NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION

v. CSC | Campos Jr., 1993

FACTS
1977, Violeta Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil
service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under
permanent status.
Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III
pursuant to PD 1529, petitioner was also appointed under permanent
status up to September 1984
Executive Order No. 649 authorized the restructuring of the Land
Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration and regionalized the Offices of the Registers therein.
Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II under
temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Barher
temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985
October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified
petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of
Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". The
Memorandum of Termination took effect on February 9, 1987,
-The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dropped the appeal of
petitioner Garcia on the ground that since the termination of her services
was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment, her separation is
in order
June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission directed that private
respondent Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds
II or its equivalent in the NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right
theory the new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for permanent
appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under
E.O. 649, would not apply to her but only to the filling up of vacant lawyer
positions on or after February 9, 1981, the date said Executive Order took
effect. Since private respondent Garcia had been holding the position of
Deputy Register of Deeds II from 1977 to September 1984, she should not
be affected by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive Order No.
649.
NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the Resolution
of the Civil Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8 and 10 of
Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and
transferred their functions to the appropriate new offices created by said
Executive Order, which newly created offices required the issuance of new
appointments to qualified office holders. Verily, Executive Order No. 649
applies to Garcia, and not being a member of the Bar, she cannot be
reinstated to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II
ISSUES

(1)WON E.O. 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC.

(2)WON there was a valid reorganization.
(3)WON Garcia may avail of security of tenure.
(4)WON the qualification requirement of membership in the bar for the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds applies to Garcia.
HELD/RATIO
(1)YES. The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of
legislative intent about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if
there is an explicit declaration in the law itself. Executive Order No. 649,
in express terms, provided for the abolition of existing positions. Thus,
from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in the
Land Registration Commission are deemed non-existent.
However, abolition of a position does not involve or mean removal
because removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely
separated therefrom. After abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus,
there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise.
(2)YES.The authority to carry out a valid reorganization is under Section 9,
Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, the applicable law at that time:
Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic
of the Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or
decreed by the incumbent President...
However, the power to reorganize is not absolute. Reorganizations have
been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. E.O. 649
was enacted to improve the services and better systematize the operation
of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is carried out in
good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify
for key positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing
circumstances and new development of the times. Garcia who formerly
held the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such
qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot hold any key position in the
NALTDRA, The additional qualification was not intended to remove her
from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed concomitant with a valid
reorganization measure.
(3)NO.On the "vested right theory" advanced by respondent Civil Service
Commission, There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices,
which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. None of the
exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case.
(4)YES.The position, which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy
anew, was abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid
reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re

employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar, the

minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for
permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be
reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of
the law.
SECRETARY OF DOTC V. MABALOT | Buena, 2002
FACTS
19 February 1996: then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued
Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation
Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin directing
him to effect the transfer of regional functions of that office to the
DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular Regional
Franchising and Regulatory Office thereat, pursuant to Section 7 of
Executive Order No. 202.
13 March 1996: herein respondent Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition praying that the Memorandum Order No. 96-735
be declared illegal and without effect.
29 January 1997: Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department
Order No. 97-1025, establishing DOTC-CAR Regional Office, created by
virtue of Executive Order No. 220 dated July 15, 1987, as the Regional
Office of the LTFRB.
Mabalot filed a Supplemental Petition assailing the validity of Department
Order No. 97-1025
31 March 1999: the lower court rendered a decision declaring
Memorandum Order Nos. 96-733 and 97-1025 of the respondent DOTC
Secretary null and void and without any legal effect as being violative of
the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of
the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive
officials from holding any other office or employment in the Government.
Instant petition where this Court is tasked in the main to resolve the issue
of validity of the subject administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.
ISSUES
(1)WON the administrative issuances of the DOTC Secretary are valid.
(2)WON the DOTC Sec encroached on the powers of the legislature.
(3)WON the administrative issuances are violative of Sections 7 and 8,
Article IX-B of the Constitution.
HELD/RATIO
(1)YES. Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025
are legal and valid administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary.

Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution mandates that The President
shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed...
Section 62 of Republic Act 7645 (General Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for
FY 1993) shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational
changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency
concerned.
The Administrative Code of 1987 also provides legal basis for the Chief
Executives authority to reorganize the National Government.
(2)NO, the office was created by authority of law, not by Congress. The
President - through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the
DOTC Secretary in the present case - may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region,
with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and
responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
By the Chief Executives unequivocal act of issuing Administrative Order
No. 36 ordering his alter ego - the DOTC Secretary in the present case - to
effectuate the creation of Regional Offices in the CAR, it is as if the
President himself carried out the creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the
President, directly and merely sought to implement the Chief Executives
Administrative Order.
The personality of the heads of the various departments is in reality but
the projection of that of the President. Thus, their acts, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
Elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public officers that a
public office may be created through any of the following modes: (1) by
the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by
Congress), or (3) by authority of law, thus, Congress can delegate the
power to create positions.
The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made
pursuant to the third mode - by authority of law, which could be decreed
for instance, through an Executive Order (E.O.) issued by the President or
an order of an administrative agency such as the Civil Service
Commission pursuant to Section 17, Book V of E.O. 292, otherwise known
as The Administrative Code of 1987. In this case, the DOTC Secretary
issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Orders pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 36 of the President
Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The
reorganization in this case was decreed in the interest of the

service and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of

the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region, thus in good
faith.
(3)NO. The assailed Orders of the DOTC Secretary do not violate Sections 7
and 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution. Considering that in the case of
Memorandum Order No. 96-735, the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR
were, in effect, merely designated to perform the additional duties and
functions while performing the functions of their permanent office. Also,
an office or employment held in the exercise of the primary functions of
ones principal office is an exception to, or not within the contemplation,
of the prohibition embodied in Section 7, Article IX-B.
No evidence was adduced and presented to clearly establish that the
appointive officials and employees of DOTC-CAR shall receive any
additional, double or indirect compensation, in violation of Section 8,
Article IX-B of the Constitution
PRECLARO V. SANDIGANBAYAN | Kapunan, 1995
FACTS
1 October 1989: the Chemical Mineral Division of ITDI, a component of
DOST employed Preclaro under a written contract of services as Project
Manager to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at
the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. The contract was to
remain in effect from October 1, 1989 up to the end of the construction
period unless sooner terminated. He was to be paid a monthly salary
drawn from counter-part funds duly financed by foreign-assisted projects
and government funds duly released by the DBM.
November 1989: to build the aforementioned CMD Structure, DOST
contracted the services of the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction Company
with Engr. Alexander Resoso, as the company's project engineer.
Preclaro intimated to Resoso that he can forget about the deductive
provided he gets P200,000.00, a chunk of the contractor's profit which he
roughly estimated to be around P460,000.00
Resoso told his boss and an entrapment was planned with the help of the
NBI.
14 June 1990: petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a
violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 as amended (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act)
Petitioner instituted the present petition for review, contending that the
SB erred in taking cognizance of the case as he is not a public officer
ISSUE
WON Preclaro is a public officer.

HELD/RATIO:
YES. Preclaro asserts that he is not a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b)
of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019 as amended),
because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office. Rather, he
maintains that he is merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on
contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period and that
he was not issued any appointment paper separate from the
abovementioned contract. He was also not required to use the Bundy clock
to record his hours of work and neither did he take an oath of office.
The definition of "public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 according to Sec. 2(b)
thereof "includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government . . ."
- The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b)
indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms "classified,
unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories of positions in
the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and NonCareer Service 11 by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil
Service Commission and by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Non-career service in particular is characterized by: (1) entrance on bases
other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the
career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made.
The Non-Career Service include: (1)...(4) Contractual personnel or those
whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical
skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a
minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency...
It is quite evident that petitioner falls under the non-career service
category (formerly termed the unclassified or exemption service) of the
Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of the
Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).
The fact that petitioner is not required to record his working hours by
means of a Bundy clock or did not take an oath of office became
unessential considerations in view of the provision of law clearly including
petitioner within the definition of a public officer.
MANIEGO V. PEOPLE | Bengzon, 1951

