Behavioral Explanations and Intentional Explanations

in Psychology
William M. Baum and Jennifer L. Heath
University of New Hampshire

A recent criticism of behaviorism asserts that intentional

explanations in psychology are acceptable and preferable
to behavioral explanations. The philosopher Dennett justifies intentional explanations on the grounds that they
are provisional and can be cashed out in principle. Skinner
objected to such explanations on the grounds that they
are never cashed out in practice. Their different views arise
from their divergent goals for psychology: understanding
intelligence and rationality versus understanding behavior.
In the context of a science of behavior, intentional explanations only give the semblance of explanation because
they rely on immediate causes that are fictional. Nonintentional explanations acceptable for a science of behavior
are historical, much as in evolutionary biology. When
Dennett's argument is applied to evolutionary biology, it
becomes a justification of creationism.

Intentional explanations, which attribute behavior to

hidden nonphysical causes such as beliefs and desires,
have long enjoyed popularity among both laypeople and
psychologists. One of Skinner's contributions to scientific
psychology was to point out the weaknesses of intentional
explanation and to offer a scientifically acceptable alternative: historical explanation. Historical explanations of
behavior resemble historical explanations of species in
evolutionary biology. Their strength, both in biology and
psychology, lies in their confining discussion and inquiry
to the physical sphere, a prerequisite for scientific validity.
As a basis for scientific psychology, historical explanation
has been slow of acceptance. Most psychologists, indeed,
seem unaware of Skinner's innovations, supposing instead
that nothing new has happened to behaviorism since
Watson and that behaviorism is outmoded or dead.
One current influence in psychology that fosters intentional explanations is the cognitive view, characteristic
not only of cognitive psychology but of many other areas
as well. In two books, Brainstorms and The Intentional
Stance, Daniel Dennett (1978a, 1987a) lent a philosopher's support to this cognitive view that was so often the
target of Skinner's criticisms and so often critical in return. Dennett (1978b) focused directly on Skinner in an
essay called "Skinner Skinned" in Brainstorms. Although
The Intentional Stance contains little about Skinner, it
expands on the earlier views and remains consistent with
them.
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As was true with Chomsky's (1959) review of Verbal

Behavior, behaviorists have made little response, despite
ample time (see MacCorquodale, 1970). In Zuriff's (1985)
book, Behaviorism: A Conceptual Reconstruction, counterarguments can be found, but one has to look for them,
and they are not directed specifically at Dennett. One
direct response was made by the philosopher Ullin Place
(1987), but the essay was not written from Skinner's point
of view, and largely agreed with Dennett. Dennett's
(1987b) response to Place indicates he felt no challenge;
he was simply able to dismiss the arguments. In this article, we attempt a reply to Dennett that is both adequate
and direct.
The substance of Dennett's argument in both
"Skinner Skinned" and The Intentional Stance is this:
(a) Everyday ways of talking about behavior with terms
like rationality, intelligence, or belief can provide satisfactory explanations of behavior; (b) it is possible to demonstrate that behavioral explanations involve as much
speculation about unknown factors as everyday explanations; and (c) therefore, everyday explanations are just
as good as behavioral explanations and are even preferable
because they are simple and familiar.
To criticize this argument, we take up three topics:
(a) Skinner's objections to mentalistic explanations and
his probable response to Dennett's criticism, (b) how
conflicts between philosophers like Dennett and scientists
like Skinner stem from differences in goals, and (c) the
strength of historical explanationsthat is, explanations
that rely on history rather than immediate causes.

Mentalism
For most of his professional life, Skinner (1953, 1969,
1974) criticized the practice he referred to as mentalism.
He argued that mentalistic explanations, those that appeal
to mental objects and events as causes of behavior, cannot
suffice for a science of behavior. Understanding his criticisms requires a close look at the way he used the word
mental, because it differed from everyday usage.
Skinner (e.g., 1974) distinguished mental from private. Private events like thoughts, feelings, imaginings,
and recollections are physical, not mental. He occasionCorrespondence concerning this article and requests for reprints should
be addressed to William M. Baum, Department of Psychology, University
of New Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824-3567.
We thank M. Chiesa for helpful comments on an early version of
the manuscript.

