G.R. No.

L-35377-78 July 31, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, pl a i nti ff-a ppel l ee,
vs .
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING
ABANO, defenda nts -a ppel l a nts .
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Vi ncent Cri sologo through counsel filed a verified motion pra yi ng for
the tra nsfer to the New Bilibi d Pri s ons or, a l terna ti vel y, to Ca mps
Cra me, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of trial of Cri minal Ca s e No.
3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, a s s ol e
defenda nt, i s cha rge d wi th i l l ega l pos s es s i on of fi rea rms a nd
a mmuni ti ons .
As jus tificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be i n jeopardy i f
he were to be confined i n the Vigan muni ci pa l ja i l duri ng the tri a l
beca use there a re many political enemies of the Crisol ogo fa mi l y i n
tha t vi ci nity; s ome of the adherents of the Crisologos had i n fact been
murdered in Ilocos Sur, a nd his father, Congressman Floro Cri sol ogo,
wa s s hot to dea th whi l e hea ri ng ma s s a t the Vi ga n ca thedra l .
Bl untly, he a ffirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting duck for
a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassina te hi m. He
coul d even be l ynched or s hot to death on the specious pretext tha t
he wa s tryi ng to es ca pe.
As ked to comment on the motion, the Provi ncial Fisca l of Il ocos Sur
s i gnified his conformity to the tra nsfer of the venue of the tri al to the
New Bi l i bi d Pri s ons .
Secti on 5(4), Arti cle X of the Constitution expres s l y empowers thi s
Court to "order a cha nge of venue or pl a ce of tri a l to a voi d a
mi s ca rri a ge of jus ti ce". Here, wha t i s i nvol ved i s not merel y a
mi s carriage of justice but the personal s a fety of mova nt Cri s ol ogo,
the a ccused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo tri a l i n a
pl a ce where hi s l i fe woul d be i mperi l l ed.
Pres ent hostile sentiment a gainst the accused at the place of trial is a
jus ti fication for tra nsfer of venue (See Sta te vs . Si ers , 136 S. E. 503,
103, W. Va . 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1wph1.t
We fi nd Cri sologo's motion to be meritorious. The cha nge of venue
i nvol ves not merely the change of the place of hea ri ng but a l s o the
tra ns fer of the expediente of Cri mi na l Ca s e No. 3949 to a nother
court. Accordi ng to Cri sologo's motion, the alleged evidence a ga i ns t
hi m i s in the custody of the a uthorities a t Camp Cra me, Quezon Ci ty.
The tra nsfer of Cri minal Ca s e No. 3949 to the Ci ty Court of Quezon
Ci ty a nd the holding of the tri a l a t Ca mp Cra me a ppea r to be the
mos t conveni ent a rra ngement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to tra ns fer the
record of Cri mi na l Ca s e No. 3949 to the Ci ty Court of Quezo n Ci ty
where it s hould be re -docketed and ra ffled to a ny Judge thereof. The
ca s e ma y be tri ed at Ca mp Cra me. The usual precautions and security
mea sures s hould be a dopted i n bri ngi ng defenda nt Cri s ol ogo to
Ca mp Cra me on the occa s i on of the hea ri ng.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, peti ti oner,
vs .
MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO
(ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN
(ATSONG) CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER,
OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM,
ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed
DOES res pondents .
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The power of this Tri bunal, constitutiona l l y ma nda ted, 1 to order a
cha nge of venue to a void any miscarria ge of jus ti ce a s wel l a s the

procedure ordained i n the i mplementation of the ri ght to ba i l 2 a re

i nvol ved i n this petition which, even if not s o denominated, parta kes
of the na ture of a certiorari. It mus t ha ve been the zea l of pri va te
pros ecutors Francisco Cruz and Reneci o Es pi ri tu, 3 no doubt under
the convi ction that there was no ti me to l os e, tha t mus t ha ve l ed
them to devote less than that full mea s ure of a ttenti on to certa i n
fundamentals. They i gnored the principle that the respons i bi l i ty for
the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned.
Nonetheless, the importance of the questions raised, the need for a
cha nge of venue a nd the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessi ta ted
tha t further a cti on be ta ken. Accordi ngl y, i n a res ol uti on da ted
February 12, 1981, one da y a fter the filing of the peti ti on, the Court
requi red the comment of the Sol i ci tor Genera l a s wel l a s of the
pri va te respondents, 4 the a ccus ed i n s i x pendi ng cri mi na l ca s es
before the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce of Negros Occi denta l .
On Ma rch 4, 1981, the Comment was s ubmitted by Solicitor Genera l
Es telito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened wi th thi s prel i mi na ry s ta tement:
"The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Cri minal
Ca s es Nos . 1700-1706, Peopl e v. Pa bl o Sol a , et a l ., pendi ng tri a l
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidenta l . Ri ghtl y, a ny
peti tion before this Honorable Court on behalf of the Peopl e of the
Phi l ippines ca n, under the l a w, be i ns ti tuted onl y by the Sol i ci tor
General. The a ssertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they
a re i nstituting the a ction 'subject to the control a nd s upervi s i on of
the Fi s ca l ' wi l l not, therefore, i mprove thei r l ega l
s ta nding." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the l egal point but i ns tea d
a dopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside,
by certi ora ri, of the order of the Muni ci pa l Court of Ka ba nka l a n,
pres ided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the a ccus ed
i n the cri minal ca s es menti oned a bove, a nd 2. the peti ti on for a
cha nge of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to a void a
mi s ca rri a ge of jus ti ce. 7
The fa cts were therein narra ted thus: "On September 15, 1980, a cting
on the evi dence pres ented by the Phi l i ppi ne Co ns ta bul a ry
comma nder a t Hi ni ga ra n, Negros Occi denta l , the Court of Fi rs t
Ins tance of that province issued a search warra nt for the s ea rch a nd
s eizure of ti le deceased bodi es of s even pers ons bel i eved i n the
pos session of the accused Pa blo Sola in his haci e nda a t Sta . Is a bel ,
Ka ba nkalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 a rmed
wi th the a bove wa rra nt, el ements of the of the 332nd PC/INP
Compa ny proceeded to the pl a ce of Sol a . Di ggi ngs ma de i n a
ca nefiel d yi el ded two common gra ves conta i ni ng the b odi es of
Ferna ndo Ferna ndez, Ma teo Ol i mpos , Al fredo Perez, Cus todi o
Jua nica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Ca llet a nd Bi enveni do Empera do. On
September 23 a nd October 1, 1980, the PC provi ncial comma nder of
Negros Occidental filed s even (7) s epa ra te compl a i nts fo r murder
a ga inst the accused Pa blo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose
Bethoven Ca bral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other pers ons
of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Cri mina l Ca s es No.
4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 a nd 4140 of the Municipal Court
of Ka ba nka l a n. After due prel i mi na ry exa mi na ti on of the
compl ainant's witnesses and his other evi dence, the municipa l court
found probable cause a gainst the accused. It thus i ssued an order for
thei r a . res t. However, wi thout gi vi ng the pros ecuti on the
opportunity to prove tha t the evi dence of gui l t of the a ccus ed i s
s trong, the court gra nted them the ri ght to pos t ba i l for thei r
temporary release. The accused Pa bl o Sol a , Fra nci s co Ga rci a , a nd
Jos e Bethoven Ca bral a vailed themselves of this ri ght and have s i nce
been rel ea s ed from detenti on. In a pa ra l l el devel opment. the
wi tnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears
tha t i f the tri a l i s hel d a t the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce bra nch i n
Hi ma maylan which is but 10 ki lometers from Ka bankalan, their safety
coul d be jeopardized. At l east two of the accused a re offi ci a l s wi th
power a nd i nfluence i n Ka bankalan a nd they have been rel ea s ed on
ba i l. In addition, most of the accused remained a t large. Indeed, there
ha ve been reports made to police a uthorities of threats made on the
8
fa mi lies of the witnesses." The facts a lleged a rgue s trongl y for the
remedies s ought, namely a change of venue and the cancel l a ti on of
the ba i l bonds .
On the very next da y, Ma rch 15, 1981, thi s Court issued the following
res olution: "The Court Resolved to: (a ) [Note] the comment of the
Sol icitor General on the urgent peti ti on for cha nge of venue a nd
ca ncellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, na mel y,
(1) the s etting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court

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of Ka ba nkalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting ba i l

to the a ccused i n Cri minal Ca s es Nos . 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138,
4139 a nd 4140, a ll enti tl ed "People of the Philippines v. Mayor Pablo
Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of tri a l of
the s a me cri mi na l ca s es to a voi d a mi s ca rri a ge of Jus ti ce; (b)
[Tra nsfer] the venue of the a foresaid crimi na l ca s es to Bra nch V of
the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce of Negros Occi denta l a t Ba col od Ci ty,
pres ided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that Dis tri ct
Judge Os terva l do Emi l i a of the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce, Negros
Occi denta l , Bra nch VI a t Hi ma ma yl a n ha s a n a pproved l ea ve of
a bs ence covering the period from January 12 to Ma rch 12, 1981 due
to a mi l d attack of cerebral thrombosis a nd that the said Bra nch V i s
the nea res t court s ta ti on to Hi ma ma yl a n: a nd (c) [Awa i t] the
comment of respondents on the peti ti on to ca ncel ba i l , wi thout
prejudice to the publ i c offi ci a l s concerned ta ki n g the neces s a ry
mea s ures to a s s ure the s a fety of the wi tnes s es of the
pros ecution." 9 Thus, the i s s ue of a cha nge of venue ha s become
moot a nd a ca demi c. The comments res pecti vel y s ubmi tted by
res pondent Fl orendo Ba l i s ca o on Ma rch 5, 1981, res pondent
Fra ncisco Garcia on Ma rch 11, 1981 a nd res pondent Pa bl o Sol a on
Ma rch 16, 1981, dea lt solely wi th the question of the ca ncella ti on of
the ba il bonds. Such comments were considered as answers, with the
ca s e therea fter deemed s ubmi tted for deci s i on.
The s ole remaining issue of the ca ncel l a ti on of the ba i l bonds of
res pondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic requi rement
tha t the prosecution be heard i n a case where the accused i s charged
wi th a ca pital offense, prior to bail being granted, must be decided i n
fa vor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be ca ncel l ed a nd the ca s e
rema nded to the s ala of Executi ve Judge Al fons o Ba gui o for s uch
hea ri ng. So we rul e.
1. It ma y not be a mi s s to s a y a few words on the ques ti on of
tra ns ferring the pl a ce of tri a l , i n thi s ca s e, from Hi ma ma yl a n to
Ba colod Ci ty. The Constitution is quite expl i ci t. The Supreme Court
coul d order "a change of venue or place of tri al to avoid a miscarriage
of jus ti ce." 10 The Cons ti tuti ona l Conventi on of 1971 wi s el y
i ncorpora ted the rul i ng i n the l a ndma rk deci s i on of Peopl e v.
Guti errez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes a s ponente vi gorous l y a nd
ca tegorically a ffirmed: "In the particular ca s e before Us , to compel
the pros ecution to proceed to tri al i n a locality where i ts wi tnes s es
wi l l not be a t liberty to reveal what they know is to ma ke a mockery
of the judicia l proces s , a nd to betra y the very purpos e for whi ch
courts ha ve been es ta bl i s hed." 12 Why a cha nge of venue i s
i mperative was ma de clear i n the Comment of the Solicitor Genera l .
Thus : "The exerci s e by thi s Honora bl e Court of i ts a bove
cons titutional power i n this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in
the ca s e are fearful for thei r l i ves . They a re a fra i d they woul d be
ki l led on their way to or from Hi mamaylan during any of the da ys o f
tri a l . Beca us e of qqqts fea r, they ma y ei ther refus e to tes ti fy or
tes timony falsely to s ave their l ives. 13 Respondent Florendo Balis ca o
wa s not a verse to s uch tra ns fer, but hi s preference i s for a court
a nywhere in Metro Ma nila. 14 Respondent Fra ncisco Garcia confi ned
hi s comment to the question of the cancella ti on of the ba i l bonds .
Res pondent Pablo Sola made cl ear that he had "no objecti on to the
tra ns fer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases where the fea r,
objectively vi ewed, may, to s ome indivi duals, be l ess tha n terri fyi ng,
but the question must a lways be the effect i t ha s on the wi tnes s es
who wi ll testify. The primordial aim a nd i ntent of the Cons ti tuti on
mus t ever be kept i n mind. In case of doubt, it s hould be res ol ved i n
fa vor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a
peti tion of this character filed before thi s Court. Such a pl ea coul d
ha ve been done a dministratively. In thi s pa rti cul a r ca s e, however,
there i s justification for the procedure fol l owed i n vi ew of the fa ct
tha t a long with the change of venue, the ca ncel l a ti on of the ba i l
bonds wa s a l s o s ought.
2. Equa lly so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than justifi ed.
Ba i l was granted to the accused i n the Order of the Muni ci pa l Court
wi thout hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the a uthoritative
doctri ne enuncia ted i n Peopl e v. Sa n Di ego. 16 As poi nted out by
Jus ti ce Ca pistrano, speaking for the Court: "The questi on pres ented
before us is, whether the prosecuti on wa s depri ved of procedura l
due proces s . The a ns wer i s i n the a ffi rma ti ve. We a re of the
cons idered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defenda nt
who i s i n custody for a ca pi ta l offens e be res ol ved i n a s umma ry
proceeding or i n the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be

