What now for Libya?

Patrick Bury is a private security specialist since 2011 as well

as a PhD Candidate at the University of Exeters Strategy and
Security Institute and PS21 Global Fellow.
The increasing number of migrants perishing in the
Mediterranean over the past fortnight has finally brought the
deteriorating situation in Libya into the spotlight of the Western media, resulting in an
increase in the EUs naval presence off the Libyan coast.
On 24 April EU leaders held an emergency meeting in Brussels, during which they
agreed to triple the budget for the EUs border control forces in the region to 120
million. The United Kingdom has announced that HMS BULWARK will shortly begin
patrolling off the Libyan coast, with the capability to deploy two smaller patrol boats and
refuel three Merlin helicopters that will based in Malta and Sicily. Germany, France and
Belgium have also offered ships and aircraft to bolster the EUs presence. It appears that
the EUs main objective will be the interdiction of trafficking vessels the majority of
which are departing from areas around Tripoli controlled by the one of Libyas rival
governments before they reach international waters, thus giving EU ships the legal
basis to force such vessels to return to Libya.
However, any lasting solution will be dependent upon the Libyan states ability to control
its own borders. For this to have a chance, the increasing intensity of the factional
infighting currently wracking the country which, with over 1,000 battle casualties
caused in the past two years can be described as civil war[1] must be brought to an end.
As part of the ongoing negotiations process between the broadly Islamist General
National Congress (GNC) based in Tripoli and generally more conservative and secularist
House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, on 28 April the head of the United Nations
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Bernardino Len, released the third draft
agreement for political transition. This draft is based on progress made at previous rounds
of talks held recently in Algeria and Morocco, which Len himself acknowledged: This
draft will not meet all the expectations of all the parties, particularly with regard to the
distribution of competencies among the different institutions.

The same day, the GNC dismissed the draft out of hand, stating it was not balanced and
does not respect the Supreme Court ruling [which declared the June 2014 elections to
choose the HoR void], neither does it meet the aspirations of the revolutionary fighters
for a political and balanced solution to the Libyan crisis. Addressing the UN Security
Council the following day, Len reacted to the GNCs statement by saying that another
draft is in the process of being drawn up, and will based on comments on the third draft
from both sides that must be submitted by 3 May. After this, another round of talks is
scheduled to take place in Morocco in the coming couple of weeks, according to Len.
The ultimate goal is the creation of a consensus government of national unity before the
beginning of Ramadan in mid-June.
This may prove optimistic.
While the dialogue between Libyas two rival legislatures has continued, the past two
weeks have witnessed heavy clashes around Tripoli, fighting and airstrikes in Benghazi
and Derna to the east, and in the south. The loose alliance of militias comprising Libyan
National Army (LNA) and Operation Dignity forces both of which support the HoRappointed government of Abdullah al-Thinni have continued to increase the military
pressure on the various militias comprising the broadly more revolutionary and more
Islamist Libya Dawn alliance that supports the GNC.
Indeed, the confidence of the Dignity bloc in an outright military victory is growing: on
13 April the LNAs commander-in-chief, General Khalifa Haftar, told journalists that the
Dignity bloc was now betting on a military solution to the current political crisis. Haftar
elaborated that while he would abide by the decisions of al-Thinnis government, it was
not clear how the rival political blocs could reach a deal. He also warned that if the peace
talks do not succeed, then the military solution is a must because it is decisive.
Haftars comments were supported by a similar statement a couple of days later by the
LNAs commander in the northwest region, Colonel Idris Madi. Taken together, both
comments are the clearest indication yet of LNA/Dignity forces pursuance of a military
strategy to wear down the Dawn alliance while the political negotiations proceed.
This strategy certainly appears to be succeeding. On 15 April pro-LNA militias in the
eastern Tripoli suburb of Tajoura clashed with Misratan and Tripoli-based Dawn militias,
while the LNA has also advanced in numerous other areas in the northwest region.