November 1992 American Psychologist

Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/92/S2.00
Vol.47, No. 11. 1312-1317

ally lapsed into everyday usage, which would include private events within the mental category, but in the great
majority of instances he used mental to exclude private
physical events. For Skinner mental included the nonphysical, the "other stuff" of dualism, the fictional. Opposing mentalism for him meant opposing dualism and
"explanatory fictions."
Dennett (1978b), like some others before him,
missed the distinction between private events and mental
events (i.e., fictional events). For example, he wrote, "it
turns out that 'mental' means 'internal' means 'inferred'
means 'unobservable' means 'private'" (p. 58). Yes,
mental means inferred and unobservable. No, it does not
mean internal or private. Private events are observable,
even if only by an audience of one. They are just as real
as public events; thinking about Dennett is as real as
writing about him. Mental (fictional) events, in contrast,
are unobservable because they are nonphysical; no one
can ever observe belief itself or intelligence itself, regardless of claims that they can be inferred from their physical
manifestations, public and private. The absence of this
distinction, however, does little harm to Dennett's discussion, because he correctly recognized that Skinner objected to belief, intention, and knowledge when they play
the role of fictional causes.
Mentalistic explanations, according to Skinner, have
two objectionable characteristics: superfluity and autonomy. Every mentalism is superfluous in the sense that it
only restates an observation. An explanatory fiction is
inferred from observed behavior and then said to cause
it. A person who is seen carrying an umbrella is said to
believe it is going to rain and then is said to carry the
umbrella because of the belief. An acceptable explanation
for Skinner would point to a preceding event like hearing
a weather report or seeing clouds in the sky, rather than
an inner belief.
As with beliefs, so with another popular form of superfluous mentalism, the internal representation. Behavior that might be explained by external events instead is
attributed to internal representations of those events. If
a category of stimuli is found to have a common effect
on behavior, then the creature is said to have a concept
somewhere inside. If we can recollect past external events,
we are said to have memory somewhere inside. The concept or memory is then said to cause the behavior.
Skinner enjoined us to seek the explanation not in
the representation but in the past events recollected and
in the histories of such stimulus categories. Laypeople
and cognitive psychologists who insist on the existence of
representations rarely see that representations in no way
explain the behavior they are supposed to explain. They
leave two unsolved problems: how a concept or memory
can affect behavior and where the concept or memory
came from in the first place. Once we have explained the
observation by its ultimate origin in past external events,
the representations are revealed to be superfluous.
Some mentalisms, according to Skinner (1974), have
the additional undesirable character of autonomy. An autonomous mentalism is imagined to behave in its own
November 1992 American Psychologist

right, but then its own behavior demands an explanation.