gi ven a n opportunity to present, within a rea s ona bl e ti me, a l l the

evi dence that it ma y des i re to i ntroduce before the court s houl d
res olve the motion for bail. If, as i n the cri minal case i nvol ved i n the
i ns tant special civil a ction, the prosecution s hould be denied s uch a n
opportunity, there would be a vi olation of procedura l due proces s ,
a nd the order of the court gra nting bail should be considered void on
17
tha t ground." These words of Justice Ca rdozo come to mi nd: "The
l a w, as we have seen, i s sedul ous i n ma i nta i ni ng for a defenda nt
cha rged with crime whatever forms of procedure a re of the es s ence
of a n opportunity to defend. Pri vi l eges s o funda menta l a s to be
i nherent in every concept of a fair tri al that coul d be a ccepta bl e to
the thought of reasonable men will be kept i nviolate and i nvi ol a bl e,
however crushing may be the press ure of i ncri mi na ti ng proof. But
jus ti ce, though due to the accused, is due to the a ccus er a l s o. The
concept of fa i rnes s mus t not be s tra i ned ti l l i t i s na rrowed to a
fi l ament. We a re to keep the balance true." 18 This norm whi ch i s of
the very es s ence of due proces s a s the embodi ment of jus ti ce
requi res that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove tha t
there i s strong evi dence of gui l t. It does not s uffi ce, a s a s s erted
herein, that the questions a sked by the municipal judge before ba i l
wa s granted could be characterized as s ea rchi ng. Tha t fa ct di d not
cure a n i nfi rmi ty of a juri s di cti ona l cha ra cter. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafa el Ga s a ta ya gra nti ng
ba i l to private respondents is nullified, set a side, and decl a red to be
wi thout force a nd effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court
of Fi rs t Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose s a l a the ca s es ha d
been transferred by vi rtue of the resolution of this Court of Ma rch 5,
1981, i s directed forthwith to hear the peti ti ons for ba i l of pri va te
res pondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the ques ti on
of whether or not the evi dence of guilt a ga i ns t the res pondents i s
s trong. Thi s deci s i on i s i mmedi a tel y executory. No cos ts .
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero,
De Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur.
Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, peti ti oner,
vs .
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN
PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO,
CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO
TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO,
FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and
EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES, res pondents .
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and Special
Attorney Juan A. Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning Abano.
Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent Camilo Pilotin.
Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Peti ti on for wri ts of certiorari a nd mandamus, wi th prel i mi na ry
i njunction, filed by the Solicitor Genera l a nd Sta te Pros ecutors , to
a nnul a nd set aside the order of Judge Ma rio J. Gutierrez of the Court
of Fi rs t Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970,
denyi ng the prosecution's urgent motion to tra ns fer Cri mi na l Ca s e
Nos . 47-V a nd 48-V of s aid Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs.
Pi l otin, et al.," to the Ci rcui t Cri mi na l Court of the Second Judi ci a l
Di s trict; to direct the respondent Judge to effectua te s uch tra ns fer;
a nd to restrain the trial of the cases a fores a i d i n the Court of Fi rs t
Ins ta nce of Il ocos Sur, s i tti ng i n Vi ga n, ca pi ta l of the provi nce.
In the morning of 22 Ma y 1970, a group of armed persons descended
on ba rri o Ora Centro, municipality of Ba ntay, Provi nce of Il ocos Sur,
a nd s et fire to va rious i nhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of
the s a me da y, i n ba rri o Ora Es te of the s a me muni ci pa l i ty a nd
provi nce, s everal residential hous es were l i kewi s e burned by the
group, resulting i n the destruction of va rious houses and in the death
of a n ol d woman named Vicenta Balboa. After i nves ti ga ti on by the
a uthorities, the provi nci a l fi s ca l , wi th s evera l s ta te pros ecutors
a s signed by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, on 10

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June 1970 fi led in the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two
i nformations (Criminal Cases 47-V for a rson with homi ci de a nd 48-V
for a rs on) charging that the seventeen priva te res pondents herei n,
together wi th 82 other uni denti fi ed pers ons , "confedera ti ng,
cons piring, confabulating a nd hel pi ng one a nother, di d then a nd
there willfully, unlawfully a nd feloniously burn or ca use to be burned
s everal residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupi ed"
a nd belonging to certain persons named in the filed informa ti ons i n
ba rri os Ora Este a nd Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes
B a nd B-1). Accused Ca milo Pilotin and Vincent Cri s ol ogo furni s hed
ba i l, and on 15 June 1970 vol untarily a ppea red before res pondent
Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pl ea ded not gui l ty. Tri a l wa s
then s et for 27, 28 a nd 29 Jul y 1970.
It a ppears that on the s a me da y, 15 June, the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce
i s sued Administrative Order No. 221, a uthorizing Judge Li no Anover,
of the Ci rcui t Cri mi na l Court of the Second Judi ci a l Di s tri ct, wi th
offi cial station a t San Fernando, La Union, to hol d a s peci a l term i n
Il ocos Sur, from a nd after 1 July 1970. Three da ys therea fter, on 18
June 1970, the Secretary further i ssued Administrative Order No. 226,
a uthorizing Judge Ma rio Gutierrez to tra nsfer Cri minal Ca ses Nos. 47V a nd 48-V to the Ci rcuit Cri minal Court, "in the i nterest of justice and
purs uant to Republic Act No. 5179, a s i mplemented by Administrative
Order Nos . 258 a nd 274" of the Depa rtment of Jus ti ce.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a
tra ns fer of ca ses 47-V a nd 48-V to the Ci rcuit Cri minal Court, i nvoking
the Admi nistrative Orders just mentioned a nd ca lling a ttention to the
ci rcums tance that they were issued at the i nstance of the wi tnes s es
s eeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La
Uni on, or Ba guio Ci ty, for reasons of s ecurity a nd personal s a fety, a s
s hown i n thei r a ffi da vi ts . The a ccus ed vi gorous l y oppos ed s uch
tra ns fer, and on 20 Jul y 1970, the res pondent judge decl i ned the
tra ns fer sought, on the ground tha t Admi ni s tra ti ve Order No. 258
onl y provi ded for tra nsfer of cases to the Ci rcuit Cri minal Court where
the i nterest of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of
the ca s es, a nd i n the cases involved the accused had already pl eaded;
tha t i f the objective of the proposed tra ns fer wa s to s ubs equentl y
obta in a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 5179 the s ame s hould have been done ri ght a t the
very i ncepti on of thes e ca s es .
In vi ew of the lower court's denial of the motion to tra nsfer the cases
to the Ci rcui t Cri minal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us for wri ts
of certi orari and mandamus, charging a buse of discretion and praying
thi s Court to set a s i de the order of deni a l of the tra ns fer a nd to
compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to
the Ci rcuit Cri minal Court of the Second Judicial District, a s well a s to
a uthorize the l atter to try the ca s es (47-V a nd 48-V) a t ei ther Sa n
Ferna ndo, La Uni on, or Ba gui o Ci ty.
Res pondents i n their a nswer denied any a buse of dis creti on i n vi ew
of the fa ct that the Administrative Order No. 226 merel y a uthori zed
the court below, but did not require or comma nd i t, to tra ns fer the
ca s es i n question to the Ci rcuit Cri minal Court, and l i kewi s e deni ed
tha t the ci rcums ta nces jus ti fi ed a ny s uch tra ns fer.
At peti tioners' request thi s Court enjoi ned the res pondent Judge
Guti errez from proceeding with the tri a l of the ca s es unti l further
orders .
We a gree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon
the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court s houl d hea r
s pecific ca ses. Any s uch power, even i n the gui s e of a dmi ni s tra ti ve
regul ation of executi ve a ffa i rs , trenches upon the ti me -honored
s eparation of the Executive a nd the Judiciary; a nd whil e not di rectl y
depri ving the courts of their i ndependence, i t woul d enda nger the
ri ghts and immunities of the accused or ci vil party. It coul d be much
too ea sily tra nsformed i nto a means of predetermining the outcome
of i ndividual cases, so as to produce a res ul t i n ha rmony wi th the
Admi nistration's preferences. The creation by Republ i c Act No. 5179
of the Ci rcui t Cri mi na l Courts for the purpos e of a l l evi a ti ng the
burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to a ccel era te the
di s position of cri minal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere
i ndicates an i ntent to permit the tra nsfer of pres el ected i ndi vi dua l
ca s es to the ci rcuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258
a nd 274 evi dence a ny s uch i ntenti on; pa rti cul a rl y s i nce
Admi nistrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, i n Secti on 2 of i ts Pa rt

V, a s confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the s ame year, i n

Secti on 3 of Pa rt III thereof, provi des tha t the tra ns fer to Ci rcui t
Cri mi na l Courts of ca s es pendi ng i n the regul a r Courts of Fi rs t
Ins tance s hould be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify
a ny executi ve a rbi tra ti on of wha t pa rti cul a r ca s es s houl d be
a pportioned to ei ther tri buna l . The very terms of Admi ni s tra ti ve
Order No. 226, i s s ued on 18 June 1970 by Secreta ry of Jus ti ce
Ma ka siar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely a uthori zi ng, a nd
not di recti ng, Judges Arci a ga a nd Guti errez of the Court of Fi rs t
Ins tance of Ilocos Sur to tra nsfer Cri minal Ca s es Nos . 44-V a nd 47-V
(People vs . Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Cri minal Court of the Second
Judi cial District, reveals that the Secretary himself was a wa re of the
i mpropriety of i mperativel y di recti ng tra ns fer of s peci fi ed ca s es .
Res pondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore i n construing Admi ni s tra ti ve
Order No. 226 a s permissive a nd not ma nda tory, a cted wi thi n the
l i mits of his discretion and vi olated neither the law nor the Executi ve
Orders heretofore menti oned.
It i s unfortunate, however, that i n refusing to cons i der Depa rtment
Admi ni s tra ti ve Order No. 226 of the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce a s
ma nda tory res pondent Judge Guti errez fa i l ed to a ct upon the
contention of the prosecuting officers that the ca ses a ga i ns t pri va te
res pondents herein s houl d be tra ns ferred to the Ci rcui t Cri mi na l
Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of jus ti ce
wa s impending, in vi ew of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to
tes tify i n the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they fel t thei r
l i ves woul d be enda ngered. Thi s cl a i m wa s buttres s ed by the
a ffi da vi ts of the i njured pa rti es a nd pros ecuti on wi tnes s es ,
rea ffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify i n ca s es 47-V a nd
48-V a nd expressing their willingness to testify i f the cases are hea rd
outs i de of Il ocos Sur, where they ca n be free from tens i on a nd
terrori sm (Petition, Annex J). The fea r thus expres s ed ca n not be
cons idered fanciful and unfounded when a ccount i s ta ken of the
ci rcums ta nces tha t the i nforma ti ons fi l ed i n the Court of Fi rs t
Ins ta nce of Il ocos Sur s how tha t of the one hundred a rmed
pa rti cipants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este a nd Ora
Centro, Muni ci pa l i ty of Ba nta y, s ome ei ghty-two (82) a re s ti l l
uni dentified a nd at large; that one of the a ccused, private respondent
Vi ncent Cri sologo, belongs to a n influenti a l fa mi l y i n the provi nce,
bei ng concededly the s on of the Congressman for the first di s tri ct of
Il ocos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant witnes s es a re
thems elves the complainants in the criminal ca s es , a nd, therefore,
ha ve reasons to fear that a ttempts will be made to s ilence them; that
i t i s not s hown that the Executive bra nch i s a bl e or wi l l i ng to gi ve
thes e witnesses full security during the trial a nd for a reasonable time
thereafter, that even i f a rmed security escorts were to be provi ded,
the s ame would be no guarantee against the possibility of murderous
a s sault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events ha ve proved;
tha t Cons tabulary reports (Annex H) s how tha t between 1 Ja n ua ry
a nd 31 Ma y 1970 no l es s tha n 78 murders ha ve been reported
commi tted in s aid province, of which number onl y 21 were s ol ved;
a nd, finally, tha t the promoti on a nd confi rma ti on of res pondent
Judge Ma rio Gutierrez from Cl erk of Court to Judge of the Court of
Fi rs t Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, wa s a cti vel y
s upported by Congres s ma n a nd Governor Cri s ol ogo, pa rents of
a ccus ed Vi ncent Cri s ol ogo (Annexes H, H -1, a nd K to N-2 to
peti ti oner's s uppl ementa l memora ndum).
Thi s just refusal to testify i n Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining
wi tnesses, who had on a previ ous occa s i on freel y gi ven evi dence
before the i nvestigators in Manila, renders mani fes t the i mperi ous
necessity of tra nsferring the place of tri al to a site outs i de of Il ocos
Sur, i f the cases a re to be judicially i nquired into conforma bl y to the
i nterest of truth a nd justice and the State is to be given a fai r cha nce
to pres ent i ts s i de of the ca s e.
The res pondents vi gorously contend that a tra ns fer of the tri a l s i te
ca n not be ma de, beca us e i t i s a l ong s ta ndi ng rul e of cri mi na l
procedure i n thes e Is l a nds tha t one who commi ts a cri me i s
a mena bl e therefor onl y i n the juri s di cti on where the cri me i s
commi tted, for the reason poi nted out i n U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phi l .
376, a ndPeople vs. Mercado, 65 Phi l . 665, tha t the juri s di cti on of a
Court of Fi rs t Instance in the Philippines i s l i mi ted to certa i n wel l defi ned terri tory a nd they ca n not ta ke juri s di cti on of pers ons
cha rged with one offense committed outside of that l imited territory,
a nd they i nvoke Rul e 110, Secti on 14 (a ), of the Revi s ed Rul es of
Court provi ding that "in a ll cri minal prosecutions the action s ha l l be

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i ns ti tuted a nd tri ed i n the court of the muni ci pa l i ty or provi nce

wherein the offens e wa s commi tted or a ny one of the es s enti a l
i ngredi ent thereof took pl a ce."

juri s di cti on of the court, i n a proper ca s e, to

cha nge the venue from one county to a ny other,
ca nnot be the s ubject of doubt.

