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LIBYA NEWS & ANALYSIS

The Death of Mokhtar Belmokhtar Is Not the Boon Everyone Thinks It Is


The world will not miss Belmokhtar, but in a perverted irony, the world, and the
Saharan region in particular, may have become a more dangerous place.
by Michael Duffy
June 19, 2015 No Comments
On the June 14, the Libyan news media reported that, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the
mastermind of the Algerian Im-Amenas gas processing plant attack, which left
38 hostages dead, had been killed.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar (VOA)


Belmokhtar, an Algerian, is believed to have been with several members of Ansar
Al-Sharia, a Libyan terrorist organization, in the town of Adjabiya, which is
located south of Benghazi, when two American F-15 fighter jets carried out
airstrikes on the location, presumably killing the terror leader.
Belmokhtar, if he is indeed dead, has been involved in jihadi militancy since the
age of 19 when he travelled to Afghanistan to participate in the jihad against
the Soviets. Upon his return to Algeria, he continued his militancy, eventually
rising up in the ranks of the Armed Islamist Group (GIA) and later the
breakaway Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and its final
iteration, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Belmokhtar was among the first
commanders to be sent southward into Mali to set new operational frontiers in
the Sahel. It is from these frontiers that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), alongside Tuareg rebels from the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and other Islamist groups, surged into the
international conscious taking control of vast swathes of Mali, all of which was
made possible by regional instability brought about by civil war and the crisis in
Libya resulting from international intervention.
Tensions within the Al-Qaeda affiliate though, such as refusing to answer phone
calls, failing to turn in expense reports, and ignoring scheduled meetings (yes,
even terror groups have to fill out paperwork), led to a parting of ways and the
subsequent formation of a new group led by Belmokhtar: al-Mouwakoune biDimaa (also known as the Signed-in-Blood Battalion), which appeared to be an
extension of his al-Mulathameen group (the Masked Men Brigade).

The group rose to international attention after the attack on Im-Amenas. The
group formed a relationship with a faction of the Movement for Oneness and
Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) through cooperative attacks on targets in Niger
and formed a new group Al-Murabitoun; the Sentinels.
Belmokhtars prominence in Saharan jihadi circles for over two decades and his
groups operational capacity to carry out deadly attacks across the region, along
with his ties to Al-Qaeda, had made him a prominent target of US counterterrorism forces. Reports emerging about Sundays strike on Belmokhtar are full
of triumphalism, but the celebrations may be short lived.
For all the innocent lives lost attributed to Belmokhtar, and there are many, his
loss may not be the best outcome for the region. The death of Belmokhtar
comes at a time when the Libyan branches of the Islamic State (or
ISIS), Wilayat Barqa, Fezzan and Tarabulus has been exploiting the turmoil in
Libya and expanding their presence in the region.
Belmokhtar was ideologically aligned with Al-Qaeda, even after his withdrawal
from AQIM, and was thus a natural counterweight to ISIS expansion.
The most obvious demonstration of this is when Al-Murabitouns deputy, Adnan
Abu Walid Al-Saharoui, discordantly pledged Bayah (an oath of allegiance) to
ISIS on a Mauritanian news broadcast, only to be rebuked by Belmokhtar who
reaffirmed his, and his groups, affiliation with Aymen al-Zawahiri and AQ.
The internal divisions about which direction to group should be heading in
regards to the pan-Islamic global jihad were clearly coming to a fore within the
group between the former MUJAO members under al-Saharoui and those loyal
to Belmokhtar.
Al-Saharoui, who reaffirmed his pledge to Baghdadi, has joined ISIS; and
whether or not those who were supportive of Belmokhtar follow suit is still open
to debate, but with AQIM still weakened by the French led African Union
effort against them, Al-Murabitoun had become the de-facto spearhead for AlQaeda in the region, and its potential shift to ISIS would be a disaster.
This increased Islamic State presence and influence in the region will likely be
realized in how hostages are dealt with from here on.
Belmokhtar was well known for his criminal exploits in the Sahel, and the kidnap
economy is amongst Al-Murabitouns most profitable enterprises. The funds
received from hostage taking was primarily used to finance terror operations,
thus the hostages had value, and anecdotal evidence from previous hostages
reveal Belmokhtar generally treated them well.
ISIS, though, as we have been so viscerally exposed too, does not offer
hostages such luxuries; neither do they seek ransom for their captives.
Instead, they prefer to cut off their heads.

This behavior towards captives seems to have been embraced in the region,
especially amongst those who are ideologically aligned with ISIS and have
pledged fealty to them.
The first instance of this occurred when ISIS aligned Algerian based
group Jund al-Khalifah fi Ard al-Jazayer (Soilder of the Caliphate in Algeria)
beheaded their 55-year-old French hostage Herv Gourdel, who had been
kidnapped whilst hiking. This occurred shortly after ISIS released a message
imploring its supporters to kill the citizens of any country which conducted
strikes against it in Syria and Iraq.
Since then, its Libyan branches have followed suit, with the graphic videos
depicting beheadings and shootings of 21 Coptic Egyptians and 28 Ethiopian
Christian hostages in February and April.
This trend is likely to continue, and now with an unknown amount of former alMurabitoun members now operating under the auspices of the Islamic State,
could get worse.
Al-Murabitoun has vast experience and capacity in carrying out kidnappings and
leveraging their local connections with nomadic communities to help locate,
capture, and move hostages around the Sahel. If the new captors are under
instruction from ISIS, their home countries will likely not get a ransom call.
This question could be answered soon. Al-Murabitoun currently has a Romanian
hostage, abducted from Burkina Faso. As of this writing, it appears as though
the group have afforded the Romanian government a chance to pay a ransom
stating, The Romanian government will be fully responsible for the fate of its
hostage if it delays in seizing the opportunity offered to it to release its
citizen
His Romanian passport may shield him from potential harm the way an American
or French would probably not. Alternatively, the revenues from hostage taken
may prove too valuable for al-Murabitoun to simply start killing all its assets, as
would likely be the wish of the Islamic State.
Belmokhtars demisewhich I should stress is still unconfirmed, with conflicting
reports appearing in the mediain and of itself is a viewed as a win by the US as
its government gives itself a congratulatory pat on the back, but the
consequences of his absence could very well lead to an increase in presence for
the Islamic State, who can use al-Murabitouns deep ties with Berbiche and
Tuareg nomadic tribes to extend its influence across the Sahel. The world will
not miss Belmokhtar, but in a perverted irony, the world, and the Saharan region
in particular, may have become a more dangerous place.
Al-Qaeda, Algeria, Ansar Al-Sharia, Drones, Islamic State, Libya, Mali, US
Foreign Policy

Michael Duffy

Michael Duffy is a freelance writer from the UK who focuses on international


relations &and security.
More articles by this author

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