FACTS
February 27, 1947: Maniego, although appointed as a laborer, had been
placed in charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic violations
in the Sala of Judge Crisanto Aragon of the Municipal Court of the City of
Manila. He had been permitted to write motions for dismissal of
prescribed traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and to submit
them to the Court for action, without passing through the regular clerk.
Felix Raba, the complainant, appeared and inquired from the accused
about a subpoena that he received. He was informed that it was in
connection with a traffic violation for which said Rabia had been detained
and given traffic summons by an American MP.
Maniego after a short conversation went to Fiscal De la Merced and
informed the Fiscal that the case had already prescribed. The Fiscal
having found such to be the case, instructed the accused that if the traffic
violator had no lawyer, he could write the motion for dismissal and have it
signed by the party concerned. This was done by the accused and after
the signing by Felix Raba the matter was submitted to the Court, which
granted the petition for dismissal.
Maniego informed Rabia that he could fix the case if Rabia would pay him
P10; which Rabia did and the accused pocketed.
Maniego was convicted, by the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, of a
violation of article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. He pleads for acquittal
contending that the Court of Appeals erred in regarding him as a public
officer
ISSUE
WON Maniego was a public officer.
HELD/RATIO
YES. The four essential elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused is
a public officer within the scope of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code; (2)
that the accused received by himself or thru another, some gift or present,
offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime or any act not constituting a
crime; (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of the functions of the
public officer.
Petitioner was a public officer within the meaning of RPC article 203,
which includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Philippine Government, or shall
perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as an
employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class." This
definition is comprehensive, embracing every public servant from the
highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates

the standard distinction in the law of public officers between "officer" and
"employee".
For the purposes of punishing bribery, the temporary performance of
public functions is sufficient to constitute a person a public official.
Although originally appointed as a mere laborer, this defendant was on
several occasions designated or given the work to prepare motions for
dismissal. He was consequently temporarily discharging such public
functions. And as in the performance thereof he accepted, even solicited,
a monetary reward, he is certainly guilty as charged.
Moreover, the receipt of bribe money is just as pernicious when
committed by temporary employees as when committed by permanent
officials.

LAUREL V. DESIERTO | Kapunan, 2002

FACTS
June 13, 1991: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order
No. 223 constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National
Centennial Celebration in 1998.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting
the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations
in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the National Centennial
Commission. Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98
Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Petitioner was among the nine (9)
Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors.
Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer
August 5, 1998: Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction
and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special
Economic Zone. Investigation was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
Committee).
February 24, 1999: President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order
No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to
investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine
centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator
Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its
Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the
Committees
recommendations
was
the
prosecution
by
the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for
violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial
contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting

manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to

construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that
has caused material injury to government and for participating in the
LAUREL V. DESIERTO | Kapunan, 2002
FACTS
June 13, 1991: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order
No. 223 constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National
Centennial Celebration in 1998.
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting
the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations
in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the National Centennial
Commission. Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel.
Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98
Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Petitioner was among the nine (9)
Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors.
Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer
August 5, 1998: Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction
and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special
Economic Zone. Investigation was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon
Committee).
February 24, 1999: President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order
No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to
investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine
centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator
Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its
Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the
Committees
recommendations
was
the
prosecution
by
the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP
for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of
centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for
exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to
AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid
contract that has caused material injury to government and for
participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused
by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in
violation of the anti-graft law.
Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended the further
investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of,
among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e)

of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,
and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were
apparently referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its
Evaluation Report, recommending that a formal complaint be filed and
preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against
former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP
President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for
violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to
PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations
April 24, 2000: petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office. Ombudsman
denied petitioners motion to dismiss, thus the present petition for
certiorari.
November 14, 2000: the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau
issued a resolution finding probable cause to indict respondents
SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA before the Sandiganbayan.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to
Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pea.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he
is not a public officer because: EXPOCORP was a private corporation, not s
GOCC, NCC was not a public office, and petitioner, both as Chairman of
the NCC and EXPOCORP was not a public officer as defined under the
ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