It i s well to note that this Court has explained i n Beltran vs. Ramos, 96
Phi l . 149, 150, tha t the purpos e of the rul e i nvoked by a ccus ed
res pondents herein was "not to compel the defenda nt to move to
a nd a ppear i n a different court from that of the provi nce where the
cri me was committed, as it would ca use him great inconveni ence i n
l ooking for his wi tnes s es a nd other evi dence i n a nother pl a ce."
Where the convenience of the a ccus ed i s oppos ed by tha t of the
pros ecution, a s i n the ca s e a t ba r, i t i s but l ogi ca l tha t the court
s hould have power to decide where the bal a nce of conveni ence or
i nconvenience lies, a nd to determine the most suitabl e pl a ce of the
tri a l a ccordi ng to the exi genci es of truth a nd i mpa rti a l ju s ti ce.

Thi s power to transfer tri al of cri minal cases in furtherance of justice,

exerci sed through writs of certiorari, has, according to the wei ght of
a uthori ty, pa s s ed to the Sta te Supreme Courts of the Ameri ca n
Uni on. 1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, a t pa ge 436, i t
wa s held that the power to tra ns fer the pl a ce of hol di ng tri a l s

In the pa rti cul a r ca s e before Us , to compel the pros ecuti on to

proceed to tri al i n a locality where its witnesses will not be a t l i berty
to revea l wha t they know i s to ma ke a mockery of the judi ci a l
process, a nd to betray the very purpose for which courts ha ve been
es tablished. Since the ri gorous a pplication of the general principl e of
Rul e 110, Section 14 (a ), would result here i n preventi ng a fa i r a nd
i mpartial inquiry i nto the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted
tha t the exigencies of justice dema nd tha t the genera l rul e rel i ed
upon by a ccused respondents s hould yi eld to occasiona l excepti ons
wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the ri gor of
the l a w would become the highest i njustice "summum jus, summa
in juria."
The res pondents accused can not complain that to tra ns fer the tri a l
to a s i te where the prosecution's witnes s es ca n feel free to revea l
wha t they know woul d be equi va l ent to ra i l roa di ng them i nto a
convi cti on. Because regardless of the place where i ts evi dence i s to
be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove the gui l t
of the a ccused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of justice clea rl y
l ean in favor of the prosecution being given full opportunity to lay i ts
ca s e before a proper a rbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for lack of
evi dence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither cha l l enge nor
a ppea l .
We mus t thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impass e of
the ki nd now before Us , a re to confes s thems el ves i mpotent to
further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested the Judi ci a l
Power i n the Supreme Court a nd s uch i nferi or courts a s ma y be
es tablished by law (Article VIII, Section 13), a nd such judi ci a l power
connotes certai n i nci denta l a nd i nherent a ttri butes rea s ona bl y
necessary for a n effective administration of justi ce. The courts "ca n
by a ppropri a te mea ns do a l l thi ngs neces s a ry to pres erve a nd
ma i ntain every quality needful to ma ke the judi ci a ry a n effecti ve
i ns tituti on of government" (Borromeo vs . Ma ri a no, 41 Phi l . 322).
One of these inci denta l a nd i nherent powers of courts i s tha t of
tra ns ferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank
i n a neighboring site, whenever the i mperative of securing a fa i r a nd
i mpartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, s o dema nds .
Thi s authority was early recogni zed i n Engl a nd a s i nheri ng i n the
courts of justice even prior to the ei ghteenth century. The opi ni on
i n Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court,208 Ma s s . 162, 21 Ann.
Ca s es 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield,
i n Rex vs. Cowle(Eng.) 2 Burr 834, deci ded i n 1759, s a i d tha t, i n thi s
res pect, "the law is cl ear a nd uniform a s far back as i t can be traced."
And i n Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the ques ti on wa s ful l y
di s cussed, and all the judges a ppear to have agreed a s to the power
of the court, Cra mpti on, Jr., s a yi ng a t pa ge 525:
There is a nother common-law right, equally open
to defendants a nd prosecutors , ... tha t where i t
a ppears that either party ca nnot obtain a fair a nd
i mpa rti a l tri a l i n the proper county, then thi s
court ... ha s jurisdicti on to ta ke the ca s e out of
the proper county, a s it is ca ll ed, a nd to bri ng i t
i nto a n i ndifferent county ... Thi s juri s di cti on to
cha nge the venue ... has been exerci s ed by thi s
court from a very ea rly period. We have reported
ca s es , where the doctri ne i s l a i d down i n
emphatic language; we have the pra cti ce of the
Court of Queen's Bench in England independently
of a ny pra ctice of our own court ... The genera l

beca me thoroughly engrafted upon the common

l a w, l ong before the i ndependence of thi s
country; a nd from tha t ti me forth, not onl y ha s
the pra ctice prevailed i n the courts of Engl a nd,
but the power is now exercised by the Courts of
very ma ny i f not a ll of our s tates, ei ther by force
of express statute or the a doption of the common
l a w i n the juri s prudence of the s a me.
Tha t s uch i nherent powers a re likewise possessed by the Phi l i ppi ne
courts a dmi ts of no doubt, beca us e they were orga ni zed on the
Ameri can pattern with the enactment of the first judicial organic law,
Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Phi l i ppi ne Commi s s i on, then
composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully fa milia r wi th
the i ns ti tuti ons a nd tra di ti ons of the common l a w.
In Alzua a nd Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phi l . 300, 333, thi s Court s ta ted:
And i t i s safe to sa y tha t i n every vol ume of the
Phi l ippine Reports, numbers of ca s es mi ght be
ci ted wherein recourse has been had to the rules,
pri nciples a nd doctri nes of the common l a w i n
a s certaining the true meaning a nd s cope of the
l egi s l a ti on ena cted i n a nd for the Phi l i ppi ne
Is l a nds s i nce they pa s s ed under Ameri ca n
s overei gnty.
Among the earliest meas ures of the Phi l i ppi ne
Commi s s i on, a fter the es ta bl i s hment of Ci vi l
Government under Ameri ca n s overei gnty, wa s
the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136,
"An Act provi ding for the organization of courts in
the Phi lippine Islands." This Act i n expres s terms
a bolished the then existing Audiencia or Supreme
Court a nd Courts of Fi rs t Ins ta nce, a nd
s ubstituted i n thei r pl a ce the courts provi ded
therei n. It s ets out i n genera l terms the
juri s diction, duties, privileges, a nd powers of the
new courts a nd their judges. The ma jori ty of the
members of the body which enacted it were abl e
Ameri ca n l a wyers . The s pi ri t wi th whi ch i t i s
i nformed, a nd i ndeed i ts very l a ngua ge a nd
termi nology would be unintelligible without some
knowledge of the judicial s ystems of England a nd
the Uni ted Sta tes . Its ma ni fes t purpos e a nd
object was to replace the old judicial system, with
i ts i ncidents a nd tra ditions dra wn from Spa ni s h
s ources, with a new s ys tem model ed i n a l l i ts
es sential characteristics upon the judicial s ystems
of the Uni ted Sta tes . It ca nnot be doubted,
therefore, that a ny i ncident of the former s ystem
whi ch conflicts with the essential pri nci pl es a nd
s ettled doctrines on which the new system res ts ,
mus t be hel d to be a broga ted by the l a w
orga ni zi ng the new s ys tem.
Whi l e not expres s l y conferred by Act 136, We fi nd i t di ffi cul t to
bel i eve tha t the fra mers ' i ntent wa s to deny, by s i l ence, to the
Phi l ippine Courts , a nd pa rti cul a rl y upon thi s Supreme Court, the
i nherent jurisdiction possessed by the Englis h a nd Ameri ca n courts
under their common law heri ta ge to tra ns fer the pl a ce of tri a l of
ca s es i n order to s ecure and promote the ends of justice, by providing
fa i r a nd i mpa rti a l i nqui ry a nd a djudi ca ti on.
Li ke the exempti on of judges of courts of s uperi or or genera l
a uthority from liability i n a civil a ction for a cts done by them i n the
exerci se of thei r judi ci a l functi ons , uphel d i n the Al zua ca s e a s
es sentially i nherent in the courts established by Act 136, even i f not
expressly provided for, the power to tra nsfer the place of tri als when

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s o demanded by the i nteres t of jus ti ce i s equa l l y es s enti a l a nd

pos sesses no i nferior ra nk. To it a ppl y, mutatis mutandis, the words
of thi s Court i n the Al zua ca s e jus t ci ted:
The grounds of public pol i cy a nd the rea s oni ng
upon which the doctri ne i s ba s ed a re not l es s
forceful and i mperative i n these Is l a nds tha n i n
the countries from which the new judicial sys tem
wa s borrowed; a nd a n examination of the reasons
a s s i gned ... l ea ves no room for doubt tha t a
fa i lure to recognize i t as a n i nci dent to the new
judi ci a l s ys tem woul d ma teri a l l y i mpa i r i ts
us efulness a nd tend very s trongl y to defea t the
ends for which it was establ i s hed. (21 Phi l . 333334)
Not onl y ha s there been s i nce then no proof of a ny s peci fi c
pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by
our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contra ry, the
l a w establishing the Ci rcuit Cri minal Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, i n
i ts Section 4, provi des express l egislative recognition of its existence:
SEC. 4. The Ci rcui t Cri mi na l Courts ma y hol d
s es s i ons a nywhere wi thi n thei r res pecti ve
di s tricts:Provided, however, tha t ca s es s ha l l be
hea rd wi thi n the provi nce where the cri me
s ubject of the offens e wa s commi tted. And
provided further, that when the interest of justice
so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme
Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring
province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied)
Si nce the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfi ed by
the fi ling of the cri mi na l ca s e i n ques ti on wi th the Court of Fi rs t
Ins tance of Ilocos Sur, i n which province the offens es cha rged were
commi tted, according to the informations; s ince the hol di ng of the
tri a l i n a pa rti cul a r pl a ce i s more a ma tter of venue, ra ther tha n
juri s di cti on; s i nce the i nteres ts of truth a nd jus ti ce ca n not be
s ubserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to tri a l i n the
res pondent court i n Ilocos Sur, because i ts wi tnes s es , for jus t a nd
wei ghty reasons, a re unwilling to testify therein, a nd the respondent
court, i gnoring their s afety, has a busively denied the motion to ha ve
the ca s e transferred to a nother court, thi s Supreme Court, i n the
exerci se of judicial power possessed by i t under the Constitution a nd
the s tatutes, s houl d decree tha t the tri a l of ca s es 47-V a nd 48-V
s hould be heard a nd deci ded by the Ci rcui t Cri mi na l Court of the
Second Judicial District, either i n San Fernando, La Union, or i n Baguio
Ci ty, a t the ea rlier a vailable date. This a rrangement woul d ha ve the
a dva ntage that the same tri al judge could later be a uthorized to hea r
the defense witnes s es i n Vi ga n, i f ci rcums ta nces s o dema nded.
Furthermore, the a djudi ca ti on of the ca s e by a judge other tha n
res pondent Gutierrez, if resul ti ng i n a cqui tta l , woul d remove a ny
doubt or s uspicion that the same was in a ny wa y i nfl uenced by the
tri a l Judge's bei ng behol den to the Cri s ol ogo fa mi l y.
The s olution thus a dopted is i n harmony wi th the i dea l s s et by thi s
Court i n Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phi l . 523, where
We s a i d:
... The mos t perfect procedure tha t ca n be
devi sed i s that whi ch gi ves opportuni ty for the
mos t compl ete a nd perfect exerci s e of the
powers of the court within the limitati ons s et by
na tura l jus ti ce. It is that one which, in other
words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the
powers of the court to transmute themselves into
concrete acts of justice between the parties
before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not
to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter but to give it effective facility in
righteous action.

justice. Its proper a i m i s to fa ci l i ta te the

a ppl i ca ti on of jus ti ce to the ri va l cl a i ms of
contending parties. It was created not to hi nder
a nd del a y but to fa ci l i ta te a nd promote the
a dministration of justice. It does not cons ti tute
the thi ng i tself which courts are a lways strivi ng to
s ecure to l itigants. It i s des i gned a s the mea ns
bes t adapted to obtain that thing. In other words,
i t i s a means to a n end. It i s the mea ns by whi ch
the powers of the court a re made effective in just
judgments. When it l oses the character of the one
a nd ta kes on that of the other the a dministrati on
of jus tice becomes i ncomplete and unsatisfactory
a nd l ays itself open to gra ve cri ti ci s m. (Ma ni l a
Ra i lroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phi l. 523, 529
[1911]. Empha sis a nd pa ra gra phi ng s uppl i ed.)
In res ume, thi s Court hol ds , a nd s o rul es :
(1) Tha t Republic Act No. 5179 crea ting the Ci rcuit Cri minal Courts did
not, a nd does not, a uthori ze the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce to tra ns fer
thereto s peci fi ed a nd i ndi vi dua l ca s es ;
(2) Tha t thi s Supreme Court, i n the exerci s e of the Judi ci a l Power
ves ted by the Cons ti tuti on upon i t a nd other s ta tutory Courts ,
pos sesses i nherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and
di s pos i ti on of a ca s e pendi ng i n a Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce be
tra ns ferred to a nother Court of First Instance within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth s o demand, and there a re
s eri ous and weighty reasons to believe that a tri a l by the court tha t
ori gi nally had jurisdiction over the ca se would not result in a fai r a nd
i mpa rti a l tri a l a nd l ea d to a mi s ca rri a ge o f jus ti ce.
(3) Tha t i n the present case there a re sufficient and adequate reasons
for the tra nsfer of the hearing of Cri minal Ca ses Nos . 47-V a nd 48-V
of the Court of Fi rs t Ins ta nce of Il ocos Sur to the Ci rcui t Cri mi na l
Court of the Second Judi ci a l Di s tri ct, i n the i nteres t of truth a nd
jus ti ce.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the wri ts
of certiorari a nd mandamus pra yed for a re
gra nted; the order of the res pondent Court of
Fi rs t Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 Jul y 1970, i s
s us ta i ned i n s o fa r a s i t hol ds tha t the
Admi nistrative Order No. 221 of the Depa rtment
of Jus tice i s not ma nda tory, but onl y di rectory;
neverthel es s , s a i d order i s decl a red i n gra ve
a buse of discretion and s et a s i de i n s o fa r a s i t
decl ines to tra nsfer the tri al of i ts cases Nos. 47-V
a nd 48-V to a nother court within the district; a nd
s a id respondent Court i s accordingly directed a nd
ordered to rema nd the two cri mi na l ca s es
a fores a i d to the Ci rcui t Cri mi na l Court of the
Second Judi ci a l Di s tri ct for hea ri ng of the
evi dence for the prosecution either i n Ba gui o or
Sa n Fernando, La Union, at the earliest ava i l a bl e
da te, a nd s uch other proceedi ngs a s the Ci rcui t
Cri mi nal Court ma y determine i n the i nteres t of
jus ti ce.
The a ccus ed a re requi red to fi l e ba i l bonds to a ns wer for thei r
a ppearance a t the trial a nd s entence by the Ci rcuit Cri minal Court for
the Second Judicial District, i n the same amount, and under the same
terms a nd conditi ons a s thei r pres ent ba i l bonds , whi ch wi l l be
repl aced by those herein ordered, all wi thi n fi fteen (15) da ys from
fi na l i ty of thi s deci s i on.
No s peci a l pronouncement a s to cos ts .
(s epa ra te opi ni ons were not i ncl uded here)

It ma y be s aid in pas s i ng tha t the mos t s a l i ent

objection which can be urged agains t procedure
toda y i s tha t i t s o res tri cts the exerci s e of th e
court's power by techni ca l i ti es tha t pa rt of i ts
a uthority effective for justice between the parties
i s ma ny ti mes in i ncons i dera bl e porti on of the
whol e. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart
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G.R. No. 158763

March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.
OCON, Peti ti oners ,
vs .
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Res pondent.
D ECI S I ON
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Thi s is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
1
Court, a s sai l i ng the 18 December 2002 Deci s i on of the Court of
Appeals i n CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 a nd i ts 12 June 2003 Res ol uti on
denyi ng petitioners Motion for Recons i dera ti on. The di s pos i ti ve
porti on of the a s s a i l ed deci s i on rea ds a s fol l ows :
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to
ha ve a cted wi th gra ve a bus e of di s creti on a mounti ng to l a ck or
exces s of jurisdicti on i n i s s ui ng the a s s a i l ed Orders , the i ns ta nt
peti tion for certiorari, mandamus a nd prohibition i s hereby GRANTED
a nd GIVEN DUE COURSE, a nd i t i s hereby ordered:
1. The a ssailed Joi nt Order da ted Augus t 17, 2001, Order
da ted September 21, 2001, Joi nt Order da ted October 16,
2001 a nd Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 di smiss i ng
the two (2) Informations for Murder, a l l i s s ued by publ i c
res pondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad i n Cri mi na l Ca s es
Nos . 36-3523 a nd 36-3524 a re hereby REVERSED a nd SET
ASIDE for havi ng been issued with grave a buse of discretion
a mounting to lack or exces s of juri s di cti on, a nd a nother
entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the
Order da ted June 25, 2001 a nd Joi nt Order da ted Jul y 6,
2001 i s sued by the then acti ng Pres i di ng Judge Wi l fredo
Tuma l i ua n;
2. Cri mi na l Ca s es Nos . 36-3523 a nd 36-3524 a re hereby
ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal ca s es
of Bra nch 36 of the Regiona l Tri a l Court of Sa nti a go Ci ty,
Is a bel a ; a nd
3. Publ i c res pondent Judge Ana s ta ci o D. Angha d i s
DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwi th Wa rra nts of Arres t for the
a pprehens i on of pri va te res pondents Jos e "Pempe"
Mi ra nda, SPO3 Al berto P. Da l ma ci o, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon
a nd a ccused Rodel T. Ma deral i n said Cri mi na l Ca s es Nos .
36-3523 a nd 36-3524. 2
The fa ctual a nd procedural a ntecedents of the ca s e a re a s fol l ows :
On 8 Ma rch 1996, two burnt ca da vers were di s covered i n Purok
Ni bulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were l a ter i denti fi ed a s the dea d
bodi es of Vicente Bauzon a nd El izer Tuliao, son of private respondent
Vi rgi lio Tuliao who i s now under the wi tnes s protecti on progra m.
Two i nformations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao,
SPO1 Ferdi nand Ma rza n, SPO1 Ruben B. Agus ti n, SPO2 Al exa nder
Mi cu, SPO2 Rodel Ma deral, a nd SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regi ona l
Tri a l Court (RTC) of Sa nti a go Ci ty.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners fi l ed a n urgent moti on to compl ete

prel iminary i nvestigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall a nd/or quash
the wa rra nts of a rres t.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 Jul y 2001, Judge Tumal i ua n
noted the absence of petitioners and i s s ued a Joi nt Order denyi ng
s a i d urgent moti on on the ground tha t, s i nce the court di d not
a cqui re juri s di cti on over thei r pers ons , the moti on ca nnot be
properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners a ppea l ed
the res olution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Jus ti ce.
On 17 Augus t 2001, the new Presidi ng Judge Ana s ta ci o D. Angha d
took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joi nt Order
of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the ca ncellation of the
wa rra nt of a rrest issued a ga i ns t peti ti oner Mi ra nda . He l i kewi s e
a pplied this Order to peti ti oners Ocon a nd Da l ma ci o i n a n Order
da ted 21 September 2001. Sta te Pros ecutor Leo S. Reyes a nd
res pondent Tuliao moved for the reconsi dera ti on of the s a i d Joi nt
Order a nd prayed for the i nhibition of Judge Anghad, but the moti on
for reconsideration was deni ed i n a Joi nt Order da ted 16 October
2001 a nd the prayer for inhibition was denied i n a Joint Order da ted
22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, res pondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiora ri ,
ma nda mus a nd prohi bi ti on wi th thi s Court, wi th p ra yer for a
Temporary Restraining Order, s eeking to enjoin Judge Angha d from
further proceeding with the case, and seeki ng to nul l i fy the Orders
a nd Joi nt Orders of Judge Angha d da ted 17 Augus t 2001, 21
September 2001, 16 October 2001, a nd 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, thi s Court issued a Res ol uti on res ol vi ng to
gra nt the prayer for a tempora ry res tra i ni ng order a ga i ns t Judge
Angha d from further proceeding with the cri minal cases. Shortly a fter
the a foresaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 di smissing the two Informations for murder a ga i ns t
peti ti oners . On 19 November 2001, thi s Court took note of
res pondents cash bond evi denced by O.R. No. 15924532 da ted 15
November 2001, a nd issued the temporary res tra i ni ng orde r whi l e
referri ng the petition to the Court of Appeals for a djudication on the
meri ts .
Res pondent Tul i a o fi l ed wi th thi s Court a Moti on to Ci te Publ i c
Res pondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Angha d "del i bera tel y
a nd willfully commi tted contempt of court when he i s s ued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 di s mi s s i ng the
i nformations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred s a i d
moti on to the Court of Appeals in vi ew of the previous referral to it of
res pondents petiti on for certi ora ri , prohi bi ti on a nd ma nda mus .
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the a s s a i l ed
deci sion gra nting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
cri mi nal cases i n the RTC of Santiago Ci ty, as well as the i s s ua nce of
wa rra nts of a rrest against petitioners a nd SPO2 Ma deral. Petiti oners
moved for a reconsi dera ti on of thi s Deci s i on, but the s a me wa s
deni ed i n a Res ol uti on da ted 12 June 2003.

The venue was later tra nsferred to Ma nila. On 22 Apri l 1999, the RTC
of Ma ni la convicted a ll of the accused a nd s entenced them to two
counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Ma deral who was yet to be
a rra i gned at that ti me, being at l arge. The ca se was a ppeal ed to thi s
Court on a utomatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, a cqui tted
the a ccus ed therei n on the ground of rea s ona bl e doubt.

Hence, thi s peti ti on.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Ma dera l wa s a rres ted. On 27

Apri l 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners
Jos e C. Mi ra nda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, a nd SPO3 Al berto P. Dalmaci o,
a certa in Boyet dela Cruz a nd Amado Doe, as the persons responsible
for the dea ths of Vi cente Ba uzon a nd El i zer Tul i a o.

Wi th a ll due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gra vely erred i n

revers ing a nd s etting a s i de the Joi nt Order of Judge Ana s ta ci o D.
Angha d da ted Augus t 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16,
2001 a nd November 14, 2001 i s sued i n cri minal cases numbered 363523 a nd 36-3524; a nd, erred in upholding, a ffirming and reinsta ti ng
the Order dated July 6, 2001 i s sued by then Acti ng Pres i di ng Judge
Wi l fredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused ca nnot s eek
a ny judicial relief if he does not s ubmit his person to the juri s di cti on
of the court.

Res pondent Tuliao fil ed a cri mi na l compl a i nt for murder a ga i ns t

peti tioners, Boyet del a Cruz, a nd Ama do Do e, a nd s ubmi tted the
s worn confession of SPO2 Ma deral. On 25 June 2001, Acti ng Presiding
Judge Wi l fredo Tuma l i ua n i s s ued wa rra nts of a rres t a ga i ns t
peti ti oners a nd SPO2 Ma dera l .

The fa cts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to thi s
Court the fol l owi ng a s s i gnments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wi th a ll due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gra vely erred i n
di recting the reinstatement of Cri mi na l Ca s es No. 36-3523 a nd 36-

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3524 i n the docket of Acti ve Cri mi na l Ca s es of Bra nch 36 of the

Regi onal Trial Court of Santiago City, Phi lippines, and in orderi ng the
public respondent to re -issue the warrants of a rres t a ga i ns t herei n
peti ti oners .
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wi t a ll due respect, the Honora bl e Court of Appea l s commi tted a
revers ible error in ordering the reinstatement of Cri mina l Ca s es No.
36-3523 a nd No. 36-3524 i n the docket of a cti ve cri mi na l ca s es of
Bra nch 36 of the regional tri al court of Santiago City, Phi lippines, a nd
i n ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest a ga i ns t
herein petitioners , the order of di s mi s s a l i s s ued therei n ha vi ng
become fi na l a nd executory.
Adjudi ca ti on of a moti on to qua s h a wa rra nt of a rres t requi res
nei ther jurisdiction over the person of the a ccus ed, nor cus tody of
l a w over the body of the a ccus ed.
The fi rst assignment of error brought forth by the peti ti oner dea l s
wi th the Court of Appea l s rul i ng tha t:
[A]n a ccused cannot seek any judicial relief i f he does not submi t hi s
pers on to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of
the a ccused may be acquired ei ther through compul s ory proces s ,
s uch a s warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary a ppearance, s uch
a s when he s urrenders to the police or to the court. It i s onl y when
the court has a lready a cquired jurisdi cti on over hi s pers on tha t a n
a ccus ed ma y i nvoke the proces s es of the court (Pete M. Pi co vs .
Al fons o V. Combi ng, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992).
Thus , a n accused must first be placed i n the custody of the l aw before
the court ma y va l i dl y a ct on hi s peti ti on for judi ci a l rel i efs . 3
Proceedi ng from thi s premi s e, the Court of Appea l s rul ed tha t
peti tioners Mi randa, Ocon and Dal ma ci o ca nnot s eek a ny judi ci a l
rel i ef since they were not yet a rrested or otherwise deprived of thei r
l i berty a t the ti me they fi l ed thei r "Urgent Moti on to compl ete
prel iminary i nvestigation; to reinves ti ga te; to reca l l a n d/or qua s h
wa rra nts of a rres t." 4
Peti ti oners counter the finding of the Court of Appea l s by a rgui ng
tha t juri sdiction over the person of the a ccus ed i s requi red onl y i n
a pplications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners a rgue, a s s umi ng tha t
s uch jurisdiction over their person is requi red before the court ca n
a ct on thei r moti on to qua s h the wa rra nt for thei r a rres t, s uch
juri s diction over their person was a l rea dy a cq ui red by the court by
thei r fi l i ng of the a bove Urgent Moti on.
In a rguing that jurisdiction over the pers on i s requi red onl y i n the
a djudication of a pplications for bail, petitioners quote Reti red Court
of Appea l s Jus ti ce Os ca r Herrera :
Except i n a pplications for bail, it i s not necessary for the court to fi rs t
a cquire jurisdiction over the person of the a ccus ed to di s mi s s the
ca s e or gra nt other relief. The outri ght di s mi s s a l of the ca s e even
before the court a cquires jurisdiction over the person of the accus ed
i s a uthorized under Section 6(a ), Rul e 112 of the Revi s ed Rul es of
Cri mi nal Procedure and the Revi s ed Rul es on Summa ry Procedure
(Sec. 12a ). In Al l a do vs . Di okno (232 SCRA 192), the ca s e wa s
di s mis s ed on moti on of the a ccus ed for l a ck of proba bl e ca u s e
wi thout the a ccused having been a rrested. In Pa ul Roberts vs . Court
of Appea l s (254 SCRA 307), the Court wa s ordered to hol d the
i s suance of a warrant of arrest i n a beya nce pendi ng revi ew by the
Secretary of Justice. And in La cson vs . Executive Secreta ry (301 SCRA
1025), the Court ordered the ca s e tra ns ferred from the
Sa ndiganbaya n to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismiss a l of
the ca s e for l a ck of proba bl e ca us e.6
In a rguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person wa s
a l rea dy a cqui red by thei r fi l i ng of the a bove Urgent Moti on,
peti tioners i nvoke our pronouncement, through Jus ti ce Fl orenz D.
7
Rega l a do, i n Sa nti a go v. Va s quez :
The vol unta ry a ppea ra nce of the a ccus ed, whereby the court
a cquires jurisdiction over his person, is a ccompl i s hed ei ther by hi s
pl eading to the merits (such as by filing a moti on to qua s h or other
pl eadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover,

a ppearing for arraignment, enteri ng tri a l ) or by fi l i ng ba i l . On the

ma tter of bail, since the same is intended to obta i n the provi s i ona l
l i berty of the a ccused, as a rule the same ca nnot be pos ted before
cus tody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial a uthori ti es
ei ther by hi s a rres t or vol unta ry s urrender.
Our pronouncement i n Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the l aw and jurisdi cti on over the pers on. Cus tody of the l a w i s
requi red before the court can act upon the a pplication for bail, but i s
not requi red for the a djudi ca ti on of other rel i efs s ou ght by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a wa i ver
of the defens e of l a ck of juri s di cti on over the pers on of the
a ccus ed.8 Custody of the l a w i s a ccompl i s hed ei ther by a rres t or
vol unta ry s urrender,9 whi l e juri s di cti on over the pers on of the
a ccus ed is a cquired upon his a rrest or voluntary a ppe a ra nce. 10 One
ca n be under the cus tody of the l a w but not yet s ubject to the
juri s diction of the court over hi s pers on, s uch a s when a pers on
a rres ted by vi rtue of a warrant files a motion before a rra i gnment to
qua sh the warra nt. On the other ha nd, one ca n be s ubject to the
juri s diction of the court over his person, a nd yet not be in the custody
of the l aw, such as when an accused escapes cus tody a fter hi s tri a l
11
ha s commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies res tra i nt
on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own wi l l a nd l i berty,
bi nding him to become obedient to the will of the l a w. 12 Cus tody of
the l a w is literally custody over the body of the accused. It i ncl udes ,
but i s not l i mi ted to, detenti on.
The s tatement i n Pi co v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 ci ted by the Court of
Appeals should not have been separated from the issue i n tha t ca s e,
whi ch is the a pplication for admission to bail of s omeone not yet i n
the cus tody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement
i n Pi co rea ds :
A pers on a pplying for a dmission to bail must be in the custody of the
l a w or otherwi s e depri ved of hi s l i berty. A pers on who ha s not
s ubmitted himsel f to the juri s di cti on of the court ha s no ri ght to
i nvoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge s houl d ha ve
di l igently a scertained the whereabouts of the a pplica nt a nd tha t he
i ndeed ha d juri s di cti on over the body of the a ccus ed before
cons i deri ng the a ppl i ca ti on for ba i l . 13
Whi le we stand by our a bove pronouncement i n Pi co i ns ofa r a s i t
concerns bail, we clarify tha t, as a genera l rul e, on e who s eeks a n
a ffi rmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the juri s di cti on of
the court. 15 As we held i n the a forecited case of Santiago, seeking a n
a ffi rmative relief in court, whether i n civil or cri mi na l proceedi ngs ,
cons ti tutes vol unta ry a ppea ra nce.
Pi co deals with an application for ba i l , where there i s the s peci a l
requi rement of the a ppl i ca nt bei ng i n the cus tody of the l a w. In
Fel iciano v. Pa s icolan, 16 we hel d tha t "[t]he purpos e of ba i l i s to
s ecure ones release a nd i t would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who i s free. Thus, ba i l i s the s ecuri ty requi red a nd gi ven for the
rel ease of a pers on who i s i n the cus tody of l a w." The ra ti ona l e
behind this s pecial rule on bail is tha t i t di s coura ges a nd prevents
res ort to the former pernicious practice wherein the a ccus ed coul d
jus t s end another i n his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
juri s diction of the court by hi s pers ona l a ppea ra nce therei n a nd
17
compl i a nce wi th the requi rements therefor.
There is, however, a n excepti on to the rul e tha t fi l i ng pl ea di ngs
s eeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary a ppeara nce, a nd the
cons equent s ubmission of ones pers on to the juri s di cti on of the
court. Thi s is i n the case of pleadings whose prayer i s precisely for the
a voi dance of the juri s di cti on of the court, whi ch onl y l ea ds to a
s pecial a ppearance. These pleadings a re: (1) i n civil ca ses, motions to
di s miss on the ground of l ack of jurisdicti on over the pers on of the
defenda nt, whether or not other gro unds for di s mi s s a l a re
i ncl uded; 18 (2) i n criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the a ccused; a n d (3)
moti ons to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences
of the fa ct that failure to file them would constitute a wa i ver of the
defens e of l a ck of juri s di cti on over the pers on. The thi rd i s a
cons equence of the fact that i t is the very l egality of the court process
forci ng the submission of the person of the a ccus ed tha t i s the very
i s s ue i n a moti on to qua s h a wa rra nt of a rres t.
To reca pitulate what we have di s cus s ed s o fa r, i n cri mi na l ca s es ,
juri s diction over the person of the a ccused is deemed wa i ved by the

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a ccus ed when he files any pl ea di ng s eeki ng a n a ffi rma ti ve rel i ef,

except i n ca ses when he i nvokes the special jurisdicti on of the court
by i mpugning s uch jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, i n na rrow
ca s es i nvolvi ng s peci a l a ppe a ra nces , a n a ccus ed ca n i nvoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdi cti on over
the person nor custody of the law. However, i f a person invoking the
s pecial jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he mus t fi rs t s ubmi t
hi ms el f to the cus tody of the l a w.
In ca s es not involving the so-called s pecial a ppea ra nce, the genera l
rul e a pplies, i .e., the accused is deemed to have s ubmitted himself to
the juri s di cti on of the court upon s eeki ng a ffi rma ti ve rel i ef.
Notwi thstanding this, there is no requi rement for hi m to be i n the
cus tody of the law. The followi ng ca s es bes t i l l us tra te thi s poi nt,
where we gra nted va rious rel i efs to a ccus ed who were not i n the
cus tody of the law, but were deemed to have pl a ced thei r pers ons
under the jurisdiction of the court. Note tha t none of thes e ca s es
i nvol ve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash a n information
due to l ack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a moti on to qua s h a
wa rra nt of a rres t:
1. In Al lado v. Di okno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certi orari on the ground of l a ck of proba bl e ca us e, we i s s ued a
tempora ry res tra i ni ng order enjoi ni ng PACC from enforci ng the
wa rra nt of a rrest a nd the res pondent judge therei n from further
proceeding with the ca se a nd, instead, to elevate the records to us .
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 20 upon the a ccuseds Moti on to
Sus pend Proceedings and to Hold i n Abeyance Issuance of Wa rra nts
of Arres t on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review wi th the
Department of Jus ti ce, we di rected res pondent judge therei n to
cea se a nd desist from further proceeding with the criminal ca s e a nd
to defer the issuance of wa rra nts of a rres ts a ga i ns t the a ccus ed.
3. In La cson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the a ccused in a
peti tion for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the pa rt
of the Sa ndiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbaya n to tra nsfer the
cri mi nal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the i ssuance of
the wa rra nts of a rres t.
We hol d that the circumstances forcing us to requi re cus tody of the
l a w i n applications for bail are not present in moti ons to qua s h the
wa rra nt of a rrest. If we allow the granting of ba i l to pers ons not i n
the cus tody of the law, it is foreseeable that ma ny pers ons who ca n
a fford the bail will remain a t large, a nd coul d el ude bei ng hel d to
a ns wer for the commission of the offense i f ever he is proven gui l ty.
On the other hand, i f we allow the quashal of wa rra nts of a rres t to
pers ons not in the custody of the l a w, i t woul d be very ra re tha t a
pers on not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. Thi s
i s because i t is the same judge who i ssued the warrant of a rres t who
wi l l deci de whether or not he fol l owed the Cons ti tuti on i n hi s
determination of probable cause, a nd he ca n easily deny the moti on
to qua s h i f he rea l l y di d fi nd proba bl e ca us e a fter pers ona l l y
exa mi ni ng the records of the ca s e.

beca use of a s ubsequently filed a ppea l to the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce,

a nd because of his doubts on the existence of probable ca use due to
the political climate i n the ci ty. Second, a fter the Secretary of Jus ti ce
a ffi rmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases
on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with di fferent
a ccus ed, doi ng s o two da ys a fter thi s Court res ol ved to i s s ue a
temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the a rrest of peti ti oners ,
peti tioner Mi randa appealed the assis ta nt pros ecutors res ol uti on
before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, s hortly a fter assuming
offi ce, quashed the warrant of a rres t on the ba s i s of s a i d a ppea l .
Accordi ng to Judge Angha d, "x x x prudence di cta tes (tha t) a nd
beca use of comity, a deferment of the proceedings i s but proper." 24
Qua s hal on this basis i s grave a buse of discretion. It is inconcei va bl e
to cha rge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence a nd obl i vi ous to
comi ty when he issued the warrants of a rrest against petitioners jus t
beca use the petitioners might, i n the future, a ppea l the a s s i s ta nt
pros ecutors resolution to the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce. But even i f the
peti tion for review was filed before the issua nce of the wa rra nts of
a rres t, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review
of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the wa rra nts
of a rres t.
25