Skinner compared it to a homunculus. An inner agent
(e.g., personality or self) is said to cause behavior, but the
behavior of the agent itself is left unexplained. The behavior of the inner agent is as complex as the behavior it
is supposed to explain, so we are no further ahead and
probably worse off because the inner agent's behavior
cannot be observed.
Dennett (1978b) partly agreed with Skinner when
he regarded intentional idiomsthat is, terms that refer
to inner purpose, intelligence, and rationality as causes
of behavior. Dennett (1978a) granted, "Intentional theory
is vacuous as psychology because it presupposes and does
not explain rationality or intelligence" (p. 15). Explaining
rational and intelligent behavior by appealing to rationality and intelligence is vacuous because it is circular.
Nevertheless, he argued, intentional idioms should be acceptable provisionally, as long as we remember that ultimately they must be cashed out for standard physical
terms.
Quine (1969) also discussed provisional explanations
based on intuitive categories ("similarity notions") in the
sciences, not just psychology. He likened them to "unredeemed notes." Examples he considered were solubility
in water and intelligence. Such terms, Quine argued, when
understood in light of a valid scientific theory, become
superfluous: "The same scientific advances that have thus
provided a solid underpinning for the definition of solubility . . . have also, ironically enough, made that line
of definition pointless by providing a full understanding
of the mechanism of solution" (p. 136). As long as the
unanalyzed similarity notions have not been cashed out,
they remain disreputable. Viewed in this light, the main
job of science could be seen as the supplanting of everyday
provisional explanations. As can be seen, Skinner was
trying to do exactly this with the notion of history of
reinforcement.
Although Dennett's justification for provisional explanations might be correct logically, it overlooks a fact
of life: People rarely see the need for intentional idioms
to be cashed out. They rest as if the explanation were
complete. Although intentional terms may serve as convenient shorthand, as when a biologist speaks of "selfish"
genes (Dawkins, 1976), a scientist avoids them when
trying to be precise because they can be deceptive and
confusing, especially when applied to human behavior.
The selfishness of a gene is much easier to cash out than
the selfishness of a person. This is the basis of Skinner's
objections to mentalism, which fall into two groups.
The first type of objection is that mentalistic explanations impede inquiry. They do this for two reasons.
First, they give the appearance of an explanation, with
the result that curiosity tends to rest. One is distracted
from looking for environmental factors that can be observed and manipulated. Second, they offer for study objects that cannot be observed. Neither memory nor mind
can be observed. How shall we study them? Why not look
for the factors that affect memory or affect the behavior
supposed to be caused by mind?
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The second type of objection is that mentalistic explanations are not useful. Here Skinner took his lead from
pragmatists like James (1974/1907) and Mach (1960/
1933), who argued that the value of science lies in its
usefulness in making sense of our experience of the world.
(See Day, 1980, for explicit discussion of this connection.)
"Making sense" of the world meant rendering it simple
and familiar by describing it in terms that we find simple
and familiar. For Skinner, the science of behavior aimed
to make sense of our experience of behavior. Mentalistic
explanations failed the simplicity criterion. Being superfluous and themselves requiring explanation, mentalistic
explanations, even if familiar, fail to offer the economy
of thought necessary to make them useful. For Skinner,
describing behavior in terms that are both simple and
familiar requires becoming familiar with a more useful
vocabulary, one in which observations can be discussed
economically.
Although Dennett justifies intentional explanations
partly by their utility, his notion of utility extends only
to their predictive value. Skinner's criterion of utility includes not only prediction, but also economical understanding (making sense). We discuss this difference in
greater depth later.
Instead of grouping Skinner's objections to mentalism as we have earlier, Dennett maintains that they seem
unfocused. This misperception is revealing because it
suggests that the two differ at the most fundamental level,
their goals.
Dennett mistakenly supposes that he and Skinner
set the same goals for psychology, when in reality their
goals could hardly be more different. Dennett's goal
comes clear when he takes up the problem that intentional
idioms assume rationality and intelligence. Why is Tom
riding the uptown bus? "Because he wants to go to the
museum, and he believes this bus will take him there."
Dennett (1978b) commented, "Since psychology's task
is to account for the intelligence or rationality of men and
animals [italics added], it cannot fulfill its task if anywhere
along the line it presupposes intelligence or rationality"
(p. 58).
For Skinner, in contrast, one goal of a science of
behavior could be to offer an account of behavior that,
in everyday talk, "shows intelligence and rationality." It
would not be the main goal, and the category, being one
of Quine's (1969) "unanalyzed similarity notions" (discussed earlier), would probably enjoy no special status.
The ultimate goal is to understand all behavior.
The difference, however, runs deeper than just a difference of scope. In a sense the two lines of thought never
engage one another, because Dennett concerns himself
with abstractions (rationality and intelligence), whereas
Skinner concerned himself with concrete behavior.
Skinner's arguments were pragmatic. His goal was
not merely to explain rationality and intelligence but to
establish a science of behavior. Dennett strives after philosophical truth, and uses true and prove, words that are
virtually absent from Skinner's writing. Skinner was after
utility, not philosophical truth. Dennett (1978b) asked,
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"can men ever be truly said to have beliefs, desires, intentions?" (p. 63). Skinner would ask, "Is it ever useful
(i.e., economical, in the sense described above) to say that
men have beliefs, desires, intentions?" His answer was
always "no."
The difference of goals leads to deep misunderstanding, particularly about what constitutes an explanation,
which is the subject of this article.

Types of Explanation
As the two men's goals diverge, so do their views about
explanation. Dennett (1978a) considered explanation to
consist of reduction to mechanism. For justification, he
relied heavily on the example of the chess-playing computer. Here is a known mechanism that nevertheless could
be said to behave purposivelythat is, to display rationality and intelligence. It afforded Dennett a model of
what it would mean to cash out intentional terms and
thereby justify intentional explanations such as "The
computer wants to win and believes this move will do the
job." To complete the analogy to human behavior, one
would have to add, "When the workings of the brain are
known the same way the workings of the computer are
known, then intentional explanations of human behavior
will be similarly cashed out."
For Dennett, the philosopher, it is enough that this
cashing out be possible in principle. In the first chapter
of Brainstorms, using a banking metaphor, he likened
"provisional" intentional terms to "loans of intelligence"
(cf. Quine's, 1969, "unredeemed notes"). That they could
someday be cashed out is his justification for use of intentional terms to explain behavior.
Although Skinner never wrote in response to Dennett, his objections are easy to guess. First, the trouble
with mentalistic terms, including intentional idioms, is
that no one cashes them out in practice. Even if such
cashing out of terms might be possible someday, the possibility remains remote. Skinner many times made the
argument that a science of behavior need not and should
not wait on an understanding of the nervous system. On
the contrary, he pointed out that only from the science
of behavior will neuroscientists learn what phenomena
need to be explained.
Second, the example of the chess-playing computer
incorrectly holds up reduction to mechanism as the only
model of scientific explanation. Skinner, the pragmatic
scientist, taking his cue from James and Mach, sought
explanations that have greater and more immediate utility. He argued that explanation of a phenomenon usually
consists of describing it with a single set of terms. He
repeatedly argued that a set of terms defines a science.
The terms are all interdependent in the sense that their
definitions rely on one another (Baum, 1974). Just as
sun, planet, and satellite are interdependent in this way,
so are response, stimulus, and reinforcement. Not that
reduction to mechanism is wrong or impossible. Cell
biologists nowadays talk a lot to biochemists, and someday
perhaps behavior analysts will talk similarly to neurosciNovember 1992 American Psychologist

entists. It is just that such reduction is neither the only

nor the usual method of explanation in science.
Moreover, whereas intentional explanations need to
be cashed out by reduction to physical terms, behavioral
explanations carry no such requirement. Neurophysiology can complement behavioral accounts, but cannot replace them, any more than an understanding of genetics
and the workings of DNA replaces an evolutionary account of species. (See Lee, 1988, for further discussion
of this point.)
If reduction were the method of explanation, as
Dennett (1978a) implied with the use of the chess-playing
computer, then, logically, the science of mechanics would
have had to wait for discoveries in atomic physics before
it advanced. Moreover, if one applied Dennett's argument
in favor of the provisional use of intentional terms, then
in the absence of an explanation of gravity at the atomic
level, Newton would have been justified in (provisionally!)
explaining the falling of a stone by the stone's desire to
reach the ground. Applied to the physical sciences, Dennett's logic becomes a justification of animism. Presumably, he would not go so far but only because of the customary (intuitive and unanalyzed) distinction between
animate and inanimate things; logically, there would be
no reason for restraint.

