PS21 and Just Security: Countering Violent Extremism

Friday 29 May 2015, New York

Unedited Transcript

Ryan Goodman (Moderator): NYU professor of law and co-editor, Just Security
Richard Barrett: Former British diplomat and intelligence officer who headed the United Nations
monitoring team covering Al Qaeda and the Taliban for nearly a decade. Now Vice President at the
Soufan Group and an International Advisor at PS21.
Faiza Patel: Founding editor of Just Security, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Program
at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU.

Goodman: So, welcome everybody, to our event on counteracting violent extremism. My

name is Ryan Goodman, Im a professor here at NYU Law School and co-editor and chief of
the Just Security blog. Its a terrific opportunity for us to have a discussion. Its not one of my
main areas of deep expertise so I plan to learn a lot and ask the questions that have been
burning in my mind on this particular topic. And its an extraordinary opportunity given the
expertise that we have here. So just to introduce our speakers. Richard Barrett, to the left of
me, is Senior Vice President of the Soufan Group, from 2004 to 2013 he headed the UN
monitoring team on al-Qaida and the Taliban. Hes served in the UK government, the security
service MI5, the Foreign Office and the Secret Intelligence Service MI6 and he also served as
the UKs Director of Global Counter Terrorism operations, both before and after 9/11. And to
the right of me is Faiza Patel, co-director of the Liberty and National Security Programme at
the Brennan Centre, and prior to joining the Brennan centre, Faiza was senior policy officer at
the organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons in The Hague and is author of a
major report on the topic of CVE, counteracting violent extremism, titled Rethinking
Radicalisation. In terms of regional experience I thought just to identify that as an element
that also unifies our speakers. Richard served abroad in the UK government in Jordan and
Turkey, and Faiza was born and raised in Pakistan. So we also have that element that is added
to the equation of our discussion.
So I thought just to start the discussion in one area and then move over to two areas. The
first area that I thought wed talk about is the conditions that might give rise to individuals on
a pathway to extremism, if that can even be identified as a pathway. Then after we discuss
that, to then start to discuss what is the real threat, in this instance, both inside the West or
in other regions of the world and then talk about policy interventions, whether or not theyre
effective and what the trade-offs may be. So to start off the discussion I guess the first

question would be, I just want to open it up with are, are there predictors or risk factors that
we can think about with respect to individuals in the West who might want to join in or join
up with groups like the Islamic State? Is there empirical evidence thats reliable in identifying
these kinds of causations and how should we think about that? I know Faiza, for example, in
your major report you identify a conveyer belt theory that the US government has in part
relied upon and dismissed??? it, but the question is, are there other predictors or other
theories that you would suggest are plausible. So why dont we just open up with you and
then turn to Richard.
Patel: Sure. So let me start by saying that I am a CVE sceptic. Thats how I define myself in this
debate. And Ive been studying CVE, which is what we use in studying Countering Violent
Extremism, what use to be called anti-radicalisation or any number of terms, but CVE or I
guess in the UK PVE, Preventing Violent Extremism, is sort of the term that most people use.
Ive been studying this issue since right around 2007, which is when I started looking at it. I
started looking at it then because the NYPD had issued this report called Countering Home
Grown Terrorism, in which it put forward this model, which said weve looked at 17 cases of
terrorism in the United States and overseas and we can trace a path by which someone
becomes a terrorist. And the implications of that theory were, one, that if you can identify a
path, then you have points of intervention that are identifiable. Two, that the behaviours that
were put forward as being, how shall we say, indicators of somebody about to become a
terrorist, were things that were very common amongst Muslim populations. So, for example,
growing a beard. It was really as simplistic as that. Joining political and religious organisations,
giving up smoking and drinking, which I thought was a good thing, but apparently not
according to the NYPD. So, they sort of came up with this model that really looked at religious
behaviour and said, if you see a young Muslim guy whos engaged in these behaviours, he
might be on the path to radicalisation, and the implication being so we should watch that
guy. The FBI had its own version of this, which came out basically simultaneously, which also
put forward the same theory.
Now the problem with that theory is that I havent seen a single empirical study that backs it
up. Pretty much every study that comes out on these issues says its a very individual process.
In fact I dont even know if I can call it a process. And there are lots of different factors that
go into whether somebody decides to commit a terrorist act. Not dissimilar to when one tries
to predict violence. Can you predict violence amidst a small, amidst any population? Its been
something that we as society have been struggling with for many, many years and simply
havent been able to come up with the problem.
So that was CVE, the original. Now, what weve seen in the current administration is a slight
shift on CVE, which is to say theyve moved away from these religious factors although they
still focus their efforts on the same communities, and theyve moved into more of a kind of
psychological thing. So if you kids are alienated or if they are concerned about foreign policy
or if they change their behaviour, you should be careful, because maybe theyre going to go
and join ISIS. Now I would pause it there there are a lot of teenagers who are alienated,
who are unhappy with the status quo, who have problems with US foreign policy, who are
not going to go and join ISIS. Now I dont see the kinds of things that have been put forward

as predictors of radicalisation or violent extremism as being particularly useful. I look at my

own kids who are fifteen and seventeen and I can assure you that if I went through the
indicators of radicalisation that were put forward by Lisa Monaco from the White House
about a year ago, my kids would probably meet five of them. Theres such an urge to do
something about the problem, that were using these models that are simply not based on
empirical science and still using them to build programs that have very real impacts on
communities. I want to make one point over here, which is that since people have started
pushing back on the theory of radicalisation, the response has been yeah, theyre not
predictors, but theyre factors. Now, sure, you can say that, but if youre using exactly the
same kinds of things to target programmes, youre treating these things as predictors, as
reasons why you should be looking at particular individuals in order to provide some kind of
programming, whether that programming be a programme like the NYPDs Muslim
Surveillance Programme or whats now being put forward as a softer, kinder guise of
countering violent extremism, driven by communities.
Barrett: Well thanks very much for asking me to join you here today. The more that you look
at countering violent extremism and the phenomenon of so many people going off to join the
Islamic state, the harder it is to think of any good policy response to that. Clearly the main
policy response, and well come to talking about that a little bit later, has to lie with the
countries in the region, primarily, rather than the Western countries from which some of
these people go. And I say some because in total theres probably five or maybe six thousand
people form EU and North America combined and in terms of the total population, that is a
minute number. And even with empirical studies, and we are trying to do that more by
interviewing people whove gone away to fight in Iraq and Syria, and who have now come
back home and indeed people who have gone away to fight in Iraq and Syria and who have
now come back home and indeed people who have gone to fight and havent come back
home, to try and find out a little bit more about what reasons they gave. What reasons they
thought they had at the point of departure and how their thinking developed when they
were there. And, for those that came back, why they decided to come back, because I think
that will help us both in terms of understanding how people get radicalised to the point of
thinking that their future lies with the Islamic State. And the sort of effect of the counternarratives that might persuade people to come back early or perhaps not go there at all.
Its difficult to disaggregate the three questions you asked. What do we know about why
people go and whose gone and what is the threat that they pose, and what effective policy
response could there be, because all those things are sort of very intertwined and they all
rely on each other. And the great majority of the people who go I dont think are much of a
threat, and well come on to talk about that, but there is a real concern, and this is the nature
of terrorism of course, to make the public concerned, not to kill you, but to scare you, thats
the whole point of terrorism. There is a real public concern about the Islamic State. If you
look at the newspapers, if you follow the media of any sort, these days, it is, as it were above
the fold, its always in the headlines, its always something that people are talking about, and
therefore politicians inevitably feel they have to respond to that. And I imagine with the 2016
election cycle coming up here, therell be a great deal of discussion about whether the
Obama administration has been effective in countering the Islamic State, or not. Well, its a