ISSUES
(1)WON the Ombudsman had jurisdiction.
(2)WON NCC performs sovereign functions, making it a public office and its
Chairman a public officer.
RATIO:
(1)YES. The Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the
government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by
Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: A public office is the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the

delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract,
an oath, salary, and continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the
sovereign functions of government as [t] he most important
characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an
employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office
involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions
of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that
some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the
individual is not a public officer
(2)YES. The NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their
due observance. The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law (Constitution Article XIV
Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The
State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nations historical and
cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations; preamble,
A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the
National Centennial Celebrations in 1998: ...vehicle for fostering
nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity...showcase Filipino
heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values,...).
It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,
created the NCC by executive order. Book III (Office of the President),
Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2: Executive Orders. Acts of the
President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders...
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public
office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his
tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary
criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive.
The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office.
Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an
honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e.,
one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached.
The term office embraces the idea of tenure and duration but the element
of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if the other
elements are present there is no difference whether there be but one act

or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the

one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good behaviour.
It is also contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any
compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public
officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.
Public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term x xx(b) Public
officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government as defined in the preceding paragraph.
It is clear from above, that the definition of a public officer is expressly
limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply
for purposes of determining the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by
the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that
define public officers. Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for
example, provides that a public officer is x xx any person who, by direct
provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of
Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or
class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987on the other hand, states: Officer as distinguished from clerk or
employee, refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical or
manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of
the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person
having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person in
the exercise of governmental power, officer includes any government
employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that
function.
Under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be
considered a public official whether or not one receives compensation:
Public Officials include elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service
including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of amount.

FERNANDEZ V. STO. TOMAS | Feliciano, 1995

FACTS

Petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity

of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission ("Commission")
and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.
Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the
Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the
Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila
Resolution No. 94-3710, signed by public respondents Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively,
of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994, stating: ". . . as an
independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in
the organization as the need arises...
Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners,
expressed the determination of the Commission to implement Resolution
No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority
Petitioners then instituted this Petition

ISSUE
(1)WON the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution
No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems
and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and
the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and
Development Office].
(2)WON Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to
security of tenure.
RATIO:
(1)YES. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292
dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the
internal structure and organization of the Commission. Sec. 16
enumerates the Offices in the Commission. Sec. 17 describes the
Organizational Structure--...As an independent constitutional body, the
Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
The OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well each of the other Offices listed in
Section 16 consist of aggrupation of Divisions, each of which Divisions is
in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office comprises
a group of positions within the agency called the Civil Service
Commission. Thus, each Office is an internal department or organizational
unit within the Commission and that accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and
OPR, as well as all the other Offices within the Commission constitute
administrative subdivisions of the CSC.
What Resolution No. 94-3710 did was to re-arrange some of the
administrative units within the Commission and, among other things,
merge three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping

called the "Research and Development Office (RDO)." It also re-allocated

certain functions moving some functions from one Office to another
The objectives sought by the Resolution: effect[ing] changes in the
organization to streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve
delivery of service."
The changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-3710
are precisely the kind of internal changes which are referred to in Section
17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code) as "changes in the organization" of the Commission.
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of
public offices, something that may be done only by the same legislative
authority, which had created those public offices in the first place.
However, the term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right,
authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit
of the public.
(2)NO. Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that
term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none
of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710
carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship
of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and
employees.
The 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14)
different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, did not mean to freeze
those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization
of the Commission until it might please Congress to change such internal
organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as
a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority had expressly
authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," "as
the need [for such changes] arises."
To the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was
breached by the respondent's in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and
ordering petitioners' assignment to the Commission's Regional Offices in
Regions III and V, firstly, the appointments to the staff of the Commission
are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments
to particular positions or ranks. The petitioners were each appointed to
the position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or
station.
Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management
prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any
department or agency of government embraced in the civil service
(Reassignment= An employee may be re-assigned from one

organizational unit to another in the same agency; Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status and salary.")
The reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their
previous positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and
Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent assignment from the RDO to
the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been effected
with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without
lawful cause. It also follows that such re-assignment did not involve any
violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure
considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would
continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new assigned
stations, which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in
Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested
right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.
The rule which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to the
security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is
appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. In default of any
particular station stated in their respective appointments, no security of
tenure can be asserted by the petitioners on the basis of the mere
assignments, which were given to them. A contrary rule will erase
altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between
appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public
officers.
The reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their
stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development
Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions' Regional Offices in
Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a
violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure