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The group rose to international attention after the attack on Im-Amenas. The
group formed a relationship with a faction of the Movement for Oneness and
Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) through cooperative attacks on targets in Niger
and formed a new group Al-Murabitoun; the Sentinels.
Belmokhtars prominence in Saharan jihadi circles for over two decades and his
groups operational capacity to carry out deadly attacks across the region, along
with his ties to Al-Qaeda, had made him a prominent target of US counterterrorism forces. Reports emerging about Sundays strike on Belmokhtar are full
of triumphalism, but the celebrations may be short lived.
For all the innocent lives lost attributed to Belmokhtar, and there are many, his
loss may not be the best outcome for the region. The death of Belmokhtar
comes at a time when the Libyan branches of the Islamic State (or
ISIS), Wilayat Barqa, Fezzan and Tarabulus has been exploiting the turmoil in
Libya and expanding their presence in the region.
Belmokhtar was ideologically aligned with Al-Qaeda, even after his withdrawal
from AQIM, and was thus a natural counterweight to ISIS expansion.
The most obvious demonstration of this is when Al-Murabitouns deputy, Adnan
Abu Walid Al-Saharoui, discordantly pledged Bayah (an oath of allegiance) to
ISIS on a Mauritanian news broadcast, only to be rebuked by Belmokhtar who
reaffirmed his, and his groups, affiliation with Aymen al-Zawahiri and AQ.
The internal divisions about which direction to group should be heading in
regards to the pan-Islamic global jihad were clearly coming to a fore within the
group between the former MUJAO members under al-Saharoui and those loyal
to Belmokhtar.
Al-Saharoui, who reaffirmed his pledge to Baghdadi, has joined ISIS; and
whether or not those who were supportive of Belmokhtar follow suit is still open
to debate, but with AQIM still weakened by the French led African Union
effort against them, Al-Murabitoun had become the de-facto spearhead for AlQaeda in the region, and its potential shift to ISIS would be a disaster.
This increased Islamic State presence and influence in the region will likely be
realized in how hostages are dealt with from here on.
Belmokhtar was well known for his criminal exploits in the Sahel, and the kidnap
economy is amongst Al-Murabitouns most profitable enterprises. The funds
received from hostage taking was primarily used to finance terror operations,
thus the hostages had value, and anecdotal evidence from previous hostages
reveal Belmokhtar generally treated them well.
ISIS, though, as we have been so viscerally exposed too, does not offer
hostages such luxuries; neither do they seek ransom for their captives.
Instead, they prefer to cut off their heads.
This behavior towards captives seems to have been embraced in the region,
especially amongst those who are ideologically aligned with ISIS and have
pledged fealty to them.
The first instance of this occurred when ISIS aligned Algerian based
group Jund al-Khalifah fi Ard al-Jazayer (Soilder of the Caliphate in Algeria)
beheaded their 55-year-old French hostage Herv Gourdel, who had been
kidnapped whilst hiking. This occurred shortly after ISIS released a message
imploring its supporters to kill the citizens of any country which conducted
strikes against it in Syria and Iraq.
Since then, its Libyan branches have followed suit, with the graphic videos
depicting beheadings and shootings of 21 Coptic Egyptians and 28 Ethiopian
Christian hostages in February and April.
This trend is likely to continue, and now with an unknown amount of former alMurabitoun members now operating under the auspices of the Islamic State,
could get worse.
Al-Murabitoun has vast experience and capacity in carrying out kidnappings and
leveraging their local connections with nomadic communities to help locate,
capture, and move hostages around the Sahel. If the new captors are under
instruction from ISIS, their home countries will likely not get a ransom call.
This question could be answered soon. Al-Murabitoun currently has a Romanian
hostage, abducted from Burkina Faso. As of this writing, it appears as though
the group have afforded the Romanian government a chance to pay a ransom
stating, The Romanian government will be fully responsible for the fate of its
hostage if it delays in seizing the opportunity offered to it to release its
citizen
His Romanian passport may shield him from potential harm the way an American
or French would probably not. Alternatively, the revenues from hostage taken
may prove too valuable for al-Murabitoun to simply start killing all its assets, as
would likely be the wish of the Islamic State.
Belmokhtars demisewhich I should stress is still unconfirmed, with conflicting
reports appearing in the mediain and of itself is a viewed as a win by the US as
its government gives itself a congratulatory pat on the back, but the
consequences of his absence could very well lead to an increase in presence for
the Islamic State, who can use al-Murabitouns deep ties with Berbiche and
Tuareg nomadic tribes to extend its influence across the Sahel. The world will
not miss Belmokhtar, but in a perverted irony, the world, and the Saharan region
in particular, may have become a more dangerous place.
Al-Qaeda, Algeria, Ansar Al-Sharia, Drones, Islamic State, Libya, Mali, US
Foreign Policy
Michael Duffy