bit rich to expect the Obama administration to have been able to do something about the
Islamic State, because it is such a complex problem and its a complex problem in
International politics.
I think people are worried about it, not because they worry about Iraq and Syria, or the
future of the Middle East, or the future of North Africa, which are the areas most affected by
this, but they are worried about what may happen at some convention they go to in garden
Texas. They worry about what may happen when they go to the local Walmart store, or
whatever. That is an unreal worry, but that is a worry created by terrorism, and of course it
shows the effectiveness of terrorism, as I said. So if you look at violent extremism, and you
look at the cases that we know of and can plot, as to why people went, what theyre saying
while theyre there on twitter and so on, you get just a collection of individuals stories, but
from all those individual stories, of course, you can make generalisations. The danger with
that is, they are generalisations, so therefore they cover a huge population far greater than
the people who have gone off to join the Islamic State, as Faiza said, but, nonetheless, what
can be done about those factors which may be indicators that somebody is becoming
radicalised to the point of committing a terrorist crime, either here or going abroad to join a
violent group? And if you go abroad to join a violent group, you may not go with any
intention yourself of being violent or terroristic, but you are in an environment where that is
very much the norm and if you do come back you may be very much affected by your
experience there. We can talk about that a little bit later.
So looking at the main drivers of violent extremism. They are common for many people who
are going through that period, sort of late teenage, early twenties where you, for many
reasons, go through a period of questioning your identity and wondering where you belong
and what the future holds for you and whether youre valued as an individual. All these sorts
of things very, very normal and everybody works their way through that. But I think for some
people theres not only those push factors, but also very powerful pull factors exercised by
the Islamic State, which prey on those feelings and say, Ok, you can come here, you can
help build something, you can be part of something you can do your duty, you can be an
individual. Dont worry about your past and what you have done, its all about your future
and what you can do. Everybody can fit, everybody is welcome. Now for the vast, vast
majority of people, 99.99 %, that isnt enough of a pull factor, but for some it is, and
unfortunately the people who get up and go are the people who get up and go, people who
actually could do something rather more worthwhile. So I think that policy makers are not
just looking at how to prevent people becoming radicalised to the point of going to join the
Islamic State, but they should also be looking, if they are not looking, at offering alternative
channels for people who have that energy and determination that takes them out of their
family and into the unknown of the Islamic State. Finding ways that they could expend those
energies in a much more positive way to help society. And I think that those two objectives
are important objectives for any politician and they have to be considered in all sorts of
policies, which can fall very broadly into a framework of a general social policy, rather than a
specific countering violent extremism policy. But people like to think that they are engaged in
countering terrorism. Its a bit attractive than saying Im engaged in social work. I would say
that social work is probably more valuable.

Patel: So I can I just jump in a little bit. I think that its important when youre talking about
countering violent extremism to look at the different kinds of initiatives that have taken place
in that space because I think its only then that you can get a clear idea of the policy response
and the concerns with the policy response. One set of initiatives that you refer to are things
that would be good for any community, whether it is building a community centre in
Beiridge, which has a large Arab population. Whether, as I believe the French are doing,
building a highway that connects their suburbs into Paris more effectively or whether youre
increasing digital literacy amongst populations. All of these things are in the social services
category and I think that if you took them out of the securitised space of counter terrorism,
they could be helpful. I think they are helpful on their own. Whether they help counter
violent extremism or not, I couldnt tell you. I dont think anybody can demonstrate giving
more economic opportunity, giving more political participation opportunity, increasing civic
engagement is necessarily going to staunch violent extremism. But theyre good things on
their own, so very little down side to them.
But theres a second set of programmes and I think those are the ones that are most
problematic, and those are the ones that weve seen emerging in the United States, imported
from Great Britain, and I think these are a really bad idea. And these are programmes that say
we are going to identify vulnerable Muslim youth and then we are going to conduct
interventions. Now I have two fundamental problems with that. One is, how are you going to
identify vulnerable youth? This is a very, very risky and open-ended proposition, particularly
when you are looking at minority populations, who are not well understood by law
enforcement, much less by public school teachers in Minnesota. So, you have that one set of
issues. And my second problem with that is, how is that intervention, whatever it might be,
and whatever it might be based on, going to dovetail with law enforcement efforts. Because,
if Im a school teacher and Im worried that some kid, some Somali kid in my class, is
alienated or seems troubled, what am I going to do? Am I going to give that child counselling?
Am I going to report him or her to the principal? Am I going to go to the police officer whose
been designated as my CVE liaison and put this kid on a list, possibly for no good reason? And
one of the problems with these programmes is that that relationship, between social workers
and law enforcement, is a black box for us. And we dont know what the criteria are, which is
going to take a kid who is troubled in high school and someone wants to give him or her
counselling to getting put on some kind of a watch list. Its a very risky proposition.

Barrett: The development of counter terrorism over the years, as I have been involved in it,
has been remarkable in that, immediately after 9/11, the idea was that you could essentially
eradicate terrorism by killing everybody. And of course that became ridiculous pretty quickly.
But I was at the White House summit on CVE earlier this year, and there were a lot of people
there. The President was there of course, and many senior people of the US administration.
But also many people from other countries as well and many civil society people. Now it was
striking to me that, what are we now, almost fourteen years after 9/11, that still were fishing
around in the dark, really, to find an understanding of terrorism, let alone find a counter

measure against that. But, having said that, there has been this remarkable change of
attitude. It is not about, well not just about a military response. It is also about understanding
why people from our societies would want to be terrorists. And I think law enforcement
definitely has a role.

We have to acknowledge that law enforcement is not just there to catch people who have
committed crimes and punish them, but also to try to prevent crimes. And with terrorism,
particularly, the prevention is much more important than the retribution, than the capture
and punishment, because you want to protect people from violence. But dealing with that,
dealing with people who are going to join a clandestine group, or possibly go abroad to
commit terrorist acts, is a very new problem for police officers who, maybe, are very use to
dealing with gangs, for example. Maybe many of the motives for people joining gangs are
very similar to the motives of people who join terrorist groups, in the sense that they want an
identity, they want a sense of belonging, they want to be part of something which is bigger
than themselves, but gangs for police officers is a known quantity. Theyve been dealing with
gangs forever and a day and they will carry on doing so. And dealing with terrorism for law
enforcement is a completely new issue, which I think touches very much on the whole
problem of community policing, of how you engage and help the community look after itself.
And maybe well come onto that when we come to talk about policy responses.

Goodman: Great. I just want to disaggregate the two elements of, is it empirically possible to
identify at risk factors or predictors separate from what should be the role of law
enforcement and the police or the state. So the question of prediction. One question is, so I
understand why we would be concerned about a list that is so generic and over inclusive that
it could just sweep in so many false positives, but are there ways in which you could
reconstruct the list, imagining that you are advising a graduate on a dissertation. Just to
identify, can we empirically get some handle on what creates a motivation or a social
network that leads individuals down this path, so that the very list you identified, if you only
looked to that once, there are other characteristics like, if the individual is consuming ISIL
social media. And then lets go to the list. Theyre changing their practices quite radically
from what theyve done before. Theyre disassociating from friends theyve had before, or
they may even wear some insignia. Would that start to count, if we had a list like that, and if
we were more honest about the potential slippage? I think Faiza, as you have said in your
writing, the government should be but we should all be honest about where the slippage may
occur. If we are honest about it, is there a way that you think we can actually get at
something here?

Patel: So I think that one way to further disaggregate the problem is if you want to talk about
how to prevent young people from going to join ISIS, to becoming foreign fighters, as is

fashionable, we can talk about that. That is a set of issues that one can talk about, but I think
that if one frames it very broadly, as countering violent extremism, that will inevitably take
you into very generic kinds of factors that people will look at. As I said, the first set of factors
that were put out by law enforcement were really focused on religious behaviour and social
behaviour and political behaviour. Now the second set of factors, the new fashion, theres
more of a kind of mental health model were looking at and neither of those are empirically
sound, and very very general, and have the risk of slippage.
One way that I think about it is, I can imagine a programme that says, we have this risk and it
is a very small risk, particularly in the United States. You are looking at roughly around,
according to law enforcement estimates, 100 or 130 people who have left. You dont
necessarily know who theyve gone to join in that fight either. You cant assume that all these
people have gone to join ISIL. So I can imagine something that says, let us educate parents
about the kind of propaganda put forward and then they can think about the best ways to
engage with their kids on that.
I want to point out a couple of things that make it really difficult to do this. One is that when
we talk about countering violent extremism, the thing we never talk about is politics and
whats going on in the world and we assume that this is come kind of poisonous ideology that
we need to inoculate kids against. And when we were discussing this at the White House,
with the National Security Council, ahead of the CVE summit, we asked them, when you have
these discussions, will you also talk about these issues. So if you go back to say Minnesota
again, which I think is an interesting example, you remember about five years ago there was
a spate of kids who went to join al-Shabaab in Somalia, and this was portrayed as being all
about the attraction of this Islamic ideology. Now, when you actually talk to these Somali
communities from whence these kids came, they will tell you that it is as much about wanting
to participate in a civil war that was going on in their country, that was brought on by
Ethiopias invasion of Somalia, backed by the United States, and that this is a kind of
geopolitical issue. Now you may not agree with their geopolitical view, and you may want to
push back against that, but if you dont even acknowledge that there are factors other than
ideology, other than mental health, that are going into this recruitment process and this flow
of young people, youre actually not getting at the problem at all.

Barrett: Yes, well terrorism is of course a political expression, so inevitably its wrapped up in
politics. Somalia is a bit different because Somalis are so well connected back to their country
and I dont think there are very many people who went back to Somalia who were Americans,
who were non-Somalis. Omar Hammami is of course a famous example of that. The American
rapper who eventually got killed by al-Shabaab because he objected to their policies and
practices. But, all right, lets accept Somalia as part of this phenomenon. But if the
phenomenon is more broadly examined, its not so much that the individual policies of
Ethiopia or the United States support of Ethiopia, are the problem. What is happening to
Muslims as a community, that seems to be a much greater appeal for people to go to join the
Islamic State, anyway, even if not al-Shabaab. And you could say well, its how the
community, the world community, treats any sort of group of people, any group of people,

unfortunately a minority group in some countries, maybe a majority in others, who can say
they are being persecuted or treated badly. And of course the response is to try and change
the policies through normal means rather than go off and attack the people who you believe
responsible for those policies through terrorist acts.
I think that many of the people who go to join the Islamic State, are objecting to those
policies, against Muslims, generally against the Uma, rather than specific things that are
being done by Western countries. In fact I think the objection is more for things that are not
being done. For example, now with the Islamic State, theres a lot of discussion about
America actually supporting Assad because it doesnt bomb the Islamic State so much. Its left
Palmyra and all this sort of thing and really the whole thing is a sort of set up. Now theres
not very much push back, unfortunately, by the United States on that because, although it is
not true that explaining the policy is extraordinarily complicated, inevitably there are gaps
that can be easily exploited by the Islamic State and others, who oppose the United States on
a point of principle. Maybe I didnt express that point very clearly, but I think you have got to
see it more as the defence of our community rather than an objection to a specific policy.
I think that, for example, there may be many people who are joining the Islamic State who
are converts to Islam. I think thats quite interesting because it shows these people who are
converts are probably looking for the truth. Theyre seeking for something to believe in and
identify with and so they go further, probably, than someone whos been brought up in a
particular religion. And they will go and they will join the Islamic State and they will say, yeah,
Im all in. Im absolutely 100% behind this. Its once you really believe this is it, this is where
Ive got to be, you want to believe that. You keep on trying to reinforce your belief in that and
therefore you look at non-Muslims or non- Islamic State people even as sort of the other.
And whatever they do is wrong. And if youre looking for indicators, its I think, extremely
difficult. There are individuals who go to join the Islamic State, theres individuals who mount
terrorist attacks here, but generally speaking its a group, its a small group of people who
wind themselves up to make a decision to either commit a terrorist attack or to go together
to join the Islamic State. That in itself is quite an interesting phenomenon as well.

Patel: Can I just say a couple of things? I think a lot of what you say is really accurate. I think
Somalia is an interesting case because its such a microcosm, but if you read the papers, alShabaab, ISIS, al-Qaida, they just think its all the same thing if you look at the media frankly.
And theres a direct line being drawn in both the media and amongst policy makers between
whats happening with the al-Shabaab recruitment and whats happening with ISIL. But I do
think this idea, for lack of a better word, the war between Islam and the West, is something
that does seem to be very much part of the motivation of a lot of people. I also think that if
you look at particular terrorists and what they say about what motivates them, they do point
to very specific things. In particular the use of drones in ??? (30:56 sec) has been a recurring
theme we see terrorists coming up with. So it is the general sense of this tension between
the West and Islam, but there are specific things which really capture peoples imaginations
and the point Im trying to make is that when we talk about this, we cant ignore those things.

Im not saying that I think the US drone policy is driving people, but I also dont think its a
religious conceptuousness necessarily driving people. I think what drives an individual is
different from case to case, but I feel that when people talk about this issue and the choose
the factors they want to focus on, they focus on the factors that most appeal to them, so
Obama is like, oh well, you need to have better democratic participation. Thats going to help
you with your extremism problem. Democratic participation is great, you know I would be
much happier if more of the Middle East was democratic, but whether or not thats actually
the solution is really dictated by what you think, what your normative value structure is. If
youre somebody like Pamela Gellar youll say, well, its Islam. Islam is an inherently violent
religion and thats whats driving this. So I feel that if you want to talk about the factors, lets
talk about all the factors that go into this and not pretend that what is an elephant in the
room just doesnt exist. And to come back to your point about converts, which is a really
good one, and I agree, is the idea that a lot of times though youll see, not a lot of times but
in a few cases, you see a conversion and then literally weeks after an attempt to go and join
ISIS. What that brings up for me is that there is more of an attraction to the violence.
Somebody with a video game mentality. This cool, exciting thing going on over there and its
somebody who is looking for that. And so it may be the zeal of a convert but it may also be
something else going on over there that we cant really put our figure on precisely.

Goodman: So Richard I actually want to drill down a little deeper on what youre both kind of
touching on. The US role potentially in geopolitics and the US role in the region, in the Middle
East and the like, and how that might be a contributing factor. And in some sense I think
when Obama is making the reference to democratisation, its a second message that hes
trying to send to take the heat off the United States for having supported autocratic regimes.
Its not actually about heres the solution and Im coming from my framework. Its actually
very strategic, instrumental. Were not supporting autocracy in the region, we are trying to
open up political institutions. Richard, one of your reports, one of the major reports from the
Soufan Group late 2014, you identify this upfront as one of the issues. I have a quote from
the report where you say, the Islamic State itself is incandescent with the rage. Not only that
the West will not leave it alone to establish the utopia that it believes is within reach, it is
hard at work persuading potential supporters that the non-Muslim world will do whatever it
can to protect local rulers, which I read being autocratic regimes and the like, and so ensure
their discriminatory and irreligious policies remain in force. Then the last sentences is what I
want to ask you most about. Not enough is being done on the ground to counter this
narrative. So what do you think should be done on the ground to counter the narrative? Is it
the Assad, this is a kind of misconception, and all we need to do to counter the narrative is
fight information with more information or is it actually change of policy, and thats what
really has to happen on the ground?

Barrett: Well, if we knew the answers we shouldnt be sitting here, we should be affecting
them, and the answers are incredibly difficult, but lets step back a little bit. One of the key
differences, probably the only difference between al-Qaida and Islamic State, in their

approach, is that al-Qaida believes that the local regimes are a secondary target, and the first
target is their supporters, the West, who really prop them up, and without those props they
would fall over, so take away the props rather than the regimes. Whereas the Islamic State
say no, we want to attack the local regimes and that is our primary target.
Well both, in a way, are right in that the regimes are both self-reliant and reliant on Western
support. And the regimes have grown up in a culture which has allowed them to reinforce
that power in ways that we in the Western world would think were inimical to the interest of
society as a whole. And that is of course one of the reasons why you see the problems of
today. If you look at what Hafiz Hassan and now Bashar Assad is doing, to replace him, it is
highly discriminatory, but then you could argue, well, Syria is a false construct anyway. It
results from an agreement between the French and the British, and years of Ottoman rule
before that. So really what experience the people have of organising themselves in any form
of government we might enjoy in the West. And I think thats very reasonable. A very
reasonable complaint to make. And our system as we see it- as we grow up in school with
atlases on the wall with nicely coloured countries all brightly distinguished by hard lines
between them. We believe in whats called the Westphalian arrangements, where nation
states enjoy sovereignty and full jurisdiction within their own borders and then have relations
with other states and international agreements. But that is being challenged now really more
broadly than just the Middle East and North Africa. I think its being challenged through other
parts of Africa and I think it will be challenged in other parts of Asia as well because its not
really tenable in the long run. Because it does depend very much on individuals holding sway.
Now in countries like Saudi Arabia you have a very strong culture where the head of the
family is the head of the family, and everyone should defer to him and so the head of the
family answer to the head of the tribe, who may answer to a more superior head of a clan or
something, and then ultimately to the head of state who is the king. And that is the way that
it goes. And if the King says such and such should happen, then not only should it happen,
but it does happen, and thats the way its organised. We may or may not like that, but its
how society, how culture, is organised in that area. And I think that to change that from the
outside is an enormous challenge and very unlikely to be successful, and that can only really
change from inside. And how should it change? Well, should it change to be more like an
American democracy? I think theres many complaints that many of us in this room would
have about American democracy living in America even. Should it change in a much more
culturally specific, evolutionary way? And these debates are endless. Who knows? I guess
history will tell us eventually.

Goodman: So one issue we havent highlighted yet is the gender dynamic of motivations for
individuals to join the Islamic State or these organisations. Recent attention has been placed
on this. At the White House Summit theres a particular panel on it and I just want to get a
sense of what you think the best evidence is for why females or women join ISIL, the Islamic
State, either from the West or from other countries. In the West I believe the statistic is
something like 18% of individuals who leave to join up with the Islamic State are female.
There is one theory, or explanation thats given, which is its about misinformation. That

theyre being lured into repressive situations in which they arent fully aware. The other is no,
this is volitional, informed. Its actually similar in character to the generic descriptions that
youve been getting for the motivation to join something thats a larger group and fulfils a
certain sense of identity, or response to alienation in the West, if were talking about people
coming from the West, or building a new state and getting a second life in a certain sense. Do
you have a sense on the gender issue, whether or not we should be thinking about CVE, both
as a response to this phenomenon, differently than if you have a gender analysis of it, or just
the causes or predictors?