In Webb v. de Leon, we held tha t the peti ti oners therei n ca nnot

a s sail a s premature the filing of the information in court a gainst them
on the ground that they s till ha ve the ri ght to a ppea l the a dvers e
res olution of the DOJ Pa nel to the Secretary of Justice. Simi l a rl y, the
i s suance of warrants of a rrest against petitioners herei n s houl d not
ha ve been qua s hed a s prema ture on the s a me ground.
The other ground i nvoked by Judge Angha d for the qua s ha l of the
wa rra nt of a rrest is i n order i f true: vi ol a ti on of the Cons ti tuti on.
Hence, Judge Angha d a s ked a nd res ol ved the ques ti on:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or a dhere to the
a bove-quoted constitutional proscription, which i s Sec. 2, Arti cl e III
Bi l l of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Cri minal Procedure a nd
to the a bove-cited decisional cases? To thi s query or i s s ue, a fter a
deep perusal of the arguments ra ised, this Court, through [its] regular
Pres i ding Judge, finds meri t i n the contenti on of herei n a ccus ed 26
mova nt, Jos e "Pempe" Mi ra nda .
Judge Angha d i s referri ng to the fol l owi n g provi s i on of the
Cons ti tuti on a s ha vi ng been vi ol a ted by Judge Tuma l i ua n:
Sec. 2. The ri ght of the people to be secure in their persons , hous es ,
pa pers a nd effects a gainst unreasonabl e s ea rches a nd s ei zures of
wha tever nature a nd for a ny purpos e s ha l l be i nvi ol a bl e, a nd no
s earch warrant or wa rrant of arrest s hall i ssue except upon probabl e
ca us e to be determined personally by the judge a fter exa mi na ti on
under oath or a ffirmation of the complainant a nd the wi tnes s es he
ma y produce, and particularly describing the pl a ce to be s ea rched
a nd the pers ons or thi ngs to be s ei zed. 27

Moreover, purs ua nt to the pres umpti on of regul a ri ty of offi ci a l

functi ons, the wa rrant continues i n force a nd effect until it is quashed
a nd therefore can still be enforced on a ny day a nd at a ny ti me of the
22
da y a nd night. Furthermore, the continued a bsence of the a ccus ed
ca n be ta ken a gainst him i n the determi na ti on of proba bl e ca us e,
s i nce fl i ght i s i ndi ca ti ve of gui l t.

However, after a careful s crutiny of the records of the case, including

the s upporting e vidence to the resol uti on of the pros ecutor i n hi s
determination of probable cause, we fi nd that Judge Anghad gra vel y
a bus ed hi s di s creti on.

In fi ne, as much as i t is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it

i s l ikewise i ncongruous to requi re one to s urrender hi s freedom
before a sserting i t. Human ri ghts enjoy a hi gher preference i n the
hi era rchy of ri ghts tha n property ri ghts , 23 dema ndi ng tha t due
process i n the deprivation of liberty must come before its ta king a nd
not a fter.

In thi s case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest
of the petitioners is a pparent from the face of the order i tself, whi ch
cl ea rly s tated that the determination of probable cause was based on
the certi fication, under oa th, of the fi s ca l a nd not on a s epa ra te
determination personal l y ma de by the Judge. No pres umpti on of
regul a ri ty coul d be dra wn from the order s i nce i t expres s l y a nd
cl ea rly s howed that it was based only on the fi s ca l s certi fi ca ti on. 28

Qua s hing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently fi l ed peti ti on

for revi ew wi th the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce a nd ba s ed on doubts
engendered by the pol i ti ca l cl i ma te cons ti tutes gra ve a bus e of
di s creti on.
We nevertheless find gra ve a buse of discretion in the a ssailed actions
of Judge Angha d. Judge Angha d s eemed a l i ttl e too ea ger of
di s mi s s i ng the cri mi na l ca s es a ga i ns t the peti ti oners . Fi rs t, he
qua shed the standing warrant of a rres t i s s ued by hi s predeces s or

Accordi ng to peti ti oners :

Peti ti oners cl aim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joi nt Order conta i ns

no s uch i ndi ca ti on tha t he rel i ed s ol el y on the pros ecutors
certi fi ca ti on. The Joi nt Order even i ndi ca ted the contra ry:
Upon receipt of the i nformation a nd resolution of the prosecutor, the
Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probabl e ca us e by
pers ona l l y eva l ua ti ng the records x x x.[29]

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The records of the ca se show that the prosecutors certifica ti on wa s

a ccompanied by s upporting documents, followi ng the requi rement
under Li m, Sr. v. Fel i x30 a nd Peopl e v. Inti ng.31 The s upporti ng
documents a re the fol l owi ng:
1. Res olution dated 21 June 2001 of Sta te Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes ;
2. Affi da vi t da ted 22 Ma y 2001 of Modes to Guti errez;
3. Affi da vi t da ted 19 Ma y 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joi nt Counter Affidavit dated 23 Ma y 2001 of Ma yor Jos e
C. Mi ra nda a nd Reyna l do de l a Cruz;
5. Affi da vi t da ted 19 Ma y 2001 of Al berto Da l ma ci o;
6. Deci sion dated 22 Apri l 1999 of the Regiona l Tri a l Court
of Ma ni l a , Bra nch 41 i n Cri mi na l Ca s e No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn s tatement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Ma dera l ;
8. Informa ti on da ted 22 June 2001;
9. Affi da vi t-compl a i nt of Vi rgi l i o Tul i a o; a nd
10. Medi co-legal Reports of the cadavers of El ezer Tul i a o
a nd Vi cente Bua zon.
Hence, procedurally, we ca n conclude that there was no vi olation on
the pa rt of Judge Tuma l i ua n of Arti cl e III, Secti on 2, of the
Cons ti tution. Judge Anghad, however, focus ed on the s ubs ta nti ve
pa rt of s aid s ection, i .e., the existence of probable cause. In faili ng to
fi nd probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2
Ma deral is i ncredible for the following reasons: (1) it was gi ven a fter
a l mos t two yea rs i n the cus tody of the Na ti ona l Burea u of
Investigation; (2) i t was gi ven by s omeone who rendered hi ms el f
untrus tworthy for being a fugitive for fi ve yea rs ; (3) i t wa s gi ven i n
excha nge for a n obvious reward of discharge from the i nforma ti on;
a nd (4) i t was given during the election period a mi ds t a "pol i ti ca l l y
cha rged s cenario where "Santi a go Ci ty voters were pi tted a ga i ns t
ea ch other a long the lines of the Mi ra nda ca mp on one s i de a nd
former Ci ty Ma yor Amelita S. Na va rro, a nd a l l egedl y tha t of DENR
Secreta ry Hehers on Al va rez on the other." 32
We pa instakingly went through the records of the case a nd found no
rea s on to disturb the findings of probable ca use of Judge Tumali ua n.
It i s i mportant to note that a n exhaustive debate on the credibili ty of
a wi tness i s not within the province of the determination of probable
33
ca us e. As we hel d i n Webb :
A fi nding of probable cause needs only to rest on evi dence s howi ng
tha t more l i kel y tha n not a cri me ha s been commi tted a nd wa s
commi tted by the s uspects. Probable ca us e need not be ba s ed on
cl ea r a nd convi nci ng evi dence of gui l t, nei ther on evi dence
es tablishing guilt beyond reasonabl e doubt a nd defi ni tel y, not on
evi dence esta bl i s hi ng a bs ol ute certa i nty of gui l t. As wel l put i n
Bri negar v. Uni ted States, while probable cause demands more tha n
"ba re suspicion," it requires "l ess than evidence which would justify x
x x convi cti on." A fi nding of probabl e ca us e merel y bi nds over the
s us pect to s ta nd tri a l . It i s not a pronouncement of gui l t.
x x x Proba ble cause merely i mplies probability of guilt and should be
determined i n a summary ma nner. Preliminary i nvestigation i s not a
pa rt of tri a l x x x.
Di s missing a criminal case on the basis of a decis i on of thi s Court i n
a nother ca s e wi th di fferent a ccus ed cons ti tutes gra ve a bus e of
di s creti on.
Judge Anghad had qua s hed the wa rra nt of a rres t on the ground,
a mong other thi ngs , tha t there wa s a peti ti on for revi ew of the
a s sistant prosecutors res ol uti on befo re the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce.
However, after the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce a ffi rmed the pros ecutors
res olution, Judge Anghad s ummarily dismissed the two cri minal cases
a ga inst the petitioners on the ba s i s of the fol l owi ng expl a na ti on:
Rodel Ma deral was one of the a ccused i n People vs . Wilfredo Lea no,
et a l ., RTC, Bra nch 41, Ma nila, and based from his sworn s tatements ,
he pi npointed to Mr. Mi ra nda the mastermi nd a nd wi th hi m a nd
the other police officers as the di rect perpetra tors , the October 9,
2001 Deci s i on of the Supreme Court a bs ol vi ng the fi ve cops of
murder, certa i nl y ma kes hi s s worn Sta tements a "na rra ti on of
fa l sehood a nd lies" and that because of the decision a cqui tti ng s a i d
offi cers "who were likewise falsely l inked by s aid Rodel Ma deral i n his
Apri l 27, 2001 s ta tements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal
ma de untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements a nd therefore

the s ame is wi thout proba bl e va l ue." Thi s Court a grees wi th the

defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Ma derals s ta tements wh en
the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evi dence pres ented
a nd a dduced i n Cri mi na l Ca s e No. 97-160355. Rodel Ma dera l i s
s upposed to turn state witness i n thes e two (2) ca s es but wi th the
Supreme Court deci s i on a dverted to, the proba ti ve va l ue of hi s
s ta tements i s pra cti ca l l y ni l .
xxxx
Thi s Court fi nds merit to the manifestation of the a ccus ed Mi ra nda
da ted October 18, 2001, pra yi ng for the s umma ry di s mi s s a l of the
two (2) murder charges in vi ew of the latest decision of the Supreme
Court i n People of the Philippines vs . Wilfredo Leao, et a l ., G.R. No.
13886, a cquitting the a ccused therein a nd i n effect di s rega rdi ng a l l
the evi dence presented by the prosecution in that ca se. Accordi ngl y,
the two (2) i nformations [for] murder filed a gainst Jose Mi ra nda a re
ordered di s mi s s ed.34
Thi s is a cl ear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no ri ght
to twi s t our deci s i on a nd i nterpret i t to the di s credi t of SPO2
Ma deral, who was still a t large when the evi dence of the prosecution
i n the Leao ca s e wa s pres ented. A deci s i on, even of thi s Court,
a cquitting the accused therein of a cri me cannot be the ba s i s of the
di s missal of criminal case a ga i ns t di fferent a ccus ed for the s a me
cri me. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the
fa ct tha t our decision in Leao was based on reasona bl e doubt. We
never rul ed i n Leao that the cri me di d not ha ppen; we jus t found
tha t there wa s rea s ona bl e doubt a s to th e gui l t of the a ccus ed
therein, since the prosecution i n that case rel i ed on ci rcums ta nti a l
evi dence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the cri mina l
ca s es of the peti ti oners i n the ca s e a t ba r a s there i s here a n
eyewi tness: Rodel Ma deral. The accused in Lea o furthermore ha d
no moti ve to kill respondent Tuliaos s on, whereas petitioners herei n
ha d been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Sena te Bl ue Ri bbon Commi ttee.
It i s prepos terous to concl ude tha t beca us e of our fi ndi ng of
rea s onabl e doubt i n Lea o, "i t i s now beyond doubt tha t Rodel
Ma deral made untruthful, fabricated and perjured s ta tements a nd
therefore the same i s without probable va lue." 35 On the contra ry, i f
we a re to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an a cquittal on the
ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the proba bi l i ty of the
pros ecutions version of the facts therei n. Such proba bi l i ty of gui l t
certa i nl y meets the cri teri a of proba bl e ca us e.
We ca nnot l et unnoti ced, too, Judge Angha ds di s mi s s a l of the
i nformations two days a fter we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a
bond, a temporary restraini ng order prohi bi ti ng hi m from further
proceedi ng wi th the ca s e. The bond wa s fi l ed the da y a fter the
i nformations were dismissed. While the di s mi s s a l of the ca s e wa s
a bl e to beat the effectivi ty date of the temporary res tra i ni ng order,
s uch a brupt dismissal of the i nforma ti ons (da ys a fter thi s Courts
res olve to i ssue a TRO a gainst Judge Anghad) creates wild suspi ci ons
a bout the moti ves of Judge Angha d.
Nul l i fi ca ti on of a proceedi ng neces s a ri l y ca rri es wi th i t the
rei nstatement of the orders set asi de by the nul l i fi ed proceedi ng.
In their s econd assignment of error, petitioners cl ai m tha t the Court
of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by
Judge Tuma l i ua n, but i ns tea d di rected Judge Angha d to i s s ue
a pparently new warra nts of a rrest. 36 According to the peti ti oners , i t
wa s an error for the Court of Appea l s to ha ve done s o, wi thout a
pers ona l determi na ti on of proba bl e ca us e.
We di sagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the is s ua nce of
new wa rrants of arrest or merely ordered the rei ns ta tement of the
wa rra nts of a rrest issued by Judge Tumaliua n i s merel y a ma tter of
s crupulous semantics, the slight i naccura cy whereof s houl d not be
a l lowed to a ffect the dispositions on the merits, especially i n this case
where the other dispositions of the Court of Appea l s poi nt to the
other di rection. Firstly, the Court of Appea l s ha d rei ns ta ted the 25
37
June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, which issued the wa rra nts of
a rres t. Secondl y, the Court of Appea l s l i kewi s e decl a red the
proceedi ngs conducted by Judge Angha d voi d. Certa i nl y, the
decl aration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to ca rry wi th
i t the rei ns ta tement of the orders s et a s i de by the nul l i fi ed
proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the wa rra nts of a rres t

