeled an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. It is the general rule that one accused of the crime
has the right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared
by the statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional
provision extending that right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a
court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a
court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly
licensed to practice in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs.
Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved
by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the
character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death
penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the
Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the
Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1, Rule 106,
of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury done to the
Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the
Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial
shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the courtmartial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a

contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a

criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the
ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p.
55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some
meaning, and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex
parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24
N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and
Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and not
an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another prosecution
of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown
by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206
U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be
accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgment
of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; and restricting our decision
to the above question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of
1902, and for the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been
acquitted of the crime of homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the
Philippines, by a military court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of
the United States, could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court
exercising authority in that territory.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers of our
Constitution in enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, it is obvious that there
exist the same if not more reason for prohibiting the appearance of members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear
as such in civil courts, because the independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our
Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi eadem lex.
Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in court-martial, the
respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any right, and hence the petitions
for mandamus in these two cases are denied with costs against the petitioners.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez
charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The
complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken
advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice,
succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was
their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their
authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T.
Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and
recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July
1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead
appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15
June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from
hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both
motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the
Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and
recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.

Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C,
replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the
sum indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with
interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special power of
attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged
property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on
or before May 30, 1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to
complainants, respondent insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the
assurance that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of
respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres
again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the
document was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy
of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real
Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the
status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the
obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position
Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of
mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was
transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to
Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March
1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2
of case), and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the
second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not
believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that
respondent had already sold the same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount
of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their
obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property, although three years had
already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.

FINDINGS

Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave
complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which
indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The computation
was made in respondent's own handwriting. Complainants went home with
shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for
disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.

Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan
of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C,
Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records).lwph1.t In the said Real Estate
Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by
complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent assured
complainants that said document was a mere formality, and upon such assurance,
complainants signed the same. The document was brought by complainant Narciso
Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he
gave the document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted from
complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious
interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously paid the obviously
usurious interest for three months: September, October and November, 1975. Then
they stopped paying due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay said
amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real

Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what

appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they
obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May
7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged
amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the
second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus
the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino
Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus
making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent denies
that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from complainants.
He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the
Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation
that the title of the property, at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA
on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already paid

On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June
1988. In as Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor
General presented the following:

the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants knew
fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the
property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the
matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against
respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual
cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the
P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied
to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to
interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due on
August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00 on
September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently,
beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of
the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months
at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants'
loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals
P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured
by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second
Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such terms, and,
therefore, there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing,
except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue
by the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages
covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00,
respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is that
when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they
have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever
is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and
abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted.
One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, applies in this case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear
that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents
by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the
successive documents was a are formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a
lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of
the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing
him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on
the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in
practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the
contract, it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through

the desired practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by
sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would
proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This respondent failed
to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their
best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan
obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it
may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent himself, returned the
proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30, 1976, considering
that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not
enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per
computation of respondent would already have earned interest of P2,500.00 for
five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00,
and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the
bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title
(T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the
first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount
was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B,
p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000.
00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have
readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for
only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is
spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the
simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the
execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent
demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three
years, as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper
(Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2).lwph1.t
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth
quoting:
In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this
particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the
complainants or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing
the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and
considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the
complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as
counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent
extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former.
However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the respondent
in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the
respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially, socially and
intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were only compelled
to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that
they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It is for this reason
therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the
complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a
lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and
himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample evidence in

the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at
least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but
common among money lenders during the time of the transactions in question'

consent of the complainants. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only

received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an
amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants?
Why is it that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said
amount? How come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was
given to the respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as
their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is
really true that complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable
settlement they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the
fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the
respondent as their private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an
affidavit belying the claim of the respondent.'

Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was
their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against
accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the accused without their
consent and received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the amicable
settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the Id amount nor
informing them of said settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement
was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].

Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena
are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be
suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may
consist of misconduct in either his professional or non- professional attitude
(Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply
something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are
punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute,
fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska
C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).

We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.

It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused
Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00.
At this stage, relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet
strained, and respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that
complainants were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent
on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for
P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then
the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both
respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent
did not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps because he was
still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning over
the whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00
to respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the
money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had
already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing
what happened to their lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the
Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw
the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500.00 that had
been given to respondent. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the
receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the
supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a
motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved
respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the
witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from
Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the respondent
agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a
criminal case wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that
Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of
the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent
received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of
an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the
respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge and

A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much.
They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and
considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the
documents, they did not bother to have them explained by another lawyer or by
any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years,
they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their
obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence
contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers
employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability merits mitigation.
(Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during
the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six
(6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty
(40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants
presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel
for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined.
Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been
pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a
change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective
position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their
separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their
documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counteraffidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28
October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by

respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the
order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination
as having been waived, had become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary
value of the complainants' position paper, not having passed through any cross-examination and argues
that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a
denial of his right to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has
been violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the
witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record
of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses
of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he
wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a
clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a
total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal
Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where respondent asked for
postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he
nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare
his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in
his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the
opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both
parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount
loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan
extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents
and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely
for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants
before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate
mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem
the foreclosed property within a certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of
whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of
course, satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's
conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a
time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo
Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a
compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent
and approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an
advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and

moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled"
the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants.
Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment
only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never
did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers
cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge
of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the
amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of
honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or
non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so
patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must
suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an
attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only
a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct
on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the
Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of
law. 8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants
in his private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered
together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court
to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued
membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken
from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant
and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.