Clearly, the military initiative lies with the Dignity bloc at present, especially as Misratan
Dawn forces have been diverted to besiege Islamic State in the Iraq and Levant (ISIL)
forces in Sirte. Thus, the temptation to continue the fighting, in the hope that the Dawn
alliance may fracture further perhaps with the all-important Misratans staying out of the
fight remains strong for some in the HoR camp.
Indeed, many Libyans remain pessimistic about the talks. The first and most obvious
reason is that the security situation on the ground reached a critical point at the start of
the year with the increasing presence of ISIL affiliates in Tripoli, Sirte, Derna and the
southern Fezzan region. The increasing confidence and belligerence of these groups, as
evidenced by their mass executions of Christians and attacks on oil facilities recently, has
underlined to the Libyan populace that those individuals once responsible and powerful
enough to potentially bring peace to the country may no longer be in a position to do so.
They argue that the ongoing political engagement is a potential distraction, rather than a
solution, to the current situation, and rightly question whether those at the table will
prove able to rule in the loose alliance of militias many with their own local, tribal and
economic agendas if an agreement is reached.
A second reason to question real impact of the negotiations is a perception that there is no
way to reconcile the situation in Libya without one of the rival governments being
viewed as losing, encouraging both sides to pursue their own diplomatic, military and
economic agendas while paying lip-service to the talks. The al-Thinni government has
provided clear examples of how it intends to strengthen diplomatic ties independently of
the negotiations. Most significantly, on 14 April al-Thinni confirmed that his government
had asked Russia to provide military equipment, and to restart work on contracts won
during the Gaddafi regime.
This announcement represents a radical departure from Libyas immediate postrevolution position of entirely marginalising Russia for its prior relationship with
Gaddafi. It should also be viewed as a blow to the West, which, due to its refusal to lift
the current UN arms embargo on Libya until a unity government is in place, has slipped
rapidly from a position of diplomatic authority and potential economic strength to one
of worrying weakness. In fact, during a meeting in Moscow on 15 April, al-Thinni went
so far as to accuse the West of destabilising Libya by supporting the Islamist bloc, calling
on Russia and China to support his government in the face of Western inaction.

Many Libyans sympathise with his statements, arguing that the HoR was elected as a
result of a democratic process and that the international community should promote
decisive resolution of the crisis by providing military assistance, rather than prolong the
crisis by delaying such support. A day later, following a meeting in Beijing between alThinnis Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hassan Sagheer, and his Chinese
counterpart, Zhang Ming, China announced it will train 150 Libyan police officers and
provide substantial food and medical aid.
Nevertheless, al-Thinnis courtship is unlikely to bear fruit. China and Russia are both
permanent members of the Security Council, and thus are highly unlikely to break the
arms embargo they have imposed; if they were going to subvert their status they would
only do so for an issue that matters much more to them than Libya. Western states know
this too, and al-Thinnis gamesmanship is thus likely to fail as well. The US and UK in
particular know that the UNSMIL process is the best chance Libya has of restoring
political stability, and they will only shift from this policy if something really radical
happens. It is noteworthy that US officials told a delegation from the HoR on 16 April
that they should adhere to the dialogue process.
Meanwhile, representatives of both the HoR and the al-Thinni government have
continued to court regional support. On 22 April, Haftar arrived in the UAE to discuss the
provision of further military aid. The visit came on the heels of another to regional ally
Jordan on 13 Apr, during which King Abdullah II promised to provide training and
material support to the LNA. However, the fact that Libya has become a proxy for
regional powers like Qatar, Turkey and Sudan on the GNCs side, and Jordan, the UAE
and Egypt on the HoRs is not surprising given the strong support many of these nations
gave to revolutionary groups in the early days of the rebellion against Gaddafi. Indeed, as
outlined in this excellent recent analysis of theLibyan revolution and its aftermath, these
groups competing visions of Libyas future is at the core of the current crisis.
While the political bodies that claim to represent them are ultimately likely to agree a
deal, it will take a strong international backing and possibly more than that to ensure
that the armed groups on the ground obey the ceasefires and disarmament programmes
agreed in conference rooms outside Libya. Libyas problems are complex and manifold
a good example of a wicked problem and will need united and enduring international
support, which has so far been lacking, to be overcome.

[1] Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000 (D&S2000). International
Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. American Political Science
Review 94 (4):779- 801
Project for Study of the 21st Century is a non-national, non-partisan, non-ideological
organization. All views expressed are the authors own.