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ha d been nullified; therefore those warrants of a rrest are henceforth

deemed unqua s hed.
Even i f, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the i s s ua nce of
new wa rrants of arrest based on a determination of probable ca us e,
i t would have been l egally permissible for them to do so. The records
of the preliminary i nvestigation had been a va i l a bl e to the Court of
Appeals, and are a lso available to this Court, allowing both the Court
of Appeals a nd this Court to personally exa mi ne the records of the
ca s e a nd not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we
ha ve ruled in Al lado v. Di okno a nd Roberts v. Court of Appea l s , the
determi na ti on of proba bl e ca us e does not res t on a s ubjecti ve
cri teri a. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the fi ndi ng of
proba ble cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of
di s cretion, i n the same vein, we ca n also overrul e the deci s i on of a
judge reversing a fi nding of probable ca us e, a l s o on the ground of
gra ve a bus e of di s creti on.
There is no double jeopardy i n the reinstatement of a cri mi na l ca s e
di s mi s s ed before a rra i gnment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners cl aim tha t the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error i n ordering the rei ns ta tement
of Cri mi nal Ca s es No. 36-3523 a nd No. 36-3524, a l l egi ng tha t the
order of dismissal i ssued therein ha d become fi na l a nd executory.
Accordi ng to peti ti oners :
It i s also worthy to point out at this juncture tha t the Joi nt Order of
Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 i s NOT ONE of those Orders
whi ch were a ssailed in the private respondent Tul i a os Peti ti on for
Certi ora ri, Mandamus a nd Prohibition filed by the private respondent
before the Court of Appeals. As ca refully enumerated in the fi rst page
of the a ssailed Decision, only the followi ng Orders i s s ued by Judge
Angha d were ques ti oned by pri va te res pondent, to wi t:
1.) Joi nt Order da ted Augus t 17, 2001;
2.) Order da ted September 21, 2001;
3.) Joi nt Order da ted October 16, 2001; a nd
4.) Joi nt Order da ted October 22, 2001.
Obvi ous l y, the Joi nt Order da ted November 14, 2001 of Judge
Angha d, which ultimately dismissed Cri minal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND
36-3524 i s NOT i ncluded i n the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders.
Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the va lidity
or nul l i ty of the Joi nt Order of November 14, 2001. 38
Peti ti oners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for
Certi ora ri, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals deci ded the ca s e
beca use we referred the s a me to them i n our 19 November 2001
Res olution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, a round three
weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon recei pt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tulia o l os t no ti me i n
fi l ing with this Court a Motion to Ci te Public Respondent i n Contempt,
a l leging that Judge Anghad "del i bera tel y a nd wi l l ful l y commi tted
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order
da ted 14 November 2001 di smissing the i nforma ti ons for murder."
On 21 November 2001, we referred s a i d moti on to the Court of
Appeals, in vi ew of the previ ous referra l of res pondent Tul i a os
peti ti on for certi ora ri , prohi bi ti on a nd ma nda mus .

Whi le we cannot i mmediately pronounce Judge Anghad i n contempt,

s eeing a s disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court
processes are cases of i ndirect contempt which require the gra nti ng
of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent, 39 the prayer to
ci te public respondent i n contempt a nd for other rel i efs jus t a nd
equitable under the premises should be construed to i nclude a prayer
for the nul l i fi ca ti on of s a i d 14 November 2001 Order.
In a ny ca se, the reinstatement of a cri minal ca s e di s mi s s ed before
a rra i gnment does not constitute double jeopa rdy. Doubl e jeopa rdy
ca nnot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned a nd i t
wa s upon hi s expres s moti on tha t the ca s e wa s di s mi s s ed.40
As to res pondent Tuliaos pra yer (i n both the ori gi na l peti ti on for
certi orari as well as i n his motion to cite for contempt) to di s qua l i fy
Judge Anghad from further proceeding wi th the ca s e, we hol d tha t
the number of i ns ta nces of a bus e of di s creti on i n thi s ca s e a re
enough to convi nce us of a n a ppa rent bi a s on the pa rt of Judge
Angha d. We further res ol ve to fol l ow the ca s e of Peopl e v. SPO1
Lea o,41 by tra nsferring the venue of Cri minal Ca ses No. 36-3523 a nd
No. 36-3524 to the Ci ty of Ma nila, pursuant to Arti cle VIII, Secti on 4,
of the Cons ti tuti on.
WHEREFORE, the peti ti on i s DENIED. The Deci s i on da ted 18
December 2002 a nd the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court
of Appeals a re hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Cri minal
Ca s es No. 36-3523 a nd No. 36-3524 be tra nsferred to a nd ra ffl ed i n
the Regional Trial Court of the Ci ty of Ma ni l a . In thi s connecti on,
1) Let a copy of thi s deci s i on be furni s hed the Executi ve
Judge of the RTC of the Ci ty of Sa nti a go, Is a bel a , who i s
di rected to effect the transfer of the cases wi thi n ten (10)
da ys a fter recei pt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the Ci ty of Sa nti a go,
Is a bel a , i s l i kewi s e di rected to report to thi s Court
compl iance hereto wi thi n ten (10) da ys from tra ns fer of
thes e ca s es ;
3) The Executive Judge of the Ci ty of Ma nila s ha l l pro ceed
to ra ffl e the cri minal cases wi thi n ten (10) da ys from the
tra ns fer;
4) The Executive Judge of the Ci ty of Ma ni l a i s l i kewi s e
di rected to report to this Court compliance wi th the order
to ra ffl e within ten (10) da ys from s a i d compl i a nce; a nd
5) The RTC Judge to whom the cri minal ca ses a re ra ffl ed i s
di rected to act on said ca s es wi th rea s ona bl e di s pa tch.
6) Fi na lly, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad i s di rected to i s s ue
forthwi th wa rra nts of a rres t for the a pprehens i on of
peti tioners Jose C. Mi ra nda, Alberto P. Da lmacio, Romeo B.
Ocon, a nd accused Rodel T. Ma deral, conformably with the
deci sion of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order i ssued by this Court dated 4 August
2003 i s hereby LIFTED. Cos ts a ga i ns t Peti ti oners .
SO ORDERED.

Our referra l to the Court of Appea l s of the Moti on to Ci te Publ i c

Repondent i n Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order wi thi n
the i ssues of the case decided by the Court of Appea l s . In cl a i mi ng
tha t Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court i n i s s ui ng the
14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had a s cri bed to Judge
Angha d a n a ct much more s erious tha n gra ve a bus e of di s creti on.
Res pondent Tuliao cl aims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November
2001 Order on 15 November 2001, a ntedating i t s o a s to a voi d the
effects of our 12 November 2001 Resol uti on. In s a i d 12 November
2001 Res olution, we resolved to issue a temporary restrai ni ng order
enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceedi ng wi th the cri mi na l
ca s es upon the respondent Tuliaos fi l i ng of a bond i n the a mount
of P20,000.00. Res pondent Tul i a o ha d fi l ed the bond on 15
November 2005.
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G.R. No. 164170

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA y ABDUL, et al V CORONA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court i s a petition for revi ew [1] a s s a i l i ng the 4 Februa ry
2004 Deci s i on [2] a nd 25 June 2004 Res ol uti on [3] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76345. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
peti tion for certiorari fi l ed by peti ti oners Ma ca -Angcos Al a wi ya y
Abdul , Is a ga ni Abdul y Si a cor, a nd Sa ra h La ngco y Angl i .
The Facts
On 18 September 2001, peti ti oners executed s worn
[4]
s ta tements before the General Assignment Section of the Wes tern
Pol i ce District in United Nations Avenue, Ma ni l a , cha rgi ng a ccus e d
P/C Ins p. Mi chael Angelo Bernardo Ma rtin, P/Insp. Allanji ng Es tra da
Medi na, PO3 Arnol d Ramos As i s , PO2 Pedro Sa ntos Guti errez, PO2
Igna cio De Pa z a nd PO2 Antonio Sebastian Beri da , Jr., who were a l l
pol icemen assigned at that ti me a t the Northern Police Di s tri ct, wi th
ki dna ppi ng for ra ns om.
The s worn-statements of petitioners commonly a lleged that a t about
10:00 i n the morning of 11 September 2001, whi le peti ti oners were
crui s ing on board a vehi cl e a l ong Uni ted Na ti ons Avenue, a bl ue
Toyota Sedan bumped thei r vehi cl e from behi nd; tha t when they
went out of their vehicle to assess the damage, s evera l a rmed men
a l ighted from the Toyota Seda n, poked guns a t, bl i ndfol ded, a nd
forced them to ri de i n the Toyota Sedan; tha t they were brought to
a n office where P10,000,000 a nd two vehicles were demanded from
them i n exchange for their freedom; that, a fter haggling, the a mount
wa s reduced to P700,000 pl us the two vehicles; that the money a nd
vehi cles were delivered in the l a te eveni ng of 11 September 2001;
tha t they were released i n the early morning of 12 September 2001 in
Qui a po after they handed the Deed of Sale and registration papers of
the two vehi cl es .
After the i nitial investigation by the Western Police District, the ca s e
wa s reported to the Philippine National Police Intelli gence Group i n
Ca mp Cra me, where a l a tera l coordi na ti on wa s ma de wi th the
Phi l ippine Na tional Police-Nationa l Ca pi ta l Regi ona l Pol i ce Offi ce
Regi onal Intelligence a nd Investigation Division (PNP-NCR-RID) for the
i dentification, arrest a nd filing of a ppropri a te cha rges a ga i ns t the
a ccus ed. After its own investigation, the PNP-NCR-RID recommended
tha t a ccused be charged with vi olation of Arti cle 267 of the Revi s ed
[5]
Pena l Code, a s a mended by Republ i c Act No. 7659.
Sta te Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velas co (Sta te Pros ecutor Vel a s co),
who conducted the prel i mi na ry i nves ti ga ti on, i s s ued a
Res olution[6] da ted 14 Ja nuary 2002, recommending that the accused
be i ndicted for the cri me of kidnapping for ra ns om. The Res ol uti on
wa s endorsed for approval by As sistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C.
Ma ri a no a nd a pproved by Chief Sta te Pros ecutor Jovenci to R. Zuo.
On 24 Ja nuary 2002, Sta te Pros ecutor Velasco filed with the Regiona l
Tri a l Court of Ma nila, Branch 41, [7] a n Information for Ki dnappi ng for
Ra ns om a ga i ns t the a ccus ed wi th no ba i l recommended. The
Informa ti on, docketed a s Cri mi na l Ca s e No. 02198832, rea ds a s
fol l ows :
Tha t on September 11, 2001 a t a bout 10:00 AM
a l ong United Nations Avenue, Ma ni l a a nd wi thi n
the juri sdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovena med Accus ed, who a re a l l pol i ce offi cers ,
cons piring, confederating a nd mutually helping one
a nother and groupi ng thems el ves together, di d
then a nd there by force a nd i nti mi da ti on, a nd by
the us e of hi gh-powered fi rea rms , wi l l ful l y,
unl awfully a nd fel oni ous l y ta ke, ca rry a wa y a nd
depri ve MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ISAGANI ABDUL

a nd ZARAH LANGCO of their l i berty a ga i ns t thei r

wi l l for the purpose of extorting ra nsom as i n fact a
dema nd for ra nsom was ma de a s a condi ti on for
thei r rel ea s e a mounti ng to TEN MILLION PESOS
(PHP10,000,000.00) whi ch a mount wa s l a ter
reduced to SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
(PHP700,000.00) pl us two vehi cl es cons i s ti ng of
TOYOTA FX a nd MITSUBISHI ADVENTURE to the
da mage and prejudice of MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA,
ISAGANI ABDUL a nd SARAH LANGCO i n s a i d
a mount a nd s uch other a mounts a s ma y be
a wa rded to them under the provisions of the Ci vi l
Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