Barrett: Well, funnily enough theres been a very interesting study by the Institute for
Strategic Dialogue in London, just produced a couple of days ago about, I think they call it Till
Martyrdom Do Us Part, about women, Western women, joining the Islamic State, and it looks
at the few examples that are available in detail, and comes to some sort of conclusions,
which broadly tracked why men joined the Islamic State. Though of course a women joining
the Islamic State is much more likely to see her role as a wife and a mother, rather than as a
fighter in the front line. There are many of the women who slightly fret that they are not
allowed to fight in the front line, particularly after they have been there some time. But this
idea of going, particularly if you are relatively young, if you are in your late teens, the idea of
thinking Im going to marry this heroic guy, because theres a lot of heroism mixed in with the
betrayal of terrorism by the Islamic State. So Im going to marry this young, good looking guy
and Im going to have children and Im going to belong to this really strong sisterhood, which
is also very important. Im not going to be discriminated against. Im not going to be teased
for wearing a hijab as I walk down the street. Im really going to be somebody who is really
going to contribute and Im going to build the future of the state through my children and so
on. That seems to be a strong motivation for many young women that are going. Its a
mixture of idealism and romanticism and the belief that there is the possibility of a world that
can, almost, not be utopia of course, most people that go are pretty intelligent, but can be
sufficiently better than the world theyre leaving, to offer a much stronger sense of identity.
And so the difference between men and women I dont think is that great, probably. But
nonetheless, this idea of sisterhood is very strong and certainly, in the twitter and whats app
and the messages that go back from these women in the Islamic State, its something they
talk about a great deal. And in deed they talk about how wonderful it is to have your husband
martyred, so that you can have an even stronger sense of sisterhood, but that rings a bit
hollow sometimes.

Patel: I think I would basically agree with that assessment.

Goodman: Then I just want to turn it a little bit more to the policy interventions, to respond
to what these drivers might be or just the phenomenon itself. And one idea I guess thats
discussed an enormous amount on CVE is counter narratives and what you think about what
makes a potential counter narrative effective? Is it the notion of using formers, which I guess

is a part of the lingo or a term that is used in CVE? People who have defected from the
organisation, have left the organisation and returned to life. So is it about testimonies from
formers who talk about why they were turned a second time, in a certain sense, or
disillusioned with their membership? Is it about using victims of terrorist acts or atrocities
being committed by the organisations so that thats part of the counter narrative thats
effective, because it puts more front and centre those aspects of the Islamic State or terrorist
organisations? What are the parts of counter narratives that you think are the most
promising? What might be the least promising ones in which they arent really working and
dont make sense?

Patel: Well, I can get to that last bit. So every time Im in a meeting with John Miller, whos
the head of Counter Terrorism and Intelligence at the NYPD, he says to me and to my
colleagues, many of whom are activists. Muslim, Arab, South Asian activists who are
concerned about the NYPD's surveillance program. He is like, but why aren't you guys out
there countering ISIS's narrative? I just look at this guy because I'm like, do you think that the
people who are interested in what I have to say, or what Linda Sarsour or Farah Ahmed
(45:20) or any of the people who are sitting in that room, most of whom are activists and
lawyers working for Muslim civil rights, are going to be at all influential with the kind of
people who want to go and join ISIS? Because if thats the case, then you are really, I don't
know. Whats going on with those marijuana arrests? But anyway, there is this false idea that
there is this moderate Muslim group out there who is going to be able to put forward
messages that are going to be appealing to the people who are going to join ISIS. And I think
we really have to get away from that because its not my responsibility to put those messages
out. I'm not an effective messenger. Its just when we start talking about that, we put this
kind of blame and responsibility on people which really doesn't belong there. So let me start
with that.
I think that the other thing that I've noticed is that the most effective counter narratives are
those that aren't even meant to be counter narratives. Those are the things that are organic
that sort of come from the community and that are really people's individual responses to
what they see as the distortion of their religion. And something that has really ill effects, not
just on the individuals who are going overseas to fight with these people but also to the
broader Muslim communities in the United States who feel the aftershocks of this. In terms
of effectiveness, and I know you have done some work on the former thing so I think I will let
you speak to that.

Barrett Sure. Well I see the audience for counter narrative really divided into five groups and
at the very end you have the people who have already committed to be violent extremists.
They are incredibly hard to reach because the more they go into the radicalisation, the more
they go into a bubble of mutual reinforcement with people who think like themselves. Really,
really difficult to reach them. You may reach them with a former, but they will quickly label
the former as a traitor, as someone who has betrayed the cause and someone who has all

sorts of reasons to dismiss what he is saying. So it is a really, really hard target. Not one to
ignore completely but certainly not the main one because it is so difficult and its also very
small.
The second one target and much more important one are the people who are sympathetic.
They are interested in things being put out by extremist groups and thinking maybe that
makes a bit of sense to me. I'll find out a bit more about that. Those guys need access to
other people who can give them the other side of the story. Not necessarily in a religious
sense, though that is important if their motivation is religious, but I don't think the religious
motivation has really been demonstrated in very many people who become extremely
radical. After all, there are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world and there are extremely few of
them who are violent extremists. So, although there is a lot of emphasis on Imams talking
about the true meaning of religion, there isn't a true meaning of Islam. Islam you have the
Koran, you have the Hadith, and there is an interpretation of what they mean. You can be a
literalist like the Islamic state people or you can take a broader view and try to put it into a
context. So that in a way the religion thing isn't so good. But in the sense that these are
people who are tempted to the Islamic state or to a radical violent extremist group because
they want to belong to something, they want to have a stronger sense of identity, they want
to do something, they feel slightly alienated or uncomfortable in their own society, then I
think a former could say oh okay I was exactly the same. I was exactly like you, I came from a
very similar demographic from you and I tried this. I was attracted by it. It didn't work out.
Now what I am doing is this. So in other words, not to deny that people would want to find
these avenues in life but to provide them alternatives. So I think that is really important. So
that is the second group.
The third group of people you would say are neutral. They dont think about it very much.
Well some people become extremists. So what? Not people I know. Well, those people are
also really important because those are the members of the community. If we are to manage
and spot people who are going to fight violent extremists groups, it is only their friends,
relatives, their family who are going to do that. It is not going to be the local policemen. It is
extremely unlikely. Probably not even their teacher. So it is people who are moving with
them every day. So those people have to be aware a little bit about the dangers of getting
attracted into a violent extremist group or even taking or paying too much uncritical
attention of them without hearing the other side of the story.
Then there are the people who are inclined to sort of think terrorism is a bad thing and they
should be doing something about it. They are a useful audience to go, okay, this is what you
could do. To be sort of enthused and encouraged.
Then there are also the people who are doing something about it, who need to be given
more ammunition and more support and more help.
So you have these five audiences but for each of them you need a different message of
course, you need to tell them a different thing. You need a different messenger, whether it is
a former or not, and you need a different medium. Because where I get my information from
will be completely different from where somebody who is younger or a different ethnic

background will get their information from. So you really need to be very aware of that and
that is why I think a lot of the counter narrative is probably quite well conceptualized but very
poorly delivered. Because it doesn't find the right messenger or the right medium. Or, it finds
the right messenger but its the wrong message. And so, this sort of stuff is not easy, but
there are increasingly a lot of formers who have a much more instinctive understanding of
what needs to be done. And I think that to provide them with opportunities is a very good
policy initiative.

Patel: One of the things that I think is worth thinking about, is what impact it has when
government intervenes in this space, in the counter narrative space. Particularly when you
have, you know as you said, people who are interested in doing something about terrorism. I
think that what I have seen in my work is that there a lot of, and I'm talking really about the
United States because that is what I know and I know these communities here, what I've seen
is there are a lot of organic initiatives which are aimed at strengthening Muslim communities.
It could be everything like a leadership initiative, there is a very famous one called Amachli
(52.20), it could be voter registration drives, it could be different forms of activism linking up
with the black lives matter, for example. So there are all of these different things which grow
up organically from within the community which are very helpful in generally building the
community to be part of the American fabric right? These are things we want every
community to be doing to be engaged, to be active to be thinking, but there is a real danger
when any of these things become associated with being a counter terrorism initiative. So,
Ammachli, I will give you this example, so in Los Angeles and I know we will get into this later,
there is a huge debate going on about whether to participate in the government's CVE
initiative. About a year ago or so, the DOJ identified three cities in the United States where it
would roll out a CVE initiative. Minneapolis, Boston and Los Angeles. Los Angeles has a long
history of police community relations right. They have had lots of institutions, theyve had
their problems, but they have also had a lot of community outreach going on for a long time.
So what happens when the federal government comes along with its CVE initiative right?
Basically L.A. says okay well we are doing x, y, and z in terms of community outreach and that
is CVE and all of the things they are talking about are actually pretty useful things. They are
useful things for law enforcement, they are useful for the community. But you put that CVE
tag on them and you are already turning off a large portion of your audience. One specific
example really struck and it is a thing called Amachli. It is a leadership training retreat, great
program, a lot of young Muslim activists that I know have gone through it. Some of the folks
who are very engaged with CVE in Los Angeles put out a tweet #CVE Amachli leadership
program (54.27). It led to a huge outburst from the community and the folks who were
involved in that leadership program were like we are doing this for ourselves, we are doing
this to build ourselves as leaders in our community and as people who can participate in civic
life of the United States. We are not doing this as part of a counter terrorism initiative. So
whatever you do in this space, your first principle I think has to be, do no harm. And what I
see is when the government intervenes in counter narrative, particularly on the domestic
side there is a lot of harm.

Barrett: Well I just have one little thing to add to that, which is that everything the
government does is counter narrative. Whether they cast it as counter narrative or not,
everything that the authorities do is counter narrative. It can push somebody away from the
community or pull somebody back in. So whether you label or not, you shouldn't label it I
agree, but everything is counter narrative.

Goodman So a question I was going to ask in some sense any case, but I want to kind of tie it
in a little bit, is how we measure effectiveness. Effectiveness of counter narrative,
effectiveness of social programs. And then who or what institution is right to make those
measurements? Faiza, based in your remarks, I think in the Brennan report you guys actually
say the ODNI would evaluate the effectiveness. Isn't that...

Patel That was a while ago..

Goodman: Okay yes, so now then what institutions or governmental institutions then
because isn't that in a certain sense intention with the idea that we don't want to invade the
space with intelligence or counter terrorism but leave it more organic or have other kinds of
frames that can be applied here rather than that?

Patel: So when I wrote that report I was looking at intelligence programs that were based on
the theory of radicalisation. I wasn't looking at the kinds of social intervention programs that
are being put forward now and are sort of the fashion these days. I guess what I would say in
terms of effectiveness is that is one of the big gaps in the space which is that nobody
measures effectiveness, partly because it is really, really, hard to do. I mean how do you
measure how many people your counter narrative prevented from going to join ISIS? I mean
it is a very, very difficult thing to do. But, in addition to that, I think there is a kind of
resistance that we see generally in the counter terrorism field and we have seen it with NSA
programs as well to actually try and measure effectiveness in a way and developing metrics.
So I think that is definitely a big issue. One thing that has happened since 9/11 is that the bulk
of the CVE funding in the United States has gone to research institutions. It has not gone out
to community groups, which I actually think is probably a good idea. These research
institutions have sort of been trying to identify indicators for at least the last twelve years
from what I can tell. But right now there are two studies going on, which I think are going to
be very helpful in this space. The one is being conducted by David Shanzer at UNC, at the
University of Carolina. It is an NIJ grant and he is actually going out and talking to various
communities in which CVE has been deployed to get a sense of its effectiveness in that so
that I think will be interesting to see. I believe his report is going to come out sometime in
early September and it will be interesting to see that. He is also doing another study which is

looking at local law enforcements interactions on these issues and sort of what are the best
practices in that space as well. So I think we certainly don't have much measure of
effectiveness in this area.

Barrett: Yeah, measuring effectiveness is a real, real problem. Because the instance of
terrorism is so small, so to measure well what happened last year, what happens this year is
not a really good way of doing it because you can't really relate that back to any of the
actions that you have taken. It is interesting, I was reading today a story in the UK papers
about a program which has caused a real rumpus where primary school children, which in the
UK is children between nine and eleven, are being asked to fill out a questionnaire about
their religion, ethnicity and so on and also their attitudes to people who are not from that
religion or ethnicity. So okay, what would you do if somebody was rude about your religion?
How would you feel about that? To sort of see what degree of potential radicalization there
was in children at this age. Well it sounds absolutely absurd, doesn't it? It sounds completely
and utterly ridiculous and indeed completely counterproductive. But I can see that behind
this somebody is thinking okay well maybe we can measure the attitudes of these children at
this age and then we can go back and look at their attitudes at a later age and see whether
some of the discussions we have been having about tolerance and the other are effective.
Maybe, but the problem with that is that even with a measure like that the backfire is so
great that it makes you wonder who the hell thought of this.

Patel: I mean that is truly, when I read that article I was just gobsmacked, I think is the word.
And you know the questions that were being asked where do you think Christmas is haram
(not allowed in religion), you know like imagine going to a Jewish population and saying do
you celebrate Christmas or do you prefer Hanukkah? It would simply be unacceptable with
any group except Muslims. Then some of the questions like do you think it is acceptable to
marry outside of your religion? I actually went and Googled the statistics on the United States
and the percentages of people, particularly the older generation by the way, who believe you
shouldnt marry outside your faith, are actually really high, well into 30s and 40 percent. By
the way good money was spent on this. I believe they got 500 thousand Euros from the EU as
part of one of its work streams of countering violent extremism. You know, spend that 500
thousand Euros on building a football stadium I tell you, or whatever, community centre.
Don't do this stuff.

Goodman: So let me ask one last question and then open it up to see if anybody has
questions. So lets imagine, so the question is about what is the proper role for the state, law
enforcement or policing. So lets imagine we have scenarios in which it is highly reliable that
we are able to identify potential youths at risk even to the point that they are engaging in
forming organizations or associations that are affiliated at some level with ISIS or engaging in
political demonstrations in favour of the Islamic State. I can imagine this as part of, its not
happening in the United States, but it is happening in some respects in other countries with

the black flag being deployed or unfurled in various situations of political protests or the like.
So if you could actually identify certain youths and it is in fact kind of clear that they are one
that would be on this kind of risk continuum, what then? What then is the role for police, the
social workers from the government, with respect to these communities?

Barrett: It is such a difficult question isn't it, because if you are only looking to intervene with
people who are showing signs of radicalization in this very specific area of Islamist terrorism,
as many people refer to it. Then it would seem to me that the community would say that that
is fundamentally discriminatory. What about a guy who is going to go out and beat up old
ladies because he is showing signs of violence, he comes from a broken home, he is
uncomfortable in his skin and so on. I mean that guy obviously merits as much attention but
he will, I hope, get attention of society, but I hope not with this label of, oh you know this guy
may be moving towards radicalization. If you start discriminating in that way, that term
discrimination becomes pejorative very, very quickly. I think the community, the at risk
community, the vulnerable community we are talking about, communities as being at risk or
vulnerable, then they are going to feel that you only come and build a football field or
community centre when you think we are going to blow you up. So probably it is a good idea
if you think we are going to blow you up.

Patel: Perverse incentives.

Barrett: So I think that when a family identifies somebody within the family, or a teacher
identifies somebody or other community leader identifies somebody who they feel is veering
off the path, it doesn't really matter whether they are veering towards violent extremism or
whether they are veering towards joining a gang or whether they are just veering towards
some other anti-social behaviour. There has to be some sort of intervention there. I think
building that communitys capacity to provide that intervention, at the community level, is
clearly what most governments would like to do. But it is how you do that on an even playing
field, to carry on with the stadium idea. How you can do that without seeming to favour
communities just because you think they are vulnerable to violence rather than because you
identify their need. I think thats really hard.

Patel: Yeah, I mean I think I very much agree with you that the discrimination and
stigmatization piece of this is a very big part of it. I mean if you sort of transpose your
question and say I'm concerned about KKK recruitment in a geographical area, and Im going
to figure out what are the signs of white supremacist particular variety of Christian and Im
going to identify the twelve guys who I think are going to go join the clan and go out and
commit violent acts. Because you know in the clan presumably last I check is still legal. The
absurdity of that, really Ryan, is that like nobody would accept that. Nobody would accept in
this country that you could go to white churches, and look at what people are saying, you

wouldn't go to white families and say we are afraid your son is about to become a racist
right? You should look out for these twelve signs to tell me if your son is going to become a
racist and go do violent things. It is simply not acceptable and I think thatis the problem with
this conversation from the very beginning. We start with the assumption that this particular
community is a sort of pool of potential terrorists, like this fifth column within our society and
that is really where fundamental discrimination starts. It is not that different frankly from
thinking oh young black men are more likely to become criminals so we say its okay if we
stop and frisk them at a higher rate so we kind of start from these assumptions which I think
are really, really problematic.
I think that in terms of intervention one of the things I would say ids that when you look at
the sentencing that is in place for material support of terrorism. The US support laws require
very, very little actus reus, very little action required in order to be charged and convicted
with material support. Each count of material support carry a sentence of fifteen years you
know. The government is never shy of charging people and so you normally see an
indictment for where you might have three to five counts where people might be looking out
60-65 years in jail for what even objectively looks like a very small amount of criminal activity,
and a lot of blather and a lot of anti-Semitism, and that kind of rhetoric that we don't like.
That risk factor alone I think makes it very difficult for concerned parents to come forward
and say, I am a little bit worried about my kid, you know, he has been watching ISIS videos, or
you know, whatever other site might even be considered reliable. So I think you have to kind
of look at that back end as well in addition to looking at the front end of this. For the most
part I really firmly would resist the import of the kinds of policies that have been
implemented in the United Kingdom. Particularly, the most recent round is even more
fundamentally objectionable to me. But one of the things that you do see in the European
systems is far lower sentences for activity. So if you were thinking of you know looking at this
kind material support stuff, it covers such a wide range of activity but when at the low end of
what might considered to be approaching terrorist activity, you might be looking at far lower
sentences because that is going to make it much more likely that you will have some sort of
cooperation from the community.
Another thing, another practical thing is you know, stop doing sting operations, right? The FBI
and the NYPD love doing sting operations and I can of understand it a little bit from their
perspective because they are like how can we tell when somebody is just a blow hard and
never going to do anything or somebody is actually going to carry out a serious attack. And so
they want to be pre-emptive and we put a lot of pressure on our law enforcement agencies
to be preventive but the consequences at the end of that are so high for the individuals
concerned that the communities from where they come are seeing this and they are like
really? Did this kid really, you know, deserve to go to jail for thirty years or face sixty? The last
thing I'd say in that space, and it comes back to some of the things we talked about earlier,
which is when you take politics and what is going on in the world off the table, when you
make that a no go zone, and some of the models in this do that, they say if somebody is
expressing concerns about US foreign policy that might be a sign, that theyre going to
become a terrorist. When you take that issue off the table you actually leave young people
much more vulnerable to whatever nonsense they find on the internet. And this is something

that weve heard from communities and religious leaders again and again. Which is, you
know, in my mosque I don't want to talk about foreign policy because if I talk about foreign
policy the FBI is going to be at my door, the Boston police department is going to be at my
door and want to know what I am all about. Parents don't want to talk to their children about
these issues because theyre afraid to do so. This is actually a real dynamic that you see in the
community which is really detrimental to allowing the organic community institutions to push
back against the ISIS narrative.

Q&A Session (unable to hear audience questions in video):

Barrett: Thank you for the questions about Northern Ireland. Many people in Britain I think
say oh we can look at the experience in Northern Ireland to deal with the problems of
terrorism today. Personally, I don't really believe that, I think that the issue of Northern
Ireland is really very, very different. As for what measures were taken to reduce radicalisation
during the troubles I think that there was some effort definitely to talk to each community
about the value and rights of "the other," but the communities themselves were so divided in
Northern Ireland that that was really rather difficult. You had Catholics living in one area, the
Protestants in another area and so at there was this long tradition of passivity between one
community to the other. So whatever was taught at schools was probably lost at home
because he messages didn't resonate. and what, how the troubles ended of course, was
when a) a degree of exhaustion and sort of revulsion at the amount of violence and b) a
degree of acceptance amongst both sides that their political solution, a dialogue, was
possible and that was the best way forward. And of course, that happened. The British
government accepted that they couldnt go on just trying to suppress Catholic rights in the
North. They had to acknowledge the IRA had some grounding in populous support, it was not
just a terrorist group and that was an important breakthrough I think. And then there was the
whole thing of politicians wanting to be on the right side of history which is also a very
important thing when it comes to dealing with terrorism.
Now when you see gestures like Prince Charles saying hello to Jerry Adams I think thats quite
confused probably. I think the Queen saying hello to the other key Northern Ireland ex IRA
guy was more instrumental. But the thing about Jerry Adams was that personally for Prince
Charles, he was very close to his uncle who was killed by the IRA, so I think there is a
personal thing there but for young people there I think they are saying who the hell is Prince
Charles you know he is just some old fogy, and by the way who the hell is Jerry Adams, and
the people who remember Jerry Adams I think both on the Catholic and Protestant side
maybe look at him in quite different ways because hes never accepted, never admitted he
was part of the IRA. He was implicated by some as being involved in the murder of, in a very
famous case, of a woman of several children who was accused of informing on the IRA,
although she wasnt an informer, leaving all her children orphaned and so on. And hes been
a politician since then. So I dont want to go on to long about it because it is a very
complicated issue but I dont think gestures like that are very relevant today because I cant

see Abu Bakr Baghdadi standing up shaking hands with Bashar Al Assad or Bader al Hajri
(1:15:01) or President Obama for that matter. So I think the terrorism we are facing today,
although it may reflect populous support in the way that the IRA reflected some sort of
populous sympathy, is a long, long way still from that sort of possibility of understanding,
reconciliation etc. Stuff like that, but its an interesting point.

Barrett: What can the UN do about terrorism? It can do and promote all of these sorts of
social things and good governance, which is very important, and rule of law very, very
important. But what can it do in a practical sense? The Security Council can declare war on
one hand or it can issue a presidential statement on the other hand. I think we have seen
that neither of those work. Certainly wars havent done too much to defeat terrorism,
perhaps they have increased them in many ways. And presidential statements if anybody
reads them on the West Side of 1st Av above 42nd St and below 48th Street, Id be a little bit
surprised. So the Security Council reaches with its tool of sanctions which is something its
familiar with and has used for very any other problems and it is just one tool. Although I dont
think it has very much effect on people like Abu Bakr Baghdadi because he is not going to be
in the world, you cant stop him travelling in the areas that he travels, you cant stop him
from having assets because he is not using the banking system in the West and so on. People
sell him arms anyway so the arms embargo wont work against him. But nonetheless,
sanctions do warn people. They raise awareness of the problems that this is of international
concern, there is international consensus about it. They warn people that if you get involved
with these guys youre likely to suffer, your reputation and your business will suffer. And also
they do act as, I think, of punishment for people who do get involved. So although the inner
ring or terrorists arent much affected, the system of supporters who might send them
money or whatever might be effected. So they have a limited purpose.
Question

Barrett: Well most of them are in fact coming from the West, because I think in Arab societies
in particular, the likelihood of, and in many other Muslim societies, the likelihood of a
woman getting up and leaving and going to a foreign country on her own or with her sister or
something is really, really difficult. It is extremely unlikely to happen. Its just the opportunity
is not there, even if they thought it was a good idea, and culturally they are probably not
thinking it is a particularly great idea. So many of the woman we hear about have come from
Western countries. From traditional societies maybe, but in Western countries. And of course
a lot of other women have come from Syria and Iraq because thats where they are. I would
say that as a sort of general answer.

Goodman: We have time for one last question.

Question

Patel: Well I mean I think that is the question that most Western governments are trying to
struggle with on this. Because when you say we have this community in our country and this
community is where the terrorists come from and so we are going to spend time and money
focusing on this community in some sense you are sort of reinforcing this idea that this is a
suspect group and so I think some of the things you have mentioned earlier are very
important, which is that you need to take. So governments feel like theyve got to do
something. I was at a conference in Brussels a couple of weeks ago, maybe three weeks ago,
and this was the general sense you got, you get it from the White House having a summit,
you get it from the EU, you get it from programs in the UK like you know eight year olds fill
out a questionnaire. So they feel like they have got to do something and they feel like they
have got to do it in this counter terrorism framework. What I would say is, if youve got to do
something, take it out of the counter terrorism framework. If you see community needs, try
and fill them. Try and do it in a way that doesnt harm the community by stigmatizing them.
Do things that are good in and of themselves and I think that is the most likely to have the
desired effect.

Question

Patel: So weve certainly seen a number of cases where there has been allegations of
entrapment. Now, I am sure he knows very well that entrapment is a very, very high bar to
clear as a defence in any criminal case but there has been a number of cases. The Newberg
ford case comes to mind as one, where there were these four young African American men
who were, you know, down on their luck in and out of prison. One or two of them had mental
health issues, an informant goes in, and goes into their community starts trying to involve
them in a plot to bomb a Synagogue, agrees to pay them something like 100,000 dollars if
memory serves and this all happens over the course of several years. And a lot of these
recordings go into evidence so you can hear the conversation between these guys and you
can see and you can kind of just tell these guys are in it for the money. The next thing you
know there is a huge media circus because they have taken these guys all the way to the
synagogue with their fake bombs and have FBI and NYPD helicopters flying overhead, all the
roads are blocked, and it was what you would call in my world a tamasha, it is like a real
spectacle. This is a huge counter terrorism success on the part of the FBI and NYPD, you know
no one mentions it was a sting operation by the way at the time when they make the arrest
that only comes out later. I think a lot of people question after that whether a case like that is
a wise use of the FBIs resources, because it takes you know many years of investigation, a lot
people involved in that case. And b) what kind of security it actually gives us to be going after
people who seem not to have the resources to actually carry out a terrorist attack and dont
seem particularly committed to it either and finally what impact this has on a community
when you see these kinds of plots over and over again and you really, as a community,

perceive them to be illegitimate. Ill give you a couple of other quick examples, there is this
guy called Cragi Monteal. He is this big body builder guy who went to a number of mosques
in Orange county in California pretending to be a recent convert to Islam and really spent a
lot of time basically trying to draw people out into talking about politics, talking about alQaida, how oppressed Muslims were, all the tropes that are used to draw people in and
eventually one of the mosques where he was going called the FBI and said there is this guy
here and hes really trying to provoke people but guess what he was an FBI informant. I think
that kind of encapsulates whats been going on in this space. As I said there have been
instances, and I understand law enforcements difficulty in sort of trying to winnow out the
weed from the chaff, and when is somebody just a blowhard or when they are actually going
to do something, but the whole system kind of exacerbates the effects of these sting
operations and they are hugely unpopular amongst all Muslim communities that Ive spoken
with.

Goodman: So we are out of time but I just wanted to make two notes of appreciation. One is
to PS21 for being our cosponsors for this event, it has been tremendous to work with them
on it, and to Faiza and Richard for such a rich discussion. Thanks.