Historical Vocabulary and Explanation

For present purposes, let a single set of interdependent
terms be called a "vocabulary." Although he never named
them, Dennett (1978a) identified two different vocabularies. The one he favored can be called the intentional
(I) vocabulary, and the one Skinner favored can be called
the physical (P) vocabulary.
In its defense, Dennett (1978a) argued that the I
vocabulary possesses the essential ingredient that lends
a vocabulary scientific utility: It allows prediction and
control. He predicted, for example, "if I were to ask a
thousand American mathematicians how much seven
times five is, more than nine hundred would respond by
saying it was thirty-five" (p. 13). The basis of the prediction, he claimed, is the "fact that men in general are well
enough designed both to get the answer right and to want
to get it right" (p. 13). He went on to explain that a rat
presses a bar in an operant chamber because "the rat
desires food and believes it will get food by pressing the
bar" (p. 15).
These examples illustrate both the aim and the error
of mentalistic explanations. The aim is to invent a cause
(e.g., capability, desire, or belief) in the present. This aim
arises from an unnecessary attachment to a "billiardball" notion of causality (i.e., a cause producing an immediate effect). The error is that the invented cause is a
fiction having no intelligible causal connection with the
behavior. (How does a belief cause a rat to press a lever?)
The great strength of P vocabulary is that it allows
physical behavioral events to be tied to physical causes
in the environment. This keeps us within the ground rules
of normal science and avoids the pitfalls of dualism (i.e.,
mentalism).
November 1992 American Psychologist

One must, however, take the step of allowing the

physical causes to lie in the pastthat is, in the history
of the behavior. Solving arithmetic problems and lever
pressing depend on earlier training. The rat presses the
lever because such responses have been reinforced in the
past. When asked "How much is five times seven?" a
person responds "35," because of several converging histories having to do with numbers, the word times, the
correct answering of questions, and the reinforcement of
the particular response "35." In comparison with the intentional explanation, such a historical explanation would
appear to be complex, but the simplicity of the intentional
explanation is apparent; if we ask where the mathematician's knowledge of the correct answer and desire to get
the answer right come from, we find ourselves inquiring
into the very same history.
Skinner (1953; 1974) pointed out that fictional
present causes often stand as surrogates for past history.
If Dennett insists that a belief causes a response, then
one must ask where the belief came from. Of course, it
results from past environmental events. If one knew the
history, one would no longer need the belief, and as long
as one insists on the belief, one deters the effort to identify
the relevant history.
Dennett insists that P vocabulary cannot deal with
the "complexity" of human behavior, as in, for example,
our ability to generate novel behavior. Like Chomsky
(1959) before him, but with more understanding, Dennett
disparages Skinner's (1953) explanation of a person
handing over a wallet in response to a gun and "Your
money or your life." The basic objection is that the person
has never handed over a wallet to a robber before, and
therefore the response could not result from a history of
reinforcement. Dennett (1987b) remarked, "The Skinnerian must claim that this is not truly novel behavior at
all, but an instance of a general sort of behavior which
has been previously conditioned" (p. 67). Furthermore,
[Skinner] must insist that the "threat stimuli" I now encounter
(and these are not defined) are similar in some crucial but undescribed respect to some stimuli encountered in my past which
were followed by responses of some sort similar to the one I
now make, where the past responses were reinforced somehow
by their consequences, (p. 67)
This is fairly true. Skinner (1974) would say that a threat
like "Your money or your life" is an example of a rule,
a verbal discriminative stimulus that points to a contingencyhere, a contingency of negative reinforcement. In
the past compliance has been negatively reinforced by
removal of a threat. Everyone has faced a bully in the
playground, a parent who threatens removal of privileges,
or a tyrannical boss. A robber may pose an unusual threat,
but a threat is a threat, and past learning provides the
right response. Historical explanations deal with novelty
as variation on a theme.
Such a sketch, however, cannot be seen as a full explanation. Rather, it provides a method for arriving at
what would ultimately be a complicated account. As with
the 1,000 mathematicians, the apparent simplicity of an
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intentional explanation appealing to knowledge, belief,

and desire would be deceptive; where do these supposed
inner causes come from?
Dennett (1978a) claimed that mentalistic explanations are just as good as historical explanations in P vocabulary because they are equally speculative. Whereas
one type invents a belief or intention, the other invents
a history of reinforcement. The conclusion presumably
would be that if both are equally speculative, then one
should prefer the vocabulary that is more familiar.
But Dennett misunderstands the argument in favor
of P vocabulary. He complains that Skinner never proves
that P vocabulary is superior. This is correct. Skinner
argued in favor of P vocabulary on pragmatic (i.e., Jamesian) grounds. It is not a matter of P vocabulary being
proved. It is superior on the grounds of simplicity and
consistency. Both I vocabulary and P vocabulary can apply to all behavior. When the history is known, P vocabulary provides a simpler account. Consistency takes care
of the rest, assuming that one vocabulary is better than
two. This is the reasoning behind a quotation Dennett
(1978a) cited but misunderstood: "When . . . histories
are out of reach, very little prediction and control is possible, but a behavioristic account is still more useful than
a mentalistic one in interpreting what a person is doing
and why" (p. 329, Footnote 41). It is true that we are
often just as much at sea about what history of reinforcement (P vocabulary) might have led to some present behavior as we would be about the purpose or drive (I vocabulary) that produced it, but, Skinner continued, "[If]
we are going to guess, it is more helpful to guess about
genetic endowment and environmental history." The key
words here are useful and helpful. What is guessed at in
history can become known or at least can be related to
what is known.
The great advantage of speculating about history, in
contrast to fictional present causes, is that it holds out
the possibility of replacing guesswork with observation.
Further study can confirm or disconfirm the speculation.
Even failing further study, however, speculation about
history demystifies a puzzling event by assimilating it to
understood phenomena. In scoffing at Skinner's speculative explanations, Dennett overlooks the similarity that
Skinner's treatment of everyday behavior bears to the
treatment of everyday happenings by the other sciences.
One observes an isolated event: an earthquake, a building
collapse, an explosion at a chemical plant, or food poisoning. It is compared to already-understood phenomena,
especially laboratory phenomena. Speculation as to
probable circumstances fits the event with the known
phenomena: Most probably this gas leaked into the
chemical plant; most probably the food poisoning is from
bacterial toxins. With behavior, Skinner took a similar
approach. When lever presses have been reinforced in the
past only in the presence of a light, lever presses occur
frequently when the light is on now. Why do I brush my
teeth at night? I was taught to do so by my father, I presume there was reinforcement for doing so then, and there
is known reinforcement (of another sort) today. When
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the history is unavailable, the behaviorist speculates in

the light of what is already known, exactly as in other
sciences.
In his criticisms of historical explanations, Dennett
points to two central problems: similarity and novelty.
What makes this response a threat rather than a question?
Where do new responses come from? In an account of
apparent purpose in terms of variation and selection, these
have to do with the nature of variation, of which behavior
analysts at present know little. Because, in the absence
of information, one guesses at the appropriate history,
Dennett would be correct that the explanation offered
might be no better than a mentalistic one, were speculative
origins the only criterion. Scientists bring in additional
criteria, however, such as usefulness. One can see where
Dennett's argument leads when applied to the other wellknown example of historical explanationevolutionary
theory.
Evolutionary biologists find in the fossil record evidence of evolutionary history. How did legs evolve? The
answer is developed by pointing to variation in the appendages offish and the similarity of appendages of some
late fishes to some early amphibians. The selection that
favored creatures with legs probably had to do with the
particulars of exploiting resources on land. In the absence
of a fossil record, one speculates still further what the
line of descent might have been.
Logically, one might argue that such speculative historical explanations are no better than the alternative, the
intentional explanations current before Darwin, which
appealed to a rational, intelligent Creator. Indeed, creationists insist that in the absence of evidence, it is justified
to say that creatures are the way they are because of the
rationality and intelligence of God or some other force.
A leading contemporary creationist, D. T. Gish (1984),
defined creationism as follows:
the creationists . . . maintain that outside the universe, and
independent of it, there is a being or a creator or force, or whatever you want to call it, that created the universe, created life
. . . by processes which are not based upon currently functioning natural laws and processes, (p. 26)
This definition in no way requires a literal interpretation
of the Book of Genesis. One "sub-model" that Gish
(1984) described, called "progressive creationism," suggests "that things really are quite old and that creation
took place in steps progressively" (p. 26). The defining
attribute of a creationist, therefore, is appeal to intelligence and rationality to explain evolution.
The parallel to Dennett's (1987a) argument is striking. On the one hand, there are the creationists attributing the creation of species of'life to an independent
intentional force (God or Mother Nature), and on the
other hand, there is Dennett attributing the creation of
species of behavior to an independent intentional force
(self or mind). Just as, before Darwin, many biologists
considered the aim of their studies to be the understanding
of the rationality and intelligence of the Creator (e.g.,
Boakes, 1984), so Dennett claims the aim of psychology
November 1992 American Psychologist

to be the understanding of the rationality and intelligence

of the self. This is the basis on which Skinner (1990) was
justified in saying, "Cognitive science is the creation science of psychology" (p. 1209).
Dennett's (1987a) comments about evolutionary biology parallel his objections to Skinner (Dennett, 1978a).
Just as behavior analysts speculate about the right history
of reinforcement, biologists speculate about the right
evolutionary history. Dennett appeals to the rationality
and intelligence of the self for the one, and the rationality
and intelligence of Mother Nature for the other. He called
on us, for example, "to substitute for our interpretive
intentions and purposes the intentions and purposes of
the organism's designer, Mother Nature" (Dennett,
1987a, p. 301). It is unclear just how seriously one is to
take this idea of Mother Nature, but he attempts to justify
both appeals on the basis that they are "intelligence-loans"
or provisional explanations until all the details of the mind
and natural selection are worked out.
When Dennett (1987a) applied the same "intentional stance," developed for psychology, to evolutionary
biology, he became a creationist, according to Gish's
(1984) definition given earlier. Mother Nature constitutes
the sort of creative, intelligent, rational "force," independent of the universe, that Gish requires. In fairness, one
should note that Dennett put forward his Mother Nature
creationism provisionally, to be cashed out at some later
time. In contrast, however, to uses of intentional idioms
in other contexts, like discussions of selfish genes, no one
knows how to cash out Dennett's provisional creationism.
It raises the same sound philosophical objections as do
other brands of creationism. Intentionality raises more
problems than it solves. Without calling him a creationist,
Amundson (1990) criticized Dennett's (1988) substitution
of intentionality for "selectionist causality," saying that
"Intentionality . . . is the most notorious unsolved
problem of modern philosophy," that "the tradeoff is not
a bargain for biologists," and that the switch to intentionality is a "poisoned pill" (p. 580). Biologists reject
more obvious forms of creationism for the reason that
Amundson puts forward: An independent creative force
replaces a potentially explainable puzzle with the mystery
of intentionality. Like Skinner, most evolutionary biologists find it more helpful to speculate about history than
about Mother Nature. Is it helpful to accept creationism,
even provisionally?
Who would seriously suggest that evolutionary biologists should have held onto the intentional idioms that
were common before the theory of natural selection? The
objection hardly comes up because almost everyone sees
that getting rid of intentional idioms represented an advance for biology. If it is absurd to hold onto intentional
idioms in biology, it is equally absurd to hold onto them
in psychology. Dispensing with intentional explanations
constitutes an advance for any science, and that includes
a science of behavior.

November 1992 American Psychologist

A lesson that psychologists can learn from evolutionary biology is that there exists another mode of explanation besides mechanism and immediate causes. The
apparent purposiveness of evolution, whether of life forms
over millenia or of behavior within the lifetime of an individual, tempts one to coin intentional explanations. One
of Skinner's contributions was to show that if one resists
that temptation, one can stay on a sound scientific footing
with historical explanations.
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Amundson, R. (1990). Doctor Dennett and Doctor Pangloss: Perfection
and selection in biology and psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
13, 577-581.
Baum, W. M. (1974). Definition in behavioral science: a review of
B. B. Wolman's Dictionary of behavioral science. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 22, 445-451.
Boakes, R. (1984). From Darwin to behaviourism: Psychology and the
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