On 28 Ja nua ry 2002, the tri a l court, upon moti on by the

pros ecution, issued a Hold Departure Order against the accused. [9] On
even date, the tri al court issued a Warrant of Arres t a ga i ns t a l l the
[10]
a ccus ed.
Mea nwhil e, on 8 Februa ry 2002, the a ccus ed fi l ed a peti ti on for
revi ew of the Resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco wi th the Offi ce
of the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce.
On 18 Februa ry 2002, the a ccus ed moved for the qua s ha l of the
Information on the ground that the officer who filed the Informati on
ha s no a uthori ty do s o. [11]
In a n Order[12] da ted 27 Februa ry 2002, the tri a l court den i ed the
moti on to quas h on the ground tha t under the rul i ng i n People v.
Mapalao,[13] a n a ccused who is at large is not entitled to bail or other
rel i ef. The tri al court also held that the jurisdiction a nd power of the
Ombuds ma n under Secti on 15(1) of Republ i c Act No. 6770 (RA
6770),[14] a s well as Administra ti ve Order No. 8 of the Offi ce of the
Ombudsman, are not excl us i ve but s ha red or concurrent wi th the
regul a r pros ecutors . Thus , the a uthori ty of the Depa rtment of
Jus ti ce to investigate, file the informa ti on a nd pros ecute the ca s e
coul d no l onger be ques ti oned.
In a Res ol uti on [15] promul ga ted on 24 September 2002, then
Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez revers ed the rul i ng of Sta te
Pros ecutor Velasco a nd ordered the l atter to ca use the withdrawal or
di s missal of the Information for ki dnapping for ra nsom. The Secretary
of Jus tice ruled that there was no prior a pproval by the Offi ce of the
Ombudsman before the Information for kidnapping was filed with the
tri a l court. He a ls o found tha t the i nci dent compl a i ned of wa s a
bungl ed buy-bus t opera ti on, not ki dna ppi ng for ra ns om.
On 11 October 2002, peti tioners filed a Moti on for Reconsi dera ti on,
whi ch wa s deni ed by then Secreta ry of Jus ti ce Si meon A.
Da tumanong i n a Resoluti on promul ga ted on 17 Februa ry 2003. [16]
Peti ti oners fi l ed a peti ti on for certi ora ri wi th the Court of
Appeals, seeking the nullification of the Secreta ry of Jus ti ces rul i ng
for ha vi ng been rendered i n grave abuse of discretion a mounti ng to
l a ck or exces s of juri s di cti on.
The Court of Appea l s rendered a Deci s i on of 4 Februa ry 2004
di s missing the petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals denied the
peti tioners motion for reconsidera ti on i n a Res ol uti on of 25 June
2004.
Hence, thi s peti ti on.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals s ustained the finding of the Secretary of Justi ce
tha t the i ncident complained of was a bungled buy-bus t opera ti on,
contra ry to the fi ndi ng of Sta te Pros ecutor Vel a s co, tha t i t wa s a
ki dna ppi ng for ra ns om.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the a ccus eds documenta ry
evi dence which supported their cl aim that the i ncident was a botched
buy-bus t opera ti on. The Court of Appea l s s peci fi ca l l y noted
the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ces a r La nda ya n (La nda ya n), who wa s
dri vi ng a ta xi a t the ti me of the i nci dent a nd wa s a pprehended

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together wi th peti ti oners . TheSinumpaang Salaysay ca tegori ca l l y

s ta ted that he and petitioners were released from accuseds cus tody
a t a bout 12:50 i n the a fternoon of the s a me da y, 11 September
2001. Thus , Cesars statement refuted the compl a i nt of peti ti oners
tha t they were freed only i n the morning of 12 September 2001 a fter
a pa y-off of P700,000 i n casino chips and two vehi cl es .The Court of
Appeals stressed that Landayans Sinumpaang Salaysay wa s gi ven on
14 September 2001, pri or to petitioners complaint for kidnapping for
ra ns om which was filed on 18 September 2001 before the Wes te rn
Pol i ce Di s tri ct. Ha vi ng been executed pri or to the fi l i ng of the
compl a i nt for ki dna ppi ng for ra ns om by peti ti oners ,
Ces a rsSinumpaaang Salaysay coul d not be discredited as a cover-up
evi dence.

Secretary of Justice over prosecutors wa s expl a i ned i n Ledesma v.

Court of Appeals [24] i n thi s wi s e:

The Court of Appeals upheld the Secretary of Justices ruling that prior
a pprova l by the Offi ce of the Ombuds ma n for the Mi l i ta ry wa s
needed for the filing of the Information before the RTC, purs ua nt to
OMB-DOJ Joi nt Circular No. 95-001.[17] The Court of Appea l s further
s us tained the finding that there were s uffi ci ent evi dence tha t the
offense charged against a ccused was committed i n rel a ti on to thei r
offi ce a nd that the a ccused were all acting in the di s cha rge of thei r
functi ons a s pol i cemen.

Contra ry to petitioners contention, the Secretary of Justices revers a l

of the Resoluti on of Sta te Pros ecutor Vel a s co di d not a mount to
executive a cqui tta l beca us e the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce wa s s i mpl y
exerci sing his power to review, which included the power to revers e
the rul ing of the Sta te Pros ecutor. However, once a compl a i nt or
i nformation is filed i n court, any disposition of the ca s e s uch a s i ts
di s missal or i ts continua ti on res ts on the s ound di s creti on of the
court.[25] Tri a l judges a re not bound by the Secreta ry of Jus ti ces
revers al of the prosecutors resolution finding proba bl e ca us e. Tri a l
judges are required to make their own assessment of the existence of
proba ble cause, s eparately and i ndependentl y of the eva l ua ti on by
the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce.[26]

The Issues

Deci sions or resolutions of prosecutors are s ubject

to a ppeal to the Secreta ry of jus ti ce who, under
the Revised Admini s tra ti ve Code, e xerci s es the
power of direct control and supervision over s a i d
pros ecutors ; a nd who ma y thus a ffi rm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings. (Empha s i s
s uppl i ed)

The i s s ues i n thi s ca s e a re:

1.
Whether the prior a pproval by the Office of the
Ombuds ma n for the Mi l i ta ry i s requi red for the
i nvestigation and prosecution of the i ns ta nt ca s e a ga i ns t
the a ccus ed;
2.
Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice
of the res olution of State Prosecutor Velasco a mounted to
a n executi ve a cqui tta l ;
3.
Whether the accused policemen ca n s eek a ny
rel i ef (via a motion to quash the information) from the tri al
court when they ha d not been a rres ted yet; a nd

4.
Whether there was probable ca use aga i ns t the
a ccus ed for the cri me of ki dna ppi ng for ra ns om.

The Ruling of this Court

On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and
prosecution of the case against the accused policemen
The Offi ce of the Solicitor General (OSG), which i s repres enti ng the
Secretary of Justice, a grees with petitioners that prior approval by the
Ombudsman is not required for the investigation a nd prosecuti on of
the cri minal case a gainst the a ccused poli cemen. The OSG correctl y
ci tes the ca s e of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
of the Department of Justice,[18] where the Court held that the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
empl oyees is not excl us i ve but i s concurrent wi th other s i mi l a rl y
a uthorized agencies of the government s uch a s the provi nci a l , ci ty
a nd s tate prosecutors. In vi ew of the foregoi ng, both the Court of
Appeals and the Secretary of Justice clearly erred in ruli ng tha t pri or
a pproval by the Ombudsman is requi red for the i nves ti ga ti on a nd
pros ecution of the cri mina l ca s e a ga i ns t the a ccus ed pol i cemen.
On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice
of the resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco
Settl ed is the rule that the Secretary of Justice reta i ns the power to
revi ew resolutions of his s ubordinates even after the i nformation has
a l rea dy been fi l ed i n court. [19] InMarcelo v. Court of
[20]
[21]
Appeals, rei terated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, thi s Court
[22]
cl a ri fied that nothing i n Crespo v. Mogul forecl os es the power or
a uthority of the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce to revi ew res ol uti ons of hi s
s ubordinates in cri minal ca ses despite an information a lready ha vi ng
been fi l ed i n court.[23] The na ture of the power of control of the

On the motion to quash the information

when the accused had not been arrested yet
People v. Mapalao,[27] a s correctl y a rgued by the OSG, does not
s quarely a pply to the present case. In that case, one of the a ccus ed,
Rex Ma gumnang, after a rraignment a nd duri ng the tri a l , es ca ped
from detenti on a nd ha d not been a pprehended s i nce then.
Accordi ngly, a s to him the tri al in absentia proceeded a nd therea fter
the
judgment
of
convi cti on
wa s
promulgated. The Court held that since the a ccused remained at l a rg
e,
he s hould not be a fforded the ri ght to appeal from the judgment of
convi cti on unless he voluntari l y s ubmi ts to the juri s di cti on of the
court or i s otherwise arrested. Whi l e a t l a rge, the a ccus ed ca nnot
s eek relief from the court as he i s deemed to have waived the s a me
a nd he has no s tanding in court.[28] In Mapalao, the a ccused esca ped
whi le the tri al of the ca se was on-going, whereas here, the a ccus ed
ha ve not been s erved the wa rra nt of a rres t a nd ha ve not been
a rra i gned. Therefore, Mapalao i s definitely not on all fours wi th the
pres ent ca s e.
Furthermore, there is nothing i n the Rul es governi ng a moti on to
[29]
qua s h whi ch requi res tha t the a ccus ed s houl d be under the
cus tody of the law prior to the fi l i ng of a moti on to qua s h on the
ground that the officer filing the information had no a uthori ty to do
s o. Cus tody of the law is not required for the adjudica ti on of rel i efs
other tha n an application for bail. [30] However, while the accused a re
not yet under the custody of the law, any question o n the jurisdiction
over the person of the a ccused i s deemed wa i ved by the a ccus ed
when he files any pl eading s eeking a n a ffi rma ti ve rel i ef, except i n
ca s es when the a ccused invokes the special jurisdi cti on of the court
by i mpugni ng s uch juri s di cti on over h i s pers on.[31]
At a ny ra te, the accuseds motion to quash, on the ground of l a ck of
a uthority of the filing officer, would have never prospered because as
di s cussed earlier, the Ombudsmans power to i nves ti ga te offens es
i nvol vi ng publ i c offi cers or empl oyees i s not excl us i ve but i s
concurrent wi th other s i mi l a rl y a uthori zed a genci es of the
government.
On the existence or non-existence of probable cause
Ordi narily, the determination of probable caus e i s not l odged wi th
thi s Court. Its duty in an appropriate case i s confined to the i s s ue of
whether the executive or judicial determination, as the ca se ma y be,
of proba ble cause was done without or i n exces s of juri s di cti on or
wi th gra ve a bus e of di s creti on a mounti ng to wa nt of
juri s diction.[32]However, i n the following exceptional cases, this Court

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ma y ul timately resolve the existence or non-exi s tence of proba bl e

ca us e by examining the records of the preli mi na ry i nves ti ga ti on. [33]
a . To a fford a dequa te protecti on to the
cons ti tuti ona l ri ghts of the a ccus ed;
b. When necessary for the orderly a dministrati on
of jus tice or to a void oppression or multipli ci ty of
a cti ons ;
c. When there i s a prejudi ci a l ques ti on whi ch
i s sub judice;
d. When the a cts of the officer a re wi thout or i n
exces s of a uthori ty;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid l a w,
ordi na nce or regul a ti on;
f. When doubl e jeopa rdy i s cl ea rl y a ppa rent;
g. Where the court ha s no juri s di cti on over the
offens e;
h. Where i t is a ca se of pe rs ecuti on ra ther tha n
pros ecuti on;
i . Where the cha rges a re ma ni fes tl y fa l s e a nd
moti va ted by the l us t for vengea nce;
j. When there i s cl ea rl y no prima facie ca s e
a ga inst the accus ed a nd a moti on to qua s h on
tha t ground ha s been deni ed; [a nd]
k. Prel i minary i njunction has been i s s ued by the
Supreme Court to prevent the threa tened
unl a wful a rres t of peti ti oners .

There is no clear s howing that the present case falls under any of the
recogni zed excepti ons . Moreover, a s s ta ted ea rl i er, once the
information is filed with the trial court, a ny di s pos i ti on of the
i nformation rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court
i s ma ndated to i ndependently evaluate or a s s es s the exi s tence of
proba bl e ca us e a nd i t ma y ei ther a gree or di s a gree wi th the
recommendation of the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce. The tri a l court i s not
bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice. [34] Reliance
a l one on the resolution of the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce a mounts to a n
a bdication of the tri al courts duty a nd jurisdiction to determi ne the
exi s tence of proba bl e ca us e. [35]
Cons idering that the Information has already been filed with the tria l
court, then the tri al court, upon filing of the a ppropri a te moti on by
the pros ecutor, s hould be given the opportunity to perform i ts duty
of eva l uating, i ndependently of the Res ol uti on of the Secreta ry of
Jus ti ce recommending the withdrawal of the Information against the
a ccus ed, the merits of the case a nd assess whether proba bl e ca us e
exi s ts to hold the a ccus ed for tri a l for ki dna ppi ng for ra ns om. [36]
WHEREFORE, we REMAND thi s ca s e to the Regi ona l Tri a l
Court, Bra nch 41, Ma nila, to i ndependently eva l ua te or a s s es s the
meri ts of the case to determine whetherprobable ca use exists to hold
the a ccus ed for tri a l .
SO ORDERED.

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